UN Peace Operations inViolent and AsymmetricThreat Environments

MARCH 2016

IntroductionThe UN system, member states, and national and local partners face complexchallenges in deploying UN peace operations—ranging from small politicalmissions to larger multidimensional peacekeeping missions—in countrieswhere there is not only little or no peace to keep but also, increasingly, a threatof terrorism and violent extremism. High-level discussions and reports to datehave narrowly focused on the question of whether or not peacekeepingoperations can undertake offensive kinetic counterterrorism. There is broadconsensus among member states around the conclusion of the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) that UN missionsshould not be mandated to conduct military counterterrorism operationsbecause they are not suited to do so. There has been comparatively littleexploration of the political and practical challenges, opportunities, andimplications for UN peace operations of operating in complex securityenvironments, particularly when operating in parallel with a non-UNcounterterrorism force. The UN is increasingly asked to “stay and deliver,” forcing it to review itscapacity to operate safely and effectively in such environments, with implica-tions not only for budgets and staff safety but also for the organization’s corebusiness of promoting lasting peace through political solutions. The increasedmilitarization of some of the UN’s “stabilization” missions could makemissions riskier rather than safer, as well as risk “sucking the oxygen out ofpolitics.” Conversely, the capacity and readiness of the UN to send observersto support cease-fires in Syria or Yemen was questioned. In his follow-upreport, the UN secretary-general seconded the conclusions of HIPPO,1 and inhis Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, he recommended thatmember states “integrate preventing violent extremism into relevant activitiesof UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions in accordancewith their mandates.”2 This raises additional questions as to whether, how,and when the UN should engage in supporting host governments inaddressing violent extremism and some of the factors that drive and sustain it(e.g., politics, governance, human rights). In light of these important questions, the International Peace Institute (IPI),with the support of the French Ministry of Defense’s Directorate General forInternational Relations and Strategy (DGRIS), convened a full-day roundtable

On February 11, 2016, the Inter -national Peace Institute (IPI) hosted aday-long roundtable to reflect onstrategies for enhancing the ability ofUN peace operations to operatesafely and effectively in violent andasymmetric threat environments. Theroundtable was part of the three-year"New Issues Observatory" project, aseries of research papers androundtables examining "new" issuesin peace operations, sup ported bythe French Ministry of Defense'sDirectorate General for Inter nationalRelations and Strategy (DGRIS).

Olga Abilova from IPI served asrapporteur. Arthur Boutellis, directorof IPI's Brian Urquhart Center forPeace Operations, oversaw thesubstantive preparations for theseminar and drafting of this report.This meeting note reflects therapporteur's interpretation of thediscussions and does not necessarilyrepresent the views of all otherparticipants.

IPI's Brian Urquhart Center for PeaceOperations conducts wide-rangingresearch and policy facilitation onprevention and mediation, peace -keeping, and peacebuilding, aimed atinforming and assisting a broad rangeof policymakers and civil society onemerging security challenges andmultilateral response capacities.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to themany donors to the programs of theCenter for Peace Operations. Inparticular, IPI is grateful to theFrench Ministry of Defense'sDirectorate General for InternationalRelations and Strategy.

1 United Nations Secretary-General, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recom -mendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, UN Doc. S/2015/682, paras. 15, 94, 95.

2 United Nations Secretary-General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, UN Doc. A/70/674, para. 58(b).

2 MEETING NOTE

in New York on “UN Peace Operations in Violentand Asymmetric Threat Environments” onThursday, February 11, 2016. The event gathered awide range of representatives from member statesand the UN Secretariat, as well as subject matterexperts. The objective of the discussion, which washeld under the Chatham House rule of nonattribu-tion, was to contribute to developing a sharedunderstanding of the issues at stake and to movingforward some of the related policy debates. Thecontent of the discussions will feed back into aseries of research papers on new peace operationsenvironments, which IPI will publish over thecourse of 2016 as part of the “New IssuesObservatory on Providing for Peacekeeping.”3

Political and PolicyImplications of Operating inAsymmetric EnvironmentsThe first panel focused on the state of policy discus-sions on UN peace operations in asymmetricenvironments. It was noted that, while the HIPPOreport and subsequent report of the secretary-general on The Future of Peace Operations includesome recommendations for UN missions operatingin hostile environments, clearer and more strategicguidance is needed. Participants questionedwhether the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) and Department of PoliticalAffairs (DPA) have sufficient resources andpersonnel to be able to operate safely andeffectively in these environments, as well aswhether it is always a worthwhile investment to“stay and deliver,” given the security costs in placeslike Afghanistan. It was noted that there has beenrelatively little exploration of the political andpractical challenges of preventive efforts incomplex environments, in particular with regardsto violent extremism. Missions all across the spectrum of UN peaceoperations, from smaller political presences tolarge-scale multidimensional peacekeeping opera -tions, are facing similar pressures to adapt to riskierenvironments. Participants noticed a change in UNpolicy, in that the question asked is no longer“when to leave” but “how to stay.” Special political

missions (SPM) in particular continue to work involatile environments, with seven politicalmissions currently operating in countries that facethe highest level of threat from al-Qaida. While environments where missions aredeployed are evolving, the capacity of missions toadjust to the heightened security costs is laggingbehind. Missions resort to armed security staff andprivate security companies as ad hoc measures, butthese are often not sustainable in the long run andoverburden missions financially. For instance, inthe UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan(UNAMA), 40 percent of the mission’s budget isassociated with security costs. This also helps toexplain the rise in SPM budgets over the last twelveyears. The lack of better and more regular capaci-ties to ensure the protection of mission staff leadsto “bunkerization,” which affects the mission’sability to reach out and engage with the localpopulation and, consequently, the successfulimplementation of its mandate. As recommendedin the HIPPO report, tailored and flexibleapproaches (rather than templates) should beadopted when planning peace operations, and UNsecurity arrangements must be custom-made. Itwas also suggested that the UN Secretariat be clearwhen presenting options to the Security Council interms of what can be done with the allocatedresources in such environments. A substantial obstacle to policy development isthe lack of conceptual clarity and clear definitionsof “terrorism,” “violent extremism,” and the propermechanisms to address these. Classifying actorsremains a policy and operational challenge, partic-ularly when it comes to terrorist and criminalarmed groups that evolve over time and when thehost government may be tempted to label itsenemies terrorists and prevent interaction. Blurreddistinction is also an issue for the UN when amission operates in an asymmetric environment inparallel with a non-UN force. While the decision todeploy peace operations to such environmentsneeds to remain under constant scrutiny and bequestioned as an assumption, it is important to de-stress the debate by taking into account the UN’shistory of managing asymmetric threats, which arenot a new challenge.

3 Available at www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/new-issues-observatory/ .

The secretary-general’s recently released Plan ofAction to Prevent Violent Extremism calls for amore comprehensive approach to prevention thatgoes beyond short-sighted, security-focusedcounterterrorism policies. While this is a welcomestep, efforts have yet to be made to create a morestrategic and coherent approach for the UN as awhole. Common policy prescriptions to addressthe range of factors that lead individuals to joinextremist groups remain at risk of lacking a cleartarget. It was emphasized that the operationaliza-tion of the plan ultimately rests on member states.Participants debated the difference between strate-gies for countering terrorism (CT) and preventingor countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE). Someargued that CVE is merely rebranding andquestioned the empirical evidence of the impact ofCVE programming and the added value of theapproach. Others suggested that using a CVE lenswhen developing strategies and some projects withbroader development or stabilization objectivescould be valuable. The discussion on the goals UN peace operationscould set to adopt a strategic approach to preven-tion in practice highlighted three aspects:1. Engagement: Echoing the recommendation of

the HIPPO report, the first step to findingpolitical solutions to violent extremism is for theUN to be able and willing to talk to all actors,including some extremist groups. It wassuggested that the UN’s impartiality principleshould not be imposed as neutrality, as the UNseeks to create space for inclusive debate. TheUN must also be better placed to identify andnavigate group fragmentation in order to targetmoderate voices within extremist groups. Whilethis requires increased political leadership fromthe UN, it more importantly relies on a strongcommitment from member states to contributeto the UN’s analytical capacity.

2. Containment: Participants agreed that a heavy-handed approach and direct confrontation areoutside the scope of peace operations. It wassuggested, though, that the UN should beprepared to use military tools to counter violentextremism in some cases to undermine extrem-ists’ ability to be violent and reduce theirpolitical space to maneuver. This is particularlycritical for missions mandated to protectcivilians but requires strengthening the military

capabilities of missions through improvedcapacity for medical evacuation and rapidreaction. Ensuring that populations will not beunder constant attack can have an importantinfluence on long-term stability, peacebuilding,and resilience building. It was emphasized,however, that the military approach should notdominate and should come in support of apolitical strategy.

3. Rehabilitation: The UN has an essential role toplay in assisting processes of disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR),expanding these programs beyond individualspreviously or currently involved in violentextremism to also target individuals prone toradicalization.

Lessons Learned fromSomalia and BeyondThe second panel largely drew on the example ofthe African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),the longest-running African Union (AU) peacesupport operation and a complex partnershipbetween the AU and the UN. A common challengefacing operations led by the African Union andother offensive and stabilization operations inasymmetric threat environments is that neither theAU nor the UN has a clear conception of what“stabilization” is. Missions commonly struggle tofind the right balance between military tasks andstabilization tasks that require more police andcivilian activities, including DDR. Often this is dueto lack of capacity (particularly a shortage of keyenablers) and overly ambitious mandates where themeans do not correspond to the designated ends.AMISOM, as an offensive operation, has experi-enced a heavy death toll, though accurate figuresare lacking, and costs significantly more than aregular UN peacekeeping operation (a ratio of 3 to1, one speaker noted). Furthermore, the success of the mission and itsexit strategy have been largely predicated onterritorial expansion rather than the ability to buildsuccessful security forces that can contain keyspoilers. AMISOM's implementation of its coretask of extending state authority has proven to beactively conflict-generating, at least in the shortterm. Government forces are not perceived asnational forces, in part because insufficient

UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments 3

4 MEETING NOTE

resources are invested in reconciliation and conflictresolution initiatives at the local level, resulting in alack of shared vision for a security strategy at thenational level. In relation to the first panel, onespeaker wondered whether the creation of PVEadvisor positions to assist the head of mission withan interdisciplinary view on the subject could helpconnect the military and civilian dots and lead tobetter mission strategy. Participants also discussed the role of missions’human rights components in a context where thereis a growing consensus that approaches to addressasymmetric threats that are not compliant withhuman rights are ineffective. Human rightscomponents of peace operations are thus crucial toensure that grievances are addressed, which in turncan make terrorist propaganda less attractive tocivilians. By engaging in the protection of allvictims of violations, irrespective of their alliances,the UN's human rights work can help to producetrust on both sides. Impartial monitoring andpublic reporting of violations, both by extremistsand government forces, help to reinforce the imageof the UN mission as an impartial actor. This, inturn, can help the mission engage with all partiesduring political negotiations and support local andnational reconciliation efforts. While the humanrights due diligence policy should guide UNsupport to non-UN forces and be based on athorough risk assessment, it was suggested that itshould not prevent the UN from talking to allactors. And if the risk of human rights violations bynon-UN forces is high, mitigation measures such ashuman rights training and monitoring must beintroduced instead of eliminating support entirely. Some participants questioned the extent to whichstabilization missions are by definition partial.Operating in the same mission area as parallel non-UN counterterrorism and offensive operations canaffect the UN’s impartiality and ability to fulfill itsmandate. However, the idea that the proximitybetween the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia(UNSOM) and AMISOM leads to more targetingof UN personnel and impairs the ability of the UNto talk to everyone was called into question. Thequestion is sometimes more about the willingnessof and incentive for certain armed groups to talk tothe UN, and this may evolve over time, as seen inAfghanistan. That said, the population’s lack ofconfidence in AMISOM’s ability to protect them

from al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia has compli-cated the work of UNSOM, as Somalis whocooperate with the mission are often threatened.

Capabilities Required forOperating Safely andEffectivelyThe last panel focused on capabilities and methodsrequired for peace operations to operate safely andeffectively in risky environments, with a particularfocus on the issue of intelligence. The HIPPOreport recommended strengthening the analyticalcapabilities of peace operations to be better able todeal with new environments. The secretary-general’s follow-up report on The Future of PeaceOperations clearly confirmed that “an effectivesystem for acquiring, analyzing, and operational-izing information for peace operations in complexenvironments” was lacking. Since then, theSecretariat has been tasked with developingparameters for “an information and intelligenceframework that can support field missions inoperating effectively and safely.” A smallInformation and Planning Cell is in the course ofbeing set up in the Office of the Secretary-General.Increased intelligence capabilities and analysis forthe UN are also consistent with the need for arenewed focus on prevention. Participants discussed the need for goodknowledge of the context down to the tactical levelto ensure the safety and security of peacekeepersand to implement the mandate. This should be thebasis for developing a concept of intelligence forUN peace operations that responds to the UN’sspecific needs and requirements. It was noted,however, that there is a lack of commonunderstanding as to what intelligence in thecontext of UN operations means. Debates are oftentainted by misconceptions of the term due to thelack of a clear concept. Intelligence is often associ-ated with gathering information through covertmeans, though this is not what the UN requires, asmost of its intelligence is based on openly availableinformation. It was also suggested that the UN needs toimprove its assessments before UN missionsdeploy, including of the spoilers they may face. Tobe able to operate safely in asymmetric environ-

ments, emphasis must be placed on (1) securingcamps, (2) extending the use of early-warningsystems, (3) mitigating the threat of improvisedexplosive devices (IEDs) through the UnitedNations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and (4)improving capacity for casualty and medicalevacuation (CASEVAC and MEDEVAC, respec-tively), among other things. Means of gathering information for UN peaceoperations are expanding with the greater use ofunmanned unarmed aerial vehicles (UUAVs) andmore emphasis on technology. However, theimportance of intelligence gathered from humansources should not be overlooked, and technologyis not a panacea. Strengthening mission leadershipis essential, particularly in identifying priorityintelligence requirements—determining informa-tion gaps and tasking the right section within themission to address these. Better training in theneeds and requirements of information gatheringand analysis is needed not only at the leadershiplevel but at all levels within missions, including aspart of pre-deployment training for troops. Trooppatrolling should aim to seek information andincrease trust in the local population instead oflimiting itself to passive routine observation. Oneparticipant noted that knowledge implies theresponsibility to act and questioned whether UNmissions were prepared for this duty. Improved methods of information gatheringalone do not give good intelligence—analyticalcapabilities and expertise to process the informa-tion into intelligence have to be improved as well.The discussion assessed the All SourcesInformation Fusion Unit (ASIFU) in the UnitedNations Multidimensional Integrated StabilizationMission in Mali (MINUSMA), the most robustintelligence structure a UN mission has ever had,which has been functioning for over a year with anumber of lessons already identified. In particular,the need for the UN to establish secure channels forsharing sensitive information and intelligenceacross mission contingents and components, aswell as for protecting sources, was highlighted.Participants also voiced the need for integratingmore local knowledge through closer interactions

with communities, while ensuring that sexualexploitation and abuse are adequately prevented.

ConclusionToday, the UN is deployed to a range of environ-ments where it faces asymmetric and violentthreats, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, andSomalia, and while its activities are limited bysecurity concerns, its presence alone is of signifi-cance. Although participants agreed that the UN isnot the right actor for engaging in counterterrorismoperations, they also concluded that the UN is notirrelevant in asymmetric threat environments andcan play a useful role in its core activities ofprotecting civilians and facilitating politicalprocesses. However, a number of areas for strategicand operational improvements were identified forthe UN to be able to operate more safely andeffectively in such environments. First, there is a need for improved understandingof the context and planning of missions beforedeploying them, including through liaisons andcooperation with regional organizations. Second,peace operations should have clear mandates andappropriate postures and should be adequatelyresourced and capacitated for operating safely insuch environments—all of which could be achievedthrough better cooperation between the SecurityCouncil, the UN Secretariat, and troop-contributing countries. Third, missions should havethe ability to adequately monitor what happens intheir environments by deploying intelligencecapacities and making sure these are well integratedinto the mission. Fourth, missions need to becomemore people-centric. Although not provided for as such in the UNCharter, UN peace operations have proven to be aflexible and adaptable tool that has evolved overtime to respond to evolving challenges. As peaceoperations find themselves in environments withnew expectations and increased challenges, it isultimately the prerogative of member states toensure that they have the necessary capabilities andstrategic guidance to be fit for purpose.

UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments 5

6

Agenda

Thursday, February 11, 2016

9:00–9:15 Welcome

Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser, IPI, and former member of the High-Level IndependentPanel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)Olivier Landour, Director, Europe, North America & Multilateral Affairs, Directorate Generalfor International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS), French Ministry of Defense

9:15–9:45 Opening Remarks

Jeffrey D. Feltman, Under Secretary-General for the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) Dmitry Titov, Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions(OROLSI), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

9:45–11:30 Session 1: Political & Policy Implications of UN Field Missions Operating in Violent andAsymmetric Threat Environments

What are some of the lessons from past UN field missions operating in asymmetric threatenvironments, in the Middle East and Africa in particular, and what are the political andpolicy implications for the UN? Beyond the fact that the UN, when deployed in violent andasymmetric threat environments, “must be capable of operating effectively and as safely aspossible therein,” how could and should UN peace operations “integrate preventing violentextremism into relevant activities” by addressing some of the political and governance factorsthat drive and sustain violent extremism? Looking forward, what, if any, role could and shouldpeace operations play as part of a broader all-of-UN approach to preventing violent extremism,and how can they be appropriately mandated and tailored for this task?

ChairH.E. Geir O. Pedersen, Permanent Representative of Norway to the UN

SpeakersNaureen Chowdhury Fink, Head of Research and Analysis, Global Center on CooperativeSecurity (GCCS) (presenting draft research paper on UN peace operations and violentextremism)Muhammad Rafiuddin Shah, Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Counter-TerrorismImplementation Task Force (CTITF)Leanne Smith, Chief, Policy and Best Practice Service, UN DPKO and Department of FieldSupportRichard Gowan, Associate Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and Non-Resident Fellow at Center on International Cooperation, New York University

11:30–11:45 Coffee Break

11:45–1:15 Session 2: Practical Approaches and Lessons Learned from Offensive Operations, HumanRights Work, and Capacity-Building Programs

What are some of the lessons from African Union and other offensive and stabilizationoperations in asymmetric threat environments? How should the UN relate to parallel counter-terrorism and offensive operations and ensure that it does not unwittingly jeopardize the

UN Peace Operations in Violent and Asymmetric Threat Environments 7

political work of a parallel UN presence operating in the same mission area? What are thepotential risks for UN peace operations in adopting “preventive and preemptive posture andwillingness to use force tactically to protect civilians and UN personnel”? What are some of thechallenges and opportunities for the UN’s human rights work and capacity-building programsin the areas of police, justice, corrections, DDR, and security sector reform (SSR) in violentextremism environments? What are the implications for SSR initiatives? How does this affectpotential exit strategies?

ChairH.E. Fodé Seck, Permanent Representative of Senegal to the UN

SpeakersPaul D. Williams, Associate Professor and Associate Director of the Security Policy StudiesProgram at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University andIPI Non-Resident Senior Adviser (presenting draft research paper on lessons from AMISOMstabilization and offensive operations)Nicholas Kay, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for SomaliaIvan Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, UN

1:15–2:00 Lunch

2:00–3:45 Session 3: Capabilities Required for Operating Safely and Effectively in Violent andAsymmetric Threat Environments

How can the UN better understand the threat environment before missions aredesigned/deployed and better plan accordingly? What kind of capabilities (military, police,civilians, field support), new technologies, postures, and leadership are necessary foroperational effectiveness in high-tempo risky environments to allow a UN peace operation tocarry out its political and protection of civilians (PoC) mandates safely and effectively? Whatare the information and intelligence capabilities currently available to the UN, and how couldthese be rendered more adequate? What are the implications for peace operations of havingsuch capabilities and how can they be prevented from unwittingly creating unrealistic expecta-tions for the host government, communities, and partners, and from diverting the mission’sfocus from political/peace processes? Does this have any implications for how the performanceof missions is reviewed?

ChairH.E. Syed Akbaruddin, Permanent Representative of India to the UN

SpeakersWalter Dorn, Professor and Chair of the Master of Defence Studies Programme at the RoyalMilitary College of Canada and the Canadian Forces College (presenting draft research paperon UN peace operations and new technologies)Alexandra Novosseloff, Senior Visiting Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, NewYork University (presenting draft research paper on UN peace operations and intelligence)Major General Adrian Foster, Deputy Military Advisor, UN DPKOColonel Vincent de Kytspotter, French Chief of Defense Staff, UN Section Head

3:45–4:00 Wrap-up Session and Closing Remarks

Arthur Boutellis, Director of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations, IPIH.E. François Delattre, Permanent Representative of France to the UN

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