tribal ways of war: combat branch conceptualizations of
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Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2017
Tribal Ways of War: Combat Branch
Conceptualizations of Warfare in the United States
Army, 1983 - 1999
Stephenson, Harris
Stephenson, H. (2017). Tribal Ways of War: Combat Branch Conceptualizations of Warfare in the
United States Army, 1983 - 1999 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary,
AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28527
http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3700
master thesis
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UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY
Tribal Ways of War: Combat Branch Conceptualizations of Warfare in the United States Army,
1983 – 1999
by
Harris Robinson Stephenson
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
GRADUATE PROGRAM IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES
CALGARY, ALBERTA
APRIL, 2017
© Harris Robinson Stephenson 2017
ii
Abstract:
This thesis addresses the questions: how did the three primary combat branches, or
tribes, of the United States Army – the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery – conceptualize warfare
from 1983 to 1999? Additionally, how does that relate to the Army’s military culture, and
strategic environment? Primary research of the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery’s professional
journals is used to understand how intra-organizational units’ conceptualizations of warfare
related and interacted with the international system, the American national security apparatus,
and the Army’s military culture. These conceptualizations were characterized by complex
relationships with events, where they were influenced by and shaped responses to changes in the
international system, fluctuations in the American national security apparatus, and internal
dynamics within the Army itself. Ultimately, this demonstrates the complexity of militaries and
provides greater insight into how organizations function, but, more importantly, it reveals the
power of tribal conceptualizations to shape responses in a bottom-up manner.
iii
Acknowledgements:
This research would not have been possible without the supervision and mentorship of Dr.
Terry Terriff, who graciously took me on as a student. It has been a great privilege to have him
supervise my work, and I am eternally grateful for the wisdom and support he showed me
throughout this, sometimes, harrowing process. Thank you to the Centre of Military, Security and
Strategic Studies and the funding provided by the Arthur J. Child Scholarship allowed me to focus
on my studies and grow as an academic. The behind the scenes work of Donna, Nancy, Shelley,
Patrick, and Jamie make the Centre an excellent research institution.
Many thanks goes out to all the students at the Centre who created a welcoming
environment, especially Danny, Tim, Adam, Katie, Blake, Matt, Steffen, and Rebecca. All of
whom offered support and advice, or encouraged I find inspiration at the bottom of a glass of crisp
refreshing beer. A special thank you to Alex Salt, who, willingly or unwillingly I am still not sure,
showed me the academic ropes, challenged me, and was eager to discuss the minutia of militaries
over numerous whiskeys.
To my parents, Gloria and Sam, thank you for sparking an interest in learning early on in
my life. Sunday dinners with James and Spence under Napoleon, Wellington, and Disraeli
provided everything I could ask for. I can’t thank you enough for your encouragement, and love.
Lastly, Ceilidh, thank you for putting up with my constant declarations that it would be
finished by this weekend or the end that month. You truly have been my rock throughout this
whole adventure. Your patience, laughter, and gentle prodding to go to the mountains preserved
at least a little of my sanity.
iv
Table of Contents:
Abstract………………………………………………..………………………………………… ii
Acknowledgements…...………………………………………………………………………… iii
Table of Contents……………………...………………………………………………………… iv
List of abbreviations …..………………………………………………………………………… v
Epigraph … …………………………………………………………………………………..…vii
Introduction: Tribal Strategy, War, and Warfare……………..…………………...………………1
Chapter 1: Analytical Framework and Literature Review……………………………………… 11
Chapter 2: Organizational Context in Narrative and Culture ……………………………..…… 25
Chapter 3: Cold Warriors, AirLand Battles ………………………………………………….… 45
Chapter 4: Strategic Upheavals and New Wars ………………………………………………... 93
Chapter 5: Uncomfortable Realities, Desired Futures, and Maneuver Warfare………………..129
Conclusions: Tribal Influence and Visions of War……………………………………………..169
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………...... 183
v
List of Abbreviations:
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE)
AirLand Battle (ALB)
Armored Gun System (AGS)
Army Chief of Staff (ACS)
Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV)
Brigadier General (BG)
Captain (CPT)
Colonel (COL)
Combat Training Center (CTC)
Command Sergeant Major (CSM)
Continuous Operations (CONOPS)
Division Advanced Warfighting Experiments (DAWE)
First Lieutenant (LT)
General (GEN)
High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
Intervehicular Information System (IVIS)
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)
Lieutenant General (LTG)
Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
vi
Main Battle Tank (MBT)
Major (MAJ)
Major General (MG)
Mission Essential Task Lists (METL)
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
National Training Center (NTC)
Observe-Orientate-Decide-Act (OODA)
Officer Evaluation Report (OER)
Operation Desert Hammer (ODH VI)
Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
Precision Guided Munition (PGM)
Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI)
Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSOI)
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
Second Lieutenant (2LT)
Sergeant (SGT)
Sergeant First Class (SFC)
Specialists (SPC)
Staff Sergeant (SSG)
Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE)
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
vii
Every soldier generally thinks only so far as the radius of action of his branch of
service and only as quickly as he can move his weapons.
- General Karl Koller, Luftwaffe
1
Introduction: Tribal Strategy, War, and Warfare
War is a multifaceted concept. Carl von Clausewitz states that war is analogous to a duel
and that at its most basic level “war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”1
On the danger of war, Thucydides quotes the Spartan king Archidamus “I have not lived so long,
Spartans, without having had the experience of many wars, and I see those among you of the same
age as myself, who will not fall into the common misfortune of longing for war from inexperience
or from a belief in its advantage and its safety.”2 For Peter Paret, war “never has been, and is not
today, a unitary or even a wholly military phenomenon, but a compound of many elements, ranging
from politics to technology to human emotions under extreme stress.”3 The US Army’s 1982
doctrinal manual, FM 100-5 Operations AirLand Battle (ALB), defined war as “the [application]
of whatever degree of force is necessary to allow attainment of the political purpose or aim for
which the war is being fought.”4 Yet, however war is defined, its operationalization as warfare
forms an essential foundation for the concept as a whole. Again, Clausewitz provides insight into
this when he wrote, “essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the
manifold activities generally designated as war… The art of war is the art of using the given means
in combat; there is no better term for it than the conduct of war.”5
As a social construct, the reality of warfare interacts with various discourses and narratives
that seek to explain it.6 Instead of defining war and warfare through an objective, universal lens –
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds., and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976), pp. 75. 2 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Robert B. Strassler ed. and Richard Crawley trans., (New York: Simon &
Schuster, Inc., 1996), pp. 1.80.1. 3 Peter Paret, “Introduction,” in Peter Paret ed. Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 8. 4 Headquarters Department of the Army, Operations FM 100-5, (Fort Leavenworth: Training and Doctrine Command,
1982), pp. B-1. 5 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 127. Emphasis in original. 6 See Appendix A in, John Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to Modern America,
(New York: Westview Press, 2003).
2
which has its uses – a constructivist approach perceives warfare as an intensely subjective, cultural
phenomenon.7 Therefore, who is doing the defining matters a great deal, especially when those
tasked with the ‘conduct of war’ are doing the conceptualizing.
Why examine militaries and their conceptions of warfare, battles, and combat? Are battles
too far removed from the level of policy to merit study? Does understanding how soldiers think
matter when it comes to how states operate in the international system? As one of the most
preeminent tools of national power particularly in war, militaries can have a disproportionate effect
when used as part of a state’s policy. The German Wehrmacht’s role in the defeat of France in
1940 is a dramatic example of this fact. Alternatively, militaries can play a more obscure part in
national policy – the American use of military advisors in the post-Cold War period is one example
of this phenomenon.8 This is not to imply they are efficient, functional tools designed to attain
political goals. Instead, their beliefs and ways of thinking shape the effectiveness and success of
the operationalization of war that, in turn, can affect the ability of a state to attain their foreign
policy goals. The intricacies and nuanced understandings of warfare held by its practitioners
matter, because it provides insight into the potential strengths, weaknesses – both known and
unknown – of a military organization.9 Additionally, as practitioners they will be doing most of
the fighting and dying in war. Therefore, how militaries themselves conceptualize warfare matter
7 Culture and cultural norms, the bedrock of culture’s ability to shape, can be defined as “intersubjective beliefs about
the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action. Norms are intersubjective
in that they are beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social practice.,” Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff,
“Introduction: The Sources of Military Change,” in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff eds., The Sources of Military
Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 2002), pp. 7. 8 Robert A. Doughty, “The illusion of security: France, 1919 – 1940,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and
Alvin Bernstein eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1994), pp. 466 – 497; Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New York: Random
House, 2005). 9 See John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld, “Introduction,” in The Evolution of Operational Art: From
Napoleon to the Present, John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld ed., (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011), pp. 1 – 8.
3
because it informs the use of military power, and appreciating the internal logic of an actor is
necessary to understand how they wield power – a vital component of strategic studies.10
Military culture, – “the symbols, rituals, and practices which give meaning to the activity
of the organization” – represents an organization’s most comprehensive conceptualization of
war.11 This does not imply that a military consists of one conceptualization of warfare directly
related to its culture, merely that at the organizational level it has a particular self-identity, vision,
and sense of purpose. Within an organization, there are identifiable communities that may have
distinct identities and conceptualizations.12 Untangling the nuance and meaning between these two
related, but different, levels of analysis is an essential endeavor because it aides in understanding
the internal dynamics of militaries.
The United States Army is an important case study for a number of reasons. First, as a
member of the United States’ defence establishment, the Army is part of one of the most powerful
militaries in the world, and it has been an active and passive player in US defence policy since its
founding in 1775.13 Second, from 1983 to 1999, it was involved in numerous conflicts and
operations – notably the Persian Gulf War – where it was responsible for the conduct of war.14
Third, it is comprised of three primary combat branches, or tribes, that all have unique characters.
10 Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 5 – 6; Stephen
Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), pp. 1 – 2. 11 Terry Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’: Organizational Culture and the Origins of Maneuver Warfare in the United States
Marine Corps,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), pp. 478. 12 For an example of this in the United States Army, see Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way
of War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). Linn describes three schools of thought within the US Army
over the course of its history. With regard to ‘sub-cultures’ at the strategic level, see Walter Russell Mead, Special
Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002); Colin Dueck,
Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008). These are not directly relatable to an examination of intra-organizational dynamics because they are
describing a state’s strategic culture. However, the competition between ‘sub-cultures’ is instructive because it
demonstrates that diversity, rather than uniformity, characterizes these ideational structures. 13 Linn, The Echo of Battle. 14 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation.
4
These ‘tribes’ present a fertile ground for examining how sub-units within organizations
conceptualize warfare. Although there are many branches to the Army – air defence, aviation,
intelligence, engineering, etc. – the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery are the primary warfighting
branches, bonded together by the combined arms approach to warfare that has dominated the Army
since the Second World War.15 Additionally, it has the potential to play a large role in future US
foreign policy and, therefore, in the international system.16 Given this, how did the three primary
combat branches, or tribes, of the United States Army – the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery –
conceptualize warfare from 1983 to 1999? Additionally, how do their conceptualizations relate to
the Army’s military culture, and strategic environment?
I do not attempt to provide a new definition of warfare. Instead, I propose to analyze how
a group of practitioners conceptualize warfare, how it has been shaped by circumstances, and what
effects this may have had on a state’s ability to achieve policy goals.17 This is an analysis of change,
or lack thereof, within militaries from a bottom-up, cultural perspective. Traditionally, military
change has been described through clear identifiable alterations – doctrine, force structure, goals,
15 Combined arms is the idea that different units – infantry, tanks, artillery, air defence etc. – are more effective when
integrated together. It is the realization of the saying ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’. The US Navy and
Air Force do not posess such a feature, making the Army a unique case study. See, Carl Builder, The Masks of War:
American Military Styles in Strategy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989); Jonathan M. House,
Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). 16 To name two possibilities, there is a potential that the Army may play a role in containing a resurgent Russia or be
called again into the Middle East. See, Bob Scales (MG ret.), Scales on War: The Future of America’s Military at Risk
(Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2016); Andrew J. Bacevich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military
History (New York: Random House, 2016); Patrick Tucker, “How the Pentagon is Preparing for a tank War with
Russia,” Defense One (May 19, 2016) (accessed November 28, 2016)
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/05/how-pentagon-preparing-tank-war-
russia/128460/?oref=DefenseOneFB. 17 It should be noted here that the differentiation between war and warfare is not consistently reproduced within the
tribes’ journals. Wars are what they fight and warfare is how they fight. Therefore, the clear theoretical differences
between the two are not as clear-cut as a student of Clausewitz might desire. This may be a function of two factors.
First, the journals are primarily focused on tactics and operations, reflective of the fact that most writers are either
have the rank of lieutenant colonels or lower. Second, and as will be demonstrated below, the US Army has a cultural
tendency to be astrategic. Both of these may contribute to the absence of distinct conceptualizations of war and
warfare.
5
and strategies.18 This research’s examination of subtle consistencies and changes in military
thought, which often appear in complex forms within the Army’s tribes, demonstrates that tribal
conceptualizations have the ability to shape practitioners perspective on warfare. This indicates
that powerful bottom-up influences exist within militaries and that they can influence the
organization. Although subject to powerful top-down sources – such as the international system,
conflicts, US defence policy, and the organizational structures within the Army – the tribal
conceptualizations hold an unexpectedly persistent and powerful sway over how the primary
combat branches of the Army thought about warfare. Throughout the analysis there are numerous
cases where the tribal conceptualizations are shaped by external factors and the conceptualizations
shape how the tribes interpret other events.
This research contributes to this idea of complexity within military organizations because
it examines how military thinking – what I term conceptualizations – can provide insights into the
ways of thinking that percolate within organizations and may not stand out after further
investigation. Writing about the United States Army’s Force XXI initiative and Army After Next
project Thomas Adams wrote,
Like most large, successful institutions, the US Army does not welcome change,
especially not radical change; but transformation of some kind is inevitable – the
Army will transform whether it wants to or not. There is no choice, given the
pressure of new technologies, new enemies, and political realities. However,
inevitability does not imply simplicity, nor does it guarantee that correct choices
will be made. There is no easy path to radical change. The collision between
ambition and reality has produced results quite different form the ones envisioned.19
Delving into the complexities of how different members of the same military service conceptualize
warfare is an important and necessary research project.
18 Farrell and Terriff, “Introduction,” pp. 3 – 20; Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal
of Strategic Studies Vol. 29, No. 5 (2006), pp. 905 – 934. 19 Thomas K. Adams, The Army After Next: The First Post-Industrial Army (Westport: Praeger Security International,
2006), pp. 3 – 4.
6
Carl Builder refers to the combat branches as ‘guilds’, “associations of craftsmen who take
the greatest pride in their skills, as opposed to their possessions or positions. The guilds are joined
in a brotherhood because, like brothers, they have a common family bond (the Army) and a
recognition of their dependency upon each other in combat.”20 Sebastian Junger describes tribal
societies of soldiers returning from war in his book, Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging,
through the sense of belonging that they produce through the sublimation of the individual to the
collective.21 The term tribe most closely approximates what these combat branches represent. They
do possess ‘guild-like qualities, but it is the belonging they have that is important and that informs
their conceptualizations. The Infantry are responsible for taking and holding ground, clearing
buildings and fortifications, but suffer from exposure. Armor, in the form of heavily armed and
armoured main-battle tanks, combines tactical mobility, firepower, and survivability, but has
difficulty retaining ground. Artillery employs massive firepower, but is mainly used to suppress
enemy forces rather than destroy them. Daniel Bolger describes this as a “giant military version of
rock-paper-scissors” in a combined arms team waging conventional warfare.22
The tribes’ conceptualizations can be understood through an analysis of their professional
journals – the Infantry’s Infantry Magazine, the Armor’s Armor, and the Artillery’s Field Artillery.
These journals are available online for the period of study and provide access to the thinking within
the tribes. Even though not all members will have contributed or even read these journals, the
publication of these ideas is important within the organization because it is representative of certain
bodies of thought or knowledge. Andrew J. Bacevich writes,
20 Builder, The Masks of War, pp. 33. 21 Junger’s work is focused on the battle with post-traumatic stress disorder that many combat veterans experience
after they have left military service and returned to public life. For Junger, this is, in part, a result of the loss of tribal
community that military service inspires. Sebastian Junger, Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging (Toronto: Harper
Collins Publishers, 2016). 22 Daniel Bolger (MG ret.), Why We Lost: A General’s Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2014), pp. 122
7
The emphasis on Service journals does not reflect a belief that the written musings
of relatively junior officers influence American military policy to any significant
degree. They do not. While the institutional organs of other professions presage and
often inspire new developments, American military journals tend instead to reflect
ideas that already enjoy official sanction. They mirror American military thought
rather than determine its direction. Although the placid character of American
military journals minimizes their utility as a forum for debating new ideas, this
character makes them ideal for the historian attempting to understand the mind-set of
the officer corps at a particular time.23
As Brian Linn states, “far from displaying the rigid organizational unanimity often ascribed to the
‘military mind,’ the Army has been engaged in a prolonged and often acrimonious debate over the
nature of both war and national defense.”24 The study of these journals provides a way for
researchers to investigate the multitude of communities and debates within a military.
Interviews may have uncovered some insights that I was unable to glean from my analysis
of the journals.25 However, conducting interviews has one significant downside for this research,
hindsight. Examining the journals themselves allows for a compartmentalized examination of how
smaller events influenced tribal conceptions of warfare. For example, Operation Just Cause in
Panama received a great deal of attention in the journals because it preceded Operation Desert
Shield by six months, but the Gulf War overshadowed it. For that brief period in the journals,
Panama represented the Army’s most recent military expedition and a direct example of warfare.
This resulted in numerous articles in all three journals dealing with the nuances of contingency
operations, low-intensity conflicts, and urban warfare. It is uncertain whether interviews would
have revealed any insights on this conflict to the same degree as the journals have.
The 1983 start date is appropriate for two reasons. First, the electronic version of Armor
only begins in 1983; Infantry Magazine’s online version starts one year earlier. Second, and more
23 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: The US Army Between Korea and Vietnam (Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1986), pp. 5. Emphasis added. 24 Linn, Echo of Battle, pp. 4 – 5. 25 Interviews would have been greatly beneficial in terms of contextualizing the journals because of the insights they
might have revealed that would otherwise be inaccessible.
8
importantly, this date accounts for the publication of FM 100-5 (1982) ‘AirLand Battle’, which
was seen as the organization’s recovery following Vietnam.26 Capturing this provides an
organizational reference point from which to begin the intra-organizational investigation.
Additionally, this period of organizational consensus around AirLand Battle can be contrasted with
the Army in the post-Cold War world. The contrast between a period of clear strategic threat and
orientation for the Army with a time of significant debate both organizationally and politically will
prove interesting to examine from this intra-organizational perspective.
The ranks of those writing in these journals range from senior non-commissioned officers
to lieutenant colonels, full colonels, and above. This presents research challenges and
opportunities. Concerning the former, the wide diversity may capture differing views and opinions
on different subject matter – such as the employment of weapons in urban warfare or the Army’s
role in post-Cold War US defence policy. An additional benefit is that any common themes that
emerge can be assumed to be widely held. On the other hand, this diversity may result in many
articles that are concerned with minutia within the Army, while professionally important, these
articles may not provide a clear picture of warfare conceptualizations.
There is no exact positivist approach to this analysis, rather it is more a function of how I
have interpreted each article in relation to others. The term conceptualization implies a broader
perspective than simply a ‘theory of victory’.27 Conceptualizations of warfare include those parts
of war that a theory of victory may not include – such as peacekeeping operations or
counterinsurgency – which reveals the tribes’ thinking and priorities. The tribes’
26 John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine, 1973 – 1982 (Fort
Monroe: Historical Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984). 27 Stephen Peter Rosen was the first to introduce the concept of a ‘theory of victory’ into the literature on military
change. Though the concept is closely related to mulitiple aspects of classical organizational theory. See, Benjamin
M. Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2016), pp.
161.
9
conceptualizations of warfare are explicit and implicit. Explicit beliefs of warfare are directly
related to warfighting and are easy to identify. Implicit perceptions of warfare are more difficult
and appear in the debates and discussions that occur within each of the tribal journals. If the author
uses them in a way to bolster their argument in a positive way, this is usually a sign of a
conceptualization that may be more widely held. On the other hand, if the contributor is critical of
something they regard as a widely held assumption, then this is indicative of a conceptualization.
These add depth and understanding to how each tribe conceptualizes warfare.
The focus of this research on intra-service tribes and comparing them does not imply that
they will be different. Often the tribes demonstrated similar ways of thinking about warfare. Other
times, they contradicted the Army’s organizational culture. Whether or not the tribes exhibit
‘culture-like’ qualities allows for an investigation into how their conceptualizations shape the
internal politics of the Army.
To contextualize the journal articles I rely on an analytical narrative. This has the benefit
of examining minute temporal patterns within a particular context that may have been overlooked
by broader studies.28 If a particular operation or event is consistently included in the journal articles
but is not prominent in the secondary literature, this may be considered a novel insight. On the
other hand, those that are left out of the articles that had been considered important by the
secondary source material may imply that elements of the Army have deemed it unimportant,
which also merits further study. The flexibility of an analytical narrative is invaluable to this
research.
This thesis is broken down into four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter will
provide context for the post-Vietnam era, especially the reforms leading up to the publishing of
28 Phillipe Mongin “Analytical Narratives,” in George Thomas Kurian ed. The Encyclopedia of Political Science Vol.
1 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2011), pp. 48 – 51.
10
FM 100-5 Operations (1982) ‘AirLand Battle’. Following this, the Army’s military culture will be
outlined as a reference point for further analysis. The second chapter will contain empirical
research covering the Cold War from 1983 to 1989. The third chapter focuses on the end of the
Cold War and the Gulf War, from 1990 to the end of 1993. The last chapter analyzes the
peacekeeping era from 1994 to just prior to America’s involvement in Kosovo in 1999. The
conclusion ties all three of the chapters’ analysis together, describes the implications of this
research, and includes section on how tribal conceptualizations set the Army up for the Global
War on Terror.
11
Chapter 1: Analytical Framework and Literature Review
To analyze a military organization a scholar must manage a myriad of factors.29 Continuity
and change in the international system may guarantee neither stability or instability. Domestic
politics can magnify issues in the international system, or may appear at odds with seemingly
‘rational’ international responses. Relations between military services within a country can
promote competition or cooperation. Military organizations may attempt to explicitly or implicitly
maintain or alter any or all of these relationships for a variety of reasons. Lastly, even dynamics
within a military service may result in changes at the organizational level and therefore potentially
affect a state’s foreign policy goals.30 It is necessary to develop an analytical framework capable
of reconciling these, sometimes, disparate influences in order to appreciate the US Army’s tribal
conceptualizations of warfare.
One way may be to privilege the explanatory power of a particular level of analysis through
a select theoretical approach.31 However, a complete analysis requires that the range of factors
mentioned above must be acknowledged. For Robert Tomes, this presents itself as a vague
‘innovation milieu.’32 Alternatively, a framework that provides a way to categorize these varied
influences is of greater analytical value. Terry Terriff and Frans Osinga note that drivers of military
change include strategic challenges, alliance commitments, legitimacy – which features resource
allocation – and military and political leadership. Related to these are the shapers of change, the
factors that augment a response to a driver. These include: strategic, political and military
29 Terry Terriff and Frans Osinga, “Conclusions: The Diffusion of Military Transformation to European Militaries,”
in Theo Farrell, Terry Terriff, and Frans Osinga eds. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 187 – 209. 30 For an overview of militaries and change see Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovations Studies.,” 31 See Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1986). 32 Robert R. Tomes, US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military innovation and the new
American Way of War, 1973 – 2003 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
12
organization cultures, the availability of resources, bureaucratic politics, and leadership.33 These
form an essential context to analyze how war is conceptualized by the tribes within the United
States Army since “There is no easy way to pull these different sets of literatures together into one
encompassing theory as a way to develop a comprehensive understanding of change in military
organizations.”34 Typically, this framework is applied to discussions of military change. However,
if it is accepted that these shapers and drivers influence military organizations as they change, or
attempt to change, then it can be assumed that these act upon the organization when it appears to
be static as well.35
This analytical framework presents external and internal drivers and shapers that influence
military organizations. A literature review of the shapers and drivers provides the theoretical and
conceptual grounding for this research. While not all shapers and drivers are of equal importance,
given the specific focus on the combat branches of the Army, they must be acknowledged.
Military Culture:
Simply put, an organization is greater than the sum of its parts. Examining an
organization’s unique culture – “the symbols, rituals, and practices which give meaning to the
activity of the organization” – provides a greater depth of understanding a functional approach
may overlook.36 This cultural perspective reveals the complexity of the organism within an
organization.37 Organizational culture provides a way to understand how implicit and explicit
33 Terry and Osinga, “Conclusions,” pp. 209. 34 Terriff and Osinga, “Conclusions,” pp. 209. 35 The difference between a static and a changing organization is definitional. Major changes are “changes in the goals,
actual strategies, and/or structure of a military organization.,” However minor changes, “changes in operation means
and methods,” while not as stark, can occur. Therefore, while a military may appear static when compared to periods
of major changes it is nevertheless constantly in motion, new recruits enter, officers are promoted, generals retire, and
units undergo training. See Farrell and Terriff, “Introduction.” 36 Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’,” pp. 478. 37 Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 2nd Ed., (New York:
Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1999), pp. 145.
13
structures can shape preferences and actions. The development of organizational culture as an
analytical framework can be traced to two sources. The first is the cultural approach, emergent in
Peter Katzenstien’s edited volume, The Culture of National Security, which was part of a
movement within International Relations scholarship away from rational and functional
explanations that had dominated the field until the collapse of the Soviet Union.38
The second source was the organizational approach to studying militaries that began with
Barry Posen’s functional comparison of the doctrines of French, British, and German militaries in
the interwar period and their connection to state policy.39 Stephen Rosen’s Winning the Next War
directly challenged Posen’s conclusions. Rosen, like Posen, sought to examine changes within
militaries while relying on a functional, rational approach. However, unlike Posen, he emphasized
the influence that complex, intra-organizational politics can have on whether or not innovation
occurs and what form it might take. Rosen noted that communities within organizations rise and
fall depending upon whether a community of thought, which includes senior military leadership,
can monopolize the promotion process and incentivize similar thinking in the officer corps.40
Elizabeth Kier’s work combined the cultural approach an organizational focus.41 Kier’s concept
38 Katzenstien hoped it would provide IR scholars with another way of examining how states function. Environmental
structures, as well as cultural and institutional elements, shape and are shaped by different states’ identities that in turn
influence state interests and policies, which can have a recursive effect upon the structure. Peter J. Katzenstein,
“Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., The Culture of National
Security: Norms and identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1 – 32; Ronald L.
Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in Peter
J. Katzenstein ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996), pp. 33 – 78. 39 Building off the work of Graham Allison in The Essence of Decision and Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the State, and War,
Posen compared whether balance of power theory or organization theory provided a better explanation as to why states
chose particular doctrines. Posen identified three broad types of military doctrine, “the subcomponent of grand strategy
that deals explicitly with military means,” offensive, defensive, and deterrent. Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine, pp. 13 – 14. 40 There are issues with Rosen’s approach, specifically his conclusion that military change driven from internal sources
is rational in its response to battlefield effectiveness. Rosen’s work remains a key addition to the literature on military
organizations because of how internal dynamics can influence both organizational and strategic outcomes. Stephen
Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). 41 Kier developed her ideas on military culture in a series of publications, including a chapter in Katzenstien’s work
The Culture of National Security. See Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,”
14
of military culture acted as an intervening variable between events in the international system and
a military’s response.42 More recently, the work of Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff has expanded
the cultural approach associated with the study of military organizations.43 Building off a wide
variety of scholarship on militaries and culture, I contend that organizational culture has eight key
elements to it.
Firstly, culture pervades organizations, especially in highly institutionalized, ‘strong’
organizations such as militaries. While many organizations have a ‘culture’, militaries are unique
in the relative strength of their cultures.44 The “trauma learning” that an organization undergoes in
combat is a process unique to militaries, which can result in militaries being at a greater risk for
spectacular failure and less open to adaptation or innovation.45 New members are inculcated in the
organization’s culture through formal education and training processes, as well as informal ‘micro-
transactions’, what Terriff describes as “highly institutionalized cultural attributes [that] are
transmitted from one individual to another.”46 This reproduces and strengthens the organization’s
International Security Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 65 – 93; Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine
Before World War II,” in Peter J. Katzenstien ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 186 – 215; and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French
and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). This is not the sole
example of efforts to utilize culture or ‘culture-like’ explanations at the time, see Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic
Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974); Builder, The Masks of War; Jeffery W.
Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1995); Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1994). 42 For example, the decision by French politicians to limit conscription to one year was interpreted by the French
military’s culture as eliminating the possibility of offensive operations. Within the French military, there was an
implicit assumption that one-year conscripts could not possibly develop the skills necessary to fight offensively. This,
Kier argued, was a contributing factor to France’s decisive defeat in 1940. For the French case study, see chapters
three and four in Kier, Imagining War. 43 As mentioned above, their studies of military change/transformation include culture as one important framework
among many to understand military organizations. For example see Farrell and Terriff, “Introduction”; Theo Farrell,
The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2005); Terriff,
“‘Innovate or Die’”; Terry Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators: Military Change and Organizational Culture in the US
Marine Corps,” Defence Studies Vol. 6, No. 2 (2006), pp. 215 – 247. 44 Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005). 45 Ibid., pp. 95 – 97. 46 Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators,” pp. 218; Hull, Absolute Destruction.
15
culture. Second, culture influences how militaries actually fight. Stephen Biddle’s examination of
how militaries fight in the ‘modern system’ of warfare concluded that employment matters more
in determining military victory than numeric advantages or technological superiority on their
own.47 Additionally, neither material nor ideational forces exist within a vacuum but are
intertwined and deeply related.48 Therefore, culture can influence how a military actually fights,
rather than just their internal dynamics.49
Third, cultural traits may be either explicit or implicit. Hull’s examination of the Imperial
German Army demonstrated their implicit cultural preference to achieve victory through the
absolute destruction of an enemy.50 An example of the explicitly of culture is the military chapels
of the US armed services. The Air Force’s bears a resemblance to the aluminum airframes, while
the Naval Academy’s emulates the majesty and traditions of Britain’s Royal Navy.51 Additionally,
US Marine Corps’ worship of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller’s exploits “is etched indelibly
in every Marine.”52 However, cultural symbols, rituals, and practices – visible or hidden – often
go unexamined by individuals within an organization.
Fourth, cultures can change slowly over time or in response to existential shocks.
Following their defeat in the Second World War, the national security policies of Germany and
47 Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2004). 48 New technologies do not instantly grant militaries with new capabilities. Instead, they require associated operational
concepts to harness a technology’s potential. John Stone, “The British Army and the Tank,” in Theo Farrell and Terry
Terriff eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2002), pp. 187 – 204. 49 Theo Farrell, Sten Rynning, and Terry Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France,
and the United States, 1991 – 2012 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 50 The 1904 Battle at Waterberg, the operationalization of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914, and the March Offensive of
1918 were all evidence of this implicit assumption shaping decisions. See chapters one, five and twelve in Hull,
Absolute Destruction. 51 Builder, The Masks of War, pp. 34 – 35. 52 Jon T. Hoffman (Col, USMC), Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC (New York:
Random House, 2001), pp. ix quoted in Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators,” pp. 217.
16
Japan deemphasized using military force to achieve foreign policy goals.53 A more subtle example
is John Lynn’s response to Victor David Hanson’s Carnage and Culture. He argued that culture’s
interaction with reality could produce minute changes.54 Fifth, cultural norms shape both the
identity and actions of an organization. Norms are “beliefs shared by a community about who they
are, what the world is like, and given these two things, what they can and should do in given
circumstances.”55 Norms function in two ways; they constitute an actor’s identity and regulate
their actions. The constitutive nature of norms informs an actor’s identity, who they are as well as
rules and roles. The regulation of action is influenced by what is consequential – where the positive
or negative consequences of an action that directly compel or coerce an actor in a particular
direction – and appropriate – the ambiguous pressures of socialization that indirectly shape
actions.56
Sixth, determining the origins of an organization’s culture or how historical events have
been incorporated is exceedingly difficult. The inability to definitively process trace how certain
cultural traits come into existence does not exclude the shaping effects of culture. The origins of a
cultural trait may be murky, yet it still can have tangible effects.57 Seventh, a nation’s strategic
culture is not consistently reproduced by their military services. Each service – navies, armies, and
air forces – can all have markedly different organizational cultures.58 Lastly, military culture can
53 The fact that cultures can change in response to external shocks does not mean that they always will. Thomas U.
Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., The Culture of
National Security: Norms and identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317 –
356. 54 Victor David Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, (New York: Anchor
Books, 2002); Lynn, Battle. 55 Farrell, The Norms of War, pp. 1. 56 Farrell, The Norms of War, pp. 8 – 12; Terriff, “’Innovate or Die’”, pp. 478 – 479. 57 Kowert and Legro refrain from using culture, but the implications of their work still stand. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey
Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Peter J. Katzenstein ed., The Culture of National
Security: Norms and identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 451 – 497; Kier,
Imagining War. 58 Terriff, “Warriors and Innovators”, pp. 217; Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (New York:
Routledge, 2006); Builder, The Masks of War; Kier, Imagining War.
17
act as a barrier to change, especially disruptive innovations that seek to move an organization away
from culturally held beliefs.59 Understanding how the Army’s organizational culture relates to the
tribal conceptualizations of warfare is a vital part of this research. Whether it has been reproduced
or rejected implies something about the relationships between the two.
Intra-Service and Inter-Tribal Dynamics:
The internal dynamics of a military can influence the organization as a whole The works
of Stephen Rosen and Carl Builder describe how these various tribes are constitutive elements of
an organization, and can have interactions that are not aligned with the organization’s broader
interests, let alone the nation’s strategic/national security interests.60 Adam Grissom’s description
of the “intra-service model of military innovation” notes that just as a state’s military is made up
of constituent services, a service has sub-units within it that can experience competition. This is
especially true when an established branch’s mission is threatened by a new capability in another
branch, or the creation of a wholly new branch.61
One way of identifying an organization’s sub-units is along their professional lines. Rosen
argues that military organizations can be conceptualized as “political communities.” The
development of carrier aviation in the US Navy was a slow change away from the traditional
balance between aviators and non-aviators to one where aviators could climb the promotional
ladder to command non-aviation forces. One political community, the aviators, propagate a
particular way of war that differed from the previous form.62 Moreover, Gregory Engel argues that
the US Navy’s development of the Tomahawk cruise missile for its surface fleet threatened the
long-range strike role that had been under the sole purview of the aviation community. In a case
59 Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, pp. 8. 60 Rosen, Winning the Next War; and Builder, The Masks of War. 61 For a series of case studies see, Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies”, pp. 913 – 916. 62 Rosen, Winning the Next War, pp. 76 – 80.
18
of limited resources, the development of a surface-to-surface missile was a low priority until the
surface community found a ready ally amongst the submarine force. The fear of losing sole control
over the long-range strike mission to the rest of the fleet was thought to imply a similar reduction
in resources amongst the aviation community and necessitated their resistance to the development
of the Tomahawk. 63
Drawing distinctions upon these lines may appear natural, but may lead towards
confirmation bias. An organization’s political communities are not always determined along pre-
existing structural lines. Brian Linn delineates political communities based on intellectual
traditions – the Guardians, Heroes, and Managers.64 Similar to Rosen’s political communities,
Linn demonstrates the variety of intra-organizational traditions and beliefs that can exist outside
formal structures. Furthermore, within each service branch, diversity exists. In Sean Naylor’s
retelling of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, he describes the efforts of the 187th Infantry
Regiment, of the 101st Airborne Division. The Regiment’s nickname, the Rakkasans, is a reference
to their occupation of Japan. Part of the famous 101st “Screaming Eagles,” the Rakkasans had a
unique ‘esprit de corps’ that was transferred to new members along with the responsibility to
uphold the Regiment and Division’s achievements.65 In spite of this unique unit identity,
determining the effect that it has on their perceptions regarding warfare proves difficult without
in-depth interviews. However, what this demonstrates is that although the complexity and diversity
63 Gregory A. Engel, “Cruise Missiles and the Tomahawk,” in B. Hays and D. Smith eds., The Politics of Naval
Innovation (Newport: United States Naval War College, 1994), pp. 18 – 22 quoted in Grissom, “The Future of Military
Innovation Studies,” pp. 915. 64 Linn, The Echo of Battle, pp. 5 – 6. 65 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005),
pp. 50 – 52.
19
of a military can be identified at units within subunits, the ‘political nature’ of these may not be
assigned to them, nor may they have any distinct influence.66
Some argue that an organization’s subunits posses their own culture. John van Maanen and
Stephen Barley define subculture as “a subset of an organization’s members who interact regularly
with one another, identify themselves as a distinct group… and routinely take action on the basis
of collective understandings unique to the group.”67 In the case of the Army’s tribes this approach
assumes too much autonomy on the part of the combat branches. It is more valuable analytically
to examine these tribes through their structurally based identities as well as their membership in
the Army, acknowledging they are not definitive and overlap can exist. This framework makes a
number of contributions. Firstly, explaining the differences between the members of the branches
may not be the result of their profession. Second, if there are any similarities between members of
different combat arms it could be a sign of a larger ideology or guiding conceptualization of
warfare beyond one’s own service. Third, there may be competing ideologies amongst members
of the combat arms during a certain period of time. Fourth, the constructivist approach taken by
this research does not rule out the existence of interactions based upon functional/rational drivers.
Resource and identity based competition can exist alongside one another.
Servicism:
The relations between military services within a state are varied. Together, these services
ostensibly fight the same wars, for the same side, and ideally in concert with one another, although
66 For example, the 10th Mountain Division is comprised of three Brigade Combat Teams that each have different
deployment histories even in the Global War on Terror. While both the 1st and 2nd Brigades deployed to Iraq, 1st
Brigade was deployed outside of Baghdad in Kirkuk. See Fort Drum, “1st Brigade Combat Team,” (accessed January
20, 2016) http://www.drum.army.mil/1stBCT/Pages/1stBRIGADE
COMBATTEAM.aspx; Fort Drum, “2nd Brigade Combat Team, History,” (accessed January 20, 2016)
http://www.drum.army.mil/2ndBCT/Pages/History_lv2.aspx. 67 Quoted in Scott A. Fischer (LTC, USAF), Army and Air Force Subcultures: Effects on Joint Operations (Carlisle
Barracks: US Army War College, 2006), pp. 2.
20
this is not always the case. The corollary of fighting for the same side implies that they must all
share/compete for that state’s defence budget. Additionally, the pursuit of prestige by the services
following military operations may contribute to tension between them. This tension has been
identified as servicism.68 Parochial service interests can hinder jointness – the coordination and
integration of different services in the same operation.69
The competition that results from the services’ fixation on resources and prestige may drive
innovation or lead to a self-serving defence of longstanding priorities. Additionally, the services
themselves are largely responsible for determining how to accomplish strategic directives assigned
by politicians. This can lead to the services’ culture influencing their state’s defence policies.70 A
service’s degree of influence over decisions can be used to maintain their current duties in national
security – ensuring their share of the budget is protected – expand their role and their budget, or
attempt to divest themselves of missions that are not supported by their organizational culture.71
This interaction between interests, including their creation, and resources is more complex than
stating that interests are the result of a “unitary, rational decision maker: centrally controlled,
completely informed, and value maximizing.”72 While the degree of servicism present in the
journals is not the focus of this research, the effects that this competition has upon militaries makes
it vital to be aware of and account for.
68 David R. Eberhart, “Inter-Service Rivalry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Comparison of Military Force
Deployments Under the Weak and Strong Chairman Models,” (PhD Diss., University of Denver, 2001). 69 Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams, Stephen J. Cimbala, US National Security: Policymakers, Processes &
Politics 4th ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), pp. 125. 70 Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” pp. 910 – 913; Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp,
Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd Ed. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), pp. 25 – 38.
For example, see Richard Lock-Pullan’s investigation of how the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine limited the use of
military force in US foreign policy decision making. Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation. 71 Halperin and Clapp include “organizational essence,” to describe how organizations can determine their own
missions and interests in relation to their role in US national security. Halperin and Clapp, Bureaucratic Politics and
Foreign Policy, pp. 25 – 38. 72 Allison and Zelikow critique this position in their examination of the organizations associated with the Cuban
Missile Crisis; see Model II. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp. 143.
21
Externalities and Militaries:
The process of determining and then analyzing tribal conceptions of war cannot be done in
isolation from outside events. The strategic environment is in constant flux, which both the state
and its military act within. This is not to say that the strategic environment has a direct causal effect
upon states and their subsequent decisions, merely that fluctuations in the strategic environment
create opportunities for different reactions coloured by interpretive and cognitive biases. It is not
guaranteed that organizations automatically or effectively “[rethink] how operations lead to victory
and [devise] new ways to measure how military capabilities relate to strategic success…deriving
a new measure of strategic effectiveness.”73
A nation’s strategic culture can influence how a military responds to an event in the
international system. Strategic culture can be defined as “the persisting socially transmitted ideas,
attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods that are more or less specific to a
particular geographically based security community that has a unique historical experience.”74 It
is not just a state’s ‘way of war’ but a representation of how that state pursues its goals and defends
its interests internationally. A state’s strategic culture will generally follow long-term trends and
will display an identifiable consistency – though certain crises may prove exceptions to these
trends.75 While strategic culture can be a significant shaper, civilian control of the military is
assumed to be a driver. The direct linkage between politicians and military leaders presents a clear
case of how external factors influence militaries. However, like the origins of an organization’s
culture, strategic culture shapes and influences actor’s in subtle ways.76
73 Rosen, Winning the Next War, pp. 110. 74 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International
Studies Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 51. 75 Oliver M. Lee, “The Geopolitics of America’s Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2008), pp.
267 – 286 76 Kier, Imagining War; Farrell, The Norms of War, pp. 5 – 8.
22
The study of civil-military relations is of the utmost importance given the fact that “the
very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the
polity.”77 However, for the purposes of this research, the most important are budgetary.78 The
domestic political battles between politicians mean that the nation’s military can be caught in the
middle.79 Politicians have direct control over the military and its budget, but the military can shape
a political discussion given their particular knowledge in matters pertaining to warfare.80
Additionally, external events can also be transmitted to an organization through civilian
superiors.81
The Spectrum of Conflict:
The conflict spectrum provides an analytical framework to discuss the types of wars,
conflicts, or operations that a military may be involved in. This research relies on the conflict
77 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2003), pp. 4. 78 Budgetary battles are the most important and visible forms of civil-military relations although other interactions,
like the discussion of military options and the conduct of operations. For a greater discussion on the quality of civil-
military relations see, Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). For examples see, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,
Essence of Decision; Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq (New
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2004); George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations
Since 1776, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 79 Herring, From Colony to Superpower; David S. Cloud and Jeff Zeleny, “Republicans on Panel Back President’s
Plan, Masking Divisions,” The New York Times (accessed January 22, 2016) (January 13, 2007)
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/world/americas/13capital.html?_r=2. 80 The civilian control of the military in the US is enshrined in the constitution and the oath the military takes to defend
it and its representatives. Despite this, the role civilians play within these organizations is contentious, ranging from
drivers of change, external to change, or shapers of change. While the executive control of President and Secretary of
Defense is strictly adhered to, the legislative branch’s authority, besides budgetary controls, is less clear. The military
can use Congress as an “escape valve, a locus for venting disagreement with the executive branch leadership, and a
potential ally when warriors wish to challenge or change policy.,” Stevenson bases this assertion on the assumed
functional nature of military organizations to constantly seek increases to their independence and power. Charles A.
Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations Under Stress (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.
208 – 209; Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 20. 81An example of this is former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates’ efforts to focus the US military’s efforts on the
contemporary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than on the future. This was demonstrated in the case of the Mine
Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) procurement designed to address the threat posed by improvised explosive
devices in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan. See, Chapter 4 “Waging War on the Pentagon,” in Robert Gates,
Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), pp. 115 – 126.
23
spectrum depicted by Sarkesian, Williams, and Cimbala, who establish a clear conflict spectrum
comprised of certain typologies.82 At one end are non-combat missions, such as disaster assistance,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. Unconventional warfare involves revolutionary
conflict, terrorism, ethnic or religious strife, and nationalist inspired conflict.83 Conventional
conflict involves limited or major wars, such as the 1991 Gulf War.84 Lastly, nuclear war occupies
the other end of the spectrum.85 The intensity of a particular typology is not determined by its
position on the spectrum. Instead, it is relative to the level of involvement or effort. However,
Sarkesian et al. point out that the proclaimed ‘intensity’ of conflict is often a subjective
categorization rather than an analytical one.86 Given the Army’s preference for conventional
warfare rather than unconventional – to be explained below – many have relied on this analytical
lens to examine the Army in relation to the character of warfare.87 This provides a way to
82 This clear depiction of conflict may not correspond to other conceptions of warfare, particularly hybrid warfare.
Hybrid war is the blending of aspects from conventional and unconventional warfare, resulting in a changed character
rather than nature. See Peter R. Mansoor, “Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in History,” in Wiliamson Murray and Peter
R. Mansoor, Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1 – 17. 83 These conflicts are characterized by the asymmetric or indirect nature of their conduct. Most often, non-state groups
have opted for this type of warfare due to its inexpensive nature – relative to conventional warfare. See Susan L.
Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1997), pp. 6 – 8. 84 Most often, states are the wielders of conventional power, which varies given particular historical contexts. John
Ferris, “Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare,” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray eds.,
Strategy in the Contemporary World, 4th Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 230 – 246. 85 See chapter 2 in Sarkesian, Williams and, Cimbala, US National Security, pp. 25 – 48. This is one example of a
conflict spectrum, but one that is comprehensive enough to provide enough analytical depth. See also, Stuart Kinross,
“Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 27, No. 1 (2004), pp. 35 – 58 and Alastair
Irwin, ”The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 19, No. 4 (1996),
pp. 227 – 251; Michael Sheehan, “The Evolution of Modern Warfare,” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S.
Gray eds., Strategy in the Contemporary World, 4th Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 39 – 75. 86 Sarkesian, Williams and, Cimbala, US National Security. 87 Comprehensive interpretations of unconventional warfare often include non-combat missions at the low end of the
conflict spectrum. For example, see Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986); David Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice
from Vietnam to Iraq (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Terry Terriff, “The Past as Future: The US Army’s
Vision of Warfare in the 21st Century,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies Vol. 15, No. 3 (2014), pp. 195 – 228;
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 2002).
24
understand how the tribes have conceptualized warfare by what is included, what is emphasized,
and what is excluded.
Conclusion:
This chapter has outlined the assumptions as well as the theoretical and conceptual
underpinnings of the research project. The most important sections of this framework are those
that discuss military culture and intra-service dynamics because they focus on the subject of study
the greatest. The wide scope of the other sections is necessary to adequately contextualize the tribal
conceptualizations within other factors. Ultimately, the complexity of military organizations
necessitates a wide analytical approach. The next chapter will present an overview of the Army’s
post-Vietnam reforms as well as a comprehensive depiction of its military culture.
25
Chapter 2: Organizational Context in Narrative and Culture
This section presents two contextual and analytical frameworks, the first is an examination
of the Army from Vietnam to the publication of FM 100-5 (1982), ‘AirLand Battle.’ This includes
a brief description of broader US foreign policy in order to situate the Army’s developments. This
is important because it outlines a dramatic period of change within the Army that sets the stage for
the subsequent analysis on the journals. The second framework depicts the Army’s culture, taking
into account the discussion from the analytical section. The themes and tendencies identified here
provide vital context for the subsequent analysis of the tribal journals, and draws upon a variety of
sources that precede and follow the period of analysis to draw attention to the slow moving features
of organization culture, the longue duree. The Army’s tribes may either differ from or reproduce
the organization’s culture, let alone the contexts in which they write. Establishing this point of
comparison is vital to a comprehensive analysis of the tribal conceptualization of warfare from
1983 to 1999.
Vietnamese Phoenix, the Army from Vietnam to AirLand Battle:
The resulting “feeling of impotence” in the aftermath of America’s war in Vietnam would
have long lasting ramifications. Both during and after, American society felt the effects of the
Vietnam War. Widespread anti-war protests occurred alongside a cultural revolution and an
economic crisis that contributed to significant divisions.88 These would not be confined to the
following decade, or the supposed exorcism of “the ghosts of Vietnam [in] the sands of the Arabian
desert” following the Gulf War.89
88 The continued recession and ‘stagflation’ produced significant hardship and strained America’s ability to pursue an
activist foreign policy. American support for Israel in the Yom-Kippur War, which resulted in the 1973 oil embargo,
created an “economic Pearl Harbor,” that only contributed to the economic crisis. Steven W. Hook and John Spanier,
American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 18th Ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2010), pp. 91 – 104; Herring,
From Colony to Superpower, pp. 761, 810 – 811. 89 The aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq raised comparisons of Iraq to Vietnam, and the seemingly repeated
failures in Iraq. Speech by J. William Fulbright, “Arrogance of Power,” on May 17, 1966 in Dennis Merrill and
26
What initially began as an attempt to contain the spread of communism in Indo-China,
eventually forced the US to undertake combat operations in Vietnam themselves, culminating in a
“Big Army” operation with a large footprint.90 The Army that fought the Vietnam War was
predominately an infantry-airmobile force – equipped with helicopters – supported by airpower
and artillery.91 The Army relied and preferred using firepower to win; often infantry units would
merely find and fix the enemy long enough to destroy them with fire support.92 The Vietnam War
shattered the US military; the Army emerged from the Vietnam War as a hollow force. Shelby
Stanton provocatively states that an “entire American army was sacrificed on the battlefield of
Vietnam.”93 For example, in 1971 alone there were over 215 cases of ‘Fragging’ in Vietnam – the
deliberate killing of officers by their own men. More troubling, these issues were not confined to
the Army deployed in Vietnam, but extended to Europe and the US from which many replacements
were drawn.94 General Michael Davison, commander of the Seventh Army in Germany, described
the situation that “the price of Vietnam has been a terrible one. In terms of casualties, in terms of
national treasure of both men and dollars that have been spent, we had to wreck the Seventh Army
Thomas G. Paterson eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations Volume II: Since 1914, 7th Ed. (Boston:
Wadsworth, 2010), pp. 419; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, pp. 912; Richard A. Melanson, “Unraveling the
Domestic Foreign Policy Consensus: Presidential rhetoric, American public opinion, and the wars in Vietnam and
Iraq,” in John Dumbrell and David Ryan eds., Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and Ghosts (New York:
Routledge, 2007), pp. 48 – 65; and Richard Lock-Pullan, “Iraq and Vietnam: Military lessons and Legacies,” in John
Dumbrell and David Ryan eds., Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and Ghosts (New York: Routledge, 2007),
pp. 66 – 85. 90 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, pp. 752; John Arquilla, The Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of
the American Military (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2008), pp. 172. 91 The creation of Army aviation first began in 1942, by 1965 the Army had a combat capable airmobile division of
“Sky Cavalry/Air-Cav.,” Christopher C.S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine, (Westport: Praeger
Publishers, 1994); Rosen, Winning the Next War, pp. 85 – 95; Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 3. 92 Scales discusses the prodigious use of firepower by the US Army from the Second World War to the Gulf War. He
argues that historically the Army was pulled between relying on maneuver or firepower to achieve results. Robert H.
Scales, Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, INC., 2003), pp. 46 – 52. See also, Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam. 93 Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army: US ground forces in Vietnam, 1965 – 1973 (Novato:
Presidio, 1985), pp. 368 quoted in Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 46. 94 Suzanne C. Nielsen, An Army Transformed: The US Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change
in Military Organizations (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College – The Letort Papers, 2010), pp. 36.
27
in order to keep Vietnam going.”95 Seven percent of the Army in Europe was addicted to heroin,
twelve percent were charged with serious offences, and barracks gangs were commonplace.96
By the end of the Vietnam War in 1972, only four of the Army’s thirteen active divisions
were deemed combat ready.97 Following Vietnam, the Army vowed to ‘never again’ put the
organization in such trauma. The never again school provided the Army with a “collective identity,
based paradoxically on both martyrdom and entitlement, which silenced both internal
recriminations and honest assessment” of the War and contributed to the Army’s post-war
direction.98
For the remainder of the 1970s American foreign policy deemphasized the use of military
force – particularly the Army – to achieve national goals. This coincided with a drawdown of
military forces and budgets, and a newly active Congress in foreign policy.99 The presidencies of
Nixon, Ford, and Carter all relied on non-military tools of national power.100 However, 1979
proved to be a pivotal turning point that saw the resurgence of military power in American foreign
policy. The combined effects of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the failure of Operation Eagle
Claw in 1980, Soviet and Cuban support of communist insurgents in Nicaragua, and the Soviet
95 David Could and Greg Jaffe, The Fourth Star: Four Generals and Their Epic Struggle for the Future of the United
States Army, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2009), pp. 19. 96 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 53. 97 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 48 – 59. 98 Linn. Echo of Battle, pp. 194 – 195; and Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror:
Military Culture and Irregular War (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 101, 195. 99 Incidents, such as the massacre at My Lai, contributed to the isolation of the US military from the American public.
The War Powers Act in 1973, was the result of an active Congress attempting to limit a president’s ability to wage a
military conflict without their support. Frederick Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military
Policy, (New York: Random House, 2006), pp. 3, 6; Linda L. Fowler, “Congressional War Powers,” in Eric Schickler
and Frances E. Lee eds., The Oxford Handbook of the American Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011),
pp. 812 – 833; Hook and Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, pp. 103; Herring, From Colony to
Superpower, pp. 817 – 818. 100 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, pp. 767; Lamont C. Colucci, National Security Doctrines of the American
Presidency: How They Shape our Present and Future (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2012), pp. 356 – 358; Hook
and Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, pp. 105 – 114; Frederick H. Harmann and Robert L.
Wendzel, Defending America’s Security, 2nd Ed. (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 1990), pp. 105 – 106.
28
Invasion of Afghanistan provided the justification for a renewed defence build-up.101 Publicly,
Ronald Reagan attempted to restore the “American spirit” and the population’s faith in the Army,
while at the same time creating a credible conventional military deterrent.102
Following Vietnam, the Army abandoned and rejected its hard fought counterinsurgency
experience.103 For the Army, the overriding lesson from the war in Southeast Asia was not that
they had needed to fight low intensity conflicts better, but that they needed to rebuild the force
from the failures of national will, careless political leadership, and a lack of mobilization.104 The
need to “save the Army” was a constant throughout the tenures of Army Chiefs of Staff (ACS)
Westmoreland, Abrams, and Weyand.105 This rebuild necessitated that the Army adopt a new way
of war – or, more appropriately, return to an older one – and a redefined civil-military relationship.
This led the Army to orientate itself back to its traditional Cold War role, the recently neglected
defence of Western Europe.106 The efforts to rebuild the Army in the 1970’s deserve attention
because they shaped the Army of the 1980’s and 1990’s. The changes instituted in this period
became part of the Army’s identity. As Robert Citino notes, the post-Vietnam reforms of the Army
saw “intellectual rebirth, doctrinal reform, and the creation of a high quality combined arms force
101 The resurgence in defence spending is usually accredited to Ronald Reagan, however, this could not resolve the
issues that stemmed from the chronic underfunding of the military throughout the 1970s. Collucci, National Security
Doctrines of the American Presidency, pp. 375 – 376; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 8 – 10, 77; Hook and Spanier,
American Foreign Policy Since World War II, pp. 127 – 128; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, pp. 832 – 836,
844, 860 102 Defence expenditures would increase by a third and by 1987, it would account for 6.2% of GNP. It was assumed
that this spending would achieve two results; first, it would provide a deterrence against the Soviet Union; and second,
it would allow the US to negotiate from a position of strength. Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 76, 77 – 78; Herring,
From Colony to Superpower, pp. 862, 866 – 867; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 110. 103 Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, pp. 35 – 45. 104 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 39, 46. 105 Nielsen, An Army Transformed, pp. 42, 53. 106 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 48 – 59.
29
that would be the best in the world: the heir to the French and German armies of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.”107
Given the Army’s Vietnam experience, Lock-Pullan notes “it is not surprising that it
orientated itself as far away from the scene of its own demise.”108 Part of the reorientation was an
Army War College study in 1973, conducted at the behest of ACS Abrams, to assess the future of
conventional landpower and the Army’s role in American foreign policy. It concluded that the US
was too drained of wealth and willpower to conduct another expeditionary war that relied heavily
on infantry. Therefore, a mechanized war in a defence of Western Europe as part of NATO was
the most important and likely contingency.109 This decision reflected not only the preference for
conventional warfare, but a return to the Army’s hallowed ground where it had proved itself in the
Second World War.110 While the renewed emphasis on Europe made both cultural and political
sense, the Army still had to address the very real problem of preparing to deter and, if that failed,
defeat the quantitatively superior forces of the Soviet Union.111 The publication of FM 100-5
Operations (1976) ‘Active Defence’ was one-step in this direction.
The creation of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 was the institutional
driver for many of the post-Vietnam changes and its publication of Active Defence was the first
major attempt to reorient the Army to the expected battlefield in Europe. First created to address
command and control issues in Vietnam, TRADOC became one of the Army’s most important
107 Robert M. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, (Lawrence: The University
Press of Kansas), pp. 235. 108 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 53. 109 As stated above, the shift to Europe was also seen in US foreign policy under the Nixon Doctrine. Linn, The Echo
of Battle, pp. 197. 110 Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2013);
Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 53. 111 For example, the mid-1980s the Warsaw Pact maintained 42,500 main-battle tanks to NATO’s 13,000. Citino,
Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, pp. 230.
30
institutions and benefited from more resources and gravitas.112 General William E. DePuy,
commander of TRADOC, imprinted his vision of war on Active Defense so much so that it was
referred to as the ‘DePuy Doctrine.’113 The doctrine primarily emphasized the tank and its ability
to dominate ground in the defence, supported by other combat arms.114 Numerous studies by the
Army of the 1973 Arab-Israeli/Yom Kippur War attempted to glimpse at the character of ‘modern
war’ influenced the creation of Active Defense.115 The Army concluded that defence was now the
strongest form of warfare given the unprecedented lethality of the 1973 conflict. The lethality also
implied that war would now feature significant material expenditures on a level previously unseen,
this resulted in the belief that the “first battle of the next war could well be its last.”116 Despite the
doctrine’s return to conventional warfare, many in the Army perceived that the doctrine relied too
heavily on the defence against Soviet breakthrough and this contributed to a significant debate
over the doctrine and the Army’s post-Vietnam direction.117
112 TRADOC’s predecessor, the Continental Army Command (CONARC), had been widely regarded as being too
bureaucratically bloated to function as an effective command, often referred to as a ‘bird sanctuary’ for the
disproportionate number of ‘Bird Colonels’ – slang for the rank of a Colonel – who were assigned there. Military
History Office, Transforming the Army: TRADOC’s First Thirty Years, 1973 – 2003, (Fort Monroe: United States
Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2003); Henry G. Gole, General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for
Modern War, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2008), pp. 229 – 235; Nielsen, An Army Transformed,
pp. 43. 113 DePuy directly supervised the writing of Active Defense, tightly controlling the writing process and suppressed
criticism in order to produce a doctrine that would fundamentally change the Army. Within TRADOC, DePuy was
lionized for creating the institution’s “solid character…and its continued relevance.,” Gole, General William E.
DePuy, pp. xiii; Kevin P. Byrnes (GEN) in Military History Office, Transforming the Army, see Foreword; Kagan,
Finding the Target, pp. 54. 114 Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 5. The tank-centric approach was also a rejection of the
infantry focus of the Vietnam era, which was believed to be ill suited for European combat. See Fitzgerald, Learning
to Forget, pp. 43 – 45. 115 The surprise attack by the Egyptians across the Suez Canal on October 6, 1973 led to rapid gains, and Israeli
counter-attacks by armoured units suffered casualty rates as high as 60% in one division without achieving much. In
response to demands by their hard-pressed ally, Syria, Egyptian forces moved beyond their air defences opening them
up to IAF strikes. This was taken advantage of by the Israeli’s who managed to push the Egyptian forces back to the
Canal. This closely approximated what a war against the Soviet Union was expected to look like. Brent L. Sterling,
Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? What History Teaches Us About Strategic Barriers and International
Security, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), pp. 289 – 298. 116 Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 6. 117 These conclusions influenced NATO’s linear defence along the inter-German border. Additionally, the positioning
of these forces was a result, in part, of political considerations within NATO; West Germany did not want to establish
a system of defence in depth from which NATO forces, sacrificing territory. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand
31
Alongside the Army’s geographic, organizational, and doctrinal changes, there were also
significant personnel innovations that altered the structure of the Army. President Nixon’s decision
to create the President’s Commission on All-Volunteer Armed Force on March 17, 1969 was a
response to the large protests at home over the Vietnam draft and its perceived inequality.118
Instead of conscripting soldiers, the military would have to attract them in competition with
American businesses.119 It “fundamentally changed the character of the US military as a social
institution,” professionalized the force, and resulted in the Army becoming more disconnected
from American society.120 Professionalization carried costs. Each soldier would be more
expensive, taking up a larger share of the budget than a conscript had. This was exacerbated by
the post-Vietnam drawdown as the Army shrank from 1.57 million in 1968 to 783,000 by 1974.121
Professionalization also resulted from the Total Force reforms that made the Active force
responsible for warfighting while the Reserves – the National Guard and Army Reserve –
supported them.122
Battle, pp. 21; Military History Office, Transforming the Army, pp. 29.John L. Romjue, “The Evolution of the Airland
Battle Concept,” Air University Review (May-June, 1984) (accessed November 14, 2015)
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html; Kagan, Finding the Target,
pp. 53 – 57. 118 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 39. 119 Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, (Westport:
Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 15; Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, pp. 8 120 Initially the program was resisted because of fears that a professionalized military would threaten civilian control,
force the Army to compete for employees, and, in the event of a major war, leave the Army would be left without an
effective conscription system. The AVF removed the draft boards that had been dispersed throughout and had provided
the majority of conscripts for Vietnam. However, many within the Army were in favour of the AVF because it was
seen as a way to solve the issues of the ‘hollow force’ – a product of the belief that draftees were of inferior quality in
comparison to professional soldiers who would have a career’s worth of experience. Kagan, Finding the Target, pp.
11 – 21; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 39 – 40, 51; Arquilla, Worst Enemy, pp. 188
– 191. 121 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 6, Nielsen, An Army Transformed, pp. 41. 122 During the Vietnam War, the Reserves were never called-up – due to fears of disproportionately high casualties –
leaving the wider American population largely disconnected from the War. Abrams’ reforms ensured that the Reserves
would have to be called up and therefore the American public to support a war of any great length. Macgregor,
Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 191; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 50 – 51
32
A new training regime was developed to account for the rising professionalism and the
necessity of the ‘first battle’. The training mantra for the Army became “our drills must be
bloodless battles’ and our battles ‘bloody drills.’”123 This replaced the conscript training regime
that had existed since the First World War.124 There would be no more first defeats similar to
Kasserine Pass in 1942 during the Second World War or Task Force Smith in 1950 during the
Korean War. The implementation of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) by
TRADOC standardized all Army Training.125 To create the “bloodless battles” the Army emulated
the Air Force’s Nellis and Navy’s Miramar training facilities to create the National Training Center
(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California for large unit exercises.126 The training revolution corresponded to
the emphasis on professionalism and would eventually produce units that were proficient in the
use of a new series of vehicles, the ‘Big 5’. The Big 5 consisted of what would become the Patriot
air-defence missile system, the M1 Abrams main-battle tank, Apache attack helicopter, Bradley
infantry fighting vehicle, and Blackhawk helicopter. Originally begun in 1963, as part of a nine-
system procurement, the Big 5 proved to be very compatible with the Army’s organizational
culture oriented toward conventional warfare fought with mechanized units.127 They allowed the
123 FM 100-5 Operations (1976), pp. 1-4 and 1-5 quoted in Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 6. 124 The Army Training Program had been in place since the First World War and was designed to prepare conscripts
for combat. Military History Office, Transforming the Army, pp. 34. 125 Although the ARTEP was extensive in its scope, the early training revolution did encounter some problems. The
tactical emphasis resulted in reduced training for future challenges in an officer’s career and the budgetary restrictions
in the early and mid-1970s had the effect of confining most of the training to military bases and limited it to smaller
units. Besides the ARTEP, the Army introduced a slew of new training programs. These included the New Skill
Qualification Tests (SQT), Initial Entry Training Program (IET), Basic Combat Training (BCT) program, as well as
the Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). The NCOES was of particular importance because it
extended professionalism beyond just the officer corps to the enlisted ranks, and one of the most crucial elements of
the Army, the non-commissioned officer corps. Military History Office, Transforming the Army, pp. 7, 35; Kretchik,
US Army Doctrine; Nielsen, An Army Transformed, pp. 39; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 43 – 49. 126 Ibid., pp. 49 – 50. 127 Richard A Stubbing, The Defense Game: An Insider Explores the Astonishing Realities of Americas Defense
Establishment (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), pp. 145.
33
Army to modernize, overcome a qualitative disparity that resulted from the Vietnam War, and
increased their ability to incorporate technology into how they fought.128
Alongside the dramatic changes following Vietnam, the Army experienced a persistent
“cognitive crisis” over how the Army would fight.129 This was sparked by Active Defense’s
apparent reliance on the defence, singular focus on the first battle of the next war, and its
expectation that the Soviets would rely on one massive armoured attack.130 On the surface, these
precepts found ready criticism within the Army, but Active Defense also contradicted much of the
Army’s organizational culture.131 However, Active Defense did contain an innovative approach to
joint operations between the Army and Air Force.132 The debates that dominated the period of
‘cognitive crisis’ were heavily influenced by new Army institutions specifically dedicated to
thinking about warfare.133 Given the crisis over Active Defense, many have argued that this
doctrinal debate made the subsequent doctrine, AirLand Battle, better.134
128 However, these systems were not fully delivered until the 1980’s. For example, the Patriot air-defence system was
not handed out to units until 1984. Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 36 – 40; Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, pp. 46. 129 Others, such as William Lind, contributed to the debate but their status as outsiders limited their participation.
Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 77; Gary Hart and William S. Lind, America Can Win:
The Case for Military Reform, (Bethesda: Adler & Adler Publishers Inc., 1986). 130 The linear defence implied that there would be few, if any, units held in reserve. Making counterattacks difficult.
Additionally, Soviet doctrine had abandoned their reliance on singular armoured thrusts and instead had opted for
multiple probing attacks to determine the weakest point. Military History Office, Transforming the Army, pp. 29. 131 Ibid., pp. 30. 132 Like the Army, the Air Force had undergone significant reforms following Vietnam. The organizational dominance
of Strategic Air Command (SAC) – which coordinated the Air Force’s nuclear mission – was challenged by Tactical
Air Command (TAC), who benefited from the advances in precision guided munitions. TAC and TRADOC
coordinated closely, eventually establishing the Air Land Forces Agency. Their relationship was codified in Chapter
8 of Active Defense “The Air-Land Battle,” and would prove to be an essential part of the Army’s AirLand Battle.
Trevor Cutler, “From Independence to Interdependence: The US Air Force and AirLand Battle, 1973 – 1985”,
(Calgary: Masters Thesis – University of Calgary, 2015); Elinor Sloan, The Revolution in Military Affairs:
Implications for Canada and NATO, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), pp. 4, 32; Kagan, Finding
the Target, pp. 58 – 59; United States Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of
the Army, 1976). 133 To understand all of the examples in FM 100-5 (1982) officers needed to be well versed in both historical battles
as well as military thinkers. The continual references to Clausewitz’s tangibles and intangibles of warfare are evidence
of this. The military schools included: School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), School of Advanced
Warfighting (SAW), and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS). Romjue, From Active Defense to
AirLand Battle, pp. 44 – 45, 69 – 70; Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, pp. 260 – 261. 134 Gian P. Gentile (COL), “Time for the Deconstruction of Field Manual 3-24.,” Joint Force Quarterly Vol. 58, No.
3 (2010), pp. 116 – 117.
34
ALB created a foundation for the Army’s future and was held up as the clearest evidence
of their return to the conventional warfighting with its emphasis on offensive combined arms
warfare.135 DePuy’s successor at TRADOC, General Donn A. Starry, brought his experience as a
commander in Western Europe with him when he was given the responsibility of crafting a new
capstone doctrine for the Army.136 In contrast to Active Defense, ALB was written in a
decentralized and consultative approach.137 This made the Combined Arms Center, as well as the
combat arms centres and schools stakeholders in the new doctrine, institutions that would
eventually be responsible for the doctrine’s operationalization, which resulted in greater support
for the doctrine and streamlined its eventual implementation.138
Most importantly, ALB raised the Army’s focus from the tactical to the operational level
of warfare, and changed the way the Army would fight.139 This represented a crucial difference
and development between Active Defense and AirLand Battle. Rather than the traditional focus
on a frontline of operations, ALB emphasized simultaneous attacks throughout an enemy’s depth
– including support and command centres as well as forces maneuvering towards the frontline.140
This, in boxing terms, would consist of not only fighting in the ring, but also attacking your
opponent’s trainers, coaches, and even their means of getting to the fight. This emphasis on offense
made it very popular within the Army.141 Strategically, ALB’s emphasis on attack would, in
135 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation; Citinio, From Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, pp. 265. 136 Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 23 – 30. 137 Nielsen, An Army Transformed, pp. 43. 138 Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 30 – 38. 139 Initial attempts to revise Active Defense at the tactical level to address the problem of Soviet second echelon forces
failed, instead a solution at the operational level was sought. Stubbing, The Defense Game, pp. 123 – 127; Romjue,
From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 72; George T. Donovan (MAJ) The Structure of Doctrinal Revolution in
the US Army from 1968 to 1986 (Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1999),
pp. 32. 140 Donovan, The Structure of Doctrinal Revolution in the US Army from 1968 to 1986, pp. 32 – 34. 141 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 61.
35
theory, give the US the ability to not only win the battle, but to win a better peace rather than
merely guarantee a return to the pre-conflict status quo.142
Further, ALB was orientated towards the future capabilities of the Big 5, meaning that its
concepts would not become redundant with the introduction of the new equipment.143 It also
significantly differed from Active Defense in its inclusion of out-of-Europe operations. The events
of 1979 were especially formative in this regard and provided a series of scenarios in which the
Army might have to fight, including the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, this emphasis on
transmissibility beyond Europe did not imply that Europe was a secondary theatre or that forces in
the “decisive theatre of Central Europe” should be deprioritized.144 AirLand Battle proffered a new
way to fight conventional wars. It described how a modernized and professionalized Army would
fight, and the concepts and conventional outlook of ALB would influence subsequent Army
thinking.
The reconstruction of the Army following Vietnam was a product of the Army’s
interpretation of itself, its mission to defend the US, and the strategic environment of the Cold
War. The Army’s reconstruction was not limited to one aspect, but a series of sustaining and
disruptive changes that included the All-Volunteer Force, new equipment and doctrine, and
organizational structures. By 1984, Russell Weigley noted that the Army had “resorted to a
questionable preoccupation with preparing for a large-scale war in Europe that appears one of the
least likely forms of war that might actually occur.”145 Nevertheless, the Army had its raison d'être,
a sense of purpose and pride especially in contrast to the Vietnam era. ALB was the Army’s
142 Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle, pp. 44 – 45, 69 – 70. 143 Ibid., pp. 46. 144 Ibid., pp. 33, 39. 145 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, 2nd Ed., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp.
558.
36
doctrine and a fundamental part of its new identity. While it is tempting to create a narrative where
1982 is the culmination of nearly a decade’s worth of effort by the Army to change, this overlooks
the fact that the Army and US military still needed to fully institutionalize these changes. By 1982,
the Army had a foundation from which it could develop.
The Army’s Culture:
The Army’s self-proclaimed duty is to win America’s wars. In 1976, the then Chief of Staff
of the Army, General Fred Weyand, claimed, “The American Army really is a people’s Army in
the sense that it belongs to the American people who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its
involvement. When the Army is committed the American people are committed, when the people
lose their commitment it is futile to try to keep the Army committed.”146 Its method of warfare is
evident in its culture, characterized by its constant desire to look to the future, preferring to fight
conventional, state-on-state conflicts, relying on a technological approach to warfare, massed
firepower, a managerial/corporate command style, and distinguished by a strain of anti-
intellectualism. These are necessarily broad to demonstrate the Army’s organizational penchants
and provide a contrast to the intra-organizational conceptualizations of the tribes.
Historically the United States has preferred, and subsequently prepared, to fight what Colin
S. Gray calls “real war… combat against a tolerably symmetrical, regular enemy,” or conventional
war.147 The Second World War, the “good war,” still provides the US military with its culturally
preferred definition of combat: conventional battles between two state’s militaries.148 This was
dramatically expressed in the conduct of General George S. Patton.
146 General Fred Weyand quoted in Sarkesian, Williams, Cimbala, US National Security, pp. 122. 147 Colin S. Gray “The American Way of War: Critique and Implications,” in Anthony D. McIvor ed., Rethinking the
Principles of War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), pp. 31. 148 William A. Stofft (MG, Ret.) in Gole, General William E. DePuy, pp. ix.; John R. Ballard, From Storm to Freedom:
America’s Long War with Iraq (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010).
37
The remarkable successes of the greatest American field general of WWII, George
S. Patton – and his colleagues – inspired a new and highly appealing orthodoxy. It
was based both on the traditional American affinity for accurate, powerful
weaponry and on a newfound attraction to speed of movement. In the face of this
love match between firepower and mobility, American skills at irregular warfare
began to erode.149
In fact, much of the Army’s organizational structure and bureaucracy is tied to its experience in
the Second World War. It was in this cataclysm and trauma that the Army’s combined arms
approach was enshrined.150
The Army’s mid-level officers believe that general (world) war was the most important to
prepare for, followed by regional war, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and then
counterinsurgency.151 However, Robert Cassidy argues that what the US Army defines as war has
occurred for only six hundred hours since 1945.152 This disparity between preparation and practice
is indicative of the Army’s cultural preference for conventional war.
If the Second World War was the Army’s most preferred vision of war, the Cold War acted
as an incubator, preserving the organization’s orientation and preferences. It believed that in the
event of an attack on Western Europe, the Army would destroy the Soviet’s forces, which would
lead to the end of the conflict. In contrast, Vietnam represented the most vivid example of their
149 It is generally argued that America’s experience in the Indian Wars and its counterinsurgency fight in the
Philippines following the Spanish American War gave the US military a unique ability to fight unconventional wars.
Arquilla, The Worst Enemy,pp. 31; Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New
York: Random House, 2005). 150 The US Army has generally been built around the principle of 3’s. Three squads of 6 to 10 soldiers makes a platoon.
Three platoons form a company. Three companies make a battalion, and three battalions form a brigade. A division
in the 1990s was structured around a Division Headquarters; three brigades of infantry, mechanized forces, or armour;
brigade artillery; an aviation brigade, including attack and transport helicopters; an engineer brigade; a brigade sized
divisional support command to manage logistics; and, a series of battalions of communications, intelligence, and air
defence. Only recently has the divisional structure given way to Brigade Combat Teams. Arquilla, The Worst Enemy,
pp. 31, 44; Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 63, 65 – 67; Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 367; Alastair Finlan,
Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies: US and UK Armed Forces in the 21st Century (New York:
Routledge, 2013). 151 Deborah D. Avant and James H. Lebovic, “US Military Responses to Post-Cold War Missions,” in Theo Farrell
and Terry Terriff eds., The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
2002), pp. 139 – 160. 152 Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror.
38
aversion to unconventional conflicts.153 The expectation that a war have a definitive conclusion
reveals the impatience the Army, and the US, assigns to war. Peace is normal; war is an aberration
of that. Therefore, victory should be achieved as quickly and decisively as possible, often relying
on America’s preponderance of power that allows them to wage resource intensive wars of
annihilation in search of complete victory.154 This leads to an expectation that a conflict should
have a clear conclusion, one that often defies the reality of war.155
Related to their continual search for complete victory, the Army tends to be astrategic.
Given the scale of America’s wealth, it gives the US the luxury to fight expensive wars. If, as Gray
states, “strategic necessity is the mother of invention” then America is not burdened with this
dilemma, rather it can simply spend its way to a solution because America’s preponderance of
wealth excludes “campaign conditions of unnecessary discomfort.”156 As General Donn Starry
said, “it is fair to say that with very, very few, very, very striking exceptions, US military thought
to 1945 produced a military system designed to overwhelm by mass in a battle of mass.”157 Victory
would be ensured if enough firepower and formations could be massed against the enemy.
The Army’s focus on the future means that it does not effectively codify lessons learned
and a critical study of history.158 In an effort to predict the crucial features of the ‘next war’, the
153 Terriff, “The Past as Future,” pp. 195 – 228. Colonel Harry G. Summers’ work On Strategy: The Vietnam War in
Context and the “Never Again,” narrative it inspired within the Army demonstrate the organization’s aversion to these
types of wars. Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget; Robert M. Cassidy. “Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State
Regulars versus Non-State Irregulars,” Baltic Security & Defence Review vol. 10 (2008), pp. 61; Linn. Echo of Battle,
pp. 194 – 195; Robert M. Cassidy Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. 154 Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 31 – 32; Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United
States Military Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1973). 155 See Rick’s account of the Gulf War or Bolger’s account of the Iraq War in Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals:
American Military Command from World War II to Today (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), and Bolger, Why We
Lost. 156 Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 30 – 31. 157 Quoted in Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 19. 158 Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 28
39
future is the subject of continuous debates to make the war easier and victory swifter.159 Former
Defence Secretary Robert Gates, railed against “[the] tendency towards what might be called Next-
War-itis — the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of what might be
needed in a future conflict" rather than what was needed for the current conflict.160 This does not
imply that the Army succeeds at ‘fortune telling’ merely that it is culturally wedded and materially
invested in the process.161 Therefore, learning from history is largely of secondary importance.
Related to the futuristic orientation is the Army’s preference for leveraging developments
in technology in its conduct of war. This manifests itself in a tendency to undervalue the ‘human’
aspects of war.162 Exemplified in their approach to the information technology revolution, which
gave rise to a vision of warfare where “a robust, redundant, and flexible network of
communications and intelligence systems interwoven into a seamless surface-to-space
continuum… [providing] an unblinking eye of constant surveillance.”163 Instead of mass, whether
the weight of a tank or the number of boots on the ground, information gathered from sensors and
communicated via networks could achieve victory on the battlefield.164 The Army’s reliance on
technology is connected with another cultural trait, an affinity for machines. Gray states that “the
exploitation of machinery is the American way of war.”165 General George S. Patton claimed that
Americans as a race are the most adept in the use of machinery of any people on
earth, and… the most adept at the production of machines on a mass production
159 Murray was speaking of the revolution in military affairs as being an example of a tendency to constantly look to
the future of warfare in American military cultures. Murray Williamson War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 90. 160 Gates is referring to the Iraq War. Associated Press, “Military must focus on current wars, Gates says.” 161 See chapter 5 “Forecasting War,” in Scales, Scales on War. 162 Colin S. Gray, “Strategy in the Nuclear Age, 1945 - 1991,” in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin
Bernstein eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See
also Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff. Transforming Military Power Since the Cold War, pp. 285. 163 Robert Scales. Future War: Anthology (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1999), pp. 24 quoted in
Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff. Transforming Military Power Since the Cold War, pp. 47. 164 This is a case where cultural traits can occasionally conflict. During the 1990’s, this conclusion was verified by
mathematical models and simulations. Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff. Transforming Military Power Since the Cold
War, pp. 83; Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 165. 165 Gray, “The American Way of War,” pp. 29.
40
basis. It costs about $40,000 for a man to get killed. If we can keep him from
getting killed by a few extra dollars, it is a cheap expenditure.166
While there is an emphasis on the human soldier it has always been superseded by the combination
of technology and machines.167 This leads to the attitude that any problem can be rectified by an
‘engineering fix’ and can lead the armed forces and civilian leaders to assume the existence of a
solution instead of accepting the intransigence of some problems.168
The US has a history of overcoming geography, making them what Gray calls “[masters]
of logistics.”169 A result of the westward expansion during America’s formative years in the 18th
and 19th centuries.170 The Army’s ability to master logistics is evident in the elaborate
bureaucracies that have been created to sustain missions around the globe. A skill that often isolates
the logistical ‘tail’ from the fighting by the ‘teeth’.171
The Army’s ability to not only mass firepower but rely on it to achieve victory forms one
of the organization’s essential cultural traits. The Army’s chosen method to deliver firepower
combines their preference for overwhelming force with technological superiority.172 A feature that
is evident in the technological and destructive capabilities of the M1 Abrams main-battle tank,
M109A6 Paladin self-propelled 155mm artillery, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the
AH-64 Apache attack helicopter. During the Korean War at the Battle for Pork Chop Hill in 1953,
Army artillery fired 37,000 rounds over twenty four hours in support of a single regiment.173
‘Problem solving’ with firepower often limits the Army’s choice of tactics to those that involve
166 Quoted in, Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, pp. 7. 167 Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 29 – 30. 168 Ibid., pp. 28 – 29. 169 Ibid., pp. 590. 170 Gray “Strategy in the Nuclear Age”; Peter Maslowski, “To the Edge of Greatness: The United States, 1783 – 1865,”
in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 205 – 241. 171 The “tooth-to-tail” ratio is military vernacular for the ratio between those that do the actual fighting and those that
support them. Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 32 – 33 172 Finlan, Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies. 173 Scales, Yellow Smoke, pp. 47.
41
destruction, excluding other, potentially more subtle, methods to achieve tactical, operational or
strategic goals. An additional effect of this is the dehumanizing of the enemy, reducing them to
targets, instead of acknowledging them as an adaptable and complex enemy.174 Firepower also
provides the Army a way to preserve soldiers’ lives, soldiers who are expensive to train, maintain,
and care for. Furthermore, friendly casualties can produce disillusionment at home and lead the
American people to withdraw support for missions, meaning the Army believes “it is better to send
a bullet than a man.”175 The ability to mass sufficient firepower necessary to overwhelm its
enemies is related to the nation’s production, manufacturing, material abundance, and
technological prowess.176
Another important aspect of the Army’s culture is the corporate managerial practices
underwriting the Army’s command traditions. Shamir Eitan argues that following the Vietnam
War the Army began adopting corporate business practices, and assumed that these would lead to
success in modern warfare.177 This attempt to regulate warfare is clearly demonstrated in the
Army’s belief in their own doctrine to inform, guide, and structure behavior.178 Army officers
began to imitate members of the business world, where a set of parameters artificially defines
“success” around a small series of “career enhancing positions and experiences,” such as
command, acting as an aide-de-camp, and key staff positions. The individual evaluation system
that determines promotions is often dependent upon qualities that have no relation to the suitability
174 Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 30 175 The belief that it is better to use bullets than men is associated with Krepinevich’s ‘Army Concept’. Gray, “The
American Way of War,” pp. 33; Scales, Scales on War, pp. 27 – 36; quoted in Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam,
pp. 5. 176 Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 196 – 197; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror,
pp. 33 – 34. 177 Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the US, British, and Israeli Armies
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 57 – 66. 178 Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 144.
42
of an officer.179 These pressures acting upon officers combined with the post-Cold War drawdown,
led to the “toxic” environment in the 1990’s characterized by the “zero-defect army” where one
failure would be enough to bar an officer’s advancement.180 The notion of a “zero-defect army” is
intriguing as it demonstrates an aversion to risk taking, whether at base or on deployment.181
During deployments to the Balkans in the 1990’s, the career implications that casualties carried
became such a “debilitating obsession” that deployed soldiers had to wear body armour at all times,
even while on base and off duty.182
Although the Army may rely on technology and engineering fixes, it is distinctly anti-
intellectual. This reflects the institution’s inability to not only produce officers that can critically
think but to accept and incorporate critical thought. This is rooted in the assumption that ‘doing’
or ‘acting’ are not possible if you are ‘thinking.’183 It is advantageous to be perceived as a
“simpleton” rather than an intellectual, demonstrated by the statement “everyone has his place,
and I accept mine. I’m just happy being a sergeant, what do I know?”184 The Army’s training
program produces officers that can function with limited autonomy and individual action.185 Even
senior officers and non-commissioned officers self-deprecatingly refer to themselves as ‘soldiers’
179 Donald Vandergriff Manning the Future Legions of the United States: Finding and Developing Tomorrow’s
Centurions (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 166. 180 Thornton identifies a recurring pattern of ‘zero-defects’ in the US Army, arguing that its origins developed in the
Second World War. The first explicit appearance of the concept of ‘zero-defects’ being identified as an issue from
within the Army appeared in a 1970 War College report Study on Military Professionalism. See Walt Ulmer (LTC)
and Mike Malone (LTC), Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, 1970); Rod
Thornton, “Cultural barriers to organisational unlearning: The US Army, the ‘zero-defects’ culture and operations in
the post-cold war world,” Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol. 11, No. 3 (2000), pp. 139 – 159. 181 Thornton, “Cultural barriers to organisational unlearning.,” 182 Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 50 – 52. 183 Lieutenant Joseph Riley’s promotional story is a contemporary example of this. Riley, both a top ranked ROTC
cadet in 2013 and a Rhodes Scholar, was being passed over for promotion because he did not pursue the traditional
military jobs expected of young officers. David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “First Steps Towards the Force of the
Future,” War on the Rocks (December 1, 2015) (accessed December 3, 2015) http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/first-
steps-towards-the-force-of-the-future/; Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 77; Vandergriff, Manning the Future Legions of
the United States, pp. 39. 184 Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 87. 185 Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 158.
43
or ‘shoot, I’m just an old soldier.’186 Furthermore, critical thinking is not assessed in the Officer
Evaluation Report (OER), which defers to those with seniority rather than experience, knowledge,
or a capacity for thinking. Even those with what might appear to be an exceptional OER may lack
the ability to think critically.187 Therefore, the few officers who reach the rank of brigadier general
are predisposed to accept those ‘innovators’ who pose a challenge to the system that got them
promoted in the first place.188
General DePuy once commented that “we do not train brigade, division, and corps
commanders in the US Army. We simply take a chance than an intelligent officer who has survived
the promotion system must have some built in intelligence and instincts that will make him an
effective commander.”189 The anti-intellectualism within the Army has other consequences, such
as the tendency to be culturally ignorant. The failure to understand the enemy has led to a
significant amount of problems that the US has faced during wartime.190
This section has outlined several significant themes and sub-themes that comprise the US
Army’s culture. The Army’s cultural preference for conventional conflicts also includes the belief
that war should be finished as quickly as possible, using overwhelming force, firepower, and
technology irrespective of strategic necessity. Second, the future orientation of the Army means
that it constantly looks ‘forward’, disregarding historical lessons. Third, the Army is infatuated
with using technology to achieve victory, solve problems, and contribute to the mechanization of
warfare. Fourth, the importance of massed firepower shapes how the Army perceives its enemy,
and how it attempts to problem solve. This cultural trope mutually reinforces and is reinforced by
186 George R. Mastroianni, “Occupations, Cultures, and Leadership in the Army and Air Force,” Parameters Vol. 35,
No. 4 (2005), pp. 79 – 81. 187 Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 177; Vandergriff, Manning the Future Legions of the United States, pp. 40. 188 Scales, Scales on War, pp. 187 – 198; Vandergriff, Manning the Future Legions of the United States, pp. 40. 189 General William E. DePuy quoted in Lock-Pullan US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 17. 190 Gray “The American Way of War,” pp. 29.
44
the inclination to prosecute wars using large-scale means. A corollary to this is the desire to avoid
taking risks that might result in casualties. Fifth, the Army’s command practices have a distinct
corporate/managerial culture to them, where career success is defined around specific parameters
limiting diverse experiences from manifesting themselves in its leadership. Lastly, the anti-
intellectualism manifests itself as a preference for action rather than thinking. While it may be easy
to present the Army’s organizational culture as a list of ‘traits’ determining how they proscribe,
prescribe, regulate, and constitute US Army actions and identities is more difficult.
Conclusions:
The Army of the 1980’s and 1990’s is not separable from the Army of the 1970’s and its
Vietnam experience, nor is it drastically removed from its own culture. History may not repeat
itself exactly, but it does echo in the present and the future. This section’s history of the US Army
in the post-Vietnam period has primarily been focused on large changes dictated by the
organization’s leadership. The culture section reveals the Army’s organizational nuances, and
presents the possibility of how these can have an influence on the Army’s development.
Admittedly, this chapter has focused on a higher level of analysis than the subsequent chapters,
yet this was necessary to demonstrate the power and presence of history and culture. Nevertheless,
this does not rule out the possibility that the tribes’ conceptualizations also have a ‘power’ of their
own. As will be shown, the tribes’ own power shapes their responses to the Army’s structure,
culture, and history.
45
Chapter 3: Cold Warriors, AirLand Battles
The threat of war with the Soviet Union underwrites the period from 1983 to 1989,
especially from the perspective of the United States Army. Although the US was increasingly
active in conflicts across the globe throughout the 1980’s, the Army was not a usual participant;
their duty, and dreams, remained in Europe.191 Given this context, this chapter examines the
conceptualizations of warfare by the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery with the persistent threat of
conflict with the Soviet Union. How the tribes dealt with the theme of consistency says something
about how they deal with a relatively stable strategic environment.192 Especially in contrast to the
post-Cold War period. This will provide an additional source of comparison for the following
chapters. Additionally, this period lacked real war, leaving the tribes free to think about warfare
in, what might be called, the ‘splendid isolation’ of the Cold War.
The increases to defence spending by the Reagan administration resulted in what Nicholas
Lemann termed America’s “first peacetime war.”193 By 1983, the US was spending more than it
had during the peak of the Vietnam War in 1968, and by 1985 it exceeded defence spending during
the Korean War.194 Like the ‘Big 5’, defence spending was focused on developing qualitatively
superior weapons, rather than attempting to match the Warsaw Pact’s quantitatively greater
191 The US military was active throughout the world during this period. The Reagan Doctrine’s emphasis on supporting
anti-communist forces meant that the US was frequently involved in the Third World. However, the US military was
predominantly oriented towards preparing for war in Europe. For general account of the expeditionary missions in the
late 1970s to 1980s, see Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War: An Era of Violent Peace, 1975 to 1986 (Novato: Residio
Press, 1988). See also, Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 866. 192 It should be noted that despite the reduced threat following Mikhail Gorbachev’s initiation of the Glasnost and
Perestroika reforms in 1985 and 1986 respectively, and the Red Army’s defensive posture beginning in 1987, the
strategic environment remained stable. Sam C. Sarkesian, “US National Security Strategy: The Next Decade,” in Sam
C. Sarkesian and John Allen Williams eds., The US Army in a New Security Era (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1990), pp. 1 – 18. 193 Nicholas Lemann, “The Peacetime War: Caspar Weinberger in Reagan’s Pentagon,” The Atlantic Vol. 254, No. 4
(1984), pp. 73. 194 James Fallows, “The Spend-Up: during the Reagan ‘buildup’ our military arsenal has become more expensive but
not larger,” The Atlantic Vol. 258, No. 1 (1986), pp. 27 – 31.
46
military forces.195 The perceived threat posed by the Soviets meant that military planning was
relatively easy. Every American military service matched their own strategies, procurement
policies, training standards, and doctrinal decisions to the Cold War context.196
An appreciation of these trends in US national security is necessary to frame the
investigation into how the tribes conceptualized warfare, but not determinative – or in some cases
even relevant. For example, the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon did not
appear within the professional journals in any detail, however, the intricacies of the National
Training Center was the subject of a great deal of conversation.197 Furthermore, there were
perpetual changes and alterations ongoing within the Army at this time – the development of the
Light Infantry Division and material procurements for example – while they remained focused on
the Soviet Union. These changes are indicative of the constant changes that military organizations
can undergo, even in a period of strategic stability.
As described previously, to counter the situation in Europe, the Army introduced its
AirLand Battle Doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations (1982).198 The next battle would be fought with
massive numbers and quantities of firepower, it would be increasingly lethal with better
information and communications technology. Additionally, the use of nuclear weapons was a
195 By the mid-1980s, there were 42,500 Warsaw tanks to NATO’s 13,000; 31,500 artillery and mortar pieces
compared to 10,750; almost 80,000 armoured personnel carriers to 30,000; and, nearly 7,000 tactical aircraft to 3,000.
Richard Stubbing argues that the US Security establishment oversold the threat posed by Soviet military
developments, such as the T-80 main-battle tank. Much of the discussion in the tribal journals agrees with the
assumption that NATO’s forces were qualitatively superior. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, pp. 231 – 232; Herring,
From Colony to Superpower, pp. 867; Stubbing, The Defense Game, pp. 3 – 28. 196 Especially when compared to the post-Cold War security environment that will be investigated in the following
chapters. Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 101. 197 For a mention of the bombing, see Jim McDonough (LTC) “Letters – Reflections on Fort Benning,” Infantry Vol
74, No. 2 (1984), pp. 50 – 51. The National Training Center is elaborated on further below. 198 In 1986, the Army introduced an updated version of FM 100-5 Operations. This added the concept of operational
art as well as Clausewitzian principles of centres of gravity, as well as numerous historical examples. It also attempted
to balance firepower with maneuver. This ‘update’ did not receive a great deal of attention in the professional journals
analyzed here, it worth mentioning. Citino, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm, pp. 264; Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 211
– 212.
47
possibility. Besides these characteristics, ALB proposed four operational concepts – initiative,
depth, agility, and synchronization. Initiative was the reliance on the offensive spirit to create
opportunities for independent action. Battlefield depth included both space and time. Where, the
success of the fight at the front was linked to the preservation of the rear area of reserves, logistics,
and command and control functions. The tenet of agility referred to the decision speed of officers
and soldiers, as faster decision speed ensured that the enemy is reacting rather than initiating.
Lastly, synchronization implied the coordination of different resources to achieve better results
relative to disparate actions.199
This doctrine produced a powerful, near paradigmatic, approach to warfare. The tribes
consistently reproduced the features of ALB throughout the 1980’s. However, each tribe used the
doctrine’s tenets differently to inform their conceptualizations. The ‘tribal’ approach each combat
branch took is the primary focus of study here. Comparing similarities and differences with each
other and the Army as a whole.
This chapter’s analysis proceeds from the abstract conceptualizations each tribe held about
themselves and warfare, and gradually proceeds to examine how this related to reality. The
examination of each tribes’ roles, duties, and histories – a tribal ‘self-conceptualization’ does not
constitute timeless beliefs but rather contextual ones. Followed by the tribes’ identifiable
conceptualizations of warfare. The second part of this chapter is dedicated to a series of themes
that add depth to the analysis because they display tribal conceptualizations implicitly. These
include training, technology, combined arms warfare, and the National Training Center. The final
section depicts each tribe’s thoughts relating to the spectrum of conflict, through an examination
of the light division and material factors. The range of analytical sections provides a holistic view
199 Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the
Army, 1982), pp. 1-1 – 2-4.
48
of the number of factors influencing the Army’s tribes, but also to set the foundation for further
analysis in later chapters that builds upon the themes discussed at length here.
The Infantry:
You wouldn’t introduce either your sister or your daughter to an infantryman. He
prefers field duty when the weather is (at the very least) uncooperative. He wallows
in the mud – and loves it. He lends atmosphere to what otherwise might be a stuffy
affair. The infantryman is the guy on the ground with the gun. The infantry is the
first in and the last out.200
The Infantry tribe describes their duty as to “close with and destroy the enemy.”201 Which
was assumed to be an unchanging historical fact.202 It would be dangerous and dirty, the most
challenging task on the battlefield requiring great skill, and the ultimate arbiter of victory.203 They
are the “tip of the spear,” where all of the Army’s effort comes to a bloody finale with the efforts
of the individual rifleman; “after all, it is the rifleman to whom falls the ultimate challenge: defeat
the enemy on a man-to-man basis and secure victory by bullet and bayonet.”204 This belief is
vividly expressed in the “spirit of the bayonet” combining the physicality, moral courage, and
training surrounding the bayonet and the Infantryman that wields it.205 In contrast to the Army’s
200 Douglas A. Martz (MAJ) “Letters – Infantry Images,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6 (1986), pp. 6. 201 For example, see Joseph J. Angsten, Jr. (LTC, Infantry) “Prepared to Fight,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 1 (1983), pp. 9. 202 Brian H. Chermol (LTC) “Battle Fatigue,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 1 (1984), pp. 13 – 15; Michael F. Spigelmire (MG)
“The Point of the Spear,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 6 (1988), pp. 1 – 2. 203 John W. Foss (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 2 (1985), pp. 2; Peter A. Eschbach (CPT) “The
US Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 2 (1985), pp. 22 – 34 204 Chuck Grist (SSG) “Letters – Only a Grunt?,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6 (1986), pp. 7. 205 Lee S. Rodriguez (CSM) “Like Bayonet, Still Around,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 1 (1983), pp. 50; Gary A. Bracht
(CPT) “Live Fire Exercises,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 6 (1985), pp. 36 – 38; Chuck Grist (SSG) “Letters – Only A
Grunt?,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6 (1986), pp. 7; Sam Wetzel, “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 4 (1983),
pp. 2; Robert J. Berens (COL ret.) “The Bayonet: Simple But Dependable,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 3 (1988), pp. 14 –
16; David H. Petraeus (CPT) “Building Morale Through PT,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 2 (1983), pp. 11 – 12; George A.
Fisher (LTC) “Combat Cross-Country Course,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 3 (1983), pp. 36 – 37; Gregory T. Banner (CPT)
“A Physical Training SOP,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 2 (1989), pp. 41 – 42; Sam Wetzel (MG) “Commandant’s Note,”
Infantry Vol. 73, No. 2 (1983), pp. 2; Dandridge M. Malone (COL ret.) “Able and Willing,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 2
(1983), pp. 9 – 11.
49
culture, material factors are secondary to the art behind their employment.206 What gives the
Infantry a certain panache are the skills that an infantryman acquires.
I am convinced the infantryman is the ultimate weapon. Whether he walks, rides,
jumps, or flies into battle, his is the most demanding role on the battlefield. He is
the ‘point of the spear’ – the cutting edge, causing it all to happen, putting together
combat power at the point of decision.207
The culmination of this fixation on skill – the physicality, courage, and training of a soldier – is
the Infantry tribe’s worship of the Ranger tab and Expert Infantryman Badge that decorate the
uniform of those who successfully achieve them.208
While the individual infantryman may be the focus of the Infantry, the combination of
infantrymen in platoons and companies brings together the basic unit and one of the most central
elements of the Tribe, leadership. Leadership, like combat, was ahistorical and more of an art than
a science.209 The ability of leadership to bring together unique, individual infantrymen to form
platoons and companies is what makes “well-trained American rifle company is the ultimate
weapon.”210 Leadership was an honour and a responsibility, anything less than commanding troops
206 Jack E. Mundstock (MAJ) “Letters – Universal Skills,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 5 (1987), pp. 2; Kenneth C. Leuer
(MG) “Commandant’s Note: Standardizing Our Units,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 5 (1988), pp. 1; Carl F. Ernst (LTC)
“Letter – Infantry Unlimited,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 1 (1983), pp. 50. 207 Spigelmire (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1. 208 William D. Phillips (CPT) “Ranger Desert Phase,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 2 (1984), pp. 10 – 12. 209 Numerous articles in the 1980’s feature tips and tricks for leaders. For example, see George G. Eddy (COL ret)
“Taking Command,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 3 (1983), pp. 18 – 20; Michael A. Phipps (CPT) “McPherson’s Ridge: A
Study of a Meeting Engagement,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 1 (1984), pp. 21 – 26; A. S. Collins (LTG ret., Infantry)
“Walter Krueger, An Infantry Great,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 1 (1983), pp. 14 – 19; Henry G. Gole (LTC) “A Personal
Reflection on Leadership,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 5 (1983), pp. 13; George G. Eddy (COL ret.) “The Leadership
Dozen,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 5 (1984), pp. 14 – 18. 210 Garold L. Tippin (MAJ) “Infantry in Action: Infantry Charge,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 4 (1987), pp. 35. See also,
Harold E. Raugh, Jr. (CPT) “The Company XO,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 5 (1983), pp. 10 – 11; Mike Hughes (CPT)
“Cohesion in a Non-COHORT Company,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 4 (1985), pp. 16 – 17; John F. Antal (CPT) “Unit
Battle Drills,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 4 (1983), pp. 31 – 32.
50
was a secondary assignment.211 The articles’ descriptions of D-Day in the Second World War often
combined the spirit of the bayonet with leadership.212
Conceptualizing Warfare in the Infantry:
The potential of high-intensity conflict against the Warsaw Pact in East and West Germany
was at the heart of the tribe’s conceptualization of warfare during the 1980s. This war “in the
Federal Republic of Germany would be fought on the rolling, fairly vacant, northern plans.”213 The
highly conventional war would be incredibly lethal, require greater mobility, be complex, chaotic
and, intense, feature operations night and day, and be very fast.214 Consequently, technology – an
important factor – was secondary to the skills and art of the infantryman to fight amidst the human
nature of war.215 These constituted the tribe’s most fundamental characterizations of war.
211 Commanding platoons and companies as a lieutenant or captain was the pinnacle of the Infantry tribe. The anti-
thesis of this was the ‘manager’ who was a bureaucrat. Someone who relied on scientific practices of command,
focused on promotions, and demonstrated an inability to lead in combat. Bernard Loeffke (BG) “Values for Infantry
Leaders,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 5 (1986), pp. 11 – 12; Danny W. Davis (CPT) “A Plan for Command,” Infantry Vol.
78, No. 5 (1988), pp. 25 – 34; Walter J. Sutterlin (CPT) “The HHC Commander,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 3 (1983), pp.
9 – 10; Dandridge M. Malone (COL ret.) “Teamwork,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 3 (1983), pp. 6 – 8; George G. Eddy
(COL ret) “Who’s on First?,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 4 (1983), pp. 21 – 23; Edward G. Burley (ROTC candidate)
“ROTC Rangers,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 3 (1983), pp. 33 – 34. 212 Albert H. Smith Jr. (MG ret.) “Infantry in Action: D-Day – Forty Years Plus One,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 3 (1985),
pp. 33 – 38; Leroy Doppel (COL ret.) “Letters – Training Analysis,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 6 (1984), pp. 48; John W.
Foss (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 3 (1984), pp. 2. 213 The assumption that the war would take place in the countryside ignored the urban nature of much of West Germany
as some commentators were quick to point out. Lester W. Grau (LTC) “MOUT and the Soviet Motorized Rifle
Battalion,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 1 (1985), pp. 25. For critics of the predominately rural focus, see Charles M. Ayers
(MAJ) “Letters – MOUT Training Inadequate,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 4 (1987), pp. 5; William R. Desobry (LTG ret.)
“Brute Strength, Not Finesse,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 4 (1987), pp. 9 – 12; Christopher E. Allen (CPT) “The M203 in
Urban Fighting,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 6 (1985), pp. 35 – 36; David A. Rubenstein (CPT) “MOUT and the Medic,”
Infantry Vol. 77, No. 4 (1987), pp. 40 – 41. 214 Variations of these descriptors all appear in a variety of articles in Infantry. For example, see Leuer (MG)
“Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Thomas M. Jordan (CPT) “The Commander’s Intent,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 3
(1988), pp. 11 – 12; James Yarrison (LTC ARNG) “Letters – Auftragstatik,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 1 (1990), pp. 3;
Malone (COL ret.) “Teamwork,” pp. 6 – 8. 215 Reflecting their mentality, the Infantry perceived all of these characteristics as fundamentally possessing a human
nature, where the application of rote principles and standard operating procedures would not achieve victory. Gole
(LTC) “A Personal Reflection on Leadership,” pp. 12 – 15; Chermol (LTC) “Battle Fatigue,” pp. 13 – 15; Richard F.
Timmons (COL) “The Moral Dimension: The Thoughts of Ardant du Picq,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 6 (1985), pp. 10 –
11.
51
While the Infantry’s duty was timeless, a conflict with the Soviet Union would be distinctly
modern in character. Despite their belief in the unchanging nature of their role in combat, history
would play a limited role in preparing for this war. A contradiction between their mentality and
conceptualization, which reveals the unique priority placed on ‘the future’ within the Army’s
culture.216 Additionally, words like conflict and war implied conventional, mid-to-high-intensity
warfare and any discussion of low-intensity conflict was clearly identified as being such.
The Infantry argued that combat was dictated by an action-reaction cycle. The side that
could react and make decisions faster would gain the initiative in combat, resulting in victory in
the fast-paced combat of ‘modern’ war.217 Commentators in Infantry continually referenced that
the offensive was the best way to attain the initiative by forcing the enemy to react and respond
rather than allowing them the ability to determine the point of engagement themselves.218 This was
reinforced by their reading of ALB, which implied “an offensive spirit in the conduct of all
operations.” Although, not all aspects of ALB adhered so closely to the Army’s culture. It
emphasized that the Army should accept risks.219 The Infantry universally accepted ALB as the
approach to warfare.220 Who believed it had returned maneuver to the battlefield, where engaging
the enemy with subtlety and surprise was better than the direct approach. This was included in the
conceptualization of the action-reaction cycle, because it would unhinge an enemy’s ability to fight
216 For example, see Robert L. Maginnis (CPT) “Independence on the Modern Battlefield,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 5
(1984), pp. 29 – 31; Harold E. Raugh Jr. (CPT) “Professional Reading Program,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 2 (1986), pp.
12 – 14; Grau (LTC) “MOUT and the Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion,” pp. 24 – 26; John L. Lane (MAJ) “Military
History: Its Importance Today,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 3 (1987), pp. 11 – 12. In extreme cases even the Second World
War was believed to be incomparable to the scale and scope of a war with the Soviet Union. See, Robert L. Maginnis
(MAJ) “Combat Motivation,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 3 (1986), pp. 15 – 17. 217 Antal (CPT) “Unit Battle Drills,” pp. 31 – 32; Nicholas G. Psaki III (MAJ) “Execution Matrix,” Infantry Vol. 74,
No. 1 (1984), pp. 33 – 34. 218 Allen L. Tiffany (CPT) “Light Infantry Scouts in the Desert,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 5 (1989), pp. 27 – 31; Curtis
L. Cook “Initiative: The Spirit of the Offensive,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 2 (1985), pp. 13 – 15. 219 Curtis L. Cook “Initiative: The Spirit of the Offensive,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 2 (1985), pp. 15. 220 Joseph K. Miller (CPT) “The Platoon Team,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 1 (1985), pp. 14 – 16; Matthew Moten (CPT)
“CAMBs A Better Solution,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 5 (1988), pp. 13 – 15; Spigelmire (MG) “Commandant’s Note,”
pp. 1 – 2; Stephen E. Runals (LTC) “Hasty River Crossings,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 4 (1989), pp. 15 – 17.
52
effectively, rather than attriting them.221 This was a necessity given the quantitative disparity
between the Soviets and the West. The Army had to fight better with less in order to win.222
The Infantry’s idealized form of warfare was a combination of their mentality and their
conceptualization of war with the Soviet Union. The term ‘idealized’ refers to a tribe’s most
preferred conception of warfare. For them, the idealized form of war was that of the platoon or
company, cut off from higher command and forced to use their own skills and leadership to achieve
victory. Future battlefields required these leaders to act independently on a complex, fluid, and
fast-paced modern battlefield.223 Independent action was a necessity given the chaos of modern
warfare – the fog of uncertainty – negating attempts by command and control systems to instill
order.224 Empowering these leaders with as much information as possible, however possible,
would allow them to lead their infantrymen to victory.225 This is evidence of tribal
conceptualizations contradicting the Army’s attempts to ‘regulate’ warfare.
The Infantry tribe conceptualized that any future war against the Soviet Union would be
uniquely ‘modern’ in character. This ‘modern’ war would be highly conventional, complex, lethal,
fast-paced, continuous, mobile, and non-linear. Furthermore, these future conflicts will be unlike
221 Carl F. Ernst (COL) and David M. White (MAJ) “Bradley Infantry on the Battlefield,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 3
(1986), pp. 20 – 24; John W. Foss (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 6 (1985), pp. 2 – 3; Edwin H.
Burba Jr. (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 4 (1986), pp. 2 – 3. However, as will be seen in the
maneuver debates of the mid- to late- 1990s, maneuver was also conceptualized solely as movement. See for example,
Joel E. Williamson (LTC) “Command and Control,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 3 (1986), pp. 25 – 29; Ernst (COL) and
White (MAJ) “Bradley Infantry on the Battlefield,” pp. 20 – 24. 222 Miller (CPT) “The Platoon Team,” pp. 14 – 16. 223 Maginnis (CPT) “Independence on the Modern Battlefield,” pp. 29 – 31; Yarrison (LTC ARNG) “Letters –
Auftragstatik,” pp. 3; John L. Silva (LTC) “Auftragstatik: Its Origins and Development,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 5
(1989), pp. 6 – 9. 224 Kenneth C. Leuer (MG) “Commandant’s Note: Training the Force,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 6 (1987), pp. 1 – 2;
Frank A. Kerkemeyer (CPT) “Auftragstaktik,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 6 (1987), pp. 28 – 30. 225 Robert R. Leonhard (CPT) “Counter-Reconnaissance Company,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 1 (1988), pp. 23 – 26;
Wayne A. Siklett (LTC) “72 Ways to Win Bigger,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 5 (1985), pp. 38 – 40; David J. Ozolek
(MAJ) “Reconnaissance Planning: A Neglected Art,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 2 (1986), pp. 27 – 31.
53
any previous one, in either the magnitude or characteristics. Only through offensive action outlined
in ALB, would action by independent platoons and companies of Infantry lead to victory.
The Armor:
Armor, while it offers mobility and shock like the cavalry of old, is closer to the
heavily armored knight. It is the apex of the combined arms team. It is the solid steel
anvil of the battlefield upon which an enemy attack would break. It is the sharp
cutting end of cold steel which delivers the shock-producing cut for the cavalry,
infantry and artillery to exploit.226
At its most basic level, the Armor tribe believed in the potency of combining a
technologically advanced tank with a well-trained and brilliant crew. It would not be an ordinary
tank, but a main-battle tank (MBT), the most important element of the combined arms team and
specifically designed to fight in conventional wars. Secondly, it could produce decisive results on
the battlefield. Third, they were deeply rooted in their history, especially their origin story during
the inter-war years. Lastly, and related to their origins, they were advocates of ‘innovative’ and
‘brilliant’ approaches to the conduct of warfare.
The ability to fight exclusively mounted with MBT’s that possessed speed, psychological
shock, and firepower was central to the tribe’s mentality and self-conceptualization. With these
traits, an armoured force could, single handed, turn the tide of a battle as the ‘combat arm of
decision.’227 The Armor tribe is the most identity driven of the Army’s combat branches. The
Armored tribe’s duty was to “seize terrain through offensive action”, “to close with and destroy
226 Kenneth Lachlann (CPT USAR) “Letters – Berets Make Sense,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 5 (1987), pp. 3. 227 Alfred T. Bowen (MAJ) “Letters – Stratified Armor and the Light Tank,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 4 (1983), pp. 3 – 4;
James Crowley (LTC) “Killer Tank Crews,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 5 (1984), pp. 21 – 23; Steven J. Eden (1LT) “Letters
– Autoloaders,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 1 (1985), pp. 3 – 4; Dale K. Brudvig (COL) “Letters – Heavy Force Needs Better
Name,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 4 (1983), pp. 2; Peter R. Mansoor (1LT) “The Defense of the Vienna Bridgehead,” Armor
Vol. 95, No. 1 (1986), pp. 26 – 32; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Armor Support to Light Forces,”
Armor Vol. 93, No. 1 (1984), pp.5 – 6; John R. Acker (LTC ret.) “Letters – Tank Format Debate Goes On,” Armor
Vol. 96, No. 1 (1987), pp. 3 – 4; Franklin Y. Hartline (LTC) “Pertinent Questions, Where Are the Answers?,” Armor
Vol. 96, No. 3 (1987), pp. 50.
54
the enemy” and, perhaps the most emblematic, “close with and roll over the enemy.”228 As part of
the Big 5 procurements, the M1 Abrams reinvigorated the tribe. The tank’s ability to travel at high
speeds, fire on the move, and protect the crew corresponded with the tribe’s mentality and their
conceptualization of war.229 Even with the emphasis on the tank crew, the importance of the
MBT’s materiality differentiated the Armor from the Infantry and indicated Armor’s use of
machines to fill capability gaps.230 This echoes the Army’s culture.
Like the Infantry, the Armor tribe envisioned offensive operations as the key to victory.231
The ‘state of mind’ of the Armored tribe was “adept at the cut-and-thrust of firepower-based force
destruction as well as parry and counterthrust of maneuver-based force disruption.”232 Major
General Frederic J. Brown’s slogan, “forge the thunderbolt!” was a powerful illustration of the
Armor tribe’s conceptualization of precise and swift application of military power.233 However,
this did not indicate a scientific approach to warfare. Instead, the tankers’ skill and aggressiveness
were vital to victory, visible in the statement by Major General Thomas Tait, Commandant of the
228 Kenneth R. McGinty (MAJ) “Attack Helicopters are Offensive Weapons,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 2 (1983), pp. 43;
T. G. Quinn (COL ret.) “Letters – A View On Armor Manning,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 4 (1985), pp. 2 – 3; Mike Deaton
(CPT) “Letters – Tank Format Debate,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 1 (1987), pp. 3. 229 The M1 also suffered from weight restrictions as well as a high rate of fuel consumption. These negatives only
appear sparingly throughout the journals, and are largely left to logisticians to discuss. Kagan, Finding the Target, pp.
36 – 40. 230 Steven Ray Witkowski (1LT) “The Return of the Gunned Tank Destroyer,” Armor Vol. 98, No. 2 (1989), pp. 21 –
25; Bourton S. Boudinot (LTC ret.) “A Missing Link in Support of Light and Heavy Forces,” Armor Vol. 98, No. 2
(1989), pp. 40 – 41. 231 Martin E. Dempsey (MAJ) and Alfred C. Tanner (CPT) “Hot Refuel: Part of the Agility Equation,” Armor Vol.
98, No. 3 (1989), pp. 14 – 17; John J. McGrath (1LT) “A New Concept for Combined Arms,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 1
(1984), pp. 46 – 47; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Report – 1984 Armor Conference,” Armor Vol. 93, No.
4 (1984), pp. 21 – 22; Brudvig (COL) “Letters – Heavy Force Needs Better Name,” pp. 2. 232 Michael S. Lancaster (MAJ) and John Clemens “AirLand Battle Defeat Mechanisms,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 1 (1983),
pp. 37. 233 Major General Brown constantly uses this sign-off throughout his long tenure as the commandant of the Armor
School at Fort Knox. For example, see Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 1 (1983),
pp. 5.
55
Armor School at Fort Knox, to “treat ‘em rough” or the emphasis on “guts, and luck” in the
attack.234
The tribe’s origins provided them with lineage that was not prioritized by the other tribes.
The Cavalry were the ancestors of the Armored tribe, but the development of the MBT
fundamentally changed the combat arm by adding survivability and firepower to the existing
mobility of the horse.235 Like other armies during the interwar period, the development of the tank
and armoured warfare was not guaranteed.236 Major General Brown’s “thunderbolt” was forged in
the interwar period, as the US Army grappled with what to do with mechanized technology. In the
face of entrenched interests within the Army, the modern version of the tribe emerged.237 It was
the innovative thinking and leadership of a group of officers led by Brigadier General Adna
Chaffee, who succeeded in creating the armored force that would exist in “a balanced team of
combat arms and services… of equal importance and equal prestige.”238 The founding of the
combined arms mantra in the Army cemented the relations between the combat branches, while
also granting independence and equality to the Armored branch.239 The tribe’s conceptualization
of warfare was significantly influenced by their origins in military innovation and independence.
234 For example, see Thomas H. Tait (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Teamwork,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 6 (1986), pp. 7;
Robert W. Kovacic (MAJ) “Attacking a Strongpoint,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 1 (1983), pp. 17 – 20. 235 McGinty (MAJ) “Attack Helicopters are Offensive Weapons,” pp. 43 – 44. 236 The Tank Corps, established in 1917, was the United States Army’s first armoured force. During the interwar years,
the tank went from being used as an infantry support weapon to an experimental weapon, integrating different concepts
of war. Despite scepticism from Army leaders, the 1928 intervention by Secretary of War Dwight F. Davis pushed the
Army to experiment with mechanized units beyond just supporting infantry. The early Armored tribe’s home of 33,000
acres at Fort Knox, Kentucky steadily grew in size and importance within the Army as the site of mechanization.
Continued exercises and the German invasions of Poland and France contributed to the importance assigned to
armored formations. However, it was not until 1950 Army Organization Act that the Armored Force was given Branch
status alongside the acceptance of the combined arms approach. Robert S. Cameron, Mobility, Shock, and Firepower:
The Emergence of the U.S. Army’s Armor Branch, 1917 – 1945 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United
States Army, 2008); Robert S. Cameron, “Fort Knox: Birthplace of Today’s Armor Branch,” Armor Vol. 115, No. 6
(2006), pp. 26 – 33. See Kier, Imagining War, for a depiction of the British case. 237 Edward G. Miller (CPT) “Armor’s First Struggle,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 2 (1985), pp. 13 – 17. 238 Bruce C. Clarke (GEN ret.) “Letters – Carrying Out Order,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 4 (1984), pp. 4. 239 Thomas H. Tait (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Combined Arms,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 5 (1986), pp. 5.
56
If the origins of the Armored tribe were the interwar period, the trial by fire of the armour
concept was the Second World War and the armoured breakout from Normandy across France and
Germany.240 From the breakout from Normandy as part of Operation Cobra to the 4th Armored
Division’s thrust into St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge, the campaign from 1944 to 1945
proved the capabilities of the Armored tribe.241 Sergeant First Class, Stephen D. Kennedy, wrote
“It wasn’t the 82nd Airborne or the Rangers or the Green Berets who fought through the steel ring
encircling the 101st Airborne. It was Colonel Creighton Abrams in his tank, with the rest of the 4th
Armored Division, who punched through and saved the day.”242 The Armored tribe’s mentality
and identity was based upon a historical perspective, the belief in the decisiveness of the tank, the
innovative nature of armoured warfare, and the potent combination of crew and MBT. These
formed the basis of the Armored tribe’s self-conceptualization.
Armored Conceptualizations:
The Armored tribe cherished offensive action, the centrality of initiative, maneuver
warfare, and the brilliant conduct of operations that capitalize on the MBT’s inherent strengths.
Taken to its extreme, the Armor tribe’s idealized form of warfare consisted of rapid offensives and
decisive thrusts into the enemy’s rear areas that would shock and paralyze their ability to react,
resulting in quick, cost-effective victories.
240 While the North African campaign received a great deal of attention – primarily because of the reverence held
towards the German general Erwin Rommel. James M. Snyder (COL ret) “Letters – 1st Armored Division Commander
Upheld,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 2 (1983), pp. 3; William R. Beston (CPT) “Armor in the RDF: Oran, 1942,” Armor Vol.
93, No. 2 (1984), pp. 36 – 43. 241 Thomas Dooley (COL ret) “The First US Tank Action in World War II,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 4 (1983), pp. 10 –
15; Stephen D. Borrows (CPT) “COBRA: The Normandy Breakout,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 5 (1984), pp. 24 – 29;
Stephen D. Borrows (CPT) “Armor’s Stand at St. Vith,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 6 (1984), pp. 24 – 30; Christopher F.
Schneider (SSG) “Letters – Some St. Vith Thoughts,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 2 (1985), pp. 2 – 3; Bruce C. Clarke (GEN
ret.) “An Estimate of the Armor Situation,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 6 (1986), pp. 34 – 36. 242 Stephen D. Kennedy (SFC) “Bring Back the Beret,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 4 (1986), pp. 44 – 45.
57
Like the Infantry, the Armor tribe believed that the next war would have a distinctly modern
character, which would differentiate it from any previous conflict. Its fluidity, speed, depth,
violence and lethality, and advanced technologies would be without compare.243 Major General
Thomas Tait’s assertion that “We did a lot of dumb things in Vietnam, and many of the lessons
learned simply do not apply to today’s high speed, high technology, heavy combat” is evidence of
this pattern of thought.244 The first battle of the next war was uniquely important to the tribe. Unlike
previous wars, there would be no opportunity to learn over time. The side that won the first
engagement would gain the initiative necessary to be victorious in subsequent battles.245 This ‘first
battle’ logic propelled the Armored tribe to prepare for a specific vision of war rather than
investigating how it could manifest in different ways, intensifying the narrow focus on combat
with the Soviets in Europe.
The tribe believed that they played a central role in AirLand Battle.246 Echoing ALB,
offense was the only path towards victory because it was the best way to gain and retain initiative
in combat.247 “Our current doctrine, AirLand Battle, attempts to structure the battlefield so that an
armor-heavy task force can strike deep into the enemy’s rear, disrupting his communications, his
243 Randall L. Grant (1LT) “Minerollers: Mobility for the Armor Task Force,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 3 (1986), pp. 30 –
35; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 3 (1983), pp. 5 – 6; Robert P. Bush (MAJ)
“The Division Commander’s Eyes and Ears,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 5 (1983), pp. 13 – 17; Frederic J. Brown (MG)
“Commander’s Hatch – Armor Assessment, Part III: Training and Equipment,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 3 (1986), pp. 5 –
8; Thomas D. Mayfield (CPT) “Is Your Personnel Action Center Ready For War?,” Armor Vol. 98, No. 1 (1989), pp.
36 – 39; Michael W. Everett (MAJ) “Moving a Heavy Division Under Radio Silence,” Armor Vol. 98, No. 1 (1989),
pp. 43 – 49; Craig B. Hanford (CPT) “Planning for Air-Ground Operations,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 1 (1984), pp. 37 –
38. 244 Thomas H. Tait (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – So You Want to Command a Battalion,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 5
(1988), pp. 4. 245 Clair E. Conzelman (1LT) “Developing the Situation,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 2 (1983), pp. 47 – 48. 246 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 61; Lancaster (MAJ) and Clemens “AirLand Battle Defeat Mechanisms,” pp. 35 –
37. 247 John L. McGrath (1LT) “The Battle of El Firdan,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 3 (1983), pp.9 – 13; Ralph Peters (1LT)
“Attacking the Attacker,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 3 (1983), pp. 30 – 33; Sherwood E. Ash (LTC) “Counterattack
Planning,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 6 (1983), pp. 23 – 25; James T. Greer (CPT) “Gaining and Exploiting the Initiative,”
Armor Vol. 93, No. 4 (1984), pp. 44 – 45. Some authors even criticized AirLand Battle’s depiction of the ‘fluid
defence’ because it did not advocate for counter-attacks. For example, see Richard D. Phillips (1LT) “Battling for the
Initiative,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 3 (1984), pp. 16 – 19.
58
command and control and, ultimately, his timetable for success.”248 A force of tanks would be the
‘combat arm of decision’ on this battlefield, and only the Army’s tanks would be sufficient to
defeat the Warsaw Pact’s mechanized forces.249
Although offense was envisioned as the only path to victory, the tribe’s conceptualization
of it featured a great deal of nuance. Direct attacks were prohibited while indirect attacks, favoured
by maneuver, warfare would be emphasized. “Maneuver, in the operational sense, is the swift
positioning of combat units to attack the enemy’s rear, strike his flank, cut his lines of
communications, bog him down in non-decisive areas, fall on an isolated segment of his force, or
elude his attack.”250 The inherent decisiveness of the MBT meant that an armoured force behind
an enemy’s lines was “equal to a battalion on his flank or two brigades attacking frontally. No
modern army is trained to handle a relatively small but effective force in an among its rear area
support, communication, and supply echelon.”251 This would be achieved by using brilliant
maneuver – a kind of Clausewitzian genius.252 Only through innovative thinking – similar to the
thinking that resulted in the birth of the tribe – could victory be achieved.253 For example, the
248 Linwood E. Blackburn (LTC) “The Two-Man Tank: An Idea Whose Time Has Come,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 1
(1987), pp. 40. 249 Gilberto Villahermosa (CPT) “T-80: The Newest IT Variant Fires a Laser-Guided Missile,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 4
(1986), pp. 38 – 39; Acker (LTC ret.) “Letters – Tank Format Debate Goes On,” pp. 3 – 4; Crowley (LTC) “Killer
Tank Crews,” pp. 21 – 23; Albert Z. Conner (MAJ) and Robert G. Poirier “Soviet Wartime Tank Formations,” Armor
Vol. 92, No. 3 (1983), pp. 19 – 25; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Armor Assessment, Part I:
Assessing Our Strengths,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 1 (1986), pp. 4 – 6. 250 As will be seen in chapter 5, the tribe did not completely agree on what maneuver warfare was, but the debate only
manifested itself in the mid-to-late 1990’s. Thomas E. White (COL) and John D. Rosenberger (MAJ) “The Armored
Cavalry Regiment: Catalyst for Operational Success,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 2 (1986), pp. 11. Emphasis added. See also,
Mark C. Baur (CPT Infantry) “Letters – GRIT Tactics Clarified,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 1 (1983), pp. 3; John F. Antal
(CPT) “Mission Tactics,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 3 (1987), pp. 9 – 11. 251 The debilitating psychological shock that these operations would inspire in the enemy meant that they would lose
the struggle for the initiative and thus the war. James H. Polk (GEN ret.) “The Criticality of Time in Combat,” Armor
Vol. 97, No. 3 (1988), pp. 12. See also, Andrew F. DeMario (CPT) “When in Doubt Fire!!,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 2
(1988), pp. 48 – 49. 252 White (COL) and Rosenberger (MAJ) “The Armored Cavalry Regiment,” pp. 11 – 15. 253 Alan W. Watts (CPT) “Leading a Platoon on the Integrated Battlefield,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 6 (1983), pp. 26 – 31;
Stephen J. Broussard (MAJ) “Mounting the Deep Counterattack,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 2 (1985), pp. 34 – 35; Thomas
G. Clark (MAJ) “Leadership Doctrine for the AirLand Battle,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 3 (1988), pp. 32 – 34.
59
Allied breakout from Normandy because of Operation Cobra was argued to be the result of “the
speed of an armored advance and adept use of combined arms that would disorganize and confuse
an enemy who was too large to destroy with a head-on frontal assault.”254 Brilliance did not imply
complexity, simplicity was a valuable trait because of the inherent chaos in warfare.255
Compared to the Infantry the Armored tribe conceptualized the action-reaction cycle in
greater depth – a reflection of their emphasis on maneuver warfare. The result was their idealized
vision of warfare. They sought to repeat the German blitzkriegs in Poland and France during the
Second World War.256 For example, Lieutenant Colonel Alan G. Vitters defined blitzkrieg as the
“rapid concentration of forces at a single point, a penetration of enemy defenses, and then a swift
and deep exploitation into the enemy’s rear, employing all means of maneuver and firepower.”257
Linking the tribe’s conceptualization of deep battle to the blitzkrieg concept of warfare verified
their idealized form of warfare’s ability to decisively win battles and achieve strategic effects.258
The addition of John Boyd’s observe-orientate-decide-act (OODA) loop reinforced their
idealized vision.259 Faster decision speed allowed the Army to “crack, then break, the enemy;
moving without pause to exploit inside the enemy’s decision loop.”260 Related directly to the
254 Borrows (CPT) “COBRA,” pp. 29. 255 David W. Marlin (MAJ) and Robert N. Sweeny (CPT) “Improved Company Command and Control,” Armor Vol.
92, No. 6 (1983), pp. 32 – 34; Bruce C. Clarke (GEN ret.) “Letters – AirLand Concept Questioned,” Armor Vol. 93,
No. 2 (1984), pp. 3. 256 For example, see B. H. Friesen (CPT) “Breakout from the Veszprem Railhead,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 1 (1988), pp.
20. 257 Alan G. Vitters (LTC) “Teamwork and Synchronization: The ‘Blitzkrieg’ of the 80’s,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 4
(1987), pp. 43. 258 For a description of German blitzkrieg during the Second World War and its strategic effects, see John Keegan,
The Second World War, (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), pp. 54 – 87. 259 The OODA-loop is based upon the idea of decision making speed, rather than physical speed. Greer (CPT) “Gaining
and Exploiting the Initiative,” pp. 44 – 45; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – The Commander’s Need
for Positive Control,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 6 (1985), pp. 4 – 5; Polk (GEN ret.) “The Criticality of Time in Combat,”
pp. 10 – 13. For an examination of Boyd’s thinking see, Frans Osinga “‘Getting’ A Discourse on Winning and Losing:
A Primer on Boyd’s ‘Theory of Intellectual Evolution’,” Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 34, No. 3 (2013), pp. 603
– 624. 260 Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 4 – 5.
60
strategic situation ALB attempted to address, retired General James Polk wrote “We must seek the
war of maneuver, we must break through, seek the priceless time advantage so that we are ahead
of our adversary, he is reacting to our last move, our time advantage overcomes his numbers, we
get one step ahead, then two steps ahead, then we have him by the throat, when boldness counts,
and numbers don’t matter, and we know and he knows that it is almost over.”261 Initiative was
conceived of as a binary commodity – where possession implied your opponent was without it –
and the Armored tribe would be the one to acquire it for the Army, making them invaluable in
achieving victory.
During the Cold War, the Armored tribe’s conceptualization of warfare reflected an
assumption of conventional warfare in Europe against the mechanized and armoured forces of the
Soviet Union. This expected war would be markedly different from any previous conflicts, in not
only intensity but character as well. For the tribe, victory on this battlefield was related to the
ability of armoured formations of main-battle tanks to conduct innovative, offensive maneuvers
that captured the initiative on the battlefield. Ideally, this would result in the collapse of enemy
forces and achieve strategic effects, reminiscent of the German Wehrmacht’s blitzkriegs during
the Second World War.
Artillery Mentality and Identity:
The Artillery tribe envisioned themselves as the purveyors of destruction. “Only fire
support can mass lethal fires across the battlefield quickly. We’ll determine the outcome of this
crucial battle by silencing the enemy’s artillery and attacking deeply with accurate fires to disrupt
the Threat’s battle tempo.”262 By supporting the maneuver forces – the Infantry and Armor – with
261 Polk (GEN ret.) “The Criticality of Time in Combat,” pp. 13. 262 Raphael J. Hallada (MG) “On the Move – Counterfire for the Jaws of Death,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No.
2 (1989), pp. 2.
61
indirect fires, they would decisively contribute to victory. To accomplish this, the tribe would
integrate sensors, artillery batteries, and command and control into a seamless system, which
would result in the synchronization of fires from different artillery batteries onto the same target.
To do this, they relied on applying advanced technology that made them the most materially
focused tribe.
At its most basic level the Artillery tribe’s duty is to prepare indirect fires.263 A more
nuanced interpretation argued that the tribe’s duty was to “shoot, move, and communicate so that
it fulfills its role as a member of the combined arms team.”264 While they believed in the
importance of their support role, this did not mean that they were subservient to the Infantry or
Armor. As Captain Thomas Hughes argued
When it comes to the variety of missions the Field Artillery is tasked with doing,
the artillery units fire those rounds and missions that the maneuver commander
deems important to the overall mission. If the artillery is firing suppression of
enemy air defense (SEAD), it is not because we are devoted to the Air Force, it is
because the maneuver commander needs air support and the protection thereof for
this current operation. We fire Copperhead at enemy armored vehicles not because
we support Armor, but because the maneuver commander has determined the
enemy tanks pose a threat to his operation.265
Furthermore, the most valuable positions within the Artillery were not amongst the maneuver
forces calling in fire support, but with the Artillery batteries themselves.266 As exemplified by
Major Leroy Beuchele’s statement,
No field artilleryman ever advised me to seek a forward observer or fire support
officer job. Cannon battery jobs are the places to be. That’s our tradition.267
263 Robert A. Glacel (MAJ) “Where Only the Fit Survive,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 5 (1984), pp. 50 – 53. 264 John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 6 (1983), pp. 1. 265 Thomas G. Hughes (CPT) “Letters – Response to ‘Sound Doctrine’,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 5 (1987),
pp. 7. 266 Howard E. Lee (CPT) “A Redleg Solution,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 3 (1985), pp. 8 – 11; Leroy J.
Buechele Jr. (MAJ) “Letters – Tackling a Problem from the Top and the Bottom,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54,
No. 2 (1986), pp. 5. 267 Leroy J. Beuchele Jr. (MAJ) “Letters – Tackling a Problem from the Top and the Bottom,” Field Artillery Journal
Vol. 54, No. 2 (1986), pp. 5.
62
The Artillery regard fire support as vital to the success of the operation itself, not just the tactical
fighting.268 For example, in one of the few cases where Field Artillery mentioned the Second
World War, the efforts of artillerymen in the fight for St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge made
it clear that it was their support rather, than the 4th Armored Division’s attack that was the deciding
factor.269 The tribe saw themselves as an equal, but separate, contributor to victory on the
battlefield.
Like the Infantry and Armor’s claims to a singular path of victory, the Artillery believed
that their unique capability to destroy would produce victory. Captain John Hamilton Jr. wrote “It
is generally recognized that destroying enemy forces is usually far more important than gaining
and holding terrain.”270 Destruction provided a direct route to victory; without an enemy to oppose
the Army they could do what they wanted.271 The ability to destroy was directly linked to the
weapons that they possessed and how they were used. For example, during the Cold War the
Artillery was responsible for maintaining the Army’s nuclear weapons.272 The tribe’s ideal method
for applying destructive power was through pre-planned and closely synchronized missions that
268 Stephen P. Duvall (SFC) “Letters – Designated Hitter,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 1 (1984), pp. 10 – 11;
Raphael J. Hallada (MG) “Chief of Field Artillery’s Message to the Field,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 6
(1987), pp. 5 – 7. 269 Jerry D. Morelock (MAJ) “Death in the Forest,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 5 (1986), pp. 8 – 14; John
Gordon (CPT) “The Gunners of Bastogne,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 5 (1986), pp. 15 – 21. 270 John A. Hamilton Jr. (CPT) “Coup de Grace,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 1 (1984), pp. 17. 271 This belief corresponds with the Army’s culture, but it should be noted that destroying the enemy was done so in
a refined precise manner to be explored below. Christopher A. Cortez (CPT) “Letters – Survival on the AirLand
Battlefield,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 3 (1985), pp. 5. 272 Despite the destructive power of nuclear weapons, a placement with a conventional artillery battery had greater
prestige amongst Artillery officers. The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty spelled the end of the Army’s
Pershing II missiles and their nuclear capability. Ingo Trauchweizer, The Cold War US Army: Building Deterrence
for Limited War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 219 – 220; Jerry D. Morelock (MAJ) “Nuclear
Weapons Technical Inspections,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 2 (1984), pp. 2 – 3; See also, Kevin Jackson
(CPT) “Letters – Qualified Artillerymen,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 4 (1984), pp. 14; Daniel L. Breitenbach
(MAJ) “The End of the Pershing Era: The INF Treaty,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 5 (1987), pp. 13 – 16;
Raphael J. Hallada (MG) “The Field Artillery State-of-the-Branch Address,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 6
(1987), pp. 2 – 3.
63
corresponded to a schedule, which would maximize individual units’ combat potential.273 This
emphasis on destruction corresponds to the Army’s firepower culture, but is in vivid opposition to
the conceptualizations by the Infantry and Armor.
The Artillery believed they were the Army’s most innovative and future focused tribes.
Major General Raphael Hallada argued that, “For 213 years, the Field Artillery has been the leader
of innovation and the decisive arm on the battlefield.”274 Intertwined with the promise of
technological advancements was the tribe’s belief that it was important to prepare for the future –
in terms of future threats as well as potential weapons.275 Many commentators in Field Artillery
connected advances in technology to their ability to provide accurate and effective fire support.276
In comparison to the Infantry and Armor, material aspects exerted a disproportionate influence on
the Artillery.
Artillery Conceptualizations:
The Artillery conceptualized warfare against the Soviet Union in a manner that closely
approximated their material capabilities. They assumed that the lethality of modern warfare was
one of its most important characteristics and since they possessed the Army’s most powerful and
destructive weapons, both conventional and nuclear, their tribe would be the one responsible for
achieving victory.277 Lieutenant General Crosbie Saint, Colonel Tommy Franks, and Major Alan
273 This also meant that the Artillery could fight Robert D. Sander (LTC) “NTC Part I: Top-Down Fire Planning,”
Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No. 3 (1989), pp. 45 – 50; M. Thomas Davis (MAJ) “Curing the Firing Point
Syndrome,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 4 (1985), pp. 19; Patrick C. Sweeney (CPT) “Keep the Fires
Burning,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 1 (1984), pp. 13 – 16; Dick Grabowski (CPT) “Cold Steel I,” Field
Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 2 (1983), pp. 46. 274 Hallada (MG) “The Field Artillery State-of-the-Branch Address,” pp. 2. 275 John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 3 (1984), pp. 1; Stephen W. Lattimore
(MAJ) “Letters – Preparing to Meet the Threat,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 2 (1985), pp. 5; Hughes (CPT)
“Letters – Response to ‘Sound Doctrine’,” pp. 6 – 7. 276 Charles B. Brenner (CPT) “A System That Could Make a Difference,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 5
(1985), pp. 14 – 16. 277 James G. Taphorn (CPT) “A Modest Proposal,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 5 (1983), pp. 19 – 24; Richard
A. Lechowich (1LT) “The Soviet Showdown: A Doctrinal Lesson We Can’t Ignore,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54,
No. 5 (1986), pp. 25 – 27; Peter E. Haglin (CPT) “Mind over Mayhem,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 1 (1985),
64
Moon wrote that destruction would create opportunities on the battlefield: “This concentration on
the enemy is not an endorsement of attrition warfare. Rather, we seek positional and organizational
advantage by focusing and economizing combat power at key points and times to seize the
initiative and, thereby, force the Threat to react rather than allow him to act.”278 This echoed the
other tribes’ emphasis on attaining the initiative and thereby denying it to the enemy. Besides the
expected lethality of the next war, the tribe also believed that modern warfare would be complex.279
However, reproducing the Army’s cultural predilection to look forward, it was magnified in
comparison to any preceding conflict because of its increased tempo, modern technology, stress,
scope, and intensity.280 Given these conditions, victory required the flawless synchronization of
various systems.281
Like the Infantry and Armor, the Artillery also conceptualized combat using the action-
reaction cycle – more appropriately called the targeting cycle. Unlike the Armored tribe, the
Artillery’s combat loop was not about decision speed relative to the enemy, but a measure of the
Artillery’s own effectiveness. This cycle was based on the ability to find targets, determine which
units should contribute, target the enemy, engage them, assess the effectiveness, relocate, and
prepare to repeat the cycle. The entire tribe was oriented towards fulfilling a part of this, and
represented their unique contribution to AirLand Battle.282 The precise application of firepower
pp. 8 – 10; Cortez (CPT) “Letters – Survival on the AirLand Battlefield,” pp. 5; Hamilton Jr. (CPT) “Coup de Grace,”
pp. 17 – 21. 278 Crosbie E. Saint (LTG), Tommy R. Franks (COL) and Alan B. Moon (MAJ) “Fire Support in Mobile Armored
Warfare,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 3 (1987), pp. 12. 279 Duvall (SFC) “Letters – Designated Hitter,” pp. 10 – 11; Eugene S. Korpal (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery
Journal Vol. 55, No. 3 (1987), pp. 1. 280 Saint (LTG), Franks (COL) and Moon (MAJ) “Fire Support in Mobile Armored Warfare,” pp. 12; Richard M.
Bishop (CPT) “Multiple Launch Rocket System Tactics,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 3 (1985), pp. 8 – 11. 281 George Strodtbeck (CPT) “Letters – Make Standardization Happen,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 1 (1984),
pp. 8; Andrew G. Ellis (MAJ) “Smart Weapons Systems for Engaging Second Echelon Forces,” Field Artillery Journal
Vol. 57, No. 6 (1989), pp. 42 – 46; Jerry D. Morelock (MAJ) “Rolling Caissons – A Legacy of Doctrine, Organizations,
and Materiel,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 5 (1985), pp. 36 – 39. 282 The relative inferiority of NATO’s artillery systems compared to the Soviet’s meant that the Artillery had to
complete these cycles efficiently and effectively to make up for the inability to mass the number of fires the enemy
65
would make the difference on the modern battlefield.283 The relationship between the targeting
cycle and technological advances meant that accurate targeting would produce dramatic results.
Captain George Norris makes the case that “Perhaps the most important thing to remember is that
the key to defeating Soviet formations is attacking the right target, not every target.”284
The AirLand Battle tenet of synchronization was central to the Artillery’s
conceptualization of warfare. Synchronization, like combined arms warfare, implied that different
systems would be integrated to produce exponentially greater effects than their individual use – a
kind of intra-tribal combined arms.285 Synchronization meant that the entire Artillery system from
sensors, command and control, and artillery batteries had to be directed towards destroying the
enemy. From this, the system-of-systems approach was developed in the late 1980’s and
represented an intensification of this conceptualization. The system’s ability to synchronize fires,
“taken to its logical conclusion, this concept offers the spectre of an inanimate, complex network
designed to kill the most things in the most efficient way.”286 This system would be highly
centralized in its planning and as decentralized as possible in its execution.287 Furthermore, the
could. Ensuring the Artillery force survived against significant Soviet counterfire was a key to victory. Scott R.
Gourley (CPT, USAR) “Letters – Tactical Damage Assessment,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 2 (1983), pp.
6; Terrence M. Freeman (MAJ) “No Sale for the Targeting Cell,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 3 (1983), pp.
19 – 21; James A. Taylor (MAJ) “Find and Attack,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 3 (1983), pp. 42 – 44; Brett
E. Morris (CPT) “Letters – Thinking Ahead: Its Everyone’s Business,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No. 5 (1989),
pp. 3 – 4. For the counterfire dilemma, see Taphorn (CPT) “A Modest Proposal,” pp. 19 – 24; John S. Crosby (MG)
“On the Move,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 4 (1984), pp. 1; Thomas S. Grodecki (MAJ) “Dummy Doctrine,”
Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 1 (1985), pp. 39. 283 Eugene S. Korpal (MG) “On the Move – Deep Battle: Right Place at the Right Time,” Field Artillery Journal Vol.
54, No. 1 (1986), pp. 1; Gene Minietta (MAJ, USAR) “Letters – Sound Ranging,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51,
No. 6 (1983), pp. 2. 284 George T. Norris (CPT) “Bit the Bullet: Looking at Red CSS,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 2 (1986), pp.
25. 285 John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 5 (1984), pp. 1; Byron Baker (MAJ)
“Fire Support Lessons Revisited,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 3 (1986), pp. 40 – 41. 286 Thomas G. Waller Jr. (MAJ) “Danger Close: A Historical Perspective on Today’s Close Support,” Field Artillery
Journal Vol. 57, No. 5 (1989), pp. 14. See also, Hallada (MG) “The Field Artillery State-of-the-Branch Address,” pp.
2 – 3; Joseph R. Cerami (LTC) “Kasserine, the Bulge and AirLand Battle – Changes in the Tactical Role of Corps
Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No. 5 (1989), pp. 16 – 22. 287 John C. Shreyach (COL) “Deep-Attack System of Systems,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No. 6 (1989), pp. 48
– 54.
66
Artillery would not be reactive, rather prior to a battle they would develop lists of targets and
through this, shape the battlefield for the maneuver tribes.288 This produced a methodical and
bureaucratized approach to warfare within the tribe, where centralized command and control was
necessary to synchronize artillery units effectively in the face of Soviet numerical superiority. This
is a clear example of how ALB highlighted the newfound professional employment of combat
power, rather than through attrition.
The Artillery’s idealized vision of warfare was evident in how they conceptualized deep
battle, which differentiated them from the Infantry and Armor tribes. Through a sophisticated
system the Artillery would identify, target, engage, and destroy enemy units and formations well
within the enemy’s territory.289 This would not only rob the enemy of the initiative, but also deliver
a psychological blow.290 An idea that corresponded to the tribe’s belief that technological
superiority would lead to victory. This techno-fetishism was evident in how laser guided weapons
were conceptualized.291 Major Joseph Antoniotti argued that Copperhead – the Artillery’s laser
guided shell – would “comprise between four and eight percent of the total rounds fired by a 155-
mm howitzer. Yet these few rounds may well be the difference between the success or failure of
the supported maneuver unit.”292 With these weapons, the Artillery could engage high-value
targets, even as part of the deep battle, therefore significantly shaping the battlefield.293
288 John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 1 (1985), pp. 1; Saint (LTG), Franks
(COL) and Moon (MAJ) “Fire Support in Mobile Armored Warfare,” pp. 12 – 14. 289 Waller J. (MAJ) “Danger Close,” pp. 10 – 15. 290 They would achieve this by using highly advanced armour-defeating precision munitions. Joseph C. Antoniotti
(MAJ, USAR) “Another Point of View – Attack the Second Echelon,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 1 (1986),
pp. 7 – 11; Taphorn (CPT) “A Modest Proposal,” pp. 19 – 24. 291 Improved technology – such as the Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (APPS) and laser designator
– enhanced the artillery’s accuracy to ensure they could hit a target, the ultimate goal being having systems with
almost zero margins of error. Philip J. Millis (CPT) “APPS: The Unsung Targeting Aid,” Field Artillery Journal Vol.
51, No. 6 (1983), pp. 18 – 19; Duvall (SFC) “Letters – Designated Hitter,” pp. 10 – 11. 292 Joseph C. Antoniotti (MAJ) “Snake Charmers,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 3 (1984), pp. 35. 293 Glen C. Collins Jr. (CPT) “Focusing the Eyes,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 2 (1984), pp. 26 – 29.
67
Deep battle proved to be a contentious concept within the tribe. Supporting the maneuver
forces was still the Artillery’s primary goal, but how that support would manifest itself was
debated. The debate fell roughly along the lines of those that thought supporting the front line of
battle was the most effective while another group argued for fighting the deep battle would make
the close fight easier and contribute to the future of war.294 The Artillery’s growing fixation with
the deep battle occurred as their inability to support the maneuver forces was being revealed in
training exercises.295 The deep battle concept was attractive to the Artillery because of the
autonomy and additional resources it promised. While the maneuver forces had the responsibility
for the close battle, the Artillery, with the necessary technological advances, could have its ‘own’
fight. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Zawilski argued that in terms of contributions to
the combined arms team “The normal answer is couched in terms of the direct effects we can
produce – destruction, disruption, and so on. Because our antiarmor capabilities are increasing,
such answers usually lead to heated discussions focused on the relative pre-eminence of fires
support or maneuver.”296 Besides independence, the Artillery also argued that it required its own
integrated intelligence units.297 Since only a handful of Artillery systems could fight at the depths
294 Many of those who opposed the deep battle approach were concerned that the Artillery’s weapons did not have the
range necessary to strike 150km to 300km behind the front lines. For those opposed to deep battle, see Waller Jr.
(MAJ) “Danger Close,” pp. 10 – 15; Samuel W. Floca Jr. (LTC) “Letters – Do We Know How to Use MLRS,” Field
Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 5 (1984), pp. 10 – 11; Mark Paulick (CPT) “Letters – Get the Point,” Field Artillery
Journal Vol. 54, No. 3 (1986), pp. 9. The proponents of deep battle ignored the capability gap and instead proposed
that the Artillery should prepare for the future when they would be equipped with weapons possessing the necessary
range. For those who supported the deep battle approach, see John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery
Journal Vol. 51, No. 5 (1983), pp. 1; Philip J. Millis (MAJ) “Bracketing the Dwell Time,” Field Artillery Journal
Vol. 52, No. 5 (1984), pp. 26 – 28; Eugene S. Korpal (MG) “On the Move,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 5
(1985), pp. 1. 295 This was especially the case at the NTC, where slower moving artillery pieces could not keep up with the fast
moving M1/M2/M3 vehicles and provide adequate fire support at the same time. Mark P. Gay (MAJ) “Then and Now
– Fighting it out at Operational Depths,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 1 (1986), pp. 33 – 39; Steven G. Starner
(MAJ) “Deep Attack – We Can Do It Now,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 3 (1986), pp. 11 – 13; Jorge M.
Fernandez (CPT) “The Flying Box: Supporting the Mobile Armored Corps,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 3
(1987), pp. 15 – 17. 296 Robert Zawilski (LTC) “A Redleg Potpourri,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 5 (1985), pp. 8. 297 Christopher E. Strauss (CPT) “Search! Extending the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” Field Artillery
Journal Vol. 51, No. 1 (1983), pp. 50 – 53; Daniel A. Jurchenko (MAJ) and Scott R. Gourley (CPT) “The Order of
68
required by deep battle, many in Field Artillery proposed a variety of futuristic new weapons
systems.298 The intermingling of ideational and rational explanations is key here. The combination
of a tribal conceptualization with the potential for resource rewards necessary to expand the
Artillery’s ability to fight their desired war is important to account for.
The Artillery’s vision of deep battle was the most vivid depiction of a tribe’s idealized form
of warfare. However, this was not without its problems, such as the discrepancy between the
proposed future capabilities and the immediacy of the next war. Without these capabilities and
their successful integration into the force, the Artillery would not be able to wage a deep battle
against the Soviets, and instead they would have to respond to maneuver commanders’ fire support
requests. For the Artillery tribe, the idealized battle was conceptualized without the requisite
capabilities at that particular time, and while some identified this, many simply ignored it,
preferring to dream of their idealized way of war.
Technology and War:
Technology played a varied role in the tribal conceptualizations of warfare, and related to
their mentality and self-conceptualization. Given the Army’s cultural affinity for technological
solutions, how each tribe approached technology matters. Additionally, the approaching
Battle Officer,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 6 (1983), pp. 15 – 17; George T. Norris (CPT) “Letters – OMG
versus ALB,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 2 (1985), pp. 2. 298 Only the Lance missile had the range required to engage targets up to 300km behind enemy lines, however it could
not destroy armoured targets. These included the developmental Stand-off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) and
the Air Force’s Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). Gary M. Bowman (CPT) “The Point
of Lance,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 1 (1986), pp. 12 – 16; Kenny W. Hendrix (MAJ) “Letters – Amplifying
On A Winner,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 1 (1986), pp. 2 – 3; Thomas G. Wilson (LTC) “Lance: Two New
Concepts for Modern Fire Support Doctrine,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 4 (1987), pp. 12 – 14; Jim L.
Claunch (CPT) “Deep Battle Lance: A Nonnculear Doctrinal Primer,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 4 (1987),
pp. 15 – 19; Tim Northrup (CPT) “Jousting with JSTARS,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 1 (1986), pp. 24 –
25; Timothy J. Northrup (CPT) “RPV: Above the Threat,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 1 (1987), pp. 19 – 21;
Kent S. Sanderson (CPT) “Joint STARS Looks Deep to Win,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 1 (1987), pp. 25 –
27; Antoniotti (MAJ, USAR) “Another Point of View – Attack the Second Echelon,” pp. 7 – 11.
69
Revolution in Military Affairs in the 1990s makes setting the stage for this even more important.299
Frederick Kagan argues that the Reagan defence increases of the 1980s, created the room in which
the technological advances associated with the early revolution in military affairs could grow.300
Of the three tribes, the Infantry were the least enamored with the promise of technology in
warfare. For them, technology was subservient to the infantryman, and his longstanding duty to
close with and kill the enemy.301 This also reflected an appreciation for the destructive power of
hand-held weapons.302 This extended to the thinking of the infantryman, whose brain had to be
nurtured to avoid becoming “automatons on the battlefield.”303 Although, this was problematized
by the presence of advanced technology on the battlefield. ALB’s emphasis on using sensors to
‘see deep’ led to some within Infantry claim that technology could overcome the ‘Fog of War’.
More importantly, the introduction of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) exposed a
large portion of infantrymen to a highly advanced vehicle specific to conventional war.
The Armor tribe’s attitude towards technology is probably best demonstrated in Lieutenant
Colonel J. Weaver’s statement “Yes, new technology is coming. We need to be alert, not alarmed.
We need to be enthusiastic about the opportunity, not overwhelmed by fascination with gadgetry,
or angered by the passing of older forms of training.”304 Armor occupied the middle ground
between the Infantry and Artillery, seeking to utilize technology to deter and win, while also
299 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military
Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). 300 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 78 – 81. 301 This included the requisite moral strength and physicality necessary to fight with the ‘spirit of the bayonet.’ For
example, see Thomas P. Kratman (CPT) “Letters – MILES vs. Live Fire,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 1 (1985), pp. 6. 302 James R. Carlson (LTC) “Queen’s Crown Sparkles,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 1 (1983), pp. 50 – 51. See also, Noyes
B. Livingston (CPT) “The Assault Rifle,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 5 (1983), pp. 26 – 29; Scott R. Gourley (CPT) and
David F. McDermott (CPT) “Soviet Mortars,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 6 (1984), pp. 12 – 14; Frank A. Emery (CPT)
“Antiarmor Weapons in Cities,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 3 (1986), pp. 42 – 43. 303 Michael Phipps (CPT) and F. R. Hayse (CPT) “Letters – Tactics in IOAC,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 5 (1984), pp. 50
– 51. 304 J. Michael Weaver (LTC) and Richard A. Renfrow “Armor Training Simulators Are On The Way,” Armor Vol.
92, No. 3 (1983), pp. 18.
70
relying on the skill of their tribesmen.305 The tribe’s primary weapon, the MBT, was a product of
technological advances – engines, weapon sights, guns, and armour – that needed to required
continuous integration into doctrine to ensure victory.306 The M1 Abrams main-battle tank was the
embodiment of the tribe’s approach to warfare. It had greater mobility, offensive power, and
survivability than any previous tank, and they were justifiably proud of its capabilities.307 Any
attempt to remove MBT’s from a unit was fiercely opposed.308 Despite the enthusiasm expressed
towards the M1, a small minority criticized what they saw as a vehicle explicitly tailored to the
expected conventional battlefield in Europe along the central front.309
The Artillery tribe were faithful proponents of the advantages that technological superiority
could bring to the Army in combat – especially the newly professionalized force. Major Joseph
Halloran expressed this sentiment when he wrote of the future
[The] focus on technology is appropriate for the US Army. We must win the
technology war before any shot is fired in future combat, or we probably will lose
that future war. We cannot afford the luxury of expending people to win wars; we
305 John D. Borgman (COL) and Alexander F. Wojciki (MAJ) “The Challenge of Force Modernization,” Armor Vol.
92, No. 5 (1983), pp. 30 – 33; Clyde T. Wilson (CPT) “How to Fight the Difficult Terrain,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 3
(1987), pp. 29 – 31; Bush (MAJ) “The Division Commander’s Eyes and Ears,” pp. 13 – 17. 306 Modernization cycles, like that following Vietnam, produced the M1 Abrams and the M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle.
For example, see Peters (1LT) “Attacking the Attacker,” pp. 30 – 33; Acker (LTC ret.) “Letters – Tank Format Debate
Goes On,” pp. 3 – 4. The focus on a tank’s technological components is not restricted to American tanks but includes
other nations, especially Soviet tank development. See, James M. Warford (CPT) “Reactive Armor: New Life for
Soviet Tanks,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 1 (1988), pp. 6 – 11; Borgman (COL) and Wojciki (MAJ) “The Challenge of Force
Modernization,” pp. 30 – 33; Ricky Lunch (CPT) and Michael F. Nugent (CPT) “Military Application of Robotics,
The USAARMS Approach,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 3 (1986), pp. 45 – 48; Richard P. Geier (MAJ) “A View of a Future
Tank,” Armor Vol. 94, No. 2 (1985), pp. 44 – 45. 307 For example, retired General Donn Starry was quoted as saying “when you see the M1A1 roll by, you have to feel
good about that.” The Army’s victory in the 1987 Canadian Army Trophy was proof that the tank, and its crew, were
capable weapons. It also signified the level of professionalism that the Army had attained. Donn A. Starry (GEN ret.)
“Leadership and Technology,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 1 (1986), pp. 48; Thomas A. Dials (MAJ) “Economy of Force –
the Cavalry Connection,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 4 (1983), pp. 42 – 46; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Report
– 1983 Armor Conference,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 4 (1983), pp. 31 – 32; George A. Iller (LTC) “Letters –
CAT/Boeselager Kudos,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 1 (1988), pp. 3. 308 For example, see Dials (MAJ) “Economy of Force – the Cavalry Connection,” pp. 42 – 46; Guy C. Swan III (CPT)
“Letters – Cavalry Connection Upheld,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 6 (1983), pp. 4. 309 Andrew F. DeMario (CPT) “Combat in Forests: Neglect at Your Peril!,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 3 (1987), pp. 47 – 48;
Acker (LTC ret.) “Letters – Tank Format Debate Goes On,” pp. 3 – 4.
71
have to expend things. It is imperative, therefore, that our things be better than those
of the enemy. 310
Echoing their desire to immediately begin preparing for deep battle without the required weapons,
Field Artillery constantly featured articles discussing technology that would not be fielded until
much later.311 It was expected that these would solve many contemporary problems and were
sources of pride for the tribe.312 The procurement of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)
sparked a debate within the tribe between those that saw missiles or tube artillery as the way of the
future.313 The tension between the ‘missiliers’ and ‘cannoneers’ was evidence of the tribe’s affinity
for technology and conventional warfare rather than a debate over the tribe’s identity. For example,
retired Brigadier General Roland Shugg wrote that “[Technological] developments have given
artillery the ability to dominate and destroy every unit and piece of equipment in an area roughly
50 to 150 kilometers behind the enemy lines which was heretofore inaccessible.”314 New command
310 The reliance on material capabilities to achieve victory Joseph E. Halloran III (MAJ) “Letters – The Technology
War,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 6 (1984), pp. 5. 311 For example, see Richard E.T. Sheffield Jr. (CPT) “Aquila… The Army’s Scout,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53,
No. 3 (1985), pp. 36 – 38. 312 This included the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the Aquila remotely piloted vehicle – an unmanned
aerial vehicle, the Battery Computer System (BCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), the
Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), JSTARS, SOTAS, Army Tactical Command and Control System
(ATCCS), Tactical Fire Control (TACFIRE), the Global Positioning System (GPS), and the Howitzer Improvement
Program (HIP). For example, see Peter D. Heimdahl (LTC), “Stretching the Circles,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51,
No. 2 (1983), pp. 42 – 45; Raphael J. Hallada (MG) “Field Artillery Vision: Master Plan for Fire Support of the
Future,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 1 (1987), pp. 5 – 13; Eugene S. Korpal (MG) “On the Move,” Field
Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 3 (1987), pp. 1; Dean A. Camarella (CPT) and Thomas M. Froneberger (CPT) “Getting
Better at TACFIRE,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 3 (1987), pp. 16 – 18; Philip J. Millis (MAJ) “Artificial
Intelligence and Fire Support,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 3 (1987), pp. 26 – 27; Zawilski (LTC) “A Redleg
Potpourri,” pp. 8 – 12. There were some that were critical of the tribe’s affinity for technology, however, they were in
the minority and their criticism revealed more about how techno-centric the tribe was. See Charles C. Sharp (SFC)
“Survivability for Sophomores: A Short Course on Staying Alive,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 1 (1985), pp.
40 – 41; Morelock (MAJ) “Rolling Caissons – A Legacy of Doctrine, Organizations, and Materiel,” pp. 36 – 39;
Richard B. Czechowski (2LT) “Letters – In With the Old,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 5 (1986), pp. 3 – 4. 313 The proponents of the new missile systems base their support upon its technological capabilities. By the end of the
1980s, cannon enthusiasts began using the same terminology to describe the howitzer improvement program (HIP)
and the advanced Field Artillery System, canon (AFAS – C). For the most obvious example of this, see Paulick (CPT)
“Letters – Get the Point,” pp. 9. Also, see Donald K. Blumenthal (COL ret.) “Letters – New Capabilities – Old
Problems,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 1 (1986), pp. 3; Raphael J. Halada (MG) “On the Move –
Understanding the Past: Our Future Depends On It,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No. 5 (1989), pp. 2. 314 Roland P. Shugg (BG ret.) “Letters – A New Name for Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 6
(1984), pp. 2.
72
and control programs – such as Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) and Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) – were developed to manage the ‘system-of-systems’
so that units could receive processed and prioritized information.315 Technology even took
precedence over doctrine; both the Armor and Artillery believed that the equipment should
determine doctrinal precepts.316 Not only does this demonstrate the role of technology in tribal
conceptualizations, but it also indicates the desire to have doctrine structure warfighting.
Preparing to Fight:
Throughout the 1980s, the tribes subscribed to the same philosophy: “Successful armies
train as they intend to fight, and fight as they are trained.”317 Problematically, their
conceptualizations informed their preparations due to a lack of ‘real’ war experience. The training
regime during this period focused the tribes on fulfilling the Army’s standards for the expected
conventional, mid-to-high-intensity war with the Soviet Union.318 The Army had to arrive ready
to fight and win, learning in combat was not considered a possibility given the rapid speed and
lethality of the next war and the importance of the first battle, which would occur unexpectedly.319
This logic made the tribe’s conceptualizations even more important, and insulated the Army. As a
result, the Army’s training took on two meanings. The first was that consistent, quality training
315 Taylor (MAJ) “Find and Attack,” pp. 42 – 44; Zawilski (LTC) “A Redleg Potpourri,” pp. 8 – 12. 316 The development of the Copperhead munition was an example of this. Its delivery to artillery units prior to the
publication of an accompanying doctrine was seen as a glaring deficiency. John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,”
Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 1 (1983), pp. 1; Joel A. Buck (CPT) and Patrick C. Sweeney (CPT) “Split –
Battery Defense,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 1 (1983), pp. 40 – 42; Anthony G. Pokomy (COL ret.) “Take
the Tech,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 5 (1984), pp. 20 – 23. For the case of the Copperhead munition, see
Antoniotti (MAJ) “Snake Charmers,” pp. 33 – 35. 317 Robert G. Bernier (LTC) “The Combined Arms Maneuver Battalion: Armor and Infantry Build a New Relationship
in Ft. Hood Experiment,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 1 (1988), pp. 14. 318 Donald E. Vandergriff, The Path to Victory: America’s Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs (Novato:
Presidio Press, 2002), pp. 140 – 143. 319 Robert R. Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO’s Strategic Options,
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), pp. 29 – 31; Kenneth C. Leuer (MG) “Commandant’s Note: Combat
Training Centers – In Support of Training Excellence,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 2 (1988), pp. 1 – 2; Gregory M. Heritage
(CPT) “NTC: Lessons Learned,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 1 (1985), pp. 39 – 41; Michael W. Symanski (CPT) “Old Style
Training Won’t Hack It,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 3 (1984), pp. 4.
73
would result in better troops. Secondly, because the Army’s soldiers could perform their roles
better, they also would possess a higher state of readiness.320 The Infantry dogmatically referenced
Army standards as being the ultimate goal. There was no emphasis on surpassing these, only that
the entire unit should meet them.321 For the Armor and Artillery, increased training was needed
because of new technologies and equipment that had been introduced into the Army.322
Even though the Army’s post-Vietnam training revolution had increased the importance of
training, many writers complained that there was a persistent lack of funds for training.323 For
example, Command Sergeant Major John Stevens stated that because of budget cuts “Here we go
again! Tighten your belts, folks – the money is not there!”324 Given the relatively high defence
budgets at the time it is interesting that either not enough was allocated for small unit live-fire-
exercises or the importance assigned to training was not reflected in the budget. During this period
preparing for war was as much the Army’s duty as fighting one. This emphasis on preparation
facilitated the tribe’s idealized conceptualizations of what conventional warfare.
The Army’s National Training Center at Fort Irwin California provided the tribes with an
arena for them to enact their conceptualizations of warfare through the Army’s training program,
320 For example, see Andrew J. McVeigh III (COL) “Your Right to Survive,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 3
(1983), pp. 8 – 13; William B. Crews (CPT) and Randy D. Luten (LT) “Live Fire Drills,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6
(1986), pp. 35 – 36; Timothy P. Hunt (CPT) “Infantry and Armor Cross-Attachments Enhance Combat Readiness,”
Armor Vol. 96, No. 2 (1987), pp. 43 – 44; James R. Rowland (CPT) and William G. Bledsoe (CW) “Lessons from the
IDF,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 1 (1983), pp. 36 – 37; Charles C. Sharp (SFC) “There’s Always an Excuse Not to Train,”
Field Artillery Journal Vol. 53, No. 4 (1985), pp. 8 – 10; Raymond E. Haddock (COL) and Keith W. Dayton (MAJ)
“MORETRAIN,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 2 (1983), pp. 15 – 19. 321 William R. Shirley (MAJ) “ITEP: What Is It?,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 4 (1984), pp. 34; Kenneth C. Leuer (MG)
“Commandant’s Note: The NCO Academy,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 3 (1988), pp. 1 – 2. 322 Andrew P. O’Meara Jr. (COL) “The Training Revolution,” Armor Vol. 92, No. 6 (1983), pp. 43 – 45; Haddock
(COL) and Dayton (MAJ) “MORETRAIN,” pp. 15 – 19; Leon D. Vaupel (CPT USAR) “Letters – Sound Doctrine?,”
Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 4 (1987), pp. 7 – 8; Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Training for
the AirLand Battle,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 4 (1984), pp. 5 – 6. 323 William A. DePalo Jr. (LTC) “Extended Cross-Attachment,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 4 (1984), pp. 5 – 6; James A.
Broderick (LTC) “Direct Fire Subcaliber Exercise,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 1 (1983), pp. 48 – 49. By the
late -1980’s there were real budget cuts that curtailed training even further than what had previously been described.
Michael F. Spigelmire (MG) “Commandant’s Note: Training Noncommissioned Officers to Train,” Infantry Vol. 79,
No. 3 (1989), pp. 1 – 2. 324 John M. Stevens (CSM) “Driver’s Seat – Training the Reduced Budget Way,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 2 (1988), pp. 7.
74
and prepare them for a war with the Soviets. Brian Lynn’s depiction of a medieval tournament
accurately depicts the NTC, “The military elite created a far more perfect, although artificial, kind
of combat in the tournament, which pitted knights against knights in an exclusive and controlled
version of warfare.”325 In an effort to replicate the deserts of the Persian Gulf, the NTC was created
to give units in the continental US the ability to train to the extent that was offered at the Combat
Training Centers (CTC) of Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels in West Germany.326 At a time when the
Air Force was receiving the B1 bomber and the Navy had 600 ships, Major Harold Coyle argued
that the creation of the NTC was part of the Army’s ‘turn around’ and restoration as a professional
combat service.327 Walter Kretchik wrote that “the CTCs capped decades of army effort to regulate
the chaos of war through doctrinal compliance, merging with the school system, the ARTEP, and
the SQT to affect every officer and solider in the service.”328 Training became a way of life,
especially at CTCs, where philosophy and principles met planning, execution, and evaluation.329
More than a mere training event, the NTC was the greatest preparation for combat.
Captains Ricky Lunch and Michael Nugent wrote “Your trip to the NTC is more than a mere
training event – it’s WWIII!”330 Those that ‘fought’ at the NTC were described as ‘veterans’.331
325 Lynn, Battle, pp. 93. 326 Bolger, Dragons at War, pp. 10 – 11, 17 – 18. For an institutional history of the NTC see, Anne W. Chapman, The
Origins and Development of the National Training Center, 1976 – 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military
History, 1992). 327 Harold W. Coyle (MAJ) “Book One: Genocide (Or How the NTC Came to Be),” Armor Vol. 98, No. 3 (1989), pp.
12 – 13. 328 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 214. 329 While there were other large CTCs – such as the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee Arkansas
– the NTC is mentioned with greater frequency and receives more discussion than other centres. The impact of the
JRTC was largely limited because only light units, special forces, and marines would rotate through the insurgent
styled training environment. Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way
of War, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), pp. 45; Kenneth C. Leuer (MG) “Commandant’s Note: Combat
Training Centers – In Support of Training Excellence,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 2 (1988), pp. 1 – 2. 330 Ricky Lunch (CPT) and Michael F. Nugent (CPT) “Military Application of Robotics, The USAARMS Approach,”
Armor Vol. 95, No. 4 (1986), pp. 11, 13. Emphasis in the original. 331 For example, see Michael S. Hackney (CPT) “Echo Company: The Fifth Player,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 4 (1985),
pp. 20 – 24.
75
The ability to win in this demanding training environment was seen as equal to success in real
combat.332 Like the tribes’ conceptualizations, the training at the NTC was focused on fighting a
war with the Soviets, but being prepared for conventional war meant a unit could easily conduct
any mission.333 This assumption revealed the belief that conventional warfare was the most
difficult, therefore, if units could win in this intensity, they could win in any intensity.
Given that the Army, and its tribes, only had the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to rely on to inform
their thinking on warfare, the NTC provided them with “kernels of truth” regarding the nature of
warfare that could be extracted from the ‘combat’ there.334 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Greenwalt
described the NTC as “an ideal training ground on which the high-intensity, high-speed battlefield
of the future can be approximated.”335 The multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES)
simulated direct fire weapons of the Infantry and Armor, and was unable to replicate indirect fire
from artillery. This discrepancy meant that the Artillery did not demonstrate the same level of
enthusiasm displayed in the pages of Infantry and Armor.336
The National Training Center of the 1980’s represented a self-fulfilling prophecy for the
Army. The dominant conceptualizations of warfare of the time informed the Center’s composition
332 Randy L. Wilkes (MAJ) “Move Fast and Deep,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 51, No. 2 (1983), pp. 53. 333 Beaufort C. Hallman Jr. (MAJ) “Lessons Learned at the National Training Center: An Observer Controller’s
Perspective,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 5 (1986), pp. 30 – 34; Stuart G. McLennan III (CPT) “Desert Death,” Field Artillery
Journal Vol. 52, No. 2 (1984), pp. 50 – 53; Heritage (CPT) “NTC,” pp. 39 – 41. 334 Tiffany (CPT) “Light Infantry Scouts in the Desert,” pp. 31. See also, George L. Reed (CPT) “Voices in the Sand:
Deception Operations at the NTC,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 5 (1988), pp. 26 – 31; William B. Crews (CPT) “Letters –
Observations and Comments,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 3 (1988), pp. 5; James D. Crabbe (LTC) “Integrated TOC,”
Infantry Vol. 79, No. 1 (1989), pp. 37. See also, Frederic J. Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Our Combined Arms
Training Plan,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 6 (1984), pp. 6 – 7; Barry Scriber (MAJ) “HMMWVs and Scouts: Do They Mix?,”
Armor Vol. 98, No. 4 (1989), pp. 33 – 38. 335 Crews (CPT) “Letters – Observations and Comments,” pp. 5; Robert J. Greenwalt Jr. (LTC) “NTC – Winning in
the Engagement Area,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 6 (1989), pp. 26. 336 Until the introduction of the combined arms training integration and evaluation system (CATIES), the effects of
artillery fires were not integrated very well into training. While it did alleviate some of the Artillery’s concerns, the
tribe never displayed the enthusiasm that the other two held towards the NTC. John S. Crosby (MG) “On the Move,”
Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 2 (1984), pp. 1; James E. Ferguson (LTC ret.) and John E. Bjornholt “CATIES –
The Key to Realism at the NTC,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 2 (1987), pp. 14 – 16; Hallada (MG) “The Field
Artillery State-of-the-Branch Address,” pp. 2 – 3.
76
and exercises. This led to exercises that were conventional in nature and came to represent what
mid-to-high-intensity conflict against the Soviet Union would look like. The continuous rotation
of units through the NTC reproduced these conceptualizations in a myriad of different scenarios
against ‘real’ Soviet formations, engrained further in thorough ‘after action reports’ which resulted
in adjustments to tactical as well as doctrinal precepts. This had the effect of creating a positive
feedback loop, continually refining pre-existing conceptualizations rather than the creation of
competing beliefs. The Army’s own training regime facilitated the bottom-up propagation of tribal
conceptualizations into the whole organization.
The Holy Trinity:
Combined arms warfare was the Army’s ‘holy trinity’; “In the grand scheme of victorious
combat the artillery disrupted the enemy, the armor broke through his positions, and the infantry
safeguarded the breakthroughs.”337 For each tribe, this ‘rock-paper-scissors’ approach was the only
way to wage war.338 Carl Builder emphasized this, “The Army branches of infantry, artillery, and
armor each see themselves as inextricably dependent upon their brother branches if they are to
wage war effectively.”339 ALB portrayed the efficient synchronization of the Army’s combined
arms as essential to offset the Warsaw Pact’s numerical superiority.340
Although the centrepiece of this synchronization would be the combined arms team, each
tribe believed that their component was the most important part.341 A case of tribal
337 Livingston (CPT) “The Assault Rifle,” pp. 27. 338 Beston (CPT) “Armor in the RDF,” pp. 32 – 35; Borgman (COL) and Wojciki (MAJ) “The Challenge of Force
Modernization,” pp. 30 – 33; Peter Albert Henry (CPT) “Letters – Rebuttal on ‘A New Concept’,” Armor Vol. 93,
No. 5 (1984), pp. 2 – 3; Hunt (CPT) “Infantry and Armor Cross-Attachments Enhance Combat Readiness,” pp. 43 –
44. 339 Demonstrated in the Army’s successes in the Second World War. Builder, The Masks of War, pp. 27. 340 Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army, pp. 225 – 226. 341 For example, see McGrath (1LT) “The Battle of El Firdan,” pp. 9 – 13; Joseph E. Halloran III (MAJ) “Letters –
Just as Robust,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 2 (1984), pp. 5; 341 Field Marshall Archibald P. Wavell quoted
in Harold E. Raugh (CPT) “With a Special Capital ‘I’,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 1 (1987), pp. 11.
77
conceptualizations shaping organizational precepts. Armor and Infantry shared many similarities
in their approach to warfare, a result of their shared duty to close with, and kill the enemy. This is
clearly revealed in the pages of Field Artillery, where the contributors constantly reference the
“maneuver arms” of Armor and Infantry. While they have differing force compositions, the type
of fire support they receive and the manner in which it is delivered remain the same. Therefore,
the Artillery tribe deemed it appropriate to refer to them by one name.342 Corresponding to the
divisions within the combined arms team.
Despite the Army’s emphasis placed on combined arms, all tribes lamented the fact that
they do not train together. Often the Artillery and maneuver forces trained separately, and even
when they did train together, the Artillery were “out of sight and out of mind so far as the maneuver
forces are concerned.”343 Even the bureaucratic standards that Army units train to, such as unit
ARTEPS, were ‘branch pure’.344
We talk combined arms; we bow to the theory; we raise our arms in praise. Yea,
though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, combined arms will lead
me to the light at the end of the tunnel. As presently constituted and practiced –
balderdash and poppycock!345
Additionally, there are cases where inter-tribal tension is visible. Such as the Artillery’s belief that
the maneuver arms did not understand the danger posed by enemy counterfire. The Armor assumed
that the Artillery had too many gunners for any one artillery piece. The Infantry believed that the
Artillery and Armor only appeared more knowledgeable because, unlike the Infantry, they could
342 For example, see Wilkes (MAJ) “Move Fast and Deep,” pp. 51 – 53; R. Scott Reid (1LT) “Letters – Lessons from
the NTC,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 2 (1984), pp. 8 – 9; Macellus Hay Jagoe IV (CPT) “Letters – NTC
Trends,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 3 (1987), pp. 5 – 6. 343 Peter A. Hansen (CPT Field Artillery) “Synchronization a Training Problem,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 5 (1989), pp.
32. 344 Jagoe (CPT) “Letters – NTC Trends,” pp. 5 – 6. 345 Robert C. Merriman (PSG) “Letters – On Cohesion… As in Combined Arms,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 4 (1988), pp.
3.
78
specialize on their one role.346 Nevertheless, these intra-service squabbles did not lead to the
abandonment of combined arms, merely that the tribe’s relationships were not without contention.
The belief and reliance on combined arms acted as an institutional balancer during this
period. While the independence of each branch is generally accepted, the differences between the
Artillery and the ‘maneuver arms’ is worth noting. The issues raised with regards to training as
well as the language used by the Artillery tribe imply a degree of separation between them and the
other tribes. This supports the argument that the Artillery’s idealized form of warfare – deep battle
– was an independent fight that only they could wage. Here, conceptualizations shaped the
constitutive relationships of the idea.
Spectrums of Intensity Relating to the Light Infantry Division:
The antagonism between unconventional and conventional form of warfare has been a
consistent contest for the Army.347 Given the alignment between the Army’s cultural preference
for conventional warfare and the threat posed by the Soviet Union – real or perceived – examining
this underemphasized facet of warfare is paramount to understanding the tribes’ conceptualizations
of war. Two factors influenced the discussion in all of the professional journals from 1983 to 1989.
First, was the creation of the Light Division in 1984, which was designed to make up part of the
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force envisioned by President Carter to protect US interests in the
Persian Gulf.348 Second, and related to the creation of the light division, there was an increasing
discussion of the Army’s role in low-intensity conflicts. David Fitzgerald notes that the term low-
intensity conflicts (LIC) was more palatable to the Army than counterinsurgency’s Vietnam
346 McVeigh (COL) “Your Right to Survive,” pp. 8 – 13; Quinn (COL ret.) “Letters – A View On Armor Manning,”
pp. 2 – 3; Huba Wass de Czege (COL) “More on Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 5 (1986), pp. 13 – 15. 347 For example, see Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget. 348 ACS General John A. Wickham’s light divisions eventually proved to be something different. While being created
as strategically mobile offensive units specialized for close-in terrain and low-intensity conflict, the light division
prepared to fight the AirLand Battle alongside heavy divisions. Linn, The Echo of Battle, pp. 214 – 215.
79
connotations.349 Discussion of LICs simmered throughout the mid-1980s, but intensified in 1987
and after.350
These developments, important as they were, did not diminish the attention directed
towards conventional, mid- to high-intensity warfighting with the Soviet Union. The journals, like
the Army as a whole, were predominantly focused on the Central Battle.351 The increasing
prevalence of LIC in the journals sparked contentious debates within the tribes, most clearly in the
Infantry and Armored tribes. The division was torn between two duties, it had to fight low-intensity
conflicts and be a strategically deployable, rapid reaction force. This led to differing views by the
tribes and reflects the power of their conceptualizations.
I. LIC – Differing Intensities, Same Character:
Throughout the 1980s, discussion of the light infantry division and low-intensity conflict
within the tribal journals was inseparable, a natural result of the new division’s stated purpose to
fight in these conflicts. True to the Army’s preference for conventional warfare, the journals
frequently mentioned the light division’s strategic deployability in the event of a conventional
conflict, to perform ‘traditional’ infantry missions. Only rarely was counterinsurgency,
peacekeeping, or post-conflict stabilization discussed. When they were, it was assumed that skills
349 President Ronald Reagan envisioned low-intensity conflicts through the use of political, economic, information,
and military aspects of national power the Army’s interpretation was vague and had difficultly integrating it into their
outlook on warfare. Additionally, promotion pathways during this time favoured ‘real’ combat experience, and
ignored experience in LIC. See Chapter 3 “Low-Intensity Conflict in the Reagan Years,” in Fitzgerald, Learning to
Forget, pp 60 – 85; Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War,
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), pp. 33 – 34, 44 – 45. Fitzgerald references the importance of the Army’s
mission in El Salvador throughout the 1980s as being a key part of how low-intensity conflict was contextualized. For
more on the Army’s mission in El Salvador see Chapter 8 “The Salvadoran Insurgency,” in Mark Moyar, A Question
of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 169 –
190. 350 Below is a complete analysis on the expectations of low-intensity conflict. Richard W. Wharton (COL) “Survivable
Hardware Coming? You Can Bet On It!,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 2 (1987), pp. 10 – 14. 351 FM 100-5 Operations (1976) was criticized for its complete focus on conflict in Europe. AirLand Battle Doctrine
rectified this, even in in rhetoric alone, by describing a ‘Central Battle’ against the Warsaw Pact in Europe and an
‘Extended Battle’ throughout the globe. See Chapter 3 ‘The Central Battle’ in Jensen, Forging the Sword, pp. 56 –
86.
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in conventional warfare would be more than adequate for success in these conflicts.352 Key to this
assumption was the belief that LIC was conceptualized as a conventional conflict of lesser
magnitude, not a different character. Lieutenant Colonel Cole Kingseed accurately portrayed this
belief when he wrote, “A light division’s combat mission is to deploy rapidly to defeat enemy
forces in a low intensity conflict and, when properly augmented, to fight and win in a mid- to high-
intensity conflict as well.”353 Additionally, the Commandant of the Infantry School, Major General
Edwin Burba, noted that “In any future war – particularly in low and mid intensity conflicts – our
infantry squads and platoons will often live or die on the basis of their ability to place accurate
small arms fire on the opposing force.”354 Even in LIC, there would be an enemy to fight with
conventional means, albeit at a reduced intensity.
By the late 1980s, the importance of LICs increased relative to the potential for conflict in
Europe. Major James Kelley and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Flynn argued that “today’s world
often lacks a clearly definable threat that would compel friendly nations to work together… In
particular, the developing countries are being threatened by conflicting internal interests as well as
being wooed by various external factions in a highly unstable political atmosphere.”355 A minority
of commentators in Infantry were the first to challenge the dominant conceptualization of LIC’s
as ‘lesser intensity, same character’. They argued that besides military power, political, economic,
and social factors would be necessary to achieve victory.356 Furthermore, they believed that LIC’s
352 Charles M. Ayers (LTC) “Peacekeeping Operations,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 1 (1989), pp. 19 – 23; John R. Galvin
(LTG) “Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 4 (1984), pp. 10 – 14; John W. Foss (MG)
“Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 3 (1985), pp. 2. 353 The division would not be augmented with different training or doctrine. Instead, mechanized units would be added
to give additional firepower. Cole C. Kingseed (LTC) “Team Spirit 88: Light Division, Heavy Challenges,” Infantry
Vol. 79, No. 3 (1989), pp. 35. Emphasis added. 354 Edwin H. Burba Jr. (MG) “Commandant’s Note: Rifle Marksmanship,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 2 (1987), pp. 2 – 3.
Emphasis added. 355 James A. Kelley (MAJ) and Francis M. Glynn (LTC) “Bridging the Differences,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 4 (1988),
pp. 15. 356 Leuer (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1.
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would take place in an urban setting, where the Army was ill prepared to meet this challenge.357
However, they remained the minority, despite their nuanced views.
As the professed importance of low-intensity grew within the Army, the Armored tribe
began to become more concerned with LIC, fearing they had fallen behind. True to the tribe’s
vehicle centric mentality, some believed that the Army’s budgetary focus on the expected
European war had left no funds to develop a tank specifically designed for LIC.358 Some tribesmen
feared that this meant Armor had lost a ‘seat at the table’ and “worse, the forces that will be
deployed will fight without the mobility, firepower, and shock effect of the combat arm of
decision.”359 The tribe leveraged the Army’s uniform acceptance of combined arms to serve their
own parochial interests in this case: a say in Army operations.360 Without the combined arms team
including MBT’s, the “Light forces enable us to ‘get there and lose.’”361 Again, LIC was
conceptualized as a lesser intensity, but not differ in character. A LIC fought without the ‘combat
arm of decision’ threatened to upend the intra-organizational stability that was established during
357 David G. Jesmer Jr. (CPT) “Room Clearance in MOUT,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 3 (1987), pp. 32 – 34; Ayers (MAJ)
“Letters – MOUT Training Inadequate,” pp. 5. 358 Many in the Armored tribe believed that if only the Army could develop a replacement for the M551 Sheridan, the
Army’s existing light tank, they would have a role to play in LIC’s. Guy C. Swan III (MAJ) “Letters – A Place for
Armor in LIC?,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 3 (1987), pp. 2 – 4; Steven M. Bettner (LTC) “The End of the Tank?,” Armor
Vol. 93, No. 2 (1984), pp. 45 – 47; Michael R. Matheny (MAJ) “Armor in Low Intensity Conflict: The US Experience
in Vietnam,” Armor Vol. 97, No. 4 (1988), pp. 9 – 15; Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Armor Support to Light
Forces,” pp. 5 – 6; Burton S. Boudinot (LTC ret.) “A Missing Link in Support of Light and Heavy Forces,” Armor
Vol. 98, No. 2 (1989), pp. 40 – 41; Christopher H. Schneider (SSG) “Thoughts on Heavy vs. Light,” Armor Vol. 96,
No. 4 (1987), pp. 2 – 3; Brent J. Boyer (PFC) “Letters – The Need for Light Armor,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 5 (1987),
pp. 5 – 6. 359 Hartline (LTC) “Pertinent Questions, Where Are the Answers?,” pp. 50. 360 Brown (MG) “Commander’s Report – 1984 Armor Conference,” pp. 21 – 22; John C. Bahnsen (BG ret.), Arthur
L. West III (COL ret.) and Douglas H. Starr (LTC) “Vietnam: 6 September, 1969 Attacking Dismounted Infantry with
Armored Cavalry,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 5 (1986), pp. 8 – 15; Sewell Menzel (LTC) and William Said (COL) “Cavalry
Action in Central America,” Armor Vol. 93, No. 5 (1984), pp. 10 – 12. Two examples were used to support this claim.
The first was the successful invasion of North Africa as part of Operation Torch in 1942, especially the limited number
of tanks from the 1st Armored Division, was seen as evidence of the important role tanks can play in any deployment.
The second was the failure of Task Force Smith in the Korean War, which was argued to demonstrate the outcome of
deploying forces without armoured support. For these historical cases, see Beston (CPT) “Armor in the RDF,” pp. 36
– 43 and Oleh B. Koropey (LTC) “Armor Operations and Training in Korea,” Armor Vol. 95, No. 6 (1986), pp. 10 –
15. 361 Robert P. Fairchild (LTC) “Letters – Reaction to Light Forces,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 5 (1987), pp. 3.
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the Second World War. It should be noted that this did not represent an overwhelming majority of
contributors to Armor. More important was the fact that the tribe’s identity and their
conceptualization of warfare shaped their response to a problem.
The Artillery’s conceptualization of LIC mirrored the other tribes. Although the Soviet’s
presented the most dangerous foe, LIC’s would occur with great frequency and feature the same
character of combat.362 Unlike the Armor tribe, the Artillery had a guaranteed role in LIC because
of the ‘organic’ light artillery units permanently assigned to the light division. For them, the
combined arms requirement was met.363 They believed their sole mission in these conflicts would
be the technologically dependent, indirect fire support of light infantry.364 Again, these missions
would be of a lesser intensity, but still possess the same conventional-like characteristics.
The importance of low-intensity conflict in the late 1980’s demonstrates the unique case
of a military organization thinking about different types of warfare within a broader
conceptualization of warfare. The belief that LIC’s would simply be less intense conflicts requiring
the same skills is indicative of the near hegemonic position of conventional warfare within the
Army. Furthermore, the minority of articles in Infantry conceptualizing LIC’s in a nuanced manner
– beyond the expectation of a similar character – is a function of the primary role the Infantry
would play in LIC’s and demonstrates the diversity of thought that can occur within the tribes.
Lastly, the expectation that LIC’s would occur with greater frequency did not produce a driver to
362 For example, see Eugene S. Korpal (MG) “On the Move – Synchronize to Harmonize,” Field Artillery Journal
Vol. 54, No. 3 (1986), pp. 1; Heinz A. Schiemann (LTC) “Fire Support for the Light Division,” Field Artillery Journal
Vol. 55, No. 5 (1987), pp. 18 – 24. 363 In military jargon, “organic,” refers to a formation that has different components permanently attached to it. This
structure is codified rather than the result of ad hoc task forcing. An example of this confident posture can be seen in
Schiemann (LTC) “Fire Support for the Light Division,” pp. 18 – 24. 364 The light artillery units lacked the mobility of their heavier counterparts, this necessitated different tactics but did
not extend to an altered method of employment operationally. Hallada (MG) “Chief of Field Artillery’s Message to
the Field,” pp. 5 – 7; Morris (CPT) “Letters – Thinking Ahead,” pp. 3 – 4; Howard E. Lee (CPT) “Light Fighter
Battery Defense,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 56, No. 2 (1987), pp. 15 – 18.
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change the Army’s ‘Central Battle’ orientation. Instead, it signifies the tribes’ belief that the
however unlikely a high-intensity conflict with the Warsaw Pact was, it was more important to
prepare for than LIC’s. In the context of the Cold War, this conceptualization was justifiable.
II. Getting the Weight Right:
The increased discussion surrounding LIC and the light division did not overshadow the
emphasis on conventional war in the Central Battle. At the other end of the conflict spectrum, the
Army was increasing its capability to deter or defeat the Soviet Union. The heavy force held a
place of prominence within the Army. Unlike the light division, the M1 Abrams, MLRS and
155mm M109 self-propelled artillery, and mechanized infantry would fight the mid-to-high-
intensity war against the Soviets’ own heavy forces.365 The differences between these force
structures contributed to a debate within the Army’s tribes, especially the Infantry, over what role,
if any, the light division would play.
The ‘believers’, those enamored with the light infantry, argued that they were completely
different from the heavy force and required special tactics and training.366 Some even went so far
as to say this meant that “the Light Fighter has become an elite warrior through a demanding
developmental process in which equipment is only a tool. It is the human element – the privates,
NCOs, and officers – that has made the light infantry a success.”367 The belief that the light division
was an ‘elite’ force was based on the Infantry mentality’s emphasis on individuals rather than
365 Galvin (LTG) “Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission,” pp. 10 – 14; Paul H. Vivian (CPT) and Peter F.
Cohen (MAJ) “Major Weaknesses,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 4 (1984), pp. 49 – 50. The heavy division had undergone
significant changes following Vietnam. The move towards Division 86, from the Reorganization Objective Army
Division (ROAD), was done to increase the efficiency with which they could utilize their weapons. See, John L.
Romjue, The Army of Excellence: The Development of the 1980s Army (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History
United States Army, 1997), pp. 8 – 14. 366 John W. Foss (MG) “Commandant’s Note: Training the Light Force,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 5 (1984), pp. 2; Wayne
A. Downing (BG) and George D. Conrad (SGM) “The Ambush,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 1 (1985), pp. 21 – 26; Thomas
E. Fish (CPT) “Thinking Light,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 2 (1988), pp. 8 – 10. 367 Van R. Dodd (1LT) “Letters – Need for Symbols,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 4 (1986), pp. 5.
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machines.368 The Field Artillery echoed part of this, believing that they had to create specific
tactics to fight as part of the light division.369 Some Infantrymen even argued that the emphasis on
LIC’s meant that the light infantry had reasserted their prominence.370
The ‘integrators’ occupied the middle ground of the debate, and envisioned the light
division supporting the AirLand Battle on the European battlefield. The division’s ability to deploy
quickly and over large distances meant that it was an invaluable asset to support the heavy force
in Europe.371 The deployment of the light infantry to a mid- or high-intensity conflict in Europe
would have the added benefit of increasing the number of infantry in theater.372 The Armor tribe
endorsed this; using exercises at the NTC as evidence, they believed that the light division could
be integrated onto the European battlefield.373 The Artillery argued that the light division could be
easily augmented with heavier weapons to fight in a mid- to high-intensity conflict.374
The ‘skeptics’ who opposed the light division, argued that its composition excluded it from
the conventional fight. Some argued that the division’s lack of motorized transport – forcing the
368 William D. Phillips (CPT) “The Light Leaders Course,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 1 (1985), pp. 35 – 37; Larry W.
Stegall (SSG) “Letters – Agrees on Symbols,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6 (1986), pp. 4. 369 Suzann W. Voight (CPT) “Much Ado About Something,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 54, No. 4 (1986), pp. 28 –
30. 370 Dale E. Wilson (CPT) “The Light Fighter’s Load: Let’s Reconsider It – Again,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 3 (1988),
pp. 13 – 14. 371 The integrators believed the light infantry division could be split up to occupy forests, towns, and other areas the
heavy force was deemed unsuitable. This would then free up the Army’s MBT’s and mechanized infantry to ‘close
with and kill the enemy’. For example, see Galvin (LTG) “Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission,” pp. 10 – 14;
James H. Silcox (MAJ) “Team Spirit: Light Infantry in Mid-Intensity Conflict,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 5 (1989), pp.
36 – 38; Joward G. Crowell Jr. (MG) and Jared L. Bates (LTC) “Heavy-Light Connection: Division,” Infantry Vol.
74, No. 4 (1984), pp. 15 – 18; Jack B. Wood (LTC) “Heavy-Light Connection: Brigade,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 4
(1984), pp. 19 – 22; Thomas P. Kratman (CPT) “Depth Through Initial Positioning,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 4 (1986),
pp. 40 – 41; Clayton R. Newell (LTC) “Heavy-Light Forces: Divisions or Brigades,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 1 (1985),
pp. 12 – 13. 372 Because a light infantry division had a greater number of infantrymen in it than a heavy division equipped with the
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Quentin W. Schillare (CPT, Armor) “Letter – Infantry Division (Light),” Infantry
Vol. 74, No. 3 (1984), pp. 50. 373 For example, see James A. Dunn Jr. (MAJ) “Heavy Force Light Force,” Armor Vol. 96, No. 5 (1987), pp. 10 – 15. 374 David L. Benton III (COL) “Letters – Shot, Out!,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 55, No. 5 (1987), pp. 3; Thomas J.
Costello (MAJ) “A Counterfire Concept for Light Divisions,” Field Artillery Journal Vol. 57, No. 2 (1989), pp. 25 –
31; Schiemann (LTC) “Fire Support for the Light Division,” pp. 18 – 24.
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infantry to march on foot – meant that it could not fight a high-intensity battle.375 Others stated
that the lethality of the next war meant that unarmoured infantry would be unable to survive.376
The most significant failing consistently ascribed to the light infantry division was its inability to
deal with enemy armour, in both Europe and the third world.377 Besides these capability
deficiencies, the ‘elite’ nature of the light division was criticized; “Today’s light infantry forces
are undeniably better, and we would all do well to remember that it is the nameless, faceless grunt
who wins wars, not the high-speed headline-gathering ‘elite forces’ who now wear the berets and
tabs that signify special status.”378
The debate over the light division demonstrates that the introduction of a new force
structure had to contend with the existing conceptualizations and mentalities of the time, as well
as the strategic environment. The resistance it faced was due, in part, to its abandonment of the
combined arms paradigm that had recently been reinvigorated following Vietnam. Additionally, it
reveals that an increase to a tribe’s prestige, missions, or share of budgetary resources is not met
with unanimous approval, especially if it contradicts closely held conceptualizations of warfare.
Materiality:
The introduction of new, high-profile equipment provides a means to understand how the
tribes conceptualize warfare in relation to changing capabilities. This was most obvious in the
Infantry’s procurement of the BIFV and the Artillery’s acquisition of the MLRS. The introduction
of the BIFV represented the pinnacle of the conventionally oriented combined arms approach to
warfare. The Bradley’s replacement of the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier and the creation of
375 James H. Silcox (MAJ) “Supporting Light Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 4 (1988), pp. 41 – 43; William J.
Godbout (CPT) “Light Support Platoon,” Infantry Vol. 79, No. 4 (1989), pp. 44 – 45. 376 Vivian (CPT) and Cohen (MAJ) “Major Weaknesses,” pp. 49 – 50. 377 Robert G. Clarke (COL) “Letters – Light Division,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 4 (1984), pp. 48 – 49; Allen L. Tiffany
(LT) “Light Infantry TOW Platoon,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 6 (1988), pp. 11 – 14. 378 R. D. Hooker Jr. (CPT) “Letters – Espirit-Building,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6 (1986), pp. 4. See also, Robert S.
Bobinski (LT) “Letters – Absurd,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 6 (1986), pp. 5.
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the light division effectively split the Infantry tribe in two.379 Blair Haworth argued that the
development of the Bradley was so significant that it resulted in the Infantry adopting practices
from the Armor.380 For some within the Infantry, the conceptualization of a high-intensity
European war – with its mobile, high-intensity, lethal characteristics – meant that the infantry
might have to fight mounted more than dismounted.381 This led to a great number of Bradley
devotees. For Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Friedrich, “the changes the Bradley brings about work
to catapult today’s mechanized infantryman into the Army of tomorrow.”382
In a reaction to the attempt by the light infantry to garner the ‘elite’ description, mechanized
proponents, such as Lieutenant Robert Bobinski argued that the complexity of the BIFV meant
that those who master it were far more elite than light infantry who had an easier job.383 At the
extreme was the belief that the BIFV gave the Infantry the capabilities of “operating as light armor
platoons, closing with and destroying the opponent through a combination of mobility, armor,
protected firepower, and shock action.”384 New capabilities had created a direct challenge to a
tribe’s mentality.
In spite of this, the Infantry attempted to rein in the technological prowess of their new
vehicle by emphasizing their belief in the infantryman rather than his equipment. They believed
that the ultimate purpose of the Infantry was to close with and kill the enemy, regardless of how
379 The Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle differed greatly from the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier. The Bradley
gave the Infantry a vehicle with a 25mm chain gun, coaxial machine gun, and a TOW (tube-launched, optically
tracked, wire-guided), this replaced the M113’s 50-caliber browning machine gun. Additionally, the Bradley required
a greater number of infantrymen to operate, meaning the average infantry squad had fewer dismounted infantry. 380 W. Blair Haworth, The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of
Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), pp. 2 – 3, 138 – 141, and 151 –
152. For examples from Infantry, see Nicholas F. Altomare (CPT) “Bradley NET,” Infantry Vol. 73, No. 4 (1983),
pp. 29 – 30; John F. D’Agostino (CPT) “The Bradley Master Gunner,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 2 (1984), pp. 9 – 10;
John E. Foley (SFC) “Observations on Mechanized Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 76, No. 4 (1986), pp. 29 – 33. 381 Ernst (COL) and White (MAJ) “Bradley Infantry on the Battlefield,” pp. 20 – 24. 382 Robert L. Friedrich (LTC) “NET,” Infantry Vol. 74, No. 5 (1984), pp. 32. 383 Bobinski (LT) “Letters – Absurd,” pp. 5. 384 Chester A. Kojro (MAJ) “Bradley Platoon Reorganization,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 2 (1987), pp. 17.
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they arrived in combat.385 Technological improvements could contribute to the Infantry’s
capabilities, but would not revolutionize it.386 The introduction of the Bradley forced the Infantry
to consider how they would fight in a conventional war. With the new capabilities in speed and
firepower came an intensification in their approach to conventional warfare, all the while they
were leading the discussion on low-intensity conflicts. The developments in material capability
and force structure bifurcated the Infantry in an operational sense; however, the tribe’s mentality
remained intact, and actually incorporated this new material capability.
Alternatively, the Artillery’s procurement of the MLRS provided the tribe with a weapons
system that was both technologically advanced and highly destructive, two traits the tribe held in
high regard.387 The MLRS was initially developed to destroy enemy artillery units, and the articles
in Field Artillery reflected this.388 Over time, numerous articles began discussing how the MLRS
could allow the tribe to fight their idealized deep battle.389 Besides its applicability in the deep fire
role, the MLRS’s ability to quickly fire and reposition, essential for artillery units to avoid
destruction, led the tribe to consider new ways of fighting. They sought to apply this to the 155mm
385 This manifested in a desire to see the Bradley support dismounted infantry, rather than have dismounted support
the Bradley’s operations. This presents a clear contrast to the Armor tribe’s belief in infantry supporting armour. John
W. Foss (MG) “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 75, No. 4 (1985), pp. 2 – 3; Steward W. Bentley Jr. (LT) “Letters
– Bradley Comments,” Infantry Vol. 77, No. 6 (1987), pp. 3 – 4; Dale E. Wilson (CPT Armor) “Letters – Don’t
Subdivide Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 78, No. 2 (1988), pp. 3; Michael P. Ryan (LT) “Dismounted Training Day,” Infantry
Vol. 78, No. 2 (1988), pp. 28 – 29; Mundstock (MAJ) “Letters – Universal Skills,” pp. 5. 386 In the case of the thermal sights on the Bradley, see Thomas G. Ziek Jr. (LT) “Bradley Gunnery Training,” Infantry
Vol. 76, No. 1 (1985), pp. 37 – 39. 387 The command and control, mobility, and firepower of the MLRS was consistently referenced as sources of pride
for the tribe. For example, see Bishop (CPT) “Multiple Launch Rocket System Tactics,” pp. 8 – 11. 388 Lieutenant Colonel Floca identifies this tendency within the Artillery branch. See, Floca Jr. (LTC) “Letters – Do
We Know How to Use MLRS,” pp. 10 – 11. The counterfire focus is clear in Bishop (CPT) “Multiple Launch Rocket
System Tactics,” pp. 8 – 11. Major Roger McCormick’s letter describes a variety of uses for the MLRS from
counterfire to breaking attacks. See, Roger L. McCormick (MAJ) “Letters – More on How to Use MLRS,” Field
Artillery Journal Vol. 52, No. 6 (1984), pp. 4. 389 The 30km range of the MLRS and the expected development of the Army Tactical Missile System were signs that
the MLRS could be the Artillery premier deep-attack weapon. Hendrix (MAJ) “Letters – Amplifying On A Winner,”
pp. 2 – 3; Antoniotti (MAJ, USAR) “Another Point of View – Attack the Second Echelon,” pp. 7 – 11.
88
M109 self-propelled howitzer, and to the targeting cycle more generally.390 For the Artillery, the
introduction of the MLRS was a clear case of how new capabilities could result in the
intensification of their conceptualizations of warfare. How they envisioned the MLRS in combat
was directly related to their idealized conception of conventional warfare in Europe. Much like the
Artillery, the procurement of the M1 Abrams and BIFV were closely aligned with the tribe’s focus
on high-intensity warfare. Reflecting their material orientated mentality, the new equipment
provided them with new capabilities that were both integrated into existing conceptualizations,
although with some difficulty.391
In comparison, the materiality of the Armor and Artillery tribes versus the reluctance of
the Infantry reflects their conceptualizations of warfare. For the former, it demonstrates how
closely wedded these two tribes were to conventional warfare. The latter suffered from an
impassioned internal debate as a result of material factors, but the underlying mentality largely
remained intact. Therefore, while important, the ideational factors of the tribes carries a greater
weight than the material ones, even in the tribes that are vehicle dependent.
Conclusions – Paradigms and Conceptualizations:
This analysis, from abstract to real, presented a holistic examination of the myriad of
factors that drove and shaped tribal conceptualizations from 1983 to 1989. They demonstrated the
supremacy of AirLand Battle doctrine and its associated concepts, while at the same time revealing
particular branch-based interpretations of the doctrine and warfare, proving the existence of
bottom-up influences within organizations, a central finding of this research. The tendency to
390 Wharton (COL) “Survivable Hardware Coming? You Can Bet On It!,” pp. 10 – 14; Hallada (MG) “On the Move
– Understanding the Past,” pp. 2; Morris (CPT) “Letters – Thinking Ahead,” pp. 3 – 4. 391 Even the Infantry’s M2 Bradley was seen as a positive for the Armor tribe because it meant that armoured attacks
could have Infantry support throughout their advance. Borgman (COL) and Wojciki (MAJ) “The Challenge of Force
Modernization,” pp. 30 – 33; Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Training for the AirLand Battle,” pp. 5 – 6; Peter
Albert Henry (CPT) “Letters – Rebuttal on ‘A New Concept’,” pp. 2 – 3; Brown (MG) “Commander’s Hatch – Our
Combined Arms Training Plan,” pp. 6 – 7.
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conceptualize mid-to-high-intensity war in similar ways is indicative of the Army’s preference for
conventional warfare at this end of the conflict spectrum. The war would be incredibly lethal,
intense, fast, and incredibly complex. The operational level of this war would be indistinguishable
from tactical combat. There would be no political interference – with the exception of controlling
the release of nuclear weapons. These expectations were shared by the tribes and provided a
consistency for each of them to conceptualize warfare in unique ways. The culmination of this was
the idealized visions of warfare that each tribe developed, a kind of war that was based on their
conceptualizations and individual mentality. Determining the influence of the idealized
conceptualization of warfare is difficult, but its existence indicates the significant amount of
attention paid to preparing for war with the Warsaw Pact.
The predominant trend within the three tribes from 1983 to 1989 was their adherence to
the AirLand Battle paradigm – an expectation of conventional, mid-to-high-intensity war fought
with combined arms against the Soviet Union. Each tribe’s conceptualization and their idealized
vision of warfare were aligned with this expectation. The tribes tended to reproduce this generally;
however, there were divergent streams of thought as well. Each branch approached technology in
a particular way. The Infantry were the most skeptical of relying on technology to win on the
battlefield, while the Artillery demonstrated the greatest affinity for technology, with the Armored
tribe in between the two but with a tendency to rely on technological developments. Further, the
importance each tribe assigns to their idealized vision of warfare differs. The Infantry’s ideal form
of combat was more mythic; small units fighting against the odds and the enemy to achieve victory
based on their own skill. The Armor’s idealized war was described in detail, but is more of an
extension of their broader conceptualization. The Artillery’s vision was the most detailed. Their
idealized vision of warfare was as important as their broader beliefs of what war would look like.
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The intensity of the tribes’ belief in their conceptualization of war imitated their professionalism
– potentially related to the all-volunteer force reforms following Vietnam.392 The complexity,
lethality, and necessity of winning the first battle meant that training and thinking about warfare
was paramount to victory. The primacy of the NTC is evidence of this.
This narrow, tribally based thinking mirrored the Army’s position during the 1980’s at the
level of national security strategy. Carl Builder summarized the Army dominant assignments as
the defence of West Germany, South Korea, and Berlin that linked and enmeshed the Army within
US national security strategy.393 Additionally, the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine’s influence over
American strategy reinforced the Army’s narrow focus. The desire to avoid another ‘Vietnam’
meant that the Army could only be deployed with overwhelming popular support, appropriate
resources, and the freedom from political interference.394 Given these two national security
priorities, the tribes’ focus on conventional warfighting can be justified, but not the extent to which
they developed idealized conceptualizations. Given the reduction of the threat posed by the Soviet
Union following Gorbachev’s reforms and the increasing focus on LIC, the near hegemonic
concern with the minute nuances of conventional warfare is problematic relative to these changes
in the security environment. This demonstrates the cultural affinity to conventional warfare held
by the tribes and that many, but not all, members of the tribes displayed. Additionally, the
importance placed on LIC by some, particularly those in the Infantry, suggests the complexity of
military organizations and the diversity of thought that existed despite the dominance of certain
conceptualizations – ie. conventional war with the Soviets.
392 By the 1980’s, the all volunteer force was succeeding. Pay had increase, training improved, and readiness was
deemed high. Furthermore, Reagan’s emphasis on the military combined with an economic recession led to an increase
in the number of recruits. Beth Bailey, America’s Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2009), pp. 173 – 174. 393 Builder, The Masks of War, pp. 92. 394 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation; Terriff, “The Past as Future,” pp. 195 – 228.
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The similarities with elements of American grand strategy are not directly related, but
tangential. A function of the tribes’ focus on the tactical and operational level of war. For example,
despite the significant changes to the national security apparatus under the Goldwater-Nichols
reforms of 1986, it received very little attention in the professional journals.395 An a strategic
perspective that matched the organization’s culture.
Some have taken the view that the most significant developments for the Army during the
Cold War period was the introduction of AirLand Battle Doctrine and the increasing attention – in
the form of training, exercises, education, and discussion – towards conventional war against the
Soviet Union in Central Europe.396 While important, this overlooks the increasing prominence of
low-intensity conflict, and, more importantly, the disparate conceptualizations of warfare among
the three combat branches. The light infantry division represented the clearest break from the
tribes’ idyllic journey of exploring and perfecting their idealized conceptions of warfare, due to
the creation of the light division. Alternatively, the Artillery was insulated from this; they assumed
they had a guaranteed role in the light division and that this left their idealized vision of combat
unaffected.
For the Infantry, the light infantry division represented a bifurcation of their skills and
capabilities. Compounded by the introduction of the BIFV, the new divisions drew the Infantry to
opposing ends of the conflict spectrum. The omnipresent threat of the Soviet Union offset this to
some extent, and led to the conceptualization of the light infantry as a subordinate force in any
European conflict. Nevertheless, the increased attention paid to low-intensity conflict was a partial
result of the creation of the division, the other being the reduced tensions with the USSR from late
395 They were some of the most significant reforms since the National Defense Act of 1947. See, Kretchik, US Army
Doctrine, pp. 213. 396 For example, see Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army and Kagan, Finding the Target.
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1987 on. The Armor tribe was concerned that the creation of the light division had resulted in a
missed opportunity to develop a new light tank. More ominously, the new force structure
represented a weakening in the combined arms approach, one that benefited the Infantry greatly.
This was a two-pronged assault on the tribe’s interests and conceptualization of warfare.
The conceptualizations revealed here demonstrate that intra-organizational groups can
adhere to the organization’s conceptualization of warfare – portrayed in AirLand Battle doctrine –
all the while developing their own beliefs. This suggests that influences within organizations do
not act solely in a top-down manner but are subject to shaping forces from the bottom up. The
adherence to the AirLand Battle paradigm, as well as the relative independence granted by the
strategic circumstances, meant that the branches could discuss conventional, mid-to-high-intensity
war in a manner that built upon their particular conceptualizations. The existing debates and fears,
especially following 1987, that developed within the tribes did not sufficiently challenge the
conventional orientation within the Army. This is not to say they were inconsequential, but that
the importance and preference of preparing for conventional war was dominant. Therefore, even
during the Cold War, a period where the strategic environment favoured conventional warfare, the
Army was not comprised of individuals exclusively focused on that form of warfare. Instead, those
that preached the importance of LIC demonstrated the heterogeneity of military organizations.
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Chapter 4: Strategic Upheavals and New Wars
Change presents an opportunity for comparison. The end of the Cold War and collapse of
the Soviet Union upended the international system, as well as the foundation upon which the
United States Army had oriented itself. Assuming rationality on the part of military organizations
does not make those organizations rational.397 In the face of change and war, the tribes’
conceptualizations of warfare would also change, but not in a manner directly related to the end of
the Cold War. It is not about determining the extent of change, but how the conceptualizations
addressed this and the implications of this. Although the strategic environment of the 1980’s
played an important role in providing the tribe’s the space to develop their idealized
conceptualizations of war, this stability did not extend into the early 1990’s. From 1990 to 1993 a
series of events made reconceptualization possible. Firstly, by 1990 it was becoming clear that the
Soviet Union did not constitute the same threat that it had even four years ago.398 The absence of
a near-competitor granted the US the position at the top of a unipolar system.399 Subsequently,
both the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations orientated US national security
institutions to the new reality in an attempt to ensure American primacy, not just containment.400
Second, the two major Army deployments in this timeframe provided the Army with real
combat to examine, instead of relying on the NTC. The US intervention in Panama not only
provided an example of real combat, but also featured a number of post-conflict stability operations
that were a glimpse into what future operations in the 1990’s would hold.401 The Gulf War would
397 Kier, Imagining War. 398 Sarkesian, “U.S. National Security Strategy,” pp. 1 – 18. 399 Hook and Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, pp. 183 – 188. 400 The Bush 41 administration published its National Military Strategy in 1991 which stated that the US military had
to fight and win two major regional conflicts at the same time. The Clinton administration adopted the Bottom Up
Review, a strategic outlook that the Bush 41 administration had dismissed but did not differ significantly from the
previous administration’s outlook. Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 144 – 167; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff,
Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, pp. 17 – 18; Jensen, Forging the Sword, pp. 87 – 90. 401 Scales (MG, ret), Yellow Smoke, pp. 61 – 62.
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feature the Army’s most preferred form of conflict and became a key feature in nearly all articles
that followed.402
Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the end of the Cold War as well as the
underlying justification for the large US defence expenditures – including the Army’s budget. The
‘victory’ in the Cold War eroded Congress’ bipartisan consensus on defence matters. Justifying a
large and expensive military to both Congress and the American public was now a necessity –
especially for the Army.403 To get ahead of this, the Pentagon developed the Base Force plan,
under George H.W. Bush’s administration, that proposed a 25% cut to the armed forces, kept the
military focused on playing an active role in the world, and would continue to guide the drawdown
into the Clinton administration.404 According to Andrew Bacevich, this process meant that
“Revolutionizing the military necessarily called into question long-standing and highly cherished
service conventions. It meant overturning hitherto sacrosanct agreements on roles, missions, and
budget share that had for decades provided a firebreak against destructive interservice rivalry.”405
Fourth, the Army underwent a doctrinal change with the publication of FM 100-5
Operations (1993). It retained the 1986 edition’s tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and
synchronization, adding versatility and an emphasis on contingency operations.406 However, the
manual retained a distinctly conventional war focus, and replicated many of the key features of
AirLand Battle.407 In this period, the tribes had to contend not only with changes internationally
and domestically, but within the US military and their own service as well. How the tribes’
402 Robert H. Scales (BG), Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 1994). 403 Sarkesian, “U.S. National Security Strategy, pp. 1 – 18; Chollet and Goldgeier, America Between the Wars, From
11/9 to 9/11, pp. 57; Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 10 – 11. 404 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 144 – 147; Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the
Cold War, pp. 18. 405 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities & Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2002), pp. 136. 406 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 222 – 223. 407 Terriff, “The Past as Future,” pp. 195 – 228; Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 32 – 33.
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conceptualizations about warfare during the Cold War interacted with these new realities provides
an opportunity to learn about thought processes in the US Army, but also military organizations
as a whole.
This chapter is structured in four sections. The first concerns the tribes’ overarching
conceptualizations of warfare and the changes in the strategic environment that resulted from the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The second section presents the tribes’ views on technology as well
as perspectives on synchronization and nonlinearity, fundamentals of ‘modern’ war. These three
elements informed how the tribes discussed a new expectation of warfare – contingency
operations. Finally, this chapter examines how the tribes conceptualized Operation Just Cause and
the Gulf War as these provide vivid cases of thought interacting with reality.
Conceptualizations:
The tribes continued to conceptualize warfare in similar ways. At its most basic level, many
of the descriptions used were the same as those during the Cold War, but in the post-Cold War era
these implied a different kind of conflict than before. Warfare would continue to be fast, offensive
oriented, maneuver focused; require agility and battlefield awareness; and, feature lethal, complex,
chaotic, and continuous operations.408 For example, Captain James Boling characterized modern
warfare as
408 A variety of articles mention or imply these traits. For example, see Yarrison (LTC ARNG) “Letters –
Auftragstatik,” pp. 3; Michael F. Spigelmire (MG), “Commandant’s Note: The Essence of Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 80,
No. 2 (1990), pp. 1 -2; Thomas T. Smith (CPT), “Blitzkrieg: The Myth of Blitz,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990), pp.
28 – 30; John F. Antal (MAJ, Armor), “Iraq’s Mailed Fist,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 1 (1991), pp. 27 – 30 Drew A.
Bennet (MAJ), “Philosophy of Command and Commander’s Guidance,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 2 (1991), pp. 13 – 15;
Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Future Challenges,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 6 (1991), pp. 1 – 2; Kyle C.
Campbell (LT), “Combat Lifesaver Training,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 3 (1992), pp. 38 – 39; Thomas C. Foley (MG),
“Commander’s Hatch: Meeting Armor’s Challenges – The Cavalry,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 4 (1990), pp. 4 – 5; Jeff
Witsken (CPT), and Lee MacTaggart (CPT), “Light Cavalry in the 10th Mountain Division,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 4
(1990), pp. 36 – 40; Jeffery E. Phillips (CPT), “Battle Drills: Simplifying the Challenge,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 1 (1990),
pp. 33 – 37; Len Hawley (COL), “Our Need to Develop… Brilliant Battalions,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 2 (1990), pp. 29
– 31; Grail L. Brookshire (BG ret.), “Here Be Dragons… Mapping a Post-Perestroika Role for the US Army,” Armor
Vol. 99, No. 3 (1990), pp. 17 – 19; Jay F. Grandin (MAJ), “Fire Support Coordination: It’s Time for a Relook,” Field
Artillery Vol. 60, No. 1 (1992), pp. 19 – 23; Raphael J. Hallada (MG), “On the Move: Massing and Integrating Fires,”
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chaotic, continuous, highly lethal, and executed at an incredible tempo. It will
present our tactical unit leaders with unprecedented leadership challenges,
especially lack of time and resources. These modern combat leaders must be able
to access rapidly and accurately the readiness of their personnel and equipment,
and, at the same time, exploit every opportunity to infuse their spirit, determination,
and will to succeed into their commands.409
The ideas and beliefs associated with AirLand Battle doctrine, including its tenets of agility,
initiative, depth, and synchronization, remained paradigmatic, and continued to act as a source for
how war was conceptualized.410 The early 1990’s saw the codification of a set of ‘keys to victory’
called the nine principles of war “objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity
of command, security, surprise, and simplicity.”411 There were similarities between these ideas
and those espoused during the Cold War, but the context was changing. How these relatively
unchanged assumptions about warfare manifested in different conceptualizations relative to
changing circumstances is at the heart of this chapter.
The Infantry’s conceptualization of lethality provides one example of this phenomenon.
Although a war with the Soviets would produce unprecedented numbers of casualties, by the early
1990’s, any friendly casualties were a sign of failure. Commander’s now had to anticipate every
contingency; otherwise, unforeseen circumstances could lead to the failure of the mission.412 For
Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 5 (1990), pp. 2; Myron F. Curtis (COL), Thomas M. Brown (COL), and John C. Hogan,
“Pershing – It Gave Peace a Chance,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 1 (1991), pp. 28 – 32; Michael W. Cannon (MAJ,
USAR), “The Division Deep-Battle Targeting Cell: Thor’s Hammer or Rube Goldberg Device,” Field Artillery Vol.
59, No. 2 (1991), pp. 44 – 49. 409 James L. Boling (CPT), “Tactical Unit Pre-Comabt Inspections,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 1 (1992), pp. 17. 410 Robert H. Clegg (COL), “Tropical Regions: influences on Military Operations, Part 2,” Infantry, Vol. 83, No. 3
(1992), pp. 24 – 31. 411 Bernard Loeffke (MG), “One Place, Three Wars: Part 2,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 4 (1991), pp. 10; Raymond O. Leso
(SSG), “Hand-to-Hand Combat Training and the Nine Principles of War,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 2 (1992), pp. 13 – 14;
Richard A. Turner (CPT), “Leadership: The Tenth Principle of War,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 1 (1992), pp. 7 – 8; For
example, see Paul E. Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Combined Arms and the Armored Force – Thinking About
the Future,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 2 (1993), pp. 5 – 6; Tom Arlelly (CPT), “Doctrine vs. Technology: A Blueprint for
the Future,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 2 (1992), pp. 29 – 30; Harry J. Schute Jr. (CPT, USAR), “Forgotten Principles: The
28th Division in the Hurtgen Forest,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 4 (1993), pp. 40 – 44. 412 Thomas R. Rozman (LTC), and Edward E. Blankenhagen (LTC), “An Infantry Mount for the 21st Century,”
Infantry Vol. 80, No. 5 (1990), pp. 21 – 24; Karl W. Eikenberry (LTC), “Deterrent Patrolling,” Infantry Vol. 80, No.
4 (1990), pp. 24 – 27; Jose M. Marrero (CPT), “Fire Support in Irregular Warfare,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 5 (1992),
pp. 37 – 40.
97
example, Captain Thomas Beron demonstrated this new logic of lethality and responsibility;
“Leaders preparing for combat must try to anticipate all the things that can possibly go wrong.
Then they should make plans for dealing with these contingencies when they occur.”413 Protecting
the force to avoid friendly casualties had become a condition of victory. Although war’s
‘principles’ remain unchanged, the environment they corresponded to could shape them. Even
though the Infantry acknowledged that future battlefields would use technologically advanced
weapons and be exceptionally fluid, the ability to fight in close combat was still described as a
necessity for victory.414 The Infantry existed for one purpose: “To close with the enemy by means
of fire and maneuver to destroy or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and
counterattack.”415 Additionally, the tribe’s idealized form of warfare in the 1980’s – featuring
dispersed, small-unit operations – remained a touchstone for the infantry.416
The uncertainty of the late 1980’s had affected the Armored tribe the greatest, and by the
early 1990’s they had fallen back on their origin story to maintain their identity. Continually
referenced by the Commanders of the Armor School, the ability of a few innovative thinkers to
overcome bureaucratic obstacles in the 1930’s was a reassurance in the face of a plethora low-
intensity conflicts and concerns about the M1 Abrams’ deployability.417 Despite this, the Armored
tribe continued to assume that its tanks would have be indispensable in modern warfare.418
413 Thomas E. Beron (CPT), “Operation DESERT STORM Crossing the LD,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 5 (1992), pp. 20. 414 Darryl W. Daugherty (CPT), and Drew Watson (CPT), “Close Combat Training,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990),
pp. 38 – 40; Ronald J. Tiso Jr. (MAJ), “The Bayonet: Commonsense Lesson,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990), pp. 40
– 41; Carmen J. Cavezza (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Marksmanship – A New Focus,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 6
(1990), pp. 1 – 2; Leso (SSG), “Hand-to-Hand Combat Training and the Nine Principles of War,” pp. 13 – 14. 415 Spigelmire (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1. 416 James L. Boiling (CPT), “Tactical Unit Rehearsals,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 2 (1991), pp. 25 – 30. 417 Patrick J. Cooney (MAJ), “US Armor Between the Wars,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 2 (1990), pp. 18 – 21; Thomas C.
Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Reforging the Thunderbolt,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 3 (1990), pp. 5 – 6; Thomas A.
Bruno (LTC), and John T. Broom (Staff Sergeant), “A New Day for Armor or the Last Glimmer of Sunset,” Armor
Vol. 99, No. 5 pp. 7 – 11; Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 4; Paul E. Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch:
Looking Ahead to this Year’s Armor Conference,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 1 (1993), pp. 5. 418 Harry Schule Jr. (CPT), “Can’t Get There From Here: Moving the Heavy Force,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 6 pp. 37 –
40; Timothy Garth (CPT), “The Future is Now: A profile of the M1A2 Abrams,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 2 (1992), pp.
98
The Artillery’s conceptualizations of war intensified during this period. They still believed
that the ‘targeting’ cycle of deciding what an operation would attempt to achieve, detecting the
enemy, and delivering munitions on specific targets was the best way to achieve victory.419 They
also still placed the greatest pride in their MLRS and new Paladin 155mm howitzers, systems that
represented the future of their tribe.420 Two key Artillery initiatives – the Fighting with Fires
program and FireStrike Operations – provide an insight into how the Artillery conceptualized
warfare in the early 1990’s. The Fighting with Fires initiative would improve the ability of
maneuver and joint force commanders to integrate fire support into their operations. It adhered to
the belief that through increased synchronization, victory could be achieved easier.421 FireStrike,
was the rebranding of the deep battle concept of the 1980’s. An artillery ‘FireStrike’ would utilize
the Artillery’s system-of-systems to ‘shape’ the battlefield.422 Continuity, rather than change,
characterized the tribes’ basic conceptualizations of warfare in the early 1990s. As demonstrated
by the Infantry’s perspective on lethality, while these basic beliefs may have remained the same,
how they were incorporated into visions of warfare differed from the Cold War given the changes
to the international system.
26 – 28; Frederick C. Turner (COL ret.), “Prokhorovka: The Great Russian Tank Encounter battle with the Germans,”
Armor Vol. 102, No. 3 (1993), pp. 6 – 13. 419 John F. Petrik (CPT), and Edmund V. Pax (CPT), “The Field Artillery Battalion S2: A Neglected Combat
Multiplier,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 2 (1990), pp. 35 – 39; Cannon (MAJ, USAR), “The Division Deep-Battle
Targeting Cell,” pp. 44 – 49. 420 Charles I. MacFarland (1LT), “The FA Commander and MLRS,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 3 (1990), pp. 43 –
47; Ralph G. Reece (COL), and Todd J. Travas (CPT), “Paladin,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 5 (1990), pp. 44 – 47;
Daniel L. Whiteside (COL ret.), “The Impact of Technology on Future Cannons,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4 (1991),
pp. 22 – 26. 421 Sammy L. Coffman (LTC), “Fighting With Fires Initiative: The Goal – Synchronized Combat Power,” Field
Artillery Vol. 60, No. 2 (1992), pp. 40 – 41; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the Move: Fighting with Fires Initiative,” Field
Artillery Vol. 60, No. 3 (1992), pp. 1 – 2; Sammy L. Coffman (LTC), “Fighting With Fires: The Major Issues,” Field
Artillery Vol. 60, No. 3 (1992), pp. 12 – 15; William A. Jones (LTC), “A Warfighting Philosophy,” Field Artillery
Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp. 47 – 50; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the Move: A Farewell Address – Fires and the Future,”
Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 3 (1993), pp. 1 – 2; John F. Rudman (COL), “Myths and Misconceptions about the
Paladin,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 5 (1993), pp. 36 – 37. 422 C. William Rittenhouse (LTC, USAR), “Operation FireStrike,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 6 (1990), pp. 33 – 37.
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Strategic Changes:
The upheavals to the international environment resulting from the end of the Cold War
meant that the Army had to compensate. Robert Scales, a retired Army Major General, wrote of
this time that “The Army needed to reset its strategic moorings and derive a clear understanding
of its strategic relevance to America’s future national policy before it could reasonably be expected
to devise a new operational method for fighting on land.”423 With the end of the Cold War, conflicts
that had been frozen or superseded by the tensions between the superpowers began to ignite, often
in areas of the world that were not at the centre of US national security policy.424 On the surface
the tribes, like the organization as a whole, were busy attempting to realign their visions of warfare
with the new strategic reality. However, the tribes displayed a remarkable ability to craft their
response to the new strategic reality in such a way as to effectively absolved them of any need to
change their pre-existing cultural preferences for high-tech, conventional wars. This was laid out
through a series of assumptions.
With the Soviet Union, and later Russia, no longer posing the danger it once had, the Third
World was the greatest threat to the US. These included countries that had historically opposed the
US, such as Iraq or North Korea, but was also used vaguely to label any nation as a potential threat.
Furthermore, any conflicts with these states would be conventional in nature.425 With uncertain
423 Scales (MG ret.), Yellow Smoke, pp. 6. 424 Herring, From Colony to Superpower, pp. 917 – 922. 425 Carmen J. Cavezza (MG), “Commandant’s Note: The Ranger Course,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 5 (1991), pp. 1; Antal
(MAJ, Armor), “Iraq’s Mailed Fist,” pp. 27 – 30; Michael R. Jacobson (MAJ, USAR), “North Korean Infantry
Battalions: Tactics,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 6 (1992), pp. 12 – 17; Carl E. Vuono (GEN), “Shaping the Army of
Tomorrow,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 5 (1990), pp. 9 – 12; Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Light and Lethal,”
Infantry Vol. 82, No. 4 (1992), pp. 1 – 2; Stephen L. Melton (CPT), “The Future of Armor,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 3
(1990), pp. 37 – 40; Carl E. Vuono (GEN), “Six Imperatives for the Armor Force,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 4 (1990), pp.
12 – 16; Witsken (CPT), and MacTaggart (CPT), “Light Cavalry in the 10th Mountain Division,” pp. 36 – 40; James
M. Warford (MAJ), “The Premium Tank-5: The Armor Threat of the 1990s,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 1 (1993), pp. 30 –
33; Raphael J. Hallada (MG), “On the Move,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1; Dennis J. Reimer (LTG),
“Interview – Reshaping the Army: A Versatile, Mobile Force to Project Power Worldwide,” Field Artillery Vol. 58,
No. 6 (1990), pp. 3 – 5; Mark B. Wroth (MAJ), “Legal Mix VII: Directions for the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery
100
enemies came the implication that the Army would have to be ready to deploy anywhere in the
world. The Infantry reflected this, conceptualizing warfare in a variety of terrains.426 This formed
a fundamental assumption that guided the tribes’ thinking on contingency conflicts, expanded upon
below. The Artillery and Armor possessed the unique belief that many Third World nations
possessed arsenals of advanced weaponry.427 Alarmingly, Major John Sorrell claimed, “This threat
will probably use hybrid Soviet-Chinese type tactics and organizations and will be equipped with
a mix of Eastern Bloc and western weapons systems and technologies. It is highly conceivable that
this threat will have ‘smart’ weapons and certain technologies that match or exceed our own.”428
This belief existed despite the fact that the US was now the only superpower on the planet.
Out of necessity, the post-Cold War budget cuts drove the tribes to reconceptualise warfare.
They would be unable to procure new weapons or maintain the force levels they had become
accustomed to during the 1980’s.429 In comparison to the aftermath of the Second World War, the
Vol. 59, No. 6 (1991), pp. 42 – 46; John D. Biggs (LTC), “Fire Support Considerations in Contingency Operations,”
Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 2 (1992), pp. 16 – 17. 426 E.W. Chamberlain III (LTC), “Letters – ITV’s in Bradley Units,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 2 (1991), pp. 3; Richard G.
Reynolds (MAJ), “Desert Navigation,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990), pp. 18 – 23; Robert L. Maginnis (LTC),
“Combat in Arctic Regions,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 5 (1991), pp. 28 – 33; Peter W. Clegg (BG), and Robert H. Clegg
(COL), “Cold Regions: Environment Influences on Military Operations,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 4 (1992), pp. 27 – 32;
David A. Pils (MSG), “Land Navigation Over Snow-Covered Terrain,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 5 (1992), pp. 11 – 12;
Jack H. Cage (LTC), “Light Infantry in Cold-Wet Conditions,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 6 (1993), pp. 11 – 12. 427 James M. Warford (CPT), “The Tanks of Babylon: Main Battle Tanks of the Iraqi Army,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 6
(1990), pp. 19 – 23; Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness, Directorate of Combat Develops, and TRADOC
System Manager for Armored Gun “The Armored Gun System: The 13-Year Search for a Sheridan Replacement
Nears an End,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 2 (1992), pp. 13 – 14. 428 John A. Sorrell (MAJ), “Letters – Long-Term Technology versus Short-term Savings,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No.
4 (1992), pp. 5. 429 Michael F. Spigelmire (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Mortars and the Combined Arms Team,” Infantry Vol. 80,
No. 3 (1990), pp. 1 – 2; Carmen J. Cavezza (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Tomorrow’s Infantry,” Infantry Vol. 80,
No. 4 (1990), pp. 1 – 2; Thomas R. Rozman (LTC), and William A. Saunders Jr. (LTC), “An Exercise in Leadership,”
Infantry Vol. 82, No. 2 (1992), pp. 20 – 24; Franklin Y. Hartline (COL), “Letters – AGS Questions,” Armor Vol. 102,
No. 2 (1993), pp. 2 – 3; Peter R. Mansoor (CPT), “Basing Light Armor Battalions: To Avoid a Mistake We Made in
WWII, Light Armor Needs to Train with Light Infantry,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 6 (1993), pp. 15 – 16; Rodney O. Luce
(MAJ), “So, You Wanna’ Be a Commander?,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 3 (1990), pp. 18 – 20; Randall C. Williams
Jr. (LTC), “Inactivation: The Reality of Building Down,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 3 (1991), pp. 19 – 21; Peter S.
Corpac (MAJ), “The New Heavy Div Arty,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 3 (1991), pp. 22 – 24; Charles W. Pope
Jr.(MAJ), “Letters – Will the Build-Down Allow Risk-Taking?,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4 (1991), pp. 4 – 5.
101
drawdown in the early 1990’s was argued to be one of the most successful of the 20th Century.430
Nonetheless, it still significantly affected the Army. Some commentators feared that the cuts to the
force would create a culture of zero-defects that would eliminate the chance to take risks in order
to learn from them.431 The preoccupation with force protection described above was an unwelcome
result of the budget cuts.432 Major Charles Pope colourfully described the build-down,
I must confess my disgust with the use of the oxymoron, ‘Build-Down.’ This
misnomer puts Orwellian Newspeak to shame. Such terminology insults the
intelligence and puts a euphemistic spin on a force reduction that will cut away
muscle, not fat, in both the Army and the federal civil service. Someone should
recall we’ll be cutting away about one-third of the force in the next two years – a
force that either won or supported winning the Persian Gulf War.433
Echoing this sentiment, Major General Thomas Foley feared that the drawdown would hurt the
Army’s combat capabilities.
As you may know, Armor comprises only about four percent of the current Total
Army force structure. While we are one of the smallest branches, we man almost
30 percent of the Army’s weapons systems and 60 percent of the heavy maneuver
battalions. In short, we are an all-weather, ground-gaining, and ground-holding,
high-leverage fighting arm.434
While the budget cuts were universally opposed, most officers accepted it as a given. The only
instance of blame being assigned to ‘politicians’ came from Major General Jerry White and those
in the Armored tribe who feared that the pursuit of a M551 Sheridan replacement would be
scrapped.435
430 Ricks, The Generals, pp. 390. 431 Pope Jr. (MAJ), “Letters – Will the Build-Down Allow Risk-Taking?,” pp. 4 – 5; Ray Riddle (MAJ), “Letters –
Reality Therapy: A Response to ‘Will the Build-Down Allow Risk-Taking?,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 1 (1992),
pp. 3 – 4. 432 Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 51 – 55. 433 Charles W. Pope Jr. (MAJ), “Letters – Will the Build-Down Allow Risk-Taking?,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4
(1991), pp. 3. 434 Thomas C. Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: A Small, Highly Lethal, Quality Total Armor Force for the 1990s…
Still the Centerpiece of Mobile, Combined Arms Operations…,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 2 (1990), pp. 5. 435 White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Hartline (COL), “Letters – AGS Questions,” pp. 2 – 3; Mansoor
(CPT), “Basing Light Armor Battalions,” pp. 15 – 16.
102
As the new strategic environment of the post-Cold War period began to take shape, instead
of revaluating their expectations of warfare the tribes argued that the character of the threat
remained the same even if the origins of that threat had changed. By doing this, the tribes could
continue to conceptualize conventional warfare in much the same manner they had previously,
albeit with some differences including resource availability and types of terrain. Despite
tremendous change, the tribes’ conceptualizations remained consistent, even though they
acknowledged the external drivers had changed.
Technology:
By the late 1980’s, the Soviet concept of a ‘military-technical revolution’ began appearing
in US military thought. A few individuals, such as Andrew Marshall at the Office of Net
Assessment, began promoting the idea of an American Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) –
what would become ‘Transformation.’436 They argued that the emergence of new technologies
meant militaries “could strike with great accuracy, irrespective of range; the ability to penetrate
defensive barriers using stealth technology, and unmanned warfare; and the ability to move
information rapidly across a joint battle network and exploit the effects of increased joint force
integration.”437 The Army attempted to integrate these new technologies into its approach to
warfare. This included initiatives by General Gordon Sullivan, the Army’s Chief of Staff, who
sought to create new institutional mechanisms for change within the Army.438
In comparison to the 1980’s, two things occurred in how the tribes conceptualized
technology in warfare. The first was that the Infantry began to argue that technology had an
important role in determining victory, although this was still tempered by the tribe’s deference to
436Kaplan, The Insurgents, pp. 46 – 54. 437 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, pp. 2. 438 This manifested in the Modern Louisiana Maneuvers as well as numerous ‘Battle Labs’ at TRADOC. Farrell,
Rynning, and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, pp. 24 – 30.
103
human factors. Second, both the Artillery and Armor delved even further into the possibilities for
victory that the RMA signified, intensifying their existing affinities for technology.
The bifurcation that had occurred within the Infantry following the introduction of the
BIFV and the creation of the light division continued to characterize much of the internal dynamics
of the tribe, although with less acrimony than before. Futuristic technology would benefit – in
theory – both the heavy and light forces. The light force’s lower combat power could be increased
with advanced technologies, and the heavy force would be better able to fight more effectively due
to improved synchronization.439 There were still a number of contributors to Infantry who
emphasized the Infantry’s mentality, traits such as leadership, company command, and the heroism
of the bayonet charge.440 The most fundamental trait for the Infantry remained the fact that the
battlefield was chaotic and defied attempts to anticipate random occurrences, which required
adaptability.441 Although technology could benefit both the heavy and light forces, the focus of the
439 Commandant of the Infantry School, Major Generals Carmen Cavezza and Jerry White, were some of the most
vocal proponents of technology in the Infantry. This position awarded them a great deal of power to set the direction
of the Infantry. Carmen J. Cavezza (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Infantry Training Strategies,” Infantry Vol. 80, No.
5 (1990), pp. 1 – 2; John P. Stack Jr. (LT), “Letters – Navigating in the Desert,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 1 (1991), pp. 3;
Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Owning the Night,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 3 (1992), pp. 1 – 2; Jerry A.
White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Infantry – Centerpiece of a Force Projection Army,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 2
(1992), pp. 1 – 2; Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Tomorrow’s Weapons – Today’s Challenge,” Infantry
Vol. 83, No. 3 (1992), pp. 1 – 2; Jerome J. Burns (LT), “lessons on the BIFV,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 1 (1990), pp. 41
– 42. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Michael F. Spigelmire (MG), “Bradley Platoon Organization,”
Infantry Vol. 80, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1 – 2; Rozman (LTC), and Blankenhagen (LTC), “An Infantry Mount for the 21st
Century,” pp. 21 – 24; Harry C. Andreas (LT), “The Bradley Challenge,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 1 (1991), pp. 18 – 21;
Lawrence A. Leone (LT), “The Bradley Let’s Make it Even Better,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 6 (1991), pp. 13 – 14. 440 Spigelmire (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Leso (SSG), “Hand-to-Hand Combat Training and the Nine
Principles of War,” pp. 13 – 14; Harry Christiansen (MAJ), “LADP: Leadership Assessment and Development
Program,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 3 (1990), pp. 8 – 9; Craig J. Currey (CPT), “Developing Lieutenants,” Infantry Vol.
80, No. 3 (1990), pp. 9 – 11; Herbert J. McChrystal Jr. (MG ret.), “Effective Military Leadership,” Infantry Vol. 80,
No. 5 (1990), pp. 16 – 18; Cole C. Kingseed (LTC), “Putting the Care into Caring,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 1 (1991),
pp. 16 – 17; David H. Hackworth (COL ret.), “Infantry’s Top Gun,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990), pp. 10 – 12;
Gregory T. Banner (CPT), “Letters – Top Gun,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 6 (1990), pp. 3; Thomas R. Rozman (LTC),
“The Mechanized Rifle Company as a Leadership Academy,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 4 (1991), pp. 31 – 35; Tiso Jr.
(MAJ), “The Bayonet,” pp. 40 – 41; Turner (CPT), “Leadership,” pp. 7 – 8. 441 Barrett F. Lowe (CPT), “Air Assault Planning,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 2 (1990), pp. 28 – 32; Michael A. Thompson
(LTC), “Light Infantry in Stay-Behind Operations,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 2 (1991), pp. 31 – 37; William J. Martinez
(LTC), “Employing Machineguns,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 1 (1992), pp. 41 – 42; Thomas E. Beron (CPT), “Desert
Navigation Devices,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 5 (1991), pp. 37 – 38.
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Infantry was on the heavy force. Simply put, the BIFV was the tribe’s most visible representation
of harnessing technology towards the conduct of war. This reflected the desire to apply technology
in conventional combat alongside the two other vehicle oriented tribes – especially in the aftermath
of the Gulf War. Ultimately, the early 1990’s saw the Infantry become more disposed to viewing
warfare as much a clash of technologies as a clash of human action.
Articles in both Field Artillery and Armor began conceptualizing technological
advancements in ways not limited to new engines, armor, firepower, and guns. The ‘revolution’ of
the RMA was visible in their conceptualizations. In a break from their Cold War focus on
technology, the Armor joined the Artillery by conceptualizing how technology could improve the
Army’s synchronization, resulting in more efficient and effective approaches to warfare.442 This
would allow the Army to fight in a more synchronized and efficient manner.443 The ability to ‘see’
the battlefield and the enemy meant that they could be destroyed quicker.444 Indeed, ‘seeing’ the
battlefield, implying the ability to consistently and constantly track the enemy, became both a
requirement and an expectation in combat.445 Both tribes believed technological superiority would
produce easy victories. Additionally, if the Army was going to become smaller due to the post-
442 Improvements to command and control, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities were key features in how
synchronization would change. John H. Cushman (LTC ret.), Frederic J. Brown (LTC ret.), and Thomas C. Foley
(MG), “Fighting the Future: A revolution in Combat Developments,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 1 (1990), pp. 13 – 19;
Hawley (COL), “Our Need to Develop… Brilliant Battalions,” pp. 30; William D. McCormack (2LT), “The Tactical
Communications Revolution,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 6 (1993), pp. 34; Sorrell (MAJ), “Letters – Long-Term
Technology versus Short-Term Savings,” pp. 5; Grandin (MAJ), “Fire Support Coordination,” pp. 19 – 23. 443 Edward W. Payne (CPT), “The Army’s Key Emerging Technologies,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 2 (1992), pp. 6 – 12;
Paul E. Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Advanced Warfighting Demonstration of Battlefield Synchronization,”
Armor Vol. 102, No. 3 (1993), pp. 5 35; McCormack (2LT), “The Tactical Communications Revolution,” pp. 32 –
34. 444 Hawley (COL), “Our Need to Develop… Brilliant Battalions,” pp. 29 – 31; Michael A. Kirby (LTC), “Find the
Enemy,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 3 (1993), pp. 20 – 21; McCormack (2LT), “The Tactical Communications Revolution,”
pp. 32 – 34. 445 McFarland (1LT), “The FA Commander and the MLRS,” pp. 43 – 47; John W. Foss (GEN), “Interview – The
Challenges of Our Changing Times,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 4 (1990), pp. 6 – 8; Raphael J. Hallada (MG), “Field
Artillery State-of-the-Branch-Address,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 6 (1990), pp. 1 – 2; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the
Move: Deep Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp. 1 – 2.
105
Cold War drawdown, technological superiority would offset this.446 Guaranteeing technological
superiority would guarantee victory in war.
The increasing sophistication with which these tribes conceptualized technology was
evident in how they discussed precision guided munitions (PGM). Previously, the term brilliance
had implied the most exceptional forms of armoured maneuver warfare. Instead, it was now also
being used to describe “brilliant munitions” – PGMs – and their ability to significantly alter the
battlefield.447 The Artillery wholeheartedly adopted PGMs because they required ever greater
sensory technologies and efficient targeting systems, which corresponded to the conceptualization
of deep battle.448 While similar in character, the intensity with which the Artillery conceptualized
technology was unmatched. Some within the tribe even claimed technology could make firepower
the dominant force on the battlefield.449 Major Mark Wroth argued that
Fires will dominate the battlefields of the future, and precision munitions will be at
the forefront. Based on computer modelling analyses and the results of Operation
Desert Storm, the ability to accurately attack and kill high-value/high-payoff
targets, both close and in depth, is an invaluable edge for the force. Further, it makes
decisive victories possible with relatively few friendly casualties. The advent of
precision munitions, coupled with other advanced technologies, has been
characterized as a revolution in warfare; recent experience bears that out.450
446 Paul E. Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Armor Conference Set Tone for Future,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 4 (1993),
pp. 5; John Bittay (MSG), “Letters – Hi-Tech Reinvention of the Wheel,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 4 (1991), pp. 4;
Raphael J. Hallada (MG), “Field Artillery State-of-the-Branch-Address,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 6 (1990), pp. 1
– 2; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the Move: Developing Soldiers and Leaders for the Future,” Field Artillery Vol. 60,
No. 4 (1992), pp. 1 – 3; Mark A. Ison (LTC), “Artillery Thirst for Voice and Digital Communications,” Field Artillery
Vol. 59, No. 1 (1991), pp. 47 – 50; Richard A. Needham (CPT), and Russell Graves (MAJ), “100 Hours with Light
TACFIRE,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 5 (1991), pp. 30 – 33. 447 Bruno (LTC), and Broom (SSG), “A New Day for Armor or the Last Glimmer of Sunset,” pp. 7; Elder (COL),
“Force Projection and Combined Arms,” pp. 17. 448 C. William Rittenhouse (LTC, USAR), “Fire Support on the Non-Linear Battlefield: The Shape of Things to
Come,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 5 (1990), pp. 36 – 39; Whiteside (COL ret.), “The Impact of Technology on Future
Cannons,” pp. 22 – 26; Wroth (MAJ), “Legal Mix VII,” pp. 42 – 46. 449 For example, see W.E. Casey Crower (MAJ), “Fire Support and FA Issues at the Maneuver CTCs,” Field Artillery
Vol. 60, No. 5 (1992), pp. 10 – 13. 450 Wroth (MAJ), “Legal Mix VII,” pp. 42.
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There was a growing split between the Infantry on one hand and the Armor and Artillery
on the other. As the Armored tribe became more enamored with technology and the Artillery
deepened their already ‘techno-phillic’ conceptualizations, the Infantry were still relying on their
belief in the skill of the individual infantryman. Even the Infantry’s newfound belief in
technology’s potential associated with the BIFV was not conceptualized with the same depth as
the Artillery or Armor’s. The bifurcation between light and heavy forces in the 1980’s, combined
with the Infantry’s longstanding belief in the ‘human’ capabilities of their soldiers, was a powerful
brake on the emerging RMA within the tribe.
Synchronizing Warfare:
Synchronization in warfare, a concept previously used exclusively by the Artillery, began
to appear in numerous articles throughout the issues of Infantry and Armor in the early 1990s.
Synchronization implied – rather vaguely – the efficient use of all the weapons and units at a
commander’s disposal.451 “Synchronization is more than just the timing of the application of
combat power; it is the sum of the command and control process, staff integration, battlefield
reporting, and the commander’s decision making.”452 It also represented the continued belief in
combined arms as well as the integration of light and heavy forces.453 For the Infantry, this concept
signified a divergence from the traditional emphasis on decentralized operations because of the
451 See for example, John Scudder (CPT), “Planning the Deliberate Attack,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2 (1991), pp. 16 –
20; Charles H. Benson III (CPT), “The Battle of Arras: Fifty-Year-Old Lessons for Today,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 3
(1992), pp. 32 – 36; Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 5 35; Bruce B.G. Clarke (COL), and Steven S. Klement
(CPT), “The Synchronization of the Brigade Fight,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 4 (1991), pp. 17 – 20; Russell W. Glenn
(LTC), “Briefing Techniques: Say Well What Needs Saying,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 2 (1992), pp. 11 – 14; John M.
Mach (MAJ, USAR), “Letters – FireStrike Anxiety,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 3 (1991), pp. 4 – 5; Needham (CPT),
and Graves (MAJ), “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” pp. 30 – 33; Marty (MG), “On the Move: Synchronizing Fires
in Joint and Combined Arms,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 1 (1993), pp. 1 – 2; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the Move,”
pp. 1 – 2. 452 Blaise Cornell-D’Echert Jr. (CPT), “Proper Spirit Plus Sound Training,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 5 (1993), pp. 41. 453 For example, see Donald A. Carter (MAJ), “Fire Support and Synchronization: The Keys to the Complementary
Force,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 1 (1991), pp. 8 – 10; William G. O’Connor (COL), “Heavy-Light Fire Support:
Light Force Ops,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 1 (1991), pp. 11 – 15.
107
implication of continuous synchronization according to existing plans. The idealized vision of
warfare in the 1980s – an infantry lieutenant or captain isolated from their superiors with only the
men under their command and own skill – was challenged in subtle ways by this ‘new’
conceptualization.
The Armored tribe saw synchronization in much the same manner as they had with
technology. Besides envisioning synchronization as a way to sustain the Army’s combined arms
approach to warfare, it represented an opportunity to link emerging technology with new ways of
war.454 In the Artillery tribe, synchronization reinforced their belief on the targeting cycle and a
system-of-systems approach to warfare that had existed in the 1980s.455 This included the belief
that efficiently synchronizing the targeting cycle could make better use of PGMs and lead to
victory.456 The Artillery never overtly used their calls for greater synchronization between the
tribes to achieve independence. Instead, it was always ensconced in terms related to the support
they could offer the maneuver commander and combined arms.457 However, the combination of
RMA technologies with synchronization made the promise of autonomy even more attractive.
The inclusion of synchronization as a condition of victory on the modern battlefield was
done so after it was introduced in the doctrines of the 1980’s. The Armored tribe’s adoption of this
concept aligned their thinking with that of the Artillery tribe. Determining why and how
454 In 1993, this concept had become an integral part of the Battlefield Operating System (BOS). The BOS was a series
of processes including, intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility/countermobility/survivability air defence,
combat service support, and command and control. Synchronizing these would pave the way to victory. C. R. Johnson
(SFC), “Applying the Battlefield Operating Systems at Platoon Level,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 3 (1993), pp. 42 – 43;
Kirby (LTC), “Find the Enemy,” pp. 20 – 21. 455 Forest D. Haynes III (MAJ), “Synchronizing the Divisional Deep Fight,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp.
21 – 25. 456 Grandin (MAJ), “Fire Support Coordination,” pp. 19 – 23; Andrew B. Fontaness (MAJ), “The Successful Task
Force FSO,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 3 (1992), pp. 22 – 23; Raphael J. Hallada (MG), “On the Move: Parting
Thoughts – Focus on the Future,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 3 (1991), pp. 1; Vollney B. Corn Jr. (COL), and Richard
A. Lacuemont (CPT), “Silver Bullets,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 5 (1991), pp. 10 – 15; Bruce B.G. Clarke (COL,
USAR), “Improving the Effectiveness of Artillery at the NTC,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4 (1991), pp. 42 – 45. 457 Bruce B.G. Clarke (COL, USAR), “Improving the Effectiveness of Artillery at the NTC,” Field Artillery Vol. 59,
No. 4 (1991), pp. 42 – 45.
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synchronization emerged in tribal conceptualizations so long after its initial appearance in Army
doctrine is unclear. One potential answer is that restricted budgets of the post-Cold War era drove
the tribes to greater integration. It could have been seen as a necessity given the limited number of
forces that would be deployed on contingency operations, meaning that they had to fight more
effectively. Lastly, the improvements in technology may have provided the means to better
synchronize. Besides these speculations, the emphasis on synchronization does demonstrate that
while doctrine is a powerful institutional tool within the Army, the ability of the tribes to freely
select what parts to emphasize reveals the power of their modes of thinking and the difficulty of
assuming the uniform adoption of even the most popular capstone doctrines.
Nonlinearity:
Nonlinearity initially appeared in the late 1980’s as an expectation of battle, but rapidly
gained prominence in the early 1990’s, appearing in numerous Armor and Field Artillery articles.
Nonlinearity was the idea that battles were characterized by their fluid, unstructured nature and
emphasis on enemy forces, instead of the classic view of battlefields characterized by clearly
defined frontlines based upon territory rather than an enemy. Doctrinally, nonlinearity was the
subject to parts of AirLand Battle Future, the name for the expected but unpublished manual
between the 1986 and 1993 versions of FM 100-5.458 Eventually, FM 100-5 Operations (1993)
codified nonlinearity into the Army’s expectation of future wars.459 Nonlinear battlefields became
an expectation and their conceptualization required the integration of a number of assumptions
about warfare, including technology and synchronization. The refinement of this concept began to
imply a different battlefield, without clearly defined frontlines, amorphous in nature, focusing on
458 Rittenhouse (LTC, USAR), “Operation FireStrike,” pp. 33 – 37. 459 L. M. Johnson (COL), and Thomas R. Rozman (LTC), “The Armor Force and Heavy Equipment Transporters: A
Force Multiplier?,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 4 (1991), pp. 13 – 16.
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the enemy rather than the terrain.460 Here, the ability to ‘see’ the enemy held greater importance
because without this advantage the enemy could seize the decisive initiative.461 Lieutenant Colonel
Michael Kirby summed this up, saying “Find the enemy and our warfighting doctrine can be
applied to defeat him. If not found, the initiative we seek to seize or retain is up for grabs.”462
Much like synchronization, the tribes all interpreted nonlinearity in different ways. Perhaps
the least invested in the concept, the Infantry still believed that combat came down to closing with
and killing the enemy.463 Despite the new battlefield, the Infantry remained focused on their direct
engagements with the enemy. Besides the Infantry’s apparent lack of interest in nonlinearity, some
zealots in the Armored tribe actively argued that the light division was not appropriate for these
conflicts. During the Cold War, the integrators had argued that the light infantry could defend
urban areas, restricted terrain, or the rear. Nonlinearity provided the skeptics with the argument
that the light division’s inability to quickly traverse the battlefield meant that they were woefully
ill-suited for this kind of warfare.464
Both the Armor and Artillery tribes heavily incorporated nonlinearity into their
conceptualizations of warfare in the post-Cold War period. For the Armored tribe, nonlinearity
implied a new form of maneuver warfare. Instead of attacking the enemy’s rear areas on a
structured battlefield, Major General Thomas Foley wrote that, “To the future armored crewman
armor operations will becomes more like the operations of fighter aircraft, extremely high tempo,
anticipating and countering enemy actions, massing to destroy key enemy elements and quickly
460 Edwin J. Kuster Jr. (CPT), “Letters – Preventing Friendly Casualties,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 3 (1992), pp. 3 – 4. 461 Rittenhouse (LTC, USAR), “Operation FireStrike,” pp. 33 – 37. 462 Kirby (LTC), “Find the Enemy,” pp. 20. 463 Kuster, “Letters – Preventing Friendly Casualties”; Garnett Arnold (MAJ), “Fire Support in Low Intensity
Conflicts,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 6 (1991), pp. 40 – 42. 464 Tom Rozman (LTC), “Making Light Forces More Flexible and Responsive,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 1 pp. 18 – 20;
Johnson (COL), and Rozman (LTC), “The Armor Force and Heavy Equipment Transporters,” pp. 13 – 16.
110
dispersing to deny enemy counterattacks.”465 This rapid concentration and dispersal corresponded
with to the Armor’s belief in rapid maneuvering across the battlefield. In yet another example of
the growing proximity of Armor and Artillery thinking, the Armored tribe began emphasizing
targeting cycles. They claimed that since nonlinear battlefields would feature extended distances,
‘seeing’ the enemy on screens rather than only through gun sights became a necessity.466 The
conclusion they reached implied that victory in future, nonlinear battles would revolve around the
ability to find, target, and hit the enemy before they could do the same.467
Nonlinear battlefields most closely approximated the Artillery’s vision of warfare in the
1980’s. Relying on sensors to locate the enemy and then engaging them with precision munitions
matched the Artillery’s desire to win battles by fighting deep.468 The ability to find and destroy the
enemy on this battlefield was deemed to be of greater importance than on linear battlefields
because of fewer maneuver forces to cover larger areas. The Artillery would substitute numbers
with firepower. 469 In short, the Artillery tribe saw themselves as being the essential component to
covering the entirety of the expanded battlefield.
Armor and Artillery’s conceptualization of warfare in nonlinear terms is yet another
demonstration of their growing proximity in how they thought about warfare. The Infantry’s
haphazard adoption of the concept shows how comfortable they were with their role to close with
465 Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 4. 466 Lon E. Maggart (COL), “A Leap of Faith,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 1 (1992), pp. 24 – 32. 467 Peter J. Mattes (CPT), and Frank E. Monroe (SFC), “Sniper Tank!,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2 (1991), pp. 38 – 40;
Bruce J. Held (MAJ), and Edward S. Sunoski (MSG), “Tank Gun Accuracy,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 1 (1993), pp. 6 –
11; Arthur W. Connor, Jr. (MAJ), “Jousting with their Main Guns: A Bizarre Tank Battle of the Korean War,” Armor
Vol. 102, No. 1 (1993), pp. 17, 49; Paul E. Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Information Age Warfare,” Armor Vol.
102, No. 6 (1993), pp. 4. 468 Marty (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 1 – 2; Grady B. Garrett (MAJ), “The Corps Artillery Commander and Deep
Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp. 15 – 21. 469 Dennis C. Cline (COL), and Joe G. Taylor (LTC), “Deep Operations – The MLRS Deep Strike Option,” Field
Artillery Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp. 26 – 31; Leighton L. Duitsman (MAJ ret.), “Army TACMS,” Field Artillery Vol.
59, No. 1 (1991), pp. 38 – 41.
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and kill the enemy, no matter the battle. The emergence of nonlinearity in the tribes’ conceptual
thinking about warfare was not in isolation. The connection to emerging technologies as well as
the types of conflicts the Army could be deployed to fight in, indicate the position of importance
that nonlinearity held for at least two of the Army’s tribes.
Contingencies – A Confluence of Conceptualizations:
Determining what conflicts the Army had to prepare for in the post-Cold War world
consumed a great many pages in the tribal journals. The emergence of the term ‘contingency’ was
the most important conceptualization by the tribes. FM 100-5 Operations (1982) did raise the issue
of Army deployments outside of Europe, however, the post-Cold War conceptualization of
contingency operations carried with it greater importance. Instead of accounting for peripheral
missions outside of Europe, these were now the primary focus.470 This thinking was akin to
General Sullivan’s call for post-Cold War thinking in the Army.471 The creation of an acronym for
contingency operations, CONOPS, demonstrated the frequency and institutionalized manner in
which this concept of war was discussed.472 The conditions for victory were conceptualized as
follows: quick deployments by conventional military power – initially light forces followed
immediately by heavier ones – would lead to fast-paced battles, requiring minimal casualties, and
focused on destroying the enemy.473 Both Operation Just Cause’s light forces and Operation
Desert Storm’s VII Corps were examples of the range of forces that might be required.474
470 See chapter 4 “The New Warrior Class,” in Jensen, Forging the Sword, pp. 87 – 124. 471 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine,” pp. 224 – 225. 472 Thomas R. Rozman (LTC), “Company D (Mobile Combat Range,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 6 (1991), pp. 23 – 25. 473 Rozman (LTC), “Company D (Mobile Combat Range),” pp. 23 – 25; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the Move: Fire
Support in Contingency Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 2 (1992), pp. 1 – 2; Sorrell (MAJ), “Letters – Long-
Term Technology versus Short-Term Savings,” pp. 5; Johnnie L. Bone Jr. (MAJ), “Joint Precision Strike – The Field
Artillery Contribution,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 1 (1993), pp. 16 – 18; Jones (LTC), “A Warfighting Philosophy,”
pp. 47 – 50; Arlelly (CPT), “Doctrine vs. Technology,” pp. 29 – 30; Daniel J. Klecker (MAJ), and Charles S. Kaune
(LTC), “Time Management – The Combat Trains,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 2 (1993), pp. 22 – 23. 474 E.C. Mariah III (MAJ), It’s Time to Consider Glider Delivery of the M1 Abrams,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 5 (1992),
pp. 27, 34 – 38; Mansoor (CPT), “Basing Light Armor Battalions,” pp. 15 – 16; Duitsman (MAJ ret.), “Army
112
Since these conflicts would occur unexpectedly, the Army’s ability to deploy would be a
condition of victory, therefore the light infantry would be the first in.475 Because of this, they had
to be capable of either deterring or defeating the enemy’s heavy forces until heavier Army units
entered the battlefield.476 The desperate fight by the 101st in Bastogne during the Battle of the
Bulge in 1944 was cited as evidence of this precarious mission.477 The deployment of light infantry
would pave the way for the heavy forces that would follow as quick as possible.478 For the Armored
tribe, this meant that they now had an important role in ‘contingencies’ as the follow-on-force with
the greatest combat power to bring to bear in any situation. Likewise, the light infantry could be
utilized in the manner they were originally created for, as a rapid reaction force. This also signified
the partial acceptance of the light infantry division as a strategically important component of the
Army. While still ‘lacking combat power’ it nonetheless had a vital role.
TACMS,” pp. 38 – 41; Marty (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 1 – 2; Kenneth R. Knight (LTC), Henry S. Larsen (CPT),
Allen W. Batschelet (CPT), and Roland A. Hoskinson (CPT), “Movement-to-Contact: ‘Red Dragons’ in Operation
Desert Shield,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 3 (1991), pp. 42 – 45; Marshall L. Helena (LTC), “Letters – Light to
Mech,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 3 (1990), pp. 3. 475 This was similar to how a war with the Soviets was conceptualized. Its unexpected nature would require that the
Army maintain a high level of readiness. Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Infantry Training – From the
Beginning,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1 – 2; Elder (COL), “Force Projection and Combined Arms,” pp. 17
– 20; James J. Waldeck (CPT), “HIMARS for Contingency Operations: To Get There Fast with Firepower,” Field
Artillery Vol. 60, No. 2 (1992), pp. 22 – 25; White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Thomas G. Waller Jr.
(LTC), and David W. Riggins (CPT), “At the Cutting Edge of Battle – The Light Fire Support Officer’s Course,”
Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 3 (1993), pp. 42 – 43. 476 Douglas J. Morrison (CPT), “Letters – Comments on Cavalry,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 1 (1990), pp. 2 – 3; Thompson
(LTC), “Light Infantry in Stay-Behind Operations,” pp. 31 – 37; John S. Zachau (LT), “TOW Accuracy Training,”
Infantry Vol. 81, No. 4 (1991), pp. 42 – 44; Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 5
(1992), pp. 1 – 2; Mark R. Lewis (LT), “JRTC Lessons Learned: An Airborne Platoon in the Defense,” Infantry Vol.
83, No. 5 (1993), pp. 42 – 44; William J. Lennox Jr. (COL), and John M. House (LTC), “Deploying for Victory,”
Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 3 (1993), pp. 21 – 23; Michael R. Jacobson (MAJ USAR), “Antiarmor: What you Don’t
Know Could Kill You,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 2 (1990), pp. 36 – 40; Cole C. Kingseed (LTC), “Kangaroo 89: US
Light Infantry in the Outback,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 3 (1990), pp. 36 – 38; Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and James F.
Gebhardt (MAJ), “Counterinsurgency and Soviet Force Structure,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 6 (1991), pp. 20 – 26; John
L. Pothin (CPT), “A Doctrinal Perspective,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 4 (1992), pp. 14 – 16. 477 Albert N. Garland (LTC ret.), “The Bulge: A Remembrance,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 6 (1993), pp. 7 – 9. 478 Russell W. Glenn (MAJ), “Give Me a Heavy-Light,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 5 pp. 35 – 37; Richard F. Dauch (CPT),
and Shawn R. Schiffer (LT), “The Light Infantry Company at REFORGER,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 5 (1990), pp. 29 –
33; O’Connor (COL), “Heavy-Light Fire Support,” pp. 11 – 15.
113
The enemy in a contingency mission could “range from highly developed, well-organized
units possessing highly lethal weaponry to poorly organized groups who rely on small-unit
operations, subversion, sabotage and terrorism to support political aims and objectives.”479
Contingencies could feature LIC’s and were expected to occur with greater frequency, and feature
a range of missions, including circumstances where firepower might not be the preferred
solution.480 For example, rules of engagement were the domain of LIC’s, for without them it could
not be considered a LIC.481 Paradoxically, accepting the fact that LIC’s might occur more
frequently or feature different missions did not result in the tribes investing more time or resources
preparing for these potential conflicts. High-intensity conventional warfare remained the
expectation, and AirLand Battle doctrine, conventional warfare training, and heavy forces were
deemed to be wholly appropriate for all kinds of conflicts.482 Colonel Joseph DeFrancisco’s
writing on LIC demonstrates the belief in a conventional force’s applicability;
479 John K. Boles III (LTC), and Vincent C. Schmoll (CPT), “The Regional Threat,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 4 (1990), pp.
30. 480 Despite efforts at this time by the Army’s leadership to use the term Operations Other Than War (OOTW) instead
of low-intensity conflicts (LIC), many writers still used the older term. Walter E. Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp.
224 – 225. For a diverse range of examples from all three journals, see Hackworth (COL, ret.), “Infantry’s Top Gun,”
pp. 10 – 12; David L. Nobles (CPT), “The Light Armored Force: An Urgent Need, A Ready Solution,” Armor Vol.
99, No. 3 (1990), pp. 8 – 13; Thomas E. Swain (COL), “FA and LIC: An Overview,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 2
(1991), pp. 4 – 7; Robert L. Bateman (LT), “NEOs The New Mission,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 5 (1992), pp. 17 – 20;
Martin N. Stanton (MAJ), “Checkpoint/Roadblock Operations,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 6 (1993), pp. 9 – 10; Bruce H.
Irwin (CPT, ARNG), “Security of the Force: A Commander’s Call,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 1 (1992), pp. 41 – 43; John
C. Merriam (LTC), “What Role for Artillery in LIC or MIC?,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 2 (1990), pp. 8 – 16; Joseph
E. DeFrancisco (COL), and Robert J. Reese (MAJ), “Nimrod Dancer Artillery: Fire Support in Low-Intensity
Conflict,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 2 (1990), pp. 17 – 21; O’Connor (COL), “Heavy-Light Fire Support,” pp. 11 –
15. 481 Joseph P. Nizolak Jr. (MAJ), “ROE Dissemination: A Tough Nut to Crack!,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 2 (1992),
pp. 35 – 36; Eikenberry (LTC), “Deterrent Patrolling,” pp. 24 – 27; Marrero (CPT), “Fire Support in Irregular
Warfare,” pp. 37 – 40; Raphael J. Hallada (MG), “On the Move: Facing the Winds of Change,” Field Artillery Vol.
58, No. 2 (1990), pp. 2. 482 Thomas E. Fish (CPT), “The Infantry Spectrum: Crossing from Light to Mech,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 1 (1990),
pp. 39 – 41; James T. Palmer (LTC), and Charles R. Rash (LTC), “Operation Hurricane Andrew Relief: Humanitarian
Assistance, Redleg Style,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 5 (1993), pp. 31 – 35; Thomas R. Rozman (LTC), “Thoughts
on Medium or Motorized Forces,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 1 (1991), pp. 22 – 26; White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,”
pp. 1 – 2.
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In LIC, the 105-mm howitzer is a major weapon. It became a symbol of US resolve
and potential destructive power. It showed we meant business.483
Training for LICs, at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee,
Arkansas, was subject to varying degrees of interest between the tribes. The Infantry paid the most
attention to the JRTC. For them, the JRTC represented a chance for units to train to fight
insurgents/guerillas, rather than train to be peacebuilders.484 By early 1992, the JRTC had gained
some prominence, with many articles describing it as a ‘battlefield’ in the same manner as the
NTC in the 1980’s. 485 Meanwhile, the number of articles focused on the NTC had declined.486 For
the Armored tribe, the value of the JRTC was its ability to train light and heavy forces to fight
alongside one another at any intensity. Making the JRTC a component of conventional training.487
For the Armored tribe, contingency conflicts implied a few things. First, it reaffirmed the
combined arms paradigm. If there was a chance for a mid-intensity, conventional battle as a result
of a contingency operation, then the Army needed to be able to deploy together.488 Second, it meant
483 Joseph E. DeFrancisco (COL), “Bayonet Artillery in Operation Just Cause,” Field Artillery Vol. 58, No. 3 (1990),
pp. 11. 484 Stanley Wilson (CPT), “JRTC: The OPFOR’s Training,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 4 (1990), pp. 31 – 34; Kevin J.
Dougherty (CPT), “Search and Attack,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 5 (1991), pp. 18 – 22; Richard A. Berglund (CPT),
“Intelligence Considerations For the JRTC Search and Attack,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 5 (1993), pp. 7 – 9. 485 Paul B. Short (MAJ), and David G. Shoffner (CPT), “Smoke Integration on the JRTC Battlefield,” Infantry Vol.
82, No. 2 (1992), pp. 11 – 12. 486 Nevertheless, there still were a large number of articles dealing with the NTC. Boiling (CPT), “Tactical Unit
Rehearsals,” pp. 25 – 30; Clarke (COL), and Steven S. Klement (CPT), “The Synchronization of the Brigade Fight,”
pp. 17 – 20; Franklin F. Childress (CPT), and Michael Prevou (CPT), “Secrets to Tactical Success at the NTC,”
Infantry Vol. 82, No. 1 (1991), pp. 20 – 27; Robert C. Neumann (CPT), “Moving the Main CP in a Heavy Task Force,”
Infantry Vol. 82, No. 1 (1991), pp. 33 – 36; R.W. Chatham Jr. (CPT), “Offensive TOW Training: An Innovative
Approach,” Infantry, Vol. 82, No. 2 (1992), pp. 42 – 45; Josef R. Hallatshek (CPT), “Infantry Breach Kits,” Infantry
Vol. 82, No. 5 (1992), pp. 36 – 37; Christopher E. Lockhart (CPT), “Modern Dragoons: Bradley Mechanized Infantry,”
Infantry Vol. 82, No. 6 (1992), pp. 33 – 35; Michael G. Jones (COL), “Preparing for an NTC Rotation,” Infantry Vol.
83, No. 1 (1992), pp. 24 – 28; Mark A. Chatter II (LT), “Heavy Task Force Medical Platoon: Maintaining Momentum
in Offensive Operations,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 4 (1992), pp. 10 – 12; Steven W. Gardner (LTC), and Edward C.
Rothstein (CPT), “NTC Lessons Learned: The Scout FRAGO,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 5 (1993), pp. 45 – 46. 487 M. R. Pierce (CPT), “Joint Readiness Training Center: A First Impression,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 4 (1992), pp. 47
– 49. 488 Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 4 – 5; Kevin J. Hammond (CPT), and Frank Sherman (CPT), “Sheridans
in Panama,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 2 (1990), pp. 8 – 15; Chris Schneider (SSG), “Letters – Building Flexibility Into
Armor’s Future,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 5 (1990), pp. 45.
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that the light infantry needed a new tank.489 The M551 Sheridan’s replacement, the Armored Gun
System (AGS), would support light forces but would not come close to replacing the combat power
of an M1 Abrams.490 Captain Cole Milstead made the case that “We should not be lulled, though,
into thinking AGS makes light division competitive with enemy armor. With a 105-mm gun, AGS
does not penetrate modern enemy tanks. With light Armor, AGS will not survive long on a higher
intensity battlefield.”491
Similarly, the Artillery believed that they would be the light division’s only source of fire
support.492 Therefore, the Artillery needed to deploy early.493 The requirement to have readily
available firepower led to the development of the high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS),
which had a MLRS-like capability but was attached to a truck chassis for added deployability.494
This would give the Artillery the capability to do what they wanted – the precise application of
firepower – in any potential conflict from the first deployment. Underpinning all of this were the
assumptions that firepower would be effective on any contingency battlefield and, more
importantly, that the enemy could be targeted, implying a conventionally oriented enemy. Joint
warfare became conceptualized as a way to provide the light force with the greatest amount of
489 Nobles (CPT), “The Light Armored Force,” pp. 8 – 13; Melton (CPT), “The Future of Armor,” pp. 37 – 40; Bruno
(LTC), and Broom (SSG), “A New Day for Armor or the Last Glimmer of Sunset,” pp. 7 – 11; Robert J. Within
(MAJ), The Case for Light Cavalry,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 6 pp. 30 – 32. 490 Boles III (LTC), and Schmoll (CPT), “The Regional Threat,” pp. 30 – 35. 491 Cole Milstead (CPT), “Future Heavy Forces: The Need for Better Air Deployability,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 3
(1991), pp. 38 – 44, 38. 492 Carter (MAJ), “Fire Support and Synchronization,” pp. 8 – 10. 493 Biggs (LTC), “Fire Support Considerations in Contingency Operations,” pp. 16 – 17; William G. Welch (LTC),
“Notes from the BCE: Observations on Joint Combat Operations at Echelons above Corps,” Field Artillery Vol. 60,
No. 3 (1992), pp. 16 – 21; Sorrell (MAJ), “Letters – Long-Term Technology versus Short-Term Savings,” pp. 5; David
D. Hollands (CPT, USAR), “Artillery TTPs for the Danger-Close Fight: LID in the Movement-to-Objective and Initial
Contact,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 1 (1993), pp. 36 – 38; John A. Dubia (BG), “On the Move: Fire Support with
20/20 Vision,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 4 (1993), pp. 1 – 2. 494 Marty (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 1 – 2; Biggs (LTC), “Fire Support Considerations in Contingency Operations,”
pp. 16 – 17; Waldeck (CPT), “HIMARS for Contingency Operations,” pp. 22 – 25; James V. Scott (MAJ),
“Contingency Ops Fire Support – Think Joint,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 2 (1992), pp. 31 – 34.
116
firepower as quickly as possible.495 US airpower, from the Navy or Air Force, would act as a
stopgap until heavy forces arrived.496 The expectation was that airpower would be wholly
subservient to the needs of the light force.
The conceptualizations of contingency conflicts imitated how the Army dealt with the light
division in the 1980’s – accepting the importance of a rapid reaction force but ultimately finding
it inconsequential in a conventional. It was clear that when discussing contingencies, mid-intensity
conventional warfare was the expectation; high-intensity warfare had all but disappeared from the
discussion, although this was minor because conventional warfare remained. The inclusion of
LIC’s in the discussions surrounding contingency operations is not evidence of their priority, rather
their insignificance. The inclusion of conventional warfare completely overshadowed any real
discussion of an LIC mission. Far from being ignored by the tribes, low-intensity conflicts were
nonetheless treated as a ‘second-class’ conflict. The classification of LIC with specific conditions
facilitated the delineation of more preferred forms of warfare. During the early 1990’s, the tribes
walked a very fine line between adjusting their conceptualizations of warfare to new strategic
realities out of necessity and preserving their most cherished expectations of warfare.
The Three Operations:
In differing degrees and ways, operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm
informed tribal conceptualizations of warfare in the early 1990’s. The US invasion of Panama in
495 EMarty (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 1 – 2; Bone Jr. (MAJ), “Joint Precision Strike – The Field Artillery
Contribution,” pp. 16 – 18; John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: Preparing for the Purple Battlefield,” Field Artillery
Vol. 61, No. 5 (1993), pp. 1; Henry G. Franke III (MAJ), “Ocean Venture 93: An Overview,” Field Artillery Vol. 61,
No. 5 (1993), pp. 17 – 19; Richard E. Evans (LTC), and Ricki L. Sullivan (CPT), “Joint Assignments: Facts and
Myths,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 1 (1992), pp. 42 – 45; Marty (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 1 – 2; Scott (MAJ),
“Contingency Ops Fire Support – Think Joint,” pp. 31 – 34; Fred F. Marty (MG), “State-of-the-Branch 1992,” Field
Artillery Vol. 60, No. 6 (1992), pp. 1 – 3; John Gordon IV (MAJ), “Naval Fire Support and the Force Projection
Army,” Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 5 (1993), pp. 22 – 27. 496 Funk (MG), “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 5 – 6; George E. Hodge (MAJ), “The Aviation LNO – What You Should
Expect,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 3 (1993), pp. 19.
117
Operation Just Cause provided the Army with their first conflict since Grenada in 1983. Between
December of 1989 and January of 1990, the US opted to remove Panamanian strongman Manuel
Noriega from power with military force – which included the 7th Light Infantry Division and 82nd
Airborne Divisions, as well as special forces.497 Instead of ‘wartime’ lessons learned in Cold War
exercises and training rotations at the NTC, Panama provided a case study in contingency
operations for the Army. Triumphantly, the commander of Just Cause, Lieutenant General Carl
Stiner, claimed that “There were no lessons learned in this operation… But we did validate a lot
of things.”498 For many, Just Cause had validated that the previous fifteen years of reforms to the
Army had succeeded in producing a capable combat force.499 Whether this was justified given the
light resistance by Noriega’s “dignity battalions” went unquestioned.500
For the tribes, Operation Just Cause reaffirmed the belief in the chaos of conflict and was
considered to be a success.501 The Infantry took the most away from the conflict in Panama,
followed by the Armor, and then the Artillery. For the Infantry primarily, Panama represented the
kind of low-intensity conflict that light forces had been created for. The rapid deployments
alongside the sometimes unconventional fighting was a clear example of the utility of light
forces.502 Both Field Artillery and Armor did not cover this aspect of the conflict. The Infantry,
and to a lesser extent the Armor, saw the need for improved training in urban warfare given the
497 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 214 – 215. 498 Quoted in Lynn, Echo of Battle, pp. 220. 499 Vandergriff, The Path to Victory, pp. 144 – 145. 500 Arquilla, Worst Enemy, pp. 8. 501 Spigelmire (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Hackworth (COL, ret.), “Infantry’s Top Gun,” pp. 10 – 12;
Robert A. Albino (CPT), “Stopping Friendly Fire,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 5 (1991), pp. 15 – 16; Richard W. Tragemann
(BG), “Redlegs on the Front Line – Operation Desert Shield,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 1 (1991), pp. 5 – 7. 502 Steven M. Galvango (CPT), and Alan J. Rock (LTC), “The IPB Process in Low-Intensity Conflict,” Infantry Vol.
80, No. 6 (1990), pp. 20 – 23; Charles W. Durr (CPT), “JRTC: Live Fire Operations,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 1 (1992),
pp. 31 – 33. See the following for examples of articles from Field Artillery, Merriam (LTC), “What Role for Artillery
in LIC or MIC?,” pp. 8 – 16; DeFrancisco (COL), and Reese (MAJ), “Nimrod Dancer Artillery,” pp. 17 – 21;
DeFrancisco (COL), “Bayonet Artillery in Operation Just Cause,” pp. 6 – 11.
118
fighting in Panama City.503 All tribes accepted the fact, unquestioningly, that civilian casualties
were unacceptable.504 For the Armor, the most important lesson drawn from Panama was that they
lacked an advanced light tank. Although successful, the Sheridan light tank had to be replaced.505
Operation Just Cause provided all three tribes with a victory in combat. Providing a
confirmation of what they believed in, while also acting as an example of what future conflicts
might look like. The Infantry’s focus on the conflict is a reflection of the involvement of two ‘light’
infantry units – one airborne, the other light. Problematically, all of the lessons drawn from this
conflict were done so from the combat phase, with post-conflict stabilization being ignored.506 As
demonstrated in the analysis on contingency operations, the primary lesson of Just Cause was the
deployment rather than the combat itself. The tribes’ focus on combat corresponded to the Army’s
own cultural preferences for conflict – in this case, any type of fighting. Even as Just Cause was
being analyzed by the tribes, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait some six months later would nearly wipe
Panama from memory.
The Army of the 1980’s had used the NTC to reveal the ‘realities’ of warfare. The Army
of the post-Cold War period had Desert Storm. The highly conventional nature of the Gulf War
provided the tribes with the opportunity to analyze a ‘real’ war and, use it to predict a particular
future. The War in the Persian Gulf confirmed many of the tribes’ conceptualizations of warfare.
503 David E. Spence (SSG, ARNG), “Urban Combat Doctrine of the Salvadoran FMLN,” Infantry Vol. 80, No. 6
(1990), pp. 17 – 19; Richard T. Rhoades (COL), “Low Intensity Conflict: What Captains Should Study,” Infantry Vol.
81, No. 2 (1991), pp. 10 – 12; Robert G. Boyko (MAJ), “Just Cause MOUT Lessons Learned,” Infantry Vol. 81, No.
3 (1991), pp. 28 – 32; Erick A. Reinstated (1LT), “Light Cavalry in a Peacekeeping Role,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 3
(1991), pp. 33 – 37; Karl W. Eikenberry (LTC), “Improving MOUT and Battle Focused Training,” Infantry Vol. 83,
No. 3 (1992), pp. 36 – 39; Douglas Stewart (CPT), “MOUT Battle Drills for Infantry and Tanks,” Infantry Vol. 83,
No. 3 (1992), pp. 40 – 42; John S. Zachau (CPT), “Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 6
(1992), pp. 44 – 46. 504 Spence (SSG, ARNG), “Urban Combat Doctrine of the Salvadoran FMLN,” pp. 17 – 19; Boyko (MAJ), “Just
Cause MOUT Lessons Learned,” pp. 28 – 32; Reinstated (1LT), “Light Cavalry in a Peacekeeping Role,” pp. 33 – 37. 505 Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch,” pp. 4 – 5; Hammond (CPT), and Sherman (CPT), “Sheridans in Panama,” pp.
8 – 15; Brian K. Chatham (CPT), “Letters – Light Tanks are Available Now,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 3 (1990), pp. 3 –
4; Hallada (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 2; Nizolak Jr. (MAJ), “ROE Dissemination,” pp. 35 – 36 506 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 214 – 215; Scales Jr. (BG), Certain Victory, pp. 32 – 35.
119
It featured technological prowess in the form of precision guided munitions – in reality the Army
used more PGMs than the Air Force – as well maneuver warfare manifested in General Norman
Schwarzkopf’s, Central Command’s Commander-in-Chief, left-hook into the Iraqi Republican
Guard.507 Scathingly, Donald Vandergriff wrote that the Gulf War “provided the perfect
environment for the US military to validate its new doctrinal practices by employing its latest
technological tools with little or no risk of defeat and without exposing the weaknesses of its
institutional culture.”508 Strategically it represented the ethos of the Powell/Weinberger doctrine,
providing the military with nearly complete autonomy in their affairs, with the total backing of the
nation.509 However, at the same time there were those either calling for the Army to learn from the
War, or describing particular lessons that the Army should be learning.510 Much like the Arab-
Israeli War of 1973 and the Army’s lessons from the National Training Center, many
commentators in Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery used the experiences in the Gulf to advocate
for certain changes in their tribe.511 These never implied wholesale changes to the tribes’ beliefs,
instead they aligned themselves with the existing perspectives on conventional warfare.
507 Arquilla, Worst Enemy, pp. 38. 508 Vandergriff, The Path to Victory, pp. 146. 509 The Weinberger/Powell Doctrine was a response to the Vietnam War. It postulated that military force would be
free from political interference, the Army would only be committed with public support, and no resources would be
withheld. In the case of the ‘Scud’ hunt in Western Iraq, there was significant political pressure from Washington on
Schwarzkopf and the Air Force to reduce the numbers of Scud missile launches targeting Israel. This was the exception
than the rule in the Gulf War. Officials in the Bush administration feared that if Israel attacked Iraq then the Coalition’s
Arab allies – including Syria and Egypt – would withdraw their support. Atkinson, Crusade; Andrew J. Bacevich,
“’Splendid Little War’: America’s Persian Gulf Adventure Ten Years On,” in Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar,
eds., The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 149 – 164; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention
Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 118 – 125. 510 John M. House (MAJ), “Lessons from the BattleKings in the Desert,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 5 (1991), pp. 16
– 21; Michael D. Farris (CPT), and Peter A. Catanese (1LT), “False Targets: Mirages in the Desert,” Field Artillery
Vol. 60, No. 1 (1992), pp. 15 – 16. 511 These ranged from the weight of a soldier’s pack to desired leadership traits. Scott C. Porter (LT), “The Soldier’s
Load,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 3 (1992), pp. 19 – 22; Edwin J. Kuster Jr. (CPT), “Letters – Employment of Scouts,”
Infantry Vol. 82, No. 4 (1992), pp. 3 – 4; Turner (CPT), “Leadership,” pp. 7 – 8; David D. Howard (CPT), “New Aids
to Desert Navigation: Knowing Where You Are…,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2 (1991), pp. 11 – 13.
120
Operation Desert Shield was the first phase of the war and saw the rapid deployment of
the 82nd Airborne Division to Saudi Arabia. More so than Operation Just Cause, this operation’s
rapid reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would come to typify expected future contingency
deployments. Demonstrated by Major E.C. Mariah’s statement that “Operation DESERT SHIELD
is the paradigm for future US military actions, the 82d will need main battle tanks on future drop
zones.”512 Desert Shield came to the archetype of a contingency operation because light forces
quickly deployed with heavy forces following.513 The unexpected nature of the conflict, especially
for the Army’s VII Corps in Germany, combined with the desert conditions also contributed to
this belief.514 Dramatically, some even compared the movement of the VII Corps to the renowned
drive north by Patton’s Third Army during the Battle of the Bulge. For the Armored tribe, this
eased many of their fears about their importance and role in the post-Cold War world.515
Additionally, the deployment of the Army’s own tanks to counter the threat posed by Iraq’s heavy
armour appeared to confirm that the Third World’s tank arsenals posed enough of a threat to
require American armour.516 This was evidence of the tribes’ focus on combat at the tactical and
operational levels of war because it ignored the fact it took months to establish the logistical base
necessary for a ground offensive.517 The establishment of an army headquarters in theatre was a
point of pride. It was the first time the Army had deployed a headquarters to manage an entire
512 Mariah III (MAJ), “It’s Time to Consider Glider Delivery of the M1 Abrams,” pp. 34. 513 Initially the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), was deployed via sealift. The heavy force was augmented by the
addition of the VII Corps. Cavezza (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Atkinson, Crusade. 514 The Army’s VII Corps had not seen combat since Korea. Robert H. Clear (COL), “Environmental Influences on
Desert Storm,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 3 (1992), pp. 28 – 34. 515 Thomas C. Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Desert Shield Deployment Rivals Patton’s Rush to the Bulge,”
Armor Vol. 100, No. 1 pp. 5; 515 Kenneth P. Graves (MAJ), “Steel Rain – XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery in Desert
Storm,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 5 (1991), pp. 49 – 56; Milstead (CPT), “Future Heavy Forces,” pp. 38 – 44;
Schule Jr. (CPT), “Can’t Get There From Here,” pp. 37 – 40; Arthur W. Connor Jr. (MAJ), “Breakout and Pursuit:
The Drive from the Pusan Perimeter by the 1st Cavalry Division and Task Force Lynch,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 4
(1993), pp. 26 – 31. For a depiction of Patton’s rapid movement, see Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light. 516 John F. Antal (MAJ), “The Sword of Saddam: An Overview of the Iraqi Armed Force,” Armor Vol. 99, No. 6 pp.
8 – 12; Warford (CPT), “The Tanks of Babylon,” pp. 19 – 23. 517 Romjue, American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War, pp. 51 – 57.
121
army.518 This gave rise to the assumption that future conflicts could require the deployment of at
least a corps, and, if necessary, an army headquarters.519
The early deployment of the 82nd Airborne reinforced the perpetual fears within the tribes
that light infantry could not withstand armoured attacks.520 From the Army’s perspective, Captain
Robert Conway put it best, ignoring the extensive contributions from the other services;
Had Saddam Hussein attacked the initial forces in Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt
in my mind that a total rout of those light forces would have resulted. Only a viable
and substantial deterrent force composed largely of armored vehicles could deter
such aggression. As it stands now, the US Army is only capable of deploying one
battalion of armored vehicles within 18 to 72 hours of an initial mobilization.521
Even some members of the Infantry agreed with this reading of the initial deployment. For
example, Captain Sean Corrigan, a member of the 82nd Airborne, wrote that “We all realized just
how tenuous and exposed our initial sector had been in late August prior to the arrival of heavy
forces. As a lightly armed, unprotected, and dismounted task force, we could not have stopped a
determined armor attack of any significant size.”522 For their part, the Artillery tribe emphasized
the necessity of deploying artillery units alongside light forces. Without them, the light forces
would be left without any fire support.
While the 82d Airborne Division deployed rapidly to the Middle East, commanders
also recognized the requirement to support them with armored and artillery forces
as soon as possible. The Fire Support Community must recognize its critical role in
the complementary force package. We’re the firepower that maintains the light
force on the battlefield. More than ever, we must be on time and on target. We’re
the force that links the mixed-force team together.523
518 An army headquarters is typically responsible for two Army corps. Welch (LTC), “Notes from the BCE,” pp. 16 –
21 519 For example, see Bone Jr. (MAJ), “Joint Precision Strike – The Field Artillery Contribution,” pp. 16 – 18. 520 Milstead (CPT), “Future Heavy Forces,” pp. 38 – 44; James Etchechury (LTC), “The Armored Gun System Debate:
Let it Begin Before it is too Late,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 1 pp. 32 – 34; Ricahrd M. Bohannon (2LT), “Dragon’s Roar:
1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 3 (1992), pp. 11 – 17; Welch (LTC), “Notes from the
BCE,” pp. 16 – 21. 521 Robert F. Conway Jr. (CPT), “Letters – Armored Force Must Push for Light Tank,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 1 (1991),
pp. 50. 522 Sean Corrigan (CPT, Infantry), “The 82d Airborne in Saudi Arabia,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 5 (1993), pp. 32 – 35. 523 Carter (MAJ), “Fire Support and Synchronization,” pp. 10.
122
This provided a recurring justification for technology and heavier equipment to augment the light
infantry for any future contingency conflict, furthering the Armored tribe’s calls for a new light
tank as well as their insistence on the immediate deployment of Abrams tanks for any conflict.
Like Just Cause, Desert Storm would come to eclipse Desert Shield. What remained was
the belief that contingency deployments could be logistically intense and feature large numbers of
heavy forces. Furthermore, because of the 82nd Division’s tenuous position in Saudi Arabia, light
forces could not be guaranteed to stop an adversary with tanks. In the end, Desert Shield set the
stage for one of the most decisive combat operations the Army would conduct, which guaranteed
it at least some attention.
The issues of Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery disproportionately represented Desert
Storm’s 100 hours of ground combat. This ‘operation’ came to represent the tribes’ new idealized
vision of warfare. The Infantry closed with and destroyed the enemy. Armored forces conducted
a ‘brilliant’ maneuver with ‘brilliant’ weapons. The Artillery employed their most technologically
advanced and destructives weapons in a deep battle. Desert Storm, not the Gulf War, had validated
AirLand Battle doctrine, as well as the Army’s equipment and training. 524 Colonel Vollney Corn
and Captain Richard A. Lacquemont declared that “Though the Desert Storm ground war lasted
only 100 hours, the US moved more forces, farther, in a shorter period of time, bringing more
524 Robert Friedenberg (LT), “Reconnaissance in the Desert,” Infantry Vol. 81, No. 5 (1991), pp. 39 – 40; White (MG),
“Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Rick J. Edmond (MAJ), and Kermit E. Steck (CPT), “M1A1 NETT in Southwest
Asia,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2 (1991), pp. 14 – 15; Howard (CPT), “New Aids to Desert Navigation,” pp. 11 – 13;
Thomas C. Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Developing Armor Leaders – Now and In the Future,” Armor Vol.
100, No. 4 (1991), pp. 6 – 7; Charles W. Gameros, Jr. (1LT), “Scout HMMWVs and Bradley CFVs: Gulf War Provides
Comparison of Scout Vehilces and MTOEs,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 5 (1991), pp. 21 – 25; Richard M. Bohannon (2LT),
“Dragon’s Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 3 (1992), pp. 11 – 17; Robert Wilson
(LTC), “Tanks in the Division Cavalry Squadron,” Armor Vol. 101, No. 4 (1992), pp. 6 – 11; John K. Tien (CPT),
“The Future Scout Vehicle: A DESERT STORM Endorsement,” Armor Vol. 102, No. 2 (1993), pp. 18 – 21; Raphael
J. Hallada (MG), “On the Move: LIC – A Fire Support Challenge,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 2 (1991), pp. 1; Fred
F. Marty (MG), “On the Move: Staying on Target,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4 (1991), pp. 1; Marty (MG), “On the
Move,” pp. 1 – 2.
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firepower on the enemy than in any campaign in US history. We must capture the data of that
campaign and extract the lessons learned.”525 Using conceptualizations from the Cold War, some
argued that victory in Desert Storm had been achieved in ‘first battle’ of the war, a realization of
the Army’s expectations of conflict in the Cold War.526 Of course, this claim conveniently ignored
the 44-day long air campaign that preceded the ground offensive.
The fact that the training, especially at the NTC, was identified as a reason for success
meant that the Gulf War did not challenge the Army to investigate its consequences critically. If
the assumptions guiding the conduct of units at the NTC were validated in war then they would
become further ingrained into the tribes. This is not to say that the training conducted at the NTC
was poor, but that the Gulf War did not challenge the assumptions – conventional war,
armoured/mechanized, absence of non-combatants – underpinning these training rotations.
The Gulf War was a point of pride for the Armored tribe; “The massive Armor advances
of Desert Storm are the first of their kind since the Allied sweeps through North Africa and Europe
in World War II.”527 Some provocatively declared that the Gulf War was an “Armor-dominated
ground conflict.”528 The number of articles dealing with the exploits of individual units surpassed
even those in the Cold War dealing with the NTC and matched the interest shown towards a
potential conflict with the Soviet Union in the 1980’s.529 Many of these articles attempted to glean
525 Corn Jr. (COL), and Lacquemont (CPT), “Silver Bullets,” pp. 10 – 15. 526 Thomas C. Foley (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Conference Capped a Triumphant Year,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2
(1991), pp. 4 – 5. This discounted the lengthy air campaign that had preceded the ground offensive. Thomas G.
Mahnken, “A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War,” in Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar,
eds., The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 125. 527 Ronald J. Bashita (1LT), “Letters – Waevives Armor Badge Issue,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 4 (1991), pp. 5 49. 528 James M. Burton (1LT), “Letters – Tankers and Scouts Due Equal Recognition,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 3 (1991),
pp. 47 – 48. 529 1-4 CAV Operations Staff “Riders on the Storm: A Narrative History of the 1-4 Cav’s Campaign in Iraqi and
Kuwait – 24 January – March 1991,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2 (1991), pp. 13 – 20; Michael Gollaher (CPT), “Two
Scouts Under Fire Helped Injured Buddies During Night Battle,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 2 (1991), pp. 21 – 23; John
Hillen (1LT), “2d Armored Cavalry: The Campaign to Leave Kuwait,” Armor Vol. 100, No. 4 (1991), pp. 8 – 12;
A.A. Puryear (CPT), and Gerald R. Haywood (LT), “Ar Rumaylah Airfield Succumbs to a Hasty Attack,” Armor Vol.
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tactical details from the Army’s engagements to uncover fundamentals about the nature of warfare.
More than Desert Shield, the combat phase allowed the Armored tribe to refocus on their Cold
War conceptualizations. Simply put, Operation Desert Storm was a lifeline for these beliefs.
Like the deployment of the VII Corps and rapid advances for the Armored tribe, the
Artillery described the Gulf War as the largest concentration of artillery since the Second World
War.530 A selection of articles in Field Artillery concluded that the Artillery had performed
FireStrikes as part of their combat operations.531 The Artillery’s ability to fight the deep battle
carried a new importance in the post-Cold War world. For example, “Operation Desert Storm,
more than any other recent military expedition, demonstrated the US military’s ability to strike
deep into enemy territory without risking the lives of ground forces.”532
For the Artillery and Armor, the technology used in Desert Storm was a crucial factor in
the American victory. Both tribes were confident that their key weapons systems, the M1A1 and
MLRS, performed exceptionally.533 Their engagements with Iraqi forces, often outside of the
Iraqi’s own range, were a point of pride for the tribes. Defeating these forces before they could
reach them demonstrated the advantages of technology superiority and quality training. To
consistently achieve this, required greater amounts of information from sensors.534 The United
100, No. 5 (1991), pp. 16 – 20; Lawrence M. Steiner Jr. (MAJ), “Rehearsal in War: preparing to Breach,” Armor Vol.
101, No. 6 (1992), pp. 6 – 11. 530 L. Scott Lingamfelter (LTC), “In the Wake of a Storm: Improving the FA After Operation Desert Storm,” Field
Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4 (1991), pp. 27 – 29; Fred F. Marty (MG), “On the Move: FA On Target in the Storm,” Field
Artillery Vol. 59, No. 5 (1991), pp. 1. 531 Gary D. Langford (CPT), “Iron Rain: MLRS Storms onto the Battlefield,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 6 (1991),
pp. 50 – 54. 532 Donald L. W. Kerr (COL), “Depth and Simultaneous Attack – One Battle Lab Helping to Forge the Army’s Future,”
Field Artillery Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp. 35. 533 Mark S. Jensen (MAJ), “MLRS in Operation Desert Storm,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 4 (1991), pp. 30 – 34;
David A. Rolston (COL), “A View of the Storm: Forward Observations,” Field Artillery Vol. 59, No. 5 (1991), pp. 4
– 6; Corn Jr. (COL), and Lacuemont (CPT), “Silver Bullets,” pp. 10 – 15; Langford (CPT), “Iron Rain,” pp. 50 – 54;
Joe G. Taylor Jr. (LTC), “Fighting with Fires: Employment of MLRS in the Offense,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 3
(1992), pp. 32 – 35; Edmond (MAJ), and Steck (CPT), “M1A1 NETT in Southwest Asia,” pp. 14 – 15. 534 For example, see G. Chesley Harris (LTC), “Operation DESERT STORM Armored Brigade in Combat,” Infantry
Vol. 82, No. 3 (1992), pp. 13 – 19. This was no easy task. Even with a record number of sensors throughout the
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States’ technological advantages, especially in the realm of night fighting, were believed to give
credence towards a technological approach to warfare, making the Infantry and Armor ‘night
fighters.’535 Ultimately, the US military’s interest in applying more and more advanced technology
to the conduct of warfare was an important result of the War.536
As described above, while contingency operations would feature joint forces, the rivalry
between the Air Force and Army was a key feature in the analysis of Desert Storm. It was easy to
declare that conflicts would be fought jointly; however, in the face of the restricted budget
environment meant that competitiveness, rather than cooperation, would be the key feature of these
operations. Some complained that joint operations in the Gulf War were hampered by the Air
Force’s lack of coordination with the Army.537 Others took issue with “Constant proclamations
that the war could be won by the Air Force alone only confirmed and reinforced these feelings.
While these perceptions are incorrect and undeserved, the fact that these perceptions were
generated and proliferated is undeniable.”538 Which service won the Gulf War became a hotly
contested between the Air Force and the Army in the following years.539
The Gulf War was a confirmation of existing beliefs and a guide for future development of
the Army’s most preferred form of warfare. By confirming the tribes’ conceptualizations of
warfare, some dating from the early 1980’s, the Gulf War allowed many of these ideas to not only
battlefield General Schwarzkopf, back in Riyadh, had difficulty tracking his own units let alone the Iraqi’s. Mahnken,
“A Squandered Opportunity?,” pp. 143 – 144. 535 Additional examples include the synchronization of artillery units via computer links and the use of JSTARS.
Needham (CPT), and Graves (MAJ), “100 Hours with Light TACFIRE,” pp. 30 – 33; Martin S. Kleiner (COL), “Joint
STARS,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 1 (1992), pp. 25 – 29; Richard A. Lacquement (CPT), Joseph V. Pacieo (CPT,
Military Intelligence), and Paul A.F. Gallo (CPT), “Targeting During Desert Storm,” Field Artillery Vol. 60, No. 1
(1992), pp. 33 – 38; Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Mechanized Infantry – A Blueprint for
Modernization,” Infantry Vol. 82, No. 6 (1992), pp. 1 – 2. 536 Adamsky The Culture of Military Innovation, pp. 74. 537 Thomas J. Mangan III (MAJ), “Direct Effective Fire Line,” Infantry Vol. 83, No. 1 (1992), pp. 13 – 17. 538 Vincent R. Bielinski (SPC), “Letters – Response to ‘Thor: A Case Study in Multi-Service Coordination,” Field
Artillery Vol. 61, No. 2 (1993), pp. 5 – 6. 539 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 137 – 143.
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survive the end of the Cold War, but also flourish. More than the overshadowing of Desert Shield
by Desert Storm, the absence of any real mention about Operation Provide Comfort, the post-Gulf
effort to give aid to Iraqi Kurds fleeing Saddam’s oppression signified the tribes’ orientation
towards warfare.540 This war demonstrated that military organizations can learn from victories, yet
what they learn may not challenge conceptualizations that predate the conflict. This may lead to
the intensification of pre-existing ideas constituting a change, even if a sustaining one.
Conclusions:
In the early 1990’s, the United States Army’s three leading tribes demonstrated a
remarkable ability to ‘stay the course.’ Major changes to the international environment did not
produce similar changes to the tribes’ conceptualizations of warfare. The tribes’ ability to augment
these drivers to match pre-existing conceptualizations of war demonstrates ability of intra-
organizational components to shape responses to reality from the bottom. Change did happen, but
not in a manner that undermined the tribes’ approach to the conduct of war.
Some academics have argued that the Army has demonstrated the ability to alter their
outlook on warfare in the form of doctrine.541 Yet, in the face of strategic change, the continued
dominance of conceptualizations featuring conventional, combined arms warfare in the early
1990’s is indicative of consistency rather than drastic change. The emergence of contingency
operations best exemplifies this tendency. By conceptualizing warfare in this way, all tribes could
continue to prepare for another Desert Storm, while rhetorically addressing a changing
international system. In reality, the conceptual development of contingency operations not only
obscured the least preferred mission the Army expected to be used for, low-intensity conflict, but
also provided a continued justification for heavy forces.
540 Bacevich, “’Splendid Little War’,” pp. 149 – 164. 541 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine; Jensen, Forging the Sword.
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Unlike the late 1980s, the early 1990s saw the three tribes become closer in how they
conceptualized warfare. The Infantry’s light division was widely accepted to be deployed early
and often in any contingency conflict. Additionally, the Infantry’s heavier units equipped with the
BIFV could not only defeat tanks but could play an important role in any future conflict alongside
armoured forces. The early 1990’s healed some of the serious divisions that had plagued the
Infantry in the 1980’s. While still suffering from a continued bifurcation between heavy and light
infantry, the tribe had established clear roles for each one. Armor not only received approval for a
new light tank during a period of constrained budgets, but also found a clear, justifiable rationale
for the heavy force. They displayed a great deal of confidence that any contingency necessitated
the eventual deployment of heavy forces. Lastly, the Artillery, who had benefitted in the 1980’s
by being able to conceptualize warfare in relative isolation, exhibited the same tendency in the
early 1990’s. The increasing potency of existing weapons systems to fulfill their desired
conceptualization of battle meant that they could continue on the path they had envisioned for
themselves through deep battle. They remained isolated from the ‘maneuver’ tribes, while at the
same time advocating for a closer relationship and continuing to refine their idealized vision of
warfare, now called FireStrike. The growing similarities between the Artillery and Armor in the
realms of technology, nonlinearity, and their emphasis on synchronization as well as how they
interpreted the Cold War signified their continued reliance on conventional forms of warfare.
While not completely abstaining from emphasizing technology, the Infantry remained true to their
belief that the human elements of war were key to achieving victory.
The tribes conceptualized doctrinally rooted precepts of warfare – for example
synchronization and nonlinearity – in a manner that reflected their own modes of thinking. This
demonstrates the bottom-up shaping effect that subunits within an organization can have on
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generally accepted ideas. The Armored tribe’s conceptualization of nonlinearity followed the
institution’s, as well as the other tribes, belief that battles in the future would characterized by
clearly identifiable frontlines. However, they used this new perspective of warfare to justify their
tank centric identity in a manner that confirmed existing conceptualizations.
The conflicts in Panama and the Middle East provided the tribes with direct examples to
draw on in constructing their visions of warfare. Instead of crafting detailed ‘images’ of warfare
culminating in idealized types of combat, the tribes could ensconce themselves within their
interpretations of operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm. In the case of the Gulf
War, it led to the fortifying of these beliefs. Retired General Jack Keane noted that the “thing that
killed us was the 1991 Gulf War. Intellectually, it bankrupted us for the rest of the decade.”542 To
a great degree, the interpretations of these conflicts aligned well with existing notions of combat.
The tribes were aware of the significant changes occurring all around them, it would be wrong to
say they ignored these and dogmatically adhered to their pre-existing conceptualizations.
However, the exclusion of uncomfortable realities and the lack of critical reflection on the entirety
of these conflicts meant that the tribes had a relatively easy time creating conceptualizations of
war that reflected their preferred interpretations while incorporating what was convenient and
superficially addressing what was not.
542 Quoted in Ricks, The Generals, pp. 388.
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Chapter 5: Uncomfortable Realities, Desired Futures, and Maneuver Warfare
The tribal journals throughout the mid-to-late-1990’s demonstrated the significant
diversity of thought that exists within military organizations and the power of an organization’s
culture to promote certain conceptualizations of warfare and proscribe others. The Army’s Force
XXI initiative sought to transform the Army into a digitized force, extremely capable in
conventional warfare. Meanwhile, the Army was deployed in peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement missions on a scale not previously seen. These two competing streams of thought
characterized the Army at this time. This represented the most dichotomous period of study and
revealed a great deal about how the Army addressed reality and their idealized future. The outcome
of this process was to isolate rather than reconcile these two streams of thought in disparate
conceptualizations.
While Desert Storm provided a glimpse of information age warfare, it was also seen to be
one of the last industrial wars.543 Furthermore, the tribes continued to fear the proliferation of
advanced weapons to the Third World, and this necessitated their perpetual preparations to fight a
symmetric enemy with capabilities that would theoretically match their own.544 In reality, the
Army’s primary threat came from the United States Air Force, not some hostile, foreign power.545
543 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 160 – 176. 544 Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Operations Other Than War – A Broader Perspective,” Infantry Vol.
84, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1 – 2; Charles R. Rash (LTC) and Robert F. Larsen Jr. (CPT), “The Field Artillery and Theater
Missile Defense,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 3 (1994), pp. 15 – 17; Randall L. Rigby (MG), “Registration Points:
Prevision Weapons – Not for ‘All Seasons’,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 2 (1997), pp. 1; John W. Hendrix (MG),
“Commandant’s Note: Combat Developments – Looking Toward the Future,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 4 (1995), pp. 1 –
2; Carl F. Ernst (MG), “Training for the Close Fight,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 4 (1996), pp. 1; Willis A. Bullard (SFC),
“In the Eyes of This Analyst,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 4 (1996), pp. 11; Bradley T. Gericke (CPT), “Company Command
in Korea,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 4 (1995), pp. 27 – 29; Don L. Willadsen (CPT), “Road march Planning in Restrictive
Terrain,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 4 (1997), pp. 7 – 9, 49; Brian Pedersen (1LT), “Mortar Support in the Korean Defile,”
Armor Vol. 106, No. 5 (1997), pp. 10 – 11; Randall L. Rigby (MG), “Registration Points: Targeting for Combat
Power,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 1 (1996), pp. 1 – 2. 545 The 1990’s were a period of intense inter-service rivalry between the Air Force and the Army. The aftermath of
the Gulf War and ongoing RMA inspired many in the airpower community to theorize about the ability of the Air
Force to generate strategic effects. This was exacerbated by the budget battles at the time. Macgregor, Breaking the
Phalanx, pp. 17; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 157.
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Yet, Force XXI was focused on the future, preparing to transition the Army away from an
industrially based force to an information-age one.546 However, the application of this technology
largely focused on the tactical aspects rather than its operational potential.547 A political
establishment favourable to the application of advanced technology as part of the Revolution in
Military Affairs buoyed the Army’s efforts in this area.548 Echoing previous conceptualizations of
warfare, these battles would continue to be chaotic, intense, rapid, and lethal places.549
All the tribes continued to believe that ‘complexity’ defined not only the nature of warfare,
but the strategic environment as well. Complexity was also a feature of the Army’s operations
during this period with a variety of potential conflicts across the spectrum that included Somali
‘technicals’, peacekeeping/enforcement operations, and conventional warfare.550 Much like the
early-1990’s, the rest of the decade was dominated by the absence of a clear threat similar to that
of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Only North Korea was continuously identified as a
tangible threat.551 Besides Iraq and North Korea, the majority of the Army’s time was taken up
with peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and the
Balkans. This was counter to the Powell Doctrine’s reluctance to use military force only with
546 Scales (MG ret.), Yellow Smoke, pp. 5. 547 Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, pp. 89 – 91. 548 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 219; Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold
War, pp. 20, 110 – 112. 549 Patrick J. Chaisson (CPT), “Rest for the Weary: The Role of Sleep Management in Combat Operations,” Armor
Vol. 103, No. 5 (1994), pp. 14 – 18; John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: A Concert of Combat – Coordination and
Killer Missions,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1; Harold T. Harvey (LTC), “Letters – A Boundary is a
Boundary by Any Other Name,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 2. 550 Oakland McCulloch (CPT), “The Making of an M1 Tank Driver,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 3 (1994), pp. 36 – 37; John
R. Wood (COL) and Steve A. Greene (MAJ), “The Emerging National Military Strategy – Enduring Goals, Evolving
Ways and Means,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 3 (1994), pp. 34 – 39; Blaise Cornell-D’Echert Jr. (CPT), “We Need
a Peacekeeping MTP,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 34 – 35; Victor A. John (MAJ), “Counterreconnaissance:
In Task Force Security Operations,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 1 (1996), pp. 30 – 34 551 Stuart G. McLennan (LTC), “A Force Protection Package for Friendly Artillery Forward,” Field Artillery Vol. 63,
No. 4 (1995), pp. 25 – 27; Guy B. Parameter (CPT), “Light Scouts in Korea: A Recommendation for Success,” Infantry
Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996), pp. 46 – 48; Gericke (CPT), “Company Command in Korea,” pp. 27 – 29; Willadsen (CPT),
“Road march Planning in Restrictive Terrain,” pp. 7 – 9, 49; Pedersen (1LT), “Mortar Support in the Korean Defile,”
pp. 10 – 11.
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public support at a time when the American people were generally disengaged with foreign
affairs.552 By the late-1990s, some feared that the Army’s operating tempo, along with budget cuts
and force reductions, risked breaking the force.553 While the Army was stretched thin, the rest of
the US military was supporting a variety of missions abroad that included the use of foreign
military proxies, the Air Force, or special forces, rather than US land power.554 Regardless of the
threat, the tribes continued to believe that the success of an operation was dependent on their ability
to win battles for America quickly, decisively, and with minimal casualties.555 This represented
the extent to which the tribes investigated their role as a part of American national strategy.
Refining Contingency Operations:
In the early-1990’s, contingency operations were conceptualized as a form of warfare that
featured deployments from the continental United States and conventional combat – first by light
forces then followed by heavier ones. Over the rest of the decade contingency operations continued
to be a focus of discussion for the tribes, and this thinking produced a specific version of CONOPS,
one that was operational rather than tactical in scope. This conceptualization emphasized the
deployment of the Army’s forces – often to uncertain locations – rather than the combat on the
552 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 167 – 168, 181 – 183; Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, American Between the
Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11: The Misunderstood Years Between the Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Start of the War on
Terror, (New York: Public Affairs, 2008), pp. 93 – 95; Fitzgerald, Learning to Forget, pp. 100; Chollet and Goldgeier,
American Between the Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11, pp. 57. 553 In the journals, budget cuts were referenced to as a problem in a force that had been reduced in strength by 35%
by the end of the 1990’s. John W. Nicholson Jr. (MAJ), “Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944: Lessons from Company C, 2d
Ranger Battalion,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 3 (1994), pp. 8 – 12; John K. Anderson (COL), “CTC Challenges: Enhancing
Fires for the BCT,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 5 (1998), pp. 12 – 13; Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 231. 554 Operation Stabilize in East Timor, Operation Focus Relief in Sierra Leone, deployments to Columbia, and
Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia. Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 156 – 165. 555 John C. Johnston (COL), “The Journey to Force XXI’s Mounted Component,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 2 (1994), pp.
14 – 16; John W. Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Warrior Focus – Taking the Field,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 3
(1995), pp. 1 – 2; Robert L. Caslen Jr. (LTC), “The Company Air Assault Raid,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 6 (1995), pp.
16 – 19; Geoffrey N. Blake (CPT), John Calahan (CPT), and Steven Young (CPT), “OPFOR Observations from the
JRTC,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 1 (1995), pp. 30 – 35; Kevin J. Dougherty (MAJ), “Mission Analysis in Stability and
Support Operations,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 1 (1998), pp. 12 – 15; William F. Kernan (LTG) and Daniel P. Bolger
(COL), “Train as We Fight,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 1 (1998), pp. 35 – 37; Randall L. Rigby (MG), “Registration Points:
The Changing Face of Ground Warfare – Fires First,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 4 (1996), pp. 1.
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ground.556 This was demonstrated by the incorporation of new acronyms to describe the
deployment of forces. This included RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and
Integration) and RFPI (Rapid Force Projection Initiative).557 Preventing another Task Force Smith
through increased readiness and the prepositioning of equipment near potential deployment
locations were all proposed to increase the Army’s proficiency in contingency operations.558 This
refined version of contingency operations still assumed that the Army would deploy its forces in
stages, with light forces conducting the initial battles that would allow for heavier, follow-on-
forces to enter the fight. The Infantry were the tribe most concerned with contingency missions,
however, the Artillery and Armor did reiterate the combined arms approach to warfare that ensured
their participation.559 The refinement of contingency operations to deployment itself reflected the
significant attention devoted to Force XXI warfare and the dominance of this conceptualization.
556 William S. Riggs (CPT), “Global Cavalry,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998), pp. 23 – 29; George H. Harmeyer (MG),
“Commander’s Hatch: The New Heavy Division – It’s more deployable and just as deadly,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 4
(1998), pp. 7 – 8, 46; James T. Palmer (LTC) and David L. Anderson (MAJ), “Preparation for Force Projection: The
Intermediate Staging Base,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 2 (1995), pp. 14 – 17; McCulloch (CPT), “The Making of an
M1 Tank Driver,” pp. 36 – 37; Johnathan D. Thompson (CPT), “Infantry Company Operations in an Extreme Cold
Environment,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 5 (1995), pp. 28 – 32; Dominic J. Caraccilo (MAJ), “The ‘B’ Deployment Bag,”
Infantry Vol. 86, No. 1 (1996), pp. 47 – 48; Martin N. Stanton (LTC), “Operational Considerations for Sub-Saharan
Africa,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 5 (1996), pp. 28 – 36; Gregory E. Beach (LTC) and Bruce A. Brant (COL), “Fire
Support Challenges in Contingency Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 5 (1997), pp. 19 – 23. 557 Daniel J. McRoberts (MAJ), “RSOI at the National Training Center,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 5 (1995), pp. 33 – 35;
Carl F. Ernst (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Forced Entry and the Contingency Force,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 3 (1997),
pp. 1 – 2; John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: Future Fires for Force Projection,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 2
(1995), pp. 1. 558 Scott Maxwell (CPT), “Mobile Pre-Positioning: A simple but effective CSS technique for a battalion task force,”
Armor Vol. 107, No. 4 (1998), pp. 19 – 20; John W. Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note: A Time of Challenge,”
Infantry Vol. 84, No. 6 (1994), pp. 1; Lawrence J. Wark (CPT), “Army War Reserve-3: Prepositioned Equipment
Afloat,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 2 (1996), pp. 7 – 9. 559 Thomas G. Dodd (MAJ), “Warfighting Experiment: During 1994 Warfighting Conference,” Infantry Vol. 84, No.
2 (1994), pp. 12 – 14; Mark A. Conley (CPT), “Enhanced Land Warrior Program,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 2 (1994),
pp. 20 – 22; Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: A Review of the Future Infantry Force,” Infantry Vol. 84,
No. 3 (1994), pp. 1 – 2; Nicholson Jr. (MAJ), “Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944,” pp. 8 – 12; William W. Sweet (LTC,
Field Artillery), “The Q-36 Weapons Locating Radar: A Primer for Brigade Commanders and Staffs,” Infantry Vol.
84, No. 3 (1994), pp. 14 – 17; Scott T. Glass (CPT), “Battle of Beaver Dam Creek,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 6 (1994),
pp. 10 – 14; Martin N. Stanton (LTC), “Let’s Reorganize the Light Infantry Division,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996),
pp. 16 – 19; Carl F. Ernst (MG), “Commandant’s Note: The Future of the Infantry in Force XXI,” Infantry Vol. 86,
No. 6 (1996), pp. 1 – 2; Beach (LTC) and Brant (COL), “Fire Support Challenges in Contingency Operations,” pp. 19
– 23; John L. Miles III (CPT) and Mark E. Shankle (CPT), “Bradleys in the City,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996), pp.
6 – 8; David B. Hilburn (CPT), “The Logistical Integration of Heavy and Light Forces,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 6
133
Uncomfortable Reality:
In the he mid- to late-1990’s, low intensity conflict was succeeded by a new concept,
operations other than war (OOTW), that came to characterize much of the Army’s activities.
Captain William Riggs put it best when he wrote, “Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
ensuing ‘peace,’ the armed forces of the United States have participated in over 25 major
deployments in a 7-year period, as opposed to 10 major deployments during the 40 years of the
cold war.”560 Understanding how the tribes encountered this ‘uncomfortable reality’ is key to
understanding how they conceptualized warfare during the 1990’s.
Of the Army’s many deployments, three garnered much of the tribes’ attention. Operation
Restore Hope in Somalia was an asymmetric conflict, with the Army relying on their conventional
warfare doctrine and Somali militias responding with unconventional tactics.561 The dramatic,
televised failure in the streets of Mogadishu, made preventing future casualties essential to a
mission’s success and would shape US military endeavors for the rest of the decade.562 Like other
conflicts, each tribe attempted to garner lessons from the mission that would be directly applicable
to their tribe. The Infantry emphasized small unit tactics and the importance of flexibility.563 Armor
focused on their quick reaction role, including the belief that the AGS would have saved lives.564
(1996), pp. 17 – 19; Dubia (MG), “On the Move,” pp. 1; Theodore S. Russell Jr. (LTC), “Echeloning Fires,” Field
Artillery Vol. 65, No. 2 (1997), pp. 24 – 27. 560 Riggs (CPT), “Global Cavalry,” pp. 23. 561 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 154. 562 Scales, Yellow Smoke, pp. 69 – 79. 563 Clinton’s expansion of the peacekeeping mission had the effect of drawing the US deeper into Somalia. This
eventually necessitated the deployment of Task Force Ranger, a quick reaction force, to protect the UN and other
humanitarian forces. Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 104 – 105. William J. Martinez (LTC), “Peace Operations,”
Infantry Vol. 84, No. 3 (1994), pp. 39 – 40; Stephen Michael (CPT), “CSS Operations in Somalia,” Infantry Vol. 84,
No. 4 (1994), pp. 29 – 33; Thomas A. Dempsey (LTC), “Back to Basics: Training Close Combat Skills,” Infantry Vol.
84, No. 6 (1994), pp. 44 – 45; 564 Lawrence G. Vowels and Jeffrey R. Witsken (MAJ), “Peacekeeping with Light Cavalry,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 5
(1994), pp. 26 – 30.
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The Artillery noted that managing the rules of engagement and relations with multinational
partners were vital.565
The 1994 deployment to Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy was featured in a
series of articles related to OOTW. They discussed classic operations such as cordon and search,
presence patrols, stability and reconstruction, and managing rules of engagement.566 All the while
emphasizing the importance of force protection.567 Similar to Somalia, the 10th Mountain Division
tailored their operations in Haiti to fit the conventional aspects of FM 100-5 (1993), using terms
and concepts more appropriate for warfighting than humanitarian operations.568
Finally, the collapse of Yugoslavia was a constant issue throughout the 1990’s, and was
the most cited example of OOTW in the tribal journals.569 Operation Joint Endeavor attempted to
separate the numerous factions in the former Yugoslavia along a 1,000 mile long demarcation
line.570 Like Somalia, each tribe emphasized a particular aspect of their mission. The Infantry
565 William J. Lennox Jr. (COL) and Charles B. Allen (LTC), “The 24th Div Arty in Somalia,” Field Artillery Vol. 62,
No. 4 (1994), pp. 14 – 17; Timothy M. Knigge (MAJ), “LNOing United Nations Style,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No.
4 (1994), pp. 26 – 28; Alfred A. Valenzuela (COL) and Theodore S. Russell Jr. (LTC), “Operation Uphold Democracy:
the 10th Mountain Div Arty in Peace Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 3 (1995), pp. 26 – 30. 566 In 1994, UN Security Council authorized the use of force to restore Haitian president Aristide to power. Subsequent
negotiations with the military Junta convinced them to restore Aristide to power without the use of force. See, Chollet
and Goldgeier, American Between the Wars, From 11/9 to 9/11, pp. 95 – 98. Christopher Hughes (MAJ) and Thomas
G. Ziek Jr. (MAJ), “Cordon and Search Operations,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 4 (1995), pp. 8 – 11; Edward F. Borowiec
Jr. (LT), Joshua T. Stevens (LT), “Urban Patrolling: Experiences in Haiti,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 4 (1996), pp. 8 – 10;
Kevin C.M. Benson (LTC), “A Report from Haiti: Cavalry in Peacekeeping Operations,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 6
(1995), pp. 15 – 17; Valenzuela (COL) and Russell (LTC), “Operation Uphold Democracy,” pp. 26 – 30; Leo A.
Brooks Jr. (LTC) and Michael O. Lacey (CPT), “Lane Training in Haiti,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 1 (1998), pp. 22 – 26. 567 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 168. 568 Despite the inclusion of OOTW principles in FM 100-5 (1993), it did not provide Army commanders on the ground
with a framework for operationalization. Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 236 – 239. 569 The July 1995 massacre at Srebrenica eventually galvanized the US into action. Following weeks of bombings and
negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, a multinational force of 60,000 troops including 20,000 Americans. Initially, scheduled
to last one year, the commitment eventually became open ended. Chollet and Goldgeier, American Between the Wars,
pp. 127 – 133; Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 104. 570 Walter Kretchik described this as a post-conflict stability operation, one in which FM 100-5 (1993) only devoted
one paragraph to. Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 241 – 242. See Also, Fred W. Johnson (CPT), “Establishing a
Zone of Separation,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996), pp. 31 – 38.
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focused on their versatility and the urban environment.571 The Armored tribe believed that the
presence of main-battle tanks, while sometimes encountering difficulties with the terrain,
demonstrated US resolve and their power.572 The Artillery’s counterfire radars played an important
role monitoring the ceasefires, but they also noted that they provided the firepower that would
back up any breach in the accord.573
These individual missions were discussed with a great deal of interest by some writers,
especially in Infantry, but how the tribes conceptualized them is more important. Although they
could have ignored these culturally proscribed missions, classifying them as unimportant in the
face of a potential conventional conflict, they engaged with them. Many commentators in the
journals interacted with the ‘uncomfortable’ reality at the time, albeit without the vigour that had
characterized the investigations into Desert Storm. The three deployments that characterized the
mid- to late-1990’s could be conceptually categorized as OOTW due to the reference points
provided by Just Cause and Desert Storm. Unlike Operation Just Cause, these operations were
identified by their OOTW nature not as a low-intensity conflict or a contingency. Additionally, no
one claimed that these represented a form of conventional warfare, especially not given the Army’s
recent experience in the Gulf War. This is what makes these three operations significant, they
informed the tribes’ conceptualizations of unconventional warfare and inspired a new way of
571 John W. Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note: A Perspective on Military Operations on Urban Terrain,” Infantry
Vol. 85, No. 6 (1995), pp. 1 – 2; Johnson (CPT), “Establishing a Zone of Separation,” pp. 31 – 38. 572 George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: The Armor Force – A Pre-conference Overview,” Armor Vol.
108, No. 2 (1999), pp. 5 – 6, 51; Charles Lehner (COL ret.), “Bosnia Report: Task Force Eagle’s Armor and Cavalry
Operations in Bosnia,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 3 (1996), pp. 9 – 10, 45. For a discussion of the terrain difficulties
armoured units encountered in the Balkans, see Matthew D. Morton (CPT), “Balkan Report II: Off-the-Shelf Wheeled
Armor Proves its Worth in Macedonian Winter,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 4 (1996), pp. 7 – 10. 573 Richard J. Brunner (2LT), “Letters – TA Success and Challenges in Bosnia,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 3 (1996),
pp. 2 – 3; Brian A. Hodges (CPT), W. Jay Hallam (CPT) and Brian T. Camperson (MAJ), “Red Rain – Counterfire
Operations in Bosnia Herzegovina,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 5 (1996), pp. 33 – 35; Peter S. Corpac (LTC),
“Evolving Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine for Fire Support in Peace Enforcement Operations,” Field Artillery Vol.
64, No. 4 (1996), pp. 34 – 38; William M. Lockard (CPT), “The FA ‘Presence’ Mission,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No.
4 (1996), pp. 36 – 37.
136
thinking about this spectrum of conflict. Similar to the Army’s push to further examine
conventional warfare out of the aftermath of the Gulf War, the OOTW missions interacted with
powerful longstanding conceptualizations of warfare that would shape the interpretations and
spark debates within the tribes.
Operations other than war occupied the conceptual place LIC’s had in the 1980’s and early
1990’s. Unlike LIC, however, OOTW included missions that did not immediately imply conflict
like counterinsurgency – these included peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, democracy promotion,
or disaster assistance. The inclusion of such a variety of missions meant that OOTW occupied a
range of possible scenarios on an expanded conflict spectrum that had previously excluded
anything that did not feature conflict.574 So while the Army’s culture and the Force XXI initiative
deemphasized this end of the spectrum, many in the tribes began considering the implications of
these missions. For example, some believed that because these operations were so different from
the Army’s previous experiences, they necessitated that new capabilities be developed, including
the ability to obtain human intelligence, develop cultural awareness, abide by strict rules of
engagement, and managing the operation’s perception through interaction with the media.575 These
574 William V. Wenger (LTC), “The Los Angeles Riots: A Battalion Commander’s Perspective,” Infantry Vol. 84,
No. 1 (1994), pp. 13 – 16; Martinez (LTC), “Peace Operations,” pp. 39 – 40; Paul D. Carron (Cadet, USMA), “Letters
– Training for Nontraditional Missions,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 3 (1997), pp. 5; Kevin J. Dougherty (MAJ), “Fixing
the Enemy in Guerrilla Warfare,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997), pp. 33 – 35; Carl F. Ernst (MG), “Commandant’s
Note: The Infantry Squad – How Much is Enough?,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1 – 2; Joseph G. Dodd Jr.
(LTC), “The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment: A Force for Peace Enforcement Operations,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 2
(1995), pp. 48 – 49; Benson (LTC), “A Report from Haiti,” pp. 15 – 17; George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Commander’s
Hatch: Focus on the Triad of Excellence,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 1 (1997), pp. 4; Bruce A. Brant (LTC), “Real-World
Training at the JRTC: The Con Ops Battlefield is Somebody’s Backyard,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 3 (1994), pp.
30 – 33; William L. Nash (BG) and James F. Byrne Jr. (LTC), “Fire Support for a Force Projection Army,” Field
Artillery Vol. 63, No. 2 (1995), pp. 10 – 12; Shannon D. Beebe (CPT), “TAP: A Conceptual Framework for Stability
Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 4 (1996), pp. 22 – 25. 575 This included managing the media and acknowledging that tactical events could have a disproportionate effect on
the strategic level in comparison to conventional warfare. Kevin C.M. Benson (LTC), “Leadership… And Command
and Control,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 5 (1996), pp. 31 – 32; White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Joel B.
Krauss (CPT), “Cultural Awareness in Stability and Support Operations,” Infantry Vol. 89, No. 1 (1999), pp. 15 – 1;
Martin N. Stanton (MAJ), “Cordon and Search: Lessons Learned in Somalia,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 6 (1994), pp. 18
– 21; Fred W. Johnson (CPT), “Checkpoint: A Key Graphic Control Measure,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997), pp. 18
137
were requirements that were in stark contrast to the idealized visions of combat that characterized
the 1980’s. However, combat and death were seen as real possibilities especially, as many
predicted these missions would, if the situation escalated into combat.576 This idea of escalation
assumed that combat at the tactical level was a real possibility, and underscored the tribes’ belief
that they had to enter these operations prepared for real combat. Like conventional warfare,
casualties had to be avoided at all costs. To avoid a repeat of the Black Hawk Down scenario,
troops deployed to the Balkans were constantly concerned with ‘force protection,’ to the extent
that soldiers had to wear body armour while on base.577 Captain Thomas Gross made this clear;
“The entire chain of command worked hard before and during the mission on these areas to ensure
mission success and to meet every infantry commander’s major responsibility to his leaders and
his soldiers in peacekeeping operations – suffer no casualties.”578 Even though OOTW was seen
to be a new mission, important enough to require new skills, combat still played a fundamental
role in how they were conceptualized. Those interested in this end of the conflict spectrum were
still soldiers.
In OOTW missions the Infantry held premier position, particularly the light infantry. Their
strategic deployability and significant numbers of dismounted infantry made them invaluable in
these operations.579 This was especially true because the arguments that had limited the light
– 19; Hughes (MAJ) and Ziek Jr. (MAJ), “Cordon and Search Operations,” pp. 8 – 11; John Brennan (LT), “Situational
Training Exercises in Stability and Support Operations,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996), pp. 39 – 41. 576 Beach (LTC) and Brant (COL), “Fire Support Challenges in Contingency Operations,” pp. 19 – 23; Nash (BG) and
Byrne Jr. (LTC), “Fire Support for a Force Projection Army,” pp. 10 – 12. 577 Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, pp. 51. 578 Thomas Goss (CPT), “Peacekeeping Operations: One Infantry Leader’s Experience,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 4
(1996), pp. 8. Emphasis added. See also, Patrick R. Milligan (1LT), “Force Protection for Checkpoint Operations,”
Armor Vol. 106, No. 5 (1997), pp. 20 – 21, 47 – 48; Randy Anderson (LTC) and John Hadjis (MAJ), “Building a
Lions’ Den in Bosnia,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 6 (1997), pp. 25 – 29, 52; Lockard (CPT), “The FA ‘Presence’ Mission,”
pp. 36 – 37; Jerry A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Tomorrow’s Infantry – A Progress Report,” Infantry Vol.
84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 1 – 2. 579 Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 206.
138
infantry’s effectiveness in conventional warfare could not be applied in OOTW scenarios. Another
benefit that the Infantry identified was their ability to identify and interact with local populations
because they would not be separated from them in armoured vehicles.580 The light infantry took
up this mission without clearly identifiable resistance, and Infantry consistently featured more
articles about OOTW missions than Armor or Field Artillery. Advice on how to develop cultural
awareness or manage rules of engagement appeared as frequently as articles restating the exploits
of Bradley equipped units in the Gulf War.581 Although the light infantry were the natural choice
for these missions, the mechanized infantry claimed they were necessary to the mission’s success.
Like the Armor’s insistence that they should participate in any LIC, the mechanized infantry
promoted the idea that they would prevent casualties that would occur without their armour and
firepower.582 Even in a culturally proscribed mission, some within the Infantry’s most
conventionally oriented formations were convinced their participation was necessary – not simply
a result of their interest in ensuring they had a voice in any Army mission.
Unsurprisingly, the Armor tribe were key proponents of what armoured units could do in
OOTW. There were indications that they recognized that the Infantry would be the dominant
branch in these operations and that they needed to ensure they would have a role to play – whether
580 James Sisemore (LT), “Cordon and Search,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 41 – 43; Jerry A. White (MG),
“Commandant’s Note: The Infantry – Achievements and Challenges,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 5 (1994), pp. 1 – 2; Shaun
Greene (LT), “Using Attack Helicopters,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 2 (1995), pp. 36 – 38; Stanton (LTC), “Let’s
Reorganize the Light Infantry Division,” pp. 16 – 19; Ernst (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Michael Dane
Acord (CPT), “Employment and Training of a Light Infantry Battalion Antitank Platoon,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 1
(1998), pp. 45 – 47. 581 Michael P. Ryan (CPT), “Training the Law of War: A Mission Essential Task for Infantrymen,” Infantry Vol. 86,
No. 2 (1996), pp. 35 – 36; Krauss (CPT), “Cultural Awareness in Stability and Support Operations,” pp. 15 – 17. 582 Trevor L. Bynum (LT), “The Mechanized Platoon in a LIC Environment,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 1 (1995), pp. 15
– 17; William A. Kendrick (LT), “Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 31 – 35;
Miles III (CPT) and Shankle (CPT), “Bradleys in the City,” pp. 6 – 8; James B. Daniels (CPT), “Mechanized Forces
in MOUT: M113 Lessons from Operation Just Cause,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996), pp. 8 – 11; O. Kent Strader
(CPT), “Counterinsurgency in an Urban Environment,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 1 (1997), pp. 8 – 11.
139
with existing or future equipment.583 They assumed that the inherent psychological power of their
tanks would be very effective at ensuring stability by demonstrating national resolve while also
providing the Infantry a potent deterrent.584 This was similar to that of the late 1980’s, when the
tribe was desperately grasping for a role in the emerging LIC frenzy. For much of the mid-1990’s
the tribe was content to await the arrival of the AGS, assuming it would improve the tribe’s
deployability and give them a guaranteed role in OOTW as well as an ability to fight in
conventional warfare.585 The cancellation of the AGS in 1996 threw the tribe back to the drawing
board with many criticizing the fact that the AGS may have been too focused on replicating the
M1 Abrams in a more deployable form.586 This did not stop the tribe from believing that the
mobility they would bring to any mission was their unique and necessary contribution to OOTW
missions.587 As a result, the tribe had to rethink how they would use the heavy force in OOTW
rather than rely on the arrival of a new vehicle, a situation that challenged their belief that new
machines should fill capability gaps rather than changes to force structure and methods of
employment. Emblematic of this tension are the two following quotes: “The presence of Abrams
583 McCulloch (CPT), “The Making of an M1 Tank Driver,” pp. 36 – 37; Tom Molino (COL), “Letters – Don’t ‘Heavy-
Up’ the 2d ACR,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 3 (1997), pp. 3; Charles Lehner (COL), “Light Enough to Get There, Heavy
Enough to Win,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 4 (1994), pp. 10 – 14; David L. Nobles (CPT), “Light Armored Cavalry: The
Right Force at the Right Time,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 1 (1995), pp. 15 – 18; Michael Prevou (LTC), “HMMWVs Lack
the Firepower and Protection for Bosnia Role,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998), pp. 36, 56. 584 Lehner (COL ret.), “Bosnia Report:,” pp. 9 – 10, 45; George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Training
the Mounted Force in Transition,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 2 (1997), pp. 5, 7; Johnathan C. Byrom (1LT), “Up-Armored
HMMWVs: The Answer for Peacekeeping Operations,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998), pp. 35 – 36; Daniel T. Head
(CPT), “The 2nd Parachute Battalion’s War in the Falklands: Light Armor Made the Difference in South Atlantic
Deployment,” Armor Vol. 108, No. 5 (1999), pp. 9 – 12. 585 Nobles (CPT), “Light Armored Cavalry,” pp. 15 – 18; O.T. Edwards III (MAJ), “Letters – TRADOC System
Manager for Abrams and the AGS comments on ‘Assault Gun Battalion 96’,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 1 (1995), pp. 49;
Michael F. Stollenwerk (CPT), “Letters – Don’t Tie AGS to Infantry Pace,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 1 (1995), pp. 49 –
50. 586 Kevin C.M. Benson (LTC), “Whither the 2d Cavalry?,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 1 (1997), pp. 20 – 21; Prevou (LTC),
“HMMWVs Lack the Firepower and Protection for Bosnia Role,” pp. 36, 56; John L. Barker (LTC), “We Gave Away
Our Seat on a Planeload of Warriors…,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 1 (1997), pp. 3, 48. 587 Stephen L. Melton (LTC), “Letters – Heavy Force Emphasis with Irrelevancy,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998), pp.
3 – 4; Riggs (CPT), “Global Cavalry,” pp. 23 – 29; George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Force
Development – Where we are Headed,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 5 (1997), pp. 4 – 5.
140
tanks and Bradleys has made potential enemies think twice about their actions. When called for,
armored forces were able to provide the necessary firepower and shock effect to defeat whatever
force they were up against”;588 and “The Abrams and Bradleys are magnificent vehicles, but the
major conflicts for which they were designed are in our past. The present and future requirements
for armor are much ‘lighter.’”589 The vehicle centric nature of the Armor tribe was clear in their
approach to OOTW.
The Artillery mirrored the effort by the Armor tribe to find a role in OOTW. However,
unlike the Armor, this was an uncertain situation for the tribe. Under the LIC conception of
warfare, the Artillery was content to rely on the assumption that they would provide the division
with most its firepower. The clear non-combat nature of OOTW missions meant that this was no
longer guaranteed. Colonel Keith Dayton and Lieutenant Colonel Richard Formica wrote,
Artillerymen need to counter the emerging consensus that operations other than war
(OOTW) is a military area in which there’s no role for Field Artillery (FA).
Consider the precedents. In all recent OOTW deployments, FA units have either
been left off the troop list or weren’t used when present. In Somalia, a battery of
artillery made it ashore but never saw action.590
Previously, the Artillery had been content describing deployments as part of the light division
involving fire support. With the recent experience in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, they encountered
a reality that did not easily fit into their expectations. This led some to attempt to reimagine the
Artillery’s role in OOTW deployments where fire support was not an immediate necessity, or even
possible given fears about collateral damage; instead, the Artillery could leverage their
communications and surveillance capabilities.591 Their potential as a deterrence force was also
588 George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Armor and MOUT,” Armor Vol. 108, No. 3 (1999), pp. 5. 589 Melton (LTC), “Letters – Heavy Force Emphasis with Irrelevancy,” pp. 3. 590 Keith W. Dayton (COL) and Richard P. Formica (LTC), “Marne Thunder: FA in OOTW and the Div Arty METL,”
Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 1 (1995), pp. 9. 591 Henry W. Stratman (COL) and Jackson L. Flake III (LTC), “Winning Early, Winning Deep,” Field Artillery Vol.
63, No. 3 (1995), pp. 31 – 35; Corpac (LTC), “Evolving Tactics, Techniques and Doctrine for Fire Support in Peace
Enforcement Operations,” pp. 34 – 38.
141
mentioned as a valuable addition.592 Notably, one article even went as far as to criticize the
incompatibility of contemporary doctrine with the requirements of OOTW missions.593 Despite
these enterprising suggestions, many articles in Field Artillery still highlighted the importance of
equipping the light division with as much modernized firepower as possible. Prizing the fire
support mission above other considerations.594
The increasing number of OOTW related deployments created a great deal of tension
within the Infantry – and to some degree Armor – over their mission essential task lists (METL)
for training. This revealed the power of an organization’s existing bureaucratic structures to direct
an organization in a particular direction. Dictated by the Army, a unit’s METL was predominantly
orientated towards conventional warfare. These included tasks such as fighting as a combined arms
team, coordinating fire support, or practicing combat maneuvers.595 On one side of the debate,
there were those that argued that OOTW was so far removed from conventional warfare that this
necessitated an OOTW specific METL for units to train to. Of the three tribes, the Artillery were
592 Brant (LTC), “Real-World Training at the JRTC,” pp. 30 – 33; Corpac (LTC), “Evolving Tactics, Techniques and
Doctrine for Fire Support in Peace Enforcement Operations,” pp. 34 – 38; Mark T. Kimmitt (COL), “Fire Support in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 4 (1998), pp. 28 – 30; Lockhard (CPT), “The FA ‘Presence’
Mission,” pp. 36 – 37. 593 David A. Bushy (MAJ), Douglas L. Flohr (MAJ, Infantry) and Michael J. Forsyth (CPT), “Targeting on the LIC
and PKO Battlefield: A Paradigm Shift,” Field Artillery Vol. 67, No. 1 (1999), pp. 5 – 8. 594 This included the belief that firepower could be decisive in OOTW missions, the HIMARS was a valuable tool,
and that the light division needed their own self-propelled howitzers. Joseph F. Napoli (LTC) and Sean E Harris (SFC),
“The FO and his PLGR in the Close Fight,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 3 (1997), pp. 24 – 26; David W. Barno (LTC,
Infantry), “Fire Support in the Heavy-Light Fight,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 1 (1994), pp. 21 – 26; John M House
(LTC), “MLRS in Low-Intensity Conflict,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 5 (1994), pp. 12 – 14; Keith R. Yoder (CPT)
and Luke M. Thompson (CWO), “Put Out the Fire: Countering Mortars in Operations Other Than War,” Field
Artillery Vol. 63, No. 1 (1995), pp. 38 – 42; Dayton (COL) and Formica (LTC), “Marne Thunder,” pp. 9 – 13; Shannon
D. Beebe (CPT), “Deep Strike MLRS DS to the Light Division Aviation Brigade,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 2
(1998), pp. 36 – 37; Donald E. Gentry (LTC) and Cullen G. Barbato (1LT ret.), “HIMARS: Firepower for Early Entry
Forces,” Field Artillery Vol. 67, No. 1 (1999), pp. 17 – 19; Leo J. Baxter (MG), “From the Firebase: ATLAS – Close
Support for Future Light Forces?,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 5 (1998), pp. 1 – 2; Randall L. Rigby (MG),
“Registration Points: The Lightfighter FO,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 3 (1997), pp. 1; Vance J. Nannini (MAJ),
“Universal Observers: Punching our FIST into the 21st Century,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 3 (1997), pp. 13 – 16. 595 Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2013), pp. 45 – 46. See, for example Robert S. Taylor (CPT), “Letters – Combat Missions Come First in
METLs,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 6 (1994), pp. 2 – 4; John A. Nagl (CPT) and Tim Huening (CPT), “Training a
Divisional Cavalry Squadron for Operations Other than War (OOTW),” Armor Vol. 105, No. 1 (1996), pp. 23 – 24.
142
the least likely to promote this side of the debate.596 An anonymous letter to the editor in Infantry
outlined this side of the debate best “If I’m receiving sniper fire or even just having rocks thrown
at me in Mogadishu, I sure don’t’ want to be preserving focus for anything other than the problem
at hand. And I hope I didn’t waste my training time learning how to fight tanks in an engagement
area instead of thugs in a courtyard.”597 Lieutenant Colonel Leo Brooks and Captain Michael
Lacey described one of the fundamental issues of the METL debate; “The soldiers’ usual
aggressiveness and individual initiative, so crucial to success in combat, could spell disaster for
the mission in the friendly streets of Port-au-Prince.”598 At the heart of this was the belief that
OOTW required something different from conventional training. For these writers, not only was
OOTW a different form of warfare, requiring different skills, but it was so fundamentally different
from what the Army usually prepared for that it warranted a transformation in the way the Army
approached OOTW.
On the other side were the ‘traditionalists’, who argued that since conventional warfare
was the most difficult form of warfare, preparing for this was more than adequate for success in
‘easier’ OOTW operations. Whereas LIC in the 1980’s had been conceptualized as combat at a
lesser intensity, OOTW in the 1990’s was a completely different mission. However, the belief that
conventional skills would be more than adequate remained the same. Beth Bailey noted that this
led to a belief within the Army that its continued OOTW deployments took away from its warrior
596 Brennan (LT), “Situational Training Exercises in Stability and Support Operations,” pp. 39 – 41; James B. Daniels
(CPT), “Contingency Training for Stability and Support Operations,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 3 (1997), pp. 23 – 27;
Robert Bateman (CPT), “NEOs: The New Mission,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 2 (1994), pp. 47 – 49; Nagl (CPT) and
Huening (CPT), “Training a Divisional Cavalry Squadron for Operations Other than War (OOTW),” pp. 23 – 24;
Beebe (CPT), “TAP,” pp. 22 – 25. 597 This is the only case of an anonymous writer appearing in Infantry. The editor of Infantry described that “Although
Infantry does not encourage letters submitted anonymously, this one is being published as an exception in the hope
that it will lead to a useful discussion of OOTW issues.,” Name Withheld, “Letters – Why Not Legitimize OOTW
Training?,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 6. 598 Brooks (LTC) and Lacey (CPT), “Lane Training in Haiti,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 1 (1998), pp. 23.
143
nature.599 Emblematic of this belief is retired Major General Robert Scales’ statement that
“decades of practical experience demonstrate convincingly that the US Army is good at
peacekeeping because troops properly trained to fight full-scale war always perform well in less
demanding contingencies.”600 For them, continuous warfighting training was vital to a unit’s
success, training for OOTW missions could be tacked onto a unit’s pre-deployment training.601
Indeed, many argued that live fire exercises were effective training for both missions – even in
OOTW situations where firepower or deadly force were restricted by rules of engagement.602
Armor and Field Artillery contained a significant number of articles that were confident current
METL training was more than adequate for OOTW missions. Writers in Infantry noted that
conventional training prepared leaders to adapt for missions and that this could make up for the
lack of OOTW training.603 Between the two sides, some argued for unit specialization to manage
both missions.604 As discussed above, the possibility that any OOTW mission could become a
599 Bailey, America’s Army, pp. 233. 600 Scales (MG ret.), Yellow Smoke, pp. xii. 601 Taylor (CPT), “Letters – Combat Missions Come First in METLs,” pp. 2 – 4; Jeffrey D. Church (CPT), “Letters –
Mogadishu, October 1993,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 2 (1995), pp. 4 – 5; William C. David (LTC), “Preparing a Battalion
for Combat: Combat Leadership Lessons Learned,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 6 (1995), pp. 32 – 35; Kirk T. Allen (CPT),
“Letters – Contingency METL and Pre-Deployment Training,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 1 (1996), pp. 4 – 5; Kernan
(LTG) and Bolger (COL), “Train as We Fight,” pp. 35 – 37; Lon E. Maggart (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Mentoring
– A Critical Element in Leadership Development,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 2 (1996), pp. 4, 11. 602 Keith R. Yoder (CPT) and Robert J. Rice (CPT), “21st Century Coup d’Oeil: Developing Commanders for Force
XXI,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 3 (1995), pp. 8 – 11; Kevin M. Felix (CPT), “Company CALFEX: A Critical Fire
Support Synchronization Exercise,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 38 – 40; John E. Bessler (CPT), “Live
Fire Training,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 1 (1994), pp. 42 – 44; Fred Johnson (CPT), “Dismounted Maneuver Live Fire,”
Infantry Vol. 84, No. 3 (1994), pp. 41 – 44; Matthew M. Canfield (CPT), “Gunnery for the Light Infantry Company,”
Infantry Vol. 87, No. 2 (1997), pp. 36 – 38. 603 Dodd (LTC), “The 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment,” pp. 48 – 49; Benson (LTC), “Whither the 2d Cavalry?,”, pp.
20 – 21; Guy C. Swan III (COL), “Letters – Computer Simulation Fallacy: Assuming Troops are Well Trained,”
Armor Vol. 107, No. 4 (1998), pp. 3 – 4; John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: Training for the 21st Century,” Field
Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 1; Christopher C. Shoemaker (COL) and Mark A. Graham (LTC), “Honing the
Edge: Artillery Training in Europe,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 22 – 25; Evan R. Gaddis (COL),
“Leadership Versatility for Operations Other Than War,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 3 (1994), pp. 12 – 14; Yoder
(CPT) and Rice (CPT), “21st Century Coup d’Oeil,” pp. 8 – 11; Valenzuela (COL) Russell (LTC), “Operation Uphold
Democracy,” pp. 26 – 30. 604 George Salerno (CPT), “Is Well-Rounded Actually Better?,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 3 (1994), pp. 46 – 47; William
V. Wenger (LTC), “Earthquake ’94: Operations Other than War,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 6 (1994), pp. 23 – 30.
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conflict was enough of justification for the Army to continue to prepare for that possibility. This
conceptualization, combined with the Army’s conventionally oriented METL, meant that despite
the enterprising efforts by some to reconceptualise the Army’s approach to OOTW, it was hindered
by competing conceptualizations and organizational structures. The existence of these ideas is
worth noting as well as the fact that it was opposed by not only structure but conceptualization too.
Besides these two competing streams of thought, the Army’s rigid bureaucracy combined
with the zero-defects mentality, stymied attempts to institutionalize a training program tailored to
OOTW missions and restricted the autonomy of subordinates to develop their own.605
Furthermore, the CTCs still focused largely on conventional warfare.606 Even the JRTC was
preparing both light and heavy units for low-intensity combat against irregular enemies.607 The
CTCs concentration on the heavy, maneuver force meant that, despite efforts to include them, the
605 Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 158. 606 John T. Ryan (CPT), P. Kevin Dixon (CPT), and James L. Richardson (SFC), “The Tank Mine Clearing Blade:
Eagle or Albatross?,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 4 (1994), pp. 26 – 30; White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2;
Theodore J. Janosko (LTC), “Joint Readiness Training Center Observations,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 4 (1997),
pp. 15 – 17; Marcus G. Dudley (LTC ret.), “NTC Truisms – Fighting with Effective Fires,” Field Artillery Vol. 65,
No. 4 (1997), pp. 7 – 10; R. Mark Blum (LTC), “NTC Notebook,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 4 (1997), pp. 11 – 14;
Karl W. Eikenberry (LTC), “The Infantry Battalion AAR: Observer-Controller Team Planning and Preparation,”
Infantry Vol. 84, No. 1 (1994), pp. 22 – 26; Kevin L. Huddy (LTC), “A Task Force Commander’s Personal Preparation
for the NTC,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 1 (1994), pp. 27 – 31; John A. Nagl (CPT), “Why the OPFOR Wins,” Armor Vol.
104, No. 2 (1995), pp. 43 – 45; Wayne Taylor (LTC), Tina G. Johnson (MAJ), and Clay B. Hatcher (CPT),
“Regenerating Combat Power at the National Training Center,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 1 (1996), pp. 6 – 12; Richard
Randazzo (CPT), “From the NTC: OPFOR Counterreconnaissance at the National Training Center,” Armor Vol. 107,
No. 2 (1998), pp. 12 – 13; Robert B. Brown (CPT), “Kill OPFOR: The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at the NTC,”
Armor Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998), pp. 14 – 15; Ron A. McMurry (MAJ), “National Training Center on Wheels,” Armor
Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998), pp. 16; Maxwell (CPT), “Mobile Pre-Positioning,” pp. 19 – 20; Dudley (LTC ret.), “NTC
Truisms – Fighting with Effective Fires,” pp. 7 – 10; Blum (LTC), “NTC Notebool,”, pp. 11 – 14; Nagl (CPT) and
Huening (CPT), “Training a Divisional Cavalry Squadron for Operations Other than War (OOTW),” pp. 23 – 24. 607 Bruce A. Brant (LTC), “Effective Fire Support at the JRTC,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 5 (1994), pp. 39 – 43; Bynum
(LT), “The Mechanized Platoon in a LIC Environment,” pp. 15 – 17; Blake (CPT), Calahan (CPT), Steven Young
(CPT), “OPFOR Observations from the JRTC,” pp. 30 – 35; James Sisemore (LT), “Preparation for the JRTC: The
Rifle Platoon Leader,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 2 (1995), pp. 33 – 34; Peter J. Don (CPT), “OPFOR Reconnaissance
Techniques Worth Adopting,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 5 (1996), pp. 44 – 47.
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Light Infantry and Artillery were still not effectively integrated into the Army’s premier training
facilities.608
Despite the diversity of thought that this debate and the broader OOTW discussion
demonstrated, those that adhered to the conventional conceptualizations – in terms of METL focus
or the classic conception of Armor and Artillery in OOTW – could fall back on powerful and long
standing assumptions and traditions of warfare that existed in the Army’s military culture,
organization of resources, equipment and, bureaucracy – that had been reinforced by the post-
Vietnam reforms. The emphasis on force protection implied that the clearest risk to any military
operation was the American public’s perception of the mission, especially following Somalia.609
The attempt to link consistent OOTW training to the belief that the Army should train as it fought
failed, efforts to create a peacekeeping division failed.610 The notion that conventional warfare was
inherently more difficult and dangerous than OOTW was rooted in the Army’s cultural beliefs and
bureaucratic structures that opposed any attempt to challenge these priorities. Nevertheless, the
debate’s existence demonstrates that, despite the powerful institutional forces, militaries can
feature different and opposed thought processes.
The individual tribes conceptualized OOTW in ways that closely related to their existing
resources and interpretations of warfare. The Infantry, most involved with the OOTW mission,
believed that they needed drastic changes in how they trained and operated in these operations.
Despite this, the mechanized infantry, like the Armor, believed that they had a role to play. Often
608 The new MILES System – Simulated area weapons effects (SAWE) MILES – still did not, in many Artillerymen’s
minds, accurately replicate the psychological impact of indirect fires. William M. Boice (MG) and Christopher C.
Shoemaker (COL), “Fires and Maneuver: The End of Splendid Isolation,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 1 (1994), pp. 8
– 11; John E. Haxton (MAJ), “Letters – Response to ‘Is Fire Support Too Hard or Just Very Tough?,” Field Artillery
Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 3; Dudley (LTC ret.), “NTC Truisms – Fighting with Effective Fires,” pp. 7 – 10; Kenneth
A. Springer (CPT), “Deception and the MRB Defense,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 3 (1998), pp. 13 – 16; Steve E. Landis
(MAJ), “Let’s Reorganize our BFV Companies,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 3 (1997), pp. 19 – 22. 609 Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 191 – 195. 610 Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 30.
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this came in the form of using existing weapons to support dismounted infantry. Besides this, the
Armor tribe’s worship of vehicles meant that they framed their involvement and future
contributions in terms of what material capabilities they could bring. The Artillery also believed
that their vehicles provided a capability to OOTW missions, but they also underscored their
counterfire radars and communication capabilities as necessity to monitor ceasefire agreements.
Envisioning the Future:
Alongside the Army’s active role in the OOTW missions of the 1990’s, the organization
was undertaking a drastic attempt to predict and prepare for future warfare. Announced in early
1994, the Army’s Force XXI initiative sought to combine emerging information technologies with
the Army’s focus on conventional warfare. Initially promoted by ACS Sullivan and his successor,
General Reimer, Force XXI was their attempt to bring the industrial Army into the information
age.611 This process would not be easy, it would involve applying information technology to
industrial age equipment.612 Central to Force XXI was the expected digitization of Army units.
This would provide them with the ability to rapidly distribute information and situational
awareness that would, in turn, improve their capabilities. The expected result was a revolution in
command and control, communications, and sensors that would enable the Army to find the
enemy, synchronize their available assets, and then destroy the enemy with minimal casualties. It
was predicted that the drawdown of the 1990’s would be offset by Force XXI warfare and that
decisive victory could be achieved with a minimum number of casualties, making it politically as
well as militarily viable.613
611 Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War, pp. 31 – 32. 612 Arquilla, The Worst Enemy, pp. 175. 613 Johnston (COL), “The Journey to Force XXI’s Mounted Component,” pp. 14 – 16.
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The insular thought environment of the post-Gulf War shaped the development of Force
XXI. The previous chapter concluded with Retired General Jack Keane’s statement that the Gulf
War had intellectually “bankrupted us for the rest of the decade.”614 This ‘bankruptcy’ manifested
itself in a narrow reading of Operation Desert Storm. Steadily, interpretations of the Gulf War
portrayed the War as a fight against an unworthy foe, yet the Army’s own performance was
deemed exceptional, a logic that led them to continue to distill lessons from that conflict even if
these were narrowly applied to the tribes.615 Desert Storm catalyzed the ideas at the heart of the
RMA, and provided the Army with a concept of future warfare.616 Rather than examine and learn
from the conflict in its entirety, the Army chose to perfect its own approach to warfare. In June
1996, the NTC OPFOR dropped their practice of using Soviet manuals to recreate the conditions
for a battle on the plains of Northern Europe, and adopted doctrine designed to replicate “maneuver
warfare more in line with the US way of war.”617 Previously, the Gulf War superseded the CTCs
in the tribal journals, but, by the mid-1990s, the CTCs had largely regained their former status as
sources of insight into modern warfare. Despite the one sided analysis of the Gulf War, many
argued that it had provided a glimpse into the future of warfare by isolating the Army’s
performance for further examination, without sullying interpretations by including the unworthy
614 Quoted in Ricks, The Generals, pp. 388. 615 Two examples of this include the effectiveness of the Army’s doctrine, and a continuing discussion about fratricide.
To solve the fratricide problem many proposed solutions were technological in nature. One example of how the Gulf
War’s lessons informed the thinking around Force XXI later on. Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1; Rick
A. Baillergeon (CPT) and John R. Sutherland III (CPT), “A Company Commander’s Keys to Success at the NTC,”
Infantry Vol. 84, No. 3 (1994), pp. 33 – 38; Jeffery N. Stowe (CPT), “The Immediate Attack and the Attack of
Opportunity,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 2 (1994), pp. 45 – 46; Charles D. Starbird (CPT), “Maneuvering the Enemy,”
Armor Vol. 105, No. 3 (1996), pp. 41 – 42; Robert S. Langol (CPT), “Training Target Confirmation,” Armor Vol.
103, No. 6 (1994), pp. 33 – 35; Michael C. Morton (CPT), “Letters – What Missile Vehicles Miss: The Shock Effects
of Tanks,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998), pp. 54; Joseph C. Sloop (MAJ), “Initial Entry Training Company METL
Assessment,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 6 (1996), pp. 44 – 45. 616 Adamsky reiterates the fact that within the US military, the acquisition of technology was seen as end in and of
itself instead of requiring altered organizational structures and operating concepts. Adamsky, The Culture of Military
Innovation, pp. 74 – 75. 617 Peter J. Palmer (LTC), “Decision Point Tactics and the Meeting Battle: Fighting the Enemy Not the Plan,” Infantry
Vol. 87, No. 1 (1997), pp. 28. See also, Landis (MAJ), “Let’s Reorganize our BFV Companies,” pp. 19 – 22.
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enemy.618 Colonel John Johnston and Majors Steve Thorson and Bruce Held demonstrate this
when they wrote,
The journey to Force XXI began with Operation Desert Storm. Equipment like
the [GPS], [MLRS], Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR), [ATACMS], and
[JSTARS] forced rapid changes in how we did business… The gathering of
Desert Shield/Desert Storm Army lessons learned was the catalyst for change.
The journey had begun.619
They also contended that “Desert Storm showed us the enticing possibilities available when you
can out see and outshoot your opponent… In addition, information technologies are driving the
change towards a Force XXI doctrine.”620 This limited interpretation of Desert Storm, and the Gulf
War generally, speaks to the insular approach to warfare of those who were enamored with
predicting future conventional warfare.
To understand Force XXI, an understanding of the features, assumptions, and beliefs that
characterized this vision of warfare is needed. This is important because it then makes comparisons
between older conceptualizations possible. First, command and control would be the primary
beneficiary from new information technologies. New weapons could be developed, but the major
changes would enhance a commander’s ability to control his forces.621 This would then improve
synchronization, leading to greater effectiveness. Ideally, increased situational awareness and
618 John W. Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Facing the Turn of the Century,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996),
pp. 1; John R. Sutherland III (CPT), “The Platoon Team,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 9 – 12; Frederick J.
Gellert (CPT), “The Combat Trains in Combat,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 5 – 7; Derek C. Schneider (CPT),
“Combat Vehicle Command and Control,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 4 (1994), pp. 40 – 42; Johnathan J. Negin (CPT),
“Desert Storm – The First Firefight,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 2 (1994), pp. 6 – 9; Jerry C. Hill (LTC), “Beyond Doctrine:
‘Pushing the Envelope’ With the MLRS,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 4 (1994), pp. 40 – 43; Lingamfelter (LTC) and
Kirby (CPT), “Stay Hot, Shoot Fast,” pp. 18 – 21; Steve Thorson (MAJ) and Bruce Held (MAJ), “Training
Ammunition for Force XXI,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 3 (1996), pp. 21 – 25, 36; Chaisson (CPT), “Rest for the Weary,”
pp. 14 – 18; Douglas J. Morrison (MAJ), “Armor Officer 2000,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 5 (1994), pp. 47 – 48. 619 Johnston (COL), “The Journey to Force XXI’s Mounted Component,” pp. 14. 620 Thorson (MAJ) and Held (MAJ), “Training Ammunition for Force XXI,” pp. 21. 621 Joseph J. Martin (CPT, Field Artillery), “The Moving Call for Fire,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 1 (1997), pp. 12; Todd
R. Wendt (MAJ), “Bradley M2A3/M3A3: The Army Fighting Vehicle for the 21st Century,” Infantry Vol. 87, No. 1
(1997), pp. 23 – 27; Lewis G. Wagner (CPT), “Owning the Night,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 2 (1994), pp. 9 – 12; Johnston
(COL), “The Journey to Force XXI’s Mounted Component,” pp. 14 – 16; Robert L. Bateman (CPT), “Force XXI and
the Death of Auftragstaktik,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 1 (1996), pp. 13 – 15.
149
information management meant commanders could efficiently synchronize their forces and seize
the initiative.622 Secondly, the improved command and control would lead to faster decisions. This
would allow the Army to obtain the initiative by forcing any enemy to respond to their actions.623
Third, Force XXI conceptualized digitized wars of the future where the ability to link units together
with information technologies would allow the Army to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces with
indirect fires at distance. Even though it still featured traditional conceptualizations such as
mobility, lethality and initiative, technology and information were now key features of the
battlefield.624
Fourth, and related to the assumption of the applicability of digitization to battlefields, was
the belief that information technologies were revolutionizing combat. “Emerging information age
technologies seem to be leading to near-perfect situational awareness on our battlefields of the
future. This, coupled with smart and brilliant munitions delivered by extended-range cannons and
missiles, makes 21st century warfare a new ball game.”625 Old forms of attrition warfare with
622 Gregory J. Dykeman (CPT), “The 21st Century Land Warrior,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 12 – 14; Anthony
R. Garrett (MAJ), “Parallel Planning: Managing the Information Flow,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 1 (1995), pp. 19 – 20;
Kevin C.M. Benson (LTC), “The Armor Battalion After Next: A Modest Proposal,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 5 (1997),
pp. 12 – 13, 50; Robert S. Mikaloff (CPT), “Mobility Analysis for the Digitized Brigade,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 5
(1996), pp. 41 – 44; James K. Greer Jr. (LTC), “Experimenting with the Army of the 21st Century,” Field Artillery
Vol. 62, No. 6 (1994), pp. 43 – 47; Michael C. Cloy (MAJ), “Is Your Battle Staff as Blind as the Six Men of Indostan?,”
Armor Vol. 103, No. 4 (1994), pp. 22 – 25; Ben Santos (LTC), “An Engagement Area Primer,” Armor Vol. 106, No.
2 (1997), pp. 33 – 35; Charles Dalcourt (CPT), “Air/Ground Integration and the Combined Arms Concept,” Armor
Vol. 106, No. 5 (1997), pp. 22 – 25; Barno (LTC, Infantry), “Fire Support in the Heavy-Light Fight,” pp. 21 – 26. 623 Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1; Greer Jr. (LTC), “Experimenting with the Army of the 21st Century,”
pp. 43 – 47; Alan D. Johnson (COL), Charles J. Berlin III (LTC) and Stuart G. McLennan III (LTC), “Proactive Fires:
Leveraging Technology to Defeat Artillery High-Payoff Targets,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 2 (1995), pp. 38 – 42. 624 Harold W. Webb (MAJ), “Concepts and Technology For the Soldier,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 15 – 16;
Morris E. Price Jr. (COL) and Allen L. Borgardts (MAJ), “Load-Bearing System for the 21st Century Land Warrior,”
Infantry Vol. 85, No. 6 (1995), pp. 12 – 16; Greer Jr. (LTC), “Experimenting with the Army of the 21st Century,” pp.
43 – 47; Randall L. Rigby (MG), “Registration Points: Targeting UAVs – The Need is Great, the Time is Now,” Field
Artillery Vol. 65, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1; Chaisson (CPT), “Rest for the Weary,” pp. 14 – 18; Andrew D. Goldin (1LT),
“Letters – Information Technology and the Armored Force,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 3 (1996), pp. 4, 47 – 48. 625 Quoted in Leo J. Baxter (MG), “From the Firebase: Nothing to Fear,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 3 (1998), pp. 1.
See also, Larry R. Jordan (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Force XXI Battle Command – Enabling Tomorrow’s Leaders,”
Armor Vol. 103, No. 2 (1994), pp. 5; White (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s
Note,” pp. 1; Tim Cherry (MAJ), “Future Command and Control Systems,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 6 (1994), pp. 16 –
18; John Woznick (LTC), “TERM: The Tank Extended Range Munition,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 2 (1997), pp. 21 – 23;
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massed armies would have to give way to new forms of military power.626 It was hoped that these
developments would eliminate Clausewitz’s fog of uncertainty. The belief that technology would
revolutionize warfare was a consistent theme throughout the discussion of Force XXI.
Fifth, Force XXI built upon the established belief that future battlefields would be
nonlinear in nature.627 A smaller Force XXI Army, or deployed force, could occupy a larger area
than an industrial army because of the improved command and control systems.628 The ability of
information technologies to find and ‘see’ the enemy on nonlinear battlefields linked concept and
technology.629 Interestingly, there was little discussion of the difficulties encountered during the
Scud Hunt in the western deserts of Iraq during the Gulf War, which may have posed problems to
this conceptualization.630 The applicability of this relationship is evident in retired Colonel Bruce
Clarke’s statement that “Mass will be achieved by fires and movement over much larger areas by
numerically smaller forces. However, in many cases the superiorities – information, accuracy,
decision speed, etc. – offered by the situational awareness made possible by digital technology
may allow for overwhelming force to be achieved without overwhelming numerical
superiority.”631
John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: Redlegs Looking Forward,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 4 (1994), pp. 1; David
C. White (COL), “Army Training XXI,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 2 (1996), pp. 8 – 10; Guy E. Willebrand (CPT),
“FA Training Devices for 1990s and Beyond,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 2 (1996), pp. 11 – 13. 626 Bruce B.G. Clarke (COL ret.), “Leadership on the Digital Battlefield,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 4 (1996), pp. 12 – 14. 627 Kevin J. Dougherty (CPT) and Richard C. Townes (CPT), “Search and Attack,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 6 (1994),
pp. 41 – 44. 628 Thomas Adams noted that an information equipped unit could occupy a space 140% larger than an industrial one.
Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 52. Michael L. Pryor (CPT), “Letters – Why Would the Force XXI Commander
Want to Intervene,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 3 (1996), pp. 4; Clarke (COL ret.), “Leadership on the Digital Battlefield,”
pp. 12 – 14. 629 Paul E. Funk (LTG), “Future Thrusts,” Armor 103, No. 1 (1994), pp. 47 – 50; John L. Gifford (CPT),
“Fundamentals of Air-Ground Integration in Division Cavalry Operations,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 4 (1994), pp. 15 –
19; Rick Lynch (LTC) and Stephen M. Cichocki (CPT), “Training the Task Force Scout Platoon,” Armor Vol. 105,
No. 4 (1996), pp. 42 – 44; Lon E. Maggart (MG), “Cavalry in Force XXI,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 5 (1996), pp. 11 –
13; Cherry (MAJ), “Future Command and Control Systems,” pp. 16 – 18; Mark P. Hertling (LTC), “The Battle of
Oom Chalouba 17 June 2008,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 1 (1995), pp. 34 – 37; Alexander J. Verret (CPT), “Engineers in
the R&S Effort,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 2 (1995), pp. 40 – 42, 45. 630 Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx, pp. 19. 631 Clarke (COL ret.), “Leadership on the Digital Battlefield,” pp. 12.
151
Sixth, and related to nonlinear battlefields, combat would revolve around ‘decisive points’
– similar to Clausewitz’s centre of gravity – where the enemy would be weakest and the possibility
of a decisive victory the strongest. These ‘points’ would be dependent upon the situation, but
would ultimately be revealed through situational awareness.632 Lastly, and most total of the
assumptions, the development of a Force XXI capable Army was viewed as a zero-sum process.
If digitization was unevenly developed, compatibility and therefor synchronization would suffer
between the Army’s digitized and non-digitized units.633 This fear drove many to argue for the
complete digitization of the Army.
Although Force XXI was widely believed to provide the Army with a path to victory in
future wars, it only had the limited experiences of the Gulf War to draw upon – even these only
hinted at the possibilities. To overcome this problem, the Army undertook numerous simulations
and exercise to peer into the future and test Force XXI concepts. Insights from these created the
elements of Force XXI.634 This proceeded slowly, without urgency. The absence of a threat meant
that the Army could experiment at its leisure.635 On the tactical level, simulations provided the
Army an economical way to train but also reflected the belief that they could improve a tank crew,
or a unit’s, proficiency.636 There were specific ‘Battle Labs’ that were used to examine how best
632 Milton R. Ayala (MAJ), “TCDC: Targets, Triggers and Killers,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 32 – 33;
Stratman (COL) and Flake III (LTC), “Winning Early, Winning Deep,” pp. 31 – 35; Stuart G. McLennan III (MAJ),
“Rockin with CSS,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 34 – 36. 633 This included US allies whom may not be able to fight at a comparable level. O.T. Edwards (MAJ), “Digital
Battlefield Training and Tactical Insights of a User,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 3 (1995), pp. 12 – 14; Michael L. Pryor
(CPT), “Letters – The Dichotomy of Non-Digitized and Digitized Forces,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 5 (1995), pp. 50 –
51; Bart Howard (MAJ), “Letters – Digitization Could Exclude Allies,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 2 (1996), pp. 48; Dean
A. Nowowiejski (MAJ), “Achieving Digital Destruction: Challenges for the M1A2 Task Force,” Armor Vol. 104, No.
1 (1995), pp. 21 – 24. 634 Henry J. Hester Jr. (CPT), “Digitization in Task Force XXI,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 5 (1996), pp. 38 – 40. 635 Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 34. 636 Johnathan D. Thompson (CPT), “A SIMNET Training Program,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 4 (1995), pp. 39 – 41;
Martin E. Dempsey (LTC), “The Green Tabbers of Force XXI,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 5 (1994), pp. 49; Stephen Snyder
(1LT), “The Guard Unit Armory Device Full Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (GUARDFIST-1),” Armor Vol.
105, No. 2 (1996), pp. 40 – 43.
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to create a Force XXI capable Army.637 Exercises such as Operation Desert Hammer (ODH VI),
Purple Dragon ’98, and the Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) tested emerging
technologies within units.638 By the late-1990’s, the 4th Infantry Division had become the Army’s
premier Force XXI experimentation unit, which enabled them to conduct large scale tests on Force
XXI concepts.639 The AWE’s represented one of the most important efforts by the Army to
investigate the applicability of technologies to combat. However, this revealed significant
problems, for in some cases digitized units performed worse than industrial ones.640 Like the other
Force XXI experiments, the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiments (DAWE) at the NTC
and Fort Hood provided the testimony for many of the claims associated with Force XXI.641 The
simulations painted a picture of warfare that closely corresponded to a vision of warfare resembling
the Gulf War – high-intensity, conventional combat.642 The degree to which these experiments
637 This included the following Battle Labs Mounted Battlespace; Depth and Simultaneous Attack; Early Entry,
Lethality, and Survivability; Battle Command; and Combat Service Support. Major General Jerry White, the
commandant of the Infantry School, described the importance of these Battle Labs because they provided “…the Army
with an institutionalized means of identifying and evaluating new warfighting ideas across the DTLOMS, and the
Battle Lab Integration and Technology Directorate coordinates the efforts of all Battle Labs within the Army.” Jerry
A. White (MG), “Commandant’s Note: Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab – Putting the Ideas of the Future into
Action Today,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 2 (1994), pp. 1; Dykeman (CPT), “The 21st Century Land Warrior,” pp. 12 – 14. 638 Carl D. Grunow (MAJ), “Force XXI Concept Tested The Forward Support Company,” Infantry Vol. 88, No. 3
(1998), pp. 11 – 13; Funk (LTG), “Future Thrusts,” pp. 47 – 50; Jeffrey R. Witsken (MAJ), “The Lessons of Operation
Desert Hammer VI: Our Doctrine Is Basically Sound,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 4 (1995), pp. 35 – 37; Ronald K. Kollhoff
(CPT), “Digitization Will Impact Many Areas of Training,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 5 (1995), pp. 41 – 43; Lon E. Maggart
(BG), “Commander’s Hatch: Focused Dispatch – Digitization of the Mounted Forces,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 6 (1995),
pp. 4, 44; William M. Bransford (LTC), “Fire Support and Desert Hammer VI – The Advanced Warfighting
Experiment,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 5 (1994), pp. 43; John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: On the Threshold,”
Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 3 (1995), pp. 1 – 2. 639 Mark Newell (MAJ), “4th ID Pioneers New Division Design,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 6 (1998), pp. 48 – 50; John F.
Kalb (COL) and Christopher T. Mayer, “The Mounted Close Combat Battalion: Operations and Organizations to
Exploit Future Capabilities,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 4 (1997), pp. 17 – 20. 640 Scales, Yellow Smoke, pp. 10 – 14; Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 41. 641 The AWE proved the Force XXI concept of dispersed operations. Units equipped with information technology
could occupy greater spaces than their industrial age predecessors. Scales, Yellow Smoke, pp. 10 – 12. See also, Leo
J. Baxter (MG), “From the Firebase: Cutting Edge Options for the Commander’s Kit Bag,” Field Artillery Vol. 66,
No. 1 (1998), pp. 1; Douglas G. Beley (LTC), “AFATDS and the Task Force AWE Insights for Fire Support Leaders,”
Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 1 (1998), pp. 3 – 5. 642 David P. Valcourt (COL), “Force XXI Victory: More than Just Gizmos and Digits,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 3
(1998), pp. 11 – 16; George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Observations on the Division AWE Now That the Smoke Has
Cleared,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 3 (1998), pp. 5, 53; R. Powl Smith (MAJ), “BCTP: Be Unpredictable, Take Risks or
Lose,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 2 (1997), pp. 16 – 21.
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merely reproduced assumptions or provided evidence for a critical examination of Force XXI
concepts was left unstated. What this did indicate was that the Army was willing to spend time
and resources to pursue this conceptualization, beyond only discussing it. In contrast to the METL
debates, here the Army’s structure supported the conceptualizations behind Force XXI.
Reflecting their unique positions and realities, the individual tribes approached Force XXI
in their own ways. For the Infantry, Force XXI would enhance individual soldiers and turn them
into sensors to provide targets to the artillery. This, they expected, would enhance the ability of
the force to be able to synchronize effectively, making use of fewer soldiers to achieve greater
battlefield effects.643 Ideas, such as the Non-Line of Sight-Combined Arms concept, featured very
Artillery-esque conceptualizations of warfare such as target acquisition, survivable command and
control, and precision indirect fire munitions.644 Proponents of Force XXI argued that it would
benefit both the light and mechanized types of Infantry. The key to this was that technology would
improve their combat power.645 At the unit level, command and control between platoons and
companies – the Infantry’s prized commands – and superiors would be enhanced.646 This
challenged the Infantry’s idealized vision of warfare of the 1980’s. The Infantry believed that
Force XXI would provide them with an evolutionary advancement in capability. They could direct
Artillery support better, communicate better, and provide a better dispersion of soldiers. There
was nothing particularly revolutionary here, revolution had become intensification.
The Armored tribe identified themselves as the ‘heart’ of the digitization efforts of Force
XXI – especially the commanders of the Armored school. They expected Force XXI would
643 Richard P. McEvoy (LTC), “Targeting for the Maneuver Force,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 6 (1996), pp. 12 – 14;
William E. Harner (LTC), “Brigade Targeting,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 6 (1996), pp. 15 – 17; Conley (CPT), “Enhanced
Land Warrior Program,” pp. 20 – 22. 644 Webb (MAJ), “Concepts and Technology For the Soldier,” pp. 15 – 16. 645 Ernst (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2; John W. Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note: The Infantry Force
XXI Working Group,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 2 (1995), pp. 1 – 2. 646 Craig A. Triscari (CPT), “Battle Simulations,” Infantry Vol. 86, No. 4 (1996), pp. 43 – 44.
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combine soldier and technology in the main-battle tank and apply that to the close battle.647 The
Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) on the M1A2 Abrams was essential for battlefield
awareness because it facilitated the sharing of vehicle positions as well as information horizontally
and vertically. IVIS meant that they could fight as a combined arms unit, better.648 With regards
to the main-battle tank, some members of the tribe envisioned artillery-like capabilities, where
tanks could indirectly attack enemies from great distances, in a manner similar to the Artillery.649
This, alongside new weapons and technologies, were at the heart of many definitions of warfare
rather than new operational concepts.650 Those members of Armor who were in favour of Force
XXI’s conceptualization of warfare believed that it could improve the MBT, but also provide them
with new capabilities. The applicability of Force XXI to the tank-centric tribe meant that they
believed this vision of warfare would make them a dominant force once again.
Like the Armor, the Artillery believed they were at the heart of Force XXI. Indirect fire
support would be even more effective than it had been previously.651 Simultaneous attack by both
maneuver forces as well as the Artillery in the deep battle would hasten the enemy’s defeat.652 No
longer would deep attacks be conducted to prepare for the close battle, the deep battle would take
647 Larry R. Jordan (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Change in the Mounted Force,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 3 (1995), pp.
4; Lon E. Maggart (BG), “Commander’s Hatch: Warfighting Spirit,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 4 (1995), pp. 4. 648 Cherry (MAJ), “Future Command and Control Systems,” pp. 16 – 18; Robert Krenzel (1LT), “The Armor
Lieutenant and the M1A2,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 4 (1995), pp. 15 – 22; Schneider (CPT), “Combat Vehicle Command
and Control,” pp. 40 – 42; Woznick (LTC), “TERM,” pp. 21 – 23. 649 Thorson (MAJ) and Held (MAJ), “Training Ammunition for Force XXI,” 21 – 25, 36; Bruce J. Held (MAJ),
“Tomorrow’s Smart Tank Munitions,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 2 (1995), pp. 21 – 25, 32; Mike Pryor (CPT), “M1A2s,
Smart Ammunition, and Time and Space Theory: Or, Why I would Not Want To Be the Threat,” Armor Vol. 105, No.
1 (1996), pp. 16 – 19; Paul D. Smith (MAJ), “The Need for Long-Range Gunnery,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 6 (1995),
pp. 34 – 35. 650 James K. Morningstar (MAJ), “Back to the Future: Javelins and Skirmishers on the Battlefield,” Armor Vol. 105,
No. 3 (1996), pp. 37 – 40; Larry R. Jordan (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: Tank 1, 080 – Follow-on to M1A2,” Armor
Vol. 103, No. 6 (1994), pp. 4. 651 Martin (CPT, Field Artillery), “The Moving Call for Fire,” pp. 12. 652 John A. Dubia (MG), “On the Move: Combined Operations Future,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 1 (1995), pp. 1;
David P. Valcourt (COL) and Lester C. Jauron (LTC), “Division Redesign – Fires for Force XXI,” Field Artillery
Vol. 65, No. 4 (1997), pp. 24 – 31; Baxter (MG), “From the Firebase,” pp. 1; Johnson (COL), Berlin (LTC) and
McLennan (LTC), “Proactive Fires,” pp. 38 – 42.
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on its own importance beyond its previous incarnations. This gave the Artillery a prominent role
in Force XXI conflicts. Limiting the number of causalities was a key goal for Force XXI, and the
Artillery assumed they would play a dominant role in doing so. For example, “It is important to
remember that the issue is not whether fires are controlling maneuver or vice versa but that the
combined arms meet the goal of destroying the enemy on the objective with minimal friendly
casualties.”653 Additionally, they portrayed themselves as another maneuver arm – a continuation
of what had begun with the Fighting with Fires Initiative in the early 1990’s. Overcoming their
historic isolation relative to the ‘maneuver’ arms was seen as a necessity for them to adequately
contribute to the Army – a belief supported by many in the Armor and Infantry tribes.654 They
believed that turning the Infantry and Armor into sensors would make the combined arms team
more effective and lead to greater synchronization as part of Force XXI.655 This included light
fighters.656 Simulations and experiments as part of Force XXI confirmed the beliefs of many within
the Artillery tribe. They highlighted the fact that the battlefield would be digital with increased
653 Russell Jr. (LTC), “Echeloning Fires,” pp. 27. Emphasis added. 654 Boice (MG) and Shoemaker (COL), “Fires and Maneuver,” pp. 8 – 11; Robert Valdivia (CPT, Armor), “The New
FSO and the Armored Company Team: A Strategy for Success,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 1 (1994), pp. 32 – 34;
Donald R. Lightman (COL, Infantry), “Fire Support – Who’s Responsible,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 1 (1994), pp.
35 – 36; Robert W. Mixon Jr. (COL, Armor), “Fighting in Your Face – And Winning,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 5
(1994), pp. 24 – 25; Robert P. Lott Jr. (CPT), “Letters – Maneuver Shooters: Eyes for the Battlefield,” Field Artillery
Vol. 63, No. 1 (1995), pp. 3 – 5; Russell Jr. (LTC), “Echeloning Fires,” pp. 24 – 27. For an example of the distance
that some commentators desire to overcome, see the following articles for mentions of the ‘maneuver arms’ David C.
Ralston (COL) and Rodney L. Lusher (CPT), “Exploiting the Effects of Fires: Synchronized Targeting and
Execution,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 1 (1996), pp. 30 – 31; Samuel R. White Jr. (MAJ), “TTP for Clearing Brigade
Fires,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 1 (1996), pp. 32 – 33; Shoemaker (COL) and Graham (LTC), “Honing the Edge,”
pp. 22 – 25; Hill (LTC), “Beyond Doctrine,” pp. 40 – 43; Valcourt (COL) and Jauron (LTC), “Division Redesign,”
pp. 24 – 31. 655 Thomas G. Waller Jr. (LTC), “Letters – Response to ‘Fires and Maneuver: The End of Splendid Isolation,” Field
Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 4; Robert J. Fronzaglia (LTC), “The Paladin Battalion at the NTC – A
Commander’s Perspective,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 4 (1995), pp. 12 – 16; Valcourt (COL) and Jauron (LTC),
“Division Redesign,” pp. 24 – 31; In some cases, this would allow the Artillery to focus more easily on high-priority
targets. Vince C. Weaver Jr. (MAJ), “Fires in AWE Focused Dispatch: A Step Toward Task Force XXI,” Field
Artillery Vol. 64, No. 2 (1996), pp. 38 – 40; Ralston (COL) and Lusher (CPT), “Exploiting the Effects of Fires,” pp.
30 – 31. 656 Turing light infantrymen into sensors would fulfill the Artillery’s belief that their fire support was the light
infantry’s most potent form of firepower. Theodore S. Russell Jr. (LTC) and Harold H. Worrell Jr. (MAJ), “Focus on
Light Force XXI: AWE Warrior Focus,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 3 (1996), pp. 36 – 39.
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pace, tempo and complexity. DAWE “supported the Field Artillery vision – ‘A more
technologically advanced, potent and agile Field artillery force relying as always on well-trained,
dedicated, and motivated leaders and soldiers to ensure success.”657
For them, the development of the AFATDS was comparable to the Armor’s IVIS. The
belief that battlefield information had to be disseminated throughout the force, vertically and
horizontally, was nothing new to the Artillery. The Artillery’s TACFIRE system from the 1980s
was already facilitating a simple version of what the Artillery envisioned.658 However, AFATDS
improved command and control capabilities would enable them to fight faster and more efficiently
than before.659 Besides AFATDS, Crusader, the Artillery’s developmental self-propelled howitzer,
was a “technology carrier” for the future.660 Given the Artillery’s need to see the battlefield in
order to precisely engage enemies, the rapid developments in information technologies led to the
Artillery conceptualizing a new element in their targeting process: assessment. Assessment, or
battle damage assessment (BDA), would allow the Artillery to determine the effectiveness of their
fires.661 This intensification of ideas indicates the depth at which Force XXI concepts were held
within the Artillery. By overcoming their isolation relative to the other tribes, the Artillery could
657 Rhett A. Hernandez (COL), “Top Ten Traits for Future Leaders,” Field Artillery Vol. 67, No. 3 (1999), pp. 8. 658 Randall L. Rigby (MG), “Registration Points: AFATDS – Learning to Interoperate not Just Interface,” Field
Artillery Vol. 64, No. 5 (1996), pp. 1. 659 John A. Dubia (MG), “Force XXI and the Field Artillery: State of the Branch 1994,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No.
6 (1994), pp. 1 – 5; Earl D. Noble (CPT) and Kurt A. Meisenzahl, “AFATDS: The FA’s Doorway to the Digital
Battlefield,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 4 (1995), pp. 36 – 39. 660 Warren N. O’Donell (MAJ) and William A. Ross (LTC ret.), “TTP for the Crusader Battalion – A Beginning,”
Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 6 (1997), pp. 16. 661 Anthony J. D’Angelo (MAJ) and Timothy M. Kogler, “Video Imaging Projectiles for Future Battlefields,” Field
Artillery Vol. 62, No. 1 (1994), pp. 46 – 49; Randall L. Rigby (MG), “Registration Points: The FA and Air Attack
Team,” Field Artillery Vol. 64, No. 3 (1996), pp. 1; Raymond C. Hodgkins (MAJ), “Removing the Unknown from
Counterfire BDA – A 90 Percent Solution,” Field Artillery Vol. 65, No. 2 (1997), pp. 11 – 13; Robert D. Kirby (CPT)
and Robert A. Nelson Jr (CWO3), “TOC Counterfire Battle Drill,” Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 1 (1998), pp. 32 – 36;
Bernard H. Street (COL) and Rand Dee Bowerman, “UAV Support for FA Operations,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No.
2 (1995), pp. 34 – 36; Timothy P. Goldfish (CPT), “The FA’s New Command and Attack Battalion,” Field Artillery
Vol. 65, No. 5 (1997), pp. 38 – 41.
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contribute as a maneuver arm. Indeed, they were the most enamored with Force XXI, because of
the potential independence that this conceptualization could grant the tribe.
Force XXI represented a vision of conventional warfare that sought to bring the Army into
the information age and make it capable of fighting digitized wars. Described as a revolutionary
process related to the RMA, in fact, Force XXI was more evolutionary. It did introduce new
technologies into the Army, but not in a manner that changed the way the Army was structured or
how it fought.662 Reinforcing an approach to warfare that had been in existence since 1980’s.
This indicated the belief for those advocating for Force XXI, and the capabilities it would
bring, that it was necessary for future warfare. However, their only indication of the applicability
of this vision of warfare was what they took from the Gulf War, with only a limited appreciation
of the strategic environment that they currently were operating within. Furthermore, the absence
of a real discussion of the Army After Next project, which began in 1996, indicates that the tribes
were totally concerned with the immediate ramifications of Force XXI.663 This disconnect is
interesting, and indicates that in the face of a strategic environment that does not provide a
justification for a preferable vision of warfare, members of an organization can find solace in the
unknown future, relatively safe from an uncomfortable reality. This is not to say Force XXI was
developed in a vacuum, but that it incorporated an interpretation of recent warfare to support it.
The adoption of information technologies to improve an existing approach to warfare
indicates the importance and value placed on this way of war and their self-perceived ability to
think innovatively. The Army’s use of simulators to create and study the kinds of conflicts they
662 Percolating alongside Force XXI, was the Army After Next (AAN) project. This sought to predict the nature of
warfare from 2020 to 2030. Many of the concepts developed by the AAN project would precede the developments of
the Future Combat System proposed by ACS Shinseki. Farrell, Rynning and Terriff, Transforming Military Power
since the Cold War, pp. 31 – 34, 43 – 50. 663 Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 39.
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expected to fight is indicative of the extent to which the Army was willing to go to pursue a
particular conceptualization of warfare. The DAWE at Fort Hood was argued to demonstrate that
“brigades with continuous situational awareness are destroying divisions. Long-range fires are the
key to victory. Done completely in simulation, it is ‘showing’ that a new definition of maneuver
may be ‘that which allows the commander to place his artillery in the most advantageous position
to destroy enemy forces without resorting to the close fight.’”664 The continued belief that an
enemy organized along a divisional structure in the face of continued OOTW deployments is the
clearest depiction of how conceptualizations of preferred warfare can create challenges to existing
situations.
Classicists and Maneuverists:
The period from 1994 to 1999 is too multifaceted to be characterized as a debate between
OOTW reality and the Force XXI future. Unlike previous periods, conventional warfare itself was
a contested subject. Richard Lock-Pullan writes “the exclusively technological focus fostered by
the Army was a corruption of the AirLand Battle evolution and was indicative of how far the basis
of the Army’s thinking was dependent on a referent which ignored the social and political aspects
of this nature – namely, a professional focusing on the technical aspects of war.”665 However, this
change did not come about without resistance from within the Army’s tribes. The ‘Classicists’ and
‘Maneuverists’ emerged as reactionary communities of Infantrymen and Tankers, that criticized
the technological way of war espoused by those who believed in Force XXI. The Infantry
Classicists hearkened back to a ‘traditional’ conception of warfare that featured close, violent
combat. The Maneuverists consisted of an assortment of Armored tribesmen who, although
664 Kevin C.M. Benson (LTC), “Armor’s Role in the Future Combined Arms Team,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998),
pp. 48. 665 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 165.
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differing on what maneuver warfare was, agreed that the technological approach to warfare in
Force XXI was flawed and dangerous. They conceptualized victory through brilliant maneuver
against an enemy. These two streams of thought were not replicated in the Artillery tribe because
the arguments that the Infantry and Armor used were incompatible with the Artillery’s consistent
technological approach to warfare and would have sparked an existential crisis within the tribe if
there had been significant opposition in Field Artillery to Force XXI.
The Classicists’ conceptualization of warfare focused on the unchanging principles of
warfare, the ‘human element’ of combat – a conceptualization closely held by the Infantry.
Leadership, physicality, aggressiveness, and unit cohesion would enable the Infantry to close with
and kill the enemy.666 Demonstrated by Lieutenant Colonel William David, who wrote
Close combat continues to be a fight that is won or lost at squad and platoon level,
where the impetus for fire and movement is found in the acts of individuals. Skill
in marksmanship – and the confidence in one’s weapon that comes with it – is the
enabling tool that overrides a soldier’s natural inclination to go to ground under fire.
It can transform a group of otherwise passive individuals into aggressive squads
and platoons with the skill and will to win.667
666 For an example of the Infantry’s close in fight logic see, Carl F. Ernst (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1 – 2;
Miles III (CPT) and Shankle (CPT), “Bradleys in the City,” pp. 6 – 8; Strader (CPT), “Counterinsurgency in an Urban
Environment,”, pp. 8 – 11; Acord (CPT), “Employment and Training of a Light Infantry Battalion Antitank Platoon,”
pp. 45 – 47; Nicholson Jr. (MAJ), “Omaha Beach, 6 June 1944,” pp. 8 – 12; Brian K. Coppersmith (CPT), “Anzio
Beachhead,” Infantry Vol. 84, No. 4 (1994), pp. 22 – 28; Sutherland III (CPT), “The Platoon Team,” pp. 9 – 12; Peter
G. Kilner (CPT), “Developing a Cohesive Unit,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 14 – 15; William C. David (LTC),
“Preparing a Battalion for Combat: Physical Fitness and Mental Toughness,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 25 –
30; Harry W. Christiansen (LTC), “Four Ways to Increase Leadership Effectiveness,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 5 (1995),
pp. 13 – 15. 667 William C. David (LTC), “Preparing a Battalion for Combat: Marksmanship,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 4 (1995), pp.
27.
160
The Armor tribe also exhibited these tendencies through their highlighting of the close fight, and
the professionalism of the individual soldier.668 The belief in the human element also manifested
itself in a skepticism towards simulators.669
These were not ‘luddite-esque’ movements, but reassertions of an older way of war – in
stark contrast to Force XXI. Technological developments could produce effective forces, but this
needed to be balanced with concerns for the soldier on the ground, in the mud. Determining how
technology would be used to accomplish a mission, rather than developing technology for its own
sake, was an important point.670 For example, Lieutenant Michael Prevou claimed
Now, I’m not some anti-technology Unabomber type, afraid of what the future
might hold. Having just commanded an M1A2 company, I know the advantages of
what technology can bring to the MBT. But victory on the battlefield can never be
obtained from an air-conditioned enclosure, engaging targets with missile and
radar. Desert Storm showed us that. Victory on the ground is obtained in an ‘in your
face’ manner, where the bold warrior takes the fight to the enemy when he
pleases.671
Furthermore, Major Brice Johnson reasoned that “No technology will ever replace the need for
infantry leaders to understand terrain and to be competent in the art of land navigation, but these
skills – when used in conjunction with technological advances such as GPS – will ensure that a
commander knows where he and his maneuver units are every time.”672 They feared that the
668 David J. Lemelin (MAJ), “Crisis in Battle: The Conduct of the Assault,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 4 (1995), pp. 6 – 14;
David A. Smith (CPT), “The HHC XO: Tips on Organizing a Tough Job With Responsibility for a Lot of Equipment,”
Armor Vol. 105, No. 1 (1996), pp. 35 – 36; Patrick J. Flynn (LTC, Armor), “Letters – Maneuver with Fires – Give
Me a Break!,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 3 (1994), pp. 5; George H. Harmeyer (MG), “Commander’s Hatch: 1998
Armor Conference – A Focus on the Leadership Challenge,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998), pp. 5; Kevin C.M. Benson
(LTC), “Waiting for the Meteor: Thoughts on Personal Leadership,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 5 (1998), pp. 23 – 25. 669 There were a series of passionate letters by some in the Armored tribe criticizing the turn towards simulation rather
than more practical field exercises. Swan III (COL), “Letters – Computer Simulation Fallacy,” pp. 3 – 4; T.J. Johnson
(1LT), “Letters – Today, Budget Cutbacks Dampen the Warrior Spirit,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 4 (1998), pp. 4 – 5. 670 Kalb. (COL) and Mayer, “The Mounted Close Combat Battalion,” pp. 32 – 36; Goldin (1LT), “Letters –
Information Technology and the Armored Force,” pp. 4, 47 – 48. 671 Morton (CPT), “Letters – What Missile Vehicles Miss,” pp. 54. 672 Brice H. Johnson (MAJ), “The GPS and the Lost Art of Land Navigation,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 11.
See also, Hendrix (MG), “Commandant’s Note,” pp. 1; Matthew M. Canfield (CPT), “Thoughts on the Medium
Machinegun for the Light Infantry Company,” Infantry Vol. 85, No. 6 (1995), pp. 9 – 12.
161
reliance upon sensors and information found in Force XXI would overwhelm combat leaders or
present a crucial weakness that an observant enemy could exploit.673 Furthermore, and in
contention to others, some of these members believed that simulators could prove to be useful
training tool.674 This stream of thought within the Infantry and Armor was as much a reaction
against some extreme conceptualizations of Force XXI, as it was a continuation of the bifurcation
of the Infantry that was strikingly evident in the mid-1980s following the creation of the light
division.
In spite of similarities, the Infantry – particularly the light infantry – benefited from their
prominent role in OOTW missions while the Armor had to justify their reliance on heavy main-
battle tanks. At the extreme, some lamented the end of the main-battle tank entirely.675 The
perception that they added little to the OOTW mission combined with a greater focus on
technology in Force XXI left the tribe deficient at one end of the conflict spectrum and out of touch
at the conventional end. Instead of reconceptualising their role in OOTW, or wholly accepting the
technologists approach to warfare, the Armored tribe delved into their history as a maneuver force
to support their orientation towards tanks in conventional warfare.
We need to stop worrying about being something we’re not (amphibious or light
armor) and concentrate on being what we are: the combat arm of decision…Our
purpose is to close with and destroy the enemy, utilizing shock, mobility and
firepower. That is what we are, period. We should be utilized when decisiveness
is critical on the battlefield, not when a group of bandits need to be maintained
673 Bateman (CPT), “Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik,” pp. 13 – 15; Hank St. Pierre (LTC), “Letters –
Down-Sizing Tank Battalions Also Has a Down Side,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998), pp. 3; Mark J. Reardon (LTC),
“Developing Cavalry Reconnaissance Doctrine for the Next Century,” Armor Vol. 108, No. 4 (1999), pp. 19 – 24. 674 For an example of those in favour of the inclusion of simulators, see Louis Di Marco (MAJ), “Tactics Training in
Virtual Reality: The Future of the Officer Advanced Course,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 1 (1995), pp. 38 – 40; Darren P.
Fitzgerald (CPT) and James E. Ward (CPT), “Using Computer Wargames to Train at the Co/Tm Level,” Armor Vol.
106, No. 5 (1997), pp. 38 – 39. 675 Benson (LTC), “The Armor Battalion After Next,” pp. 12 – 13, 50; David P. Cavaleri (MAJ), “British Tradition
vs. German Innovation: The Continued Development of Mechanized Doctrine During the Inter-War Years,” Armor
Vol. 106, No. 2 (1997), pp. 8 – 11; Michael E. Evancho (CPT), “Letters – Tanks Offer Shock Effect That Missiles
Miss,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998), pp. 4; Harold L. Spurgeon (MAJ) and Stanley C. Crist, “Armor in the 21st
Century,” Armor Vol. 103, No. 1 (1994), pp. 12 – 14; John Kirk (BG ret.), “Controlling Armor’s Destiny,” Armor
Vol. 108, No. 2 (1999), pp. 8 – 15.
162
behind a line that has been painted either by our government or the United
Nations. 676
This return to history was a recurring characteristic for the Armored tribe, and demonstrated the
power of their identity. Maneuver warfare was as important to the tribe as their founding by Adna
Chaffee and victories in the Second World War. By the mid-1990’s – echoing their 1980’s belief
in ‘brilliant’ maneuver and the praise for Schwarzkopf’s left hook in Desert Storm – maneuver
warfare became a sanctuary for those opposed to the primarily technological approach to warfare
espoused by those who envisioned warfare through Force XXI lenses. It was a rejection of the
character of warfare envisioned by Force XXI and a home for those critical of the perceived state
of the Army at the time – especially the personnel system, which was argued to be an impediment
to warfighting.677 This debate, between the maneuverists and technologists, was less of a debate
about what wars the Army should fight and more of a conflict about how to fight one particular
type of war.
Maneuver was a common yet ill-defined term in the US Army. Used to describe both the
Infantry and Armor as combat branches that would ‘close with and kill the enemy,’ it also defined
the movement of forces on the battlefield, as well as an approach to warfare. For William S. Lind,
a proponent of maneuver warfare in the 1980s, maneuver warfare was the ability to shatter an
enemy’s cohesion and warfighting ability, rather than destroy them through attrition. “The main
means is not firepower, but maneuver. In the term ‘maneuver warfare,’ the word maneuver means
Boyd Cycling the enemy: presenting him with surprising and dangerous situations faster than he
676 Gary F. Bonanno (CPT), “Letters – Don’t Lighten Up the Combat Arm of Decision,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 4 (1998),
pp. 5 – 6. 677 Michael A. Kelly (CPT), “Letters – Personnel System Drives Good People Out of the Active Army, and the Guard,”
Armor Vol. 106, No. 4 (1997), pp. 4; George Eddy (COL ret.), “Letters – Leadership Development Demands the
Chance to Try and Fail,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 4 (1997), pp. 4, 50; Mark Hertling (COL), “Managing Career
Progression in a Smaller, Higher Tempo Army,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 6 (1997), pp. 47 – 51.
163
can react to them, until he comes apart.”678 Some conceptualized maneuver as merely consisting
of movement, however, others believed it to be a more complex concept.679 A selection of officers
in Field Artillery believed in the latter, but the majority associated it with movement.680 There
were those that believed the Army could be proficient in maneuver warfare. Lieutenant Colonel
O.T. Edwards claimed that the Army did practice maneuver warfare,
we have other tools to [teach and train operational maneuver] – simulations, CGSC,
etc. Rest assured that our battalion and brigade commanders will gladly opt to hit
the enemy’s rear and flank. If it’s open to attack. If the higher mission permits. If,
if, if.681
However, a large portion of the maneuverists were concerned with making the Army capable of
conducting maneuver warfare, the approach closer to Lind’s depiction of it being more than
merely movement.
Those that believed in the ‘ideal’ maneuver warfare – similar to the German Army in the
Second World War – claimed that the US Army did not practice maneuver warfare.682 In direct
contradiction to those who believed movement equaled maneuver, Lieutenant Colonel Donald
Zacherl argued that “Churning treads, rolling dust clouds and spinning spurs do not a maneuver
678 Hart and Lind, America Can Win, pp. 30 – 31. For an explanation of Boyd’s conception of warfare, see Osinga
“‘Getting’ A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” pp. 603 – 624. 679 For an example of movement as maneuver, see Wayne T. Seidler (MAJ) and Cameron A. Leiker (CPT), “Task
Force Operations,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 4 (1997), pp. 37 – 40 and Kris P. Thompson (LTC), “Trends in Mounted
Warfare Part III: Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 5 (1998), pp. 50 – 54. Alternatively, for a
case of an author conceptualizing maneuver as the management of enemy strengths and exploitation of their
weaknesses, see James E. Zanol (LTC), “Battle Command Insights,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 5 (1998), pp. 17 – 32, 55. 680 For an example of those who saw maneuver as an approach to warfare, see Donald H. Zacherl (LTC), “Letters –
Churning Tread and Rolling Could of Dust Do Not a Maneuver Force Make,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 3 (1994),
pp. 5. On the other hand, maneuver as movement can be seen in J Hill (LTC), “Beyond Doctrine,” pp. 40 – 43, and
John M. House (LTC), “It’s Time for FA to Maneuver,” Field Artillery Vol. 62, No. 2 (1994), pp. 41 – 44. 681 O.T. Edwards (LTC), “Letters – Training for Maneuver,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 4 (1997), pp. 3. Emphasis in original. 682 Donald E. Vandergriff (CPT), “The Exploitation from the Dieulouard Bridgehead: An Example of Maneuver
Warfare that Applies Today,,” Armor Vol. 104, No. 5 (1995), pp. 6 – 9; Donald E. Vandergriff (MAJ), “Maneuver
Warfare: Change the Culture First,” Armor Vol. 105, No. 6 (1996), pp. 3 – 4, 51; Robert Bateman (CPT), “Training
for Movement,” Armor Vol. 106, No. 1 (1997), pp. 32 – 36; Christopher M. Coglianese (CPT, Infantry), “Letters –
More on Manuever Warfare: Can We Change a Culture?,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 6 (1998), pp. 4; Donald E. Vandergriff
(MAJ), “Without the Proper Culture: Why Our Army Cannot Practice Maneuver Warfare,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1
(1998), pp. 20 – 24; Kirk (BG ret.), “Controlling Armor’s Destiny,” pp. 8 – 15.
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force make.” 683 These purists argued for a cultural change within the Army, not far removed in
magnitude from what the technologists envisioned with Force XXI, but without the focus on
information technologies and hardware. One area of consternation was the Army’s reliance on
processes designed to systematically organize and synchronize combat. This closely corresponded
to the Artillery’s vision of warfare in their use of synchronization tables and matrices.684 This was
the bureaucratic application of violence, and was clearly demonstrated in Major David Callahan’s
recommendation for improving planning speeds; “In a time-constrained environment, subordinates
often do not have the time to make the necessary links between paragraphs that are required when
using the standard sequential method. The standard sequential method requires subordinates to
link previously briefed information from paragraphs 1 and 2 to paragraph 3 as it is being briefed
and then link information from paragraphs 4 and 5 back to paragraph 3 in order to gain a thorough
understanding of the plan.”685 This systematized approach to warfare was criticized for being a
poor approach to fighting and winning and wholly incompatible with maneuver warfare.
For maneuver purists, the Army’s systematized approach to warfare was as much a barrier
to the conduct of true maneuver warfare as the future proposed by Force XXI.
Right now, we preach Auftragstaktik (mission orders) to the exclusion of all other
methods… The best we can manage might be a five-page ‘matrix’ order, and that
683 Zacherl (LTC), “Letters – Churning Tread and Rolling Could of Dust Do Not a Maneuver Force Make,” pp. 5. 684 The Artillery were some of the most prolific users of this systematized approach to warfare. For an example of the
tendency to plan an attack through rigid preplanning, see Doug Slater (LTC), “Press the Attack: A 5-Step Technique
for Offensive Planning,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 2 (1998), pp. 17 – 19; Tim Reese (LTC), Matt Waring (MAJ) and Curt
Lapham (MAJ), “Task Force Battle Drills,” Armor Vol. 108, No. 3 (1999), pp. 29 – 32; Samuel R. White Jr. (CPT),
“Developing the Brigade Scheme of Fire Support,” Field Artillery Vol. 63, No. 4 (1995), pp. 32 – 35; Arthur M.
Bartell (LTC), Glenn W. Harp (MAJ) and Philip P. Serrano (SFC), “Integrating Fires into the Brigade Battle Plan,”
Field Artillery Vol. 66, No. 5 (1998), pp. 8 – 11; David A. Lee (MAJ) and John A. Yingling (COL), “Fire Support
Planning for the Brigade and Below,” Field Artillery Vol. 67, No. 2 (1999), pp. 15 – 19; Patrick J. Sweeney (LTC),
“The FA Wargame Synchronization Matrix,” Field Artillery Vol. 67, No. 2 (1999), pp. 36 – 39. 685 David Callahan (MAJ), “An Integrated OPORD Technique: Tips on Trimming Crucial Minutes from the Sequential
Orders Process,” Armor Vol. 108, No. 4 (1999), pp. 48.
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is at the battalion level. Truth be told, while we say we want ‘Mission Orders,’ we
practice ‘Orders Tactics’ (Behfelstaktik).686
Many maneuverists were convinced that commanders who were promoted in a Force XXI Army
would lose the ability to think freely and capitalize on initiative. This would be impeded by both
a reliance on computers and greater micromanagement from superiors.687 Retired Brigadier
General, John Kirk demonstrated this when he wrote, “Future victors won’t be thick-lensed nerds,
heads-down in their turrets or welded to work stations and large screen displays in search of
checklisted, matrixed, summed and scored deterministic answers. They will be bold, confident,
tough, smart SOBs who lead in front, think fast in the heat of combat, are comfortable in
uncertainty, weigh probabilities and risks, make apparent order from obvious chaos and WIN.”688
The idealized form of maneuver warfare could only be reached by changing the Army.
The return to more traditional and historical ways of warfare in the form of the
maneuverists and classicists are another example of the many ways warfare was conceptualized
from 1994 to 1999. While these communities rejected the dominant role that technology played in
the Force XXI vision of warfare, they both agreed in the primacy of conventional warfare. Where
they differed was on how to conduct these kinds of wars. The fact that this debate occurred at the
same time as the one over the Army’s METL for OOTW reveals the degree to which large portions
of the tribes – including the Infantry – were still focused on conventional warfare.
686 Auftragstaktik, Captain Bateman argues, is a key component of maneuver warfare because it would allow units to
seamlessly respond to changes on the battlefield and capitalize on opportunities without rigid, top-down methods of
control. Robert L. Bateman (CPT), “Letters – Mission Orders Concept Deserves More Than Lip Service,” Armor Vol.
105, No. 6 (1996), pp. 3. For a 687 Bateman (CPT), “Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik,” pp. 13 – 15; Pryor (CPT), “Letters – Why Would
the Force XXI Commander Want to Intervene,” pp. 4; Benson (LTC), “Leadership… And Command and Control,”
pp. 31 – 32; Robert L. Bateman (CPT), “SHOCK and the Digital Battlefield,” Armor Vol. 107, No. 1 (1998), pp. 14
– 19. 688 Kirk (BG ret.), “Controlling Armor’s Destiny,” pp. 15. Emphasis in the original.
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The attacks upon the Army’s bureaucratic approach to warfare – Befehlstaktik – are
indicative of a rejection of the ‘zero-defects’ mentality of the time, but also the Artillery’s vision
of warfare. As seen in the Artillery’s vision of Force XXI, they believed that they now could be
identified as a maneuver arm. The Infantry and Armor’s rejection of some of the Artillery’s most
cherished visions appeared to differentiate the combat arms further. At the least, this tension
indicated the Artillery’s prominent role in developing and operationalizing Force XXI.
Conclusions:
From 1994 to 1999, the Army’s tribes – and various thought communities within them –
conceptualized warfare in different ways. Of the three periods identified in this study, this one
featured the greatest diversity of thought. Everything was open to discussion, from peacekeeping
to high-intensity warfighting and, more importantly, was subjected to critiques by members from
other tribes and thought communities. These discussions mirrored the contestation surrounding the
Army’s future capstone doctrine in the late-1990’s.689 The tribes’ conceptualizations from the mid-
to late-1990’s reflected the complexity of intra-organizational analysis. The fact that there was
sometimes radical disagreement between tribal conceptualizations and the Army’s way of doing
things indicates the turmoil that can exist within a military organization.
The two most prominent critiques of the organizational and bureaucratic focus of the Army
were the development of OOTW and the rejection of some precepts in Force XXI by the Classicists
and Maneuverists. Much like the emergence of LICs in the late 1980’s, OOTW was a novel
development in how the tribes thought about warfare, and represented a real engagement with the
current operations the Army was undertaking. Similarly, the investigation of maneuver warfare by
many in the Armor tribe indicated that they were not content with the Army’s dogmatic reliance
689 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 243 – 246.
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on technology to achieve victory in conventional warfare. Despite these conceptualizations of
warfare, the influence of the Army’s organizational structure dictated that a unit’s METL should
be focused on mid-to-high-intensity warfare. Additionally, the Army’s continued investigation of
Force XXI and future warfare demonstrated the dominance of the focus on conventional warfare
within the Army. This dominance implied that divergent ideas could not develop without some
kind of sanction from the organizational Army. They remained ideas on paper, not in practice.
The material nature of the three tribes provides some indication as to the general nature of
their thinking, but this is not a guarantee. In the case of Force XXI, there were members of the
Infantry and Armor communities that embraced it and Maneuversits and Classicists that opposed
it. In the METL debate, there emerged a fracture within the Infantry over the relative importance
of OOTW compared to conventional conflicts. Of the three tribes, the Artillery were the most
likely to maintain tribal unity and adhere to a Force XXI vision of war. That is not to say dissent
did not exist within the tribe, but that it did not approximate the contention found in the Armor or
Infantry, potentially reflecting the Artillery’s preference for a form of warfare close to Force XXI.
The 1980’s were characterized by the proximity between the Infantry and the Armor. By
the early 1990’s, the Artillery and Armor had coalesced into a more cohesive stream of thought.
The mid and late-1990’s proved that the Armor could rejoin the Infantry as ‘maneuver’ focused
tribes. The conceptualizations of the Infantry and the Armor tribes demonstrated the skepticism
towards overly technological visions of warfare despite the fact that the presence of the RMA and
Force XXI. It should be noted that Force XXI was not solely oriented towards new vehicles, but
improved synchronization through information technologies.690 This could explain the lack of
investment from the Infantry – chiefly mechanized – and Armor because of their vehicle-orientated
690 Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation, pp. 162.
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conceptions despite Force XXI’s focus on the heavy force. That significant parts of the Army held
this view is not indicative of a complete rejection of applying technology in warfare, simply that
not every member of the organization believed in the new emphasis on technology.
The fact that much of the Force XXI discussion within Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery
was occurring at the same time as larger debates within the US defence community over what to
do with the emerging RMA provides novel insight into how the Army dealt with this on a
theoretical level.691 The varied Force XXI discussions meant that there was no unified vision of a
Force XXI capable Army. Unlike the introduction of the Light Division in the 1980’s, Force XXI
did not benefit from the clarity of an immediate alteration to force structure. The vague concepts
that made up this vision of the future provided the tribes with the space to fill with their own
conceptualizations. The result was the overwhelming acceptance from the Artillery, and mixed
reception from the Infantry and Armor.
The expansion of the spectrum of conflict and the resurgence of maneuver warfare
represented bottom-up ideas that sought to pull the Army away from Force XXI. Even with the
numerous OOTW missions, the lack of strategic direction for the Army meant that there was no
consistent theme to rally the tribes and communities within the Army behind a single threat. There
was no mention of the growing threat – with hindsight – that terrorism posed to the US.692
Furthermore, much of the thinking on conventional warfare ignored the fact that America suffered
from a ‘superpower paradox’ where potential enemies would not fight in a conventional conflict
as Saddam foolishly had. Instead, they would engage in asymmetric warfare, exploiting
weaknesses.693 Adherence to AirLand Battle in everything but name continued to be the norm.694
691 Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 13. 692 Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 119. 693 Ibid., pp. 130 – 131. 694 Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 32 – 33.
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Therefore, with no real direction, commentators could develop an array of ideas, extensive in scope
without being tied to have to compensate for strategic realities.
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Conclusions: Tribal Influence and Visions of War
Through their professional journals, the Infantry, Armor, and Artillery tribes of the United
States Army conceptualized warfare in a variety of ways. From the publishing of AirLand Battle
in 1983 to the months preceding the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo, the Army’s tribes interacted
with continuity and change, and their conceptualizations reflected this. The tribes’ capabilities,
expected missions, relations with each other, characteristics of the Army, and strategic realities all
related to their conceptualizations of warfare. These levels of analysis provided a logical way to
examine tribal conceptualizations throughout the period under research. This concluding chapter
will demonstrate the character of their conceptualizations, the persistence of these tribal ideas in
the face of change, their ability to shape responses to changes, and the power of events – both
within the Army and external to it – to shape and influence tribal conceptualizations but not
determine them. Ultimately, the product of this bottom-up research is that it aides in the
understanding of an organization’s sub-units and the dynamics that factor into their thinking.695
The conceptualizations of the three primary tribes of the Army from 1983 to 1999 provide
an insight into the ‘military mind’. Specifically, the people tasked with achieving national policies
on the ground, sometimes using violent means. While they consistently conceptualized warfare as
lethal, complex, and fast-paced, this only narrowly referred to conventional warfare. In the tribes’
hierarchy of priorities on their spectrum of conflict, they excluded other forms of war – namely
low-intensity conflict and Operations Other Than War. While not as vividly imagined as
conventional war, these ‘others’ were continually featured in their conceptualizations, for without
the emphasis on one there could not be the other. Concluding that the Army conceptualized war
as conventional war would be correct but add little to the existing literature. Interrogating the
695 This has been identified as one area that the study of military change needs to be investigated further. Grissom,
The Future of Military Innovation Studies.
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relationships between the concept of war, in its broadest sense as a “continuation of politics by
other means,” and the Army’s narrow view of warfare is of greater analytical value because it
examines how, as tools of national power, the dynamics and politics internal to militaries can affect
the achievement of national policy goals.696
A Family in Contrast – the Tribes in Comparison:
The intra-organizational level of analysis reveals that the conceptualizations developed by
the tribes reflect, to some extent, the theoretical characteristics of organizational culture within
militaries. However, conceptualizations are not synonymous with culture. This is a key finding for
two reasons. First, it reaffirms the unique power organizational culture has upon constituent
units.697 Second, it allows for a more nuanced view of the tribes within an organization, adding
depth of understanding to Benjamin Jensen’s “the micropolitics of innovation”, or Stephen
Rosen’s “political communities.”698
The tribes’ relation to the Army’s organizational culture will be conducted further below,
for the purposes of the intra-organizational level of analysis differentiating conceptualization from
culture is necessary. Each tribes’ emphasis on history, identity, beliefs, mission, and tradition
echoes the categories that the Army’s culture is based upon. However, conceptualizations can be
related to individuals more easily than organizational culture. They also provide a better
understanding of the organization’s approach to operations and tactics. While culture’s influence
may be identifiable at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war, the tribes’
conceptualizations provide a better understanding of the tactical and operational level of war. Most
696 The changing character of warfare requires an expansive investigation of the concept rather than one rooted in an
ahistorical perspective. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Penguin
Books, 2005). 697 Farrell and Terriff, “Introduction,” pp. 3 – 20. 698 This research’s added depth comes from its focus on military thought within organizational structures across time
rather than specifically on its influence on military change. Jensen, Forging the Sword, pp. 21; Rosen, Winning the
Next War, pp. 19.
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important is the fact that conceptualizations are not monolithic. While culture can shape actions
and beliefs without anyone actively espousing cultural precepts, conceptualizations are
representative of thought communities within sub-units of an organization. Often there is a
dominant conceptualization within a tribe, like the Infantry’s belief in ‘closing with and killing the
enemy’. Yet, dominance does not imply hegemony. The competing visions over the Infantry’s
mission essential task list are one example of competing conceptualizations. Delving into the
conceptualizations of an organization’s subunits is analogous to ‘going into the weeds’ but
nevertheless provides a better idea of the military mind, on the ground and in the barracks.
Given that conceptualizations differ from culture, it is necessary to understand how they
feature within and between the tribes of the US Army. Ideationally, the mentality of each tribe –
discussed in chapter 3 – remained consistent throughout the 17-year period. For the most part, the
Infantry remained wedded to their belief in the individual skill of the infantryman and the historical
duty to close with and kill the enemy. The Armor continued to relate to the main-battle tank for its
shock, mobility, armour, and firepower. The Artillery demonstrated the persistent belief in their
ability to destroy the enemy and the benefits of technological advancement. These consistencies
signify the importance of the most closely held beliefs within the tribes.
The tribes demonstrated diverse conceptualizations related to the procurement of new
equipment and therefore capabilities. Each tribe acquired new material capabilities within the
period of study, and each procurement reveals something about how conceptualizations relate to
changes in capabilities. The Armor tribe’s acquisition of the M1 Abrams directly corresponded to
their beliefs about warfare and their role in it. Furthermore, the expected procurement of the AGS
was shaped by the tribe’s conceptualization because it would allow them to fight an armoured war
of maneuver in a contingency or low-intensity conflict/OOTW just as they would in conventional
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war. This was due to the tribe’s conceptualization of the primacy of vehicles in warfare. The
Artillery’s procurement of the MLRS and HIMARS also demonstrates how a conceptualization of
warfare can assimilate new capabilities into established modes of thinking. The MLRS, despite its
initial range of only 30km, was believed to represent a deep strike asset for a Corps whose area of
influence extended to 150km. Further, the procurement of the HIMARS would give the Light
Division the destructive capability of an MLRS system in a deployable package. This belief
persisted, despite the fact that by the time the HIMARS was developed in the late 1990’s, the
Army’s Light Divisions were more likely to be deployed on OOTW missions that did not require
the kind of firepower it provided. These examples demonstrate that when new equipment has a
place within existing tribal conceptualizations it reinforces them, rather than stimulating new
modes of thought.
Unlike the previous two examples, the Infantry’s acquisition of the Bradley Infantry
Fighting Vehicle forced the tribe’s conceptualizations to incorporate a capability that had not
previously existed. The Bradley allowed the conventionally minded within the tribe to
conceptualize warfare against the Soviets with capabilities that resembled the Armor tribe’s more
so than the Infantry’s. The intensification of the mechanized mindset within the Infantry – along
with the creation of the Light Division – led to a bifurcation of the tribe that was evident throughout
the 1990’s. A final example is the development of precision guided munitions that inspired some
in the Armor tribe to envision MBT’s with similar capabilities of an artillery howitzer. These cases
demonstrate that the procurement of military equipment that does not already have a
conceptualized role can, in some circumstances, lead to new conceptualizations of warfare.
Each tribe’s conceptualizations of the others were shaped by the Army’s adherence to the
combined arms approach to warfare. Unlike the US Airforce or Navy, the Army’s three primary
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combat branches have been structured by the combined arms approach since the Second World
War.699 While the paradigm of combined arms was dominant within the Army, the tribes’
conceptualizations shaped its interpretation within each combat branch. First, it dampened tribal
rivalries by ensuring no one tribe went to ‘real’ war without the others. Nevertheless, at one time
or another, every tribe claimed that their contribution was the deciding one – that they were ‘first
among equals.’ Second, some assumed it applied to every possible conflict/contingency, even
where it may have been ill suited and in defiance of the realities on the ground – the humanitarian
missions in Somalia and the Balkans are representative. For example, the Armor tribe continued
to assert that any LIC or OOTW conflict required their participation, because without them, there
was a potential for the repeat of Task Force Smith in Korea.
The Big Green Machine:
In comparison with the organizational level, the tribes’ conceptualizations replicated and
rejected various elements of the Army. Culture had an uneven influence on the tribes’
conceptualizations. Some traits were more dominant than others, especially the proclivity towards
conventional warfare. Unlike the competition between military services within the United States,
the tribes never argued over budgetary allocations. Instead, they clashed over capabilities and the
Army’s orientation, which only tangentially involved budgetary allocations. The Army’s structure
and processes had a clear influence on the tribes’ conceptualizations. These took the form of micro
and macro-structures. An example of micro-structures was the Artillery’s assumption that their
role in the Light Division was secured because of the organic assignment of light artillery. In
contrast to the Armor’s fears of being forgotten, the Artillery’s guarantee shaped their
conceptualizations in the late-1980’s. Alternatively, the rejection of the Mission Essential Task
699 While the combined arms approach to intra-service relations is not replicated in the US Air Force or Navy it is
present in most nation-state armies. See House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century.
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Lists by some within the Infantry is indicative of the power that the Army’s bureaucratic structures
can exert upon the tribes.
Capstone doctrine represented a macro-structure that guided the use of force. Despite the
near deified position that doctrine held within the post-Vietnam Army, the tribes incorporated and
ignored various parts of the doctrine. Instead of demonstrating an adherence to doctrinal updates,
the tribes proved that the vision of warfare described in FM 100-5 Operations (1982) was one of
the most enduring forces shaping tribal conceptualizations. The doctrine’s focus on conventional
warfare, deference to the combined arms paradigm, and novel approach was continually featured
in the tribal journals, especially in contrast to the 1993 version. Its dominance only continued
following the Gulf War, where many of its ideas were believed to have been justified. Yet
dominance did not imply uniformity of thought. From 1983 to 1999, elements of ALB were used
to support particular tribal conceptualizations of warfare – most clearly in their idealized visions
of war. Synchronization, a central tenet of ALB, proliferated not in the 1980’s but in the 1990’s.
This was a result of, in part, the drawdown across the military services, which led to the
examination of possible gains to efficiency. The Armor used synchronization to support the
combined arms approach and ensure that it remained paradigmatic.
The introduction of the 1993 version of the capstone doctrine altered the Army’s rhetorical
focus to include an emphasis on the lower end of the conflict spectrum.700 The 1993 version
retained the essence of AirLand Battle doctrine, and this continued to feature in the tribes’
conceptualizations, especially conventional warfare. FM 100-5 Operations (1993) did push the
Army to consider the importance of Operations Other Than War, but this encountered resistance
from the Army’s and its tribes’ conventional orientation. This was most clearly demonstrated in
700 Kretchik, US Army Doctrine, pp. 226 – 231.
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the METL debates and the rejection of OOTW as a comparable form of warfare. The members of
the tribes demonstrated the ability to pick and choose elements of doctrine that featured the greatest
correlation to their conceptualizations. This may be a product of the branch-specific view produced
by the journals, but nonetheless indicates how tribal perspectives and politics influence the
adoption of organization wide programs.
The reactions to the Force XXI program vividly demonstrated this. Despite its integration
of sophisticated technology and applicability for conventional warfare, the Infantry Classicists and
Armor Maneuverists rejected portions of Force XXI. They claimed that ignoring the complex
human factors of warfare and relying solely on what they perceived as a technological approach
to war would fail. In contrast, many within the Artillery were in favour of the vision of war
proposed by Force XXI. It coincided with their own conceptualizations, including their idealized
vision of war from the 1980’s. The Artillery’s vision of warfare proved to be the most consistent
predictor of the future of the Army’s conventional thinking. This carries important weight for two
reasons. One, their role as bringers of destruction to targets most clearly aligns itself with the
Army’s conventional orientation. Second, their infatuation with technology makes them the most
receptive to the ideas espoused in the RMA as well as positions them in the same mode of thinking
as the Air Force and, to some extent, the Navy.
The Army’s culture was not consistently reproduced in the tribal conceptualizations of war.
While the academic understanding of culture may have been invisible to the tribesmen, many
commentators identified the Army’s ‘way of doing things’. This demonstrates the saliency of
culture. Its capability to shape thought and action is there, but amorphous. The orientation towards
conventional warfare was the most consistent feature. A majority within each tribe believed that
fighting in a conventional war was their primary mission, all others – OOTW and LIC – were of
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lesser priority. Given the Soviet threat, conceptualizations featuring conventional warfare were the
most apparent in the 1980’s. The 1990’s were more complex. While much of the tribes’ focus
remained on conventional warfare the nature of these wars was less clear. Whether it would involve
advanced technology – such as Force XXI – or feature brilliant maneuver, the character of
conventional warfare was up for debate, but its nature was not. While the majority of each tribe
adhered to this cultural trait, there were many within the Army that argued they needed to be better
prepared for LIC – later on OOTW. These dissenters defied the Army’s military culture, and faced
resistance for it. Therefore, one of the most evident traits of the organizational culture was not
uniformly adopted and integrated by the entirety of the tribes.
The tribes approached technology very differently, with the Artillery being the most
technologically inclined.701 The Armor was divided between relying on highly advanced tank
technology, and the capability of their crews. The tribe’s insecurities regarding their role in
anything outside of a mid- to high-intensity conflict, especially following the end of the Cold War,
meant that they had many competing visions. This was clear in the debate between the
Maneuverists and those within the tribe that advocated for a Force XXI way of war. To a lesser
degree, the Infantry were also torn between technology and the ‘human’ aspect of warfare.
However, this manifested itself in the procurement of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle rather
than a persistent tension similar to Armor. The belief in the infantryman and the platoon or
company remained the most powerful manner in which the Infantry conceptualized warfare.
Following Operation Desert Storm, many articles in the tribal journals feature technological
advancements that promised to provide the Army with war-winning technological superiority.
Force XXI, the product of this conceptualization, was not welcomed by the entirety of the tribes.
701 The degree to which the Artillery associated technology with victory on the battlefield was closer to the US Air
Force than the other tribes of the Army. Builder, The Masks of War.
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Throughout the chapters, the Army’s future focus was prominent. While modern
battlefields are a subject of great discussion as well as future ones, ‘modern’ wars were believed
to be fundamentally different from previous ones; usually it was implied that they would more
difficult than previous. This linear direction presents an interesting situation, for if the difficulty
and complexity of war is steadily increasing, how does the Army manage this? Technology
provided the easiest way for the Army to overcome this progression. Procuring new weapons, or
enhancing existing ones with technology, would allow the Army to stay ahead of the
modernization trend. But some, such as the Maneuverists in the 1990s, believed that the Army had
to change as an organization to become more better at warfighting.
The tribes regularly avoided talking strategy. It could be argued that the absence of any
discussion of US grand strategy or military strategy is a function of many commentators branch
specific focus, or relatively junior rank – although many were lieutenant colonels and colonels.
However, assuming this discounts the need to think strategically at all ranks, especially since many
of these junior officers represented the Army’s future. Unlike strategy, articles regularly criticized
the Army’s bureaucratic and managerial culture. The post-Cold War drawdown exacerbated much
of this disparagement. While this is interesting on a cultural level, it also demonstrates the
awareness amongst the organization’s members that the structures and processes of the Army have
an influence, in this case a negative one, on their individual occupations.
The Army’s culture of emphasizing firepower and attrition based warfare is not
consistently replicated by the tribes’ conceptualizations. On the surface, both the Infantry and
Armor indicated a willingness to use maneuver warfare to gain an advantage over their enemies.
Even the Artillery appears to favour precision, with networked and synchronized systems, rather
than mass destruction. However, all the tribes do, in one way or another, agree that firepower is a
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potent problem solver. For example, the Artillery’s development of the HIMARS rocket was
designed to give the Light Division the firepower they needed even if they were on missions
governed by restrictive rules of engagement. On OOTW missions in the Balkans, the Armor
envisioned their tanks as the ultimate deterrent because of their potential destructive capability.
Comparatively, the Infantry tribe had the least amount of firepower of the three tribes – although
the development of man-portable weapons such as the Javelin anti-tank system did improve their
capabilities. This featured in their conceptualizations of war. To gain overwhelming firepower,
they had to call upon other branches of the Army, or the Air Force.
The Competition:
The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps were never discussed with any of the passion that
issues within the Army were. The other services’ contributions were consistently framed as how
they could assist the Army. The Air Force was referenced, especially in the 1980’s, because of
their ability to assist in the deep battle. In the early 1990s, the Navy was discussed because of the
air support they could provide the Army in rapid contingency operations that the Air Force could
not participate in. The Marines prepositioned task forces onboard Navy vessels were seen as one
way the Army could solve their deployability issues in the early 1990’s. Interestingly, the fierce
competition between the Air Force and the Army throughout the 1990’s was not featured often in
the professional journals.702 This, combined with the sporadic references to jointness, is reflective
of the tactical focus many of these journals had, as well as the Army’s belief that the other services
should support their efforts.703
702 Kagan, Finding the Target. 703 Builder, The Masks of War; Linn, The Echo of Battle.
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The International System:
The relationship between events in the international system and the tribes’
conceptualizations is varied. The difference between the Cold War period and the mid-to-late
1990’s is emblematic of this. The near total focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union and their
Warsaw Pact allies allowed each of the tribes to develop a thorough conceptualization of warfare,
culminating in their idealized visions. This was consistent with the US national security posture at
the time. In comparison, the conceptualizations of the 1990’s were not replicated with such
consistency. The Army’s Force XXI program sought to bring the force into the information age,
but its focus on conventional warfare was not in line with the Army’s then current and probable
peacekeeping/peace-enforcement/humanitarian missions.
The response to the end of the Cold War in the tribal journals were more complicated. The
tangible decrease in threat that resulted from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and eventual
dissolution of the Soviet Union radically changed the international system and balance of power.
The commentators in Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery all recognized this, yet many perceived
the ‘new world order’ in a manner similar to the previous one. The threat of ‘Third World
militaries’ and the proliferation of advanced weaponry were argued to necessitate the same
capabilities and orientation the Army had during the Cold War, albeit with a true global focus –
unlike the rhetorical emphasis of the ‘extended battlefield’ described in AirLand Battle doctrine.
Here, the changing realities in the international system were conceptualized in such a way as to fit
within previously established orientations within the Army and tribes.
Although different in nature, the conflicts the Army was involved in from 1983 to 1999
also had a varied influence on the tribes’ conceptualizations. Operations such as Just Cause in
Panama and Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf were treated much differently than
181
those of a lower intensity on the conflict spectrum such as Operation Joint Endeavor. The tribes
designated the operations in Panama and the Persian Gulf as wars because they provided them
with real experiences from which they refine their preferred conceptualizations of warfare. The
labeling of Just Cause as a war may have more to do with the absence of combat operations since
the US invaded Grenada as part of Operation Urgent Fury in 1983. Following the Gulf War, Just
Cause was a lesser example of war than the mechanized combat of the Desert Storm.
The Gulf War provided the tribes with an opportunity to learn directly from the type of
conflict they had spent a decade preparing for. The subsequent conceptualizations necessitated
continued preparation for a similar conflict. The tribes used the conflict to reaffirm their belief in
heavily armoured, mechanized forces fighting in conventional wars. It also intensified the tribes’
interest in using information technologies to increase their lethality – predominantly in the
Artillery. Just Cause and Desert Storm also generated a discussion about operational level
capabilities – especially contingency operations. This was not replicated in the OOTW missions
of the mid-to-late 1990’s. The lessons from operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans mainly
concerned the tactical level, such as how the Army could better modify their patrols or how their
rules of engagement affected operations. Besides the mission essential task list debate within the
pages of Infantry, the emphasis on the tactical level reflects the cultural preference for conventional
conflicts over OOTW/LIC.
The end date of this research in 1999 was designed to limit the already significant amount
of research until that point. It also concluded the research prior to the late-1999 announcement of
the Future Combat System by General Eric Shinseki, the Army’s Chief of Staff.704 More
importantly, it avoids becoming entangled with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath
704 Farrell, Rynning, and Terriff, Transforming Military Power since the Cold War.
182
of September 11, 2001. The logical step for this research would be to continue examining the tribal
journals from 2000 to the withdrawal from Iraq by US forces in 2011. This would contrast the
occasional conflicts – as well as a sustained one in the Balkans – researched here with the long-
term deployments as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This
could lead to a comparison between tribal conceptualizations while at peace and at war.
Additionally, it presents an opportunity to compare the tribes’ approaches to conventional,
OOTW/LIC, and counterinsurgency warfare across the conflict spectrum. Interviews could
supplement this research and would provide insight into the dynamics within the military at the
time of writing, as well as an appreciation for how the journals were edited. Another avenue for
further research could involve comparing these journals with the Army’s Military Review, the
Army wide professional journal. Military Review often features articles more concerned with the
operational and strategic levels of war and would provide a wider perspective than the tribal
journals have.
To conclude, the tribes conceptualized war in manner that related to their operational focus,
the material capabilities they possessed, and the ideas that informed their profession. They were a
function, in increasing importance, of the international environment, the United States’ defence
posture, recent conflicts, the Army’s organizational culture, and their relationship with the other
tribes. Acknowledging these influences does not imply the conceptualizations were merely a
product of these forces. Instead, the conceptualizations produced by each of the tribes
demonstrated the sub-units’ ability to develop unique conceptualizations that did not always mirror
the top-down influences. The external and internal features interacted to produce tribal
conceptualizations that were unique in some respects and similar in others.
183
The bottom-up influence on the Army by the tribes’ conceptualizations contributes to the
literature on military organizations and military power by demonstrating the significance of the
practitioners’ thoughts that informs their conduct in war. These individuals are tasked with doing
the fighting and dying on behalf of their nation and their conceptualizations provide an insight into
how they approach that task. These nuances can be used to appreciate the complexity of a military.
This is demonstrated in the subtly of organizational change within militaries. Clear, vivid cases of
change are important to study because they provide drastic comparisons. However, the
transformations and rigidity of tribal conceptualizations reveal the variability and active nature of
organizations. The diversity of thought within the Army exists alongside their very powerful
organizational culture, in some cases reproducing cultural norms and beliefs and at other times
rejecting and conflicting with them, demonstrating both the strength and limits of organizational
culture. Ultimately, this diversity means that successful organizational innovation may not have to
start from ground zero. Instead, those attempting to change militaries may be able to harness
existing conceptualizations of warfare within the organization, thereby providing them with a base
of support to alter an organization’s culture that influences nearly every aspect of a military.
Organizations are complex collections of individuals bounded together by powerful norms and
beliefs; this is especially true in militaries. Appreciating this is fundamental to developing an
understanding of how effective militaries are at operationalizing a state’s policy goals.
184
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