turkey's kurds: toward a solution?

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Analysis

ANKARA — For a quarter o a century,separatist Kurdish rebels o the out-lawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

have been waging an armed campaignagainst the Turkish army or an inde-pendent Kurdish state carved out o Iran, Iraq, Syria, and a very large chunko southeastern Turkey. Over 40,000people have died in the conlict that hascost the Turkish government billionso dollars to contain. The “Kurdishproblem,” as it has been labeled, isTurkey’s number one headache. Thearmy’s tactics in battling the PKKhas dented Turkey’s image, with

hundreds o thousands o Kurdsorcibly displaced rom their villagesand thousands o Kurdish activiststortured and jailed. The PKK’s ownbrutal methods, including attacksagainst civilian targets, have sharpenedTurkish nationalism and preventedsuccessive governments rom movingon reorms that would address the de-mands o Turkey’s estimated 14 millionKurds or greater cultural and politi-cal rights. Broadly speaking, Turkey’sailure to resolve the Kurdish issue hasarrested its development into a ully-ledged Western-style democracy. Ithas also blunted Turkish inluence inits natural hinterland in Kurdish-con-trolled northern Iraq.

Yet, over the past month a series o statements rom the army, the govern-ment, Kurdish political leaders, and

the PKK itsel has raised hopes thatater decades o deadlock a compro-mise might be struck. Early signs o a

shit came in 2005 when Recep TayyipErdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister,acknowledged during a rally in thesoutheastern province o Diyarbakirthat the state had made “mistakes” inits dealings with the Kurds. His wordsollowed a rat o EU-tailored reormsthat loosened restrictions on publishingand broadcasting in the Kurdish lan-guage. Soon ater, Emre Taner, Turkey’sintelligence chie, initiated secretcontacts with the regional government

in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.The aim was to broker a deal throughIraqi Kurdish mediators that wouldallow PKK rebels, who are based in themountains separating Iraq rom Iran,to lay down their arms. Fighters un-tainted by the violence would have beenpermitted to return to Turkey, whiletheir leaders would be shipped o toany European country willing to acceptthem. But the plan ran into resistancerom the Turkish army, and PKK hawksalike, and was quietly shelved.

The Bush administration’s decision inNovember 2007 to share real time intel-ligence with the Turkish army on PKKactivities and to let Turkish warplanesbomb their bases in northern Iraq, overthe objections o the Iraqi Kurds, dra-matically shited the balance in severalways. The PKK has been squarely put

Turkey’s Kurds: Toward a Solution?

by Amberin Zaman*

June 4, 2009

* Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf . The views

expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United

States (GMF).

Washington, DC•Berlin •Bratislava • Paris

Brussels • BelgraDe • ankara • BuCharest

www.gmfus.org

O f f i c e s

Summary: The campaign for an

independent Kurdish state by the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

has been termed Turkey’s number

one headache. While the PKK’s

attacks against the Turkish army

have bolstered Turkish nationalism,

Turkey’s image has been tainted by its

response to these assaults. In

addition, Turkey’s failure to resolve the

issue with the Kurds has hindered the

development of its democracy.

Recent statements by the Turkish

army and government as well as

responses from Kurdish political

leaders and the PKK have made

the potential for a compromise

appear more realistic. Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister,

acknowledged that “mistakes”

have been made in dealing with the

Kurds, and Ahmet Turk, the leader of

the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society

Party (DTP) outlined that non-violent

measures should be used to develop

a democratic solution to the Kurdish

problem. This brief examines thesteps necessary for both sides to

come to a peaceful solution.



on the deensive and has sustained heavy losses. The percep-tion that the United States avors Iraqi Kurds over Turkey (because o Ankara’s reusal to let U.S. troops use Turkishterritory to launch a second ront against Saddam Hussainin 2003) has dissipated. Ater a prolonged chill, relations be-tween the Turkish army and the United States have improved.This, in turn, has prompted Iraqi Kurds to be more coop-erative with Ankara. The appointment last August o Gen-eral Ilker Basbug as Turkey’s new chie o general sta wasanother turning point. General Basbug has long advocatedthat the Kurdish problem cannot be solved through military means alone. In a landmark speech last month, the General

reerred to the “peoples o Turkey” rather than applying theterm “Turk,” which was used by his predecessors to deine allcitizens o Turkey. He also spoke o the Kurds. “This is a irstand marks a big change in rhetoric perhaps even in actualpolicy,” said Hasim Hasimi, a veteran Kurdish politician.

General Basbug’s speech coincided with a declaration by Abdullah Gül, Turkey’s president, that there now exists “ahistoric opportunity” to solve the Kurdish problem. Mean-while, Besir Atalay, Turkey’s interior minister, hinted that“Turkiied” villages could re-adopt their original Kurdishnames. Coming on the heels o the January launch o Tur-

key’s irst-ever state run Kurdish language television channel,1 Atalay’s comments suggest that the Justice and DevelopmentParty (AKP) is ready to urther expand cultural rights or theKurds; crucially, the army isn’t demurring. And or a change,Deniz Baykal, the main opposition leader o the RepublicanPeople’s Party, has been making some positive noises too.

This virtuous cycle seemed almost complete when MuratKarayilan, the PKK’s top military commander, told a Turkishnewspaper that independence was no longer on the PKK’sagenda and that it would be ready to negotiate a deal with thegovernment through third parties i need be. The govern-ment, however, has ruled out talking to the PKK, which ison the U.S. State Department’s list o terrorist organiza-tions. Herein lies the conundrum: How can the governmentproceed with a deal that doesn’t smack o negotiating withterrorists?

It is precisely to impart this image that Karayilan has beenextending his olive branch together with the ig lea o “third

parties.” He is making a virtue o necessity. The PKK is underpressure rom all ronts. It no longer enjoys the patronage o Syria. Iran isn’t as riendly anymore either. The Iraqi Kurdssee the PKK increasingly as more o a threat to their ownstability than as a card to wield against Turkey. Rapproche-ment between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds maniested itsel more concretely than ever beore on June 1 ater a jointTurkish/Iraqi-Kurdish company began pumping oil rom theTak Tak oil ields in northern Iraq to be exported through apipeline running to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. Accordingto the Diyarbakir Chamber o Commerce and Industry, some1,200 Turkish companies are doing business in northern Iraq

On the same day, the PKK announced that it was extendingby a urther six weeks its unilateral ceaseire, irst declaredon April 24, but that it reserved the right to “deend” itsel i the Turkish army were to pursue its operations against therebels. On May 29, six Turkish soldiers were killed in a mineblast near the Iraqi border. The army retaliated with aerialraids against PKK targets across the border. The PKK claimedthat rogue elements had planted the mine. Ahmet Turk, theleader o the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP)that is widely seen as a political ront or the rebels, took therare step o indirectly criticizing the PKK. All those who talk

about a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem “shouldremove their hands rom the trigger,” Turk said. In so doing,Turk asserted a measure o independence rom the PKK.Turkish leaders should reward the DTP leader’s courage—thePKK likes to assassinate dissenters within its ranks—withgestures o its own. The irst would be or Erdoğan—who haslong spurned Turk’s requests or a meeting—to arrange oneas soon as possible. He should also speak up against the pos-sible closure o the DTP on the thinly supported charges thatit is a “terrorist ront” (no matter that none o its membershas been accused o any violent act). Turk makes no secreto the act that the bulk o his party’s supporters also eelsympathy or the PKK.

By engaging with the DTP, the government would send aclear signal to these disenranchised citizens that it respectsree expression o their demands so long as this is donethrough politics not guns. And i the PKK is serious aboutpeace it will need, as Turk has said, to keep its inger o the trigger, remain silent, and allow the DTP to articulate

2

Analysis

1See Amberin Zaman, “Winning Kurdish Hearts and Minds: The Battle Shifts to the Airwaves,” On

Turkey series. Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, January 12, 2009.



Analysis

the Kurds’ demands. In the meantime, Iraqi Kurds mustdo their share in keeping up pressure on the PKK. And tokeep the Iraqi Kurds irmly on board, Turkey will need toovercome its queasiness over their ederal status, which isenshrined in Iraq’s constitution. All o this will take bigdoses o courage, without which the historic opportunity Gül speaks o will be missed yet again.

Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist

Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent or The Economist and

writes a weekly column or the Turkish daily Taraf .

About GMF The German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a

nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution

dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding

between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting

individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by

convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,

and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation canaddress a variety o global policy challenges. In addition, GMF

supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies. In

addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven

ofces in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara,

and Bucharest.

About the On Turkey Series

GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about Turkey’s

current political situation and its uture. GMF provides regular analysis

bries by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-

tuals, with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground Turkish observers.

To access the latest bries, please visit our web site at

www.gmus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at

http://database.gmus.org/reaction.

turkey's kurds: toward a solution?

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