turkey’s political islam and the west: the evolving nature of a relationship

4
Summary: The approach to “the West” occupied a central place in T urkish Political Islam’s identity formulation and distinguished them from other “systemic” parties. Nevertheless, Turkish Political Islam’s stance on the “West” has not been static. Instead, the character of the relations has acquired new shapes and dynamism, particularly in the late 1990s and 2000s. For a better understanding of the evolution, it is necessary to divide the time-span from the Welfare Party to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) into distinguishable periods. These periods can be described as going from rejection of political Islam of the West to its enthusiastic embrace, and from co-existence to uncertainty. Currently, opposing trends have been set in motion simultaneously, and ambiguity rules Turkey ’s relations with the West. Analysis  T urkey’s Political Islam and the West :  The Evolving Nature of a Relationship by Galip Dalay June 2, 2014 Analysis W , DC • B • P B • B  A B • W  T OFFICES Introduction “Te West ” has be en a contentious topic or the Islamic Movements all across the Muslim World. Tis was largely resulted rom historical interac- tions (such as colonialism) between the West and Muslim-majority world. Indeed, some o these movements rst emerged as anti-colonial resistance movements. Te West, thereore, has constituted Political Islam’s 1  political other. urkey does not have a history o being colonized, thereore urkey’s Political Is lam (PI) lacks some o the historical memories common to other Islamic Movements. Moreover, urkey’s experience with the West, unique among all Muslim countries, where West ernization and moder n- ization was regarded as interchange- able and pursued as state policy or 1 The usage of the term “Political Islam” t o denote parties of the pro-Islamic National Outlook Movement (NOM) tradition and the ruling AKP is a contested issue. A variety of other labels such as conservative, Political Muslumanism, and Muslim Democrats have been offered by many scholars in lieu of “Political Islam.” Moreover, once set against Political Islamist movements across the Arab World, Turkey’s “Political Islam” might appear more like a conventional conservative party than Political Islamist. Yet the choice of the term Political Islam in this piece is motivated by Turke y’s domestic political context rather than any theoretical considerations. Domestically, this term is widely used to describe the identity of the concerned parties. majority o republican history, sets PI apart rom other examples. In spite o this, the approach to the W est occu- pied a central place in PI’s identity- ormulation and distinguished them rom other “syst emic” parties. Never- theless, PI’s stance on the West has not been static. Instead, the character o the relationship has acquired new shapes and dynamism, particularly in the late 1990s and 2000s. New circumstances have emerged, such as Political Islam’s lessons o the 1990s, in particular the February 28, 1997, coup that toppled the Reah Party (Welare Party , WP) led-government. In this respect, the domestic context and considerations hav e exerted a sign i- cant impact on urkish Political Islam’s attitude toward the West. o better illustrate this evolution, it is necessary to divide the time-span rom the WP to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) into distinct periods: the Welare Party’s brie rule (1996-97), and the rst (2002-07), second (2007-11), and third (2011-present ) periods o the AKP’ s rule. Tese periods can also b e described respectively as going rom Political Islam’s rejection o the West to

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7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 14

Summary The approach to

ldquothe Westrdquo occupied a central

place in Turkish Political

Islamrsquos identity formulation

and distinguished them from

other ldquosystemicrdquo parties

Nevertheless Turkish Political

Islamrsquos stance on the ldquoWestrdquo

has not been static Insteadthe character of the relations

has acquired new shapes and

dynamism particularly in the

late 1990s and 2000s For a

better understanding of the

evolution it is necessary to

divide the time-span from the

Welfare Party to the governing

Justice and Development Party

(AKP) into distinguishable

periods These periods can be

described as going from rejection

of political Islam of the Westto its enthusiastic embrace

and from co-existence to

uncertainty Currently opposing

trends have been set in motion

simultaneously and ambiguity

rules Turkeyrsquos relations with the

West

Analysis

Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West

The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

by Galip Dalay

June 2 2014

Analysis

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B983154983157983155983155983141983148983155 bull B983141983148983143983154983137983140983141 bull A983150983147983137983154983137

B983157983139983144983137983154983141983155983156 bull W983137983154983155983137983159 bull T983157983150983145983155

O F F I C E S

Introduction

ldquoTe Westrdquo has been a contentioustopic or the Islamic Movements allacross the Muslim World Tis waslargely resulted rom historical interac-tions (such as colonialism) betweenthe West and Muslim-majority worldIndeed some o these movements firstemerged as anti-colonial resistancemovements Te West thereore hasconstituted Political Islamrsquos1 political

other

urkey does not have a history obeing colonized thereore urkeyrsquosPolitical Islam (PI) lacks some othe historical memories common toother Islamic Movements Moreoverurkeyrsquos experience with the Westunique among all Muslim countrieswhere Westernization and modern-ization was regarded as interchange-able and pursued as state policy or

1 The usage of the term ldquoPolitical Islamrdquo to denote

parties of the pro-Islamic National Outlook Movement

(NOM) tradition and the ruling AKP is a contested issue

A variety of other labels such as conservative Political

Muslumanism and Muslim Democrats have been offered

by many scholars in lieu of ldquoPolitical Islamrdquo Moreover

once set against Political Islamist movements across

the Arab World Turkeyrsquos ldquoPolitical Islamrdquo might appear

more like a conventional conservative party than Political

Islamist Yet the choice of the term Political Islam in this

piece is motivated by Turkeyrsquos domestic political context

rather than any theoretical considerations Domestically

this term is widely used to describe the identity of the

concerned parties

majority o republican history sets PIapart rom other examples In spite othis the approach to the West occu-pied a central place in PIrsquos identity-ormulation and distinguished themrom other ldquosystemicrdquo parties Never-theless PIrsquos stance on the West hasnot been static Instead the charactero the relationship has acquired newshapes and dynamism particularlyin the late 1990s and 2000s New

circumstances have emerged such asPolitical Islamrsquos lessons o the 1990s inparticular the February 28 1997 coupthat toppled the Reah Party (WelareParty WP) led-government In thisrespect the domestic context andconsiderations have exerted a signifi-cant impact on urkish Political Islamrsquosattitude toward the West

o better illustrate this evolution itis necessary to divide the time-span

rom the WP to the governing Justiceand Development Party (AKP) intodistinct periods the Welare Partyrsquosbrie rule (1996-97) and the first(2002-07) second (2007-11) andthird (2011-present ) periods o theAKPrsquos rule Tese periods can also bedescribed respectively as going romPolitical Islamrsquos rejection o the West to

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 24

Analysis

2

Analysis

WP Leader Necmettin Erbakan

regarded the current international

system as being underpinned

by Judeo-Christian values and

therefore having no place for a

Muslim power

its enthusiastic embrace and rom co-existence to uncer-

tainty

Rejection of the West as Constitutive Other

Te WP along with other parties that came rom the tradi-tion o the Islamic National Outlook Movement (NOM)regarded the West as their ideological and constitutiveother Te West thereore assumed a central place in theirdefinition o their identities For the WP it was a means toset itsel apart rom all other ldquostatus quordquo parties given thaturkeyrsquos Westward-orientation was a state policy and chal-lenged by no mainstream party in earnest In this respectthe WP could easily claim a special place with its anti-

Western rhetoric denouncing Europe as a Christian clubthe international system as a Judeo-Christian artiact andinternational institutions as tools o Western imperialismand capitalism

rue to its antisystemic posture the WP attempted to laythe oundation or a parallel Islamic international systemduring its brie period in office by bringing together eightMuslim-majority countries to create D8 mirroring theG8 Moreover the WPrsquos leader Necmettin Erbakan wouldspeculate about creation o a common Islamic currency thedinar or a long time Tis currency was meant to be used

as a currency o exchange and reserve in the envisionedcommon Islamic market mirroring a rudimentary orm othe EU and its euro currency

Moreover the party regarded the West as a homogenousmonolithic entity composed o the United States Europeand Israel In their criticism they adopted the blanketterm ldquothe Westrdquo rather than make distinctions betweenits elements Lastly Erbakanrsquos critique o the West andWestern-led institutions were not primarily related tourkeyrsquos under-representation in the system unlike currentPrime Minister Recep ayyip Erdoğan whose criticism

o the West does not ocus on values but on the perceivedunder-representation o urkey in the system InsteadErbakanrsquos critique was more value-driven He regardedthe current international system as being underpinnedby Judeo-Christian values and thereore having no placeor a Muslim power Te only way or urkey to reclaimits proper place and status in the international arenacommensurate with its historical mission was by way ospearheading the creation o a parallel Islamic interna-tional system and then leading it Tis attitude only urther

aggravated the WPrsquos crisis o legitimacy domestically andinternationally

Yet during its brie period in power the WP was unableto translate its criticisms o the West into governmentalpolicies due to institutional constraints and the competinginterests rom within the coalition government Neverthe-less the toppling o the WP-led government in 1997 elicitedno serious criticisms either rom the West or rom withinurkey Te younger and reorm-minded cadres o theNOM which later ounded the AKP interpreted this as the

result o the partyrsquos anti-Western and antisystemic stance

Genuine Embrace of the West

as Legitimacy-Conferring İnstrumentDistancing itsel rom the WPrsquos experience the AKP2 actively sought to commence membership talks with theEU improve the relations with the United States and tomaintain cordial ties with Israel upon coming to powerin 2002 It considered unbreakable the ties between theadoption o human rights and democracy-ocused rhetoricintegration with the EU and overcoming its crisis o secu-rity and legitimacy both internally and internationally Temilitaryrsquos then continuing undue influence over politicswas endangering the partyrsquos survival Te EU process notonly necessitated curtailing the militaryrsquos clout over politicsthereby effectively alleviating urkeyrsquos macro-democraticdeficit but also accorded legitimacy to the AKP Tis couldnot have been solved merely through election victories asthe downall o the WP had demonstrated Tus unlike the

2 The AKP has been put under Political Islamrsquos umbrella because almost all the partyrsquos

founding members came from the NOM tradition and their breakaway from the NOM was

largely not motivated by the traditionrsquos goals rather its political style

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 34

Analysis

3

Analysis

The AKPrsquos third term has been

shaped by the Arab Spring and

characterized by uncertainty in

Turkeyrsquos relations with the West

WP the AKP regarded the West as an instrument to gain

domestic and international legitimacyMoreover in contrast to Erbakan Erdoğan rerained romusing the blanket term ldquothe Westrdquo in his criticisms largelydifferentiating between Western countries instead Forinstance when urkeyrsquos relations with the United Statessuffered a considerable setback during the invasion o Iraqurkey-EU relations experienced a honeymoon periodLikewise when urkish-Israeli relations were deterioratingurkey strove to keep its relations with the United Statesintact However it needs to be recognized that the politicalcontext o the early 2000s and the securitization o Islamic

politics played the primary role in the AKPrsquos overenthusi-astic pro-Europeanness Consequently it was untenable inthe long-run

Co-Existence and Balancing

In its second term the AKP attempted to balance itsWestern-ocused oreign policy with alternative rame-works to achieve a more prominent international role Tereduced military threat urkeyrsquos growing economy andthe election o leaders opposing urkeyrsquos EU membershipin Germany and France in 2005 and 2007 respectivelyresulted in reduced enthusiasm or the AKPrsquos pro-Western

(EU + the United States) stance During this period urkeyengaged in its surrounding regions more vigorously Tiswas also when urkey carved out a unique position oritsel as mediator and acilitator in some o the intractablelong-lasting issues and conflicts Tis included mediatingbetween Israel and Syria Iran and the West and differentPalestinian actions albeit largely to no avail

The Era of Uncertainty

Te AKPrsquos third term has been shaped by the Arab Springand characterized by uncertainty in urkeyrsquos relations with

the West In the early stages o the Arab Spring with the rise

o Islamic Movements across the region and the gradualretreat o the United States urkey saw an opportunity tolead these revolutions and fill a perceived emerging power vacuum Te AKP saw their shared Islamic identity andlexicon as its vantage point in orming closer relations withthe Arab Worldrsquos uture political elites Essentially the AKPbelieved its identity (values) and interests were in sync inthe post-Arab Spring countries In contrast a competitionor influence particularly with France and Britain was seenas inevitable as demonstrated by their conflicting positionson Libya Such a reading o events created the incentive orurkey to prioritize the Arab World even at the expense o

relations with the West A three-year hiatus on opening newchapters or urkeyrsquos EU accession was partially a reflectiono this understanding

However the Syrian imbroglio exposed urkeyrsquos limitsand the gap between capacity and discourse along with itsreliance on the West in the security realm Appreciationo ties to the West especially to NAO soon turned intostern criticisms o the West and o the international systemonce the much-anticipated intervention did not materializeBitter criticisms o the West reached their apex during thecoup in Egypt and the Gezi Park Protests Te Westrsquos stance

on the Egyptian coup and on the Syrian Crisis have beenseen by urkeyrsquos political elites as the maniestation o itsanti-Islamic movement strategy in the region Te Westrsquosoverall approach to the Ukraine crisis urther reinorcedthis sentiment In addition constant criticism o urkey bymedia and official circles in the West is seen by the govern-ment through the same lenses Te more urkey receivessuch rebukes even i many o them are not misplaced themore political elites resort to an anti-Western parlancePutting aside the politically expedient nature o suchdenunciations aimed or domestic consumption this cyclei not reversed can cause the West to once again be recast

as urkeyrsquos conservative circlersquos political ldquootherrdquo o avoidthis due criticism should not give the impression o cast outurkey

Nevertheless mindul o the value o Western ties thegovernment is partially attempting to recover its relationswith the West Opening a new accession chapter with theEU afer three years signing o readmission agreementand launching dialogue on visa liberalization with theEU the AKPrsquos decision to open an office in Brussels and

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 44

Analysis

4

Analysis

About the Author

Galip Dalay works as a researcher in the political research department

at the SEA Foundation in urkey He is also the book review editor o

Insight Turkey His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion AJE

Magazine Huffington Post World Politics Review Fair Observers and

in major urkish dailies

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens

transatlantic cooperation on regional national and global challenges

and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan GMF does this by

supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic

sphere by convening leaders and members o the policy and business

communities by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic

topics and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship In addition GMF

supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies Founded

in 1972 as a non-partisan non-profit organization through a gif rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance GMF

maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic In addition

to its headquarters in Washington DC GMF has offices in Berlin

Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw and unis GMF

also has smaller representations in Bratislava urin and Stockholm

About the On Turkey SeriesGMFrsquos On urkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about urkeyrsquos

current political situation and its uture GMF provides regular

analysis bries by leading urkish European and US writers and

intellectuals with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground urkish

observers o access the latest bries please visit our web site at www

gmusorgturkey or subscribe to our mailing list at httpdatabase

gmusorgreaction

the gradual mending o ties with Israel all point to such a

desire But the counter-examples abound as well Te AKPrsquosdecision to leave the European Peoplersquos Party citing thegrouprsquos reusal to upgrade the AKPrsquos observer status to ullmembership as the cause to instead join the Euro-skepticAlliance o European Conservative and Reormists is onesuch example

In the AKPrsquos third term thereore opposing trends havebeen set in motion simultaneously As such uncertaintycurrently rules urkeyrsquos relations to the West Te uturedirection will be largely determined by the domestic andregional political context and the Westrsquos reaction to them

Tus the evolution o urkish Political Islamrsquos under-standing o and approach to the West continues

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 24

Analysis

2

Analysis

WP Leader Necmettin Erbakan

regarded the current international

system as being underpinned

by Judeo-Christian values and

therefore having no place for a

Muslim power

its enthusiastic embrace and rom co-existence to uncer-

tainty

Rejection of the West as Constitutive Other

Te WP along with other parties that came rom the tradi-tion o the Islamic National Outlook Movement (NOM)regarded the West as their ideological and constitutiveother Te West thereore assumed a central place in theirdefinition o their identities For the WP it was a means toset itsel apart rom all other ldquostatus quordquo parties given thaturkeyrsquos Westward-orientation was a state policy and chal-lenged by no mainstream party in earnest In this respectthe WP could easily claim a special place with its anti-

Western rhetoric denouncing Europe as a Christian clubthe international system as a Judeo-Christian artiact andinternational institutions as tools o Western imperialismand capitalism

rue to its antisystemic posture the WP attempted to laythe oundation or a parallel Islamic international systemduring its brie period in office by bringing together eightMuslim-majority countries to create D8 mirroring theG8 Moreover the WPrsquos leader Necmettin Erbakan wouldspeculate about creation o a common Islamic currency thedinar or a long time Tis currency was meant to be used

as a currency o exchange and reserve in the envisionedcommon Islamic market mirroring a rudimentary orm othe EU and its euro currency

Moreover the party regarded the West as a homogenousmonolithic entity composed o the United States Europeand Israel In their criticism they adopted the blanketterm ldquothe Westrdquo rather than make distinctions betweenits elements Lastly Erbakanrsquos critique o the West andWestern-led institutions were not primarily related tourkeyrsquos under-representation in the system unlike currentPrime Minister Recep ayyip Erdoğan whose criticism

o the West does not ocus on values but on the perceivedunder-representation o urkey in the system InsteadErbakanrsquos critique was more value-driven He regardedthe current international system as being underpinnedby Judeo-Christian values and thereore having no placeor a Muslim power Te only way or urkey to reclaimits proper place and status in the international arenacommensurate with its historical mission was by way ospearheading the creation o a parallel Islamic interna-tional system and then leading it Tis attitude only urther

aggravated the WPrsquos crisis o legitimacy domestically andinternationally

Yet during its brie period in power the WP was unableto translate its criticisms o the West into governmentalpolicies due to institutional constraints and the competinginterests rom within the coalition government Neverthe-less the toppling o the WP-led government in 1997 elicitedno serious criticisms either rom the West or rom withinurkey Te younger and reorm-minded cadres o theNOM which later ounded the AKP interpreted this as the

result o the partyrsquos anti-Western and antisystemic stance

Genuine Embrace of the West

as Legitimacy-Conferring İnstrumentDistancing itsel rom the WPrsquos experience the AKP2 actively sought to commence membership talks with theEU improve the relations with the United States and tomaintain cordial ties with Israel upon coming to powerin 2002 It considered unbreakable the ties between theadoption o human rights and democracy-ocused rhetoricintegration with the EU and overcoming its crisis o secu-rity and legitimacy both internally and internationally Temilitaryrsquos then continuing undue influence over politicswas endangering the partyrsquos survival Te EU process notonly necessitated curtailing the militaryrsquos clout over politicsthereby effectively alleviating urkeyrsquos macro-democraticdeficit but also accorded legitimacy to the AKP Tis couldnot have been solved merely through election victories asthe downall o the WP had demonstrated Tus unlike the

2 The AKP has been put under Political Islamrsquos umbrella because almost all the partyrsquos

founding members came from the NOM tradition and their breakaway from the NOM was

largely not motivated by the traditionrsquos goals rather its political style

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 34

Analysis

3

Analysis

The AKPrsquos third term has been

shaped by the Arab Spring and

characterized by uncertainty in

Turkeyrsquos relations with the West

WP the AKP regarded the West as an instrument to gain

domestic and international legitimacyMoreover in contrast to Erbakan Erdoğan rerained romusing the blanket term ldquothe Westrdquo in his criticisms largelydifferentiating between Western countries instead Forinstance when urkeyrsquos relations with the United Statessuffered a considerable setback during the invasion o Iraqurkey-EU relations experienced a honeymoon periodLikewise when urkish-Israeli relations were deterioratingurkey strove to keep its relations with the United Statesintact However it needs to be recognized that the politicalcontext o the early 2000s and the securitization o Islamic

politics played the primary role in the AKPrsquos overenthusi-astic pro-Europeanness Consequently it was untenable inthe long-run

Co-Existence and Balancing

In its second term the AKP attempted to balance itsWestern-ocused oreign policy with alternative rame-works to achieve a more prominent international role Tereduced military threat urkeyrsquos growing economy andthe election o leaders opposing urkeyrsquos EU membershipin Germany and France in 2005 and 2007 respectivelyresulted in reduced enthusiasm or the AKPrsquos pro-Western

(EU + the United States) stance During this period urkeyengaged in its surrounding regions more vigorously Tiswas also when urkey carved out a unique position oritsel as mediator and acilitator in some o the intractablelong-lasting issues and conflicts Tis included mediatingbetween Israel and Syria Iran and the West and differentPalestinian actions albeit largely to no avail

The Era of Uncertainty

Te AKPrsquos third term has been shaped by the Arab Springand characterized by uncertainty in urkeyrsquos relations with

the West In the early stages o the Arab Spring with the rise

o Islamic Movements across the region and the gradualretreat o the United States urkey saw an opportunity tolead these revolutions and fill a perceived emerging power vacuum Te AKP saw their shared Islamic identity andlexicon as its vantage point in orming closer relations withthe Arab Worldrsquos uture political elites Essentially the AKPbelieved its identity (values) and interests were in sync inthe post-Arab Spring countries In contrast a competitionor influence particularly with France and Britain was seenas inevitable as demonstrated by their conflicting positionson Libya Such a reading o events created the incentive orurkey to prioritize the Arab World even at the expense o

relations with the West A three-year hiatus on opening newchapters or urkeyrsquos EU accession was partially a reflectiono this understanding

However the Syrian imbroglio exposed urkeyrsquos limitsand the gap between capacity and discourse along with itsreliance on the West in the security realm Appreciationo ties to the West especially to NAO soon turned intostern criticisms o the West and o the international systemonce the much-anticipated intervention did not materializeBitter criticisms o the West reached their apex during thecoup in Egypt and the Gezi Park Protests Te Westrsquos stance

on the Egyptian coup and on the Syrian Crisis have beenseen by urkeyrsquos political elites as the maniestation o itsanti-Islamic movement strategy in the region Te Westrsquosoverall approach to the Ukraine crisis urther reinorcedthis sentiment In addition constant criticism o urkey bymedia and official circles in the West is seen by the govern-ment through the same lenses Te more urkey receivessuch rebukes even i many o them are not misplaced themore political elites resort to an anti-Western parlancePutting aside the politically expedient nature o suchdenunciations aimed or domestic consumption this cyclei not reversed can cause the West to once again be recast

as urkeyrsquos conservative circlersquos political ldquootherrdquo o avoidthis due criticism should not give the impression o cast outurkey

Nevertheless mindul o the value o Western ties thegovernment is partially attempting to recover its relationswith the West Opening a new accession chapter with theEU afer three years signing o readmission agreementand launching dialogue on visa liberalization with theEU the AKPrsquos decision to open an office in Brussels and

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 44

Analysis

4

Analysis

About the Author

Galip Dalay works as a researcher in the political research department

at the SEA Foundation in urkey He is also the book review editor o

Insight Turkey His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion AJE

Magazine Huffington Post World Politics Review Fair Observers and

in major urkish dailies

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens

transatlantic cooperation on regional national and global challenges

and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan GMF does this by

supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic

sphere by convening leaders and members o the policy and business

communities by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic

topics and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship In addition GMF

supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies Founded

in 1972 as a non-partisan non-profit organization through a gif rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance GMF

maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic In addition

to its headquarters in Washington DC GMF has offices in Berlin

Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw and unis GMF

also has smaller representations in Bratislava urin and Stockholm

About the On Turkey SeriesGMFrsquos On urkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about urkeyrsquos

current political situation and its uture GMF provides regular

analysis bries by leading urkish European and US writers and

intellectuals with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground urkish

observers o access the latest bries please visit our web site at www

gmusorgturkey or subscribe to our mailing list at httpdatabase

gmusorgreaction

the gradual mending o ties with Israel all point to such a

desire But the counter-examples abound as well Te AKPrsquosdecision to leave the European Peoplersquos Party citing thegrouprsquos reusal to upgrade the AKPrsquos observer status to ullmembership as the cause to instead join the Euro-skepticAlliance o European Conservative and Reormists is onesuch example

In the AKPrsquos third term thereore opposing trends havebeen set in motion simultaneously As such uncertaintycurrently rules urkeyrsquos relations to the West Te uturedirection will be largely determined by the domestic andregional political context and the Westrsquos reaction to them

Tus the evolution o urkish Political Islamrsquos under-standing o and approach to the West continues

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 34

Analysis

3

Analysis

The AKPrsquos third term has been

shaped by the Arab Spring and

characterized by uncertainty in

Turkeyrsquos relations with the West

WP the AKP regarded the West as an instrument to gain

domestic and international legitimacyMoreover in contrast to Erbakan Erdoğan rerained romusing the blanket term ldquothe Westrdquo in his criticisms largelydifferentiating between Western countries instead Forinstance when urkeyrsquos relations with the United Statessuffered a considerable setback during the invasion o Iraqurkey-EU relations experienced a honeymoon periodLikewise when urkish-Israeli relations were deterioratingurkey strove to keep its relations with the United Statesintact However it needs to be recognized that the politicalcontext o the early 2000s and the securitization o Islamic

politics played the primary role in the AKPrsquos overenthusi-astic pro-Europeanness Consequently it was untenable inthe long-run

Co-Existence and Balancing

In its second term the AKP attempted to balance itsWestern-ocused oreign policy with alternative rame-works to achieve a more prominent international role Tereduced military threat urkeyrsquos growing economy andthe election o leaders opposing urkeyrsquos EU membershipin Germany and France in 2005 and 2007 respectivelyresulted in reduced enthusiasm or the AKPrsquos pro-Western

(EU + the United States) stance During this period urkeyengaged in its surrounding regions more vigorously Tiswas also when urkey carved out a unique position oritsel as mediator and acilitator in some o the intractablelong-lasting issues and conflicts Tis included mediatingbetween Israel and Syria Iran and the West and differentPalestinian actions albeit largely to no avail

The Era of Uncertainty

Te AKPrsquos third term has been shaped by the Arab Springand characterized by uncertainty in urkeyrsquos relations with

the West In the early stages o the Arab Spring with the rise

o Islamic Movements across the region and the gradualretreat o the United States urkey saw an opportunity tolead these revolutions and fill a perceived emerging power vacuum Te AKP saw their shared Islamic identity andlexicon as its vantage point in orming closer relations withthe Arab Worldrsquos uture political elites Essentially the AKPbelieved its identity (values) and interests were in sync inthe post-Arab Spring countries In contrast a competitionor influence particularly with France and Britain was seenas inevitable as demonstrated by their conflicting positionson Libya Such a reading o events created the incentive orurkey to prioritize the Arab World even at the expense o

relations with the West A three-year hiatus on opening newchapters or urkeyrsquos EU accession was partially a reflectiono this understanding

However the Syrian imbroglio exposed urkeyrsquos limitsand the gap between capacity and discourse along with itsreliance on the West in the security realm Appreciationo ties to the West especially to NAO soon turned intostern criticisms o the West and o the international systemonce the much-anticipated intervention did not materializeBitter criticisms o the West reached their apex during thecoup in Egypt and the Gezi Park Protests Te Westrsquos stance

on the Egyptian coup and on the Syrian Crisis have beenseen by urkeyrsquos political elites as the maniestation o itsanti-Islamic movement strategy in the region Te Westrsquosoverall approach to the Ukraine crisis urther reinorcedthis sentiment In addition constant criticism o urkey bymedia and official circles in the West is seen by the govern-ment through the same lenses Te more urkey receivessuch rebukes even i many o them are not misplaced themore political elites resort to an anti-Western parlancePutting aside the politically expedient nature o suchdenunciations aimed or domestic consumption this cyclei not reversed can cause the West to once again be recast

as urkeyrsquos conservative circlersquos political ldquootherrdquo o avoidthis due criticism should not give the impression o cast outurkey

Nevertheless mindul o the value o Western ties thegovernment is partially attempting to recover its relationswith the West Opening a new accession chapter with theEU afer three years signing o readmission agreementand launching dialogue on visa liberalization with theEU the AKPrsquos decision to open an office in Brussels and

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 44

Analysis

4

Analysis

About the Author

Galip Dalay works as a researcher in the political research department

at the SEA Foundation in urkey He is also the book review editor o

Insight Turkey His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion AJE

Magazine Huffington Post World Politics Review Fair Observers and

in major urkish dailies

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens

transatlantic cooperation on regional national and global challenges

and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan GMF does this by

supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic

sphere by convening leaders and members o the policy and business

communities by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic

topics and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship In addition GMF

supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies Founded

in 1972 as a non-partisan non-profit organization through a gif rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance GMF

maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic In addition

to its headquarters in Washington DC GMF has offices in Berlin

Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw and unis GMF

also has smaller representations in Bratislava urin and Stockholm

About the On Turkey SeriesGMFrsquos On urkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about urkeyrsquos

current political situation and its uture GMF provides regular

analysis bries by leading urkish European and US writers and

intellectuals with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground urkish

observers o access the latest bries please visit our web site at www

gmusorgturkey or subscribe to our mailing list at httpdatabase

gmusorgreaction

the gradual mending o ties with Israel all point to such a

desire But the counter-examples abound as well Te AKPrsquosdecision to leave the European Peoplersquos Party citing thegrouprsquos reusal to upgrade the AKPrsquos observer status to ullmembership as the cause to instead join the Euro-skepticAlliance o European Conservative and Reormists is onesuch example

In the AKPrsquos third term thereore opposing trends havebeen set in motion simultaneously As such uncertaintycurrently rules urkeyrsquos relations to the West Te uturedirection will be largely determined by the domestic andregional political context and the Westrsquos reaction to them

Tus the evolution o urkish Political Islamrsquos under-standing o and approach to the West continues

7272019 Turkeyrsquos Political Islam and the West The Evolving Nature of a Relationship

httpslidepdfcomreaderfullturkeys-political-islam-and-the-west-the-evolving-nature-of-a-relationship 44

Analysis

4

Analysis

About the Author

Galip Dalay works as a researcher in the political research department

at the SEA Foundation in urkey He is also the book review editor o

Insight Turkey His opinion articles have appeared in AJE Opinion AJE

Magazine Huffington Post World Politics Review Fair Observers and

in major urkish dailies

About GMF

Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) strengthens

transatlantic cooperation on regional national and global challenges

and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan GMF does this by

supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic

sphere by convening leaders and members o the policy and business

communities by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic

topics and by providing exchange opportunities to oster renewed

commitment to the transatlantic relationship In addition GMF

supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies Founded

in 1972 as a non-partisan non-profit organization through a gif rom

Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance GMF

maintains a strong presence on both sides o the Atlantic In addition

to its headquarters in Washington DC GMF has offices in Berlin

Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw and unis GMF

also has smaller representations in Bratislava urin and Stockholm

About the On Turkey SeriesGMFrsquos On urkey is an ongoing series o analysis bries about urkeyrsquos

current political situation and its uture GMF provides regular

analysis bries by leading urkish European and US writers and

intellectuals with a ocus on dispatches rom on-the-ground urkish

observers o access the latest bries please visit our web site at www

gmusorgturkey or subscribe to our mailing list at httpdatabase

gmusorgreaction

the gradual mending o ties with Israel all point to such a

desire But the counter-examples abound as well Te AKPrsquosdecision to leave the European Peoplersquos Party citing thegrouprsquos reusal to upgrade the AKPrsquos observer status to ullmembership as the cause to instead join the Euro-skepticAlliance o European Conservative and Reormists is onesuch example

In the AKPrsquos third term thereore opposing trends havebeen set in motion simultaneously As such uncertaintycurrently rules urkeyrsquos relations to the West Te uturedirection will be largely determined by the domestic andregional political context and the Westrsquos reaction to them

Tus the evolution o urkish Political Islamrsquos under-standing o and approach to the West continues