uk p&i - gard - loss prevention circulars

Gard Loss Prevention Circulars

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© Gard AS, March 2011


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Compilation of Loss Prevention Circulars IntroductionThe Gard loss prevention updates that are regularly sent to Members and clients are divided into three different categories:

• Gardalerts-whichcontainimportantandtimelyinformationrelevanttotheshippingindustry,mostlyprovidedbyexternalpartiessuchascorrespondents,localexpertsanddifferentinternationalorganisationsandauthorities.

• Losspreventioncirculars-thatcontainimportantlessonslearnedfortheshippingindustry,mostlybasedoninternalknowledgegainedbyGard’sclaimsdepartments,andbasedontrendsandclaimscases.

• Casestudiesforonboardsafetymeetings-thesedescribetypicalincidentsonboardavessel.ThecasestudiesarebasedonactualcasesfromtheGardclaimsdatabase,andfocusonriskassessmentandidentifyingthechainoferrorsthatledtoanincident.

ThisbookletcontainsacollectionofGard’sLossPreventioncircularsinEnglish.ItisacompilationofwhatGardconsiderstobethemostimportantandrelevantcircularspublishedduringtheperiod2000toFebruary2011.TheyarereproducedhereforMembersandclients,tobereadaspartofourongoingeffortofknowledgesharingandlossprevention.

Thecompilationmaybeusedforindividualstudies,aspartoftrainingschemes,orcoveringindividualtopicsinsafetymeetings,onboardriskassessmentsoreducation.AdditionalcopiesfordistributiontoshipsortrainingcentrescanbeobtainedfromGardAS.

Thiscompilationisupdatedonaregularbasis.Theaimistoorganiserelevantcircularsinapracticalandusefulformat.Inthisregard,wewelcomecommentsandsuggestionsfromourreaders.

Foracompletelistofallourlosspreventioncirculars,pleasevisitourwebsiteatwww.gard.no.

FormoreinformationregardingGard’slosspreventionprogramme,pleasecontact:

SeniorManagerTerjePaulsen,tel:[email protected],or SeniorLossPreventionExecutiveMariusSchønberg,tel:[email protected]

TerjePaulsenSeniorManager,LossPreventionGardAS

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NavigationNo.15-10 IncreasedrisksofgroundinginBarranquilla,Colombia............................................................. 8No.12-10 Limitationsofavessels’anchoringequipment............................................................................ 9No.09-10 Oceantowageofnewbuildinghull............................................................................................10No.16-09 AnchoringwithinMalaysianwatersoffSingapore...................................................................11No.11-09 DangerousanchoringintheSingaporearea..............................................................................12No.06-09 Damagetofixedobjectswhenmanoeuvringinconfinedwaters............................................13No.14-08 Anchoringanddeterioratingweatherconditions......................................................................14No.13-08 Moored vessels breaking out from their berths.........................................................................16No.04-07 Globalwavewatchsystem...........................................................................................................18No.02-06 NavigationthroughtheentrancestotheBalticSea..................................................................19No.02-04 WinterseasoninthenorthernBalticSea....................................................................................20No.10-01 Operationsinextremelycoldclimates........................................................................................21

MachineryNo.02-11 Exhaustboilerdamages...............................................................................................................23No.14-10 Lossofship’srecordswhenchangingownershipormanagement.........................................24No.15-09 Lowsulphurfuelchangeover......................................................................................................25No.14-09 Lay-upofshipsandthemarineinsurancecover........................................................................27No.11-08 Liftinggear–isyourshippreparedtoavoidaccidentsoccurring?..........................................28No.08-07 Warning-Fueloilqualitymightbeatstake...............................................................................29No.11-06 Fire safety in the engine room.....................................................................................................31No.06-06 MarpolAnnexVI–Challengesinoperatingonlowsulphurfuel............................................32No.18-05 ImportantchangestotheneweditionoftheISO8217FuelStandard....................................33No.02-03 Pirate parts used on rotating machinery.....................................................................................34No.08-01 Effectsofoff-specbunkers...........................................................................................................35No.03-01 BunkerQuality...............................................................................................................................37No.01-01 Turbocharger damages................................................................................................................38No.03-00 MainEngineDamageDuetoContaminatedLubricatingOil................................................... 40No.02-00 MainEngineMediumSpeedCrankshaftDamage.................................................................... 42No.01-00 MainEngineDamageDuetoIgnitionDelay.............................................................................. 43

Piracy and maritime securityNo.02-10 CounterPiracy–FollowBestManagementPractices(BMP).................................................... 44No.7-09 Master’sbriefbeforeenteringhighriskpiracyareas................................................................... 46No.02-09 USCoastGuardimposesconditionsofentryonvesselsarrivingfromVenezuela................. 47No.12-08 USCoastGuard-Newruleregardingnontankvesselresponseplans.................................... 47No.03-08 MaritimeSecurity-UnitedStatesCoastGuardNoticeonIndonesianports.......................... 48No.03-10 USCustomsregulations–ImporterSecurityFilingsand

AdditionalCarrierRequirements(10+2Rule)......................................................................................... 49

RegulationsNo.05-10 ParisMOUPortStateControl–Newinspectionregime.......................................................... 49No.12-09 PortHealthAuthorityfinesinBrazil............................................................................................. 51No.01-08 Operational challenges in the Ukraine........................................................................................ 51No.12-07 TherisksoftradingtoAngola–acautionarystory.................................................................... 53No.07-07 ShipToShip(STS)transferofcargo:NewlawinDanishwaters............................................... 54No.03-07 Typhoonseasonprecautions–HongKongarea....................................................................... 55No.10-06 Reminder:MARPOLAnnexIIandIBCCoderevisions.............................................................. 56No.09-06 Reminder:RequirementsforalcoholanddrugtestingintheU.S............................................ 57No.03-06 UnitedStates-AdvancePassengerInformationSystem(APIS)

InternationalCarrierBondrequirement.................................................................................................. 58No.01-06 NewregulationsintheU.S........................................................................................................... 59No.07-05 UnitedStates:ElectronicNoticeofArrivalandDeparture(ENOA/D).................................... 60

Contents

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Pollution and the environmentNo.11-10 GreywaterdischargeandpollutionfinesinTurkey................................................................... 61No.5-09 U.S.GuidelinesonMARPOLAnnexVI.......................................................................................... 62No.04-09 Areyoupurifyingorjustpumping?............................................................................................. 63No.17-08 Dischargeanddisposalofdrycargoresidues–U.S.CoastGuard

RegulationsfortheGreatLakesRegion................................................................................................. 64No.16-08 NewPermitRequirementsforVessels–U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.................... 64No.13-07 USCoastGuard–FormalpolicyonvoluntarydisclosureofMARPOLviolations................... 65No.09-07 CompliancewithPanamaCanalShipboardOilPollutionEmergencyPlan

(PCSOPEP)requirements.......................................................................................................................... 66No.05-07 SECA–NorthSeaandEnglishChannel..................................................................................... 67No.07-06 MarpolAnnexV–IncreasedfocusonwastemanagementintheUS(updated)................... 67No.07-01 Oilywaterseparationanddischarge:Dischargeofoilprohibited.......................................... 68No.06-01 Oilywaterseparationanddischarge:Riskofoilpollutionversusvessel’ssafety................... 70

Crew, passengers and other persons on boardNo.04-10 ChangestoMedicarereportingintheUS.................................................................................. 72No.13-09 Refugeesandmigrantsrescuedatsea....................................................................................... 73No.10-09 InfluenzaAH1N1virus................................................................................................................. 74No.9-09 Lifeboatlaunchesduringabandonshipdrills.............................................................................. 75No.01-09 UnitedStates–Responsibilityforstevedores............................................................................ 76No.02-08 Lifeboataccidentswithon-loadreleasehooks.......................................................................... 77No.03-04 Accidentsinvolvingcrewandstevedoresduringcargooperations......................................... 79No.04-02 Master’sResponsibilityforSafetyofSurveyors.......................................................................... 80

CargoNo.01-11 Damagetocargoesofwindturbineblades............................................................................... 82No.13-10 Argentina–Localcustomsregulations....................................................................................... 84No.10-10 FinesinLebanon........................................................................................................................... 85No.08-10 Liquefactionofcargoesofironore............................................................................................. 86No.07-10 Carriageofdistillers’DriedGrain................................................................................................ 87No.06-10 Thedangersofhotworkoncargosecurings............................................................................. 88No.15-08 LoadingofhotcoalatMaputo,Mozambique............................................................................ 89No.10-07 LoadingofIronOreFinesinIndia............................................................................................... 90No.06-07 ExportofscrapmetalfromRussia............................................................................................... 91No.01-07 SteelcoilsfromChinacontaminatedbyasbestos..................................................................... 91No.08-06 Update:Containerlossesfromvesselsusingfullyautomaticcontainerlocks......................... 92No.05-06 Recentcontainerlossesfromvesselsusingautomaticlocks................................................... 93No.11-05 SeriesofrecentcaseshighlightsdangersofliquefyingChinesefluorspar............................. 94No.07-03 ThedangersofcarryingDirectReducedIron(DRI)................................................................... 95No.02-02 Manifoldmonitoringwhilstloadingliquidcargoes................................................................... 96

Bills of lading and other legal issuesNo.01-10 LOI,LOUandBLG–Confused?.................................................................................................. 97No.08-09 Measures to prevent drug smuggling......................................................................................... 98No.06-03 Straightbillsoflading–Doyourbillsuseclearwords?(PartII)................................................. 99No.13-02 Straightbillsoflading–Delivery–Doyourbillsuseclearwords?.........................................101No.05-01 BillsofLading:Istheshipper’sstowagerequestalwayscompulsory?..................................102


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Loss Prevention Circular No. 15-10

Increased risks of grounding in Barranquilla, Colombia

Figure 1- Magdalena River & Rio Cauca reaches the sea in Barranquilla

ordeparture.Vesselsenteringtheportshouldrequesttheiragents to provide the most up to date bathymetric charts and recommendations from the local authorities prior to enteringport.Whenpossible,vesselsshouldentertheportduringdaytime.

When possible the pilot should board the vessel three or moremilesoutsidetherivermouth.Thiswillallowthepilotmoretimetogetabetterfeelofthehandlingoftheship,shouldtherebeanemergencysituation.Mastersshouldworkcloselywiththepilotsinthediscussionandplanningoftheenteringmanoeuvre.Thepilotstationshouldbecontactedwellinadvancetoobtainanupdateontheconditions in order to get accurate data for the onboard risk assessment.TheMasterandthepilotshouldplantogethertoreducethevessel’ssideexposuretothecurrenttoavoidlosingruddercontroloftheship.

ThecircularhasbeendraftedandeditedbyGard’slocalcorrespondentinColombia–MarventuraServicesLtda.

BackgroundGardandotherP&IclubshaverecentlyexperiencedseveralseriouscasualtiesintheportofBarranquilla.TheportofBarranquillaislocatedonthewestbankoftheRioMagdalena(MagdalenaRiver)some10milesupriverfromthemouth,knownasBocasdeCeniza,intheCaribbeanSea.Theportreceivessome300vesselsmonthly.ThepurposeofthiscircularistoinformaboutthesituationinBarranquillaand to help members and clients to assess the increased risk whenenteringorleavingthisport.

The unusual situation in BarranquillaThe2010rainyseasoninColombia,withunusuallylargevolumes of rain falling for considerable periods of time has beentheworstin40years.TherainiestmonthsoftheyearareusuallyAprilandOctober,butin2010duetotheLaNiña1phenomenon,thelaterainyseasonstartedinlateAugustandisnowrunningintoDecember.Colombianclimateexpertsestimatethattherainswillcontinuewellinto2011,probablyuntilMarch,causingthelaterainyseasonof2010tomergewiththeearlyrainyseasonof2011.Atthetimeofwriting,thisyear’srainshavesofarleftmorethan130peopledeadandclosetotwomillionaffected.

Therearecurrentlyunusuallylargevolumesofwaterintherivers,andspecialdirectionaldamsatBocasdeCenizahavebeenconstructedtoacceleratetheflowoftheriverto maintain and improve depth and thus the draught for theshippingchannel.Thishascreatedunprecedentedconditions and increased the risks involved in navigating in theportofBarranquilla.

IncreasedriskwhennavigatingintheportofBarranquillaThe severe conditions described have caused difficulties foreventhemostexperiencedpilotsinBarranquillaandsomeoftheincidents,includingthreeseriousgroundingsinOctober/Novembermaybedueinparttomisjudgementoftheriverconditionsbythepilotsandmasters.Examplesofthis could be “presenting too much hull” to the current and turningatthewrongtime.Inadditiontothegroundings,theexcesswaterflowhasalsoledtootherincidentssuchascollisions due to miscalculating the speed and strength of thecurrent.

Withtheincreasingvolumeofwater,thesiltingupoftheriverbedandofthemouthoftheriverhasalsoincreased,causingchangesinthepatternofsiltdeposits,creatingshoalsandreductionsofdepthwheretherepreviouslywerenone.Thechangesintheriverbedalsohaveabearingonthespeedanddirectionofthecurrent.ThecurrentinthenavigationalchannelhasincreasedduetotheBernoulliprinciple2.ThishaschangedthehydrodynamicsoftheRiver.

Theauthoritieshaveexpressedconcernedandhaveincreasedthefrequencyofbathymetriesandsoundingsoftheriverbed.Theyhavealsostartedtoprovideinformationmoreregularly(bi-ortri-monthly,ratherthanonceamonth).Inaddition,apermanentdredgeisnowstationedatBocasdeCenizatocopewiththechangingcircumstances.

RecommendationsDuetotheunusualconditionsinBarranquilla,GardstronglyrecommendsMasterstobeawareoftherisksinvolvedandtaketheaboveintoconsiderationwhenplanningthearrival

1LaNiñaisacoupledocean-atmospherephenomenonthatisthecounterpartofElNiñoaspartofthebroaderElNiño-SouthernOscillationclimatepattern.2Ifthevolumeincreasesandtheareatodischargeremainsthesame,thesamevolumeisdeliveredbutatahigherspeed.


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Limitations of a vessels’ anchoring equipmentGard has seen an increasing number of cases involving lost anchors,andfromclasssocietieswelearnthatasmanyasoneanchorper100shipsislostannually.Thereasonsforlossofanchorsandchainaremany,andincludelackofseamanshipandinadequatemaintenance,butalsoinstancesofthechainandanchorbreaking,leavingaquestionmarkastothequalityofsuchpartsasprovidedbythemanufacturers.

InGard,aboutonein200shipsayearhasananchorrelatedclaim.Mostoftheseareduetothelossofanchorsatdesignatedanchorageswheretheauthoritiesrequirethelostitemstoberemoved,thusresultingina“wreckremoval”case.Themoreseriousandverycostlycasesarewhenavesselstartsdraggingitsanchorinbadweather,andwherethisleadstocollisionswithothervessels,groundingsandlossoftheship,ortodamagetocablesandpipelinesontheseabed.

StrengthandlimitationsofanchoringequipmentTherulesforanchoringequipment,thegrade,lengthandsizeofchain,numberandweightoftheanchors,thestrengthofthechainstoppersandthepoweroftheanchorwindlassesandthebrakes,areestablishedbytheclasssocieties.Theycanbefoundintherulesoftheindividualsocieties,orintheunifiedrulesofIACS,theInternationalAssociationofClassSocieties.Itisimportanttobeawarethattheseareminimumrequirements,andtoknowtheassumptionsmadeinthecalculations.

ForeachvesseltheclasssocietywillcalculateanEquipmentNumberbyusingaformula,wherethedisplacementofthevessel,thebreadthoftheshipandtheheightfromthesummerloadwaterlinetothetopoftheuppermosthouse,aswellastheprofileviewareaofthehull,superstructuresandhousesabovethesummerloadwaterlineareincluded.Thus,theforcesontheshipbycurrentandwindfromboththefrontandthesidesaretakenintoaccount.Theformulais based on an assumption that the speed of the current mayreach2.5m/sec,andwindspeedof25m/sec,whichrepresentquitehighforces,butitisalsoassumedthatthevesselcanuseascopebetween6and10,thescopebeingtheratiobetweenlengthofchainpaidoutandwaterdepth.However,largeshipsatdeepanchoragesdonothavesufficientchainonboardtoreachscopesofsuchmagnitude.

Ifashipisatanchorinballastcondition,theMastershouldalsobearinmindthatwindforcesactingonhisshipmaybe much larger than the calculations have accounted for,aslargershipsideareasarenowexposed,whilethemeasurementsenteredintheformulawastakenfromthesummerloadwaterline.Vesselsinballastwillalsobemorevulnerableiftheyhavetomoveawayinbadweather,asboththesteeringandthepropulsionmaybeaffected.

Classsocietiesmakeitclearthattheuseoftheanchoringequipmentisonlyforthetemporarymooringofavessel,withinaharbourorashelteredarea,whenawaitingberth,tide,etc.Itisparticularlyemphasizedthattheequipmentisnotdesignedtoholdashipoffafullyexposedcoastinbad

weatherortostopavesselfromdrifting.Theanchoringequipment,asdesignedinaccordancewiththeclassrules,willonlyholdthevesselingoodholdingground,whiletheholdingpowerissignificantlyreducedinpoorholdingground.

RecommendationIfavesselisanchoredinanareaexposedtoweather,itisnecessarytohaveapolicyastowhentoleave.TherehavebeencaseswhenMastershavebeenundercommercialpressurenottoleavetheanchorage,anddisastershavehappenedbecausetheMasterwastempted“towaitandseeuntilthemorning”,althoughtheweatherforecastwasbad.Inmakinghisdecisionwhethertostayortoleave,theMastershouldalsobeawareofthelimitationsofhisanchoringequipment.SomeMastersmaynothavefullknowledgeoftheselimitations,however,theyarelaiddownbytheclasssocietiesintheirrulesforcalculatingthedimensions,weightsandstrengthsoftheanchoringequipment.

Withthementionedlimitationsinmind,itcanbeseenfromcasesofshipsdragginganchorsinbadweatherthatMastershaveattimesplacedtoomuchtrustintheirvessel’sanchoringequipment.Today’sweatherforecastsareusuallyvery reliable and Masters should more often choose to weighanchorsandgoouttoseaintimeifheavyweatherisforecast.

Thefulltextoftherulesforanchoringequipmentcanbefoundinthedocument“Requirementsconcerningmooring,anchoringandtowing”,bysearchingthewebpagesoftheInternationalAssociationofClassificationSocieties:www.iacs.org.uk,ordirectlyinwww.iacs.org.uk/vdunifiedrequirements/ur_a_pdf148.pdf.

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Ocean towage of new building hull

Introduction Gard has seen an increasing number of incidents occurring duringoceantowageofhullsfromconstructionyardtooutfittingsite.Theincidentsaremainlycausedbythelossoftowageconnection,1followedbyaninabilitytore-establishthetowbeforeperiloussituationsariseandconsequentialstrandingoccurs.Wehaveoccasionallyseenthatalackofexperience,combinedwithincompleteriskassessmentsandplanning,togetherwithpressuretotransportthehulltotheoutfittingsiteasquicklyaspossible,haveresultedindecisionsbeingmadewhichhaveleadtothenecessaryprecautionsnotbeingtaken.Wintertowmayinvolveadditionalproblemsanddelay,e.g.wintertowsiniceconditions.Thewarrantytowagesurveywithregardstoweatherandensuringsafetowagearealsoattimesdisregardedtohastendelivery.

Responsibilities and commandWhoisincontrolofcontractingthetug;theowner,sub-contractororinsurer?Thepartycontractuallyobligedtotransportthevesselwillmostlikelyberesponsibleforcontractingthetugandwillberesponsibleforanyliabilitiesarisingoutofthetow.Ashipbuilder’sallinclusivepriceforavessel implies that it carries the contractual liability for delivery tothefittingoutsite.2

Eventhoughthetowmaybeconsidereda“deadship”,theMasterofthetugisalwaysincommandandhasthefinalwordinrespectofthesafetyofthetugandtow.Owners’representativescannotoverridethedecisionsofthetugmaster.Linesofcommunicationshouldbeestablishedwithcontractors/insurersandanyinformationregardingthetow,communicatedtothem.

Contractors and yard issuesInourexperiencetherearedifferingpracticesamongtugoperators,andtheseshouldbeconsideredwhenselectingacandidateforthetowageoperation.Thetypeofcontract3 entered into could also affect the outcome of any incident arisingduringthetowageoperation.Thetugmaster’sandcrew’spreviousexperienceofoceantowingisessential.

Gardhasalsoseenthatyardsfrequentlyplaceadditionalequipmentandsectionsonboardvessels,henceadditionaltimemustbeusedonrepeatsurveys,fasteningandrecalculationofstability.Dueconsiderationsshouldalsobegiventoanypossiblesub-contractorsthatmaybeinvolvedinthewayofsteeragetugs,harbortugs,etc.inordertoconductthevoyageinasafemanner.

Warranty survey4 AWarrantyClauseshouldbeinsertedinthecontractwiththetugoperatorwithpreferablyoneorseveralnamedsurveyorswhoshouldbeentrustedtoundertakethewarrantysurveyfortheintendedtowage,asurveywhichshouldincludethetug,thetowandtheequipment.Thewarrantysurveyorisappointedbytheinsurerbutthecoststhereofarecoveredbytheassured.

Thewarrantysurveymustbecompletedpriortodeparture,andany recommendations given by the surveyor must be carried outbeforetheconvoyisallowedtodepart.Ifanythinghappenstotheconvoyenrouteandaportofrefugeisrequested,thewarrantysurveyorshouldrevisittheconvoyinordertoreconfirmtheconditionofthetugandtow.Anydeviationfromorshortcomingsfromtheobservationsmadebythewarrantysurveyormayinfluenceinsurancecovertotheextentthatinsuranceisvoid.

Risk assessment and planning considerationsWhenconductingtowageduringadverseweathertugpower,endurance(bunkercapacity),theneedforsufficientbollardpullandpower,weatherrouting,reportingandpassageplanning–includingaportofrefugeplan–shouldbeconsidered.Itisimportanttoselectatugbasedonsize(lengthanddisplacement),especiallyduringwintertowing.Bollardpullisnottheonlycriteria.

Considerationshouldalsobegivenastowhethertheequipmentonboardthetugisold,whetherallcertificatesarewithindate,thatthetowingwireandshacklesetc.areingoodconditionandthattheemergencytowingwireisinanacceptableconditionandcorrectlyinstalled.

Fortheunmannedtow,safeaccesstotheobjectisimportantandmaintainingthesameand,whenpossible,inspectthetowforherstructuralintegrity(noaccumulationofwater).Inordernottoloosetheobjectwhenatowispartedfromthetugatranspondercouldbeconsideredputonboardthetow.Inaddition,thetowshouldbewelllitandwhenpassingarea’swithheavynavigationitisadvisabletobroadcastnavigationwarningswithinformationaboutthelengthbetweentugandtow.

Thetowshouldbetrimmedbysterntoimprovecoursestability,andtheruddershouldbesecuredamidships.Amongtheshaftproblemswhichmayariseareshaftnotconnectedtomainengine,bracketfastening,lubricationofthesterntube,shaftalignmentandsecuringofpropeller.Thetowtobeequippedwithemergencytowinggear/bridleforuseifmaintowinggearbreaks.

RecommendationsWhenadeadshipistowedthereisno-onepresenttorepresenttheowner,thusifanymishapoccursthereisanurgentnecessityto dispatch a member from the management to look after the owners’interests.Thoseinvolvedshouldalsoensurethatthewarrantysurveyor’srecommendationsaremetandthatanyrecommendedweatherconditions/windowisadheredto.

The choice of tug operator and tug may have a future impact onthebottomline,andowners/builders(contractors)shouldensurethatprudentchoiceismadeasfarasmanning,pastrecord,andpresenceinthemarketisconsidered,tonameafewoftheissues.Compliancewithrecommendationsmadebythewarrantysurveyorshouldbeadheredtoforthwith,includinguseofexternalassistancesuchasadditionaltugs,pilot,orridingcrew.

1Reasonsforwiredamagecouldbe(1)wireswerenothandledwithcare,(2)wiressnappedduetochafingonthesternofthetugs,(3)thewiresandwire-protectorswerenotwell-monitored,(4)thecrewwastoolaterefreshingthetouchpointofthewireonthestern,(5)lackofknowledgeofslackingofthewireinrelationtothewaterdepth,(6)thewiresweretouchingtheseabedwhichwascoveredwithobstructions,(7)thecrewfailedtohaulinthewiresontime,socontactwiththeseabedcouldnotbeavoided,and(8)crewsweretoolatepayingoutthetowingwireorreducingspeedwhenexcessiveforcescameonthewire(weather,tug).2Classisnotconcernedwiththetowingprocessunlessspecificallyinstructedtoundertakea“Warrantysurvey”.Membersshouldthereforebeawareofthedifferentrolesandresponsibilitiesoftheclasssurveyorandthewarrantytowagesurveyor.EventhoughthehullisfullyapprovedbyClass,watertightness,leakingvalves,hatches,tanksetcismaynotinspectedbyClass.3BIMCOTowHireorTowconandsimilar.4Warrantytowagesurveyisasurveytoascertainthattugandtowareequippedandmannedfortheintendedvoyageandshortcomingshavetobeattendedtobeforedepartureisgranted.


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Anchoring within Malaysian waters off Singapore EarlierthisyearweaddressedtheproblemsofanchoringincongestedareasoffSingapore.1InthiscircularweaddresstheproblemsencounteredwhenanchoringwithinMalaysianwatersoffSingapore.Sofar,threevesselscoveredbyGard have been arrested and fined for not having notified Malaysian authorities of their arrival and anchoring outside theouterportlimitsofTanjunPelepasandJohorportsandfornon-paymentoflightdues.

Itiswellknownthatthereareno“internationalwaters”outsideSingaporewaters;shipsareeitherinSingapore,MalaysiaorIndonesia.WhenanchoringoffMalaysia,itshouldbeborneinmindthatMalaysianterritorialwatersextend12nauticalmilesfromthebaseline,ifnotlimitedbyotherStateboundaries.

AmendmentstoTheMerchantShippingOrdinance19522

Section491BoftheMalaysianMerchantShippingOrdinance1952stipulateswhichshipsmustnotifytheDirectorofMarineofactivitieswithinMalaysianwaters.TheDirectormay impose terms and conditions including fees on the activitiespermitted.Theowner,masteroragentoftheshipmaybefoundguiltyofanoffence,aswellasriskingafineofMYR100,0003orimprisonmentforuptotwoyears,forcontraveningtheordinance.

The Marine Department of Malaysia has recently amended theMerchantShippingOrdinancetoalsoincludevesselsengaged in activities such as:

a. Layingupb. Weldingandotherhotworksc. Anchoringinnon-anchorageareasd. Anyformofunderwateroperations

The Marine Department of Malaysia advises4 that notification to the Director of Marine can be made at the nearestportofficeduringnormalworkinghours.

AsforthepaymentofLightDues,thisisregulatedbyAct250,FederationLightDuesAct1953,5whichstatesthat“everyshipwhichinthecourseofavoyageentersanyportorplacewithinPeninsularMalaysia,otherthanshipsexempted,shallpaylightduesasprescribed.”6

Risk of finesItshouldbenotedthatoncevesselshavebeenarrestedfornon-paymentoflightdues,itcanberatherexpensivetoobtaintheirrelease.ArateofRegisteredNetTonnagexMYR0.20X10hasbeenleviedasapenalty.AuthoritiesmayrequestabondofMYR50,000issuedbyalocalregisteredbank,priortoreleasingthevessel.TheMarineDepartmentappearstoprefertodealwithalocalregisteredshippingagentratherthanwithaP&IClubrepresentative,andwillonlyacceptaLetterofUndertakingfromshippingagentswhilewaitingforsecurityguaranteestobeissuedbyabank,whichmaytakeuptofiveworkingdays.

RecommendationsFinesfornon-paymentofharbourduesetc.arenotcoveredbyGardRule47andarethereforeoutsidetheP&Icover.Ouradvice to Members and clients entering Malaysian Territorial Waters is to arrange for notification of arrival and the paymentofduesthroughaMalaysianshippingagent.

Footnotes1GardLossPreventionCircularNo.11-09:DangerousanchoringintheSingaporearea.2MDCLegalAdvisers,“TheMerchantShippingOrdinance1952”,MDCPublishersPrinters,1996.3MYR=MalaysianRinggit.4MarineDepartmentMalaysia,MalaysianShippingNoticeMSN15/2009,dated13Oct2009.5LawsofMalaysia,Act250,FederationLightDuesAct1953,reprint2006.6AdditionalinformationcanbefoundatMarineDepartmentMalaysiawww.marine.gov.my/

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Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area

TheMaritimeandPortAuthoritiesofSingapore(MPA)recentlycalledameetingwithrepresentativesoftheP&IClubstodiscussparticularproblemsofdangerousanchoringintheSingaporearea.

VesselsnotanchoringwithinSingaporeportlimitsare,forcommercialreasons,optingtoanchorinouterportlimitareas(OPL).TheEastandWestOPLareasusedforanchoringare,however,rathernarrowspacessituatedbetweentheportlimitsandthetrafficseparationscheme(TSS)throughtheSingaporeStrait.Theseareasarebecomingverycongested,beingpopularwithownersforthepurposesofbunkering,takingsupplies,changeofcrew,repairsorjustwaitingforcargooperations.Duetothecongestion,someanchoredvesselsarestrayingintotheTSS,andarethusviolatingtheInternationalRegulationsforthePreventionofCollisionsatSea(COLREG).TheMPAstatesthatvesselsinbreachofCOLREGRule10(g)byanchoringintheTSSarebeingreportedtotheirrespectiveflagadministrations.Itappearsfromthevesselshavingbeenreported,thatSingaporeauthoritiesalsoseemtoreportvesselsanchoredinPrecautionaryAreasforbeinginbreachofCOLREG.

WhenitcomestobunkeringatSingapore,andthetendencytobunkerinOPLareas,itshouldbenotedthattherisksfactorsconcerningbothbunkerqualityandquantityhavebeenconsideredhigherinOPLareasthanfromsuppliersoperatingwithinthemuchmoreregulatedportlimits.TherearealsotwobunkeranchoragesinthewesternsectoroftheSingaporePort,locatedconvenientlyclosetotheTSS,wherevesselsof20,000GTandabove,stayinglessthan24hours,maytakebunkersatreducedportdues.Vesselsotherthangastankersandchemicaltankers,withadraftof11.5metersorless,mayalsobeexemptedfromcompulsorypilotageatthesebunkeringstations.

TheMPAhasalsopointedtoseveralinstancesofdamageto subsea cables by incorrect anchoring and has alerted the P&IClubstothisproblem.Whenavesselisanchoringtooclosetochartedcablesandpipelines,theownersofthecables/pipelinesareinformedofthevessel’sparticulars,toenablethemtomakeaclaimagainstthevessel,shouldanydamageoccur.OPLisa“loose”term,buttheEasternOPLisconsideredboundtothenorthbyJohorePortlimitsandtothesouthbythewestboundTSS.Itshouldbenotedthatthis5milelongareaisverynarrowandthereareseveralsubmarinecablesrunningthelengthofit.

WehavealsobeenadvisedthattheMPAisindiscussionwithMalaysianandIndonesianportauthorities,inordertoreachanagreementforvesselsanchoringintheTSS,ordamagingsubseacablesandpipelines,tobepenalisedbytheStatehavingjurisdictionoverthearea.

TheproblemofcongestionofvesselsoffSingaporeisnoteasytosolve,butthereisalwaysthepossibilityofseekingdesignatedanchoragesinsideSingaporeportlimits.VesselsshouldnotanchorintheTSSorPrecautionaryAreas,andcareshouldbetakennottoanchortooclosetosubseacablesandpipelines.Claimsfordamagecausedbyanchoringinwayofcablesandpipelines,orbydragginganchorsacrosssuchequipmentareverycostlytotheClub.

TherehavebeenanumberofcontactdamagesbetweenshipsatanchorinOPLareasduringrecentmonths,mostlyintheEastarea.Foranchoringincongestedareas,fullalertnessisrequiredandanchoringatnightshouldbeavoidedifpossible.InlocationssuchasthecongestedSingaporeOPLs,windandtidalcurrentsmustbeconsidered;ananchorwatchshouldbekeptatalltimesandtheengineattheready.Forthetimebeing,whenanchoringoffSingapore,thekeymessageisextremecaution.

For further information on anchoring in general please see thefollowingGardpublicationsGardNews193Whatif...?’-Planningfortheunexpectedbefore an emergency developsGardNews177Anchoring-Gettingintoasafehavenorintoapotentialdisaster?GardLossPreventionCircularNo.14-08:AnchoringanddeterioratingweatherconditionsGardGuidancetoMasters,section2.14.3Anchoring.


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Damage to fixed objects when manoeuvring in confined watersGard has recently seen a noticeable increase in cases involvingsignificantcontactdamagetofixedobjectsbyvesselsmanoeuvringinconfinedwaters,mostlywithinport.Fixedobjectsincludeberths,docks,locksandshoresideequipmentsuchascranes.Thecontactdamagehasresultedinsomeverylargeclaimsfortherepairand/orlossofuseofsuchobjects.Theseincidentsalsoriskharmingpeopleandtheenvironment(e.g.pollutionfrombreachedoiltanks),andtheshipitselfisoftenleftwithexpensiverepairsandlossoftradingtime.

Outlinedbelowarefiveofthemostcommonfactors,inGard’sexperienceincasesinvolvingcontactdamagetofixedobjectsinconfinedwaters.

1. Prevailing and forecast conditions not properly assessedThecumulativeeffectofwind,sea,currentandtidalconditionsontheshipmaynothavebeenfullyappreciated.Asaresultoftheabovefactorsthevesselcanexperiencedifficultiesinmanoeuvringinacontrolledfashionandwithinsafeparameters.Insufficientallowancehasbeenmadefortheforcesactingontheship.Thesecaneasilyturnouttobegreaterthanexpectedandbeyondthecapabilitiesoftheshipand,duetotheunforeseeneffectsoftheprevailingand/orforecastconditions,insufficienttugswouldhavebeenemployedtohandlethevessel.Thereareinstanceswheremanoeuvringsinconfinedwatersshouldbedeferreduntilconditionshaveimproved.Thisalsoincludescasesofreducedvisibility.

2. Unfamiliarity with the ship’s manoeuvrabilityApilotwillknowthelocalwatersbest,however,themasterismorefamiliarwithhisvessel’smanoeuvrability.Duetotherotationofcrew,familiaritywiththeship’sownmanoeuvringsystemscanbelacking,and,astechnologyandcomputerisationisbecomingevermoreprevalent,trainingmaybeneededtoensurethatcrewmembersarefamiliarwiththevessel’ssystems.Itisimportanttoincludeinformationastothevessel’smanoeuvrabilityinthemaster/pilotinformationexchangebeforethecommencementofthepilotage.Theeffectofchangesinthevessel’sdraft,trimandwindagecharacteristicsmustalsobetakenintoconsiderationwhendiscussingthevessel’smanoeuvrability. 3. No agreed manoeuvring planJusthowthevesselwillmanoeuvrewhenincloseproximitytofixedobjectsisoftennotplannedand/oragreedinadvancewithinthebridgeteamand/orwiththepilot.Thisnot only concerns the location that the vessel is proceeding to/from,butalsootherfixedobjectswhichthevesselwillpasswithincriticalcloseproximity.Often,insufficienttimeisinvestedinadvancetoconsiderhowthevesselcanbeexpectedtobehave,givenitsmanoeuvringcharacteristicsandtheprevailingconditions.Theclosestpointsofapproachareoftennotcalculatedasarecriticalbearings,transits and ranges to assist in determining the limits of the safemanoeuvringparameters.

4. Poorly executed manoeuvreEventhebestshiphandlersoccasionallygetitwrong,althoughitisperhapssurprisinghowverywronginsomecases.Excessivespeedisacommonfactorasispiloterror

andthebridgeteamcanbereluctanttointervenewhenthepilotisclearlymakingmistakes.Communicationwithtugs,terminalsandmooringcrewsleadingtomisunderstandingshasalsobeenacontributoryfactor.Evenwhereamanoeuvringplanisagreed,prevailingcircumstancescanrequiretheplantobechangedandtheremaybelittletimetoreacttonewsituations.Inparticular,changesinwindconditions and the movements of other vessels often create problems.Inanumberofcasesitappearsthatabortingthemanoeuvre to try again has not been considered or has been lefttoolate.

5. Loss of manoeuvring capabilityThelossofengines,propulsion,steerage,orthrustersis,perhapssurprisingly,alesscommonfactorthanthosementionedabove.Thereareinstanceswheresuchalosshasoccurredimmediatelybefore/aftermanoeuvringsystemshavebeen,orareduetobe,repairedoroverhauled.Unfortunately,duringtheseperiodsofincreasedrisk,additionalprecautionsappearnottohavebeentaken.Pre-sailingandpre-arrivalchecksonmanoeuvringsystemsareimportant,especiallyafteralongoceanpassageorstationaryperiod.Lessobviousfactorsinvolvesquatand/orinteraction.Althoughalossofmanoeuvringcapabilitywillinevitablymakecontactavoidancemoredifficult,exercisesanddrillscanbeusedtotestback-upsystems,includinguseoftheship’sanchors.Havingsomethinginreserveisimportant,butbeingabletoputthatreservetoeffectiveuseisequallyimportant.

RecommendationItisbettertoabortthemanoeuvreandmakeasecondattemptthantofailonthefirst.Duringdrills,exercisesandtestsofequipmentpriortoarrival,theMastershouldensurethatthecrewisabletorespondatanytimetoanemergencysituationrelatedtomanoeuvring.Tasksshouldbeproperlydefinedandassignedtoqualifiedpersonnel,and the Master should ensure that the company procedures arefullyunderstoodbyeverybodyinvolved.Effectiveandclearcommunicationisimportant.TheMastershouldclosely monitor the manoeuvres and should not hesitate to comment,giveadvice,orevenabortanapproachifheisuncomfortablewiththesituation.

Seealso“Bumpsandscrapescanbecostly!”fromGardNews183.Someshipownershavesoughttostandardiseequipmentacrossvesselsintheirfleetandtoalwaysassignseniorofficerstothesameclassofvessel.Seealso“Master/pilotexchangeofinformation”fromGardNews154.SeeGuidancetoMasters2.13.4Navigationinconfinedwaters–BridgeResourceManagement.SeealsoLossPreventionCircularno.04-00:Pilotonthebridge-Role,authorityandresponsibility.

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Anchoring and deteriorating weather conditions

IntroductionGardhasrecentlyseenseveralsevereincidentswhereanchoredvesselshaveendedupdraggingtheiranchors.The purpose of this circular is to highlight some of the issuessurroundinganchoringoperationsinadverseweatherconditions.

Experience from casualtiesItisinevitablethatvesselsmayberequiredtoanchoroffshoreatmoreexposedanchorageswhilstwaitingforaberthtobecomeavailable.Thevesselsmaybeatsuchananchoragefordaysorevenweeksandwillbeexposedtowindandwaves.Oneofthemostimportantfactors identified during the analysis of the incidents is the importance of making the appropriate decisions in time whentheweatherisdeteriorating.Seafarersareoftentakenbysurprisebydeterioratingweatherandfailtopreparetheirvesselforsuchasituation.Severalimportantlessonscanbelearnedfromthetwoincidentsdescribedbelow.

Collision at anchorageAbulkcarrier(vesselAlpha)recentlycollidedwithanotherbulkcarrier(vesselBravo)whiledraggingitsanchorinstrongwinds.Thetwoshipswereanchoredatanexposedoffshoreanchorage.

Duringthemorninginquestion,asoutherlyweatherfrontcamethroughtheanchorage–changingthewinddirection

fromoff-toonshore.At0900,theOOWonboardvesselAlphanoticedthattheshipwasdraggingtheanchor.Themasterwasinformedandhedecidedtoweighanchoranddeparttheanchorageat0913.

However,vesselAlpha’screwencountereddifficultiesinweighinganchor.DuringtheanchorretrievalprocessthevesseldriftedtowardsvesselBravo,whichwasanchoredtothenorth.

At0935vesselAlphapitchedheavily,resultinginthepropellercomingclearofthewaterandthemainenginebeingshutdownbytheoverspeedtrip.VesselAlpha’smainenginewasrestarted;however,itwastoolatetoavoidacollisionandat0939thevesselcollidedwithvesselBravo.ThetwoshipsmovedapartandthenmadecontactasecondtimebeforevesselAlphafinallymadeitswayclearoftheothervessel.

Thefollowingcausescontributedtothisincident:(1)Theshipsintheanchoragewereanchoredtoocloseto

eachother.

(2)VesselAlpha’sOOWdidnotuseallavailablemeanswhilekeepinganchorwatch.Thisleadtohimfailingtoidentifythechangeintheship’spositionuntil40minutesaftertheshiphadbeguntodragitsanchor.Thedecisiontoleavetheanchoragethereforecametoolate.


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(3)VesselAlpha’smasterdidnotincreasethescopeofcablelaidout,eitherpriortooronthedayoftheincidentdespitetheweatherreportsandthechangingweatherconditionsattheanchorage.

Grounding following dragging of anchorAstronggalepassedthroughanexposedanchorageinthesouthernhemisphere,producing50knotsoutheasterlywindsand7metrewaves.Thegalecreateddangerousanddifficultconditionsattheanchorage,particularlyforlightlyballastedlargebulkshipswithlimitedmanoeuvrability.

Thedaybeforetheincidentoccurredtherewere56shipsatanchorwaitingtoentertheport.Inresponsetotheforecastgaleforcewindstwoshipsdecidedtodeparttheanchorage.Laterthatdayandduringthenightfurthershipsputouttosea.Bythenextmorningtherewereonly9shipsoutoftheoriginal56leftattheanchorage.Atleast3shipsexperienceddifficultiesinmanoeuvringorweredraggingtheiranchorsduringthatmorning.

Oneshipwasdrivenashorebytheweatherandgrounded.Anotherhadgreatdifficultiesmanoeuvringwhilstonly0.7nmawayfromtheshorelineandnearlyranaground.Athirdshipwasunabletoweightanchoranddraggedtowardstheshoreline.

TheinvestigationundertakenbyTheMaritimeAuthorityofNSWfoundthatthegroundingofthebulkcarrierresultedfromaseriesoferroneousjudgementsanddecisionsmadebythemaster.Themostsignificantbeing:

(1)themaster’sfailuretorealisethepotentialimpactoftheweatherforecastfortheanchorageforthatparticularday;

(2)aninitialdecisiontorideoutthegaleforcewindsatanchor; and

(3)adecisionnottoballasttheshipforheavyweather.

Recommendations and Lessons LearnedAgoodanchorwatchshouldalwaysbemaintainedandmainenginesshouldalwaysbeavailableforusewhenatexposedanchorages.Weatherconditionsmaydeteriorateatshortnotice.

Thefollowingareimportantfactorswhenatanchor:• Regularpositionchecksusingallavailablemeans

includingvisualaids,GPS,ECDISandradar

• Thetimeavailabletoreactbasedonthelimitationsoftheanchorageandnearbyhazards

• Theweatherforecast• Communicationwatchandregistrationofinformation

received from shore

• Thelevelofexperienceofthebridgeteam

• Theloadlimitationsoftheanchoringequipment

Intheeventthatrapidlydeterioratingweatherisforecast,theMastermustmaketimelydecisionswhetherto:• takeonheavyweatherballastbeforeconditions

deteriorate• deployanextraanchor• payoutmoreanchorcable• weighanchoranddeparttheanchorage• sliptheanchorcableifnecessary• callfortugassistance• monitorthesituationandletthevesseldragina

controlledmannerthroughtheanchorage.

Recentincidentsindicatethatdeterioratingweatherconditionsareanincreasingchallengetothecrew.Gardwouldliketoemphasisetheimportanceofdetailedplanningandriskassessmentoftheoperationwhenvesselsareanchoring.Knowledgeoftheship’smanoeuvringcharacteristics and the particulars of the anchorage are very important.Itisalsoimportanttocontinuouslyevaluatethechanges in the situation and if necessary to change the initial plan.

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Moored vessels breaking out from their berths

Introduction/IncidentsGardhasinvestigatedseveralP&IandH&Mincidentsinvolvingmooredvesselsbreakingoutfromtheirberths,followingarecentincreaseinthefrequencyofsuchincidents.Theconsequencesoftheseincidentsrangefrompersonalinjury,significantcontactdamagetothevesselincludingrangingandgroundingdamage,damagetoadjacentvessels,shore/terminalstructurestopollutiondamagetotheenvironment.Themajorityoftheseincidentsoccurredduringperiodsofadverseweather,withhighwindsactingonvesselswithlargewindageareas.

Wind speeds recorded in the above incidents ranged from63km/hto120km/h(Beaufortforce7-12),althoughinonecasetheactualwindspeedwasestimatedtohavebeen much higher due to the funnelling effect of container stacksashore.Inmanycasesadditionalmooringlinesweredeployedinanticipationofhighwinds,ultimatelytonoavail.Inonecasethevesselmooringswereevensupplementedbyshorelineswithloadmonitoring,however,thevesselstillbrokefreeduetoexcessiveloadsonthelines,seeminglyasaresultofabnormaltidalflowcausedbyrestrictedunderkeelclearance.Eventugscouldnotpreventherfromultimatelygrounding.Inanothercase,thevesseldidgettugstoholdheralongsidetheberth,onlytostandthemdownprematurely.Thesecondtimethevesselcameofftheberthshegroundedresultinginsubstantialbottomdamage.

Portsaroundtheworldhavevariousberthlayoutsandmooringfacilitiesandareexposedtodifferentwind,tidalandswellconditions.ItisimportantthattheMastertakesinto consideration the key critical aspects of any given port alongwiththevessel’scharacteristics,inordertoensurethatthevesselisadequatelymooredtowithstandtheanticipatedmooringforces,eveninnormalconditions.ItisequallyimportantthattheMasterisreadytotakeextraprecautionstokeepthevesselalongsideinadverseweather,tidalandswellconditionsandisreadyandabletovacatetheberthsafelywhenconditionsmakeitdifficultformooringstocope.

Risk AssessmentsWhilst incidents of this nature may involve reports of defectivemooringequipmentorlackofattentiontomoorings,1 investigations suggest that in many incidents aproperriskassessmentwasnotundertaken.Itisrecommended that appropriate risk assessments are carried out,takingintoconsiderationthevessel’scharacteristics,type,size,tradingpatternandtheprevailingweatherconditions.Factorstobetakenintoconsiderationinclude,butshouldnotbelimitedto,thefollowing:

Examples of wind, tidal, swell and weather related factors• Windloadsexertedontoavessel’ssuperstructure

andhullabovethewaterline,whichcanformalargeproportion of the total load on the mooring system dependingonthemooredvessel’slocationandcharacteristics.

• Waveloadsonavessel,whichcanvarydependingonthevessel’sresponsetowavesofvaryingperiodsandheights.Ofspecialconcernaremooringsinrelativelyshallowwaterdepths,inlowtideandhighwave

conditions.Theseconditionscanleadtoviolentvesselbehaviouratthemoorings(breakingwaves,excessivemotions,snatchloadsetc.)andinextremecases,lossofunder-keelclearanceinwavetroughsforlarger,deeperdraftvessels.

• Forcesresultingfromsteadycurrentsincombinationwithotherloadings,especiallyatlowwaterlevelsinbreakingwaveconditions,whichcanalsoexertsubstantialloadsonaship’smooringsystem.

• Theeffectofwindagainsttideorcurrentandtheeffectofachangeintidedirectiononmoorings.

• Tidalsurgesbefore,duringandafterstorms,whichmaybewellawayfromtheareainwhichthevesselisberthed,causingunusuallylargetidalrangesandlowerthanexpectedwaterlevels.

Examples of port/berth related factors• Characteristicsandhistoryoftheportandberthandany

unusualoccurrences.

• Peculiarfeaturesoftheberthsuchasoverhangingberthingarrangements,obstructionbygantrycranes,windfunnellingeffectsfromshorestructures.

• Design/type,position,qualityandadequacyofshoremooringequipment,includingstormmooringsandfenders,andoftugs.

• Exposureattheberthtowind,tideandswellconditions.

• Delayintheavailabilityofshoremooringequipment,mooringgangs,pilotsandtugsetc.innormalaswellasemergencysituations.

• Proximityofothervesselsandhazardsinthevicinityoftheberth.

• Effectofpassingvesselsonvesselsmooredalongside.

• Availabilityofstormbollards,whichmaynotbeuseableduringcargooperationsifmooringsrestrictworkingontheberth.

• Port/terminalproceduresintheeventofextremeconditionsandtheirsuitability.

Examples of vessel related factors• Size/typeofvessel,notablythewindagearea(including

windageareaduetocargoorcontainersifapplicable)andtherelatedeffectsofthesamewithchangesinwind,tidalandswellconditions.

• Design/typeandconditionofmooringequipment,itslimitationsandweaknesses.2

• Suitabilityofthemooringpattern-numberoflines,lengths,anglesandleadsandtheabilitytomaintaineventensiononthelines.

• Manninglevel/crewavailabilityfornormalaswellasadverseweatherconditions.


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• Weatherforecastandwarnings-reliabilityandfrequency.

• Readinessofengines,thrusters,anchorsandpowerondeck.

• Availability,conditionandreadinessofadditionalmoorings.

ConclusionItisrecommendthattheMastercarriesoutaproperriskassessment for the different mooring conditions and loadings to suit their specific vessel characteristics and mooringlocationinnormalaswellasadverseweatherconditions.TheMasterisencouragedtobeproactiveinrequestinginformationfromtheport,pilotsandagentsandinestablishinghowwarningswillbebroadcastbytheport.However,heshouldnotrelywhollyoninformationfromotherparties.Intheeventthatdeterioratingconditionsareforecast,theMastershouldmaketimelydecisionsto

ensure that the vessel is brought to a state of immediate readiness.AmongstotherthingstheMasterwillwanttoensurethat,beforeconditionsbecomeextreme,thevesselisfullymanned,isappropriatelyballastedforheavyweather(withdueregardtounderkeelclearanceattheberthandintheport),hasenginesready,andisinclosecontactwiththe terminal and port authorities in relation to timing and availabilityforstoppageofcargooperations,deploymentofadditional(storm)moorings,andfortugs,pilotsetc.Mostimportantly,theMasterwillneedtodecidewhetherto remain alongside or depart from the berth to sea or a safeanchorage.Itisworthbearinginmindthatadditionalprecautionssuchasextramooringlinesmaynotpreventashipfrombreakingfreefromhermoorings.

Last,butbynomeansleast,itisalsoworthrememberingthat mooring stations can be very dangerous places in badconditions,henceanothergoodreasonnottodelaydeparturefromtheberthuntilitisdangerouslylate.

1SeeforexampletheAustralianTransportSafetyBureaureportpublishedinMay2008andfoundat:http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2006/MAIR/pdf/mair232_001.pdf2Forexample,somewinchbrakesaredesignedtorenderunderexcessiveloadtoavoidthedangersofpartinglines.OCIMFrecommendsthatthewinchbreakbesetat60%MBL(MinimumBreakingLoad)ofthemooringline.Ifthewinchstartstorenderthenthedesignconditionsarebeingexceeded.SeeIntertankocommentaryonwinchbrakesettingsat:http://www.intertanko.com/templates/intertanko/issue.aspx?id=40247

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Global wave watch system

Thewinterseasoninthenorthernhemispherehasagainclaimedvictimsatseaassevereweatherconditionscontinuetobeachallengeforshipsandtheircrews.Themajorityofthelargecasualtiesoccurredwhentheshipwasaffectedbystormyweather.Itappearsinformationaboutandpreparationsforsevereweatherconditionsmaynotbeattherequiredlevel.

Wave Watch IIIOne important piece of information is an accurate and understandableweatherforecast.Shipsalreadyreceiveinformationabouttheexpectedwindsandtemperaturesbutnotallhaveaccesstowaveinformation.

WaveWatch3isaserviceprovidedbytheUSNavythroughthe Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center.Theserviceisopentothegeneralpublicandfreeofchargeandmaybesubjecttoperiodsofnon-availability.

WaveWatch3(WW3)isawebservicewhichprovidesglobalwaveforecasts.Itpresentstheforecastsfordifferentoceansinaselfexplanatoryandinformativeway.Notalloceanareasarecoveredandtheservicesetsoutthemainwavepatternsproducedbythedifferentpressuresystems.Themodelshowssignificantwaves,swell,windwavesandwhitecapprobability.Theheightsanddirectionsareindicatedbytwodifferentcolorschemes.WW3ispresentingtheforecastwavedevelopmentin12hourintervalsuptoamaximumof6daysahead.

Theforecastsarepresentedaslowerresolutionpictureswhichcaneasilybecopiedandforwardedbye-mailforvesselswithlimitedinternetconnectiononboard.

Thewebpagecanbefoundathttps://www.fnmoc.navy.mil and the WW3 is found at the bottom left of the page under the menu item Oceanography or https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil/PUBLIC/WW3/index.html.


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Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic SeaThis circular is based on a recent letter received from The Danish Maritime authorities highlighting the increased numberofnavigationalaccidentsinDanishwaters,andGard’sownexperiencewithsimilaraccidentsinthesamearea.

Asmembersandclientsareaware,IMOresolutionMSC.138(76)providesrecommendationsonnavigationthroughtheentrancestotheBalticSea,namelytheGreatBelt(RouteT)andTheSound.Therecommendationsincludetheuseof pilots for certain types of ships in high traffic density waters.ThepurposeofIMOresolutionMSC138(76)wastoprovidethoseresponsiblefortheoperationofshipswithrecommendations on safe navigation through the entrances oftheBalticSeawiththeobjectivestoensuresafety,preventhumaninjuryorlossoflife,andtoavoiddamagetotheenvironment,inparticularthemarineenvironment,andtoshipsandtheircargoes.

InalettertotheInternationalGroupofP&IClubs,theDanishMaritimeAuthorityhasdrawntheshippingindustry’sattentiontoIMOresolutionMSC.138(76)andindicatingthatanumberofshipsaredisregardingtherecommendations.AccordingtoasafetystudyconductedbytheDanishMaritimeAuthority,duringtheperiodfrom1stJanuary2002to30thJune2005alone,22shipsgroundedintheGreatBeltandnoneoftheseshipshadapilotonboardatthetime.

TheDanishMaritimeAuthorityletterillustratesandemphasises that it is highly recommended to utilise the expertiseandlocalknowledgeofpilots,andthatasaminimum,vesselssailingthroughtheGreatBeltorTheSoundfollowIMO’srecommendationonnavigationthroughtheentranceoftheBalticSea.

DenmarkhasalsolaunchedaprocedurewherebyallvesselsenteringDanishwaterswithoutorderingapilotinaccordancewiththeIMOrecommendationwillbecontactedinordertodrawtheirattentiontotherecommendationsontheuseofpilots.Whenashipdoesnotcomply,themasterwillbeinformedthatDenmarkfindsitinconsistentwithsafenavigationpracticesandprocedurestoneglectanIMOrecommendation.Theseshipswillbereportedtothemaritimeauthorityintheship’sflagstate.

Thefollowingdocumentsareavailableatwww.gard.nounderNewsintheLossPreventionsection:

• The Danish Maritime Authority Letter.

• IMO resolution MSC.138(76)

• Intertanko model charterparty clauses in recognition and

support of IMO res MSC 138(76).

GeneralinformationonPilotageintheBalticcanbefoundattheBalticPilotageAuthoritiesCommissionwebsiteat:http://www.balticpilotage.comandhttp://www.pilotage.dk

VesselstowhichtheIMOrecommendationsdonotapplyareadvisedtonavigatewithextracautionthroughtheentrancestotheBalticSea,i.e.theGreatBelt(RouteT)andTheSound.

AguidetonavigationinDanishwaterscanbefoundat: http://www.frv.dk/en/ifm/navigation/navigation_ntdw.htm

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Winter season in the northern Baltic Sea

The2002/2003winterseasonwastheworstonrecordsincethewinterof1987.Ourstatisticsappeartoindicatethattheprecedingrelativelymildwintersmayhavelulledseafarersintoafalsesenseofsecurity.Howthisandfuturewinterswillunfoldremainstobeseen,butshipownersandoperatorswouldbewelladvisedtoensurethattheirseagoingpersonnelarewellawareoftheplanning,preparationandcarerequiredwhilenavigatinginice.

Approximately30%ofallaverageswhichoccurredinconnectionwithnavigationiniceintheBalticSeaduringthepastwinterseason,werecollisioncases.Thisisasubstantialnumberandleadsustoagainremindshipownersoftheissuesinvolved.

Themostcommoncausewascollisionbetweenvesselsinaniceconvoy.Undernormalcircumstancesblamehasbeenapportionedequallybetweenthecollidingvessels.Otherwise,indeterminingliability,emphasiswasplacedon:– Howthewatchkeeperhadbeenalertedbythevessels

involved,– Howvesselsaheadandabafthadbeenwarnedbythe

vesselwhichwasstuckorsloweddownintheice,– Distanceskeptbetweenthevessels,andofcourse– Theicesituationingeneral.

Insomecollisioncases,andinparticularwhenanassistingicebreakerisinvolved,thecasemaybesettledona“knock-for-knock”basis.Thismeansthatbothpartiescovertheirowncostofrepairs.Thesameprinciplemayalsobeusedoragreeduponbetweentheparties,whentwomerchantvessels,assistingeachotherwhennavigatinginice,areinvolvedinacollision.However,theabove“knock-for-knock” practice is only used in “standard” cases caused by difficulticeconditions.Ifgrossnegligenceorothersimilarcausesareinvolved,othermethodsofapportioningblamewillbeused. Analysisofthecollisioncasesshowsthatthevesselsinvolvedareveryoftenblamedfornotcomplyingwiththeapplicablerules;TheInternationalRegulationsforPreventingCollisionsatSea,1972(COLREGS72),andtheFinnish/Swedish“RulesforWinterNavigation”.

TheFinnish/Swedish“RulesforWinterNavigation”areendorsedbyGermany,DenmarkandtheBalticStates.InadditiontodirectingnavigationduringthewinterperiodinFinlandandSweden,theseRulessetthestandardforicenavigationintheBaltic,includingnavigationiniceinconjunctionwithicebreakersinthemajorityoftheBaltic.

Forfurtherdetailsaboutthe“RulesforWinterNavigation”pleaseseetheFinnishMaritimeAuthority’shomepageathttp://www.fma.fi/e/functions/icebreaking/

Navigationwhenthevesselispartofaconvoyisariskyoperation,andthecrewmustbealertandmaintainaproperlookoutatalltimes.Itisessentialthatallrelevantregulationsareproperlycompliedwith.BreachofCOLREGS72,especiallythebelowmentionedrules,appearstobethemost common cause of collisions:

–Rule5–Properlookout–Rule6–Safespeed–Rule7–Riskofcollision–Rule8–Actiontoavoidcollision–Rule13–Overtakingvessel–Rule17–Actionbystand-onvessel–Rule27(a)(i)–vesselnotundercommand(stopped)toshowtworedlights

The Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter Navigation” require(a) Strictwatchkeepingbothvisuallyandespeciallyby

radarandimmediatenotificationbyVHFradiowhenlossofspeedisexperienced.

(b) Incaseofstoppage:–Immediatesignallingincaseoffailureofothermeans of communication–Immediateenginemanoeuvring–Immediateruddermanoeuvring

RecommendationWhennavigatinginiceorinthevicinityofice,shipownersmustensurethattheironboardpersonnelarewellawareoftheregulationsgoverningsuchnavigation.Furthermore,mastersmustbeadvisedoftherequirementtoensurepropercompliancewiththegoverningregulationsandalsooftheutmostcarerequiredinordertopromotesafenavigation.

Thiscircularhasbeenproducedwiththevaluableassistance offormerHullClaimsManager,CaptainJohnHammaréninFinland.


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Operations in extremely cold climates

IntroductionOperationsinextremecoldenvironmentsareperhapsthemost demanding and challenging that a vessel and her crewmayexperience.Theextremecoldreducesthecrew’sefficiencyconsiderably.Inaddition,sensitivedeck-mountedequipmentandpipelinesareoftenatriskofdamageifprecautionsarenottakenintime.Thereisalsotheriskthaticedamagetovesselsmayresultinoilspills.

Damagerelatedtoextremecoldandnavigationiniceoccurseveryyear.Theyaremorefrequentatthebeginningofacoldperiod,andvesselsenteringsuchwatersinfrequentlyaremoreexposedthanothervessels.Extremecoldcausesdamagetocargo,vesselequipmentandinjuriestothecrew,whilenavigationinicecausesdamagetothehull,propellersand/orrudder.

AnarticleinGardNewsissueNo.127outlinedguidelinestopreventcoldweatherdamagestovesselsandtheirequipment.GardServiceshasalsotriedtoobtaininformationbasedonexperiencesgainedbyshipownersoperatinginextremecoldenvironmentsonafrequentbasis.Thefollowinglistisnotmeanttobeexhaustive,butshouldserveasareminder,astemperaturesintheNorthernHemisphereareagainverylow.

Deck mounted equipment• Frozenpipelinesareperhapsthemostcommon

damagethatoccurs.Thepipelinesshouldbeproperlydrainedwellinadvance.Donotforgetfirehosesandcouplings,whichinsomecasesmaybecomeinoperativeifnotproperlydrained.Exposedpipingshouldbeinsulatedtopreventfreezingwherenecessary.

• Periodicallypurgeairlinesondecktoremovewatercondensation.

• Freshwaterpipingsystemsareparticularlyatriskoffreezing.Considercirculatingwaterinthefreshwaterpipingsystem.

• Deck-mountedwinchesandothersensitiveequipmentshouldbecoveredtoavoidicingfromfreezingspray.Hydraulicequipmentshouldalsobestartedseveralhoursbeforeuse,inordertoachieveproper oil temperatures on hydraulic hoses before theyareexposedtohighpressure.Insomecasesitisrecommendedtokeeptheequipmentgoingconstantly.

• Considerstowingmooringropesandpilotladdersbelowdecktopreventfreezingandreducethechancesoficebuildup.

• Ifpossible,ballasttanksshouldbefilledwithwaterwithahighsalinity(andconsequentlylowerfreezingpoint).Furthermore,toavoidfreezingoftheairpipes,theballastlevelshouldbedropped.Frozenair pipes may cause severe damage both to tank structureandpumpsalike.

• Allspareelectricityshouldbeusedtoheattheaccommodationandcompartmentsexposedtotheiceandcold(forepeak,etc.).Keepdoorsclosedtoretaintheheat.

• Engineventilatorsmayinsomecasesbeturnedoff(butremainopen)toavoidfreezingofsensitiveequipmentintheengineroom.

• Iceondeckshouldpreferablyberemovedwithwoodenicemallets,toavoiddamagetothehullpaintcoatings.Itisalsorecommendedtokeepsufficient stocks of glycol and salt to remove and preventicebuildup.

• Safetyequipmentshouldbecheckedfrequently,includingsafetyhandlines,ifrigged.

• Move anchors periodically in order to prevent chains andwinchesfromfreezing.

• Alterationsinspeedand/orcourseshouldbeconsideredtoreducetheeffectsoffreezingspray.

• Deck and navigation lights can easily be damaged by thecoldandice,andshouldbecheckedfrequentlytoensuretheyremaininproperworkingorder.

Cargo holdsSeveraltypesofcargoareexposedtocontaminationfromwaterandlowtemperaturesandinsomecasesthismayincreasethecondensationproblem.• Ifcargoventilation(ifinstalled)isused,snowand

moist cold air may lead to condensation and should notbeblownintothecargoholds.

• Whencleaningtheholds,keeptheuseofwatertoanabsoluteminimum.Sweepholdsproperlyinadvanceofusingwater.Usepre-heatedwaterwheneverpossible.Preventdirtywaterfromaggregatingandfreezingbyremovingexcesswaterinlocationswherefreezingcouldoccur.

Crew• Lowtemperaturesreducethecrew’sphysicalability,

effectiveness,andcanimpairjudgement.Properclothing is therefore essentialtomaintaincrewsafetyandawareness.

• Reviewrotationofwatchesforcrewmembersworkinginexcessivelycoldareastoensureexposureiskeptataminimum.

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Navigation in ice• Aconsiderableamountofinformationonice

conditions and navigation in ice is available on the Internet.Forexample:- http://www.natice.noaa.gov/home.htm

provides global and regional sea ice analyses andforecastsfromtheUnitedStatesNationalIceCenter;

- http://www.cis.ec.gc.caprovidesinformationabouticeconditionsinCanada;and

- http://fram.nrsc.no/CEO_Training/Present.htmprovides general information on ice conditions intheBalticregion.

• Localmeteorologicalstationsaremorethanwillingtoshareimportantinformationwhencontacted.Icechartsarealsoreceivedontheweatherfacsimilereceiver.

• Instructionsfromicebreakersandlocalauthoritiesshouldbecarefullyfollowed.Ifyouaretakingshortcuts and are caught by the ice it may be difficult toreceivetimelyassistance.

• The effect of current on ice should not be underestimated.Ifyouarecaughtintheicewiththecurrentinanunfavourabledirection,thismayexposethevesseltocollision,groundingorothertypesofcontactdamage.

• Reversionofpropellersiniceshouldbedonecarefully and controlled to avoid damage to the rudderandpropellerblades.Itmaybeadvantageoustoruntheenginesaheadtowashawayicearoundthe propeller and rudder before attempting to run astern,whichagainshouldbekepttoaminimumtoavoidtherudderorpropellerbeingexposedtosolidice.

• Especiallyinballastcondition,thecoolingwaterinletsmaybechockedwithice.Thiscansubsequentlyleadtoalossofcoolingwater.Enginecrewmustbeproperlybriefedandmadeawareinordertoavoidsuchsituations.

• Forvesselswithhighairdraftorexposedrigging,icingcanaffectthestabilityofthevessel.Therefore,vesselsmayneedtolaybyeandremoveicewithmalletsorothersuitabletools.

The shipyard• Ifthevesselisattherepairyardordock,thevessel’s

crewshouldcheckallitemsatriskofcolddamage,andnotleavethistotheyardorsub-contractors.

• Ifthevesselisattherepairyardasaresultofdamage,andadditionaldamageisincurredduetoextremecoldwhilstattheyard,theadditionaldamageswillbesubjecttoaseparateclaimandwillinmanycases,bebelowtheapplicabledeductible.This applies to both hull and machinery and loss of hire.

Bunkers• Ifthevesselisattherepairyardordock,itis

imperative that all heavy fuel oil bunkers are kept heated above 20 degrees centigrade to ensure that itretainstheproperviscosity.

• Whilstatportorattherepairyardinlocationswithanextremelycoldclimate,itisimperativethatheavyfuel oil bunkers remain properly heated at all times in order to retain enough viscosity to be pumpable and tobeused.Ifthefueloilisnotkeptatthepropertemperature,itcouldtakedaysbeforeitisheatedsufficientlytobeusedand,willthusdelaythesailingofthevessel.


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Exhaust boiler damages

IntroductionGardhasexperiencedanincreaseintheseverityofincidentsinvolvingexhaustboilers,andinparticularfiredamages.Thecausesoftheboilerdamagesvary,however,slowsteaming,fuelqualityandthefrequencyofmanoeuvrescanallbeimportantfactors,andcanleadtosootaccumulating.Thiscanincreasetheriskoffireduetosparksfromtheexhaustgasignitingthesoot.

The purpose of this circular is to address the risks involved and toemphasisetheimportanceofpropersootblowing,cleaning,maintenanceandtreatmentofboilerfeedwater.

Problems caused by soot on the exhaust sideThedesignofexhaustboilersiscompactwithverynarrowchannelsandfinsontheexhaustside.Inadditionthedesignofthemainengineexhaustchanneltotheexhaustboileronmanyshipsisrestrictingtheeasyflowofgasthroughtheboiler.Combinedwithe.g.slowsteamingandreducedexhaustgasvelocitytheriskforbuildupofsootdepositswillincrease.Unburned deposits coming from the combustion process of the mainengineduetodifferentfuelsanddifferentloadswillcauseignitablesootdepositstobuildupintheboilers.Astheexhaustcontainshighlevelsofoxygen(about14%),theignitionofthesoot deposit may cause serious fire damage if preventive actions arenottakeninduetime.Forlong-strokedieselengine,thelargerlub.oilquantumrequiredwillalsoaddtothebuildupofignitablesootdeposit.Highlubricationoilconsumptioninslowspeedengines–lowergastemperaturesandlargereconomizersincombinationwithlowgraderesidualoilswillincreasetheriskforsootfiresandinworstcaseresultinacompletemeltdownoftheboileroreconomizer.

Thesootblowingequipmentfittedmustbeusedaccordingtomanufacturer’srecommendations,buttheequipmentprovideddoes not necessarily take into account the various design and layoutoftheexhaustchannel.Itisthereforeimportantthattheconditionoftheexhaustsideischeckedfrequentlyinordertoestablishthatthesootiseffectivelyremoved,andifnot,morefrequentblowingormanualcleaningwillhavetobeperformed.Ifthevesseloperatesonareducedload,werecommendincreasingtheloadduringthesootblowing.Itisalsopossibletofitadditionalequipmenttomonitorpressureandtemperaturethroughtheboiler/economiserforoptimizationofcleaningintervals.

Proper treatment of feed waterAsslowsteamingappearstohavebecomemorecommon,theimportanceofregularinspection,waterwashing,blowdownandproperfeedwatertreatmentshouldbeemphasised.Impuritiesinthefeedwatercanresultinincreasedscaling,corrosionandfoaming.Propertreatmentofboilerfeedwateristhereforeanimportantpartoftheboilermaintenanceprogramandwillreducetheriskofpittingandcorrosion.

Toreducethepossibilityofproblemsarising,andtohavecontroloftheconcentrationofdissolvedsolidsinthefeedwater,itisnecessarytocarryout“blowdown”orperiodicallydischargethewaterorinsomecasesreplacethewatercompletely.Surfacewaterblowdownisoftendonecontinuouslytoreducethelevelofdissolvedsolids,whilstbottomblowdownisperformedperiodicallytoremovesludgefromthebottomoftheboiler.Regulartestingandchemicaldosingofthefeedwateristherefore important to reduce the problem of corrosion and pitting.

Normallythefeedwaterisproducedbythevessel’sownfreshwatergenerator;however,itmaybecomenecessarytotopupwithshorewaterwhichwillbeofadifferentquality.Ifthefeedwaterhasbeentoppedupwithshorewater,feedwatertests,chemicaldosingandblowdownareextremelyimportant.

Problems caused by scale on the water sideThe biggest problem caused by scale is overheating and failure oftheboilertubes.Thethermalconductivityofporousboilerscaleissimilartoinsulatingbricks.Thescaleactsasaninsulatinglayer and prevents an efficient transfer of heat through the tubes tothecirculatingwater.Thereductioninthermalconductivitymeanslowerboilerefficiencywhichinturnleadstooverheatingandmayresultinsoftening,bulgingorevenfracturingoftheboilertubes.Boilerscalecanalsocausepluggingorpartialobstructionofcirculatingtubesinawatertubeboiler,whichagaincausesstarvationandoverheatingofthetubes.Itcanbenecessarytoplugsomeofthewatertubesfromtimetotime,however,thiswillreducethewatercirculation,andisonlyintendedtobeatemporarysolution.Incaseofalargernumberofpluggedwatertubes,themanufacturer/classsocietyshouldbeconsulted.

RecommendationsWiththenewgenerationofveryefficientenginesthesootcleaningofexhaustgasboilerhasbecomeevenmoreimportantforefficientandsafeoperation.

• Itisthereforestronglyrecommendedthatallsootblowing/fixedwashingsystemsareusedandtestedregularlybyskilledcrewtoensurethattheyarefullyoperational.

• Theimportanceofregularinspection,waterwashing,blowdownandproperfeedwatertreatmentshouldbeemphasised.Acceptancecriteriafortheconditionaftercleaningshouldbeestablishedthroughoutthefleet.Bythis,anyalterationinoperationalconditionsanditsconsequencesfortheboilerconditionswilladdressed.

• Alarmandmonitoringsystemtoberegularlytestedtoensure proper function

The manufacturer to be contacted for further and more detailed instructions,andinparticular-Ifvesselsnormaloperationalconditionsalter.(i.e.suchasslowsteamingorchangeoffuelquality)

Lower side of middle evaporator tubes section with melted metal.

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Loss of ship’s records when changing ownership or management BackgroundWhenavesselchangesownershipand/ormanager,therulehas generally been that the outgoing technical managers removeallmaintenancerecordsfromtheship,leavingtheincomingcrewandmanagementwithminimuminformationontheconditionofbothshipandmachinery.Thishasevenbeenseenwhereownershipremainsthesame,andthereisasimplechangeofmanagement-theoutgoingmanagementleavesnoinformationbehind,thusputtingtheincomingmanagement at a serious disadvantage and increasing the riskanduncertaintyforbothownersandunderwriters.Inonerecentcaseinvolvingasimplechangeofmanagement,the superintendant could not find any information in the maintenance system and the previous technical manager wasnotveryco-operative.

Thislackofcontinuitymeansthatthecrewandthenewmanagermuststartfromthebeginningwhentakingoverthevessel.Astheyobviouslyneedtimetoverifytheconditionofeachcomponentandsystem,thereisaclearriskthatsomerequiredmaintenancewillbeoverlooked,and this may result in costly claims arising out of damage to the vessels in the period immediately or shortly after a changeofownershipormanagement.Typicalclaimscanbeabreakdownofmachinery,rudderorcomponentfailures.The purpose of this circular is to highlight the risks and consequencesofremovingship’srecordsandtoprovidesomerecommendations.

Increased risk and consequencesAnewownerand/ormanagerwillhaveareasonableexpectationofmanagingandoperatingthevesselimmediatelyfollowingatakeover.Wherethedocumentationhasbeenremovedbypreviousowners/managersitcantakesomeconsiderabletimebeforethenewcrewandmanagementarefullyfamiliarwiththevessel,hermachineryandanymaintenanceschedules.Thevesselandcrewwillbeexposedtoanincreasedriskofsomethingbreakingdownduringthisperiodoffamiliarisation.

Shouldtherepaircostsresultinaclaimonaninsurancepolicy,allpoliciesexcludedamagecausedbywearandtear,inadequatemaintenanceetc.Thesurveyorattendingonboardonbehalfoftheinsurerwillrequesttoseethemaintenancerecordscoveringthedamagedcomponent.IfnorecordsareavailableonboardthereisnowaytheAssuredcandocumenttherunninghoursofthecomponent,and that the component has received the recommended maintenanceasstipulatedbythesupplierofthecomponent.

Thislackofdocumentationwillnotautomaticallyresultintheclaimbeingrejectedbyaleadinginsuringcompany,butbynot being able to present relevant documentation in a claim situation,theAssuredmaynotbeabletoprovethecauseofthedamageandrecovertherepaircostsfromtheinsurer.Therequirementtopresentrelevantdocumentationisbasicallythesameforasecondhandshipasfortheexistingshipsofhisfleet.

Inordertodocumentthatadequatemaintenancehasbeenperformed,ClassificationSociety’scertificationcannotberelied on as evidence that the vessel has been properly maintainedthroughouttheperiodsbetweenClasssurveys.TherequirementtoestablishprogramsandmaintainrecordstoverifytheconditionoftheshipbetweentheClasssurveysis,however,anintegralpartoftheobjectivesbehindtheISMCode.

WeareawarethatchangeofownershipimpliesnewDOCandISMcertification,butitisaparadoxthatoldrecordsofrunninghoursandperformedmaintenanceshallnotfolloweachship.

RecommendationWestronglyrecommendthatownersincludeintheSales&PurchaseagreementofasecondhandshipthatmaintenancerecordsshouldfollowtheshipinthesamewayasClasscertificatesandshipdrawingsdeliveredwiththeshipnormallyformpartofaS&Pstandardagreement.Where the maintenance records are part of the outgoing manager’sowndevelopedmaintenancesystem,atleastahardcopyoftherecordsshouldbeleftonboard.Thiswillgreatlyassisttheincomingcrewandmanagertofamiliarisethemselveswiththeshipandwillalsoprovideanindicationofwheretoconcentrateanynecessarymaintenanceand/orupgrading.ItwillalsoplacetheAssuredinapositiontodocument that any claim on an insurance policy is not as a resultofwearandtearorinadequatemaintenance.


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Low sulphur fuel changeover

BackgroundToreduceemissionfromships,variousinternationalregulationsandEmissionControlAreas(ECA)1 have been inforcesince2005.Recently,newandstricterfuelsulphurcontentregulationspromulgatedbyCalifornia2andtheEU3 havebeendevelopedandimplemented.TheCalifornianAirResourceBoard(CARB)hassince1July2009enforcedtheuseofdieseloils(MDO)orgasoils(MGO)inCalifornianwaters.4Inaddition,wheninberthinEUports,vesselsmustasof1January2010usemarinefuelswithasulphurcontentnotexceeding0.1%bymass.

Sincetheimplementationoftheregulationon1July2009,theUSCG11thDistricthasdocumentedamajorincreaseinpropulsionfailuresrelatedtofuelchangeover.5 The SanFranciscoBarPilotshavereportedanecdotallyamarkedincreaseinenginefailures,enginesnotstartingandproblemswithchangesinspeed,whichaffectmanoeuvrability.Thepurposeofthiscircularistosetoutthevariousfuellimitsandtheirdateofimplementation,toprovideinformationaboutthepossiblerisksinvolvedwhenswitchingtolowsulphurfuels,andtogiverecommendationstoownersandvessels.

Marine fuel limits in EU and date of implementation ThefollowingtablelistsmarinefuellimitsintheEU,andtheir dates of implementation:

The risks and possible consequences involvedChangefromHFOtoMGOorMDOonenginesandboilershasoccurredsinceHFOwasinitiallyusedonboardships.However,onedifferenceistheverylowviscosityandlowsulphurMGOorMDOnowcomingonthemarketasaresultofthenewrequirements.Whenchangingtolowsulphurfuel,severalengineproblemscanoccur,oneofwhichisthermal shock in the fuel system due to the rapid change in temperatureandpoorerlubricationqualitiesoflowsulphurfuel.Thiscanresultinsticking/scuffingofthefuelvalves,fuelsuctionvalvesandfuelpumpplungers,whichagainleadtoshutdownofthemainenginefollowedbymanoeuvringproblems.Waterswherefuelswitchingisrequiredareoftenenvironmentallysensitiveandcontainanumberofhazardstonavigationtogetherwithstrongtidesandcurrents.Theincreasedriskoffurnaceexplosionintheeventofflame

Vessel locationSulphur limits all types of marine fuels used onboard from

1 January 2010 1 July 2010 1 January 2012 1 January 2015

ShipsatberthinEUcommunity ports andportsinnon-EUcountries that have adopted directive 2005/33/EC

0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%

InsideECAbutnotatBerth

1.50% 1.00% 1.00% 0.10%

OutsideECA,butnotatBerth

4.50% 4.50% 3.50% 3.50%

failureduringoperationoftheboileronlowsulphurfuelisanothersafetyissue.6

Recommendations to Shipowners and ManagersOwnersandManagersarerequired,bytheISMCode1.2.2.2,toassessthevarietyofrisksthatmaybeinvolvedwhenchangingtolowsulphurfuel,bysystematicallyidentifyingandanalysingpotentialhazardstotheirvessels,personnelandtotheenvironment.Basedonthese,theappropriatemaintenance(ISM10)andoperationalprocedures(ISM7)shouldbedeveloped.

The manufacturers of the engines and boilers must be contactedandtheirrecommendationsonhowtochangeoverandruntheequipmentonlowviscosityfuelmustbepartoftheISMproceduresonboard.Ifthemanufacturer’srecommendationincludescertainrequirementsformodificationtotheequipmentorsystems,thesemustbeimplementedwithClassapproval.Asnotallrequiredmodificationswillbecompletedby1January2010,theremaybeaneedforownerstodocumentthatthenecessarymodificationsareinprogress.

Operational recommendations Vesselsthattradebetweenareaswithdifferentsulphurlimitations should test the MGO and MDO received on boardastheBunkerReceiptmayonlygivethemax/

minvaluesoftheviscosity.Ifviscositybelow2.5-3cstisreceived,problemscouldbeexpectedastheviscositywilleasilyfallbelow2cstwhenpassingthroughthefuelsystemonboard.7Thefirstproblemswillbethefuelpumps,injectionvalvesandboilerburnerssufferinginternalleakswithmalfunctionandreducedcapacity.

Ifsuchlowviscosityfuelsaretobeused,changeoveronmainengine,auxiliaryenginesandforboilersproducingsteamforpropulsionfromHFOtoMDO/MGOshouldtakeplacesufficienttimebeforearrivalatCalifornianportsto ensure that both the propulsion and manoeuvring are maintained.8Ifdifficultiesareencountered,theenginesmustbechangedbacktotheiroriginalHFO.9SuchproceduresmustbeimplementedbytheAssuredwithreferencetotheISMcodeandemergencyprocedures.

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Beforestartingthechangeover,watchoutforareductionorincreaseintemperature,observetheviscosityandreducetheengineload.Toprotecttheinjectionequipmentagainstrapidtemperaturechanges,thechangeoverprocessmustbecarriedoutslowlyandinaccordancewiththemanufacturer’sinstructions.ThesamealsoapplieswhenchangingfromMGOtoHFO.

Footnotes1UnderMARPOLAnnexVI,RegulationsforthePreventionofAirPollutionfromShips,countriescanapplytosetupEmissionControlAreas(ECA).MoreinformationaboutECAareasisavailableat:http://i.pmcdn.net/p/ss/library/docs/subscriber/ECAs_2009.pdf.2CARB,“MarineNotice2009-2,RegulationsonFuelSulphurandotherOperationalRequirementsforOcean-GoingVesselswithinCaliforniaWatersand24NMoftheCaliforniaBaseline”,7May2009.3EUDirective2005/33/EC,“AmendmentoftheEULowSulphurDirective”.4Thefollowingregulationsareinforcewhenoperatingwithin

the24nauticalmileregulatoryzoneofftheCaliforniaCoastline:From1July2009,Marinegasoil(MGO)atorbelow1.5%sulphurcontent,orMarinedieseloil(MDO)atorbelow0.5%sulphurcontent.From1January2012,Marinegasoil(MGO)orMarinedieseloil(MDO)atorbelow0.1%sulphurcontent.5HSCoftheSanFranciscoBayRegion,“CARB:Ocean-GoingVesselCleanFuelRegulation”,14Oct2009.6Othersignificantoperationalimplicationsbyusinglowsulphurfuelsmightbereducedlubrication,lowviscosity,flashpoint,acidity,catalyticfinesorignitionandcombustionquality.7DuringthechangingprocessfromHFOtoMGO,itisrecommended that temperature change of the fuel inlet to the fuelpumpsdonotexceed2ºC/minute.8Itisnotconsiderednecessarytotesttheauxiliaryboilersbeforearrivalatport.9IftheMasterofthevesseldeterminesthatcompliancewiththeregulationswouldendangerthesafetyofthevessel,itscrew,cargo,orpassengers,theMastershouldimmediatelytakethenecessarystepstoremedythesituation(CARB,“MarineNotice2005-5,SafetyExemptionInformationandClaimForm”,Sept2009).


27


Lay-up of ships and the marine insurance cover

InorderforGardtomaintaintheinsurancecoverofashipinshortorlongtermlay-uptheAssuredmustpresentalay-upplanwhichmustincludethefollowingitems:

1. Lay-up SiteAdescriptionofthelay-upsitemustbeprovidedwithparticularfocusontheweatherconditions.Thelay-upsitemustalsobeapprovedbythelocalauthorities.Lay-upinhurricaneaffectedand/ortropicalareasmustbethesubjectofparticularconsiderations.

2. Mooring/anchoring arrangementsDescription and maintenance routines of anchoring and mooring arrangements must be provided including distancestoshoreandtootherships.Thearrangementsshouldpreferablybeapprovedbythevessel’sClassSocietyorbyaconsultantappointedbythem,butothercompetentbodiesmayalsobeused.

Informationofseabed,maximumwindforcesanddirection,shoreandonboardbollards,anchorswithsystemsisneededforcalculationpurposes.Theanchorwindlassesandmooringwincheswhichareinuseorunderconstanttensionmustbethesubjectoffrequenttestingandmaintenancetoensurethattheyfunctionproperlyatalltimes.

3. Class StatusGardgenerallyrequiresthattheClassischangedintothestatusof“laid-up”tofacilitateareturnofpremium.AnnualandothermandatorysurveysmustbecarriedoutinaccordancewithClassrules.AsforshipsinnormaltradingitisaprerequisiteforcoverthattheClassrulesandregulationsarefollowedatalltimesalsoduringthelay-up,andanysuspensionofClasswillleadtoterminationoftheinsurancecover.

4. Minimum manningTheFlagState’srequirementastominimumnumberofcrewforthedifferentlay-upsituationsmustbemaintained.Ifwatchmenandroutinemaintenanceasdescribedinthelay-upplanarecontractedouttothirdparties,thesearrangementsmustalsobedescribedinthelay-upplan.

5. Power availabilityThelay-upplanshouldalsoincludetheenvisagedneedforpropulsionpoweranddescribetheavailabilityoftugassistanceinthelay-uparea.

6. Protection against explosions and fireAllcargotanks,pumprooms,cofferdamsandcargolinesmust,asageneralrule,bekeptgasfreeduringlay-up.Inertedtanksmaybeacceptableifapprovedbylocalauthorities.Hotworkisonlypermittedifavalidgasfreecertificateiskeptonboard.

Allfirealarmsystemsmustbefullyoperationalduringlay-up.Theship’snormalfirefightingsystemsmustbeavailableandreadyforuse.Iffixedfirefightingsystemsaredisconnected(CO2tanks)foranyreason,substitutesystemsmustbeoperationalandapprovedbyClass.

7. Precautions against floodingAllseaoverboardvalvesnotinusemustbeclosed.Ifseawatercoolers/condensersetc.areleftopen,theseawaterconnectionsmustbeblankedoff.

Thewaterlevelintheballasttanks,pumproomandbilgesmust be checked regularly and bilge alarms systems forallspacesmustbemaintainedinnormaloperation.Temporarybilgealarmsystemsforcoldlay-upconditionsareacceptable.Allwatertightdoorsandmanholesmustbeclosed.

8. Maintenance of equipmentThelay-upplanmustalsoincludespecificitemsinaccordancewiththemanufacturers’recommendationsastothepreservation,maintenanceandoperationofmachineryandotherequipmenttopreventdamageoccurringasaresultoftheitemsnotbeinginnormaluse.Theplanshoulddescribe the preservation and maintenance of among others:

• Mainenginewithturbocharger,gearandshaftingarrangement

• Auxiliaryengineswithgenerators• Boilers• Rotatingequipmentsuchaspumps,compressorsetc.• Shiptypespecificequipment• Generalrequirementsastoambienttemperatureand

humidity,useofheaters,dehumidifiers,preservationoiletc.

9. Resuming of trading/Breaking of lay-upTheextentofsurveyandtestingwhenbreakinglay-upwilldependontheextentofmaintenanceandotherpreservativemeasureswhichhadbeenundertakenduringthelay-upandthereasonforbreakinglay-up(trading,drydockforre-commissioning,scrap).Gard’srequirementisthatClass’requirementsforre-commissioningarefollowed,andthatthemanufacturers’recommendationsforpreservationandmaintenancehavebeenfollowedduringthelay-upandre-commissioning.

Pleasenote,theseguidelinesaregeneralandshouldnotreplaceanyrequirementsgivenbyclass,authoritiesorflagstate.

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Lifting gear – is your ship prepared to avoid accidents occurring?IntroductionLiftinggearonboardvessels,suchascargocranes,provisioncranesandotherservicecranes,isanimportantpartoftheoperationalequipmentforcargohandlingandthesupplyofgoods,sparepartsandfood.Faultyperformanceofthegearcaneasilyleadtooff-hireandlossofincomeforthevessel.Theconsequenceofaccidentswhichmayresultininjuriesorfatalitiesismuchmoreseriousandtragicforthoseinvolved.

The current international legislation covering the operation andsafetyofvessel’sliftinggeardoesnotprovidesufficientdetails to ensure consistent enforcement by the various flagstates.ThiscontrastswithotherareasoftheshippingindustrywhereconventionssuchasSOLASorMARPOLcompulsorilyapplyaconsistentpracticewhereadopted.

Thiscurrentsituationrequiresthattheshipownersplayan active part in establishing routines and systems for the inspection and maintenance of lifting gear onboard their vessels.

Experiences from casualtiesOnerecentincidentinvolvedanentirecranecab,includingthejib,separatingfromitspedestalandfallingdownintothecargoholdduringoperation.Onepersonwasseriouslyinjuredanddisabledasaresultoftheaccident.Investigationsrevealedexcessivewearonandimpropermaintenance(greasing)oftheslewingbearing.Themanufacturer’srevisedmaintenanceinstructionswerenotreadilyavailableonboardandthemaintenancewasnotcarriedoutasrecommended.Ananalysisofthequalityofthegreaseintheslewingbearingoraproperwear-downmeasurementwouldhavedetectedabnormalwearandcouldhavepreventedtheaccident.

Anotherrecentaccidentwithfatalconsequenceswascausedby the stevedores manually overriding the safety monitoring system.Duringtheliftingoperation,theautostopmonitoroftheboom/jibinlowerpositionwasdisabledinanattemptto increase the reach of the boom for a specific lifting operation.Theincreasedloadontheequipmentcausedbythis position of the boomcausedaspanropetobreakandthederrickboomfelldownontojettyandfatallyinjuredpersonnelstandingashore.

RegulationsThe most commonly adopted legislation covering lifting gearisILOconventionno.152;OccupationalSafetyandHealthinDockWorkoftheInternationalLabourOrganisation.CertificationaccordingtotheILO152isadoptedandrequiredbymanynationalauthorities,butitdoesnotcontainadetaileddescriptionofhowtheconventionshallbeenforced.

Theconventiononlyrequiresaperiodicalthoroughexaminationoftheliftinggearwiththeservicetobecarriedoutbyacompetentperson.Ageneraldefinitionofcompetentpersonisprovided,butmanyflagstateauthoritiesleaveittothevessel’stechnicalmanagerstoidentifyandappointsuchpersonnel.Manycompaniesuseexternalinspectioncompanies,butitisnotunusualforchiefengineerstobegiventhisresponsibility,evenwherenospecifictrainingisavailable.InGard’sexperiencethissolutionisofteninsufficient.Consideringthevarietydesign,

make,ageandfunctionalityoftheliftinggear,itrequiresin-depthtrainingtoachievethecompetencerequiredtoperformthisduty.

Basedonthecurrentstatusoftheinternationallegislationitisnotsufficienttorelysolelyontheindividualflagstates’enforcement of the regulations to ensure safe operation of liftinggear.Gardencouragesallshipownertoconsidertherecommendationsbelow.

Recommendations• Maintenanceagreements. Considerestablishingamaintenanceagreementwith

themanufacturerstoexecuteanannualthoroughexaminationand5-yearlyre-certification.Theinvolvementofthemanufacturerswillensurethatserviceinstructionsandoperationalexperiencesaretransferredtothecrewandreflectedintheproceduresonboard.

• Additionalclassnotation Many classification societies are offering an additional

notationcoveringcranesandliftinggear.Suchanotationwill,inadditiontotheabovemaintenanceagreement,serveasathirdpartycontrolandprovideasurveyregimeinaccordancewitharecognisedsetofindustryrulesandrequirements.

• Traininganddocumentation Themaintenanceagreementwiththemanufacturers

should include a training package and onboard training forexecutionanddocumentationoftheregularmaintenancetobecarriedoutbythecrew.Akeyissueisforthecrewtogainknowledgeandcompetenceoftheliftingequipmentonboard.Knowingthelimitationsoftheequipmentandbeingfamiliarwiththe necessary safety checks of the lifting gear to be conductedpriortousewillreducetheriskoffailure.Sincetheoperationofcargohandlingcranesareveryoftenlefttostevedoresitisvitalthatthecrewiscapable of ensuring that safety systems are functioning and that the operation instructions as prescribed by themanufacturersareavailable/postedpriortothestevedoresoperatingtheequipment.


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Warning - Fuel oil quality might be at stake

Fueloilqualityisdirectlyrelatedtothesafeoperationofships and it is important for any ship operator to focus on preservingfueloilquality.

BearinginmindthattheEuropeanUnionDirective2005/33/ECwhichdealswithsulphurcontentcomesintoforceon11August2007andtheNorthSeaSoxEmissionControlArea(SECA)willbefullyimplementedon22November2007,therefineryindustrymayexploremoreadvancedproduction/blendingprocessestosatisfytheglobaldemandforlowsulphurfuel.Thetraditionalmethodofassessingfueloilqualityandsuitabilitymaybeunreliableincertaincircumstances.Inrelationtothedeliveryoflowsulphurfuel,agrowingnumberofdeliverieswithexcessiveAluminumandSiliconcontent,problemswithfuelstabilityandignitionqualityhavebeenreported.

FueloilignitionandcombustionqualityisnotyetpartoftheISO8217fueloilspecificationandtheCalculatedCarbonAromaticIndex(CCAI)hashistoricallybeenthedefaultmethodofestimatingheavyfueloilignitionquality.Thefueloil density and viscosity are the key parameters needed for calculatingtheCCAI,andthenumber860hasforyearsbeenconsideredthelimitforanacceptableignitionqualityforatrunkpistonengine.WithrefineriesincreasinglyusingHeavyCycleoil(HC)intheblendingprocesstoachievelowsulphurvalues,theCCAIandtheCalculatedIgnitionIndex(CII)haveoftenbeenfoundtobetooinaccurateandinadequatetodetectfuelwithpoorignitionproperties.ThemostwidelyusedequipmentforfuelignitiontestshasbeentheFIA-100FCA,whichisalreadyavailablefromsometestlaboratoriesandcomeswithanInstituteofPetroleumapprovedtestmethod,IP541/06.

Typicalengineproblemsexperiencedwhenusingafueloilwithpoorignitionpropertiesare:-Difficultiesorcompletefailureinstartingtheengine

-Undesirablepeakpressureswhichcanleadtoblowbyandcollapse of piston rings

-Unstableoperationandlossofpower

-Varyingrevolutions,whicharehighlyundesirablefortheoperationofauxiliaryengines

-Increaseddepositsinthecombustionareaandintheexhaustgassystem,includingturbochargerandboiler

-IncreasedemissionsofNOx

Inaworstcasescenariopoorfueloilignitionandcombustion properties can render the engine inoperative andcompromisethesafeoperationoftheship.

Toillustratetheconsequencesofpoorignitionandcombustionproperties,avesselrecentlyreportedaknockingsoundtothemainengineaswellasnumerouspistonseizures.Temporaryrepairswereexecuted,butthevessel’sC/Edidnotrealisethattheproblemsexperiencedmighthavesomethingtodowiththefueloilproperties,andoptedtocontinuerunningtheengineatreducedRPMwiththesamefueloiluntilthevesselreachedaportofrefuge.Whentheenginewasopenedupseveredamageswerediscoveredtoallcylinderunits.Mainbearingshadtoberenewedandthecrankshaft’smainbearingjournalshadto be polished in addition to numerous of different parts inspected/overhauled.ThedamagerepairsamountedtoUSD1.2million,andinvolved40daysoff-hire.

Duringrepairsitwasfeltthatthedamageseenhadsimilaritiestothatwhichcouldhavebeencausedbyfueloilwithpoorignitionandcombustionproperties,andadecisionwasmadetoperformanignitionqualitytest.

A:Referencecurve.Normalpeakpressureandanignitiondelayof5.9ms(millisecond).Startofmaincombustion,7.85ms.B:Ourvessel.Lowpeakpressurewith“afterburning”effects.Ignitiondelay13.8ms,startofmaincombustion,21.6ms.

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The diagram above illustrates the results from the fuel oil ignitiontestsperformedwiththeFIA100/3(A),comparedwithareferencecurveillustratingtestresultsfor’normal‘fueloil.

Amongthecommentsmadebythelaboratorywere;Thecombustionpropertiesarebad…Fueloilswithpoorignition and combustion properties may contribute to high pressure peaks and thermal overload in the combustion chamber.Thiscauseswhatisknownashard,knockingornoisyenginerunning,especiallyatlowloadoperation,andwhichishighlyundesirableoverextendedperiodsoftime.Amongthepossibleeffectsispoorfueleconomy,lossofpower,buildupofcarbonaceousdeposits,damagedpistonrings,burneddownpistoncrownsandruinedcylinderlubrication.

Theseverityoftheseimpactsisinfluencedtoagreatextentbyenginetype,modelandage,loadprofileandoperationalcondition.Ingeneralenginesofolderdesignaremoreprone to operational problems caused by poor ignition and combustion properties than engines of more recent design,whileslowspeedenginesseemtobelesspronetooperationalproblemsthanmediumandhighspeedengines.(ItshouldbenotedthatthisfuelwasbunkeredoutsidetheSECAarea)

Lessons learned:-Itisimportanttosecureadequatequalitycontrolofyourfueloilpurchasecontacts/providers.-Theship’screwshouldbebettertrainedtodetectthesetypesofproblemswhentheyoccurinordertominimisecosts,vessel’soff-hireperiodsandnotleastthesafetyofcrewandship/cargo.-Fueloiltestsdonotalwaysadequatelydescribethefueloil’sproperties,inparticularwithrespecttoignitionandcombustionquality-TheincreaseddemandforlowsulphurfuelwillrequirebetterunderstandingoffuelparameterswhicharenotdescribedintheISOstandard.

Pleasealsocontactyourenginemanufacturerandyourfuel oil test laboratory service provider to obtain further informationontheabove.


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Fire safety in the engine room

Mostfiresonboardshipsstartintheengineroom.Thereareanumberofbuilt-insafetyfeaturesonboardavessel,designedtolimittheriskoffireandthespreadofit,andtheofficersandcrewmusthavefullknowledgeoftheseandmaintaintheirintegrity.Thiscircularhighlightsthemainaspectsassociatedwithfiresafetyofenginerooms,based on observations made during condition surveys of vesselsenteredwithGard.ThiscircularisbasedonanarticlepreviouslypublishedinGardNews.

Steel separationsOne of the reasons for the engine room casing and various decks,bulkheadsandstaircasesbeingmadeofsteelistolimitthespreadofafire.Ifthereisafireintheengineroom,itisimportantthatthefiremaynotreadilyspreadtoaccommodation,bridge,lifeboatstationsandcargoareas.Likewise,afireinthecargoareasshouldnotbeabletogainaccesstotheengineroom,whichis“theheartoftheship”,wheregeneratorsandfirepumps,themeanstofightafire,arelocated.

Therefore,gettingtoknowthebuilt-infireboundariesand maintain the integrity of such separations is of vital importance.Becarefulwhenmakingalterationsonboard,andbeespeciallyawarethatwhennewcablesandpipelinesareinstalled,theirpenetrationthroughsteeldecksandbulkheads,i.ecrossingfirezonesmustbemadeinafire-proofway.

Air controlAirventilationisessentialforgoodworkingconditionsintheengineroom,butsoisalsothecrew’sfullknowledgeoffans,fireflapsandotheropeningstotheengineroomthatmayneedtobeclosedinafiresituation.Belowaresomeimportantareaswerewerepeatedlyhaveseenbreachesofsafety.Theseareasshouldbeaddressedonboard.

– Air ventilator fire flaps which can not be closed and/or secured in closed position.

Solidityoffireflapsshouldbecheckedandtheyshouldbemovedregularlyandmaintainedwithgreasenottofreeze.Thereshouldalsobemeanstosecuretheflaphandles in closed position and the open and closed positionshouldbeclearlymarked.Iffireflapscannotbesecured,thedraftofafireislikelytothrowthemopen.

– Entrances to the engine room that are damaged and allowing passage of an air draft.

Doors leading to the engine room from the accommodationarefittedwithdevicesforautomaticclosing.Doorsillsandcoamingsmaybedamagedbythe moving of machinery parts through doors in the engineroom,causingobstructionsforthefullclosingofthedoor.Doorsshouldbetestedbyreleasingthemfromtheopenposition,toseeiftheyclosefullybytheautomaticdevice,andthereshouldthenbenoopeningsbetweenthedoorandthecoaming.

– Emergency escapes from engine rooms that are obstructed or damaged.

Emergencyescapesmaybearrangedbyshaftsleadingtodeckandwithaccessdoorsatvariouslevels.Thefull

closing of the doors should not be obstructed by the stretchingoflooseelectriccables,hoses,etc.,andalsothesedoorsshouldclosetightlybytheirownautomaticmeans.Itmustberememberedthatsuchashaft,ifnotkeptclosed,willprovideadraftfromtheengineroom.

– Engine room entrances kept open by the fitting of hooks, ropes or wedges.

This is often seen especially on doors leading through thesteeringgearflattothepoopdeck.Inthecaseofafire,suchdoorsmaybeinaccessible,andthehooks,etc.,cannotbereleasedtoclosethedoor.Airtotheengineroomcanthennotbeclosedoff.Likewise,Gardsurveyors often see skylights at the top of the engine room and removable steel panels for the passing of sparepartsbeingkeptopenbysteelwireslings,etc.

Combustible oilOnboardashipthereisfueloil,lubricatingoil,hydraulicoil-allverycombustibleandthemostlikelynourishmentsofanengineroomfire.Gardsurveyorshavemetcrewmemberswhodonotconsiderlubricatingoilandhydraulicoiltobefirehazards,assuchoilsareseentobedifficulttoputonfire.Thatis,however,onlyaquestionoftemperature.Inanoilfireitisthegasabovetheliquidthatburns,andifheatedsufficientlybyafire,lubricatingoilandhydraulicoilalsobecomevolatileandfire-hazardous.

Level glasses on oil tanksOnebreachofsafetywhichGardsurveyorsseeonboardmostvesselstheyinspectisthatthelowervalveofthelevelglassesofoiltanksisforciblykeptopen.Itisclearlystatedinclassification and statutory rules that such a valve is to close automatically.

Normallysuchavalveisspringloadedandthecrewmemberwillhavetobenddownandkeepapressurebyhanduntiltheoilhasriseninthelevelglass.Thickoilmaytakesometimetofillupthelevelglass,andfortheeaseofwork,crewmembersoftensecuresuchvalvespermanentlyinopenposition,bysteelwire,blocksofwood,etc.,orbyingeniouslydesigned“thumbscrew”fittings.Duringcondition surveys Gard surveyors find this serious breach ofsafetyonboardmanyofthevesselsequippedwithoiltankswithlevelglasses.Thiscouldincaseofafireleadtoasuddenandinexplicableincreaseinthepowerofafirewhentheglassbreaksandthetankdrains.

Sources of ignitionThe sources of heat most likely to start a fire in the engine roomarehotexhaustpipeandenginesurfaces,bearingsof rotating machinery heating up and faulty electrical equipment.Heatsourcescanofcoursealsobeintroducedbyhumanerror,asbyforinstancedangeroususeofelectrictoolsandweldingequipment.Insulationofexhaustpipesisoftenfoundtobedefective,especiallyinthevicinityofthedieselengines,whereremovalofinsulationisneededduringenginemaintenance.Also,flangeconnectionsandsteelsupportsofexhaustpipesmayoftenbeinadequatelyinsulated,aswellasindicatorsandotherinstrumentsfitted.Lookforsignsofhotareas,suchaspaintdiscolorationandreddishrustsurfaces.Electricalinstallationswillalwaysrepresentacertainriskofsparksandfire,althoughtherisk

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isreducedbytheuseofqualitysafetydevicesandcloseadherencetovalidregulations.Allrotatingmachinerymayalsorepresentasourceofsufficientheattolightafire,firstofallbybearingsofpumpsheatingup.

General cleanlinessInsomeshipsthereisalargecollectionofusedsparepartsanditemswhichare“nicetohave”.Gardsurveyorshaveseenlargecollectionsofplasticsheets,cardboard,woodenplanks,usedpainttins,etc.,beingstoredinfire-exposedareas.Itisimportanttodiscardcombustiblematerials,removeoutdatedequipmentthatmayhinderaccessinafiresituation.

Drain pipes from gutters to oil collecting tanks should be keptopen,oilyragsshouldbedisposedofinacorrectmannerandenginesandfloorplatescleanedregularly.Oilydepositsinbilgesandinotherareasbelowfloorplatesmayattimesneedchemicalcleaningtoberemoved.

Alertnessandpropermaintenancearethekeywords.Acompetentcrewwiththenecessaryresourcesandsupportfromtheshoreorganizationwillimprovethefiresafetyconsiderablyonboardtheships.

ThiscircularisbasedontheGardNewsarticlewiththesamenamepublishedinGN170andcanbereadinfullatwww.gard.no.


Marpol Annex VI – Challenges in operating on low sulphur fuel BackgroundInternationalregulationstocontrolharmfulemissionsfromships’exhaustsenteredintoforceon19May2005.MARPOLAnnexVIcontainsprovisionsallowingspecial“SOxEmissionControlAreas”(SECAs)tobeestablishedwithmorestringentcontrolsonsulphuremissions.Intheseareas,thesulphurcontentoffueloilusedonboardshipsmustnotexceed1.5%m/m.Alternatively,shipsmustfitanexhaustgascleaningsystemoruseothermethodstolimitSOxemissions.Theregulationrequiresanysuchalternativemethodstobeapprovedbytherelevantflagstate.SanctionsforMarpolviolationsarebecomingincreasinglyseverearoundtheworld,andthereisnoreasontobelieveAnnexVIwillnotbetreatedtothesamescrutiny.

Theregulationallowedfora12-monthperiodfromthedateofentryintoforcebeforethelimitswithinaSECAcouldbeenforced,andtheywillthusbeenforcedfrom19May2006.TheBalticSeaAreaisthefirstareadesignatedasaSECAundertheProtocolandwillpermitamaximum1.5%sulphurcontentinanyfuelusedonboard.In2007,thesecondSECA,coveringtheNorthSeaandEnglishChannel,willbecomeintoforce,requiringsimilarsulphurlevels.

The effects of low sulphur fuelThereareseveralimplicationsofoperatingonlowsulphurfueloralteringbetweenhighandlowsulphurfuels.Theissueslistedbelowaresomeofthemostcommonchallengesthatmustbeconsideredbytheshipownersand operators to avoid problems related to operation and maintenanceoftheshipengines.

Fuel related issues– Incompatibilityofdifferentfuels– Combustioncharacteristicsandimpactonengine

depositsandwear– Varyingfuelviscosity,andimpactonfuelinjection– Lowsulphurfuelhavinglessanti-wearcapability– Supplyandstorageforlowsulphurfuels

Lube oil related issues– MatchingcylinderoilBNfuelsulphurlevelacross

operating conditions– Possibleadditionalstoragetanks– Cylinderlubricationmonitoring– Cylinderoilfeedrate

Operations related issues– Monitoringsulfurcontentinfuel– Engineload– CylinderLinerTemperature– Watercontentinscavengeair

RecommendationsShipownersandoperatorsshouldthoroughlyconsiderallundesiredeffectsofoperatingonlowsulphurfuel.Itis recommended that the engine makers and the lube oil suppliers are contacted to obtain their detailed instructions andguidelines.SpecificallywordedcharterpartyclausesregardingbunkerssuppliedbyCharterersareimportanttoensurethatanyproblemsareavoided.


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Important changes to the new edition of the ISO 8217 Fuel StandardThenew(third)revisionoftheISO8217:1996(E)MarineFuelSpecificationwasofficiallypublishedon1November2005.

ThenewmarinefuelspecificationISO8217:2005(E)shouldbereferredtowhenorderingfuel.ThespecificationcontainsamendmentstotheISORM(residualFuel)andDM(distillateFuel)grades.

ThenewspecificationincorporateschangestothefollowingparametersfortheISORMgrades:• Viscosity:Viscositygradesarenowbasedon

centistokes(cSt)at50 C,andthenumberofgradeshasbeenreducedfrom15to10.ThisalignsthenewISOgrademeasurementtemperaturewithcommercialreality.

• Maximumwatercontenthasbeenreducedfrom1%to0.5%

• Maximumsulphurcontenthasbeenreducedfrom5.0%to4.5%(ThisalignstheISOmaximumsulphurcontentwiththeIMOMARPOLAnnexVI)

• Theelementalspecificationhasbeenexpandedtoincludeamaximumlimitforthreenewelements;zinc(Zn),Calcium(Ca)andphosphorous(P).Afuelshallbeconsideredfreeofusedlubricationoil(ULO)ifoneormoreoftheseelementsarebeloworatthespecifiedlimits.

• Density:FortheRMgrades30and80maximumdensityhasbeenreduced.

• Ash:Aminorchangeinashlimits,withthemaximumpermitted level for some of the high viscosity grades reducedfrom0.2%to0.15%.

ThenewspecificationcontainsthefollowingchangesfortheISODM(Diesel,marine)grades:

• Sediments:FortheISODMBgrade,formerlytestedaccordingtosedimentbyextraction,willnowbetestedaccordingtotheTotalSedimentExistent(TSE)testprocedure.Thenewlimitis0.10%maximum.

• InadditionseveralinformativeAnnexeshavebeenaddedtotherevisedstandard,includinginterpretationoftestresults,sodiumandvanadium,usedlubricantsandacidityinmarinefuel.

The revised fuel standard is no doubt an improvement on theexistingone,andownersshouldfeelsecurethatbetterqualityfuelisdeliveredonboard.

ThemostsubstantivechangeinISO8217istheintroductionoflimitsontheelementszinc(Zn),phosphorus(P)andcalcium(Ca).Thisinclusionisintendedtoseverelyrestrictthepotentialutilisationofusedlubricationoil(ULO)asafuelblendstock.

AlthoughGardwelcomesthechangesmadetothefuelstandardweareoftheopinionthattheprocessofrevisingthe standard and the changes made should have been more comprehensive.Itisafactthatparametersnotincludedorwithtoohighlimitsinthetoday’sstandardcanleadtoextensiveengineproblemsresultinginlossoftimeandadditionalcoststotheOwner.Examplesareareductionofthemaximumallowablecatalystfines(AL+Si),inclusionofSodium(Na)andnotleastanintroductionofanignitionandcombustionqualityparameter.

AcopyofthenewISO8217:2005(E)isavailablethroughISO(www.ISO.org)ortheirrespectiveNationalStandardsInstitute.

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Pirate parts used on rotating machinery

IntroductionManymanufacturersaroundtheworldofferawiderangeofnon-original(pirated)sparepartsforenginesandmachineryingeneral.Althoughthesepartsmaybemadeinaccordancewiththeoriginalmanufacturer’sspecifications,theyareusuallynotofthesamequalityastheoriginalparts.Importantcharacteristicssuchasrawmaterialandstrengthmaybeunsuitablefortheintendedpurposeandcondition.Rotatingpartsareespeciallyvulnerabletopotentialdamage.Theincidentdescribedbelowillustratestheneedforprudencewhendealingwithship’sspareparts.AmoredetailedarticleonproblemsexperiencedwithsparepartswillbepublishedinGardNewslaterthisyear.

Course of eventsAreefervesselrecentlyexperiencedabreakdownofoneoftheauxiliaryengines.Therequirementformaximumpoweris,dependingonthecargosituation,oftencriticalforthistypeofvessels.Inthisparticularinstance,thevesselwasforced to deviate from its original course and enter port for a damageassessment.Italsohadtohireaportablegeneratorto ensure maintenance of the appropriate cargo carriage temperature.

Later,duringthedamageassessment,itwasfoundthattheboltsofconnectingrodno.6hadparted,dislocatingtherodfromthecrankshaft.Thepiston,liner,bearings,cylinderblockandbedplatewereseverelydamaged.Theextentofdamagewassubstantialandtherepaircostswereestimatedtoequalthecostofareplacementengine.Adecisionwasmadetorepairtheengine,and,inadditiontotherepaircosts,expenseswereincurredrelatingtotheuseofaportablegeneratorsetandthevessel’stwoweeksoffhire.

Thecauseofthedamagewerefoundtobethefailureofoneoftheconnectingrodbottomendboltsinunitno.6,whichappeartohavebrokeninnormaloperationalconditions.Thecrewhadfittedtheboltinquestionduringanoverhaulonly15dayspriortothecasualty.Itturnedoutthatthebolthadnomarkings,whilstaccordingtothemanufacturer;theseboltsshouldhavealogostampedonthehead.

Threebolts(thebrokenbolt,anon-originalboltaswellasanoriginalbolt)weresenttotheclassificationsocietyfor

metallurgicalanalysis.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedquiteclearlythatthetwonon-originalboltswereoff-speccomparedwiththemanufacturer’srequirementsfortensilestrengthandelongation,andalsohadaconsiderablylowerproofstrength.Notsurprisingly,theresultofthematerialanalysis also revealed that the material composition of the non-originalboltsweredifferentfromthatoftheoriginalbolt.

Lessons learnedThis incident could easily have been avoided by using manufacturerapprovedsparepartswhenoverhaulingtheengine.Thesparepartspurchaseddirectlyfromtheequipmentmaker,ortheirlicensedsub-contractorsmaybemoreexpensivethannon-originalsparepartsavailableinthemarket.However,itcanbestatedwithsomecertaintythattheuseofmanufacturerapprovedspareparts,andinparticularwhenusedinconnectionwithcriticalcomponents,will,inthelongrun,bemoreprofitable,bothbydurationand reliability of service intervals and a significant reduction intheriskofprematurebreakdownswithensuingexpensiveconsequentialdamages.

The origin of the production and delivery of spare parts mayattimesbeuncertain.However,thisplacesfurtherresponsibility on the receiver to ensure that the spare parts areofanappropriatequalityandinaccordancewiththeclassificationsociety’sandmanufacturer’srequirements.

Forfurtherguidancewithregardtotherisksinvolvedinusingnon-originalsparepartsforturbochargers,wealsorefertotheGardServicesLossPreventionCircular01-01,Turbocharger damages ontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no.


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Effects of off-spec bunkers

IntroductionTakingonboardoff-specbunkerscancausesignificantdisruptiontoavessel’sabilitytotrade.Inaddition,itcreates problems in recovering from the insurers costs incurredduetoalackofand/orlimitationincover.Thiscircularisintendedtoprovideanexampleoftheproblemasexperiencedbyshipowners.Thecasedescribedbelowrelatestoapassengership,butappliesequallytoalltypesofvessels.LossPreventionCircularNo.08-01isthenextinstalmentinaseriesofcircularsproducedbyGardServicesdealingwithdamageassociatedwithbunkersandbunkering1andoutlinesproblemswhichmayarisewhenpassengershipshavetodealwithoff-specbunkers.

Passengershipoperationsareverysensitivetooperationaldisruptions.Costsofdisruptioncanoccurintheformofhullandmachinerydamages,damagesandcompensationtopassengersandcrewaswellasdamagetoreputationthatmayinfluencefuturebookingsandearnings.Compensationto customers beyond the initial costs due to commercial considerations can easily fall outside the scope of cover of hullandmachinery,lossofhireandP&Icover.

Course of eventsUponarrivalinSingapore,thevesselwasfirmlysecuredtothepierat0550hrs.At0800hrs,abunkerbargecamealongsidetodeliverbunkerstothevessel.Thebargecommencedbunkeringat0810hrsandcompletedtheoperationat1255hrs.Thebunkerdeliverystatementnotedthat90metrictonnesofsupposedlyIFO180cstwassupplied.Fuelsamplesweretakenfortestingbyacrediblebunkerqualitytestingcompany.However,theresultsfromthisbunkertestwouldnotbeavailableforanother2–3days.

ThevesseldepartedSingaporeforThailandatapproximately1745hrsonthatsameday.At2215hrsthatevening,thevesselexperiencedatotalblackout,includingthelossofallnavigationalequipment.Powerwastemporarilyrestoredat2217hrs.Asecondblackoutoccurredat2218hrsresultinginthevesselnotbeingundercontrol.Althoughpowerwasfinallyrestoredat2220hrs,thevesselwasonlyabletocontinueathalfspeed.

TheChiefEngineerobservedthatthebunkerwhichhadbeensuppliedinSingaporethatday,hadahighdegreeofcarbonresidue,cloggingthecompletefuelsysteminthemainandauxiliaryengines.TheMasterinformedtheownersoftheproblemandthedecisionwasmadetoreturntoSingaporeduetosafetyconsiderations.

At1100hrsthefollowingday,fuelsamplesweretakeninthesettlingandservicetankswherethebunkershadbeenloadedandthevesselbegandischargingtheoff-specbunkersat1200hrs.ArepresentativefromtheSingaporeMaritimePortAuthorityinformedthevesselat1230hoursthattheywerebeingcautionedduetotheemissionofblacksmoke–apparentlytheresultoftheburningoftheoff-specbunkers.Anenginerepaircontractorboardedthevesselat1600hrsanduponsurveyingthesituation,indicatedthatrepairswouldtakeatleasttwodaysprovidednoextensivedamagewasfound.Afterconsultationswiththeowners,theMasterdecidedtoabortthecruise.

At0630hrsthefollowingday,thedebunkeringoperationwascompleted.AnotherbunkerbargebeganloadingafreshsupplyofIFO180cstat0810hrsandtheoperationwasconcludedat0945hrs.Allpassengersweredischargedfromthevesselat0945hrs.Asecondagencywasusedforthesampling of the second bunkers taken and a different bunker testingcompanywasusedtoanalysethesecondbunkers.The results of the tests of the first and second bunkers indicatedhighash,waterandtotalsedimentpotential(TSP)content.Inaddition,highsodiumtowatercontentwasalsoreported,indicatingthepresenceofseawaterinthebunkers.

However,thebunkerbrokersadvisedthecompanythatthesampleshadnotbeentakenatthebunkerbargeasrequiredbytheSingaporeStandardCP60:1996.Furthersamplesweredrawnatthebarge’smanifoldandsealedwithabargeseal.

Damage to machineryThe damage to the main engine as a result of using the off-specbunkerwasabrasivewearmarksonallfuelnozzles,abrasivewearonallfuelpumpbarrel/plungerassembliesaswellasheavyfoulingofallturbochargers.Theturbochargerimpellerswerenotedtobeheavilyfouled,thelabyrinthsealsonthegassideswerechokedwithcarbondeposits,andthebearingbusheswereworn.Inaddition,theboilerburnerunitwasalsoheavilyfouled.Uponreviewoftheenginelogbooks,therewasnoevidenceofanyproblemswiththeenginespriortotakingontheoff-specbunker.Therunninghoursofthemainandauxiliaryengineswerenotedtobewellwithinacceptablelimitsforoverhauls.

Inthiscase,therewasnoindicationthatthevesselhadreceivedtheresultsfromthefirstfueltestpriortosailing.Inaddition,thevesselhadapparentlyaverylimitedamountofbunkersonboardpriortoloadingthefirstoff-specbunkers.Therefore,thevesselhadtocommenceusingthenewbunkerspriortoreceivingthetestresults.Inthiscircumstance,thevesselwasnotabletocreatea‘buffer’byusingtheexistingbunkerswhileawaitingthetestresults.Hadthisbeenthecase,thecompanymayhavebeenabletodischargetheoff-specbunkersandtakenonreplacementbunkers.

What types of damages are actually covered?Inthistypeofcase,shipownerscanfindthemselvesinasituationwhereinsurancecovercanonlypayaportionofthecostsincurred.Forexample,inthisinstancethecostofrepairstothedamagetothemachinerywasbelowthedeductible.Forlossofhire,thevesselwasoffhirebutwithintheoffhiredeductible.TheP&IentrycoveredtheMember’s“liability to pay damages or compensation to passengers onboardtheShipinconsequenceofacasualty”asperRule28(b)ofGardP&IClub’sStatutesandRules.AsstatedintheGardHandbookonP&IInsurance2:“‘compensation’relatesonlytotheMember’slegalliabilitytothepassengersand cannot include any claim by the Member in respect of paymentsmadetopassengerstoprotecttheMember’scommercialreputation.”P&Icoverthus,doesnotincludeadditionalcompensationtopassengersabovetheMember’slegalliabilitymadetofostercustomergoodwill.

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Theshipownersisthereforelefttobearasignificantcostforbusinessdisruptioninthesetypesofinstances,whereonlylimitedinsurancecoverwouldbeavailableunderhullandmachinery,lossofhireandP&I.Dependentuponthecircumstances,demurragemayalsoneedtobechargedandthuscreatingproblemfortheshipowner.

Lessons learnedThelessonslearnedfromthiscaseapplytoalltypesofships.However,thepassengershipindustrycanbemoresensitivethanmostindustries.

Fuel testing1. Bunkeringprocedures,includingfuel-testing

procedures,shouldbereviewedtoensurecorrectprocedureswhendealingwithoff-specbunkers.Thecrewinvolvedshouldalsobeproperlybriefedontheseprocedurestoavoidcostlyandtime-consuminginterruptions.IntheDetNorskeVeritasAnnualReport2000,itisstatedthatonly40percentoftheworldfleetperformsfueltesting.3 This lack of testingcanleadtoextensivedamagetothevessel’smachinerywhichiscostlybothtotheownerandinsureralike.

Ontheotherhand,therearecaseswherethereis a company fuel testing procedure but due to commercial or other reasons the results of the tests are neither received in time nor actions taken to adjustthefuelequipmentandenginesaccordingly.Theimproperuseofoff-specfuelcancausesignificant damage to the vessel and its ability to trade.Inthecaseoutlinedabove,thecostswereconsiderableandwereonlypartiallyrecoverablefrominsurers.

Taking on bunkers2. Everyprecautionshouldbetakentoensurethat

adequatebunkersuppliesareavailabletoallowforthepropertestingbeforeuseofanynewbunkerstakenon.Itisimperativethatpassengerships,aswellasothervesselsontightcharterschedules,areabletodealwithsituationswhereitisnecessarytousebunkerswithoutthetestresultsbeingavailable.Thismayinvolvecomplexcontingencyplanninginordertoproperlyevaluateandensurethata‘buffer’exists.Forexample,someshipownersmaintainaquantityofmarinedieseloil(MDO)onboardforsituationswhereoff-specbunkersneedtobedischargedandonlylimitedIFOisavailable.

Footnotes1. GardLossPreventioncircularsrelatedtobunkersare:LossPreventioncircular01-00(MainEngineDamageDuetoIgnitionDelay),LossPreventioncircular03-01(BunkerQuality),andLossPreventioncircular04-01(Charterer’sLiabilitiesandBunkers).ThesecircularscanbefoundontheGardwebsiteatwww.gard.no.2. Gard Handbook on P&I InsurancebySimonPolandandTonyRooth.PublishedbyAssuranceforeningenGard.Arendal,Norway1996.ThishandbookcanalsobefoundontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no.3.DetNorskeVeritasAnnualReport2000canbeaccessedviatheirwebsiteatwww.dnv.com.


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Bunker Quality

IntroductionThesecuringofbunkersofanacceptablequalitydependsonavarietyoffactorssuchasavailability,demand,area,choiceofsuppliersetc.Theproblemshave,toacertaindegree,fluctuatedwiththebunkerprices.Themarkethasseenfuelscontaminatedwithwastechemicalsdetrimentaltothehealthofthecrewaswellasdamagingtotheshipsengines.Formanyyears,ithasbeennormalincertainareasoftheworldtodisposeofusedautomotivelubricantsinbunkers,thuspossiblyaddingtoengineoperatingproblems.

High-densityfuels,whichfarexceedthecapabilitiesoftheonboardfueltreatmentplants,arebeingdeliveredtovessels.Waterinthefuelsisnotuncommon,resultingin emulsified fuels and fuels that cannot be treated in shipboardfueltreatmentplants.Someoftheproblemsmentionedresultindamagesthatareinsuredagainst,butinmostcasestheassociatedcostsfallbelowthedeductible.Occasionally,blendingcontaminatedfuelwithgoodqualityfuelmaysolvetheproblem.Inotherinstances,thedamagesintheformofwearandtearofmovingpartsaresogreatthatthevesselhastodiverttoanemergencyportformajorrepairs.

Primary problemsWe see mainly three problems:1. Catfines,aluminiumandsiliconresultingfromthe

refinerycrackingprocesses,areveryabrasivetoship’smachinery,unlessproperlyremoved.TheendresultcanbemachinerydamageunlesstheCatfinesareremovedtoanacceptablelevel(contactyourenginemanufacturer)througheffectivefueltreatmentonboard,i.e.optimumuseofthecentrifuges.Themodeofcentrifugeoperationmustbediscussedwiththemanufacturer as the type and year of manufacture of the separatorsisofsignificance.

2. Astheglobaldemandforpremiumproductssuchasgasoline,jetfuel,heatingoilsandgasoilshasincreasedsharply,theuseofrefineryconversionprocessinghavemarkedlyinfluencedthequalityoftheendproduct,theresidualcomponentwhichisthemajorcomponentusedforblendingIntermediateFuelOil(IFO)forships.Theresultisfuelswithhigherdensity,carbonresidue,sulphuretc.Practicallyeveryparameterhasincreasedsignificantlythroughouttherefineryprocessing.

Shipsfittedwitholdercentrifugesareunableto

effectivelytreatsuchfuels,particularlythe“highdensity”products,i.e.fueldensitiesof990Kg/m3 and above.Centrifugemanufacturersofferedupgradekitsforthe“old”separators,butfewoperatorsinvestedinthesekits.

3. Poorignitionqualityisanotherproblemthathasarisenrecently.Thestandardlaboratorytestsdonottesttheignitionquality,anditisnotapartoftheISO8217FuelStandards.Theproblemisnormallyassociatedwithlowviscosity/highdensityfuels.Ifavesselreceivesthistypeoffuel,theshipshouldkeeptemperaturesashighaspossible,thusavoidinglowloadoperation.GardServiceshasseenanumberofclaimsinthelastfewyearswherethevesselhashadtobeassistedtoan

emergencyport.Theuseofinferiorignitionqualityfuelsmaywellresultinmajorrepairstothevessel’sengine(s).

RecommendationsOwnersshouldbeawarethattheincreaseddemandfromshore side industries for premium products has resulted in a deteriorationofIFOusedinmarineengines.Compoundingtheproblemisthedemandfromshipownersforhighperformancelighterengines.

1. IFOusedasbunkersshould,asaminimum,meettherequirementsofthespecificationssetoutinISO8217,latestissue.BunkertestingagenciessuchasDnVPetroleumServices(DnVPS)andLloyd’sRegister’sFOBASaresetuptomonitorthatthisisthecase.

2. IfthevesselhasperformancedifficultiesandpoorignitionqualityissuspecteddespiteasatisfactoryCCAIvalue,afurthertestfortheignitionqualityshouldbeperformed.Fueltech,FOBASandDnVPScanperformtheseservices(seeGardServicesLossPreventionCircular04-01,CharterersLiabilitiesandBunkers).

3. IfthevesselisintheunfortunatesituationofhavingreceivedahighCatfinesfuel,andhastousethefuel,ownersshouldbepreparedforasuccessionofreplacementsofplungers,nozzlesandothermoveableengineparts.Anormalfullsetofsparesmaynotbesufficienttoseetheproblemthrough.Thefueltestingserviceprovidershouldalsobecontacted,togetherwithyourcentrifugemanufacturerandfuelsupplierforadviceanddecision-making.

4. Separatorsmustbeinprimeconditions.Considerationsshould be given to replacing separators manufactured priorto1984/1985.

5. Ifthevesselhasbeenonextendedlay-up,Catfinesand other impurities may settle in the bunker tanks if a sufficient amount of bunkers remain onboard during the lay-upperiod.Whensubsequentlyre-commissioned,theseCatfinesandimpuritiesarelikelytobestirredupinheavyseasandcausedamagetotheengine(s).Therefore,considerationshouldbegiventothecleaning of bunker tanks prior to bringing a vessel out ofanextendedlay-uptopreventtheoccurrenceofthistypeofproblem.

ThesettlingofCatfinesisacontinuousprocesstakingplaceonboardeveryseagoingvessel.Asarule,fueltanksshouldbecleanedregularly.Settlinganddailyservicetanksshouldbecleanedatleastonceayear.Thismessy,butimportanttaskwouldsaveshipoperatorsalotofproblems.

Forfurtherinformationonbunkerquality,testingandotherrelevantinformationcanbefoundonwebsitessuchaswww.bunkersworld.com,www.dnvps.com,andwww.lrfobas.comandwww.fueltech.no.

GardwouldliketothankandacknowledgeMr.KjellHaugland’sassistanceinpreparingthiscircular.

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Turbocharger damages

IntroductionTurbochargers are among the most technologically advanced enginecomponentonboardship.Impellerbladesofamediumsizedturbochargerregularlyrotateatasmuchas400revolutionspersecond.Theouteredgesoftherotorbladesthusmoveat1.5timesthespeedofsound.

Intheprocess,theturbochargerdigestscontaminatedexhaustgasesofupto700degreescentigrade.Thus,theturbochargerisaverysensitivepieceofhigh-speedmachinery continuously serving in harsh conditions and under extremestrain.Beingonthereceivingendofgasflows,turbocharger damages are often caused by the failure of variousupstreamcomponents.

Asshipownersandshipmanagersareaware,damagetomainengineandauxiliaryengineturbochargershaveasignificantimpactonthevessel’sabilitytotrade.Damagescanleadtocostlyrepairs,significantreductioninspeedwhileatseaandcanbeaconsiderablesafetyhazard.

ThesedamagesarecostlytoshipownersandshipmanagersaswellastoGardServices.ForshipsinsuredforHullandMachinerythroughGardServicesintheperiod1996and2001,therehavebeen192incidentsofturbochargerdamageswithtotalgrossclaimsofUSD24.7million.Takingintoaccountdeductibles,theseturbochargerdamageshavecostshipownersandshipmanagersinexcessofUSD25million.Additionalcostsareaccruedbyshipownersandshipmanagersforturbochargerdamagesthatfallbelowthedeductiblelevels.Asaresult,thiscircularbeenhavepreparedasanassistancetotheMembersandClientsinthepreventionof such costly damages to this critical part of the machinery system.

Some major contributors to turbocharger breakdowns1. Late maintenance and overhauls.Inmanycases,

theservicelifeofmajorcomponentsisdisregarded.Notonlybearings,butalsocompressorwheelsandturbineblades/discscanhaveservicelifelimitations.Compressorwheels,forinstance,canbelimitedtobetween50,000and100,000workhoursdependingupontheuseandconfiguration.Thisisequivalentto7.5to15yearsofusebetweenexchangeintervals.Duetooperationalandfinancialconstraints,overhaulsareoccasionallypostponeduntildry-dockingratherthanoverhaulingwhiletheshipisinservice.

Obvioussignalsindicatingthatthereareproblemswillattimesbedisregarded.Surgingoftheturbochargercanpointtoacloggedaircoolerorfoulednozzlering.Continuedsurgingatfullloadmightcausebreakdownbyitself.Further,risingexhaustgastemperaturesmayindicatethataninspectionfollowedbyserviceisrequired.

2. Non-manufacturer parts used in place of manufacturers parts. Toreducethecostsofmaintenanceandparts,ownerswilluse‘pirate’or‘alternativesource’partsinplaceofmanufacturer’sparts.Duetotheroughserviceenvironmentofaturbocharger,inferiorqualitypartswithslightdiscrepanciesinmaterial,designanddimensionscaneasilyleadtodamages.

ABB TPL TurbochargerPhoto courtesy of ABB.

3. Maintenance not performed by manufacturer. Maintenancecostsforturbochargerscanbesignificant.Maintenanceundertakenbythecrew,shipyardorotherpersonnelnotqualifiedbythemanufacturertoperformsuch servicing can lead to improper maintenance and servicing.Belowarelistedafewexamplesofsmallmistakeswhichmayeventuallyleadtototalbreakdowns:

– Failuretoobservetherightfittingsequencemaypre-damagecomponents.

– Failuretoexchangekeywearpartsmayleadtolossoffunctionality,forinstancetolossofbearinglubrication.

– Failuretoobservethecorrectclearancesoftheassemblyandtoadjusttherighttruerunofrotorsmayleadtorubbingoftherotorwithconsequentialunbalance.

– Impropercleaningofcoverringscanleadtobladerubbingandconsequentbladefailurewheninstallingoverhauledrotors.

– LackoforImproperbalancingofarotormaydamagebearings.(Duetothehighspeed,tolerancesareextremelylow).

4. Missing service letters. When there is a change of ownershipofavessel,theservicelettersandlogbooksfortheturbocharger,aswellasothercriticalpiecesofmachineryandequipmentcanbemissing.Thisbreakininformationdoesnotallowthenewownersor shipmanagers the opportunity to assess the maintenanceandservicesneedsoftheturbochargers.

5. Inappropriate use.Dependingupontheship’stradeandoperation,enginesandturbochargersaresometimesspecifiedfor‘slowsteaming’.Whenincreasedloaddemandsaremadeonsuchequipment,somecomponents may need to be replaced to match the newoperatingconditions.Ifdisregarded,operationalproblemsand/orreducedlifecycleoftherotatingpartsoftheturbochargerduetoelevatedspeedmayresult.

6. Actual turbocharger is not appropriately matched to engine. Duringvesselconstruction,turbochargersareratedforspecifiedoperatingconditions.Engineconversionsandchangestoincreasethe


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poweroutputplacesagreaterloaddemandonthe turbocharger and thus reducing the reliability andservicetimeofturbochargerturbinewheel,compressorwheelandbearings.

7. Upstream maintenance resulting in damage to the turbocharger.Inmanycases,damagestoturbochargersoccurswhenmaintenancehasbeenconducted on other machinery components or systemsupstreamoftheturbocharger.Sincetheturbochargerisdownstreamofmostotherenginemachinery,anyforeignobjects,looseparts,forgottenequipmentorpiecesofmachineryequipmentthat may have not been properly reassembled mayeventuallymovedownstreamtodamagetheturbocharger.Suchitemsincludeloosebolts,injectionnozzlefragments,compensatorbellowbits,weldingelectrodestumps,wrenchesandscrewdrivers,ragsoranyotherforeignobjects.Duetotheextremeservicespeedofaturbocharger,evenminuteparticlesmaydamagevitalpartsandleadtoseveredamage.

8. Improper operation and maintenance by the crew. Impropermaintenanceandoperationbythecrewcanleadtodamagetotheturbocharger.Thefollowingisa list of some of the types of causes and events that canleadtomoreseriousdamages.– Dirt on compressor and turbine blades –

Improperlyimplementedorneglectedwashingroutines can let dirt accumulate on both compressorandturbineblades.Thiswillleadtoimbalancesintherotor,andconsequentiallyitcancausebearingdamagesandeventotalbreakdown.

– Improper lubricating oil – The use of lubricating oils not recommended by the manufacturer or contaminatedoil,canleadtoreducedperformanceandeventualdamagetothebearings.

– Improper cleaning and maintenance of filtration rings – Theintakeairqualitycanbeaffectedwhenairfiltersarenotproperlycleanedand/orchanged.Acloggedfiltermayleadtosurging.Insomecases,ithasbeenobservedthatthecrew,tokeepfromhavingtomaintainandcleanthefilters,haveremovedthefiltrationrings.

– Turbocharger over-speed –Duetoincorrectmaintenanceoroperationalactivities,turbochargersareinsomecasesover-sped.Whencontinuouslyover-spedbyonlyafewpercent,thisquicklydamagesturbochargercomponentsandreducestheirservicelife.Anover-speedof30-40%islikelytoblowuptheturbochargerinstantly.

Recommendations– Only qualified manufacturer approved

maintenance personnel should perform maintenance to turbochargers.Inmostcases,themostqualifiedpersonneltoperformmaintenanceand overhauls are the manufacturers themselves whererepairscanbeperformedwhiletheshipisinserviceoratdry-dock.Somecompaniesandshipyardsarewillingtoperformturbochargermaintenanceandoverhaulata‘cheaper’costthanthemanufacturer.Thesereducedcostscanbeattractivetoshipownersandshipmanagers.

However,thiscostcanbebasedona‘falseeconomy’ifdamagesoccurduetoinadequatemaintenanceanditcan,intheend,beverycostlytotheownerandunderwriterinsettlingaclaim.Whereas,whenqualifiedpersonnelperformthemanufacturer’swork,workmanshipismorethanlikelyunderwarranty.

– Use the correct manufacturers replacement parts. Theturbochargerisahighlyloaded,hightechnologyenginecomponent.Therefore,itisimperativetomaintainandoverhaulthemwiththecorrectparts.Aswiththemaintenancework,thepartswillalsomorethanlikelybeunderwarranty.

– Ensure that proper records of turbocharger service documents and letters are obtained and kept. This is to ensure that proper maintenance andservicecanbescheduled.Incaseswheretheservice documents and letters are not available uponsaleoftheship,theequipmentmanufacturercanoftenhelpwithproperdocumentationandsometimesevenwiththeturbochargerservicehistory.

– Operate the turbochargers within the operational design parameters. Damages arising due to improperusecanbeveryexpensiveandleadtooperationsatreducedspeeds,atotalbreakdownof the turbocharger or loss of hire due to the need formaintenanceandrepair.Therefore,importantparameters such as turbocharger speed and exhaustgastemperaturesshouldberoutinelymonitored and if possible used as input to trigger alarms.

– Ensure proper care and maintenance of the turbocharger. Turbocharger care and maintenance arerequiredatregularintervalsandshouldbeinaccordancewiththemanufacturersrecommendations.Ifindoubt,contacttheequipmentmanufacturerforinformationoncomponentservicelife.Propercareandmaintenance include:

1. Watercleaningofcompressorsandturbinesto remove dirt and other residual material fromtherotortoensureproperbalance.

2. Regularcleaningandchangingofairintakefilterstopreventforeignobjectsenteringanddirtandresiduebuildupontherotorblades.Furthermore,contaminationofairintakefiltersresults in a higher inlet restriction and may causeturbochargeroverspeedorsurging.

3. Incaseofturbochargerseparatelubricatingsystem:Regularchangingoflubricatingoil(consultmanualforapprovedoil)andcleaningofcentrifugesaswellasfilters.

4. Regularinspectionofturbochargerparameterswhileinoperation.

AcknowledgementsGardisgratefultoABBTurboSystemsLtdofBaden,SwitzerlandandtheturbochargerservicestationinOslo,Norwayforprovidingvaluableinformationtoassistinthepreparationofthiscircular.

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Main Engine Damage Due to Contaminated Lubricating OilShip Type: Bulk carrier (85,000 dwt, built 1981)

Course of EventsTheabove-mentionedvesseloperatedformorethan1yearwiththemainenginelubrication(lube)oilcontaminatedbyfreshwater.Duringthesameperiodthelubeoilpurifierswerenotoperatedonaregularbasis.Occasionallythevesselusedthedieseloilpurifierforcleaningthelubeoil.Thelubeoilsumpwascleanedonatleasttwooccasionsandseveralthousandlitresoflubeoilwerefullyorpartlyreplaced.Ononeoccasiontheengineroomwasfloodedwithsandywateroutsideariverreefbarrierwherewaterenteredtheenginesumpthroughthethrustbearing.Lubeoilsamplingduringthatyearshowedawidevariationofresults.Sometimesitwaswithinacceptablelimits.Atothertimes,thelubeoilwascontaminatedwithupto30%watermakingthetexturesimilarto“wholemilk”and“creamyandmudlike”.

Atalltimesthevesselwasinclosecontactwiththeshoreoperation.Requestsforsparesforpurifiersandreplacementsforlubeoilwerefrequentlymade.Theshoresuperintendents did not appreciate the lube oil problem forthevessel.Therefore,requestsfromthevesselwerenottakenseriously.Thisledtodelaysindeliveryand/orininsufficientquantitiesofcriticalspareparts.Fewactionsorinitiativesweretakentocorrectthesituation.

Exceptforthefloodingincident,noconclusionwasmadeas to the source of the continuous contamination of fresh waterinthelubeoil.However,possiblesourceswerecondensation,lubeoilcoolersand/orthepurifiers.Inaddition,thevesselwasmainlyemployedinafreshwaterrivertrade.Finallytheshipoperator’stechnicaladvisorsrequestedtheattendanceofaserviceengineerfromtheenginemakerandextensivedamagetotheenginewasrevealed.

Extent of the DamageExcessivewearwasdiscoveredtoallenginemain,crankpin,crossheadandcamshaftbearings,plusdamageandweartootherlubricatedpartsoftheengine.Thevesselstayedoff-hirefor125daysfortherepairsthatresultedinaLossofHire(LOH)claimofUSD$5,000,000.TheParticularAverageclaimtothehull&machinery(H&M)underwritersisnotknowntous,butisestimatedtobeapproximatelyUSD$2,000,000.

Probable CauseThe lube oil purifiers had been out of order during operation.Wheninoperation,theywereactingmoreas transfer pumps instead of purifiers due to incorrect operationthatincluded:(1)alackofpartsinthediscstack,(2)incorrectgravitydiscs,and(3)alowoperationtemperature.

Thelubeoilsumphadonlybeenpartlyreplaced.With15,000litresofcontaminatedoil,itisnotsufficienttoreplace10,000litrestoeliminatethecontamination.Theremaining5,000contaminatedthenewoil.

Water had entered the crankcase through the thrust bearing onatleastoneoccasionwhenthevesselsufferedapartial

engineroomflooding.Itwasreportedthatthelubeoilinthesumpwasreplacedonthisoccasion,butitisuncleartowhetherthepipingandengineinternalsweresufficientlycleaned.

Alackofpropercontrolandfollow-upfromvesseloperatorswhousedpersonnelwithouttheproperqualificationsandknowledgetotakethenecessaryactionsinensuringtheproper maintenance and operation of the vessel despite being continuously kept informed of the lube oil system problems.Evenafterthetopmanagementhadbeenmadeawareoftheproblemwiththemainengine,theyforcedthevesseltocontinueserviceforseveralweeks.

Technical & management lessons to be learnedThe lessons to be learned from this incident are among the following:– Oilsamplingmustbetakenatfrequentintervalsand

recordedasbestrecommendedpractice.– Itisveryimportantofcorrectandcontinuous

operationofthelubeoilpurifiers.Thegravitydiscmustbeselectedtoobtaintheoptimumoil-waterinterfaceatamaximumtemperaturecloseto90degCdependingonspecifications.

– Thelubeoilfeedsystemtothepurifiersshouldbeevaluatedinordertoensuretheoptimumflowratebetweenthepurifier’scapacityandfeedpump.Older lube oil feed system designs use a direct drive pumpthathastoohighcapacitywithrespecttotherecommendedflowthroughthepurifiers.

– Ifheavycontaminationofwaterispresentinthesystem:(1)thelubeoilinthesumptankmustbetransferredtoasettlingtank,(2)thesumptankshouldbecleaned,and(3)freshoilfilledtotheminimumlevelrecommendedbytheenginemaker. The contaminated lube oil can be drained and circulated through the purifiers and the future use of theoilcanbeassessedafteranalysis.

– Ifithasbeendeterminedthatsolidparticlesarepresent,youshouldalsoconsidercleaningofthepipingsystemandflushingtheentireengine.

Thisincidentalsoshowstheimportanceofresponsibleandqualifiedshoremanagement.Inthiscase,thepersonatthemanagementofficeindirectcontactwiththevesseldidnothavetheproperqualificationsrequiredtoeffectivelyassist the vessel or take the necessary actions in case of an emergency.Therewaslittleunderstandingofthecontinuousrequestforsparepartsoroftheseriousnessofrunningthemainenginewithcontaminatedlubeoil.

Impact on vessel’s LOH and H&M policiesInsurance conditionsThevessel’sH&MinsurancewassubjecttoInstituteTimeClausesHulls(ITCH)PortRisksincludingLimitedNavigation(20.7.87).TheITCPerilsClauseincludes,interalia,thefollowingwording:“This insurance covers loss of or damage to the subject matter insured caused by negligence of master, officers, crew and pilots….provided such loss or damage has not resulted from want of due diligence by the assured, owners or managers.”


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Furthermore,thevesselwasinsuredforLOH,andthepolicywasbasedontheSP40BLossofCharterHireForm(August1961),amendedtocoverlossordamagecausedbyaperilinsuredagainstundertheITCHPortRisksincludingLimitedNavigation(20.7.87).Consequently,theaboveperilsclausewouldalsogoverntheLOHpolicy.

Cause allegationTheassuredmaintainedthatthedamagewasproximatelycausedbyanactoractsofnegligencebyvessel’sengineersinfailingtoensurethatthemainenginelubeoilwasproperlypurified.Therefore,thiswouldbea“primafacie”claimundertheabovestatedperilsclause.

Coverage issuesWhilstitmightappeardifficulttodisregardtheassured’sallegation,itseemsclearthatthelackofpropersupervision/supplyofsparesetc.byshore-basedpersonnelsignificantlyinfluencedthedamage.

Withreferencetotheperilsclausequotedabove,itshouldbe noted that the cover of loss or damage caused by negligenceofthemaster,officers,crewandpilotsissubjectto a proviso that the loss or damage has not resulted from wantofduediligencebytheassured,ownersormanagers.

Therefore,thecrucialquestionstoconsiderinthistypeofcase are: (a) Whetherthelackofpropersupervision/actionsby

shorepersonnelamountsto“wantofduediligence”,andifso,

(b) Whethertheloss/damagewasaresultofthewantofduediligence,and

(c) Whetherthosewhocouldbeblamedforwantofduediligencecouldbeidentifiedwith“theassured,ownersormanagers”.

Iftheanswerstoallquestionsareaffirmative,thereisnoclaim.TheITCHPortRisksaresubjecttoEnglishlawandpractice.However,thenumbersofEnglishcasesthathaveconsideredthewordingoftheduediligenceprovisohavebeenratherlimited.

Weproposehoweverthefollowingcommentstothequestionsabove:(a) Thereappearstobelittledoubtthatthelackof

propersupervision/actionsbyshorepersonnelamountsto“wantofduediligence”.

Thereisnodoubtthatthewantofduediligencebyshorepersonnel has been an important factor in the development ofthedamage.Ontheotherhand,onecaneasilyarguethatthevessel’sengineershavecommittedseveralactsofnegligence have also contributed to the damage

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Main Engine Medium Speed Crankshaft Damage

Ship Type: Panamax bulk carrier (built 1981)Course of EventsWehaverecentlyexperiencedtwosevereconsequentialdamages to main engine crankshafts after failure to big endconnectingrodbearings.Thesequencesofeventshave,inbothcases,beenthesame.Alarmsweregivenforthe oil mist detector fitted in the crankcase indicating over heatingofinternalparts.Theenginewassloweddownandcontinuedrunningonreducedloadforaperiodbetween20to45minutesbeforeitwasfinallystopped.Thecrankcasewasthenopenedforinspectionofcrankshaftandbearings.

Clearevidencewasfoundofadamagedbigendconnectingrodbearingthathadrotatedinsidetheconnectingrod.Inordertoreachasafeportthepistonwithconnectingrodwasdismantledandcylinderblankedoff.Preparationwasmadetogrindthecrankpinin-situtoremovethescoresandtofitanundersizeconnectingrodbearing.

Extent of DamageThecrankpininbothcaseswasfoundwithconsiderablescoresandsmallcracks,butthesecouldhavebeenremovedbyin-situgrindingofthecrankpin.SeriousdamagewasdiscoveredwhentestingtheBrinellhardnessofthecrankpin.Thelongperiodwithrunningtheenginewithadamagedbig end connecting rod bearing had transferred such amount of heat to the crankpin that the steel had hardened toanunacceptablelevel.Tofullyrestorethecrankpin,thediameterhadtobereducedbymorethan8mm.Consequently,theenginewouldhavetobede-rated.

Thiswasnotacceptablefortheshipowner.Theresultinbothcaseswasacompletedismantlingoftheengineandfittingofnewcrankshaft.

TheapproximatecostsforeachoftherepairswereaboutUSD1,800,000.andtotaloff-hiredaysexcludingslowsteamingortowingtorepairyard,about2monthsdependingondeliverytimefornewcrankshaft.

Incomparison,hadthemainenginebeenstoppedafterthealarmsindicatedtheoverheating,thedamagescouldhavebeenlimited.Thetotalcostsforanormalin-situgrindingofthecrankpinincludingnewundersizeconnectingrodbearingandotherspareswouldhavebeenintherangeofUSD$50,000.

Cause of DamageIthasnotbeenpossibletoestablishthecauseforthebreakdownofthebigendconnectingrodbearings,butitismostlikelytoberelatedtothecleanlinessand/orsupplyoflubricatingoil.Smallscorescouldbeseenonothermainjournalsandcrankpins.

Lessons to be Learned– Whenoverheatingisdetectedand/ortheoil

mistdetectoralarmissounding,stoptheengineimmediatelyifpossible.

– Theengineshouldnotberestartedbeforethereason for the overheating is identified and corrected.

Keepthelubricatingoilascleanaspossibleusingcontinuouslythelubricatingoilspurifieratthemaximumrecommendedtemperature(normallyabove90deg.C.).Maintain the lubricating oil filters in clean and proper conditionbyfrequentdailyroutinesorasnecessary.


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Main Engine Damage Due to Ignition Delay

Ship Type: Panamax bulk carrier (built 1980)Course of EventsInaGulfofMexicoport,thevesselreceivedheavyfueloilIFO180accordingtoISOcategoryRME25withadensityof989,6kg/m3andaviscosityof172Cst.ThebunkerreceiptinformationandthefollowingDNVPSanalysiscoincidewithrespecttotheseparameters.

Basedonthedensityandviscosityinformation,theignitionqualitiesofthisfuel(CCAI)werecalculatedto860whichisacceptableforslowspeedengines.Thevesselisequippedwitha16-cylindermediumspeedmainengineofEuropeandesign,andthisfuelisonthelimitofwhereoperationalproblemscouldbeexpectedformediumspeedengines.Asaresult,thechiefengineeronboardandtheshipmanagementofficewereinformedbyDNVPSthat precautions should be taken to ensure satisfactory combustion.

The chief engineer on board and the ship manager ashore didnotpayanyattentiontothefuelanalysis.Theydidnotconsidered the specific recommendations issued by the enginemakerorDNVPS’sprecautionsforoperatingthemainenginewithfuelwithinferiorignitioncharacteristics.Tocompoundtheproblem,thevesselwassenttoareasfortradingincludingdayswithriverpassagewithvariableloadsonthemainengine.Thismadeitdifficulttomaintainmaximumcombustiontemperatureandthusmadeitvirtuallyimpossibletofollowtheoperationalrecommendations.

The delayed combustion resulted in increased combustion pressure,combustionclosetothecylinderwallsandtheconsequentialfailureofthelubricationofthepistonsandliners.

Extent of the DamageTheresultwasacompletebreakdownofallpistons,cylinderlinersandcylinderheadswithrelatedparts.Duetolackofavailabilityofsparepartsonboardship,onlypreliminaryrepairsweremade.Thus,thevoyagetothedischargeportwasmadeatreducedspeed.Meanwhile,thecompanyhadtomakearrangementsatthedischargeporttoacquiresparepartsandmakepreparationforfinalrepairs.Thevesselwastakenoff-hireuponarrivalatthedischargeport.

Asaresultthetotalcosttorepairisapproximately$530,000USDandthetotaltimeoff-hireisapproximately45days.

Probable CauseTheshipmanagerand/orcommercialoperatorofthevesselmadetheerrorinbelievingthatalowerviscosityfuel(180Cst)wasofbetterqualitythanahighviscosityfuel(380Cst).Thisiscommonlyseenwhenafuelsupplierlowerstheviscosity by adding lighter components that may seriously altertheignitioncharacteristics.

The ship manager had arranged for sampling and analysis offuel.However,theshipmanagerhadnotensuredthattheirchiefengineerswereprovidedwithproperprocedures

and instructions to take the necessary precautions against damagesthatcouldbeincurredbyinferiorqualityfuel.

Theresultwasthatthevesselleftthebunkeringportwithnopreventiveactionsandprecautionsonhowtodealwithasituationwithafuelonboardwithinferiorcombustioncharacteristics.

Lessons to be LearnedThe importance of fuel sampling and analysis is essential forverificationofthequalityofthefuelreceivedonboard.Thereishoweverlittlevalueincompaniesspendingmoneyon sampling and testing if shipboard engineers are not properlytrainedtounderstandthefuelqualityanalysisandprovidedwithproceduresandinstructionsonhowtoadjustthefuelequipmentandenginesaccordingly.

Procedures and instructions should be established in the technical or operational departments on how to:

– establish requirements for fuel quality depending on the fuel treatment equipment and engines on board

– follow-up the vessels’ bunkering schedules, ensure cor-rect sampling and where to send samples for analysis

– ensure the engineers on board and technical staff ashore will understand the analysis and the limitations for their equipment, and

– in the event of having taken on fuel of inadequate qual-ity, establish communication with the engine makers and fuel analysing company in order to provide proper instructions to the vessel.

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Counter Piracy – Follow Best Management Practices (BMP)BackgroundAlthoughtherewasasubstantialdecreaseinpiracyactivityintheGulfofAdenduring2009,piracyintheSomaliBasin/IndianOceanreachedrecordlevelsduringthesameperiod.Bothareasmuststillberegardedasareaswithanextremeriskofpiracy.Itisclearthatthepirateshaveboththeabilityandwillingnesstooperateatanever-increasingdistancefromthecoastlineofSomalia,andstatisticsshowthattheattacksinthesecondhalfof2009coveredasignificantlylargerareathanthosewhichtookplaceinthefirsthalfofthesameyear.Statisticsalsoshowthatthemerchantvessels’owndefensivemeasuresplayamajorroleindefeatingthepirates.Thetotalnumberofattackshasincreased;thenumberofsuccessfulattackshasbeenreduced.Inaddition,it has also become clear that most of the successfully hijackedvesselswerenotregisteredwithMSCHOA1 and thattheydidnotreporttheirmovementstoUKMTO2 or wereusingtheBestManagementPractise.

ThepurposeofthisCircularistohighlightthetrends,theimportanceofregisteringwithMSCHOAandtheimportanceofthevessel’sownprotectivemeasuresandtraining.TheCircularalsoprovidesinformationonsomerecentinitiativesimplementedbyMSCHOA.

Gulf of Aden (GoA)Therewasatotalof72attacksintheGoAintheperiodMarch2009toDecember2009,butonly20%ofthese

resultedinsuccessforthepirates.Inapproximatelyhalfoftheunsuccessfulattacksitwasthemerchantships’owndefensivemeasuresthatdefeatedthepirates.Thepirates’successratiohasshownasteadydeclinetobelow20%sinceitspeakinlate2008of50%,demonstratingtheeffectivenessofthecombinationofmerchantvessels’ownmeasuresandmilitaryintervention.3

The Somali Basin/Indian OceanDuringtheperiodMarch2009toDecember2009therewereatotalof85attacksintheSomaliBasin.Justunderathirdresultedinthevesselbeinghijacked.Inapproximately55%ofthecasesitwasthemerchantvessels’owndefensivemeasuresthatdefeatedthepirates.Thepirates’successratiohasshownadeclinefromapeakofalmost60%inlate2008toanaverageofapproximately30%inlate2009.Duetoasmallernavalpresenceinthisarea,therehasonlybeenone instance of decisive intervention from naval forces in this area.Itisimpossibleforthenavalforcescurrentlyintheareatopolicesuchavastareaofsea,whichhighlightstheneedformerchantvessels,theirownersandcrew,toproperlyplanandprepareforanypossibleattack.

Masters’ Anti-piracy briefing packageSelectedvesselspassingSuezCanalsouthboundwillasof20January2010receivea“MastersAnti-PiracyBriefingPackage”4fromSuezCanalAuthority/EUNAVFOR.Vesselsofferedthispackagewillbeselectedbasedonthefollowing


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criteria:Speed(lessthan15kts),freeboard(lessthan7mts)andthedegreeofawarenessandpreparednesstofaceanythreatofpiracy.TheassessmentisdonebythefirstpilotembarkinginPortSaid,andthesecondPilotembarkinginIsmailiawillbringthepackageonboardfortheMaster.Also,thereisapossibilityfortheMastertoaskforsuchabriefing,althoughthecriteriaforselectionarenotmet.

The Anti-piracy Chart (Q6099)Theanti-piracycharthasbeendevelopedbyMSCHOAfor use on board the vessels as a guidance to training and preparationsbeforeenteringtheGoA.NotfollowingtheBestManagementPracticesandthereportingprocedureswillreduceyourownandothers’abilitytopreventandresistanattack.TheMSCHOAhasthereforeincludedanoverviewofthewholeBMPintheanti-piracychart.Thechartisdistributedtocharthandlersworldwide,andisnowavailableasa”ListofAdmiraltychart”.Thechartisveryusefulasacompletechecklistwhenenteringahighriskpiracyarea.5

RecommendationsAnyvoyagethroughtheGoAandwesternpartsofIndianOceanshouldbeconsideredaspotentiallyexposingthevesseltopiracyattacks.AllownersandoperatorsarestronglyrecommendedtoadheretotheBMPs,whicharesupportedbyallmajorindustrygroupsandbytheITFandEUNAVFOR.IntheIndianOcean,anyvesselisfairgame,regardlessofsizeandspeed,andownersshouldnotrelyon being able to seek protection from or receive a rapid responsefromnavalforcesinthesewaters,simplyduetothesheersizeoftheseaarea.ThemostimportantmeasuresonecantakeisregisteringyourvoyagewithMSCHOA,reportingyourpositionstoUKMTODubaiandoperatinginaccordancewiththeBMPs.AnywarningsofpotentialthreatsissuedbyMSCHOA,UKMTODubaiorIMBshouldbeadheredto,allowingtheMastersmoredynamicvoyageplanning.6

TheBMPsaretheindustry’ssharedbestpractices.Thesemeasureswillensurethecrewhasthebestpreparationandtrainingfordealingwithanattackandwillenhanceanyvessel’sdefensiveabilitiesintheeventofanattack.Itisessential that companies commit themselves to establishing solidsecuritypolicieswiththeBMPsasabasisfortheircompany’sriskassessmentandadaptedasappropriatetospecificvessels.

TheHighRiskAreaisdynamicandrequiresconstantattention.TheIndianOceanisnotnecessarilysafeeastofanyspecificlongitude–insteadprepareandplanaccordingly,remainvigilantthroughout,followtheBMPsandpayattentiontothewarningsissued.Keepupyourguard.intheGulfofAden–itdoesnottakemanysuccessfulhijackingsbeforeactivityincreasesagain.EvenwithNavalForcespresent–theGulfofAdenisnotapiracy-freearea.

Footnotes1MSCHOAmanagestheGrouptransitsystem.AllshipownersandoperatorsarerequestedtoregistervesselsgoingthroughtheGulfofAden(IRTC)ontheMSCHOAwebsite(orbyemailtoMSCHOA).2UKMTODubaimanagesthemerchantshippingintheregionbasedonvoluntaryreportingscheme.MovementsthroughtheregionshouldbereportedtoUKMTODubai,andUKMTODubaishouldbethefirsttocontactifpiracyattacksareencounteredduringthevoyage.3Amilitarydecisiveinterventionisbasedoninformationabout imminent piracy attacks received from the vessels transitingtheGoA.Thenearestnavalvesselwillseektoprovideassistancebyanymeanswithinacertainresponsetime.Presently,theaverageresponsetimeis15-20minutes.Naval forces managed by decisive intervention to prevent an attackbecomingasuccessfulhijackinjustfewerthan30%ofthecases.4MastersAnti-piracybriefingpackagecontains(1)the“Counter-piracy–adviceandchecklistforMasters”booklet,(2)aDVDthatcontainstheBMP,(3)afolder“Howtosurviveapiracyattack”andaQuestionnaire.Thisinformationisavailableonwww.mschoa.orgaswell.5SeealsoGard’sLossPreventionCircularno07-08:“Master’sbriefbeforeenteringahighriskpiracyarea”.6Areportofsuspiciouseventsorattacksgenerateswarningstoallvesselsinsidethereportingarea.Thesewarningsprovideearlynoticetoothervesselsintheareatoavoidthatarea,orifthisisnotpossible,toproperlyprepareforapossibleattack.

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Master’s brief before entering high risk piracy areasPiracyiscurrentlyoneofthemajorconcernstoshipping.Inordertopreparetheshipproperly,itisimportantthattheentirecrewhasafullunderstandingofthesituationandthetaskstobecarriedout.AMaster’sbrieftothecrewpriortoenteringtheareaisthereforerecommended.ThebelowlistcontainsitemswhichshouldbeconsideredwhenpreparingaMaster’sbrief.

Area of operation•Chartofthehighriskarea.• Designatedrouteandtimespentwithinthehighriskarea.•Weatherforecast.

Situation and risk assessment• Currentpiracysituationinthearea.

o Thepirates’knownmodeofoperationandtheirexpecteduseofforce.

o Thenumberofpirateswhichcanbeexpected.oThepirate’shistoricalsuccessrate.

• Maritimesecuritysituation.o Othercivilianvesselsinthearea.o Dedicatedmilitaryorcivilianarmedescortand/or

assistanceavailable.o Authoritiesandorganisationswhichwillbeinformed.o Navalrescueresourcesinthearea.

• Shipowner’spolicy–briefoverview.•TheMaster’soverallriskassessment.1

o Crewsafety.o Freeboard.o Speed.o PrevailingWeather.o Timeoftransit.o Recentpiracyactivity.o Identificationofsoftspotsandstrengtheningmeasures.

• Physicalmeasuresavailableonboardtodiscoveranddelaypirates–e.gbarbedwire,waterhoses,cameras,radarwatchoperatingondifferentscales(e.g3nmand12nm),dedicatedlookouts,additionalguards(armed/unarmed–Shipowner’spolicy),internalcommunications,nightvisiongoggles.

Mission• Executepreparationsandimplementstrengthening

measures in vulnerable areas in order to prepare the ship fortransitthroughahighriskpiracyarea.

•Conducttrainingandexerciseplannedhijackingprocedures.

Execution of the Ship Security Plan• General

o Prepareclose-downofship.o Only personnel on duty have access to the bridge or

outsidearea.o Watchroutinesandescalationtriggers.

• Planproceduresforthefollowingscenarios:o Notificationofasuspiciousvessel.

– Descriptionofvessel/boat.– Distanceanddirectionoftravel.– Numberofpeopleonboard.– Additionalinformation(weaponsobserved).

o Threatening/attackingvesselsapproaching.– Immediatelynotifythebridge.– Activatepiracyalarmwithadditionalinstructions.

– ActivateSSASandAIS(ifturnedoff).– MakeemergencycalltoUKMTO,orotherregional

reportingservices.– Signaltheattackersthattheyhavebeendetected.– Implementfinalphysicalbarriers,ifnotalreadyin

place.– Evacuatecrewtodedicatedarea.– Activationofremotecontrolledsecuritymeasures,

suchasfirehoses.– Evasivesteeringandmaximumspeed.

o Hostileboardinginprogress.– Ifnecessaryandpossible,controlshipfromengine

room.– Masterandmanagementshutdownbridgeand

evacuatetosaferoom.– ReportonVHFchannel16(8).

Communications• Allpersonnelondutytocarryaradio.•VHFchannel16(8)onthebridgeandinsaferoom.•Identifytherelevantcontactinformationthatshouldbe

availableonthebridge.Thiscouldinclude:MTODubaiHotline,owncompany,MSC-HOA,CJTF-HOF,Rescuesources,othershipsandnavalshipsnearby.2

•Testofallcommunicationequipment.

Other• Preparesaferoomwithsupplies,foodwater,medical,

communicationsequipmentandVHF.•Asfaraspossible,protectalloutsideequipmentsensitive

tofireandsmallarms.•Removealloutsideequipmentthatcanbeusedtogain

entryorcausedamagetotheship.

ThisCircularhasbeenpreparedwiththeassistanceofBestiaRiskConsulting,Oslo.

1details,see:OCIMF,PracticalMeasurestoAvoid,Deter,orDelayPiracyAttacks2ContactdetailsforGoA,HornofAfrica,see:OCIMF,PracticalMeasurestoAvoid,Deter,orDelayPiracyAttacks


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US Coast Guard - New rule regarding nontank vessel response plansSummaryTheUnitedStatesCoastGuardissuedanoticeon23June2008toinformU.S.andforeign-flagnontankvesselownersandoperatorsthat,effectivefrom22August2008,theUSCGwillbeenforcingtherequirementtoprepareandsubmitanontankvesselresponseplan(NVTRP)fornontankvessels.This change in enforcement policy formalises the need for ownersandoperatorsofnontankvesselstradingwiththeUnitedStatestoensurethattheyhavesubmittedup-to-date and comprehensive vessel response plans to avoid becomingsubjecttoCoastGuardenforcementactions.

TheCoastGuardandMaritimeTransportationActof2004,whichwassignedintolawon9August2004,requiredownersandoperatorsofallnontankvesselsof400grtorgreatertoprepareandsubmitNTVRPstotheCoastGuardby8August2005.TheCoastGuardissuedNavigationandVesselInspectionCircularNumber01-05,whichwasamendedbyNavigationandVesselInspectionCircularNumber01-05,CH-1(NVIC01-05,CH-1),toprovideinterimguidanceforthedevelopmentandreviewofNTVRPs.Thefinal regulations have not yet been issued and because of some uncertainty relating to enforcement and application of therequirements,theUSCGissuedanoticeon24June2005statingthatitwouldnotenforcetheActuntilregulations

wereissuedandinforce.Inthemeantime,theCoastGuardencouragedvesselownersandoperatorstoseekinterimauthorisation letters through the voluntary process set out inNVIC01-05,CH-1.Despitethenonenforcementnotice,ownersandoperatorswerestillrequiredtodevelopandsubmitNTVRPs.

TherecentchangeinenforcementpolicynowformalisestheneedforownersandoperatorsofnontankvesselstradingwiththeUnitedStatestoensurethattheyhavesubmittedup-to-dateandcomprehensive vessel response plans to avoid becoming subjecttoCoastGuardenforcementactions.ItisimperativethatownersandoperatorssubmittheirNTVRPstotheCoastGuard as soonaspossible.Iftheyhavepreviouslysubmittedsuchplans,they should ensure that the vessel response plans previously submittedarestillcurrent.

Theguidancecircular,NVIC01-05,CH1canbeaccessedat:http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/nvic/NVIC%2001-05,%20CH-1.pdf

WearegratefultoMessrs.BlankRomeLLPforprovidingtheinitialinformationontheabovetopic.


US Coast Guard imposes conditions of entry on vessels arriving from VenezuelaTheCoastGuardhasannouncedthateffectiveanti-terrorismmeasuresarenotinplaceincertainportsofVenezuelaandthatitwillimposeconditionsofentryonvesselsarrivingfromthatcountry.Thepolicyannouncedinthisnoticewillbecomeeffectiveon23January2009.

Section70110oftheMaritimeTransportationSecurityActof2002providesthattheSecretaryofHomelandSecuritymayimposeconditionsofentryonvesselsrequestingentryintotheUnitedStatesarrivingfromportsthatarenotmaintainingeffectiveanti-terrorismmeasures.TheCoastGuardhasbeendelegatedwiththeauthoritybytheSecretarytocarryoutthe provisions of this section and has determined that ports inVenezuelaarenotmaintainingeffectiveanti-terrorismmeasures.Accordingly,asof23January2009,theCoastGuardwillimposethefollowingconditionsofentryonvesselsthatvisitedportsinVenezueladuringtheirlastfiveportcalls.Vesselsmust:

• Implementmeasurespertheship’ssecurityplanequivalenttoSecuritylevel2whileinaportinVenezuela;

• Ensurethateachaccesspointtotheshipisguardedandthattheguardshavetotalvisibilityoftheexterior,bothlandsideandwaterside,ofthevesselwhilethe

vesselisinportsinVenezuela.Guardsmaybeprovidedbytheship’screw,butadditionalcrewmembersshouldbeplacedontheship,ifnecessary,toensurethatlimitsonmaximumhoursofworkarenotexceededand/orminimumhoursofrestaremet,orbeprovidedbyoutsidesecurityforcesapprovedbytheship’smasterandCompanySecurityOfficer;

• AttempttoexecuteaDeclarationofSecuritywhileinaportinVenezuela;

• Logallsecurityactionsintheship’slog;• ReportactionstakentotherelevantU.S.CoastGuard

CaptainofthePortpriortoarrivalintoU.S.waters;and• BasedonthefindingsoftheCoastGuardboarding

orexamination,thevesselmayberequiredtoensurethateachaccesspointtotheshipisguardedbyarmed,private security guards and that they have total visibility oftheexterior,bothlandsideandwaterside,ofthevesselwhileinU.S.ports.ThenumberandpositionoftheguardshastobeacceptabletotherelevantCoastGuardCaptainofthePortpriortothevessel’sarrival.

Formoredetails,seethenoticepublishedintheFederalRegistercanbefoundathttp://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-845.pdf.

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Maritime Security - United States Coast Guard Notice on Indonesian portsTheUnitedStatesCoastGuardhasdeterminedthatportsinIndonesia,withcertainexceptions,arenotmaintainingeffectiveanti-terrorismmeasuresandIndonesiaisthereforeincludedintheexistinglistofcountrieswithsimilarstatus.Accordingly,effectiveMarch10,2008,theCoastGuardwillimposethefollowingconditionsofentryonvesselsthathavecalledatportsinIndonesia(withtheexceptionoftheportslistedinthenotice)duringtheirlastfiveportcalls.

Withthisnotice,thecurrentlistofcountriesnotmaintainingeffectiveanti-terrorismmeasuresisasfollows:Indonesia,Cameroon,EquatorialGuinea,Guinea-Bissau,Liberia,andMauritania.

VesselsthathavevisitedthesecountriesmustdemonstratehavingtakenthefollowingstepspriortoarrivalintoU.S.waters;a)Implementmeasuresaspertheship’ssecurityplanequivalenttoSecurityLevel2.

b)Ensurethateachaccesspointtotheshipisguardedandthattheguardshavefullviewoftheexterior,bothlandsideandwaterside,ofthevesselwhilethevesselisinportsintheabovelistedcountries.Guardsmaybeprovidedbytheship’screw;howeveradditionalcrewmembersshouldbeplacedonboardtheshipifnecessarytoensurethatlimitsonmaximumworkhoursarenotexceededand/orminimumhoursofrestaremet.Alternatively,guardsmaybeprovidedbyexternalsecurityforcesapprovedbytheship’sMasterandCompanySecurityOfficer.

c)AttempttoexecuteaDeclarationofSecurity.

d)Logallsecurityactionsintheship’slog.

e)ReporttheactionstakentotheU.S.CoastGuardCaptainofthePortpriortoarrivalinU.S.waters.

f)Ensurethateachaccesspointtotheshipisguardedbyarmed,privatesecurityguardsandthattheyhavefullviewoftheexterior(bothlandsideandwaterside)ofthevesselwhilstinU.S.ports.

The number and position of the guards has to be accepted bytheCoastGuardCaptainofthePortpriortothevessel’sarrival.

Membersarerequestedtoconsultthefollowing:UnitedStates,73FederalRegulation10042(DocketNo:2007-0142)whichisavailableat:http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20081800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/08-842.pdf


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Paris MOU Port State Control – New inspection regimeWedrawourMembers’andclients’attentiontotheNewInspectionRegime(NIR)ofParisMoUonPortStateControl,whichwillenterinforceon1January2011inall27MemberStates,includingthenon-EUstatesCanada,Croatia,Iceland,NorwayandtheRussianFederation.ThePSCDirective2009/16/ECadoptedinMay2009introducestheNIRintheEuropeanUnion,.

NIR,whichwillreplacetheexistingPSCsystem,hasariskbasedtargetingmechanism,aimedatrewardingqualityshipsandoperatorswithareducedinspectionburden,whilehighriskshipsgetmorefrequentin-depthinspections.Atthesametime,trainingofPSCofficerswillbeenhanced,toharmonisethelevelofprofessionalcompetencyinParisMoU.

Toestablishariskprofileforeachship,informationfrompastinspections,companyperformance,performanceofflagandclasssocieties,alongwithparameterssuchastypeandageofvesselwillbeused.WhenoperatingintheParisMOUarea,aHighRiskShip(HRS)willbeinspectedevery5-6months,aStandardRiskShip(SRS)every10-12monthsandaLowRiskShip(LRS)every24-36months.

ItisimportanttonotethenewShipReportingObligationswhicharepre-arrivalnotificationatleast24hoursinadvanceforallships,but72hoursforshipseligibleforanexpandedinspection.Actualtimeofarrival(ATA)andactualtimeofdeparture(ATD)mayalsohavetobeprovideddependingontheState.ShipswhichmaybesubjecttoanexpandedinspectionincludeallshipswithaHighRiskprofileandanypassengership,oiltanker,gasorchemicaltankerorbulkcarrierolderthan12years.Failuretoreporttheinformationrequiredmayleadtoashipbeingtargetedforinspection,andpenaltiesmaybeimposedbynationalauthorities.

AsunderthepresentPSCregimevesselsmaybebannedfromenteringportswithinParisMoUstates.However,eachrefusalofaccesswillbegivenapredefinedminimumdurationandmayalsobecomepermanent.

Useful links:FullinformationontheNewInspectionRegimeandthereporting obligations can be found by contacting national maritimeauthoritiesoronthewebsites:

http://www.emsa.europa.euhttp://www.parismou.org


US Customs regulations – Importer Security Filings and Additional Carrier Requirements (10+2 Rule)TheUnitedStatesBureauofCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)hasrecentlybegunenforcementofregulationsthatrequiretheelectronictransmissionofadditionaldataelementstobeprovidedasadvanceinformationwithrespect to cargo destined for importation into the United States.Thisinformationmustbeprovidedpriortoloadingofsuchcargoonvesselsatforeignseaports.TheseregulationswerepromulgatedunderTheUnitedStatesSecurityandAccountabilityforEvery(SAFE)PortActof20061 and the MaritimeTransportationSecurityAct2002,2 by publication ofafinalruleon25November2008,ImporterSecurityFilingandAdditionalCarrierRequirements,commonlyknownasthe“10+2Rule”intheFederalRegister(73FR71730).Thefinalrulecameintoforceon26January2009andincludedadelayedcompliancedateof12months.Asof26January2010,CBPisenforcingthe10+2Rule.

Importer Requirements (The “10” of the 10 + 2 Rule)The10+2Rulerequiresimporters,includingowners,purchasers,consignees,oragentssuchaslicensedcustomsbrokers,tosubmitfullImporterSecurityFilings(ISF)totheCBPforcargo,otherthanforeigncargoremainingonboardavesselandcertaingoodstransportedinbond,nolaterthan24hoursbeforethecargoisloadedonboardavesseldestinedfortheUnitedStates.ISFsmustbemadeelectronicallyviatheAutomatedBrokerInterfaceortheAutomatedManifestSystem(AMS).Importersneedonlysubmit five elements for foreign cargo that remains onboard

and goods intended to be transported in bond as an immediateexportationortransportationandexportationshipment.3

The Carrier requirements4 InadditiontosubmittingthecargomanifestinformationelectronicallytotheCBPbywayofitsAMSs,5 the carrier is nowrequiredtoalsoelectronicallysubmittwoadditionaldataelements;aVesselStowPlanandContainerStatusMessagestotheCBPforallcontainerisedoceanvesselshipmentsinboundtotheUnitedStates.

AVesselStowPlanmustincludeinformationonthephysicallocationofthecargo,inparticular,dangerousgoodsandotherhigh-riskcontainerisedcargo,loadedonboardthevesseldestinedfortheUnitedStates.TheCBPmustreceivethestowplannolaterthan48hoursafterthecarrierdepartsfromitslastforeignport.Ifthevoyageislessthan48hours,theCBPmustreceivethestowplanpriortothevessel’sarrivalatitsfirstU.S.port.Thevesselstowplanmustinclude standard information regarding the vessel and each containeronboardthevessel.AccordingtotheCBP,thevesseloperatingcarrier,nottheNVOCC,isresponsibleforfilingthevesselstowplan.Forbulkandbreak-bulkcarriersshippingpartcontainercargo,theCBPrequiresthecarriertosubmitavesselstowplanforallcontainerisedcargoaboardthevessel.

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ContainerStatusMessages(CSM)reportcontainermovementsandchangesinstatus,e.g.whetherfullorempty.IfacarriercurrentlycreatesorcollectsCSMsinanequipmenttrackingsystem,thatcarriermustsubmitCSMstotheCBPregardingcertaineventsrelatingtoallcontainersdestinedtoarriveinaU.S.portbyvessel.CarriersmustsubmitCSMselectronicallyviathesecurefiletransferprotocolnolaterthan24hoursafterthemessageisenteredintothecarrier’sequipmenttrackingsystem.AswiththeVesselStowPlan,theCBPrequiresthevesselcarrier,nottheNVOCC,tosubmitCSMs.

EnforcementAccordingtotheCBP,enforcementin2010willbegradualandprogressivedependingonthecircumstances.6Inthefirstquarter,CBPintendstoconcentrateitsenforcementmeasuresonimporterswhohavenotmadeanISFdespitehavingimportedproducts,orwhohavemadeinaccurateoruntimelyISFs.AlthoughtheCBPdoesnotintendtoassessliquidateddamagesorissue“DoNotLoad”orders(DNLs)duringthefirstquarter,instancesofnon-compliancewillbereviewedonacase-by-casebasispotentiallysubjectingnon-compliant operators to penalties.7

Inthesecondquarter,theCBPintendstouseholdsoncargo and other security approaches as a means to compel compliance.However,theCBPhasadvisedthatitdoesnotplantoassessliquidateddamagesorissueDNLsduringthisperiod.Inthethirdandfourthquarters,theCBPintendstobeginassessingliquidateddamagesonISFwithdataorfilingproblems,includingtimeliness.Bythefourthquarter,CBPwillbeinfullenforcementmode.

RecommendationsEventhoughenforcementwillreportedlybegradual,carriersandimportersshouldensurethattheyarecomplyingwith10+2requirements.Importersandcarriersshouldtakethisopportunitytoreviewtheirproceduresforcompliancetoavoiddelaysattheborderortheimpositionoffines.

Footnotes1SecurityandAccountabilityforEvery(SAFE)PortActof2006(sec203).2TradeActof2002asamendedbytheMaritimeTransportationSecurityAct2002(section343a).3SeealsoFederalRegister,Vol.73,No.228.25November2008.pg71731-71733.Forcertainlimitedpurposes,theoceancarriermaybedeemedanimporter,forexample,withrespecttoforeigncargoremainingonboard(FROB),andisresponsibleforsubmittingthefivedataelementstoCBPbeforethecargoisloadedonthevessel,althoughitisnotarequirementthatsuchnoticeissubmitted24hoursbeforeloading.4Exemptfromthecarrier’sadditional“2”reportingrequirementsare:(1)Bulkandbreakbulkcarriersthatareexclusivelycarryingbulkandbreak-bulkcargoand(2)carriersofgoods(includingcontainerisedcargo)arrivingviavesselintoCanadaorMexicoandafterwardstruckedorrailedintotheU.S.5SeeFederalRegister19CFRParts4,103andGardMemberCircularNo07/2003.6SeeAmericanAssociationofExportersandImporters,“ISFEnforcementStrategy”(Jan.20,2010),availableathttp://www.aaei.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=UlCAz3wrz5A%3d&tabid=36.Furtherinformationconcerningtherequirementscanbeobtainedathttp://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/carriers/security_filing/.7TheCBPwillimposefinesofatleastUSD5,000foreachviolationwithamaximumfineofUSD100,000.ThefinelevelwilldependonwhetherviolationsareinternationalconsignmentswithafinaldestinationintheU.S.,whetherthegoodareintransitthroughtheU.S,orwhethertheadvanceinformationhasnotbeensubmittedontime,isinsufficientorincorrectlyreportedonthevesselstowplanorcontainerstatusmessage.


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Port Health Authority fines in Brazil

VesselsarrivingatBrazilianportsaresubjectedtoverythoroughinspectionsbytherelevantPortHealthAuthority(PHA).

Thebelowlistoutlinessomeofthemainareasofinspection:

• AnyconsumptionofmedicinesduringthevoyagetoBrazilmustbeproperlyregistered.Duetothecurrentswineflupandemic,anydiscrepancymayleadtotheporthealth authorities suspecting the vessel of omitting any casesofillnessonboard.

• Thevessel’sderatisationcertificatemustbevalid.IfthecertificateisduetoexpirebeforearrivalattheBrazilianport,itshouldberenewedpriortodepartingforBrazilasthefactthatitexpiredduringthevoyagemaygiverisetofines.

• TheyellowfevercertificatesarevalidandhavebeenissuedintheformatrecommendedbytheWorldHealthOrganization.

• Thevessel’saccommodationandgalleyiscleanandfreeofinsects.

• Thevessel’shospitalmedicalchestdoesnotcontainexpiredmedicine.

• Allpreservedfoodiswithinitsusebydatesandstoredawayfromcleaningmaterials.

• Thesewageplantisfullyworkableandthechlorinetabletsusedcorrespondstothesizeofthetubes.Brokentablets can give rise to fines as the health authority is of theviewthatbrokentabletsdonothavesameefficiency.

ShipownersnotfullycomplyingwiththerecommendationslistedabovehaveexperiencedbothfinesanddelaysduringPHAinspectionsinBrazil.WethereforerecommendthatparticularattentionisplacedonportcallstoBrazil,andthattheitemslistedaboveareproperlyadheredto.Yourlocalagentwillalsobeavailabletoprovideadditionaladvice.

GardisgratefultoMessrsRepresentaçoesProindeLtda.inBrazilforcontributingtothiscircular.


Operational challenges in the Ukraine

BackgroundThere have recently been many incidents reported in Ukrainianportsofvariousnatures.ExperienceindicatesthataccuracyandcautionareimportantwhendealingwithUkrainiancustomsandauthorities,asthefinesthatcanbeimposedarenumerousandsubstantial.Thislosspreventioncircularhighlightssomeoftheareaswherechallengesincomplyingwithlocalregulationshavebeenreported.

Declaration of ship’s stores and bunkersSeveralvesselshaverecentlybeenfinedforinaccuratedeclarationsofgoodstypicallybeingstoredforthevessel’sownuse.

a)Ship’sstoresCustomsperformsverycomprehensiveinspectionsandthus,anydiscrepanciesfoundwillincurafine.Itisimportanttobeasaccurateaspossiblewhenmakingdeclarationsofmedicinesstores,chemicalsandcleaningproducts.

b)BunkersCustomsofficersintheUkraineoccasionallyconductsurveysofthebunkeronboarduponarrival.Anydiscrepancymayleadtocustomschargingthevesselfor’concealing’fuelandimposingasubstantialpenalty.Thismayleadtoallegationsthatthevesselhassmuggledthefuel.PenaltiescanreportedlybeashighasUSD10,000.

Reportsindicatethatthediscrepancyisusuallyduetothefact that the vessel did not perform sounding of the bunker tanksjustbeforearrivalataport,butmadecalculationsbasedonuptoaweekoldbunkersurveyfigures.Itisrecommended that a sounding of the bunker tanks are performedjustbeforearrivingatportsintheUkrainetominimisetheriskofdeclaringanincorrectbunkerquantity.Itisimportantthatthequantitiesoffuelinbarrelsandcansarealsoincluded.

Ballast water – large fines for small infringementsAgrowingnumberoffineshavereportedlybeenleviedforballastwaterinfringementsintheUkraineandtheauthoritiesrequireallshipstoexchangeballastintheBlackSea.AllshipsarethereforesubjecttoballastwatersamplingbytheStateInspectionforProtectionoftheBlackSea(SIPBS).

TestsforthreedifferentpollutantsareperformedinSIPBSapprovedlaboratoriesintheUkraine:iron,suspendedorganicmaterialandoil.TheacceptedthresholdsforthepresenceofpollutantsaremuchlowerthanthoseprescribedbyMARPOL;oilandoilproducts0.05mg/litre,iron0.05mg/litreandsuspendedsolids0.75mg/litreor2mg/litre,dependingonthelocality.FinesofuptoUSD60,000havereportedlybeenlevied.

Inordertominimiseexposuretoballastingfines,MembersshouldstrictlyadheretotheSIPBSrequirements,suchas

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exchangeofballastwaterwhenenteringtheBlackSea,documenttheexchangeintheappropriatelogsandtheIMOballastwaterreportingform,anddeclaretotheagentthequantityofballastthevesselwilldischargeinport.Membersshouldpayparticularattentiontotankmaintenance,wheretheballastistaken,drainingofthetankswhenemptiedandsamplingroutineswhenSIPBSinspectorsareonboard.TheIMOguidelines(referredinthelatterarticlebelow)providemoredetailsonballastwaterexchangeproceduresandguidancetoavoidoutofrangeballastsamples.

For further guidance regarding deballasting issues in the Ukraine,wealsorefertoGardNewsNo.171articleToloadornottoload-HydrocarboncontentinballastwateratUkrainianandRussianportsandGardNewsNo.188articleBallastwater-HighfinesforsmallinfringementsinUkraine.

Trade restrictionsThe Ukrainian Government has in recent years issued several exportandimportrestrictions,e.g.grain,wheat,rye,maizeandbarley.Theserestrictionsareprimarilyintheformofimporttariffsandlicensesandarechangedregularly.Therefore,wesuggestthatmembersascertainwhethertheappropriateexportorimportpermitcanbeobtainedfromUkrainianauthoritiestoavoidanydelays.

Problems with loading of iron ore concentrateWe understand that cargoes of iron ore concentrate have beensubjecttoliquefactionduetohighmoisturecontentintheportofOdessa.Insuchinstances,thepropertiesofthecargowillchangeandmayseriouslycompromiseavessel’sstabilityandsafety.AccordingtotheSOLASConvention,theshipperisrequiredtoprovidevalidcertificatesdeclaringthatthemoisturecontentaswellasthetransportablemoisturelimit(TML)iswithinpermissiblethresholds.

Loadingofironoreshouldnotbecommenceduntiltheshippers are able to provide the certificates in accordance withCodeofSafePracticeforSolidBulkCargoes(BCCode).IfthereisanyuncertaintywhetherthecertifiedmoisturecontentandTMLcorrespondtotheactualconditionofthecargo,theMastershouldaskthecorrespondentstoinstructindependentsurveyorsforfurthersampling.

MoreinformationcanbefoundinnewsitemLoadingofironoreconcentrateinOdessaatGardASwebsiteatwww.gard.no.

Shore scale figure disputesShipscarryingbulkcargototheUkrainemayexperienceshortagedisputesupondischarge.Ithasbeenreportedthatonaverage,eachshortageisabout120-180mt,withlossesofsomeUSD40,000-65,000.Incontrasttootherstateswhichinmostcasesacceptapapershortageof0.5%,theUkrainedoesnotacceptpapershortages.

To minimise the risk of this occurring it is recommended that after loading the ship:•Theholdsaresealedinthepresenceofsurveyorsrepresentingallparties(jointbasis).•Atthedischargeportthesurveyorsshouldoncemorebepresentasthesealsarebroken.•Draughtsurveysshouldtakeplaceattheloadportandalsopriortodischarge.•An‘emptyholdcertificate’shouldbeissued.

Oil pollution in UkraineOilPollutionintheUkrainehaspreviouslyresultedinverylargefines.TheamountsarecalculatedusingatheoreticalformularesultinginanestimationofthequantityspiltandafixedtariffofUSD329perkiloofoilspiltandanadditionalfixedamountofUSD84perkilo.Membersshouldexerciseoutmost care during bunkering operations to prevent any spilloroverflowofbunkers.Ifthereareanyindicationsthatpollution has occurred Members are advised to immediately contactGard’scorrespondentsintheUkraine,MessrsLegat.MoreinformationcanbefoundinGardNewsNo.186articleOilpollutionintheUkraine-Shipownersbeware.

RecommendationsWhentradingwiththeUkraine,Membersshouldbeawareofthenumerouschallengestheymayface.WerecommendthatMembersexerciseextracautionandkeepadialoguewithlocalagentspriortoanycallsatUkrainianportsandcontactGardifanyincidentoccurs.


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The risks of trading to Angola – a cautionary storyOneofGard’sownermembershasexperiencedarecentincidentintheRepublicofAngolawhichhasprovedextremelyexpensiveandtime-consuming.

ThevesseldischargedacargooffueloilatLuandaearlyin2007.Somemonthslater,shewasaccusedofhavingspilledsome250m/toffueloil.Investigationsmadeonboardshowedclearlythattheoildidnotcomefromthevesselandallindicationsarethatthespillwasthefaultoftheterminal.

Whenthevesselreachedtheendofhercontracttotradein/aroundAngola,shewasdetainedandclaimsfortheallegedpollutionweremadebytheAngolanAuthorities.Initially,theamountclaimedwasforseveralmillionUSdollars.Thisfigurewaslaterreduced,buttheamountwasstillaverysubstantialsumofmoney.Nojustificationforeitherfigurehaseverbeenproduced.

SecuritywasofferedintheformofaClubLetterofUndertaking.Thisformofsecurityiswidelyrecognisedandacceptedworldwide.Thiswasrejected.Sowasthesubsequentofferofabankguarantee.MeetingswereheldwiththeHarbourMaster,aswellasvariouspoliticalfigures,butgettingagreementontheformandwordingofsecurityprovedimpossible,notleastbecausethedemandswhich

weremadekeptchanging.

Intheend,theviewwastakenthattheonlywaytomakeprogresswastodiscussasettlementoftheclaim,notwithstandingthefactthatitwasnotthevessel’sfaultorresponsibility.FurthernegotiationsresultedintheclaimbeingpaidinfullagainstasignedSettlementAgreement.Thiswasachievedandassoonaspaymenthadbeenreceived,thevesselwasreleasedfromdetention.

Thenegotiationstookseveralweeks.ConsiderationwasgiventoapplyingtotheAngolancourtsforanorderliftingthe detention of the vessel against provision by Gard of reasonableandacceptablesecurity.Onthebasisofadvicereceived,thisoptionwasnotpursued.

Gard has no reason to think that such a situation may not ariseinfuture.Membersareadvisedaccordingly.

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Ship To Ship (STS) transfer of cargo: New law in Danish waters

ShiptoShiptransferofoilcargoeshasrecentlybeenasubjectofpublicdiscussionandconcern.STSoperationsarecurrentlyselfregulatedbytheSTStransferguide(petroleum)issuedbytheInternationalChamberofShipping(ICS)andOilCompanies’InternationalMaritimeForum(OCIMF).TheGuidereflectsindustrybestpracticeandcontainschecklistsandadviceformastersandothersplanningSTStransferoperations.

TheDanishMaritimeAuthority(DMA)hasissuednewregulationscoveringSTSoperationsinDanishterritorialwaters.Orderno.734of25June2007,basedontheSTStransferguide,appliestoDanishandforeignshipsthattransferoilcargoinDanishterritorialwaters.Itenteredintoforceon4July2007,buttheprovisionsofSection4(1)andSection5(1)requiringthepresenceofanapprovedoperatorshallenterintoforceon1November2007.TheOrdershallnot apply to the transfer of bunker oil intended for operation ofthereceivingshipwhichissubjecttoaseparateorder,Orderno.733of25June2007.

Ingeneral,Orderno.734statesthat:• STSoperationsshallbecarriedoutundertheguidance

andsupervisionofanSTSoperatorwhohasbeenapprovedbytheDanishMaritimeAuthority.

• TheDanishMaritimeAuthoritymaycarryoutchecksonSTSoperationsandonSTSoperatorswithaviewtoensuringcompliancewiththeprovisionsofthisOrder.

• WheretheprovisionsofthisOrderarenotcompliedwith,theDanishMaritimeAuthoritymayprohibitanSTSoperation from being performed or may demand that anSTSoperationthatisinprogressmustbestopped.

• ApprovedSTSoperatorsshalluseaqualityassurancesystem that ensures that their tasks are performed in accordancewiththisOrder.

• Atleast48hoursbeforethescheduledperformanceofanSTSoperationthesupplyingshipshallinformtheAdmiralDanishFleet(MaritimeAssistanceService)[email protected] [email protected]

Thefullorderisavailablefordownloadat:www.dma.dk/sw221.asp,undertheheadingselectedorders.


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Typhoon season precautions – Hong Kong area

IntroductionSevereweathercontinuestobeachallengeforvesselsandtheircrews.Owners,agentsandcharterersshouldremind their ship masters of the need to take precautionary measuresduringtheapproachoftropicalcyclones.This circular provides information on specified mooring regulationsinoperationinHongKongduringtyphoons,however,dueconsiderationsforpropermooringsshouldbemadeduringtyphoonconditionsinanylocation.SimilarrequirementsmayalsoapplyinportsotherthanHongKongandownersmaybewelladvisedtocheckforanyadditionalrequirementsiftheirvesselscallatsuchports.

SpecificationsMasters,owners,agentsandotherindividualsincontrolofvesselsareremindedoftheirobligationunderSections61and62oftheShippingandPortControlOrdinance,Cap.313oftheLawsofHongKongSAR,tocomplywithany direction of the Director of Marine concerning the safe operationofvesselsattheport,orinrelationtoanymatterastowhichtheDirectormaygivedirectionsundertheaboveOrdinance.AllgovernmentClass“A”and“B”mooringsareavailableforuseduringtyphoonswiththeexceptionof:•“A”mooring–A17,A29,A35,A39,A43,A46;and•“B”mooring:B1,B2,B3,B4.

ThestatusofanygovernmentClass“A”and“B”mooringsissubjecttochangewithoutpriornotice.Up-to-dateinformationcanbeobtainedfromtheVesselTrafficCentre,attelephone+8522337808,telex63607MDVTS,orfacsimile+8528586646.

Recommendations• Themasterofashipmooredatagovernmentmooring

may,athisdiscretion,dropaboweranchorunderfoottolessenthetendencytosheer.Thisshouldnotimpairtheefficiencyofthemooring,althoughananchorshouldnotbeusedduringnormalweatherconditions.

• MastersareremindedthateveryvesselwithinthewatersofHongKongmustmaintainacontinuouslisteningwatchontheVHFradiochannelappropriatetotheVHFsectorinwhichthevesselislocated,oranotherVHFchannelasmaybespecifiedbytheVesselTrafficCentre(callsign“Mardep”)unlessthevesselisreleasedfromthisobligationbytheCentre.TheCentrewillbroadcasttropicalcycloneinformationfromtimetotimewhenthetropicalcyclonewarningsignalshavebeenhoisted.Masters should listen to local radio broadcasts for advisoryweatherinformationbulletins.

• Somevesselshavebeenfoundtonothaveadequatemanningonboardduringperiodswhentropicalcyclonewarningsignalsarehoisted.Theattentionofmasters,owners,agentsandcharterersofvesselsisthereforedrawntoRegulation26(1)oftheShippingandPortControlRegulations,whichstatesthat:

“A ship shall, while within the waters of Hong Kong, have onboard at all times such number of crew as is, in the opinion of the Director, qualified and capable of carrying out all duties which may reasonably be required to ensure the safety of the ship having regard to the circumstances pertaining thereto.”

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Reminder: MARPOL Annex II and IBC Code revisions

WewishtodrawMembers’andclients’attentiontoforthcomingchangestoMarpol73/78,AnnexII,“RegulationsfortheControlofPollutionbyNoxiousLiquidSubstancesinBulk”andtheIBCCode,“InternationalCodefortheConstructionandEquipmentofShipscarryingDangerousChemicalsinBulk”.Althoughthechangesareimminent,wenotefrombothClassSocietiesandINTERTANKOthatmanyshipownersareverylatewiththeirapplicationsforthenewcertificates.

Allcurrent“InternationalCertificateofFitnessfortheCarriageofDangerousChemicalsinBulk”(ChemicalcodeCoF)and“InternationalPollutionPreventionCertificatesforthecarriageofNoxiousLiquidSubstancesinBulk”(NLSCertificates)ceasetobevalidonthe1January2007,whentherevisedrequirementstakeeffect.Allapplicableshipswillthenhavetocarrythenewcertificates.Withverylittletimeleft,ClassSocieties,representingtheFlagStates,fearthatmanyshipswillnotbeabletoobtainthenewcertificatesintimeandmaythusbedetainedinPortStatecontrolsaswellasfaceothertradingdifficulties.Someoperatorsmayalsoexperienceproblemsinrelationtolongtermcharterparties,if their vessels are no longer suitable for the carriage of certaintypesofcargo.

TherevisionofMARPOLAnnexIIandtheIBCCodeaffectallshipsholdingacertificateissuedinrelationtoMARPOLAnnexII,including:– Chemicaltankers– OiltankerswithNLScertificate– GascarrierswithNLScertificate– Combinedgas/chemicaltankers– OffshoresupplyvesselswithNLScertificate– Offshoresupplyvessels/wellstimulationvesselswith

CertificateofFitnessissuedinaccordancewithIMORes.A.673(16)

– Drycargoshipswithdeeptanksforchemicalcargoes(moltenpitchorsulphuricacid).

Chemicalcargoeswhichusedtobelistedinafive-categorysystem:A,B,C,DandAppendixIII(negligiblerisk)cargoes,arenowdividedintofourMARPOL73/78AnnexIIpollutioncategories:X,Y,ZandOS(OtherSubstances,notposinganyharm),dependingontheirpotentialimpactontheenvironment.AstherevisedAnnexIIincludesanumberofchanges,includingsignificantlylowerpermitteddischargelevelsforcertainproducts,therearenewstripping

requirementstocomplywith.Itshouldalsobenotedthatasubstantialnumberofcargotypeswillnowrequirepre-washingofthecargotanks.

The very large number of chemical products has each been givenanewhazardprofile,andthesubstancesareindexedaccordingtobio-accumulation,bio-degradation,acutetoxicity,chronictoxicity,longtermhealtheffectsandeffectsonmarinewildlifeandbenthichabitats.Theresultisthatmanyproductsareclassedasmorehazardousunderthenewregulations,andmaynotbeabletobecarriedinthesamecategorychemicalcarrier(Shiptype1,2and3)asbefore.

Certainnoxiousliquidsubstances,havingpropertiessimilartothoseofMARPOLAnnexI,(Oilcargoes),couldpreviouslybecarriedonoiltankersunderthetermsofAnnexIIRegulation14.From1January2007,suchproductscanonlybecarriedonchemicaltankerscomplyingfullywiththeChemicalCode,andcargoresiduesmustbedischargedasrequiredforchemicalsubstances.Theterm“Oil-likesubstances”willnolongerexist.

How to obtain a new certificate?Toqualifyforanewcertificateundertherevisedrequirements,theshipmustbeequippedwitharevisedandapprovedProceduresandArrangementsManual(P&Amanual).ThemanualmustbeestablishedinaccordancewiththenewStandardFormatprovidedinAppendix4totherevisedMARPOLAnnexIIandsubmittedtothevessel’sClassificationSociety(representingtheFlagState)forapproval.Followingsuchapprovalanewcertificatewillbeissued,tobekeptonboardandtobeexchangedforthecurrentcertificateonthe1January2007.Noadditionalsurveyisrequiredfortheexchangeofthecertificate.

TherevisedIBCCodewasformallyadoptedbytheIMOinDecember2004andtheIMO,classsocieties,flagstatesand shipping associations have publicised the changes onseveraloccasions.Classsocietieshave,however,heldbackissuingcertificatesuntilthemiddleofSeptember2006,inordertobeabletoincludeanyadditionalproductsevaluatedbytheIMOworkinggroupduringtheEvaluationofSafetyandPollutionHazards(ESPH)meetinginearlySeptember2006.Thatbeingcompleted,theclasssocietieswouldnowliketoreceivetheP&Amanualsforapprovalwithoutdelay.


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ForthoseoperatorsnotalreadywellunderwaywithestablishingthenewP&AManuals,itissuggestedtheycheckthewebpagesoftheirclasssocietiesforfurtherguidance.SomesocietiesofferreadymadetemplatesfortheP&Amanuals,andweunderstandthatforexample,DNValsooffertheirtemplatestoconsultantsandtovesselsnotclassedwiththem.INTERTANKO’swebsitecontainsinformationabouttheofferfromDNV:TemplatesinWordformatcanbeobtainedbysendingarequesttoMTPNO880@dnv.com.


Reminder: Requirements for alcohol and drug testing in the U.S.

Significant Marine Incidents – Requirements for alcohol and drug testing Asof20June2006newregulationsareinforcerequiringdrugandalcoholtestinginconnectionwithall“SeriousMarineIncidents”(SMIs)inU.S.waters.

TherevisedRuleplacestheburdenonmarineemployerstoensurethat,followingaSMIoraneventlikelytobecomeaSMI,allpracticalstepsaretakentotesteachindividualdirectlyinvolvedintheincidentforevidenceofdrugoralcoholuse.Thisrequiresvesselstohaveasufficientnumberofapprovedtestingkitsonboard.

Alcohol testing– Itistheresponsibilityofthemarineemployerto

have a sufficient number of approved alcohol testing devicesonboardthevessel.Approveddevicesforthetesting of alcohol consumption are included in either theConformingProductsList(CPL)entitled“ModalSpecificationsforDevicestoMeasureBreathAlcohol”or“ConformingProductsListofScreeningDevicestoMeasureAlcoholinBodilyFluids”whichispublishedperiodicallybytheNationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration(NHTSA).

– Alcoholtestingmustbeconductedbythemarineemployer on each individual engaged or employed onboardthevesselandwhoisdirectlyinvolvedinaseriousmarineincident.

– Thealcoholtestingmustbeconductedwithintwohoursoftheincidenthavingoccurred,unlessprecludedbyanysafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheincident.

– Ifsafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheincidentpreventthealcoholtestingfrombeingconductedwithintwohoursoftheincident,thealcoholtestingmustbecompletedassoonasthesafetyconcernsareaddressed,butnolaterthaneighthoursafteranincident.

ThecurrentAnnexIIandChemicalCodecertificatesandtheassociatedP&AManualremainvalidforanycargoloadedbefore1January2007untilsuchcargohasbeendischarged.The current manuals and certificates should therefore be kept onboard until cargoes and cargo residues have been removed.Anyproductinformationsheetskeptonboardwillneedtobeupdatedtoreflectthenewrequirements.

ConformingProductsListsofEvidentialBreathMeasurementDevices,at69FR42237(July14,2004)http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/alcohol/ebtcpl040714FR.pdf

ConformingProductsListofAlcoholScreeningDevicesat70FR72502(December5,2005)http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/E5-6848.pdf

Drug testing– Themarineemployermusthaveasufficientnumberof

urine-specimencollectionandsamplingkits,meetingtherequirementsof49CFRpart40,readilyavailableforusefollowingaseriousmarineincident.

– Drugtestingmustbeconductedoneachindividualengagedoremployedonboardthevesselwhoisdirectlyinvolvedinaseriousmarineincident.

– Thecollectionofdrugtestspecimensofeachindividualmustbeconductedwithin32hoursoftheseriousmarineincidenthavingoccurred,unlessprecludedbysafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheincident.

49CFRpart40http://www.dot.gov/ost/dapc/NEW_DOCS/part40.html

TheUSCoastGuardhasnominatedthefollowingindividualtobe contacted for further information:RobertC.Schoening,DrugandAlcoholProgramManager,USCoastGuardHeadquarters,email:[email protected]

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United States - Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)International Carrier Bond requirementBackgroundTheUSBureauofCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)issuedandpublishedtheAdvancePassengerInformationSystem(APIS)FinalRuleon7thApril2005,stipulatingthat,witheffectfrom6thJune2005,commercialvesselmanifestsforpassengersandcrewmembersmustbefiledelectronically.TherequirementswereoutlinedinGard’sLossPreventionCircularNo07-05of2005.TheUSCGNationalVesselMovementCenter(NVMC)hasalsoreleasedtheElectronicNoticeofArrival/Departure(eNOA/D)UserGuide.ThiswasoutlinedinGard’sLossPreventionCircularNo.01-06.

DevelopmentsAsfrom31stOctober2005,theUSCGisstrictlyenforcingtheeNOA/Dregulations.Inaddition,CBPAreaPortDirector(s)have issued a notice stating that “… all international carriers transportingpassengersandorcrewmembersmustobtainan international carrier bond and place it on file with the CBP prior to entry or departure from the United States …”. Asanexample,acopyofanoticeissuedbytheAreaPortDirectorforPortland,Oregonisattachedforyourperusal.

CBPhasadvisedthatthepartythatisconsideredtobethecarrierforthepurposesofAPISistheentityresponsibleforprovidingthecrew.

Effectiveimmediately,inlieuofaninitialpenaltyassessmentagainstacommercialcarrierthathasarrivedorwilldepartwithoutavalidinternationalcarrierbond,theportdirectorwillnotifythemasterinwritingofthebondrequirement.Aletterofnoticewillbeprovidedtothemaster.CPBwillstartenforcingtheinternationalcarrierbondrequirementson1stFebruary2006or,ifthemasterhasnotreceivednotificationby1stFebruary2006,enforcementofthebondrequirementwillbeginonthemaster’snextarrivalintheUSfollowingissueofthewrittennotice.

TheminimumamountforthebondrequirementissetbytheAreaPortDirector.CarrierswithacurrentvalidinternationalcarrierbondbelowtheamountsetbytheAreaPortDirectorandcarriersapplyingforanewinternationalcarriersbondmustsecureabondforatleasttheamountsetbytheAreaPortDirector.

RecommendationEstablishwhoisthecarrierforthepurposesofAPIS(eNOA/D).BasedonthemostrecentadvicefromCBP,thecarrierwouldmostlikelybetheownerorbareboatcharterer(i.e.theentityresponsibleforprovidingthevessel’screw).

IftheentitywhichisthecarrierforthepurposesoftheAPISregulationsalreadyhasacurrentvalidinternationalcarrierbondfortheAutomatedManifestSystem(AMS)regulationsonfilewiththeCBP,heshouldthroughthecarriersagentscontacttherespectiveCustomsPortDirectorfor confirmation that the amount of the international carrierbondwillalsosufficeforthepurposesoftheAPISregulations.

IfthecarrierdoesnothaveacurrentvalidinternationalcarrierbondfiledwiththeCBP,heshouldcontacttheCustomsPortDirectorinthemostfrequentlyusedportstodeterminethemaximumamountoftheinternationalcarrierbond likely to be demanded and arrange a continuous or single entry international carrier bond through an approved suretyormarketfacilityaccordingly.

Foralistofapprovedsureties,seewww.fms.treas.gov/c570/c570.html#certified

Pleasenotethatnon-compliancewiththeAPISregulationsandtheassociatedinternationalcarrierbondrequirementsmaycausesevereinterruptionofshipoperationswithconsequentfinancialloss,suchasdenialofentryintoport,denialofcommencementofcargooperations,anordertostopcargooperations,orevenanordertoleavetheportandmoveoutsideUSterritorialwaters.Hence,alleffortsshouldbemadetocomply.


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New regulations in the U.S.

GardwouldliketoadviseMembersandClientsaboutseveraldevelopmentsaffectingvesselstradingtoorinU.S.waters.

Marine casualties – additional reporting requirementsTheU.S.CoastGuardisadding“significantharmtotheenvironment”tothelistofreportablemarinecasualties.Therequirementtoimmediatelyreportamarinecasualtyinvolvingsignificantharmtotheenvironmentwillapplyto:(1)anyvesseluponnavigablewatersoftheUnitedStates;(2)anyU.S.vesselwhereversuchcasualtyoccurs;and(3)anyforeigntankvesseloperatingwithinwaterssubjecttoUSjurisdictionincludingtheU.S.exclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ).Theamendedrulecomesintoeffecton17January2006.

Thepre-existingreportablecasualtiesunder46U.S.C.§6101and implementing regulations are;(1)deathofanindividual,(2)seriousinjurytoanindividual,(3)materiallossofproperty,and(4)materialdamageaffectingtheseaworthinessofavessel.Furtherinformationconcerningtheadditionalrequirementsof70Fed.Reg.74669(16December2005)canbefoundat:http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-24125.pdf

Significant Marine Incidents – Requirements for alcohol & drug testingTheU.S.CoastGuardhasrevisedtheRuleforalcoholanddrugtestingfollowinga“seriousmarineincident”(SMI)whichrevisionwillcomeintoeffecton20June2006.TherevisedRuleplacestheburdenonmarineemployerstoensurethatafteranSMI,oraneventlikelytobecomeanSMI,allpracticalstepsaretakentohaveeachindividualwhois directly involved in the incident tested for evidence of drugandalcoholuse.

Alcohol Testing-Mustbeconductedwithintwohoursoftheincident,unlessprecludedbysafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheincident.-ShouldsafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheSMIprecludetestinginthe2hourwindowthentestingshouldbe completed as soon as the safety concerns have been addressed.Anytestingisrequiredtobeundertakenwithin8hoursoftheSMI.ThereasonsforfailingtotestmustbedocumentedontheformCG-2692b.

Alcohol testing devicesThefinalRulealsorequiresmostcommercialvesselstohavetestingdevicesonboard,andauthorisestheuseofsaliva as an acceptable specimen for the testing of alcohol consumption.ApproveddevicesforthetestingofalcoholconsumptionareincludedineithertheConformingProductsList(CPL)entitled“ModalSpecificationsforDevicestoMeasureBreathAlcohol”or“ConformingProductsListofScreeningDevicestoMeasureAlcoholinBodilyFluids”whichispublishedperiodicallybytheNationalHighwayTrafficSafetyAdministration(NHTSA).

Drug Testing-Mustbeconductedwithin32hoursoftheSMI,unlessprecludedbysafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheincident.-ShouldsafetyconcernsdirectlyrelatedtotheSMIprecludetestinginthe32hourwindowtestingshouldbecompletedassoonasthesafetyconcernshavebeenaddressed.Thereasons for failing to test must be documented on the form CG-2692b.

Furtherinformationon70Fed.75954(22December2005)canbefoundat:http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20051800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-24375.pdfAdditionalclarificationofwhatconstitutesanSMIasopposedtoareportableoccurrencecanbefoundin46CFR4.0.-2

USCG – eNOAD User GuideTheUSCGNationalVesselMovementCenter(NVMC)hasreleasedtheElectronicNoticeofArrival/Departure(eNOAD)UserGuide.TheguideisavailableinanOnlineVersionthatincludesinteractivefeaturesandasearchfunction.Theagencyisprovidingincentivestoencourageshipownersandoperatorstoconverttotheelectronicfilingsystem.Masters,operators,andagentsarealsoremindedthatpreviouslyassignedNoticeIDsorGloballyUniqueIdentifiers(GUIDs)mayonlybeusedwhensubmittingupdatedinformationregardingtheparticulararrivalordeparturetowhichtheIDnumberwasassigned.UseofsuchNoticeIDorGUIDforadifferentarrival/departureorforadifferentvesselwillnotconstitutevalidnoticeandmayresultindelaysand/orpenalties.

TheUserGuidecanbefoundat:http://www.nvmc.uscg.gov/Forms/eNOADUserGuide.pdfandtheonlineversionat: http://www.nvmc.uscg.gov/robohelpenoad/eNOAD_RoboHelp_System.htm

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United States: Electronic Notice of Arrival and Departure (ENOA/D) IntroductionTheU.S.BureauofCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)hasissuedandpublishedaFinalRulestipulatingthat,witheffectfrom6June2005,thefilingofcommercialvesselmanifestsforpassengersandcrewmembersmustbeperformedelectronically.ThenewregulationconformswiththerequirementsbyboththeUSCoastGuardandtheCBPandeliminatestheneedforduplicatinginformation.

The new regulationCarriersareresponsibleforensuringthat:

–theinformationtransmittediscorrect,–thetraveldocumentpresentedbythepassengerorcrewmemberappearstobevalidfortraveltotheUS,and–thepassengerorcrewmemberisthepersontowhomthetraveldocumentwasoriginallyissued.

ThisinformationsubmittedwillbesharedbytheCBPandtheUnitedStatesCoastGuard–thus,onlyonenotificationwillhavetobesubmittedbythevesselowner,therebysaving time and eliminating the need to submit separate formstotwodifferentagencies.

The submissions must be performed by using an “electronic datainterchangesystem”approvedbytheCBP.ThiscanbedonebyaccessingtheUSCG’sNationalVesselMovementCenter(NVMC)ontheInternet.

ForvesselswhichdonothaveaccesstotheInternet,thesubmissions can be made from a land based computer

terminal.Submissionscanalsobemadebyemail,ratherthanbyInternet.Formoreinformationonhowtodothis,pleaseconsultthefollowingUSgovernmentwebsites:

www.nvmc.uscg.gov/Forms/eNOADInfoPath.msiwww.nvmc.uscg.gov/Forms/InfoPathUserGuide.pdf

Oncetherequiredinformationisfilledinusingtheaboveforms,thefinalsubmissionshouldbesavedandsentasanemailattachmenttoNVMCatthefollowingaddress:[email protected]

Thetimerequirementsforsubmittingthenotificationbyanarriving vessel are:–Foravoyageofmorethan96hours:96hourspriortoarrival.–Foravoyageoflessthan96hours:atleast24hourspriortothedepartureofthevessel.–Foravoyageoflessthan24hours:atleast24hourspriortoarrival.

Fordepartingvessels,thecrewandpassengermanifestmustbefilednolaterthan15minutesbeforedeparturefromthelastUSport.

ForacopyoftheFinalRule,pleaseaccessthefollowingwebsite:http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-6523.pdf


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Grey water discharge and pollution fines in TurkeyIntroductionGard has seen a number of fines having been levied due to greywaterpollutioninTurkey.TheTurkishAuthoritieshaveimposedfinesforpollutingtheseawithgreywaterinteraliawhilevesselswereenteringtheport.Calculationofthefinesisbasedonvessels’grosstonnageandbearsnorelationtotheextentofthepollutionoranyallegedenvironmentaldamage.Asmallspillofgreywatercanresultinalargefine.The purpose of this circular is to remind members and clients thatdischargeofgreyand/orgalleywaterisconsideredpollutionbyTurkishAuthorities.

ApplicableregulationsandinterpretationAccordingtolocalportregulations,copiesofwhicharenormallyprovidedtothevessel’sMaster,dischargeofenginebilgeoroilwasteandgarbageintoseaisstrictlyprohibited.The penalties charged by Turkish authorities due to air or environmentpollutionaresevere.Theminimumfineisestablishedbythecountry’sannual“BudgetLaw”beginningat1Januaryeachyear.

Asgreywaterisnotspecificallymentionedinlocalportregulations(whichcontravenesUSEPAVGPregulations),theMastermaywrongfullybelievethatsuchdischargesispermitted.GardRule47.ccoverspollutionfinesarisingasaresultofthe‘accidentalescape’.AslongasgreywaterisdischargedwillinglyandnotaccidentallytoseaMember’scoverisprejudiced.

AccordingtoTurkishEnvironmentalLawitisprohibitedtoreleasedirectlyorindirectlyanykindofwasteorleftoversintotheenvironment.TheTurkishEnvironmentallawseemstohavegiven‘anykindofwaste’averybroadmeaningandthusincludesgreywaterasapollutant.Wherethereispossibilityofpollution,anyauthorisedpersonnelareobligedto prevent the pollution and the individuals causing the pollution are obliged to take the necessary precautions to minimiseanyeffectthereof.

TheTurkishAuthoritiesregardanykindofwasteasapollutant.Furtherarticle181/182ofthenewTurkishCriminalCodeNo.52371 provides for imprisonment for intentional or negligentpollutionoftheenvironment.

ExamplesofrecentcasesInarecentGardcase,TurkishAuthoritiesimposedalargefineduetopollutionbygreywater(galleywater)dischargedintotheseawhiletheshipwasatberth.Theportauthorityinspectorsmostlikelybecameawareofthedischargeandtooksampleswhilstthedirtywaterwasbeingdischargedoverboardfromcabins’bathrooms.

AnothercaseinvolvedavesselleavingberthinaTurkishportfortheanchoragearea.Whilstthecrewwaswashingthecompassdeckandbridgewingwithafirehose,theportauthority inspector came alongside the vessel and took somesamplesoftheseawateronboththestarboardandportsidescuppersofthevessel.Theresultwasthattheshipwasfinedduetodirtywater(oil,dustresiduesandsomeforeignmaterials)ondeckleakingintothesea.

RecommendationsShipownersshouldfamiliarisethemselveswithlocalregulations.EventhoughallMARPOLregulationsaremet,the local regulations may be stricter and members and clientsmustcomplywithalllocalregulations.P&Icoverforpollution fines responds only to the accidental escape of a pollutantfromtheship,andnotininstancesofoperationaldischargeduetomisinterpretationoflocalrules.ItshouldalsoalwaysbeborneinmindthatthedischargeofanykindofwaterisprohibitedexceptcoolingwaterinallTurkishports.

1Enteryintoforceinthesecondhalfof2009.

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U.S. Guidelines on MARPOL Annex VI

TherequirementsofMARPOLAnnexVI,relatingtoairpollutionfromships,enteredintoforceon8January2009intheUSAaspartoftheMaritimePollutionProtectionActof2008.ThisenactmentfollowsthegreateremphasisbeingplacedintheU.S.onvesselairemissions.Asofthisdate,foreignflaggedshipsoperatinginU.S.watersandU.S.flaggedshipsmustbeabletodemonstratecompliancewithMARPOLAnnexVI.Complianceverificationshouldprimarilyfocuson(1)documentation,(2)equipmentcertification/approvaland(3)cursorymaterieltests/examination.

TheU.S.CoastGuardissuedGuidelinesforEnsuringCompliancewithAnnexVI…on4February2009.TheseguidelinessetforththetypesofcriteriathatUSCGinspectorsmayusewhenconductinginspectionsonshipsinrelationtoairemissions.TheseinspectionscanoccureitherwithinthecontextofaPortStateControlinspection,orasa‘standalone’examination.

TheseregulationsapplytoallU.S.flaggedinspectedanduninspectedvessels,aswellasallnon-U.S.flaggedvesselsabove400grosstonsoperatinginU.S.waters.

PreviouslyobtainedStatementsofVoluntaryCompliance(SOVC)canbeusedasdocumentaryproofofcomplianceuntilavessel’sfirstscheduleddrydocking,butinnocaselaterthan8January2012.Otherwise,avalidInternationalAirPollutionPreventionCertificate(IAPP)andanEngineInternationalAirPollutionPreventionCertificate(EIAPP)willbeneeded.TheUSCGGuidelines,atpages1-4,discussindetail the applications of the regulations on this certificate issue.

TheseAnnexVIinstructionsandcriteriaoftheUSCGcanbefound at: http://www.gard.no/gard/Publications/USCG_Guidelines.pdf

ThefollowinglistofMARPOLAnnexVIdetainabledeficienciesis,bynomeans,acompletelisting,however,itprovidesanexcellentdefinitionof“substandard”forthepurposesofAnnexVI:

• AbsenceofavalidIAPPCertificate,EIAPPcertificate,orTechnical Files;

• AdieselengineforwhichanEIAPPCertificateisrequired,whichdoesnotmeettheNOxTechnicalCode;

• Thesulphurcontentoftheonboardbunkersexceeds4.5%m/m;

• Non-compliancewithSECArequirementsinU.S.waters;• Anincineratororrequiredemissionscrubbersthatdoes

notmeetapprovalrequirements,ormeetsapprovalrequirements,butdoesnotfunctionproperly;

• Ozone-depletingsubstancesarebeingemitted;• Thevesselhasasubstantiallyincompletefileofbunker

delivery notes and associated fuel samples; and• Masterorcrewisnotfamiliarwithessentialprocedures

regarding the operation of air pollution prevention equipment.

RecommendationVesselowners/operatorsandvesselpersonnelareadvisedtoconsulttheUSCGGuidelinestoensureregulatoryequipmentand operational compliance and that the appropriate documentationcoveringtheseitemsisinorder.ByconsultingtheGuidelinesownersandoperatorswillalsobecomefamiliarwiththetypesofitemssubjecttosuchUSCGinspectionsandwillensurethatthevesselsuccessfullypassesthistypeofofficialsurveysandinspections.


63


Are you purifying or just pumping?

GardregularlyseescasualtiesinvolvingenginebreakdownsduetoexcessivewearcausedbyabrasiveparticlesinthebunkeredHFO.TherehavebeenanincreasingnumberofHFOdeliverieswithhigherlevelsofcatalyticfines.Thisisthoughttobeduetotheintroductionofthelowsulphurfuelrequirementsinpartsoftheworld,andisprobablyaresultoftheproduction/blendingprocessesusedbytherefineryindustrytosatisfythedemandforsuchlowsulphurfuel.ThecurrentinternationalstandardforHFOtobeusedinmarinedieselenginesandboilersisISO8217:2005.ButevenwheretheHFOreceivedonboardsatisfiestheserequirements,operationalproblemsmayoccuriftheHFOseparatorsarenotproperlyoperatedandmaintained.

HFOcontainscatalyticfinessuchasaluminiumandsiliconoxides,whichareremnantsfromtherefiningprocess.Thesearehardabrasiveparticles,andISO8217:2005regulatestheamountofcatalyticfinespermittedinHFO,expressedasAl+Si,to80mg/kg(ppm).However,duetotheabrasivenatureoftheseparticles,mostenginemanufacturerslimittheamountofcatalyticfinesinthefuelinjectedintotheenginesto15mg/kg.Excessivewearofthecomponentsinthecombustionchamber(pistongrooves,pistonrings,cylinderliners)andofthefuelinjectionequipment(fuelpumpplungerandbarrel,fuelinjectionvalves),willbetheconsequencesofexceedingthelevelofcatalyticfinesof15mg/kg.InorderfortheHFOseparatorstoefficientlyreducethe level of catalytic fines and other impurities that can be presentinthefueloil,suchasrust,sand,dustandwater,thefollowingprecautionsshouldbetaken:

1. Keep the HFO inlet temperature at 98oCThe efficiency of the separator is highly dependent on the inlettemperatureofthefuel,andthepreheatersareoftentoosmall,thesetpointiswrong,orthepreheaterisfouledorinotherwaysdefect,resultinginaninlettemperaturewhichistoolow.

2. Use of correct flow ratioThelongerthefueloilispresentintheseparator,thebetterthecleaningofthefueloilwillbe.Sincethe1980’s,separatorswithoutgravitydiscshavebeenmoreorlessstandard,anditisrecommendedtoalwaysuseallavailableHFOseparatorsandtoruntheminparallel,withcorrespondingfeedrate.Iftheseparatorsareofthemanualtypewithgravitydiscs,theymustbeoperatedinaserieswithapurifierfollowedbyaclarifier,butwiththelowestpossibleflow.

3. MaintenanceMaintaintheseparatorsaccordingtothemanufacturer’sinstructionsandusingthemanufacturer’sapprovedsparepartsonly.Regularchecksoftheseparatorsbythemanufacturer’sserviceengineerswillalsoenhancethequality.

4. Check fuel system efficiencyInordertochecktheefficiencyofthefuelsystem,itisrecommended that samples are taken of the fuel oil before andaftereachseparatoratintervalsof4or6months.Thesamples should be sent to an established fuel analysing instituteforanalysis,andtheresultwillprovideanindication

oftheefficiencyoftheseparators.Theanalysiswillbemostaccurate if performed once it is confirmed that a certain amountofcatfinesarepresentinthebunkeredfueloil.Above25-30mg/kgispreferable.

5. Clean storage, settling and service tanksLargeparticleswillsettleinthestorage,settlingandservicetanks,andovertimetheconcentrationofabrasiveparticlesinthebottomofthetankscanbeexcessive.Duringroughweatherthesecomponentscanbewhirledupandbesuppliedtotheseparators,sometimesinconcentrationsabovethe80mg/kglimit.Hence,thesetanksshouldbedrainedandcleanedatregularintervals.Itisthereforebeneficialtorunallavailableseparators,evenwherethefuelusedinitiallyhasalowlevelofcatalyticfines.

6. Train responsible personnelEnsurethatpersonnelresponsiblefortheoperationandmaintenance of the separators are properly trained and are familiarwiththeequipmentandhowtoperformtheregularmaintenance.Thisincreasesreliability,andreducestheconsumptionofnon-wearparts.

ItshouldbementionedthatcompaniessuchasDNVPetroleumServicesandLloyd’sRegister(FOBAS)offerfuelmanagementservicesthatcanassistshipownersinefficientlyrunningonboardfueltreatmentsystems.

Byfollowingtheabove,thefueltreatmentsystemshouldoperatewithoptimumefficiency,whichwillincreasethelikelihoodoftheengineshavinganacceptablelevelofwear,whichagainwillleadtotheintervalsbetweenoverhaulsbeingasspecifiedbytheenginemanufacturer.

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New Permit Requirements for Vessels – U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyFollowingvariouscourtchallengesandregulatoryprocessing,theU.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)has issued proposed regulations and forms to be used by commercial vessels for obtaining discharge permits for almostalleffluentsgeneratedduringnormalshipboardoperations.Theseregulationsaresettobefinalisedonorbefore19December2008.Allcommercialvesselsinexcessof300GT.,orexceeding79feetinlength,orthathavethecapacitytocarrymorethan8cubicmeters(2,113gallons)ofballastwatermustfilea‘NoticeofIntent’toobtainageneralpermit.Thepermitsarerequiredbyvesselsoperatingupto3milesfromshoreintheterritorialwatersoftheUnitedStates.

Thepermit,whichisissuedundertheaegisoftheNationalPollutantDischargeEliminationSystemprogram(NPDES),coversmanyofthecategoriesofnormalvesseldischarges,includingballastwater,deckrunoffandgraywater.Typesofeffluentalreadycoveredbyotherspecificregulationswillremainwithintheambitofthosealreadyestablishedregulations.Thisgeneralpermitsystemwillrequireeitherspecificactionsor‘bestmanagementpractices’,andwillincludeinspections,maintenanceofwrittenrecords,andreportingrequirements.

Intertankohasrecommendedthattheinterimregulationsbeusedasthebasisforpreparinga‘NoticeofIntent’,whichisthebeginningofthepermitprocess,butnotfiling

sucha‘NoticeofIntent’untilafterthefinalregulationsarepromulgatedinDecember.Inviewofthetimerequiredtocomplywiththisregulatoryprocess,thatrecommendationwouldbeoneforvesseloperatorstoseriouslyconsider.TheEPAhasasectiononitswebsitedevotedtothisprocess:http://www.epa.gov/npdes/vessels.

Atthatwebsitearealsolinkstotheoverviewofthehistoryandproposedpermittingscheme,http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vessel_overview.pdf,afactsheet,http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vessel_commercial_factsheet.pdf,andapermitform,http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vessel_commercial_permit.pdf.

WewillawaittheissuanceofthefinalregulationsbytheEPAwithinthenext2months,andwillissueasupplementtothisnoticeoncethefinalrulesareavailable.


Discharge and disposal of dry cargo residues – U.S. Coast Guard Regulations for the Great Lakes RegionFormanyyears,theU.S.CoastGuardhastoleratedthesweepingoverboardofdrycargoresidues(knownas‘sweepings’or‘DCR’),producedduringtheloadingordischargingofbulkcargos.ThisissuemainlyinvolvesshipscarryingoreandmineralcargoesintheGreatLakesregion.However,environmentalgroupshaverecentlyfocusedonthisphenomenon,andhavepushedforregulationand/orbanningofthepractice.IthasbeenreportedthatanestimatedonemillionpoundsofsuchwastematerialissweptintotheGreatLakeseachyear.

On29September2008theUSCGpublishedasetofinterim rules for the discharge of such residues in the Great Lakes,withtheperiodallowingforpubliccommentbeforefinalisingtherules,torunto15January2009.

Theseregulationspermitthecontinuedsweepingoverboardofsuchdebrisinmostcircumstances,butwithcertainlimitationsandcontrols.Suchdischargesarenowprohibitedincertainsensitiveandprotectedareaswheretheyhadpreviouslybeenallowed,andthenewrulesprovidefornewrecordkeepingandreportingrequirements.Inthese

Rules,theCoastGuardalsodiscussesproposedvoluntarymeasures to reduce the disposal of dry cargo residues and minimisetheirimpactontheenvironment.

ThesenewregulationscanbefoundintheFederalRegisterat:http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-22670.pdfItwouldappearthatthemosttimeconsumingofthenewrequirementswillbetherecordkeepingandreporting.ShipswillberequiredtokeepaDCRLog,withentriesforcargoloadedandunloaded,howandhowmuchsweepingtakesplaceandwhatmeasures,ifany,weretakentocontrolormitigatetheresidues.Theserecordsmustbekeptonboardtheshipforatleast2years,andcopiesmustbeforwardedtotheU.S.CoastGuardquarterly,bye-mail,faxorpost.RecordsmustbekeptonCoastGuardFormCG-33,whichcanbefound,alongwithreportingaddressandotherdetails,onlineontheU.S.CoastGuard’swebpageat:http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/CG522/cg5224/dry_cargo.asp


65Loss Prevention Circular No. 13-07

US Coast Guard – Formal policy on voluntary disclosure of MARPOL violations

TheUnitedStatesCoastGuardhasissuedaformalpolicyonvoluntarydisclosurethatappliestoMARPOLviolationsthatmayresultincriminalprosecutionofownersandoperatorsofforeignflagvesselsintheUnitedStates.ThepolicyissimilartoexistingpoliciesofotherU.S.governmentagenciesandtheUSJusticeDepartmentindescribingthefactorsthatwillbeconsideredinevaluatingaviolationforpossiblecriminalinvestigationorprosecution.

Thesepoliciesrequirecompaniestohaveinplaceacompliancemanagementsystemtoprevent,detectandcorrectviolationsofenvironmentalregulations.Ifimplemented,theShippingIndustryGuidanceonEnvironmentalCompliancepublishedbyInternationalChamberofShipping(ICS)andInternationalShippingFederation(ISF)wouldappeartomeetalltherequirementsfor a compliance management system as set out in the USCGpolicy.Theshippingindustryguidancecanbedownloadedat:www.marisec.org/environmental-compliance

TheUSCGvoluntarydisclosurepolicystatesthatifacompany promptly and voluntarily discloses a violation discoveredwithinthecompany’senvironmentalcomplianceplanincludingshipauditstotheCoastGuard,andthedisclosureotherwisemeetstherequirementoftheCoastGuardpolicy,theCoastGuardwillnotrecommendprosecutionofthecompany.However,itisimportanttonotethatsuchdecisionswillbecase-specific,andultimatediscretiononwhetherornottoundertakeacriminalinvestigationstillrestswiththeUSCoastGuard.TheCoastGuard investigates violations and can refer matters to theJusticeDepartmentforfurtherinvestigation,typicallythroughtheuseofaGrandJury.TheCoastGuardpolicynowmakesitclearthattheCoastGuardmayrecommendleniency in certain cases before the matter goes to the JusticeDepartment.

Otherimportantrequirementsstatedinthepolicyare:• Theviolationmustbediscoveredandidentifiedbefore

theCoastGuardoranyothergovernmentagencylikely wouldhaveidentifiedtheproblemeitherthroughitsowninvestigativeworkorfromtheinformationreceivedthrough a third party;

• Theviolationmustbereportedinwritingwithin21daysof discovery;

• Theviolation(orarelatedviolation)hasnotoccurredpreviouslywithinthepastthreeyearsinvolvingthesamevesselandhasnotoccurredwithinthepastfiveyears as part of a pattern involving multiple vessels ownedoroperatedbythesameentity.

UnderUSlaw,foreignflagshipownersandoperatorscanbeandoftenareprosecutedforentryintoUSwaterswithafalseoilrecordbookthatconcealsdischargesofoilywasteswhichhavetakenplaceoutsideofUSwaters.DischargesinviolationofMARPOLininternationalwatersareviolationsthataresubjecttothelawoftheflagstatebuttheUnitedStatesdoesnothavejurisdictiontoprosecuteforeignflagoperatorsforthedischargeitselfbecausethevesselswereoutsideofUSwatersatthetimeofthedischarge.AccordingtotheIndustryGuidanceonEnvironmentalCompliance,“non-compliancewithMARPOLregulationsshouldbe

reportedtothevessel’sflagadministration.Intheeventofthediscoveryofevidenceofintentionaldischargesofwaste,theflagadministrationmustbenotifiedimmediatelyandarequestforaninvestigationshouldbeinitiated”.

IfthevesseltradestotheUnitedStates,thevesselowneror operator may also consider reporting the discovery and the correction of any false entries in the oil record book totheCoastGuardinadditiontotheflagstate,inordertocomplywiththevoluntarydisclosurepolicy.IndecidingwhethertoreporttotheCoastGuard,prudencesuggestsforeignflagownersandoperatorsshouldseekimmediatelegaladvicefromalawyerfamiliarwiththeCoastGuardandJusticeDepartmentpolicyguidelinesandMARPOLcriminalprosecutionsingeneral.

The official document can be found at: www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/CH-4%20Appendix%20V.pdf

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Compliance with Panama Canal Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (PCSOPEP) requirements

ThePanamaCanalAuthorityhasissuedAdvisorytoShippingNoA-19-2007highlightinganendtothegraceperiodforfullcompliancewiththePCSOPEPrequirements.

NoticetoShippingN-12-2007reiteratesthatallvesselsapproachingCanalwatersfortransitmusthaveaPanamaCanalShipboardOilPollutionEmergencyPlan(PCSOPEP)validatedbytheAutoridadDelCanalDePanama(ACP).ThePCSOPEPmustbesubmittedtoACPatleast96hourspriortoarrival.

Thisrequirement,whichenteredintoforceon1January2005,appliestovesselswithfueland/oroilcargo-carryingcapacityof400MTormore.Non-complianceconstitutesaviolationofChapterIX,SectionFouroftheMaritimeRegulationsfortheOperationofthePanamaCanal,andthevesselmaybesubjecttofinesinaccordancewithChapterXI,Offences,SanctionsandSanctioningProceedingsoftheRegulations.

Asof1October2007,vesselsfailingtosubmitacompliantPCSOPEPatleast96hourspriortoarrivalatCanalwaterswillbeclassifiedasnon-compliantandwillnolongerbegrantedagraceperiod.ThevesselwillbescheduledasTier3andwillbechargedaccordingly,aswellasforadditional

resourcesassignedtothevesselduetothisnon-compliance.Inaddition,thevesselwillonlybeallowedtotransitaftertheshipowners,operatorsorshippingagenthavepaidorprovided satisfactory guarantees for the payment of the applicablefine,whichisaminimumofUSD2,500.

SubsequentarrivalstoPanamaCanalwatersundersimilarnon-complianceconditionswilltriggerincreasedfinesthatmayeventuallyresultindenialoftransit.

Shipowners,operators,andmastersareencouragedtoensurethattheirvesselscomplywiththePCSOPEPrequirementandotherPanamaCanalregulations.Furtherinformationcanbeobtainedfrompcsopep@pancanal.comorbytelephone+507272-4635.

TheAdvisorytoshippingNoA-19-2007isavailableat: http://www.pancanal.com/common/maritime/advisories/2007/a-19-2007.pdf


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SECA – North Sea and English Channel

This circular is issued to remind all operators of the general requirementsfortheNorthSeaandEnglishChannelSECA.Moredetailsonthesubject,includingcharterpartyandbunkersalescontractscanbefoundinGardNews187,August/October,whichwillbepublishedinAugust2007.

TheNorthSeaSOxEmissionControlArea(SECA)enteredintoforceon21stNovember2006,andwillbefullyimplemented12monthslater,on22ndNovember2007.AnnexVIofMarpol73/78limitsthecontentofsulphuroxide(SOx)andnitrogenoxide(NOx)emissionsfromshipexhaustsandprohibitsthedeliberateemissionsofozone-depletingsubstances.

AnyvesselenteringaSECAmustswitchtoalowsulphurfueloil(LSFO)beforeenteringthearea.Theregulationsrequireshipstoallowsufficienttimeforthefueloilsystemstobefullyflushedofallfuelsexceeding1.5%sulphurpriortoentry.

TheEuropeanUnionDirective2005/33/ECdealingwiththesulphurcontentofmarinefuelswillcomeintoforceandwillapplytotheNorthSeaSECApriortothefullimplementationofAnnexVI.TheEUfuelsulphurregulationswillenterintoforceintheNorthSeaAreaandEnglishChannelSECAon11August2007andrequiresshipstoburnfueloilwithlessthan1.5%sulphurbymass.ThislimitwillalsoapplytopassengervesselsoperatingonaregularservicetoorfromanyEUport.ThesulphurlimitwillbeenforcedforvesselsofallflagsfromthisdatebyportstatecontrolofallEUstateports.


Marpol Annex V – Increased focus on waste management in the US (updated)

MARPOLAnnexVprohibitsthedisposalintotheseaofallplasticsaswellasregulatingthedisposalofothergarbage,includingpaperproducts,glass,metal,andrags.Foodwastemaybedischargedas“faraspracticable”fromlandand in all cases “not less than 12 nautical miles from the nearestland”.Dischargeoffoodwastecontainedinplasticgarbagebagsisaviolationoftheplasticsban.

TheActtoPreventPollutionfromShips(APPS)introducedintoUSlawtheprovisionsoftheMARPOL73/78Convention.FutureUSCGandDepartmentofJusticeGrandJuryinvestigationsmayincludethereviewofgarbagemanagementpractices.

DuringarecentcalltotheUSWestCoast,crewmembersaboardaGardenteredvesselwereservedwithGrandJurySubpoenasforthepurposeofcriminallawinvestigationsofshipboardgarbagemanagementpractices.Inadditiontocrewtestimony,recordsweredemandedpertainingtothestorageanddisposalofrubbish,refuse,plasticsandwaste.

MarpolAnnexVIalsorequiresshipsof400gtormore,engagedinvoyagestoorfromcountrieswhohaveratifiedtheConventionor,shipsflyingtheflagofthesamecountries,arerequiredtohaveonboardanInternationalAirPollutionPreventioncertificateissuedbytheflagstate.Toenableflagandportstatestomonitorcompliancewiththeregulations,MarpolAnnexVIrequiresabunkerdeliverynoteto be obtained and retained on board stating the sulphur contentofthebunkers,aswellasasampleoftheoil.

ThereareseveralchallengesinvolvedincomplyingwiththeregulationscontainedinMarpolAnnexVI.Oneofthekey issues for operators to address is the need for proper changeoverproceduresandtheimportanceoffollowingthese.Evenwiththerequiredfuelonboard,amistimedorimproperlyexecutedchangeoverwillresultinviolationoftheSECArules.

IntheeventthefuelonboarddoesnotmeettheMarpolrequirements,portstateorflagstateauthoritiesmayrequireadeviation,de-bunkeringandreplacementoffuel,causingdelayandadditionalcosts.

Marpolviolationsmayalsoresultinfinesagainstthevessel.Theenforcementhasreportedlybeenlightsofar,butthereisreasontobelievethatenforcementofAnnexVIwillfollowthatofAnnexIandseverepenaltieswillbeimposediftheindustryisslowtocomplywiththenewrules.

ViolationsofMARPOL/APPSintheUnitedStatescanresultin criminal fines and penalties against the vessel operator ofuptoUSD500,000eachviolationanduptoUSD250,000and/orajailtermforindividuals.TherearealsoadditionalcriminalprovisionsunderUSlawforillegaldischargeswithinUSterritorialwaters,includingtheexclusiveeconomiczone.

TheUSCGandJusticeDepartmentareincreasinglyinvestigating and prosecuting environmental crimes and MARPOLviolations.MembersshouldanticipateinspectionofallvesselwastemanagementpracticesduringportstatecontrolinspectionsintheUnitedStates,includingwasteoilsaswellasgarbage.Membersshouldensurethatvesselsarenotdumpingfoodwastecontainedinplasticbags.

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Oily water separation and discharge: Discharge of oil prohibitedIntroductionAspartofouroveralllosspreventionactivities,GardServicesregularlymonitorsportStatedetentionsfromtheParisMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU),TokyoMoUandUnitedStatesCoastGuard(USCG).In2000,therewasatotalof131detentionsofshipsenteredintheGardP&Iportfolio.Oilywaterseparationanddischargerelateditemswerethesinglemostfrequentdeficiencycited.SimilarresultswerealsoobservedinthedetentionofvesselsenteredintheGardMarineportfoliofor2000(147detentionsandthesecondmostciteddeficiency).Wearenotsatisfiedwiththesefigures.Asaresult,webelieveitisnecessarytorevisitthisissueforGardServicesMembersandClients.

This circular includes updated adaptation of the article “Dischargeofoilprohibited”,whichappearedinGardNewsissueNo.152(December1998/February1999)warnedagainst the implications of pumping oil and oily bilge wateroverboard.Thisisthesecondinaseriesofcircularsproducedonthismatter.GardServicesLossPreventionCircular06-01entitled,“Oilywaterseparationanddischarge:Riskofoilpollutionversusvessel’ssafety”alsoaddressessafetyandenvironmentalmattersrelatedtothissubject.WehopethatthiscircularwillassistourMembersandClientsinstayingvigilantinlightofthepotentialcostsofnon-compliancewithregulationsrelatingtooilywaterseparationanddischarge.

Bilge water problemsOn vessels in operation before the implementation of MARPOL73/78,itwascustomarytopumptheoilyengineroombilgewaterstraightoverboard,evenifanoilywaterseparatorwasinstalled.Pipesystemswerearrangedsovariouspumpscouldbeusedasstand-byforeachother,interconnectedbyvalvesandblindflangedconnections.WhentheengineroompipesystemsofexistingshipswereinspectedforcompliancewithMARPOL73/78andissuanceofthevessel’sfirstInternationalOilPollutionPreventionCertificate,such‘useful’connectionshadtoberemovedorblindedoff.Tomaintainthepossibilityofanemergencydischargeconnection,carefulChiefEngineersfittedchainsandpadlockstovalvehandles.Withtime,illegalshipsidevalveconnectionsdisappearedorwereblankedoffpermanently.

A useful pre-entry condition surveyDuringaninspectionofa16yearoldcargovesselof4,000GTwhichhadbeenpurchasedbyoneofourMembers,wediscoveredthatthewaterdischargelinefromthevessel’soilywaterseparatorwasjoinedattheshipsidevalvebyanunmarkedpipewhichcamefromthelowerpartoftheengineroom.Followingthetwoinchpipelinefromtheoverboardvalve,itconnectedonefloorlowerdowntoafourinchlubeoilpipe,endingupinablindflangeonthedeliverysideofthemainenginestand-bylubeoilpump.Thefour-inchpipehadprobablyoncebeenpartofapipelinetodeck,forthepurposeofdischargingthemainenginelubeoilsumptanktoashorerecipient.

Fromtheblindconnectionatthestand-byoilpump,therewasafurtherbranchlinetothevessel’sbilgepumpandbilgewatertank.

The oily water separator. “Fine 5000” placard is in place.

Thisvesselcouldthuspumpoilybilgewateroverboardbybypassingtheoilywaterseparator.Byremovingablindflangeatthemainenginelubeoilstand-bypump,thevesselcouldalso,ifneeded,pumptheentiremainenginelubeoilsumptankoverboard!Theweldingworkoftheunauthorisedpipeconnectionwascrudelycarriedoutsoiteasilycaughtasurveyors’attention.Itwasdefinitelynotanewinstallation,andoildepositssmearedtheshipsidevalve.StrangetothinkthatanumberofIOPPsurveyshavebeencarriedoutovertheyearswithoutdetectingsuchanobviousdefault.

OurMember,whohadjustpurchasedthevessel,wasthankfulforourdetectingtheby-passoftheseparatorandtheAssociationwaspleasedtoseeitremovedimmediately.ThisvesselhadbeensailingintheWestIndiesandoccasionallyvisitingUSports.OurMemberwastousethevesselinthesamearea.

A warning outdatedOnmostvesselsinspected,theAssociationfindsthatwarningsoffinesuptoUSD5,000arepostedinenginerooms,increwquartersandonthebridge.UndertheUSFederalCleanWaterActanowner,operatororpersonincharge of an onshore or offshore facility could be fined up to USD5,000foroildischargedfromsuchfacilityaffectingUSwaters1.PrudentownersorMastershaveobviouslyusedthethreatofaUSD5,000fineasatooltopreventthecrewfromdischargingoiloverboard,andthe“Fine5000”warningshavespreadtoshipsnevervisitingUSwaters.

AftertheentryintoforceoftheUnitedStatesOilPollutionActof1990,the“Fine5000”stickersbecameobsolete,andmaymisleadthecrewinrespectoftheimplications


69

ofdischargingoiloverboardinUSwatersandelsewhere.Todayshipownersnotonlymaycarryunlimitedresponsibilityfortheclean-upoperationandthedamagecausedbyanoilspillinUSwaters,butarealsofacedwithstrictcriminalpenaltiesforviolationsofUSlaw.ByspillingoilaffectingUSwater,theoffenderriskscriminalprosecutionforspillingthe pollutant and for failing to notify the government of thespill.Bothindividualviolatorsandorganisationsmaybepenalised;individualsmayevenbeimprisoned.Fornegligentviolations,themaximumfineisUSD50,000perday and one year imprisonment2.For“knowingviolations”3 theimprisonmentmaybeuptothreeyears.

UndertheAlternativeFinesActthemaximumfineforanindividualisUSD100,000(negligent)andUSD250,000(knowingly).Foranorganisationthefinesaredoubled.Ifanindividual or an organisation derives pecuniary loss to a third party,thefinewillbeuptotwicethegrossgainorloss,which,dependingonthecircumstancescouldruntomillions.

The text of the new warningUSregulationsrequireeveryshipabove26feetinlengthtohaveaplacardofatleast5x8inchesmadeofdurablematerialfixedinaconspicuousplaceineachmachineryspace,oratthebilgeandballastpumpstation,withthefollowingmessage,inalanguageunderstoodbythecrew:

“Discharge of Oil ProhibitedThe Federal Water Pollution Control Act prohibits the discharge of oil or oily waste into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, or the waters of the contiguous zone, or which may affect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the exclusive management authority of the United States, if such discharge causes a film or discoloration of the surface of the water or causes a sludge or emulsion beneath the surface of the water. Violators are subject to substantial civil penalties and/or criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment.”

Oldwarning-placardsmaybeleftinplace,butnewonesshouldbeaddedandallcrewmembersshouldbeinformedthatthetimeofamaximumUSD5,000fineisnowhistory.Thereshouldbenoexcusefornotusingthenewplacard,asitmaybeobtainedeasilythroughshiphandlers.

Some good advice1. AcopyofMARPOL73/78shouldbekeptonboard.

Thecrewmembersshouldbemadefullyawareoftheregulations.

2. EnsurethevesselhasavalidIOPPcertificateatalltimes.3. TheOilRecordBookmustbecorrectlyfilledin.Port

Stateinspectorswillinspectthebookandmaycheckthevessel’ssludgetanks.Ifthevesselhasnosludgeonboardandhasnorecordofdelivery,theMasterandChiefEngineerarelikelytobefined.

4. Theoilywaterseparatorinstalledonboardmustbeofanapprovedtypeandfunctionwell.

5. Theoilcontentmeter,themonitoringdeviceandthealarm/automatic-stoppingdevicemustfunctioncorrectly.

6. Whenpurchasingasecondhandvessel,visuallycheckalllinesfromsludgeandoilybilgewatertankstoverifythatnooilybilgewaterlineorsludgelinemaydischargedirectlyoverboard.Ifonesuch

The overboard valve for clean water discharge from the separator. The pipe from the left leads to the main engine sump tank and to the oily bilge water tank.

connectionisfound,removeitimmediately.Ifindoubt,consultthevessel’sClassificationSociety.

7. Theplacardwithwarningagainstthedischargeofoiloverboardmustreflectthetruepenaltysituationfacedbythecrewandoperator.

8. Reducetheoilleakagestothebilgesbycollectingoilindriptraysandguttersleadingtoawasteoiltank.Besurethedrainpipesfromtheguttersarenotcloggedbydepositsandrags.

9. Oilsludgefromengineroomsisnottobepumpedoverboard.Ifnotdisposedofinanincinerator,theoil must be contained on board until discharged to shore-basedreceptionfacilities.

P&I CoverMembersshouldbeawarethatRule47oftheAssociationsRulesdoesnotincludecoverfortheMember’sliabilityforfinesresultingfromnon-compliancewiththeprovisionscontainedinMARPOL73/78.

Footnotes1.ItseemstobelessknownthatthesameActallowedfinesuptoUSD250,000fordischargesbeingaresultofnegligenceorwilfulmisconduct.2.ThefineiscomposedofamandatorycivilpenaltyforuptoUSD25,000perdayofviolationorUSD1,000perbarreldischarged,andafurtherUSD25,000adayorthreetimesthecostsincurredbytheOilSpillLiabilityTrustFund,forfailingtocleanup.Twoyearsimprisonmentforanegligentviolationmayoccurifitisthesecondorsubsequentoffence.3.“Knowing”requiresonlygeneralintent,notspecificintenttoviolatethelaw.

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Oily water separation and discharge: Risk of oil pollution versus vessel’s safety

IntroductionAspartofouroveralllosspreventionactivities,GardServicesregularlymonitorsportStatedetentionsfromtheParisMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU),TokyoMoUandUnitedStatesCoastGuard(USCG).In2000,therewasatotalof131detentionsofshipsenteredintheGardP&Iportfolio.Oilywaterseparationanddischargerelateditemswerethesinglemostfrequentdeficiencycited.SimilarresultswerealsoobservedinthedetentionofvesselsenteredintheGardMarineportfoliofor2000(147detentionsandthesecondmostciteddeficiency).Wearenotsatisfiedwiththesefigures.Asaresult,webelieveitisnecessarytorevisitthisissueforGardServicesMembersandClients.

Thearticle“Dischargeofoilprohibited”,whichappearedinGardNewsissueNo.152(December1998/February1999)(alsoreproducedasGardLossPreventionCircular07-01)warnedagainsttheimplicationsofpumpingoilandoilybilgewateroverboard,andwasfollowedbyanotherarticleonthesametopicinGardNewsissueNo.155(September1999/November1999),titled“Riskofoilpollutionversusvessel’ssafety”.Thepresentcircularcontainsasummaryofthatsecondarticle,whichwehopewillassistMembersandClientsinstayingvigilantinlightofthepotentialcostsassociatedwithanincident,fines,portStatedetentionsandthesafetyimplicationsrelatedtooilywaterseparationanddischarge.

Environmental and safety mattersDuringconditionsurveysofvessels,theAssociationnormallynotesthatMastersandChiefEngineersenforceastrictpolicyregardingpumpingofbilgewater,inordertoavoidanyoilspill.PortStatecontrolofficersinspectengineroompipelinesandoilywaterseparatingequipmenttoensurecompliancewiththeMARPOLregulations.Finesanddetentionsarenotpopular.Toguardagainstaccidentallypumpingoverboardengineroombilgewaterwhichhasnotbeencleaned,shipsidevalvesaresometimeschainedandpadlockedorlinesareevenblindflanged,allinanefforttoreducetheriskofanoilspill.Attimes,suchremediesarerequestedbyportStatecontrolofficers,andarewillinglyinstalledbytheship’screw.

Oily water separatorAlleffortstoavoidpollutingtheseasandcoastalareasareappreciated,ofcourse,butitshouldbenotedthatthereis also an overriding issue involved: the safety of the vessel inanemergencysituation.Incaseofwateringressandfloodingoftheengineroomorthecargoholds,thevesselneedsafullyworkingandreadilyoperationalbilgepumpingsystem.Therefore,theoverboardconnectionsfromthebilgepumpshouldnotbeblockedbylockedhandwheels,blankflangesorbyremovedspoolpipes.ItshouldbenotedthatSOLAS,ChapterII-1,Regulation21,aswellasrelevantClassrules,requireavesseltobeequippedwithabilgepumpingsystem that should be operational under all practical conditions.Incaseofasuddenfloodingoftheengineroom,thebilgepumpingsystemmustbeabletobestartedwithoutunduedelay.

SoisthereaproblemincomplyingwithbothMARPOLandSOLAS?Notreally,ifonekeepsinmindthattheMARPOL73/78regulationsaremeantfornon-emergencyoperational

Oily water separator.

situations.InAnnexIofMARPOL73/78,Regulation9dealswiththecontrolofoildischargeandRegulation10coversmethodsforpreventionofoilpollutionfromshipswithinaspecialarea,butRegulation11providesexceptionsfromboth,inthecaseofanemergency.TheexceptionsunderRegulation11arethefollowing:“Regulation9and10shallnot apply to:

Oily water separator (a) thedischargeintotheseaofoiloroilymixturenecessary

for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea; or

(b) thedischargeintotheseaofoiloroilymixtureresultingfromdamagetoashiporitsequipment:(i) providedthatallreasonableprecautionshave

been taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the discharge for the purpose of preventing or minimising the discharge; and

(ii) exceptiftheownerorthemasteractedeitherwithintenttocausedamage,orrecklesslyandwithknowledgethatdamagewouldprobablyresult;or

(c) thedischargeintotheseaofsubstancescontainingoil,approvedbytheAdministration,whenbeingusedforthe purpose of combating specific pollution incidents inordertominimisethedamagefrompollution.Anysuchdischargeshallbesubjecttotheapprovalofany


71

Governmentinwhosejurisdictionitiscontemplatedthedischargewilloccur.”

Overboardlineforcleanedbilgewaterfromtheoilywaterseparator.Thehandwheelhasbeenchainlockedbythevessel’sChiefEngineerattherequestofportStatecontrolauthorities.Asealhasalsobeenfittedtothechain.

InviewofRegulation11,MARPOLandSOLASarenotinconflictwitheachotheranditisimportantthatallauthoritiesinspectingavesselforcompliancewithMARPOLunderstandthis.Blockingtheoverboardpipefromthemainbilgepumpsshouldneverbedone,asthiswouldseriouslyaffectthesafetyofthevesselandwouldbeinconflictwithSOLASandClassrequirements.IntheinterestofthecoastalStates,attimesportStatecontrolofficersseemtopaymoreattentiontotheMARPOLregulationsthantothecorrespondingSOLASregulations.Aconflictofinterestmayoccurwhenthebilgepumpofavesselisalsousedforballastwaterandinsomecasesevenforemptyingasumptank.Oilremainsinthepipelinemaynotbelargeinquantity,butwillputharbour authorities on full alert if inadvertently pumped overboardwithballastwater.InsomesuchcasesportStateauthoritieshaverequiredblanksinsertedinthepipelineorthelockingofvalvehandles.Thismaysecureagainstoilpollution,butaspointedout,mayreducethesafetyoftheshipinanemergencysituation.

Ontheotherhand,thereshouldbenoexcuseforpumpingoiloverboardthroughpumpsservingadualpurpose.Itshouldalwaysbeensuredthatallpipelines,whetherusedforcleanbilgeorballastwater,arefreefromoilcontaminationpriortousingthebilge/ballastpumpsfordirectoverboarddischarge.Suchverificationshouldbeincludedintheoperationalprocedures.

Itshouldalsoalwaysbecleartoavessel’screwthatsludgetanks,wasteoiltanksandoildraintanksarenotallowedtohaveanydirectconnectionoverboard(MARPOL37/78AnnexI,Regulation17(3))andthatthecontentofsuchtanksmust be discharged to reception facilities ashore through thestandarddischargeconnectionrequired(MARPOL37/78AnnexI,Regulation19),ifnotdisposedofinanincineratoronboard.Ifrequiredbyharbourauthorities,pipelinesfromsuchtanksmaybeclosedofftopreventoilpollution,butnottheoverboardpipelinefromthemainbilgepump.

IncaseMembersfaceconflictingrequirementsfromvariousauthoritiesconcerningtheissuesaddressedabove,theyshouldalwaysconsultthevessel’sClassSociety,whichhasapprovedthevessel’sbilgepumpingsystemandnormallyhasalsoissuedtheInternationalOilPollutionPreventionCertificate.Inanycase,allchangestoavessel’sbilgesystemshouldalwaysbeinformedinadvancetothevessel’sClassSociety,forproperapproval.

Overboard line for cleaned bilge water from the oily water separator. The hand wheel has been chain locked by the vessel’s Chief Engineer at the request of port State control authorities. A seal has also been fitted to the chain.

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Changes to Medicare reporting in the US

AnarticleinGardNews197,USLaw–Medicarereportingandsetaside,providesanoverviewofrecentchangestoUSMedicarelaw.However,sincethepublicationofthisarticle,furtherchangeshavebeenmadetotheregulationsandnewguidelinesforMedicarereportingintheUS1werepublishedon22February2010bytheCentersforMedicare&MedicaidServices(CMS).2 These guidelines postpone the effectivedatesforrecordingdataandreportingtotheCMS.

This circular provides information on this latest set of changes.

Summary of updates to Medicare reportingThe live reporting date has been delayed until the first quarterof2011.TheCMShadinitiallysetadeadlineforlivereportinginthefirstquarterof2010.

ResponsibleReportingEntities(RRE’s)arenowrequiredto report settlements and other payments to Medicare recipientswhichoccuronorafter1October2010.Thisdatamust be retained and reported in the live report mentioned aboveduringthefirstquarterof2011.TheCMShadoriginallysetadateof1January2010.

RRE’smustreportallongoingresponsibilityformedicalcare(whichwouldapplytotheobligationforcontinuingcureforseamanandworkerscompensationcases)thatexistsasof1January2010.Thisdatamustberetainedandreportedinthelivereportmentionedaboveduringthefirstquarterof2011.PreviouslytheCMSrequiredreportingasof1July2009.

RecommendationsFailuretoactinaccordancewithCMSreportingrequirementscanresultinpenaltiesofUSD1,000adayforeachfailuretocomply.Therefore,allmembersandclientswhotradetoandfromtheUSareadvisedtofamiliarisethemselveswiththenewMedicarerequirements.

ItisprudenttoseeklegaladvicefromaUSlawfirmorThirdPartyAdministratorpriortopayinganymedicalfees/expensesorsettlementwhichinvolveindividualswhoareormaybecomeMedicareeligible.

MembersareadvisedtoobtainanyguidancefromCMSwithrespecttoregistrationwithCMSbyforeignentitiesthatdonothaveUSfederaltaxidentificationnumbersorUSaddresses.

Footnotes1CenterforMedicare&MedicaidServices(February22,2010,ver.3.0),“MMSEASection111MedicareSecondaryPayerMandatoryReporting-LiabilityInsurance(includingSelf-Insurance),No-faultInsurance,andworkers’Compensation–USERGUIDE”.http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Downloads/NGHPUserGuideV3022210.pdf.2 The postponements described in this circular have made thedatespublishedinGardNews197nolongerapplicable.


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Refugees and migrants rescued at sea

The1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSeaandthe1974InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS)placeadutyoneveryshipmastertorenderassistancetoanypersonindistressatsea,irrespectiveoftheirnationality,statusorthecircumstancesinwhichtheyarefound.Thisisalongstandingmaritimetraditionandthe obligation has been enshrined in international and humanitarianlawthroughtheseinternationalconventions.

This loss prevention circular aims to provide a summary of someoftheprocedurestofollowshouldthevesselfinditselfinarescuesituation.

Planning and executing the rescueTheMastershouldrefertoproceduresintheEmergencyContingencyPlanandthevessel’sSSPwhenencounteringrefugeesatsea.Oncerefugeeshavebeenspottedatseathefollowingactionsshouldbetaken.• Contactthenearestand/orresponsibleRescueCo-

ordinationCentre(RCC),and,ifneeded,nearbyshipswhomaybeabletoassistyou.ClarifywhethertheRCChasanyguidelinesfortherescueoperation.

• Establishaplanfortherescuepriortoitscommencement.Thisplanshouldalsoincludeanysafetyand/orsecurityissues.

• Assessthesafetyofthecrewandpassengersshouldpersonsbroughtonboardbecomeaggressiveorviolent.Aseachrefugee/migrantisbroughtonboard,heorsheshouldbesearchedandanyweaponsordangerousobjectsconfiscated.

• Thecrewshouldobtainasmuchpersonaldatafromeachindividualaspossible.

• Establishwhetheroneoftherefugeesisabletocommunicateinacommonlyunderstoodlanguage.Appointoneoftherefugeestomanagethegroupandbetheirspokesperson.

• Toavoidthepotentialspreadofdiseaseorsicknessonboardthevessel,considerusingglovesandotherpersonalprotectionequipment.

Treatment of people rescued at sea – health and safety concernsTheshipmastershoulddoeverythingpossible,withinthecapabilitiesandlimitationsoftheship,totreatthesurvivorshumanelyandtomeettheirimmediateneeds.• Considerwhetherthevesselhassufficientfoodand

provisionsonboardforthecrewandrefugees,aswellasmedicalequipmentshoulditbeneeded.Ifnot,stepsshouldbetakenimmediatelytorectifythesituation.

• Providesufficientaccommodationonboard.Setasideaprotectedareafortherefugeestostay,includingblanketsandbeds.

• Provideforthebasichumanneedsoftherefugees(food,water,shelterormedicalneeds).Establishwhetheranymember of the refugees needs immediate medical assistance.Seekmedicaladvicefromashoreifnecessary.

• Ifpossible,informthesurvivorsofyourintentionsandtheirarrivalataplaceofsafetywheretherescueoperationareconsideredtoterminateonshore.

NotificationTheMastershouldinformtheCompany,theRCCandtheP&Iinsurerofthepresenceofrefugeesonboard.IfitisnotpossibletocontacttheRCCresponsiblefortheareawheretherefugeeswererecovered,attemptsshouldbemadetocontactanotherRCCoranyotherGovernmentauthoritythatmaybeabletoassist.• ContacttheCompanytoadvisethemofthesituationas

wellasyourintentions.• ContacttheP&IClubforfurtheradvice.• InformtheRCCresponsiblefortheregionofthe

conditionsonboard,assistanceneededandactionstakenor planned for the disembarkation:

• Nameoftheship,flagandportofregistry.• Nameandaddressoftheowner’sagentatthenextport.• Positionofthevessel,nextintendedportofcall,

continuingsafetyandcurrentstatuswithadditionalpersonsonboard.

• Numberofrefugeesonboard,name,age(ifpossible),gender.

• Apparenthealth,medicalconditionandspecialmedicalneeds.

• ActionscompletedorintendedtobetakenbytheMaster.

• Master’spreferredarrangementfordisembarkingthepersonsrescued.

• Anyhelpneededbytheassistingship,duringoraftertherecoveryoperation.

• Anyotherfactors(e.g.prevailingweather,timesensitivecargo,etc.).

DisembarkationThe coastal states are obliged to assist the Master in the disembarkationprocess.Onceadecisionhasbeenmadetolandtherefugees,thefollowingactionsshouldbetaken:• InformtheCompany’sagentandthecorrespondentin

theportofdisembarkation.• ComplywithanyrequirementsoftheGovernment

responsiblefortheSARregionwherethesurvivorswererecovered,andseekadditionalguidancefromthoseauthoritieswheredifficultiesariseincomplyingwithsuchrequirements.

• Disembarkationofrefugeesandasylumseekersrecoveredatseainterritorieswheretheirlivesandfreedomwouldbethreatenedshouldbeavoided.

• Forthetypeofevidencetobecollected,seeGARDGuidancetoMasters,para3.13.4.

Ifthepeoplerescuedatseaclaimasylum,alerttheclosestRCCandcontacttheUNCHR.

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Influenza A H1N1 virus

• SeekadvicefromlocalauthoritiesastowhethertheInfluenzaAH1N1virusisaparticularconcernforthatportofcall.Thiscannormallybedoneviathecompany’sships’agent.

• Restrictshoreleaveinaffectedareas.

• Limitcontactwithshoresidepersonnelinaffectedareas.

• Imposeheightenedpersonalhygieneroutines.

GuidelineswhenenteringportswithpossibleinfectiononboardItisimportanttomitigatetheeffectsoftheInfluenzaAH1N1virusoninfectedcrewmembersaswellastoprotectthehealthofthoseonboardwhoarenotaffected.IfHumanSwinefluissuspected,isolatethecrewmemberfromanypersonnelnotdirectlyinvolvedinthecareofthesickcrewmember.Anyindividualwhohavebeeninclosecontactwiththeinfectedcrewmember,mustalsobeconsideredpotentialacarrierofthevirus.

Beforearrivalinport,notifylocalhealthauthoritiesifanycrewmembershowssymptomsofHumanSwineflu.Beprepared for the possibility that once the port authorities havebeennotified,theymayrefusedisembarkationofany/allcrewmembersfromthevessel.Inthistypeofsituation,attempts should be made to have local health providers (doctor/nurse)attendonboardthevesseltotakebloodsamplesandtoprovideanti-viralmedication,ifrequired.

Itwouldappearthatmanyportsaroundtheworldhaveintroducedscreeningofallpassengersandcrew.Thisisdone using thermal imaging cameras in order to detect individualswithahighfever.Localships’agentscanprovidefurtherinformationonthis.

Thevesselmustfullyco-operatewithanyrequestsmadebylocalhealthandportstateauthorities.Inthemeantime,shipboardcrewsshouldcontactthecompanyofficestoseekguidanceonthetreatmentandcareofthesickcrewmember(s).

Additional informationMostcountrieshavealreadyestablishedwebsitesprovidinglocalinformationandguidelines.Yourlocalagentwillnormallybeabletoguideyoutothesewebpages,andalsoprovideinformationaboutlocalrulesandregulations.Inaddition,updatedinformationandgeneralguidelinesonInfluenzaAH1N1virusandHumanSwineflucanbefoundonthefollowingwebsites:

www.who.intwww.cdc.gov

Gard is of course also available for additional information shouldyoususpectacaseofHumanSwinefluonboardyourvessel.

IntroductionHumanSwinefluhasmadetheworld’sheadlinesbecauseitiscausedbytherarerInfluenzaAH1N1virusthathasevolvedfromaswineassociatedvirus.Amuchsmallernumberofpeoplearepre-immunetothisvirusthantopreviousseasonalfluviruses.TheInfluenzaAH1N1virusisthereforeexpectedtospreadfasterandahigherpercentageof the population is predicted to become ill than during previousseasonalfluepidemics.

AccordingtotheWorldHealthOrganization(WHO)theInfluenzaAH1N1virushasnowreachedpandemicstatus,i.e.itisglobal.Membersandclientsshouldthereforeassume that the virus may be introduced to the vessel at any portofcallanywhereintheworld.

ThepresenceofInfluenzaAH1N1onboardworkingshipspresentschallengingproblemsforowners,charterersandoperators.Recentpressreportsindicatethattherehave been instances of shore side medical authorities not permittingship’screw/passengersashorewhenHumanSwineflucasesaresuspectedand/orconfirmedonboard.This,inturn,causeslogisticalproblemsforthevessel.

Measures to prevent infection on boardTheInfluenzaAH1N1virusismainlyspreadbetweenpeoplethroughphysicalcontactandairdroplets.Thespreadoccursthroughcoughing,sneezingandclosecontactwithinfectedindividuals.Takingpreventivemeasuresagainstthediseaseisstronglyrecommended.Itissuggestedthat,asaminimum,thefollowingshouldbeconsidered:


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Lifeboat launches during abandon ship drills

Lifeboataccidentscontinuetooccurduringlifeboatdrillsonboardship.

Inanefforttominimisetherisktotheseafarerstakingpartinsuchdrills,theIMO’sMaritimeSafetyCommitteehasdecidedtoclarifytheapplicationofSOLASregulationIII/19.3.3.3whichgovernsthelaunchoflifeboatsduringabandonshipdrills.

Theregulationrequireseachlifeboattobelaunchedandmanoeuvredinthewaterbyitsassignedoperatingcrewatleastonceeverythreemonthsduringanabandonshipdrill.However,CircularMSC.1/Circ.1326statesthatalthoughtheregulationrequiresthelifeboattobelaunchedandmanoeuvredaspreviouslyindicated,itdoesnotrequirethattheassignedoperatingcrewbeonboardthelifeboatwhenitislaunched.

TheCommitteehasthereforeagreedthattheassignedoperatingcrewisnotrequiredtobeonboardthelifeboatduringlaunching,unlesstheMaster,havingtakenintoaccountallsafetyaspectsandinaccordancewiththeauthorityconferredtohimbyparagraph5.5oftheISMCodeconsidersthelifeboatshouldbelaunchedwiththeassignedoperatingcrewonboard.

Duringtheperiod1Septemberto30November2009thePortStateControl(PSC)regionsofParisMOUandTokyoMOUwilllaunchaConcentratedInspectionCampaign(CIC)onlifeboats.ThePSCoftheregionsofIndianOceanMOUandBlackSeaMOUwillalsoparticipate. TheclarificationprovidedinMSCcircular1326shouldalsobeobservedbyPortStateControlofficersinvolvedintheCIConlifeboats. Gard’sgeneraladvicetoMembersisthatcrewmembersshould not be on board the lifeboats in the course of loweringandhoistingduringexercises,untiltheIMOhasprovideddetailednewrequirementsforsafeon-loadreleasehooks,anduntilexistinghookshavebeencertifiedtocomplywithsuchnewrequirements.

GardalsoreferstoLossPreventionCircularno.02-08:Lifeboataccidentsduringdrills,issuedinFebruary2008whichprovidesgeneraladviceonhowtodealwiththisproblemonboard.

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United States – Responsibility for stevedores

IntroductionGard continues to see stevedore incidents occurring during loadinganddischargeoperationsintheUnitedStates.ThiscircularhighlightsthedutiesowedbytheshiptothestevedoresunderUSlaw.

Legal ResponsibilitiesTheLongshoreandHarborWorkersCompensationAct(LHWCA)placesprimaryresponsibilityforthelongshoreman’ssafetyonthestevedoringcompanyasemployer.However,theUSSupremeCourtinthecaseofScindiaSteamShipNavigationCo.v.DeLosSantos,451U.S.156,1981AMC601(1981)hasheldthattheshipownermaybecomelegallyliableifhedoesnotexerciseduecaretowardsthestevedoreswhileonboardhisvessel.

Thedutyofcarecanbesplitintothefollowingfivedutieswhichthevesselowesthestevedores:

1. Turnover Duty of Condition:Thevesselmustexercise”ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship anditsequipmentinsuchconditionthatanexpertandexperiencedstevedorewillbeable,bytheexerciseofreasonablecare,tocarryonitscargooperationswithreasonablesafetytopersonsandproperty.”

2. Turnover Duty to Warn:Thevesselmustwarnthestevedoreofanyhazardsontheshiporwithrespecttoitsequipmentthatareknowntothevesselorshouldhavebeenknowntoitintheexerciseofreasonablecare,thatwouldlikelybeencounteredbythestevedoreinthecourseofhiscargooperations,andthatarenotknownbythestevedoreandwouldnotbeobvioustooranticipatedby him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work.

3. Active Involvement Duty: The vessel may be liable if it actively involves itself in the cargo operations and negligentlyinjuresalongshoreman.

4. Active Control Duty: The vessel may be liable ”if it fails toexerciseduecaretoavoidexposinglongshorementoharmfromhazardstheymayencounterinareas,orfromequipment,undertheactivecontrolofthevesselduringthestevedoreoperation.”e.g.thegangway.

5. Duty to Intervene:Ifastevedore’sjudgmentis”obviouslyimprovident”,andiftheship”knewofthedefect”inequipment,andthestevedorecontinuestousethedefectiveequipment,andtheshipshouldhaverealisedthattheuseofthedefectiveequipmentpresentedan”unreasonableriskofharmtothelongshoreman,”thevesselhasadutytointerveneandhavetheequipmentrepaired.

RecommendationsEnsurethatyourQualityManagementSystemsandSafetyManualslistthefivedutiesofcare.Theyshouldalsobedistributedtotheseniordeckofficers.

Inspectandtestanyequipmenttobeusedbythestevedorepriortoturnover.

HaveawalkthroughwiththestevedoreforemanandChiefMatebeforeoperationsbeginandattheendofoperations.Promptlyaddressanyproblemsorunsafesituationsunderthevessel’scontrolthatareuncovered.

Useasign-offsheettoshowthatthestevedoresaresatisfiedwiththeconditionofthevesselpriortohandover.

Thedeckofficerondutyshouldperformfrequentroundsonthevesselduringthecargooperations.Notesshouldbetakenandincludedinthedecklogbook.

The deck officer should carry a digital camera and take picturesofanythingamiss.

Haveanalertandwelltrainedgangwaywatchmakingnoteofanyunusualactivity.Keepagangwaylogwhichaccuratelyrecords the name and employer of all persons on and off the vessel.

Notifythestevedoringcompany,inwritingifpossible,ofanydangerousworkpracticesobservedduringthecargooperation.

Ineveryinstanceofastevedorealleginginjurytheincidentshould be promptly reported to Gard so that a proper investigation can be undertaken to protect the interests ofthevesselandmitigateanypotentiallosses,ifpossiblebeforetheshipsailsandachangeofcrewhastakenplace.


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Lifeboat accidents with on-load release hooks

Forthelast20years,accidentsduringmandatorylifeboatdrills have been an ongoing issue in the discussions of the safetyofseafarers.Thiscircularprovidesgeneraladviceonhowtodealwiththisproblemonboard.

BackgroundThelifeboataccidentsareassociatedwiththeon-loadreleasefunctionsofthelifeboathookswhicharemandatoryunderIMOregulationsforallshipsbuiltafter1June1986.Onshipsbuiltbeforethisdatetherearegenerallyoff-loadhooks that cannot be released unless the lifeboat is fully supportedbythewater.

The number of accidents and the number of people killed or injuredrunsintothehundreds.However,therearenoofficialrecords for the total numbers and the lack of such records maybeoneofthereasonswhytheregulatorshavenotmanagedtochangethesituation.Theendresultisreducedconfidenceindavitlaunchedlifeboats.

Gardhaswarnedabouttheon-loadreleaseaccidentsformanyyearsandhostedaconferenceinOctober2007todiscusstheseaccidentswithrepresentativesofflagstates,lifeboatmanufacturers,P&IClubs,classsocietiesandvariousotherinternationalorganisationsattending.Forthepurposesofthisconference,wereviewedGard’slossesover

theyears1992-2007.Atotalof37accidents,resultingin13peoplekilledand87injuredhadbeenregisteredduringthisperiod.Inaddition,therewillalsohavebeenlifeboatsaccidentswithoutinjuriestopersonnelandthusnotresultinginnotificationtotheP&Iclub.

During2007,Gardregisteredtwoaccidentsresultingin1deathand6peoplebeinginjured.Comparedtoothertypes of accidents on board ships and in relation to the 6,200vesselsenteredwithGard,onemayconsiderthesefigureslow.Thedilemmais,however,thattheaccidentswithlifeboatsdonotoccurinnormalworksituationsonboard,butduringmandatorydrillswiththevessel’slifesavingequipment.Duetothemanyaccidentswithlifeboats,IMOregulationsnolongerrequirepeopletobeonboardthelifeboatsduringloweringandhoisting.Thecrewmemberscanbeplacedintothelifeboatsbyothermeansafterlaunch,suchaslifeboatladdersortaxi-boatsinport.

Accidentswithon-loadreleasehooksarefoundtooccurduetolackofmaintenance,lackofknowledgeorpoordesign.WhencomplyingwiththeIMOrequirementsforhookstohavebothoffloadandon-loadcapability,ithasproveddifficult to design sufficient barriers against the effects of poormaintenanceandhumanerror.

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General adviceDuetotheincreasedattentiontotheproblemofon-loadreleasehooks,wehavereceivedmanyquestionsfromMembersaboutwhattodo.WhileGardcannotrecommendonemanufactureroveranother,wewillinthefollowingattempttoprovidesomegeneraladvice.

1.Itisveryimportanttoknowthetypeofhookreleasesystemwhichisinstalledonyourlifeboats.Whileitwouldbe natural in a shore based industry to have such an importantitemstandardised,theGardConferencelastautumnrevealedthattherewere72differentsystemsinuse,andthenumberisstillgrowing.

2.Ensureyouhaveclearandcorrectmanualsandinstructionsabouthowtohandlethehookreleasesystemon board and that such material is made available to thecrew.Ensurethatanyonewhooperatesthelifeboatreleasegearhasbeentrainedonthatparticularsystem.

3.Donotallowanyonenottrainedintheoperationofyourvessel’sparticularhooksystemtooperateit.Ifyourcrewisnottrainedintheoperationofthesystem,sendthemforspecific training or ask a specialist in that particular system toconducttrainingonboard.Uptillnow,mostseamenhaveonlyreceivedmandatoryshore-basedtraininginthe launching of lifeboats during their education and very rarelyanytrainingontheexacttypeofreleasegearfoundonboard.

4.Giveprioritytothemaintenanceoflifeboats.Usestronghanging off pendants to secure the boat to the davit arm beforeanyworkisdoneonthehookreleasesystem.Forinstance,theAustralianMaritimeSafetyAuthority(AMSA)nowrequiressuchrestraintstobepresentbeforetheirsurveyorscanenteralifeboat.Forthemaintenanceofhookreleasesystems,engageservicepeoplefromorapprovedbythemanufacturer.

5.Donothaveanypeopleonboardthelifeboatduringloweringandhoisting,unlessyouknowyourhookreleasesystemiswellmaintainedandthatthecrewonboardboth understands the mechanisms of the system and the risksrepresentedbyhumanerror.TheIMOregulationsrequirethehooksystemtobecapableofreleasingtheboatwiththetotalloadofboat,equipmentandafullcrew.However,iftheboatisreleasedbeforereachingsealevel,peopleonboardmaybeseriouslyinjuredorevenkilled.

6.Free-falllifeboatsshouldbeconsideredfornewbuildings.Ifdavitlaunchedlifeboatsareselected,reviewthehookrelease systems available in the market and insist on the safestsystemavailable.

SummaryAlothasbeenlearnedfrom20yearsofaccidents,andtherearetodayon-loadreleasehooksinthemarketwhicharefarsaferthanthefirstgenerationofhooks.Wesuggestthattheoldhooksystemsarereplacedwithnewimproveddesigns.

Sincelifeboatswithmodernon-loadreleasehooksystemsare still capable of being accidently released before they

areloweredonthewater,Gardstronglyrecommendsthatallownersandshipmanagersaddressthisissuewithintheirrespectivecompaniesandensurethatadequatetrainingisprovidedtothecrewonthespecifichooksystemswithintheirfleet.

TheIMOSub-committeeonDesignandEquipmentisdiscussingtheproblemoflifeboataccidentsandwillbemeetinginBonnon18February2008.Itishopedthatthisimportantmeetingwillresultinnewregulationstoreducethenumberofaccidentsandinjuriesoccurring.


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Accidents involving crew and stevedores during cargo operationsFatalorseriousaccidentscaneasilyoccurwhencrewandstevedoresstandontopofmovingobjectsduringcargooperations.Regrettably,thisiswide-spreadbehaviour,particularlyduringliftingoperationsinvolvingcontainers,thoughitisnotunknownforpersonneltostandontopofgangwaysorbasketsduringloadinganddischarging.Thisisclearlyahazardouspracticesincethecranewirecansnap,hookscancomeloose,andotherfactorscancausethesuspendedobjecttofallormove.

GardP&Ihasbeennotifiedofseveralcasesinvolvingsuchpractices,resultinginfatalitiesorseriousinjuriesandhighliabilityexposure-particularlyintheUS.

Recent casesLIFTINGCONTAINERSAfatalaccidentoccurredataportinThailandduringdischargeofemptycontainers.Thevessel’scranewasbeingusedtogetherwithamanuallyoperatedspreader.Twostevedoreswerepositionedontopofthecontainertolock/unlockthecontainerspreaderwhenlifting,andthenagainwhenthecontainerhadbeendischarged.Whilethestevedoreswerestandingonthecontainer6to7metersabovethewharf,therunnerbroke,andthecontainerfellontothewharfseriouslyinjuringthestevedores,oneofthemhassubsequentlydied.

LIFTINGAGANGWAYAvesselwasunderrepairinaUSdockyard.Ashipyardworkerwasstandingonagangwaythatwasbeingliftedontothevessel,whenthecranewirebroke.Thegangwayandyardworkerfelldowntotheground.Theyardworkerwasseriouslyinjuredanddiedseveralmonthslaterwithoutregainingconsciousness.TheclaimwassettledintheUSforaverysignificantamountofmoney.

LIFTINGABASKETAtaportinGermany,twostevedoreswerepositionedinabaskettobeliftedonboardthevessel.Thehooksattachedtothebasketloosenedandthebasketfelldownontothe

wharf.Oneofthestevedoreswaskilledandtheotherwasseriouslyinjured.

RecommendationsMembers are recommended to introduce instructions on boardtheirvesselsregulatingthisbehaviour.Crewmembersand stevedores should be clearly advised of company policy andproceduresregardingthispractice.Ifstevedoresfailtocomply,awrittenprotestshouldbeissuedandsenttothestevedoringcompanyinordertoprotecttheshipownerincaseofaccident.

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Master’s Responsibility for Safety of Surveyors

IntroductionArecentjudgmentoftheHighCourtoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegionhighlightedtheresponsibilityofMastersforthesafetyofsurveyorsboardingtheirvessel.The dangers of entering enclosed spaces have previously beenhighlightedinGardNews154andintheGard Guidance to Masters,paragraph2.8.5.7(seetheGuidancetoMastersontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no).Nevertheless,surveyorscanbeatriskwhilstperformingsurveys aboard ship and every effort should be made to preventtheirinjuryordeath.Thiscircularhighlightsthisand particular steps that should be taken by a Master to protectsurveyors.AmoredetailedreportofthiscaseandassociateddecisionappearsinGardNews167.

The course of eventsAbulkcarrierenteredwithanInternationalGroupP&IClub(notAssuranceforeningenGard)calledattheportofChiwan,Chinain1997todischargeacargoofbulksoyabeans.Theshipownersappointedasurveycompany(‘theSurveyCompany’)tocheckthecondition,qualityandquantityofthecargoandthesealsoftheholds,forthepurposeofprotectingthemagainstpossibleclaimsbythecargoownersfordamageorshortdelivery.TheSurveyCompanywasbasedinHongKongandoneoftheirmarinesurveyors(‘theSurveyor’)attendedonboardduringafternoonfollowingthevessel’sarrival.TheMasterofferedhimtheassistanceofthevessel’sChiefOfficertocarryouthisinspectionbuttheSurveyoradvisedthatthiswasnotnecessaryandthatheonlyneededthehelpofanAssistantBosun.TheMasterthereforedelegatedthedutyABtoaccompanytheSurveyor.

ThehatchcoversoftheNo1holdwereopenedandtheSurveyorwasobservedtakingphotographsofthecargoinsidetheholdfromthedeck.ThehatchcoversoftheNo1holdwerethenclosed.ThehatchcoversoftheNos2and3holdswereopenedandtheSurveyorwasobservedtaking photographs of the cargo inside these holds from the deck.Followingthisinspectionthehatchcoversoftheseholdswereleftopen.ThedutyABthenadvisedtheMasterbyportableradiothatheandtheSurveyorwouldbetaking

samplesfromtheforwardholds.Therewerenowitnessestowhattranspiredthereafter.

At4:00pmthatafternoontherewasachangeofwatchwiththeChiefOfficerandadifferentABtakingover.Some20minuteslatertheChiefOfficeradvisedtheMasterthattherelievingABhadnotbeenabletolocatethedutyABwhentakingoverthewatch.TheMasterorderedthecrewtosearchfortheSurveyorandthedutyAB.ShortlythereaftertheSurveyorandthedutyABwereobservedlyingatthefoot of the ladder leading to the access hatch of the No 1 hold.Bothofthemhaddiedasaresultofoxygendepletion.

The judgment on this caseFollowingtheaccident,theadministratorsoftheestateoftheSurveyorinstitutedproceedingsintheHighCourtoftheHongKongSpecialAdministrativeRegionagainsttheSurveyCompany,astheemployersoftheSurveyor,for breach of the contract of employment and negligence andagainsttheshipownersandbareboatcharterersofthevessel(‘theShipowners’)forbreachofstatutorydutyundertheOccupiers’LiabilityOrdinanceandnegligence.TheShipownersbeforetrialsettledtheclaimoftheadministratorsandthejudgmentwasconcernedonlywiththeapportionmentofliabilitybetweentheSurveyCompanyasemployers,theSurveyor(contributorynegligence)andtheShipowners.

Althoughtherewasnodirectevidenceofthis,theassumptionwasthattheSurveyorhadrequestedthedutyABtogodownintoNo1holdfirstinordertoobtainsamplesandthat,afterthedutyABhadcollapsedduetooxygendepletion,theSurveyorhadfollowedthedutyABintotheholdandsufferedasimilarfate.ItisunlikelythattheSurveyorwasthefirstonetoentertheholdas,ifhehaddonesoandhadcollapsed,thedutyAB,whowasinpossessionofaportableradio,wouldmostprobablyhavereportedtheincidenttothebridge.

TheevidencewasthattheSurveyorhad14yearsexperienceatseafollowedby6yearsworkingasamarinesurveyorfortheSurveyCompany.HeheldanumberofCertificatesofCompetency,includingaCertificateofCompetencyasChiefOfficerandatransitionalCertificateofCompetencyasMaster.ThelatterdocumentwasissuedbyPanamaandmostoftheotherdocumentswereissuedbyLiberia.NoevidencewasproducedoftheexaminationssatandpassedbytheSurveyortoobtaintheseCertificatesofCompetency.TheevidenceoftheSurveyCompanywasthattheSurveyorhad carried out numerous surveys on their behalf based on whichtheyweresatisfiedastohiscompetence.

ThecourtfoundthatitwasnotsufficientmerelyfortheSurveyCompanytorelyontheCertificatesofCompetencyproducedbytheSurveyorasevidenceoftraining.Theyshouldhavedonemoretoensurethathewaskeptuptodatewithinformationaboutdangersonboardship,wasfullyawareofsuchdangersandknewhowtodealwiththem.

AsfortheSurveyorhimself,thecourtfoundthathemusthavebeenawareofthedangersofenteringenclosedspaces,particularlywhendealingwithcargoessuchassoyabeansthatcauseoxygendepletion,andhewas


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thereforetosomeextenttheauthorofhisownmisfortune.NotwithstandingthesefindingsagainstboththeSurveyCompanyandtheSurveyor,thecourtapportionedtheirdegree of blame for the accident at only 30 per cent and 20 percentrespectively.

AharshercriterionwasappliedtotheconductoftheMasterwhowasfoundtobe50percenttoblame.Thecourtstarted from the premise that the Master is in overall charge of the vessel and responsible for the safety of all persons on board,includinglawfulvisitors.Therelevantsafetycodesprovidedforaplannedentryintoanyenclosedspacewitha competent officer or other person appointed specifically forthatoperation.Therewasnosuchoperationplannedinthiscase.ThefactthattheMasterhadofferedtheservicesoftheChiefOfficerwhosepresencemighthaveavoidedtheaccident,andthattheSurveyorrejectedthisoffer,didnotdetractfromtheoverridingresponsibilityoftheMaster.

ThemostimportantfindingofthecourtwasonthequestionofwhethertheMasterwasentitledtoassumethattheSurveyorwasqualifiedandcompetenttocarryoutthetasksexpectedofhimandtofollowsafetyprocedures,inparticularthoserelatingtoentryintoenclosedspaces.ThecourtheldthattheMasterwasnotinpossessionofsufficient information to make a decision about the ability oftheSurveyortodealwithanydangeroussituationthatmightarise.TheMastercouldmakenoassumptionsinthisrespect.

ThisjudgmentconfirmsthegeneraltrendofcourtseverywheretoimposemoreresponsibilityontheMaster.ShipownersandMastersshouldbeguidedaccordingly.

RecommendationsItsclearlyimpracticalfortheMastertocheckthequalificationsandtrainingofeverysurveyorwhocomeson board his vessel and satisfy himself that the surveyor is competenttocarryoutthetasksexpectedandfollowsafetyprocedures.TheMastershouldmakenoassumptionsaboutthequalificationsandtrainingofasurveyornomatterhowexperiencedasurveyormayappearorclaimtobe.Insomecaseshemaynotevenholdthequalificationclaimed.Therefore:(1) wheneverpossible,theMastershouldinsiston

surveyors being accompanied at all times by a deck or engineroomofficer,dependingonthetypeofsurvey.

(2) beforecommencementofthesurvey,thescopeofthesurveyandaplantodealwithanypotentiallydangeroussituations,suchasenteringenclosedspaces,shouldbeagreedwiththesurveyorandtheappropriatesafetyequipmentprovided.

Whilstshipownershavenocontroloverthechoiceofsurveyorsappointedbycharterers,cargointerestsandotherthirdpartiestoattendonboardtheirvessel,thesameisnottrueofsurveyorsappointedbytheP&IClub,thehull&machineryinsurersortheircorrespondents.Therefore,itisrecommended that:

(3) beforeselectingasurveycompanytoperformworkonbehalfofMembersorinsureds,correspondentsshould ascertain from that survey company not only

thequalificationsandexperienceoftheirstaffbutalsowhatongoingin-servicesafetytrainingisprovided.

(4) thesafetycultureofasurveycompanyshouldbeoneof the criteria applied by correspondents in deciding whichsurveycompanytoappoint.Itisnotsufficientmerely that surveyors have in the past undergone trainingassuchmattersneedconstantreminders.Itshouldberequestedofthecorrespondenttoascertainthisinformationfromsurveycompanies.

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Damage to cargoes of wind turbine bladesIntroductionAsaresultoftheincreasingnumberofshipmentscontainingwindturbinebladesGardhasrecentlybeeninvolvedina number of cases of alleged damage to turbine blades stowedbothonandunderdeck.Amongthemaincausesofsuchdamagesarepoorweldingofstoppers,handlingofthebladesandpoorstowage.Thepurposeofthislossprevention circular is to provide information on the risks involvedandincreasetheawarenessneededwhenhandlingturbineblades.

Causes of damage1.WeldingInarecentGardcasethebladeswerestowedbelowdeckintheholdsinstackstwoorthreebladeshigh.Atthedischargeport,thestowintheholdcollapsedcausingseveredamagetoboththecargoandthebulkhead,whichledtothevesselhavingtocallatanintermediateportforrelashing/securingofthecargo.Onlyoneweldedstopperoutofnineteenwasfoundtobestillinposition.Thesurveyorwasoftheopinionthatthecollapseofthestowwasduetopoorweldingofthestoppers.Gard’sexperienceisthatpoorweldingoperations1 carriedoutbybothship’screwandthirdpartiesappointedbythecharterers/shippersisoneofthemaincausesoflossofordamagetowindturbines.

2.Handlingdamageduringloading/discharge.Thegroupingofthebladesandthesizeofbladesvariesbetweenmanufacturers.Thebladesarepackedindifferentwaysdependingontheirdesign,somecompletelypackedwithinasteelframe(Figure1),whileothersareshippedwithframesattherootendofthebladeandaframesomewhereattheoppositeendofthegravitypoint.

However,thecargodeliveredforshipmentisoftenunpackagedandstowedeitherondeckorbelowdeckintheholds.Theturbinebladesaremadeofpolyesterandarethereforeparticularlyvulnerabletotransitdamage,althoughrepairiseconomicallyfeasibletoacertainextent.

Gardhasexperiencedthatstrongwindsduringloadinganddischarge operations is a contributing factor for handling damages.Anotherfactoriswrongdeterminationofthestructure lifting points and the centre of gravity; special attention should be given to the lifting points and the centre of gravity on the lift needs to be verified to avoid the blades becoming bent or touching other obstacles during these operations.

3.Poorstowageand/orinsufficient/impropriatesecuringOneincidentinvolvedthecollapseofastowofturbine

blades,packagedin40’ISOframesandstowed3highand5widebothondeckaswellasinthecargoholds.Inmostcasesthebladeunitswillbestowedondeckinlongitudinaldirection.Thecargoisrelativelylightweightbutvoluminousandthereforesusceptibletowindforces.Theforceofthewind,whichincreasesproportionallywiththeheightofthestow,shouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhencalculatinglashingcapacity.

Preventing damageClearlythestowagepositiononboardshipsdependslargelyonthesizeoftheholdsandthelengthofthebladestobecarried.Theheightofthestowdependsonthestrengthofthe designed frames or cases or other manner of packaging oftheblades.Thepreparationofthevesseltoproperlyload/stowandsecurethecargoisthereforeoftheutmostimportance.Thebookingnoteshouldcontaininformationinrespectoftheweight,themannerofpackaging,unitweight,dimensionsofthebladesandmaximumallowablestowageheight.

Calculationsshouldbemadepriortothecommencementofloading,basedonthevessel’srelevantcharacteristics(suchaslength,speed,GM,stowagelocationonboard),thecargo(dimensionsandweight)andthelashingmaterialtobeused(containerlashingmaterial,chains,wires,belts,etc.).Theunitshavetobehandledwithextremecareasstrongwindsduringloading/dischargingcreatedifficultieswhenliftingtheblades.

We do not here intend to discuss the various issues surroundingthecalculationofstabilityaspectswhenloadingaship,however,duringheavyweatherwithhighseasexcessiveinitialstabilitywillresultinrapidandviolentmotionwhichwillimposelargeslidingandrackingforcesonthecargocausinghighstressingonthelashings.Themastershould take into consideration the stability information obtainedfromtheship’sstabilitymanual.

RecommendationsMembers should pay particular attention to the allocation of contractualresponsibilityfortheloading,stowage,securinganddischargeoperations.Ifthememberhasresponsibilityforanyoftheseoperationstheymaywishtoconsiderappointingacompetentsurveyortoassistwithensuringthattheoperationisdoneproperly.Ifthecargoistobecarriedondeck,itisessentialthatthisisclearlystatedinthecontract,asitwillhaveasignificantimpactonthetermsandconditionsonwhichthecargoiscarried.Particularattentionshouldbepaidtotheweldingstoppersensuringthatweldingoperationshavebeenproperlyperformed.

Figure 1 - Blades packed in steel frame

Figure 2- Frames at root end


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Thevessel’sCargoSecuringManualshouldbeapprovedbytherelevantFlagStateauthorityordirectlybytherelevantClassSociety,ifsuchauthorityforapprovalhasbeentransferredtotheClassSocietybytheFlagStateAuthority.Aswindmillbladesarenotmentionedinthelistofcargoesunderthesection5.3fornon-standarisedstowageandsecuringinTheCodeofSafePracticeforCargoStowageandSecuring,2003edition,anannexdescribingthegeneralnatureforthestowageandsecuringshouldbeworkedoutandapprovedbytherelevantFlagStateauthorityorClassSociety.Vigilanceisthereforevitaltoensurethatstowage/lashingsandsecuringofthecargoisincompliancewiththeapplicableannex.

WithrespecttosoftwareproductsrelatingtolashingprogramstherelevantClassSocietymaybecontactedforadvice.Regardlessofthemannerofunitising,thestowage,lashing and securing of the units of blades should be in accordancewithTheCodeofSafePracticeforCargoStowageandSecuring,edition2003.

1WithrespecttohotworkstobeperformedonboardthevesselwewishtorefertoourpreviousLPcircularNo.06-10:Thedangerofhotworksoncargosecurings.

84



Argentina – Local customs regulations

BackgroundArgentineCustomsSearchGangshavebecomearegularpracticewhencallingatArgentineanports;especiallyforvesselscallingatmorethanoneportinArgentina.Particularproblemsarethemisdeclarationofbunkers,lubeoilandduplicatedeclarations.

The misdeclaration of bunkers and duplicate declarations occurwhenvesselsentertheCommonRoadsandthenproceedtoUpriverPorts;especiallySanNicolasandSanLorenzo.CustomsSearchGangscarryouttheinspectionsinthese ports and appear to be actively looking for incorrect declarations,whichcanleadtosubstantialfines.ThisisaparticularlycommonoccurrenceinSanNicolasPort.

ArecentGardcaseinvolvedavesselarrivingatSanLorenzo.Duringinwardclearance,theCustomsofficerreceivedfromtheMastertheShip’sStoresDeclaration,containingtwopagesofannexeswhereallrequiredarticlesincludingEngineChemicalsandLubeOilwerelisted.CustomsSearchGangofficerswereonboardduringtheloadingoperation,andfounddifferencesbetweenthequantitiesdeclaredofLubeoilandgreaseintheShip’sStoreDeclarationandthequantitiesfoundduringtheinspection.AdditionalpageswerepresentedasanannextotheShip’sStorelistcontaining detailed listings of all chemicals and grease in theEngineDepartment,butCustom’sofficersconsideredthese as a second declaration and the vessel may therefore befined.

Local Custom regulationsAccordingtolocalcustomsregulations,theMastershoulddeclaretoCustomsthecargoandalsotheship’sstoreandbunkersduringinwardclearance.ForCustomsinArgentina,theship’sstoresandbunkersfallintothesamecategoryascargoandthusanydifferencesdetectedbetweenthequantitiesdeclaredandthequantitiesfoundduringinspectionbyCustomsonboardwillgiverisetolargefinesand/orconfiscationoftheitems.

Thelawprovidestwopenaltiesforwrongdeclaration.ThefirststatesthatCustomsisentitledtoimposeafineof1to5timesthecargocif(cargo,insuranceandfreight)valueforinaccuratedeclarationsasitispresumedthatwithoutproofto the contrary that such cargo has been released into the marketwithoutthepaymentofdutiesandtaxes.

ThesecondoptionisforCustomstoconfiscatetheundeclared goods found on board and to impose a fine uptothefullcifvalueofthecargo.Whereconfiscationofthegoodsisnotpossible,Customsmaybeentitledtoimpose a fine in the amount of double the cif value of the cargo.InaccordancewiththeCustomsandNavigationlawtheportagentisjointlyliableforCustomsfinesandwhereproceedingsareinitiatedagainstthevessel,theagentmaybeatriskofbeingsubjectoffines.Therefore,whenproceedingsarebroughtbyCustoms,theportagentwillseeksecurityfromtheowners,usuallyintheformofaP&IClubLetterofUndertaking.

RecommendationsInordertoproperlyaddressthesituationandprovideapossiblesolution,Gardbelievesitisnecessarytoconsiderthefollowing:

Intheeventofshortagesatdischargeoperations,assesswhethertheyexceedthetolerancessetoutintheCustomsCode,checkwhethertheyrefertoafineandduesortoduesonly,evaluatethecostsinvolvedandthereafterdecidewhetheritispossibletopresentadefencethatrendersasuccessfuloutcomewhentakingintoconsiderationcostsandbenefits.

Onealternativeistoproceedasfollows:• Draftsurveytobecarriedoutatloading1,ifpossible

involvinglocalCustoms,andloadedquantityaccordingtodraftsurveyrecordedintheB/L.

• Allaccessestocargospacesincludinghatchcoverstobesealeduponcompletionofloading,ifpossible,(recommended)jointlywiththeCustomsauthoritiesattheloadingport.

• Beforeship’sarrivalinArgentinacollatedletterstobepassedbyagentstoCustoms/Receiversinvitingthemtocarryoutajointdraftsurveyuponarrivalandthentojointlyproceedwiththebreakingofsealsplacedattheloadport.

• Uponcompletion,“emptyholdscertificate”shouldbejointlyissuedbyallpartiesconcerned.

Intheeventofmisdeclarationofgoods;careshouldbetakenwhenissuingCustomsstatementsinconnectionwithmisdeclarationsandincorrectdeclarationsofbunkers,lubeoilandstores.Besides,athoroughverificationofthecontentsisalsoappropriate.

1Thecostofadraftsurveywillbefortheowners’accountandthelocalcorrespondentcanassistinobtainingquotationsfromsurveyors.


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Fines in Lebanon

Introduction GardhasrecentlyexperiencedthatsomevesselshavebeenleviedwithsubstantialcustomsfinesinLebanonforshortdeliveryofliquidbulkcargoes.ForcargoesdestinedforLebanontheriskofbeingfinedincreasesifadiscrepancy(shoreovership)existsatloadport,eventhoughthismaybewithinthelimitsgenerallyconsideredtobeacceptableforthemeasurementofabulkliquidcargo,andtheBillsofLadinghavebeenissuedwithaloadportshorequantityfigurewhichishigherthantheship’sfigures.Thepresenceofsuchdiscrepancieswillincreasetheriskofbeingfined.ThepurposeofthisCircularistoadviseclientsaboutthesituationintheLebanon,andhowtoavoidthesefines.

Fines leviedThe customs fines are issued for both shortlanded and overlandedcargoandtheLebaneseAuthoritieswillonlytake into consideration the findings of the inspectors appointedbytheLebaneseMinistryofEnergy&Waterswhencalculatingtheshorefigureslocally.TheLebaneseCustomsAuthoritieswillonlytakeintoconsiderationtheshoretankmeasurements(m/tinair)whendeterminingthequantityofcargodelivered.Finesatcurrentlevels,whichinsomecaseshavebeenashighasUSD50,000,arethenleviedafterdeductinganallowanceof:

• 0.7%forshortlandedgasoline• 0.5%forshortlandedJetA1• 0.4%forshortlandedgasoil• 0.3%forshortlandedfueloil• 2%foranyoverlanding

Incaseofshortlanded/overlandedcargoinexcessofthecustomsallowance,theLebaneseCustomsAuthoritieswillnotpermitanytankertodischargecargounlessaLetterofUndertakinghasbeenissuedtothembytheship’sagentspriortotheship’sarrival/discharge.Theship’slocalagents

generallyrequirecountersecuritybytheshipownerintheformofaClubLetterofUndertakingpriortotheshipsailing.Whereashortage/overageexceedingthecustomsallowanceisascertainedfollowingshoretankmeasurements,afinewillbeimposedupontheshipowneraccordingtotheapplicablerates.Thefinesareleviedaccordingtolocallawandpractice,andarecalculatedbasedonofficiallyapprovedshorefiguresatdischargeport.Therelevantcustomsfine,onceissued,willgenerallybesettledbytheagentorthecorrespondentonbehalfoftheshipownerandrecoveredunderthecountersecurityasprovided.

RecommendationsGard recommends that the Master pays particular attention to the areas and items to be checked prior to signing the BillsofLading.1Gardalsorecommendsthatshipownersshould ensure that the charter party enables them to obtain reimbursementofthesefinesfromthecharterer.ShipownersshouldalsoensurethatthecargofiguresshownintheBillsofLadingareasaccurateaspossibleandthat,ifthevessel’sfigures differ from the shore figures by more than the normal andcustomarydifference,these(i.e.thevessel’sfigures)arealsoshownintheBillsofLading.

Finallyitisalsoadvisable,atMember’sdiscretion,toappointasurveyoronOwner’sbehalftoperformshoretanks’measurementsjointlywiththeofficialsurveyorsparticularlyfortankersdischarginggasolineinordertowitnesstheprocessalthoughtheofficialsurveyorsactautonomously.

1Gard’sGuidanceonBillsofLading(chapter2)describeswhichpointsthatshouldbeconsideredinadvanceofsigningbillsoflading.

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Liquefaction of cargoes of iron ore

BackgroundMembersmaybeawareoftheproblemsthathaveariseninrecenttimeswithrespecttotheliquefactionofcargoesofironorefinesoriginatinginIndiaandloadedatIndianports.1 However,similarproblemshavebeenexperiencedinthepastwithsimilarcargoeselsewhereintheworldand,assuch,thesecargoesmustalwaysbetreatedasliabletoliquefyregardlessoftheirorigin.

Liquefactionofmineralores,resultingincargoshiftandlossofstability,hasbeenacauseofsomemajormarinecasualtiesformanydecades.However,aspateofincidentsleadingtoseveral losses in recent times involving iron ore fines loaded inIndianportshasleadtoconsiderablefocusonthelackofcompliancewiththerequirementsforsafecarriageofthiscargo.2 There have also been incidents involving cargoes of nickelorefromIndonesia,thePhilippinesandNewCaledonia.

TheSouthwestMonsoongenerallyprevailsfromJunetoSeptemberandmainlyaffectsIndia’swestcoast.TheNortheast Monsoon generally prevails from December to MarchandmainlyaffectsIndia’seastcoast.TheadventoftheSouthwestMonsoongivesusgoodreasontorevisitthissubjectthroughthiscircular.

Main causes of casualtiesThe main cause of the casualties and near misses appears to bethepoorcomplianceofsomeshipperswiththetestingandcertificationrequirementsthatarerequiredunderSOLASandtheIMSBCCode2009anddesignedtoensurethatcargoes are loaded only if the moisture content is sufficiently lowtoavoidliquefactionoccurringduringthevoyage.Indianironorefinestendtobeleftintheopenpriortoshipment,andasaconsequence,areentirelysubjecttoweatherconditionsduringthisperiod.Theproblemsrelatedtowetcargoanditsmoisturecontentparticularlyworsenduringthewetmonsoonseasons.

IncargoesloadedwithamoisturecontentinexcessoftheFlowMoisturePoint(FMP),liquefactionmayoccurunpredictablyatanytimeduringthevoyage.Somecargoeshaveliquefiedandcausedcatastrophiccargoshiftalmostimmediatelyondeparturefromtheloadport,someonlyafterseveralweeksofapparentlyuneventfulsailing.Whiletheriskofliquefactionisgreaterduringheavyweather,inhighseas,andwhileunderfullpower,therearenosafesailingconditionsforacargowithunsafemoisturecontent.Liquefactioncanoccurunpredictablyeveninrelativelycalmconditionsonavesselatanchorageorproceedingatlowspeed.

Giventhisunpredictability,itisofutmostimportancethatthelengthofvoyageandprevalentandforecastedweatherconditions do not serve to encourage the carriage on ships of cargoespronetoliquefactionwithaTransportableMoistureLimitinexcessofthatwhichisacceptedassafeforcarriage.ItisforthesereasonsthatSOLASandtheIMSBCCodeincorporate provisions intended to ensure that only cargoes withsufficientlylowinherentmoisturecontenttoavoidliquefactionareloaded.Strictadherencetotheseprovisionsistheonlysafewayofcarryingthesetypesofcargoes.

Preventive measuresBasedonpreviousexperienceswithrespecttocargoesofiron

orefinesloadedfromIndia,Membersareadvisedtoexerciseextremecautionwhenloadingsuchcargoontheirvessels.Itisimportantthatcargoesofironorefinesunsuitableforshipmentareidentifiedandrejectedbeforecomingonboardthe vessel and proper measures are taken to ensure that the cargoloadedonboardcomplieswithSOLASandmeetstherequirementsoftheIMSBCCode.Additionalsamplingwillberequiredifthecargoissubjecttosourcesofmoistureduringloading.

AlthoughtheIMSBCCodeplacestheburdenofcertificationontheshipper,inmanycasestheinformationcontainedinthecertificatesmaybeincorrect.Thismaybeduetofailuretocorrectlyanalysethesamples,oruseoffacilitiesnotgearedtoproperlytestthesamples,orthetestsamplesnotbeingproperlyrepresentativeofthecargotobeloaded.Itisthusextremelyimportantthattheshipownerandmasterascertainthatthecargoissuitableforseatransport.

Althoughexposuretomoistureisheightenedduringthemonsoonseasons,shipownersshouldensurethatthesamelevelofcautionisexercisedwithrespecttotheloadingofironorefinesirrespectiveofthetimeoftheyear.TheAssociationstrongly recommends Members to contact the local correspondentortheAssociationingoodtimetoassisttheminengagingtheservicesofacompetentandexperiencedsurveyortoactontheMember’sbehalftoassistthemasterboth before and during loading operations in order to ensure thatthecargoisloadedincompliancewithSOLASandthattheIMSBCCodeisadheredto.

Freight disputes3 AlthoughnotdirectlyconnectedwiththesafetransportofironorefinesfromIndia,thisseemslikeanopportunetimetohighlightthisissue.

WeunderstandthatsomeChineseportsdonotallowthedischargeoflowgradeironorewithoutanimportpermit.This can cause considerable delay of vessels and disputes concerning,e.g.freight,demurrageordeadfreightmayariseinrelationtoironorefromIndia.

Weunderstandthat“ChinaChamberofCommerceofMetalsMineralsandChemicalsImportersandExporters”and“ChinaIron&SteelAssociation”notifiedtheirmembersinAprilofthisyeartostopimportingironorewithanIron(Fe)contentbelow60%.ThishasmadeitdifficulttoobtainimportpermitsfromthegovernmentthroughthesetwoAssociations.

ItisthereforerecommendedthatbeforetransportingIndianironoreorironorewithlessthan60%FecontentfromothercountriesintoChina,shipownersshouldcheckwiththeCharters/Shippers/CargoReceiversiftheChinesebuyershave obtained the import permit so as to avoid unnecessary disputesoverfreight,demurrageanddetentionofvessels.SimilarcautionshouldalsobeexercisedwithrespecttospotcargoesoflowgradeironoreintoChina.

1SeeGardLossPreventionCircularNo.10-07:LoadingofironorefinesinIndia.2LiquefactionofcargoesofIronorehasalsobeenaddressedinGardNews197(Feb/April2010)“Liquefactionofunprocessedmineralores–Ironorefinesandnickelore”,byDr.MartinJonas,BrookesBell,Liverpool.ThearticledescribestheSOLAS/IMSBCCodeRegulations,CertificationofTML/moisturecontentandprinciplesofliquefaction.3Wearegratefulto“HaiTongandPartners”ofBeijing,ChinaforprovidingtheinformationwithrespecttotheFreightdisputes.


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Carriage of distillers’ Dried Grain

BackgroundGardhasreceivednumerousenquiriesfrommembersforadviceonthecarriageofdistillers’DriedGrain(DDG)ordistillers’DriedGrainwithsolubles(DDGS).Thesecargoesareoftenincorrectlydeclaredbyshippers.TheyaresometimesdeclaredasharmlessbulkcargoeswhereasatothertimestheydeclaretheseashazardouscargoesundertheprovisionsofIMO’sCodeofSafePracticeforSolidBulkCargoes(BCCode)forseedcake.Thesediscrepanciesinshippers’declarationsrequiresomeclarification.

RegulationsandrisksinvolvedShipownersareoftenadvisedtofollowIMO’sCodeofSafePracticeforSolidBulkCargoes(BCCode)forseedcake.TheclassificationsforseedcakeundertheIMSBCCodeareasfollows(IMOClass4.2,UNNumber1386SEEDCAKEcontainingvegetableoil):

• 1386(a)–Mechanicallyexpelledseeds,containingmorethan10%oilormorethan20%oilandmoisturecombined.

• 1386(b)–Solventextractionsandexpelledseeds,containingnotmorethan10%oiland,whentheamountofmoistureishigherthan10%,notmorethan20%oilandmoisturecombined.

ItisourunderstandingthattheIMOregardthepresentBCCodeandthenewInternationalMaritimeSolidBulkCargoesCode(ISMBC)asbeingbasedonthechemicalpropertiesand composition of the commodity rather than its name or methodofproduction.TheabsenceofanyspecificmentionofDDGorDDGSintheCodesisnotconsideredtobeofconsequenceasbothCodesacceptthatitisimpossibletoindividuallynameandlistallcommoditiesthatfallwithintheirambit.

DDG/DDGSisnotaseedcakeinthetruesenseofthewordsince it is not a residue produced by removing oil from thegrainbyeitherphysicalorsolventextraction.Drieddistillers’grainistheby-productofthefermentationofcornandcontainsaresidualoilcontentofmorethan10%andcombinedoilandmoisturecontentofmorethan20%.Thismaterialmayself-heatand,ifwetorcontaininganexcessiveproportionofunoxidisedoil,ignitespontaneouslyiftheproductisorbecomeswet.

RecommendationsInordertocomplywiththeBC/IMSBCstipulationsforthecarriageofcargoesunderUN1386Gard’sadviceistomonitorthecargotemperature,whichmustbebelow55degreesCelsiusorbelowtheambienttemperatureplus10degreesCelsiuswhicheveristhelower.Thereisarequirementtoregularlymeasurethetemperatureofthecargoatdifferentdepthswithinthestowandtorecordtheresults.Ifthecargotemperaturereaches55degreeCelsiusandcontinuestoincrease,ventilationshouldbestopped.Ifselfheatingcontinuesthevesselmustintroducecarbondioxideorinertgasintothecargospace.

Itistheshippersobligationtoprovideappropriateinformation about the cargo to be shipped and to establish thatthecargocanbesafelycarriedinaccordancewiththeBCCode.Thisinformationshouldbeaccompaniedbyadeclaration(anexampleofwhichcanbefoundintheISMBCCode)andshouldincludeacertificatefromapersonrecognised by the competent authority concerning the cargo’sactualwaterandmoisturecontent.

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The dangers of hot work on cargo securings

IntroductionGardhasseenaspateofincidentswhereshipfireshaveresultedfromhotworkoncargosecurings.Mostcasesinvolvedproject/heavyliftcargoes,whichoftenrequireadditionalsecuringstobefittedonthevesseltodealwiththeexpectedadditionalforces.Insomeinstances,thecargoitself,oritsframework,maybeweldeddirectlytotheship.Inarecentcaseitwasfoundthattheship’screwhadinadvertentlystartedafireinthecargoholdwhileusingoxy-acetylenecuttingequipmenttoremovesteelbracketsfromthehatchcover.Thebracketshadbeenusedtosecureaheavyliftcargoonthehatchcover.

Gard’s experienceGard’sexperienceisthatfireshaveresultedfromhotworkperformedbybothship’screwandshorecontractors.Ontheonehand,shorecontractorsmaynotbefullyfamiliarwiththefirerisksonboardashipandontheother,theship’screwmaynotbefullycompetenttooperatethehotworkequipment.Inspiteofalltheavailableformsandchecklists,proceduresarestillnotalwaysfollowed.InGard’sexperiencemostfireshaveoccurredwhenfixtureshavebeenremovedtodischargethecargoortoreturntheshiptoitspreviousstate.Manycaseshaveinvolvedhotworkondeckwithsparksandmoltenmetalfallingintocargospacesbelow.

Guidance to the crewTheship’ssafetymanagementsystemshouldprovideguidancetothecrewonhotworkoperations.Regardlessofwhoistoperformthework,thefollowingfactorsareworthbearing in mind:

Ariskassessmentshouldbeundertakenbyaship’sofficerinchargeofthehotworkoperation;identifyingallhazards,howeverremote,enablingthenecessaryprecautionstobetaken.Considerationshouldbegiventothebesttimeandplacetoperformthehotwork,preferablywhenfireriskscanbeminimisedandfireresponsecapabilitiesareoptimal.Forexample,itwouldbeprudenttodeferhotworkondeckuntilcompletionofdischargeofholdcargoalongsidetheberth,especiallyifcargoisdangerousorhighlycombustible.Ifsparksfallintoaloadedcargohold,theycanfindtheirwayintoapartofthestowwherefiredetectionandfirefightingisextremelydifficult.Oneofthecriticalpointswhichshouldnotbeoverlookedistheheatgeneratedbyhotwork.

APermittoWorkshouldbecarriedoutbytheofficerinchargeofthehotworkandreferenceshouldbemadetothe risk assessment for any additional precautions to be taken.Ahotworkpermitwilloftenberequiredbytheshoreauthoritiesandmustbeobtainedastheymayrequirespecificprecautionstobetaken.However,apermitdoesnotrelievethe ship of responsibility to take the necessary precautions onboard.

The officer in charge should be completely satisfied as to the competenceoftheperson(s)performingthehotworkandusingtheequipment–anumberoffireshavebeencausedbyholescutthroughtoadjacentspaces.Atoolboxmeetingledbytheofficerinchargeandinvolvingallindividualswitharoleinthehotworkoperationshouldbeheldbeforetheworkiscommenced.Onlyoncetheofficerissatisfiedthatallparties,particularlynon-crewmembers,understandthehazards,precautionsandemergencyproceduresinvolved

shouldthePermittoWorkbesignedoffbyallparticipants.

Intermsofprecautionstobetaken,particularattentionshouldbepaidtothefollowing:1

1. Thefirehazardsintheimmediatevicinityoradjacentspaces,especiallythosenotimmediatelyapparent,e.g.combustiblegases/vapours.

2. Hotworkshouldbeprohibitedinthevicinityoftanksorventstotankscontainingflammableliquids/residues,unlesscompletelygasfreed.

3. Ifcombustiblematerialcannotberemovedfromthecargobeingsecured,theimmediatevicinityoradjacentspaces,itshouldbeshielded,preferablywithfireretardantmaterial.

4. Theneedforaconstantfirewatchinthevicinityoftheworkandinalladjacentspaces,bearinginmindthatsparks can travel some distance and fall into openings whichcannotbeclosed.Screensshouldbeusedtoconfinesparkspray.Agenerousapplicationofwaterwillbeneededtocooldownthesurfaces/moltenmetal.Havingagoodfirewatchmeansthattheearlyapplicationofwateronthehotsparks/slag/surfacescanpreventthefirespreading.

5. Theneedtocontinuouslysupervisetheindividualsperformingthehotworktoensurethattheydonotundertakeanyhotworkoutsidethepermittedareawhereprecautionsmaynotyetbeinplace.Ifsupervisionisinterruptedtheworksshouldbesuspended.

6. Theneedforgoodcommunicationbetweenthefirewatchandtheofficerincharge.

7. Theimmediatereadinessoffirefightingappliances,suchasextinguishersandchargedhoseswhichshouldbelaidout,andbepositionedclosetohotworkandwithineasyreachforthoseonfirewatch,eveninadjacentspaces.

8. Firedetection,alarmsystemsandfixedfirefightingsystemsmusthaveundergonerecenttesting.

9. Theneedtomaintainafirewatchforatleasttwohoursafterthehotworkhasbeencompleted.

RecommendationsAriskassessmentshouldbeundertakenbyaship’sofficerinchargeofthehotworkoperation.TheMastershouldneverallowweldingincargocompartmentswherecargoisalreadyloadedwithoutallnecessaryprecautionshavingbeentaken and the operation being continuously monitored by a responsibleandcompetentperson.Followingcompletionoftheweldingwork,afirewatchmustbemaintainedtomonitorthesituationandpreventanysubsequentoutbreakoffire.

Charterersaswellasownersneedtobeawareofthedangersofhotwork,asthecharterermaybecontractuallyresponsibleforstowage/securingofthecargounderthecharterparty.

1Theguidelinestothecrewaregeneralyetusefulandshouldnotinanywayconflictwithcompanyproceduresorpolicy.


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Loading of hot coal at Maputo, Mozambique

Gard has recently been advised by our Durban correspondentsofcoalinbulkbeingloadedwithapparentlyhightemperaturesattheMatolaCoalTerminalinMaputo,Mozambique.Itappearsthatinthecourseofloadingthecoal,thecargoinoneholdspontaneouslycombusted.Theship’screwfortunatelydetectedthesmoulderingofthecargobeforeloadingwascompletedandallcargowassubsequentlydischargedfromthevessel.Temperaturesfarinexcessof55CwhichisIMO’slimitforsafecarriage,wererecordedduringdischarge.

Furthermore,weareadvisedbyourcorrespondentsthatduringthecourseoftheirinvestigationsitwasnoticedthatatleastoneshoredumpsitewasonfirewithflamesclearlyvisible and they noted that prior to this incident several other shoredumpsiteshadbeenobservedtobesmouldering.

This is the first such reported incident at this terminal for atleast5years,anditappearsthislatestincidentmaybeassociatedwithunseasonablyhighwindscombinedwithseveralmonthsstorageofthecargoattheterminal.

Itisrecommendedthat,inadditiontoensuringthatalltherequirementssetoutintheCodeofsafepracticeforsolidbulkcargoes(BCCode)arefollowed,theship’screwshouldbe particularly vigilant during loading of coal in bulk at

Maputo.Lastbutnotleastwestressthatshipownersmustobtaininformationfromtheshippersenablingthecrewtoproperlycareforthecargoduringthevoyage.TheBCcodeemphasisesthatpriortoloading,theshippers/hisagentshouldprovidethevesselwiththecharacteristicsofthecargoinwritingtogetherwithguidelinesastothesafehandling/loading/transportofthecargo.Asaminimumrequirement,specificationsformoisture/sulphurcontentandsizeshouldbesubmitted,especiallywherethecargomaybesubjecttoemittingmethaneorself-heating.

WearegratefultoMessrs.P&IAssociatesPty.Ltd,Durbanfortheaboveinformation.

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Loading of Iron Ore Fines in India

Gard has recently been advised of several serious incidents involvingironorefinesloadedinIndia.Eventhoughthemainfocusofthiscircularisironorefines,theadviceprovidedappliestoanytypeoffinelydividedand/orpowderedcargosubjecttoliquefaction.

Theproblemappearstobeliquefactionoffinelypowderedironoreduetohighmoisturecontent.Inalloftheincidents,thecargoshiftedandthevessels’stabilityandsafetywasseverelycompromisedasaconsequenceofliquefaction.Itis believed that the cargo had been left in the open air and thereforeexposedtomonsoonshowerspriortoloading.

AccordingtotheSOLAS1974Convention,theshippersareobliged to provide valid certificates declaring the moisture contentaswellasthetransportablemoisturelimit(TML)ofanytypeofcargobeingabletoliquefy.Itisimperativethatthesetwofiguresareidentifiedatthetimeofloading,especiallyifthecargoisknowntohavebeenleftoutintheopenpriortoloading.ThemoisturecontentshouldnotexceedtheTML.Otherwisetheresultmaybeliquefactionandshiftingofcargo.

RecommendationGardrecommendsthatMastersexerciseextremecautionwhenreceivinganykindoffinelydividedand/orpowderedcargobeingabletoliquefy,topreventshiftingofcargowithinthehold.Mastersshouldaccordinglyobtainvalidcertificatesfromshippers,statingthemoisturecontentandtheTMLbeforeallowingthecargoonboard.Iftherequiredinformationisunavailable,andtheMasterandcrewexperiencepressuretopermitloadingofthecargo,Gardor our local correspondents should be contacted for further adviceandassistance.


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Export of scrap metal from Russia

FromtimetotimeGardexperiencesproblemsinconnectionwithexportsalesofscrapmetalfromRussia.ThewarinNorthCaucasus(Chechnya)hasforsometimebeenasourceofscrapmetal.Tonsofmilitarysteelthereforearriveattheseaportsmixedwithstandard/commercialscrap.

Ithasproveddifficulttorecognisemilitarypartsintheheaps

ofscrapintendedforloadingontoships.Inaddition,otherhazardsaremixedinwiththemetalscrapsuchaswireballs,tinsheetsandmetalcuttings/shavings/turnings,withthelatteralsobeingsubjecttoself-ignition.

ExportscrapisusuallycoveredbysafetydeclarationsandqualitycertificateswithreferencetoRussianStateStandard3A.TheMastersshouldinsistonbeingprovidedwiththedescriptionanddimensionsofthepiecestobeloaded.Theyshouldalsoinstructthecrewastothetypesofcargowhichcanbeloadedandwhichcargomustberejected.

WealsorefertoGardNews159,September/November2000–Warning:ScrapmetalfromRussia.Gard’sNovorossiyskcorrespondents,MessrsNostra,issuedtheinitialwarningthatleduptothearticle.

WerepeatbelowtherecommendationssetoutinGardNews159.(1)Requestshippers(forwarders)toprovideadetaileddescriptionofthescraptobeloaded.(2)Arrangea24-hourwatchneartheholdsinordertocheckthecargoineachload.(3)Immediatelystoploadingincaseanysuspiciousmilitarypartsornon-standardpiecesarenoticed.(4)Sendaletterofprotesttoallpartiesconcerned(inthefirstinstancetothelocalHarbourMasterwhoisresponsiblefortheship’ssafety)againstloadingdangerous/impropercargo.(5)Requestthatanydangerouspiecesofcargoberemovedfromtheship’sholds.

TheaboveinformationwaskindlyprovidedbyGard’sSt.Petersburgcorrespondents,Messrs.PandiServicesEast.


Steel coils from China contaminated by asbestosGardhasrecentlybeenadvisedbyourAntwerpcorrespondentsofsteelcargoesfromChinaallegedlycontaminatedbyasbestos.WeunderstandthatotherP&IClubshavealsobeennotifiedofsimilarcases.TheproblemappearstobemostlyassociatedwithsteelcoilsshippedfromBayuquaninChina.InthecaseinwhichGardisinvolved,wewereinformedbyourAntwerpcorrespondents that charterers had specifically asked for a surveytobecarriedoutuponarrivalatAntwerpofunpackedhotrolledcoils.

The coils had been shipped on board three different vessels fromBayuquantoAntwerpandarereportedlycontaminatedbyasbestos.Theappointedsurveyorattributedthecontaminationof the coils to being put on fire resistant material during the productionprocesswhilestillhot.Thisfireresistantmaterial,however,containsasbestosfibres,causingcontaminationofthehotrolledcoils.Thesurveyorinvolvedinthisparticularcaseisofthe opinion that the contamination may have been visible at the timeofloading.

Discussionsareongoingwhetherthissortofcontaminationof hot coils may have been visible at the time of loading and

whether,accordingly,therelevantbillsofladingshouldhavebeenproperlyclaused.Whatisclearisthatsubstantialtimeand money has had to be spent on cleaning each coil prior to discharge.

Wehavebeenadvisedthatinoneincident,anexpertwasappointedonbehalfofthecarrierduringloadinginChinaandhisinterventionresultedinmanycoilsbeingrejectedduetocontaminationofasbestos.Informationreceivedsuggeststhatunsuccessfulattemptsweremadetoremovetheasbestosbycleaningwithabrush.Moreimportantly,weunderstandthattheshippers intend to load these same coils aboard a substitute or latervessel.

RecommendationGardrecommendsthatMembersandclientsexerciseextracautionwhenfixingavesseltoloadhotrolledsteelcoilsinChina.ToprovidetheMemberwiththebestpossibleprotection,westronglyrecommendthatalocalexpertisappointedtoinspectthecargouponloadingofhotrolledcoilsinChinaandthatMembersascertainthepre-shipmenthistoryofthecoils.

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Update: Container losses from vessels using fully automatic container locksBackgroundAsaresultofseveralcontainerlossesfromlargecontainershipsinthepastsixmonths,theshippingindustryhastakentheissueoffullyautomaticcontainerlocks(FATs)veryseriously.VariousinvestigationsofthepotentialproblemswithlashingarrangementsinvolvingFATshavebeeninitiatedtoclarifywhatmeasuresmaybenecessarytoavoidfuturelosses.Thiscircularhighlightssomeofthecurrentactivitiesinthisrespectintheindustry.

Gard’s Member surveyAsapartofourinvestigationofthecontainerlosses,Gardconductedasurveyamongstsomeofitsmembers.Thesurveyhasrevealedthatthelossesexperiencedbythe members of Gard seem to be limited to one type of FATsavailableinthemarket.OurrecommendationinLossPreventionCircularNo.05-06tocontacttherespectivesupplier of such locks to seek clarification of any limitations is thereforestillvalid.IthasbeensuggestedtoholdameetingofInternationalGroup’s“ShipTechnicalCommittee”onthisissue.Itisexpectedthatthismeetingwilltakeplacethisautumn,whenmoreevidenceisavailablefromthepartiesmentionedbelow.Theintentionistoalsoinvitetheclassificationsocietiestoattendthismeeting.

Actions by Classification societiesInaletterfromGermanischerLloyddated16March2006,thepotentialproblemwashighlightedandfuturelimitationsintheuseofFATswerediscussed.However,intheirletterof27April2006,GermanischerLloydclarifiedtheircurrentposition: The letter states that the approved container stowageplans,withtheirrespectivestowagesystems,continue to be valid unconditionally and that a general and type independent recommendation for the substitution of FATsshouldnotbeissued.GL’stestsalsoconfirmedthatFATswithaflangeandsufficientlydimensionedlockingnoseobtainedgoodresults.Accordingtothepress,GLhasat a recent seminar also pointed to other factors such as theplacementofheavycontainers,inadequatecontainerlashings and the age of the containers as potential causes fortherecentlosses.Noneoftheotherclassificationsocietieshavesofarconcludedinthisissue.

Actions by the industryOwners,suppliers,authoritiesandresearchersarejoiningforcesinatwoyearprojectinvestigatinglashingloadstoimprovesafetyandefficiencyofcontainer,Ro-Roandheavylifttransportation.TheJointIndustryProject,namedLashing@Sea,wasinitiatedbytheMaritimeResearchInstituteNetherlands(MARIN).Theprojectisaimingtoimprovethesafetyandefficiencyoflashings.Thiswillbeachieved by investigating the mechanisms of lashing loads andidentifyingthekeyparameters.FATswillbeoneofmanytechnologiesinvestigatedbythisprojectgroup.

Actions by the manufacturersOneofthemajormanufacturersoflashingequipmenthaschosentorecalltheirFATsfromthemarket.Initspressrelease,thismanufacturerstatedthattheydidthisasaprecaution despite the fact that they had not received reportsofequipmentfailure.WehavebeeninformedthatatleastonemajormanufacturercontinuestosellFATssubsequenttoadditionaltestingandapprovalbyGermanischerLloyd.Accordingtothemanufacturer,nocontainer losses have been reported due to using their type ofFAT.

No implication on the P&I coverThe use of fully automatic container locks does not have anyimplicationonthescopeofP&Icover,aslongasthelocksusedareclassapprovedandthecontainerstowagecomplieswithapplicableregulations.

RecommendationGardisstilloftheopinionthatitisprudentforshipownersto seek further information from the approving classification societyandcontainerlockmanufacturer/supplierconcerningthesuitabilityandconditionsforuseofthespecifictype(s)offullyautomaticcontainerlock(s)thatarebeingusedorareintendedtobeusedonboardtheirships,inordertominimisetheriskoffuturelosses.


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Recent container losses from vessels using automatic locks

BackgroundAlargecontainervesselinsuredwithGardhasrecentlyexperiencedaseriouslossofcontainers.Whilstinvestigatingtheincidentwelearnedofsimilareventswithseveralothernew,largevesselscoveredbyotherP&Iclubs.Oneofthecommon factors of all these incidents seems to be that the vessels have all been using fully automatic container locks betweenthecontainercornercastings.Suchlocksappeartohavebeenintroducedin2004,mainlyonboardnew,modernvessels. Investigationsarestillongoing,butitseemsclearthatthistypeoflock,havingholdingpoweronlybyitsgeometricalshape,mayundercertaincircumstancesjumpoutofthecornercastings.Thebestevidenceisthatthisishappeningduring heavy pitching movements of the ship and that the containersmaythereafterbelostwhenthevesselisrolling.Inmostcasesthecontainershavebeenlostfromtheaftdeck.

RecommendationWeexpectthattheclasssocietiesinvolvedwillinvestigatetheseevents,butuntilasolutionhasbeenfound,werecommend our Members and clients to take note of the problemandlearnfromtheunfortunateexperiencesalreadymade.

Membersandclientswithvesselsusingfullyautomaticcontainer locks are recommended to contact their class societiesaswellasthemanufacturerofthecontainerlockstoobtaintheirrecommendationsastofurtheractions.

Gardhasbeeninformedofownerswhohavealreadytakensubstantialmeasurestorectifythissituation,includingreplacinglocks,applyinglimitationswhereheavyweatherisexpectedandevenreducingtheheightofthecontainerstacks.

OwnersmaycontactGardwithanyqueriesrelatedtotheissueandanyinformationtheownersareabletoprovidewillbeofconsiderableinterest.Responsesbye-mailshouldbedirectedtoourlosspreventionmanagertrygve.nokleby@gard.no

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Series of recent cases highlights dangers of liquefying Chinese fluorspar IntroductionGardhasbeenmadeawareofthreecasualtieswhichhaveoccurred in the past three months involving vessels loaded withcargoesofChinesefluorsparcarriedfromHongKong.Eachofthethreevesselsdevelopedaseverelistduetowhatispossiblyaliquefactionofthecargo.Inatleastoneofthesecargoes,freewaterdevelopedonthecargosurfaceduringcarriage.Onlyoneofthevesselswasabletobetakensafelyintothenearestport.Oftheothertwovessels;onecapsizedandtheotherwasabandonedandwaslaterfoundgrounded.DuetotheprevalenceoftheinstancesinashortperiodoftimeMembersandClientsarerecommendedtopay special attention to the dangers of carrying this type of cargo.

TheIMOCodeofsafepracticeforsolidbulkcargoes(BCCode),Sections7and8andAppendixAadvisesthatmineralcargoeswhichcontainbothmoistureandaproportionoffineparticlescanundergoliquefactionduringoceantransportifshippedaboveacriticalmoisturepoint.ThelistofcargoesinAppendixAoftheBulkCodeisnotexhaustive,andsomeformsoffluorsparareknowntoliquefyandtherebyimpairingthevessel’sstability.

Loss preventionTopreventhazardousliquefactionoccurring,theIMOBulkCoderequirestheflowpropertiesofsubjectcargoestobetestedandsubsequentlycertifiedbyshipperspriortoloading.CargoesshouldnotbeloadediftheirmoisturecontentexceedsthecertifiedTransportableMoistureLimit(TML).Theloadingconditionsandmethodofloadingcanhave serious impact on the moisture level and these types of cargoesshouldnotbeloadedifwaterisobservedescapingfromthecargoduringloading.

Formoreinformationaboutshiftingandliquefactionofsolidbulkcargoespleaseseethearticle“Shiftingofsolidbulkcargoes”publishedinGardNews150,availableatwww.gard.no

WearegratefultoMessrs.RichardsButler,HongKongforprovidingtheinitialinformationontheabovetopic.


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The dangers of carrying Direct Reduced Iron (DRI)

SincetheInternationalGroupofP&IClubs’CircularonDirectReducedIronpublishedin1982,thedangersofDRIhavesomewhatdisappearedfromthelimelight.GardP&Ihasrecentlybeeninvolvedinseveralcases,whichhave served as a stark reminder of the dangers involved in carryingthishazardousbulkcargo.

Types of DRIDRIistherawmaterialusedintheproductionofsteelinelectricarcfurnaces,whichformthemajorityofthesteelproductionfacilitiesworldwide.DRIcanbesplitintotwodistinctsub-groups;coldmouldedpelletsorhotmouldedbriquettes.TheIMOBulkCargo(BC)Codedealwiththesetwotypesseparately.HotmouldedDRIbriquettesareamorerefinedproduct,formedbythefurtherprocessingofcoldmouldedpellets.BothformsofDRIareconsideredhazardouswhencarriedinbulkandspecificcarriagerequirementsarelistedintheBCCode.

DRI properties and dangersDRIineitherformissimilartoothersteelstructuresinitssusceptibilitytorust(re-oxidise)inthepresenceofoxygen.Therateofoxidisationisdependant,toagreaterorlesserdegree,onthemoisturecontentoftheDRIandtheatmosphereinwhichtheDRIiscarried.Theoxidisationprocessgeneratesheat,whichinbulkcargoesofDRIcanbesignificant.Theprocessofoxidationisacceleratedinthe presence of moisture and is substantially increased if thewatercontainsdissolvedchlorides,asisthecasewithseawater.Thesponge-likestructureofDRIalsoinhibitsthedissipationofheatandDRIinbulkcanthereforeheatrapidlyinisolatedpockets.

Hotironwhenincontactwithwatercancauseachemicalreactionresultingintheproductionofhydrogen,whichishighlyexplosiveinthecorrectquantities.ThegenerationofhydrogenisthemostdangerouspropertyofDRIandhasledtoseveralfatalexplosions.Insomemanufacturingprocesses,theDRIundergoesoneoftwoprocessescalledeither‘passivation’,wherebythebriquettesarecoatedwithsodiumsilicateor‘ageing’inwhichthebriquettesareallowedtoformanironoxidecoating.Theseprocessesareintendedtoreduceorinhibittheoxidationprocessduringtransit.ThisadditionalprocessisdealtwithspecificallyintheBCCode.

Carriage RequirementsCarriagerequirementsaresetoutintheIMOBCCode.ReferenceshouldalsobemadetothelatestpublishedadviceandcarriagerequirementsapprovedbythelocalCompetentAuthorityandissuedbytheshipper.TheBCCoderecommendsthattheshippersshouldprovidespecificinstructionsforthecarriageofDRI,andtheseshouldeitherbe:

1. Thatthecargospacesbemaintainedinaninertcondition,withtheatmospherecontaininglessthan5percentoxygen.Thehydrogencontentofthecargospaces should be maintained at less than 1 per cent byvolume,OR

2. ThattheDRIismanufacturedortreatedwithanoxidationinhibitingprocesstothesatisfactionoftheCompetentAuthority.

Iftheatmosphereisinerted,theinertingagentmustbenitrogen.Carbondioxideshouldnotbeused,primarilybecauseitcanproducecarbonmonoxide,whichisbothtoxicandflammable.Evenonshortseavoyagesitisrecommendedthatthecargobefullyinerted.Passivationhasbeenshowntoeffectivelyreduceoxidation,fromfreshwatercontamination,intheshortterm,but,overtime,theeffectiveprotectionisreduced.Itshouldbenotedthatthereis little protection from the rapid reactions caused by the ingressofsaltwaterintothecargospaces.ItisthereforerecommendedthatthecarriageofDRIshouldalwaysbeundertakenunderanitrogenblanket.Theship’screwshould carry out effective monitoring of the atmosphere in thecargospaces.Recordsshouldbekeptofthelevelsofhydrogenandoxygenineachcargospace.

The condition of the cargo should be monitored during loading.Cargothatishotordampshouldnotbeloaded.Itisalsorecommendedthatthetemperatureofthecargoduringloadingshouldbemonitored.Ifthecargotemperatureisabovetheambienttemperature,adviceshouldbeobtainedfromthelocalCompetentAuthority.However,cargowithatemperatureinexcessof65oCshouldneverbeloaded.Itisusualfortemperaturethermocouplestobeplacedwithinthecargoholdsduringloadingforthemonitoringofcargotemperaturesduringcarriage.Itis important that these thermocouples are tested prior to beingpositionedwithinthecargoandtheirlocationwithinthecargorecorded.

Itisalsorecommendedthatthecargoshouldbeproperlytrimmed in order to reduce the amount of surface area exposedtotheatmosphere.Trimmingalsohelpsreducethe“funnel” effect by reducing the amount of void spaces in the cargowherehotgasescanmoveupwardswhiledrawinginfreshair.

IfthevesselhasanydoubtsaboutanyparticularDRIloadingit is recommended that independent advice be obtained fromanexpert.TheAssociationisonlytoohappytoassistinthisregard,andinanyotherwayitcan.

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Manifold monitoring whilst loading liquid cargoesIntroductionTankersandterminalsareexposedtonumerouscontrolswiththeaimofensuringincident-freevisitstoportsbyshipsengaged in the transport of cargoes dangerous to both healthandenvironment.Nonetheless,avoidableincidentscontinuetooccur.Thefollowingincidentillustratestheneedforcarefulplanningandmonitoringofalloperationsinport.Complacencyisnotacceptableandcouldveryeasilyleadtolossofbothlifeandproperty.

Course of eventsRecentlyachemicaltankerwasloadingacargoofethylalcoholinaBrazilianport.Thevesselalsotookbunkersinthisport.Theloadingofbunkersfromabargeandloadingofcargofromtheshoreterminaltookplacesimultaneously.Bunkerswereloadedwithoutincident.However,asparkfromthefunnelofthetug,whichwasstandingbytoassistthebunkerbargeinmanoeuvring,causedafireatthevessel’scargomanifold.Thishappenedduetocollectionofethyl alcohol in the manifold drip tray from a leaking loading hose.

Fortunatelythevessel’screwdealtwiththefirequickly,but,unwisely,loadingwasre-startedassoonasthefirewasputout,apparentlywiththeblessingoftheterminal,throughthesameleakinghoseandwithoutcheckingforhotspots.Theresultwasthatthepresenceofahotspotcausedre-ignitionoftheethylalcoholinthemanifold.Onceagain,theship’screwswiftlyextinguishedthefire.

The second incident resulted in the terminal and local fire brigaderequiringthatalldamagedhosesbereplacedandthatalltracesofcargoberemovedfromthediptray.Thiswasfollowedbyajointinspectionofthevesselbytheterminal and local fire brigade prior to the vessel being allowedtoresumecargooperations.Duringthisperiodofrectificationandinspection,avesseldischarginggasataneighbouringberthwasalsorequiredtosuspendcargooperations.

Lessons learnedAsmentionedpreviously,thisincidentwasclearlyavoidable.Itismostsurprisingthattheloadingofachemicalcargowasallowedthroughaleakinghose.Somefundamentallessonsto be learned from this case are:

1. Itiscommonpracticeandarequirementbymost,ifnotall,tankercompaniesandterminalsthatacheckis carried out on commencement of loading to ensure that,amongstotherthings,noleaksarepresentinthetransferofcargo.Thispracticeshouldalwaysbefollowed.

2. Anyleaksmustberectifiedpriortoresumptionofcargooperations.Unfortunately,thisisasimplerulethatwasignoredinthecaseinquestion.

3. Inaddition,themanifoldmustbecontinuouslymonitored.Whatismostsurprising,though,isthefactthatinthepresentcaseloadingwasallowedtoresumethrough a leaking hose after the occurrence of the first fire.

Cargomanifoldanddrippans.

4. Safetyconsiderationsneedtobetakenintoaccountforloadingofbunkersconcurrentwiththeloadingofcargo.Many,withgoodreason,frownuponthispractice.Thepresence of the bunker barge produces additional risks that may not be readily appreciated or may simply be beyond the control of the relatively limited manning requirementsofpresenttimes.

5. Loadingofbunkersduringcargooperationsmaybeacceptablewhenloadingfromashoretank,orifthebunker barge is occupying a berth at the terminal and a shorepipelineisutilisedforthetransfer.Thisremovesthe additional risks present due to the presence of the bargealongsidethevessel.Ofcourse,itstillrequirestwooperationstobeefficientlymonitoredatthesametime.Forobviousreasons,itisadvisabletoprohibitsimultaneousbunkeringandcargooperations,wherethenatureofthecargorequiresmaindeckscupperstobekeptopenduringcargooperations.Thisnormallyappliestogastankers.

Fortunately,intheabove-mentionedcasethevesselwasluckytoescapewithjustfiredamagetosomecargohoses,scorching of main deck paint in the vicinity of the fire and 13hourslostinrectifyingthesituation.Thingscouldhavebeenmuchworseas,atthetimeofthefires,thevesselhadonboardparcelssuchasEthylAlcohol,Voranol,CarbonTetrachloride,PolyethyleneglycolUSP,andEthyleneDichloride(EDC).


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LOI, LOU and BLG – Confused?

BackgroundWhendealingwithliabilityclaimsinshippingoneoftencomeacrossterminologyunfamiliartothosenotworkingwithclaimsonaregularbasis.

Theaboveabbreviationsaretypicalexamplesoftencausingconfusionandmisunderstandings.Theyareoftenregardedasnamesfordocumentsneededwhenthingsgowrong,butmanyhavenoideawhattheycontainorwhicheffecttheyhave.Itisalsooftenthecasethatthecontentofsuchdocumentscanbelegalisticanddetailed.

ThisCircularexplainswhatthesedocumentsareforandthekindofcontenttheyshouldcontaininordertoprotectone’sinterests.

LOI – Letter of IndemnityWhenonepartywantstheothertodeviatefromanormalorregulatedpractice,itmaybenecessarytogiveanindemnity.ALetterofIndemnityisadocumentwhichpurportstogiveapartyarightofrecoveryagainsttheLOIissuerforanyliabilities,losses,costsorexpensesarisingfromfollowingthespecificrequests/orderscontainedwithintheLOI.

Atypicalshippingexampleisacharterer’sordertoacarriertodischargecargoatadischargeportwithoutthereceiverprovidinganoriginalbillofladinginexchangeforthegoodsbeingdeliveredtohim.Inthesecircumstances,thecarrier’sconsequentialliabilityforfollowingsuchanorderisexcludedfromitsP&Iinsurance.TheInternationalGroupofP&IClubshas,however,draftedastandardformLOI,underwhichanindemnityiscreatedinfavourofthecarrier.TheissueofinsurancecoverremainsunchangedbuttheLOIgivesthecarrieranexpressrightofrecourseagainstthecharterer.

ALetterofIndemnityshouldnormallyinclude:-reasonforissuewithadescriptionofthecircumstances,-indemnityforalistofspecificrisks,-agreementtoprovidefundstodefendclaims,-agreementtoprovidesecurityifvesselorassetsarearrested,-fulllistofpartiesjointlyliableundertheLOI,-lawandjurisdictionoftheLOI.

ItisimportanttorememberthatLOIsarenotafix-allsolutionforanykindofproblem.Equallyimportant,someLOIsareunenforceableatlaw,forexampleanLOIreceived in return for issuing a clean on board bill of lading despitethefactthatthedocumentwasknowntocontainanincorrectdescriptionofthecargooritsquantityoritscondition.Furthermore,anyLOIisonlyasgoodasthepartyprovidingit.Hence,acceptinganLOIdoesmeanariskofincurringanuninsuredloss.

LOU – Letter of UndertakingWhiletheLOIisadocumentwherebytheproviderpromisesthe receiver of it to reimburse his financial loss for carrying outcertainactions,aLetterofUndertakingisadocumentwherebytheproviderpromisesthereceiverofittoreimburse financial loss incurred as a result of a shipping incident.

AnLOUisaguaranteeoftenissuedbyaP&IClubonbehalfofitsMembertoaclaimantwhoallegedlyhassuffereda

lossforwhichtheMemberisliableandcoveredunderitsP&Iinsurance.Inmostcases,aClubLOUisissuedonthethreatofarrestordetentionofavessel.ThetermsofaClubLOUwillincludethat,onceacceptedbythereceiverassecurityforhisclaim,hemustreleasetheshipfromarrestordetentionandpromisenottore-arresttheshiportakeanyaction against other assets to obtain security for the same claim.

ThemainadvantagesofaClubLOUfromtheMember’sandClub’sperspectivelieinitseaseofissueandflexibilityregardingcontent.Onceasecuritydemandisputforward,aClubLOUcanbeissuedassoonitstermshavebeenagreed,formulatedandsigned,thenfaxedore-mailedaroundtheglobeinminutes.ThemainadvantageofaClubLOUfromtheclaimant’sperspectiveisthatheobtainsarighttorecoverhisclaimdirectlyfromtheClub.ItisimportantthataClubLOUbalancestherespectiveinterests,i.e.securingtheclaimwithoutjeopardizingthedefendant’srightsanddefences.

AClubLOUshouldnormallyinclude:-identityofparties,-detailsoftheclaim,-reasonforissue,-referencetothecontractorcircumstancesunderwhichitisgiven,-maximumamountofsecurity,-triggersforpayment,-provisionpreservingMember’srightsanddefences,-lawandjurisdictionfortheclaimandforanyenforcementoftheLOU.

Normally,thetriggerforpaymentunderaClubLOUisasettlementagreementbetweenthepartiesorafinalandenforceablecourtjudgmentorarbitrationaward.

Importantlimitationstokeepinmind:P&IClubshavenoobligationtoprovideLOUs,theyarepurelydiscretionary;ClubLOUsmaynotbeacceptedinsomejurisdictionsorbytheclaimant;andtheclaimmaybeoutsideP&Icover.

BLG – Bank Letter of GuaranteeBankGuaranteeshavealongtraditionforsecuringclaims.Aswithanyformofsecurity,itisimportantthatthetermsincludedareinlinewithourrecommendationsforClubLOUs.DuetothecostsandtimeinvolvedinissuingBankGuarantees,especiallywheremorethanonebankisinvolved,therearemanyadvantagesinhavingaClubLOUissuedratherthanaBankGuaranteewherepossible.Itshould also be remembered that banks are not immune from financialfailureandthataBankGuaranteeisnotnecessarily“better”security.

SeeGardNewsissues162and155forfurtherinformation.

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Measures to prevent drug smugglingGeneralDrug smuggling constitutes a very serious crime almost anywhereintheworld.Affectedpartiescanexpectextensiveinvestigations,interrogation,detentionandpossiblycriminalprosecution,convictionandimprisonment.Moreover,assetsmaybeseizedassecurityforheftyfinesandpenaltiesandultimatelyconfiscatedand/orsold.

Gard has recently seen an increase in the number of reported drug detection incidents involving merchant ships callingatportsinVenezuela,ColombiaandEcuador,aswellastheCaribbean.Itisbelievedthatthelatterisincreasinglybeingusedasastagingpostfordrugtrafficking,withnoshortage of volunteers due to the decline in traditional industries.ItissuspectedthatthedrugswereboundfortheUS,Europeand/orRussia.ThepurposeofthisCircularistoalertMembersandClientstotherisks,andsuggestmeasurestopreventsimilarincidentsoccurring.

Measures to prevent drug smuggling The general aim in all instances is to prevent the illegal substances from coming on board the vessel in the first place.Thefollowingaresomegeneralguidelinesforprecautionarymeasurestobetakenbeforeentryintoport,whilstinportandafterdeparture.

Before entry• Crewgoingashoreshouldbeinformedoftheriskthat

possible drug traffickers may seek to befriend them in ordertoachievetheirco-operationtosmuggledrugs.Thecrewmustunderstandthat,apartfromviolatingcompanypolicy,thiscouldbepotentiallydangerousforthemselves,theirfamilies,fellowcrewmembersetc.Moreover,localauthoritiesarelikelytoactforcefullyagainstanycrewmemberwhoisconsideredtobeassociatedwithdrugtraffickers.

• Warningpostersdescribingtherisksinvolvedinthecarriage of drugs should be clearly displayed at the pointoftheentry/exittothevesselandwithintheaccommodationareas.

• Theshipshouldkeepaccuraterecordsofallactivitiesobservedandtheactionstakenbylocalauthorities,stevedoresandothershore-basedpersonnelandcrewbeforeentryintoport,duringthestayandimmediatelyafterdeparture.

Whilst in port or at anchor • Themasterandcrewmusttakeallpossibleprecautions

to limit access to the vessel and monitor the surrounding areaadjacenttothevesselwhilstinport.Individualswhohavenolegitimaterequirementforbeingonboardmustnotbeallowedonboard.Thecrewshouldkeepalogatthepointofentry/exit,andtheMasterorChiefOfficershouldbeinformedifthewatchisuncertainastowhetheranindividualhaslegitimatereasonstobeonboard.

• Apermanentwatchmanshouldbepresentinareaswherestevedoresorrepairtechniciansareworkingonboardtheship.Duringhoursofdarknessallareasshouldbewelllitinordertofacilitatevisualmonitoringofactivities.AnysuspiciousactivitiesconductedbythirdpartiesonboardshouldbereportedtotheMaster.Attentionshouldbe paid to small boats approaching the ship and any

suspiciousactivityinthevicinityoftheshipwhichmaywarrantfurtherinvestigation.Theuseofasearchlightduringthehoursofdarknessshouldbeconsidered.

• Thecrewshouldperformregularshipboardinspectionsthroughoutthedurationoftheportcall.Inportsparticularlypronetodrugsmuggling,itshouldbeconsidered to employ additional security guards from anapprovedsupplier.Whenbroken/missingsealsforcompartments,lockers,containersetc.,arediscoveredan investigation should be conducted and if nothing is foundthesealsshouldbereplacedbythecrew.Arecordshouldbemadeinthelogbooktogetherwithanoteoftheoutcomeoftheinvestigation/searchandtherelevantsealnumbers.

• Oncecargooperationsarecompleted,thecrewshouldperformafullsearchofthevessel.Inadditiontolookingforillegalsubstances,thecrewshouldbeonthelookoutforstowaways.Ifthereareanysuspicionsthatdrugsmayhavebeenplacedonboard,theMastershouldrequestacomprehensivevesselinspection,includinginspectionofthevessel’shullbelowthewaterline,beforedeparture.Themostcommonmeasureistheanti-smugglingsub-aquaticsurveytoascertainthatnoillegalsubstancesareattachedtothevesselbelowherwaterline.

After departure• Oncethevesselhassailedandtheoutboundpilothas

disembarked,athoroughsearchofallcompartmentsshould be conducted and the results recorded in the logbook.

Action to be taken if drugs are found onboard IfdrugsarefoundonboardtheMastershouldimmediatelytakestepsassetoutinthevessel’sEmergencyContingencyPlan(aspertheISMCode)and/ortheShip’sSecurityPlan(aspertheISPSCode),oneofwhichshouldincludestepstobetakenwithregardtonotificationtothelocalauthorities.Thefollowinggeneralguidelinescanalsobegiven:• Thedrugsmustnotbetouched.• Photographorvideotheareaoftheshipwherethedrugs

werefound,butleaveituntouchedandsealitofftopreventanyunauthorisedaccess.

• InformtheP&Iinsurer,thelocalP&Icorrespondentandtheshipowner/manager.


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Straight bills of lading– Do your bills use clear words? (Part II)IntroductionSinceGardServicesLossPreventionCircularNo.13-02waspublishedinDecember2002,thecasereferredtoatfootnote4ofthatcircular–theRAFAELAS–hasbeenappealedintheEnglishCourts.TheCourtofAppeal’sjudgment1 contains some very important and useful guidanceonhowtheEnglishcourtshave,inthepast,andnowoughttoviewstraightbillsofladingunderEnglishlaw.ThecasealsomadereferencetotheVossPeercasementionedinCircularNo.13-02andtoleadingdecisionsinthecourtsofothercountries,suchasGermanyandtheNetherlands.

AlthoughtheRAFAELASmostlydealtwiththequestionofwhetherstraightbillsoughttobeconsidered“documentsoftitle”forthepurposesoftheHague/HagueVisbyRules2,thecaseclarifieshowEnglishlawoughtnowviewthecarrier’sdeliveryobligationsundersuchbills.Onecanalsodetectfromtheappealacertainamountofcriticismtowardscarriersforambiguouswordingsintheirownbillofladingformsandfornotusingwaybillsinsteadofstraightbills.Itisparticularlyimportanttonotethefollowing:

Printed words requiring surrender of a bill of lading to take deliveryReferencewasmadeinCircularNo.13-02toprintedwordscommonlyappearingonthefaceofmostbillsoflading,andwhichintheRAFAELASwere:

“In witness whereof the number of Original Bills of Lading stated above [viz 3] all of this tenor and date, has been signed, one of which being accomplished, the others to stand void. One of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchange for the goods or delivery order”.

Atfirstinstancethesewordswereinterpretedtoapplyonlywhenthebillwasnegotiable.TheCourtofAppealhoweverdisagreedandwerepersuadedthatthebetterviewwasthatthewordsreflectedarequirementbythecarrierthatanybill presented should apparently entitle the holder to claim delivery(aswithabearerbill).TheleadingjudgeintheCourtofAppeal(LordJusticeRix)wentontotosay:

“…I do not regard it as a happy matter that the omission of adding words “or order” in the consignee box in this case (or the omission to add a notify party in the form used in the CHITRAL3), either of which could have happened without deliberation at all, should have the effect of transforming a contractual document which in every respect looks and reads like a bill of lading into a sea waybill, when a sea waybill commonly takes a totally different form”

“If it had been intended that it [the printed paragraph containing the above words] should not apply when the bill was used in non-negotiable form, then it could very easily have said so. Against the background of common forms of sea waybills, it is truly remarkable that it does not say so”

“Everyone seems to be agreed that if a straight bill expressly provides, as it commonly does, that its surrender is required for delivery to take place, then it is a document of title”

Therefore,ifwordssuchasthosementionedaboveappearinastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billtheywillbeinterpretedunderEnglishlawasgivingthebillthefunctionofdocumentoftitleandwiththatarequirementfortheproductionofanoriginalbilltotakedelivery.

The absence of printed words requiring surrender of a bill of lading to take deliveryWhilstitwasnotnecessarytodoso,LordJusticeRixwentontotogivetheview(obiter)thatastraightbillofladingwas,inprinciple,adocumentoftitleevenintheabsenceofanexpressprovisionrequiringitsproductiontoobtaindelivery.Rixwentontosay:

“A shipper needs the carrier to assist him policing his security in retention of the bill. He is entitled to redirect the consignment on notice to the carrier, and although notice is required, a rule of production of the bill is the only safe way, for the carrier as well as the shipper, to police such new instructions. In any event, if proof of identity is necessary, as in practice it is, what is wrong with the bill itself as a leading form of proof. This is of course an inconvenient rule where the carriage is very short ... and that is why sea waybills are used in such trades. But it is clear that straight bills are used in intercontinental carriage and therefore the inconvenience argument fails”

Therefore,regardlessofwhetherwordsrequiringproductiontotakedeliveryappearinastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)bill,suchabillislikelytoberegarded,atleastinprincipleunderEnglishlaw,tobeadocumentoftitleandwiththattherewillbearequirementfortheproductionofanoriginalbilltotakedelivery.

Words permitting delivery without surrender of a bill of ladingItissomewhatdisappointingthattheCourtofAppealdidnotgoasfarastoconsiderthepositionwhenastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billdoesexpresslyprovidethatdeliverycantakeplacewithoutsurrenderofanoriginalbilloflading,muchinthesamewayasawaybilldoes.TheCourtofAppealonlywentsofarastosay:

“…it seems to be common ground that a document which does not have to be presented to the carrier to obtain delivery of the goods cannot be called a document of title”

“…whatever may be the position as a matter of principle and in the absence of express agreement, [our emphasis] the practice appears to be that a straight bill of lading, unlike a mere sea waybill, is written in the form of an otherwise classic bill and

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requires production of the bill on delivery, and therefore transfer to a consignee to enable him to obtain delivery”

“If it had been intended that it [the printed paragraph containing the above words] should not apply when the bill was used in non-negotiable form, then it could very easily have said so. Against the background of common forms of sea waybills, it is truly remarkable that it does not say so”

ThereisnothingintheRAFAELAScase,whichsuggestsanyintentiononthepartoftheEnglishCourtstodeviatefromproperlyconstructingacontractasagreedbetweentheparties(i.e.acarrierandashipper).Inanothernotablerecent“packagelimitation”case–TheKapetanPetkoVoiveda4 -theCourtofAppealrecognisedthatshippershavetheoptiontonegotiateacceptablecarriageterms.Thereisnoreasonwhythisshouldnotextendtoanyrequirementforthe production of an original bill of lading under a straight (andthereforenon-negotiable)bill.Accordingly,theremarksuggestedinCircularNo.13-02tobeinsertedinastraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billofladingoughttominimisetherisk,underEnglishlaw,ofacarrierbeingfoundliableformisdeliverybydeliveringcargowithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.

GeneralLordJusticeRixconcluded:-

“I am not unhappy to come to these conclusions. It seems to me that the use of these hybrid forms of bill of lading is an unfortunate development and has spawned litigation over the years … Carriers should not use bill of lading forms if what they want to invite shippers to do is to enter into sea waybill type contracts. It may be that ultimately it is up to the shipper to ensure that the boxes in these hybrid forms are filled up in the best way that best suits themselves, but in practice I suspect serendipity prevails. In any event, these forms invite error and litigation, which is best avoided by a simple rule”

1CaseNo.A3/2002/0909.2Ifastraightbillwerenotdeemedadocumentoftitle,theHague/HagueVisbyRuleswouldnotapplyunderEnglishlawandthecarrierwouldbefreetocontractontermsmorefavourablythansuchRules.IfthoseRuleshadnotappliedintheRAFAELASthemoreliberalpackagelimitationundertheUSCarriageofGoodsbySeaActwouldhaveapplied.3[2000]1Lloyd’sRep529.4DaewooHeavyIndustriesandAnotherv.KlipriverShippingLtd&NavigationMaritimeBulgares(“KapetanPetkoVoiveda”)EnglishCourtofAppeal:LordsJusticesAldous,JudgeandLongmore:[2003]EWCACiv.451:3April2003.

SummaryWhilsttherecommendationsinCircularNo.13-02stillstandgood,thejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealintheRAFAELASmustbeconsideredastarkwarningtocarriersdeliveringcargounderstraight(andthereforenon-negotiable)billswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.Anagreementbetweenthecarrierandshippertodosowillberequired,alongthelinessuggested,inordertominimisethecarrier’sexposuretoclaimsformisdelivery.

The case also supports a firm recommendation to carriers andshipperstousewaybillsinsteadofstraightbillsincircumstanceswherethefunctionsofdocumentoftitle(withthesecuritythatgivesfortheshipper)andnegotiabilityarenotneeded.

AccordingtoRule34of Gard’s Statutes and Rules cover is excludedfor“… liabilities, costs and expenses arising out of the delivery of cargo under a negotiable Bill of Lading without production of that Bill of Lading by the person to whom delivery is made except where cargo has been carried on the Ship under the terms of a non-negotiable Bill of Lading, waybill or other non-negotiable document, and has been properly delivered as required by that document…”


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Straight bills of lading – Delivery – Do your bills use clear words?IntroductionTherehaverecentlybeenanumberofcourtcasesquestioningthestatusandfunctionsofastraightbilloflading.Astraightbill of lading is generally accepted to be one completed insuchawaythatdeliveryistobemadetothenamedconsigneeonly.Accordingly,itisnotatransferableornegotiabledocumentoftitle,whichcanbeusedtotransfertitle(therighttopossession)tothegoods,coveredbythatdocument.Billsofladingthataremadeout“toorder”are,byendorsement,negotiabledocumentsoftitle.Bearerbillsofladingarenegotiablewithoutendorsement.

Thecommonlyheldviewisthat,whilstdeliveryunderanegotiable bill of lading should only be against production ofanoriginalbill,suchproductionisnotnecessaryunderastraight(non-negotiable)billoflading,i.e.,deliveryneedonlybemadetotheproperlyidentifiednamedconsignee.AsmentionedinGard’sGuidance on Bills of Lading,however,andinlightofrecentcaselaw,thatviewisover-simplisticandindeeddangerous.Ifcareisnottaken,thecarrierrisksfacingclaimsformisdelivery.

The problemInarecentcasebeforetheEnglishcourts,THEHAPPYRANGER1,thebillofladingappearedtobeastraightbill-theconsigneeboxshowedonlyanamedconsigneeanddidnotcontainthewords“toorder”orotherssimilar.However,thefaceofthebillcontained,inanotherbodyoftext,theprintedwords“consignee or to his or their assigns”andtheseweretheonlywordsonthefaceofthebillindicatingnegotiabilityorotherwise.Sincethosewordsareacceptedtomean“to order”,thecourtdecidedthatmadethebillnegotiable.

Whilstthiscasedidnotconcernamisdeliveryclaim,itneverthelessdemonstratesthat,iftheintentionistoissueastraightnon-negotiablebill,clearwordsmustbeused(andotherwordsshouldnotconflictwiththem)toshowthatthebillisinfactastraightnon-negotiablebill.Ifnot,thebillwillprobablybedeemedtobenegotiableandthecarrierwillbe obliged to deliver the goods only against production of anoriginalbill.Inanotherrecentcase,whichdidconcernmisdelivery,thecarrierhaddeliveredthecargowithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.Theshipperhadretainedtheoriginalbills(allthree)becausethebuyer/consigneehadnotyetpaidinfull,andwhenhefailedtodoso,theshippersuedthecarrier.Thecase, Voss Peer v. APL Co Pte Ltd2,wasbroughtbeforetheSingaporecourts.

Thebillofladingformwas,asisincreasinglycommonplace,designedforvariouscircumstancesincludingwhenthebillistobenegotiableandwhenitistobenon-negotiable.Itwasacceptedthatthebillwasastraightbill3.Notably,thebillofladingcontainedprintedwordselsewhereonitsface

“Upon surrender to the Carrier of any one negotiable bill of lading, properly endorsed, all others to stand void”.UnderEnglishlaw4suchwordswererecentlyinterpretedtoapplyonlywhenthebillwasnegotiable.Byimplicationtherefore,under

1[2001]2Lloyd’sRep.530and[2002]2Lloyd’sRep.357.2[2002]3SLR176andCivilAppealNo.18of2002.3Itcontainedtheprintedwords“(non-negotiableunlessconsignedtoOrder)”andthewords“toorder”didnotappearinthebillthatwasissued,eithernexttothenamedconsigneeorelsewhere.4SeeforexampletheRAFAELAS[2002]2Lloyd’sRep.4035Seawaybillsexpresslystatetheyarenon-negotiableandthatdeliverydoesnotrequireproductionofanoriginalseawaybill.

astraightnon-negotiablebill,thecarrierwasnotpreventedfromdeliveringthegoodswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.TheSingaporeCourtsdisagreedanddecidedthat“clear words were required”toreflecttheintentionofthepartiestocontractoutofdeliveringthegoodswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.

Asaresult,theSingaporecourtsfoundthecarrierliableforthemisdeliveryclaim.LessrecentEnglishcaselawsuggeststhattherequirementforclearwordsmaybecorrect.Carriersshouldthereforeensurethat,wherethebillisastraightnon-negotiablebill,itcontainsclearwordspermittingthecarriertodeliverthegoodswithoutproductionofanoriginalbill.

RecommendationsInconsiderationoftheaboverecentcourtcases,GardServicesrecommendsMembersandclientsto:– Checktheirstandardformbills,particularlythose

designedforvariouscircumstancesincludingwhenthebillistobenegotiableandwhenitistobenon-negotiable.

– Ensurethatprintedwordsinthebillmakeitclearinwhatcircumstancesthebillwillbeastraightnon-negotiablebill.Forexample,useofthewords“(B/Lnotnegotiableunless“orderof”)”intheconsigneebox.

– Ensurethatotherprintedwords,particularlyonthefaceofthebill,suchasthoseinTHEHAPPYRANGER,donotconflictwithabillwhichisintendedtobenon-negotiable.Ifthosewordscannotbedeleted,orothersmoreappropriateused,itshouldbemadeclearthattheyonlyapplywherethebillisnegotiable.

– Thedocumentissuedshouldofcourseproperlyreflectwhathasbeenagreedwiththeshipper.Ifanon-negotiabledocumentissufficient,aseawaybillwillusuallybemostappropriate.Ifaseawaybill5 can notbeissued,itissuggestedthatthestraightbillshouldalsocontainwords(handwrittenorstampedtogivepreferenceoverprintedwords)suchas“wherenontransferable/negotiable,thecarrierisentitledtodeliverthegoodstothenamedconsigneewithoutsurrenderofanoriginalbilloflading,andisobligedtodosounlesstheshipperrequestsotherwisebeforedeliverytakesplace”.

– Whereitisagreedthatanon-negotiabledocumentistobeissued,that,togetherwiththecarrier’sdeliveryobligationsthereunder,shouldpreferablybereflectedinbookingconfirmations.

– Incaseofdoubt,cargounderstraightbillsshouldnotbedeliveredwithoutproductionofanoriginalbill,unlessanduntilwrittenconsenthasbeenobtainedfromtheshipper.

GardwillbehappytoreviewMembers’billsofladingandtoprovideguidanceinlightoftheabove.Amorein-depthcommentaryonthecasesreferredtointhislosspreventioncircularappearsinGardNews169(February2003).

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Bills of Lading: Is the shipper’s stowage request always compulsory?IntroductionBillsofladinginawordingwhichmayseemharmlessuntilaclaimarisescancreateproblemsforshipownersonwording.Thiscircularoutlinesonesuchcasewherethebillofladingwasclausedtoincludeaparticularrequestforstowageofcontainers.Forfurtherinformation,pleaserefertotheGardGuidanceonBillsofLadingwhichcanbefoundontheGardServiceswebsiteatwww.gard.no.

Course of eventsAttheportofNewYork,9containerssaidtocontain(s.t.c.)18coilsofaluminumsheet(2coilspercontainer),wereloadedonboardacontainershipforcarriagetoSantos,Brazil.Thebillofladingwaswordedsuchthat,intheeventofhavingtodeterminethecarrier’sliabilityfordamageorlossofthecargo,eachcoilwasconsideredapackage.

Theshippersofthecargorequestedthatthecontainersbestowedbelowdeckandaclausestating“belowdeckstowagerequested”wasinsertedonthefaceofthebilloflading.Afterthestowagearrangementswerefinalised,itturnedoutthat4ofthecontainersstuffedwithaluminumcoilswereloadedondeck.ThevesselencounteredbadweatheronroutetoBrazil.Asaconsequence,2ofthecontainerscarriedondeckaswellasthecoilsinsidethecontainers,sufferedextensivedamage.Aftersurveyingthealuminumcoilsthecargoreceiversrejectedtheminfull,arguingthatthealuminumwasnotusefulfortheintendedpurpose.Afewmonthsaftertherejectionofthecargobythereceivers,theshipownerreceivedaclaimfromthecargounderwritersintheamountofUSD184,000.

Thecargounderwritersarguedthattheywereentitledto100percentoftheamounttheyhadpaidtotheirassured.Theystatedthatthecarrierhadnotcompliedwiththetermsoftherelevant bill of lading as the cargo had not been carried under deckasrequestedbytheshippers,andthereforewouldnotbeentitledtolimithisliability.ThecargounderwritersthreatenedtostartlegalproceedingsintheUnitedStatesastheshipmentoriginatedinNewYork.Atsomestage,cargounderwritersofferedtosettletheclaimatthelevelof70percentoftheUSD184,000claimed.

Theshipownerhadapotentiallydifficultcase,ashehadnotstowedthecargobelowdeckasrequestedbytheshippers.Theaffectedcontainerswereeffectivelyloadedondeck.Theshipownercontinuedsearchingforthebestsolutiontotheclaim.AshewasfacedwiththecargounderwriterslookingtocommenceproceedingsintheUnitedStates,heconsideredpiecesoflegislationwhichmayhelphimresolvethematter.

TheshipownerdiscoveredadecisionmadeinapriorcaseInsurance Company of North America v. Blue Star (North America) Ltd.,whereasimilarsituationhadarisen.IntheBLUESTARcase,aforty-footcontainerwasloadedonthedeckofacontainershippursuanttoabillofladingstating“belowdeckstowagerequested”.ThecasewasheardattheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkandthecourtconcludedthatthe

“stowageondeckofacontainershipisnotanunreasonabledeviation”.ThisdecisionofthecourtmeantthatthecarrierwasentitledtoalltheexceptionsandlimitationsprovidedbyU.S.CarriageofGoodsbySeaAct,1936(COGSA).USCOGSAapplies to all inbound and outbound cargoes to and from the UnitedStates.

Furthermore,thecourtwentontoanalysethemeaningoftheclause“belowdeckstowagerequested”andconcludedthatthe“billofladingdidnotrequirebelow-deckstowage”,astheword“request”hadbeenusedinthebilloflading,and“request”wasinterpretedtomean“askingorpetition”.Therewasnocontractasonlyapetitionhadbeenmadeand“inorderfortheretobeacontract,theremustbemutualassent”.

AcopyofthisdecisionoftheSouthernDistrictofNewYorkwasforwardedtothecargounderwriterswithanoffertosettle the claim based on the package limitation according toUSCOGSA,i.e.USD500/package.Sincethebillofladingstatedthatthepackagesweretheindividualcoils(2lostpercontainer),anofferofUSD2,000wasputforward.Afterconsideration,thecargounderwritersacceptedtheshipowner’sofferandthecasewasamicablysettledforUSD2,000.

Recommendations1. Shipper’sinstructionsregardingthestowageofcargoon

boardshouldbefollowed.However,ifforanyreasonthecarriercannotfollowtheinstructions,heshouldensurethatthebillofladingisproperlyclausedtoprotecthisposition.

2. Thewordingoftheclausestampedonthefaceofthebillofladingbenefitedtheshipowner.Byusingtheword“request”asopposedto“mandatory”,“compulsorily”,“required”etc.,theshipowner’sliabilitywassignificantlyreduced.Thisreinforcestheneedtoexerciseconsiderablecarewhenclausingabillofladingeventhoughthe“request”oftheshippersisthesame.

3. Theshipowner’sbillofladinghadaclauseonthereverseside giving the carrier the liberty to carry the containers on orbelowdeckbysaying:

“Goods, whether or not carried in containers, may be carried on deck or under deck without notice to the Merchant or any annotation on the face hereof...”

Theshipownershouldensurethatanybillofladingusedby containerships in the liner trade includes this clause or similarwording.

4. Allpreventiverecommendationsshouldbeadheredtoasaprecautionarymeasure. The Insurance Company of North America v. Blue Star (North America) Ltd.casewasofassistancetotheshipownerinthisinstance.However,itwasalowercourtdecision.Thepossibilityofhighercourtdecisions in the future may lead to a different result that doesnotfavourtheshipowner.

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