trends in treaty-based investment...
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2010/IEG/WKSP1/003
Trends in Treaty-Based Investment Disputes
Submitted by: Vanderbilt University
Workshop on Dispute Prevention and Preparedness
Washington, DC, United States26-30 July 2010
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T d i TTrends in Treaty-Based Investment
Disputes
Professor Susan D. Franck
VISITING ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF LAWVVANDERBILTANDERBILT UUNIVERSITYNIVERSITY, , SCHOOL OFSCHOOL OF LLAWAW
26 July 2010
My Summer Vacation and What it Taught Me about Dispute Preventiong p
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Methodology: Data BasisIdentify Sources of Datad y ou o a a
UNCTAD and ICSID Research by Franck (2007; 2008; 2009; forthcoming 2010; forthcoming 2011)
Analysis and conclusions are as good as d l i d tunderlying data sourceFranck analyses based upon data from publicly available awards (pre-2007) Dataset in process of updating further to inter-coder reliability testing
Scope of Claims – UNCTAD Data:fCumulative number of known treaty-
based cases = 35763 % filed with ICSID25% filed with UNCITRAL6% filed with SCC6% filed with SCC6% filed in other foras (ICC, Cairo, ad hoc)
In 2009, there were at least 32 new investment treaty arbitration disputes
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Scope of Claims filed during 2009 – UNCTAD Data:
Canacar v. United States (UNCITRAL)Apotex v. United States (II) (UNCITRAL)Abengoa, S.A. y COFIDES, S.A. v. United Mexican States (ICSID Additional Facility)( y)Dow AgroSciences LLC v. Canada (UNCITRAL)Howard and Centurion Health Corporation v. Canada (UNCITRAL)
Scope of Claims: Historical Data from UNCTAD
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
l num
ber
of c
ases
150
200
250
300
350
400
ve n
umbe
r of c
ases
0
5
10
15
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Annu
a
0
50
100
Cum
ulat
i
ICSID Non-ICSID All cases cumulative
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Scope of Claims: Historical Data
Decisions from 2009 – UNCTAD DatafForty-four decisions rendered in 2009:
7 Jurisdiction Awards20 Merits Awards 4 Arbitrator Challenges3 Annulment Decisions3 Annulment Decisions
Other decisions concerned admissibility of ancillary claims, provisional measures and settlement agreements
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Awards in 2010 – UNCTAD DataBetween January and July 2010, ICSID registered at least 14 new requests
Existence of other alternative arbitral forums means number of new awards could be higher [NB: awards may not be final resolution of a case]
One case involving an APEC economy: Convial Callao S.A. and CCI - Compañía de Concesiones de Infraestructura S.A.v. Peru
Party Demographics: RespondentsArgentina
Venezuela
Canada
Ukraine
United States
Ecuador
Czech Republic
Mexico
g
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Kazakhstan
India
Egypt
Poland
Number of cases
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Party Demographics: APEC Respondents
Peru
The Philippines
Chile
Russia
Canada
The United States
Mexico
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Indonesia
Thailand
Viet Nam
Number of cases
Party Demographics: Respondents
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Party Demographics: Investors United States
F
Italy
Canada
Germany
United Kingdom
Netherlands
United States
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Greece
Belgium
Spain
France
Number of cases
Demographics: Industries
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Demographics: Industries – UNCTAD Data
Pétrole, gaz & mines25%
Services & commerce3%
Finance8%
Information & communication6%
Agriculture, pêche & forêts4%
Electricité & autres sources d'énergie
13%
Eau, assainissement & protection contre les inondations
8%
Construction7%
Tourisme5%
Autres industries10%
Transports11%
Demographics: Treaties –UNCTAD Data
ASEAN 2%
NAFTA5% Energy Charter Treaty
7%
CAFTA2%
Bilateral investment treaties 84%
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Demographics: Treaties
Actual Risk: Winning DisputesClaim: Investors win more than StatesClaim: Investors win more than States
Data: Investors won 39% of the time and states won 52% of the time
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Actual Risk: Winning DisputesCl i I t l tClaim: Investors recover large amounts
Data: On average, investors won US$10m but requested US$343m
Actual Risk: Amounts Awarded
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Scope of Risk – Data from UNCTAD (amount claimed v. amount awarded)
Case Name Amount Claimed Amount AwardedSiemens
v. Republic of ArgentinaUS$ 462,477,071 US$237,838,439
Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assetsv. Republic of Argentina
US$582,000,000 US$106,200,000
Sempra Energy Internationalv. Republic of Argentina
US$210,000,000 US$128,250,462v. Republic of ArgentinaIberdrola Energía, S.A.
v. Republic of GuatemalaUS$672,000,000 Pending
KT Asia Investment Group B.V.v. Republic of Kazakhstan
US$1,500,000,000 Pending
Abengoa, S.A. y COFIDES, S.A.v. United Mexican States
US$96,000,000 Pending
Variables Linked with Outcome: Development Statusp
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Variables Linked with Outcome: Development Status
Damages: Mark KantorExpropriation – Market Value
“the estimated amount for which an asset should exchange on the date of valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s length transaction after proper
k i h i h i h d h dmarketing wherein the parties had each acted knowledgeably, prudently, and without compulsion.” International Valuation Standards Council
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Damages: Mark KantorNet Invested Capital and Net Book Value Are Not Market Values Unlawful Conduct – Chorzow Factory -“…reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and re-all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.”
Damages: Mark KantorfUnlawful Conduct – ILC Art. 36
(Compensation)1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established.
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Practical Implications of Damage Calculations: Mark Kantor
“ h l i f i d h i“…the valuation of expropriated shares in a company necessarily involves a consideration of the future profitability of the business, a matter which is inherently uncertain. As Whiteman observed: However, the absolute certainty of prospective profits can scarcely ever be established in as much as in all cases they are to be realized in futuro. It is the worth of the expectation of future profits, appropriately discounted, that is to be considered in cases where an award for the loss of prospective profits is proper.” Kazakhstan v. Rumeli Annulment Decision, at 40
Dispute Resolution Risk Calculusf fRisk is a function of:
Amount claimedAmount likely to be awardedAmount of interest on any awardCost of arbitral tribunal (TCE)Cost of arbitral tribunal (TCE)Cost of parties’ lawyers (PLC)Which party bears TCE and/or PLC
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Cost Issues – UNCTAD’s ApproachCosts involved in ITA have skyrocketedLegal fees may amount to an average of 60% of case’s total costsExample – Plama v. Bulgaria (2008):
Investor’s PLC was around US$4.7 millionR d t’ PLC US$13 2 illiRespondent’s PLC was US$13.2 millionTCE nearly US$1 millionLosing investor required to pay: (1) own PLC + (2) respondent’s PLC of US$7 million + (3) TCE = US$12.7 million
Cost Issues – UNCTAD Examples Victor Pey Casado v Chile (2008):Victor Pey Casado v. Chile (2008):
Investor’s PLC around US$14.5 millionRespondent’s PLC around US$4.4 millionTCE was around US$4 millionLosing State required to pay: (1) own PLC
( ) ’ f $ ll ( )+ (2) investor’s PLC of US$2 million + (3) 75% (US$3 million) of TCE = US$9 million
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Cost Issues – UNCTAD Examples ADC Affiliate v Hungary (2006):ADC Affiliate v. Hungary (2006):
Investor’s PLC around US$7 millionRespondent’s PLC around US$3 millionTCE around US$700,000Losing State required to pay: (1) own PLC, ( ) ’ d ( ) $(2) Investor’s PLC, and (3) TCE = US$7.7 million
Cost Issues – UNCTAD Examples Waguih Elie George Siag and ClorindaWaguih Elie George Siag and ClorindaVecchi v. Egypt (2009):
Investors’ PLC around US$8 millionRespondent’s PLC around US$3.5 millionTCE around US$1 millionLosing State required to pay: (1) own PLC + (2) investors’ PLC of US$6 million + (3) 50% of TCE = US$14 million
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Cost Issues – APEC Counter ExamplesThunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (2006): u d b d a g o ( 006)
Investor’s PLC around US$1 millionRespondent’s PLC around US$1.5 millionTCE around US$500,000Losing Investor required to pay: (1) own PLC + (2) investors’ PLC of US$1 million +PLC + (2) investors’ PLC of US$1 million + (3) 75% of TCE = US$2.5 million
Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada (2010)TCE around US$1 millionParties bare own PLC + 50% of TCE
Cost Issues – Recent APEC ExamplesWalter Bau AG v Thailand (2009):Walter Bau AG v. Thailand (2009):
Investor’s PLC around EUR3.4 millionRespondent’s PLC around EUR1.1 millionTCE around EUR3.1 millionLosing State required to pay net PLC/TCE f illiof EUR1.8 million
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A Need for Rationalization?Eureko v. Poland = arguable outlieru o o a d a guab ouUS$1.34 billion claimed + prominent tribunal86-page awardCost justification was two sentences:j
“Claimant has prevailed. Consequently, its costs and those of the Tribunal shall be borne by the Respondent.”
IIA flatly prohibited this approach
Franck’s Normative RecommendationAddress ITA costs at an early stageEncourage tribunals to be transparent cost decisions Implement clear and predictable legal guidelines for making cost decisionsguidelines for making cost decisionsImplement a pleading system with enhanced clarity for claimed damagesConsider use of ADR
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Alternative Means of Settling Investment Treaty Disputes
What are alternative methods?Negotiation, Mediation, Early Neutral Evaluation, Hybrids, etc.
Consider how alternative methods being d i t i di ti
y p
used now in systemic diagnosticConsider Dispute Systems Design (DSD) to create systems to implement strategic recommendations using proper norms
Other forms of Dispute Resolution
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Other forms of Dispute Resolution – Data from ICSID
Responding to ChallengesConduct research to monitor trends and emerging issues in IIAs and ISDSOffer technical assistance activities to develop understanding and capacity related to understanding investment framework, negotiate IIAs train government officialsnegotiate IIAs, train government officials, and train courses on managing investment disputesEncourage innovation to address real issues and learn from success stories
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Implications for the FutureExpand scope of empirical research
More data, variables and models
Encourage stakeholders to take the data into account
Informed policy debatesp yEnhanced efficacy for designing ISDS systemsImplement DPP and ADRProvide training, capacity building and communication networks