unep information note 99-16...unep information note 99-16 new unep report provides an overview of...

UNEP Information Note 99-16

NEW UNEP REPORT PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, RESOURCES, ANDCONFLICT

Nairobi, June 1999 - A new report, "Environmental Conditions, Resources, andConflicts: An Introductory Overview and Data Collection", has been published bythe United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP). The report highlights the proposition that agrowing trend in international and intranational conflict appears to be linkedto deteriorating environmental conditions and resources. The report provides aconcise overview of the elements of environment-related conflict as a basis fora better understanding of an increasingly complex field. An understanding ofthe principles presented in the report should facilitate efforts of conflictresolution and prevention.

A review of the scientific literature indicates three major trends:

1. Conflicts over water resources appear to be a major source ofdirect international conflict. The most common environmental elements aroundwhich conflicts can erupt are water flow, diversion, salinization, floods andpollution.

2. Indirect international or indirect intranational conflict arecommonly caused by resource depletion issues - deforestation, soil erosion,desertification, flooding and pollution.

3. From the empirical evidence across all categories, it appears thatthe vast majority of environmentally related conflicts occur in developingregions.

These trends point to different avenues for conflict resolution and prevention.The first two trends for example, suggest that priority attention to soundmanagement of environmental and natural resource usage factors could preventconflict. The transboundary nature of many of these issues places emphasis forthe mitigation of environmental degradation on international institutions.Stewardship of these environmental factors requires the commitment and effort ofgovernmental and non-governmental bodies and communities at national and locallevels.

The third trend suggests that the level of technical ingenuity and capacity toovercome deteriorating environmental conditions could be an important factor inaddressing environmental conditions in the developing world and reduce pressuresleading to conflict. The level of "technical ingenuity" in a society refers toits capacity to systematically marshal scientific and social solutions tosocietal quandaries. Efforts at conflict resolution and prevention, therefore,should not only be directed at improving environmental conditions but shouldalso aim to heighten the level of technical ingenuity and capacity to mitigateenvironmental degradation.

The report makes it clear that the maintenance of good environmental conditionsand resources may hold one of the keys to future peace. As Dr. Klaus Toepfer,Executive Director of UNEP concludes in the Foreword to the report, "This reportin no way judges individual countries or political groups, nor does it attempt

to give direction and advice on how to solve these conflicts. However, almostseven years after the Rio Conference, and in the light of the Special Session ofthe General Assembly of June 1997, it is clear that the opportunity for thehumankind to combat international and intranational conflict must be seen i thelight of the connection between environmental conditions and resources".

Copies of the report are available from:Dr. Ashbindu Singh,Regional Coordinator,UNEP Environmental Information,Assessment & Early Warning,EROS Data Center,Sioux Falls, SD 57198 USA,Tel: 1 605 594 6107/6117, Fax: 1 695 594 6119,E-mail: [email protected], http://grid.cr.usgs.gov

ISBN: 92-807-1766-9

For more information please contact:Daniel van R. Claasen,Officer-in-Charge,UNEP-DEIA,P.O. Box 30552, Nairobi, Kenya,Phone: [254-2] 62 3518, FAX : [254-2] 62 3943email: [email protected],

or Ms. Beth Ingraham,Information Officer,INFOTERRA Secretariat,The Global Environmental Information Exchange Network,Division of Environmental Information and Assessment,United Nations Environment Programme,P.O. Box 30552,Nairobi, Kenya,Tel: (254-2) 624299 or 623273, Fax: (254-2) 624269Email: [email protected] or [email protected], Web: www.unep.org

Environmental Conditions,Resources, and Conflicts

An Introductory Overview and Data Collection

Daniel SchwartzUniversity of Toronto, Canada

and

Ashbindu SinghUnited Nations Environment Programme

Acknowledgments

Disclaimer

The authors are grateful to a number of experts who reviewed the report and made usefulsuggestions. Mr. Daniel Shwartz worked as an intern with the United Nations Environment Programme(UNEP) in New York. Mr. Aiko Bode, formerly a Junior Professional Officer, Regional Office for NorthAmerica, UNEP, in New York provided valuable suggestions and his contributions are gratefully acknowl-edged. Also, a special thanks to Marc Lulham, Dawn Buehner, Gene Fosnight, Rachel Clement, and KimGiese for their valuable assistance in the production of this report.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP). The designations used and material presented do not imply the expression of anyopinion whatsoever on the part of UNEP concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or areaor of its authorities, or of the delineation of its frontiers or boundaries.

ISBN: 92-807-1766-9

For bibliographic and reference purposes this publication should be referred as:

UNEP (1999). Schwartz, Daniel and Singh, Ashbindu. Environmental Conditions, Resources, and Conflicts: An Introductory Overview and Data Collection.

Division of Environmental Information, Assessment & Early Warning ( DEIA&EW)United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)P.O. Box 30552, Nairobi, Kenya

To have copies of this report, please contact:

Ashbindu Singh, Regional CoordinatorDivision of Environmental Information, Assessment and Early Warning - North AmericaEROS Data CenterSioux Falls, SD 57198, USAFax: (001) 605 594 6119E-mail: [email protected]://grid.cr.usgs.gov

Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Focus Area One: The Redefinition of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Focus Area Two: The Relationship Between Traditional Security Institutions

and Environmental Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Focus Area Three: The Relationship Between Environment and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Conclusions to Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Data Collection and Selected Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Data Collections

Direct International Conflicts and Potential Conflicts Over Water Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Indirect Intranational Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Indirect International Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Selected Case Studies

Indirect Intranational Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Indirect International Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

General Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Annotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

References for Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

References for Data Collection and Selected Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Historically, environmental resources haveoften been an indicator of the wealth of those beingin a position to utilize them. Thus, for centuries,access to non-renewable resources was directlylinked to development, and conflicts occurredwhile powers were defending or trying to gainaccess to these resources. During the second half ofthe 20th century, socio-economic developmentsshifted the political and scientific discussions onconflicts and environmental resources. Discoursein this area turned to the question of whether, andhow, depletion and unsustainable uses of naturalresources (renewable as well as non-renewable),and the demographic development of human pop-ulations, triggers international and intranationalconflict.

This publication attempts to give a briefoverview of the most recent discussions surround-ing environmental conditions and resources, andthe linkages to conflict. By compiling examples andgrouping these according to specific characteris-tics, this report attempts to provide a basis for theestablishment of a global data collection on envi-ronmental conflicts. By indicating patterns of socialand environmental interaction, a continuouslyupdated data collection on environmental conflictscould enhance efforts of conflict resolution andprevention by the international community.

This report in no way judges individual coun-tries or political groups, nor does it attempt to givedirection and advice on how to solve these conflicts.However, almost seven years after the RioConference, and in light of the Special Session of theGeneral Assembly of June 1997, it is clear that theopportunity for humankind to combat international

and intranational conflict must be seen in light ofthe connections between environmental conditionsand resources, and conflict. It is the intention ofthis report to assist in deepening our understand-ing of these linkages.

Klaus ToepferExecutive DirectorUnited Nations Environment Programme

Page 4

Foreword

The political and strategic impact of surging pop-ulations, spreading disease, deforestation andsoil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and

possibly, rising sea levels — developments that willprompt mass migration and, in turn, incite group con-flicts — will be the core foreign-policy challenge [in thetwenty-first century].

— Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy

Robert Kaplan’s 1994 Atlantic Monthly article,“The Coming Anarchy,” popularized the idea thatmounting population and environmental pres-sures can contribute directly or indirectly to con-flict.1 Although Kaplan’s graphic depiction of aworld beset by swelling population numbers,severely degraded environmental resources, andescalating violence, may have shocked the public,his ideas (if somewhat exaggerated) are not new tothe international security community. Nearly twodecades ago, the prospect of environmentally-induced conflict was identified, and subsequentlythe idea of “environment and conflict” has beenhotly debated in academia and international pol-icy circles.

The Overview section which follows attemptsto summarize the field of enquiry referred to as“environment and conflict.”2 It begins by placingthe field of “environment and conflict” in perspec-tive relative to the larger field of “environmentalsecurity”. The analytical positions on “environ-ment and conflict” are then characterized and cate-gorized according to the following foci:

• Renewable vs. non-renewable resources

• “Direct” vs. “indirect” conflict

• International vs. intranational conflict

This categorization, which is explained in fullbelow, is an attempt to provide a framework forthe data collection and selected case studies whichfollow the Overview. The intent of organizing the

theoretical and empirical material in this fashion isto provide policy-makers and researchers with ameans of systematically analyzing environmentalconflicts, which in turn should allow them to bet-ter apply techniques of conflict resolution and pre-vention to such conflicts.

Page 5

Introduction

The environment-conflict nexus is a subset of“environmental security” — a field of inquiry thatseeks to determine whether or not traditionalnotions of security (which emphasize counteringmilitary threats with military power) should beadapted to include threats posed by populationgrowth and diminishing quantity and quality ofenvironmental goods and services.

This query was launched in 1977 by LesterBrown of the Worldwatch Institute, in an articleentitled “Redefining Security.”3 Brown based hisargument for a redefinition of security on what heand his colleagues perceived to be the pre-eminentthreat to future human welfare — the increasinglywidening gap between the supply and demand ofenvironmental resources. Brown’s hypothesis, inturn, derives from an historical debate that pits“pessimists” (neo-Malthusians who believe thatunchecked population growth will inexorably out-strip the supply of resources) against “optimists”(neo-classical economists who believe that marketforces working in conjunction with human ingenu-ity will produce technological solutions to mitigatethe threats posed by population growth).4

A plethora of academic, governmental, andnon-governmental writings on environmentalsecurity have emerged since the issue was sparkedby Brown in 1977. Work on this topic has grownprogressively complex and now incorporates amultitude of institutions, actors, and conceptualframeworks.5 These concepts can be broadlygrouped into three basic focus areas:

• The redefinition of traditional notions ofsecurity.

• The relationship between traditional securityinstitutions and environmental concerns.

• The relationship between environment andconflict.

As noted in the introduction, the emphasis ofthis report is on the third conceptual focus area, therelationship between environment and conflict.Nevertheless, it might be helpful to briefly portrayall three areas in order to attain an enhanced per-spective on the debate surrounding the linkbetween environment and conflict.

FOCUS AREA ONE: THE REDEFINITION OF SECURITY

Proponents of the redefinition of security claimthat by focussing solely on the military dimensionsof security, one risks bypassing non-militarythreats to security such as economic decline anddeteriorating human health conditions — bothinduced, in part, by demographic and environ-mental pressures such as population growth, pol-lution, and resource scarcity. Proponents stress thatin an increasingly socially and economically inter-dependent post-Cold War world, it is misguidedto consider military threats as the consummatesecurity concern. Economic as well as environmen-tal policies, not to mention overlapping ethnic andcultural conflicts, need to be addressed via theredefinition of security.6

Opponents of redefining security argue that byincluding non-military threats, the definition ofsecurity becomes so broad that it loses all practicalutility. They therefore support the continuation ofa strict demarcation between what they consider“low” (economic and environmental) and “high”(military) politics. 7

Page 6

Overview

FOCUS AREA TWO: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

TRADITIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 8

The dominant debate in this field of inquirycenters around the potential utility of military anddefense intelligence institutions in mitigating envi-ronmental concerns. Proponents argue that suchinstitutions are well trained and adapted for suchmissions.9 Opponents maintain that environmentalproblems require co-operative responses whereasdefense institutions are primarily of a conflictualnature, and therefore ill-suited for addressing envi-ronmental quandaries.10 Other critics add thatbecause defense institutions contribute signifi-cantly to environmental degradation, it is counter-intuitive and counter- productive to assign theseinstitutions to the duty of mitigating environmen-tal problems.11

FOCUS AREA THREE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

ENVIRONMENT AND CONFLICT

The notion that disputes and violence canerupt over access to resources appears common-place: international wars have been fought overaccess to land and water since biblical times.Indeed, the link between environmental resourcesand the outbreak of international conflict has beenrecognized for decades. What separates modern-day analysis on environmental conflicts, however,is a recognition of: (1) the role that populationgrowth plays in fomenting conflicts; and (2) thedistinction between non-renewable and renewableresources.

Post-1970 works on “environment and con-flict” emphasize the role that population growthplays in engendering resource scarcity.12 This“demand-induced scarcity” might either forcenations to look beyond their borders for resourcesand hence propel state expansion, or create appre-hension amongst the population(s) within a nationwhom are most affected by this scarcity and createconditions ripe for internal violence.

The distinction between non-renewable andrenewable resources is likely one of the moreimportant factors distinguishing past works onresource wars from modern-day analysis on “envi-ronment and conflict.” In the past, most analysison the link between resource scarcity and interna-tional war focussed on non-renewable resourcessuch as oil and minerals. Today, most experts donot contest the influence that non-renewableresource scarcity has had on the outbreak on inter-national conflict.13 Instead, the focus has shifted torenewable resources such as cropland, fish, forests,air and water.14 The various foci of those analyzingthe links between renewable resource scarcity andconflict, however, requires differentiation.

Renewable Resource Scarcity andConflict

There are two important distinctions to bemade while analyzing the renewable resourcescarcity - conflict relationship: (1) direct vs. indi-rect conflict; (2) international vs. intranational con-flict (see Figure, this page). These distinctions arenecessary in order to be able to group and analyzethe various aspects of environment and conflict.

Page 7

EnvironmentalSecurity

RedefiningSecurity

MilitaryInstitutions andtheEnvironment

EnvironmentalConflicts

Non-RenewableResources

RenewableResources

IndirectIntranational

DirectInternational

DirectIntranational

IndirectInternational

Environmental Security and Related Subfields

“Direct conflict” refers to conflict over renew-able resources that arises because of direct compe-tition between two or more parties for the controland/or access to these resources. “Indirect conflict”refers to conflict that arises when renewableresource scarcity interacts with one or moresocial/economic factors to elevate friction withinor between states. When “indirect conflict” occurs,environmental factors are only one factor exacer-bating and/or interacting with other social phe-nomena such as poverty and ethnic tensions.International conflict refers to conflict between twoor more nations. Intranational conflict refers toconflict within national boundaries.

Given these two distinctions, studies on thelink between renewable resource scarcity and con-flict can broadly be categorized under four distinctheadings:

• Direct international conflict

• Direct intranational conflict

• Indirect international conflict

• Indirect intranational conflict

Although the boundaries may sometimes beblurred, this typology can serve as a guide to theavailable scientific literature, and as a frameworkfor organizing empirical evidence.

Direct International ConflictProponents of this type of conflict claim that

an increasing demand for natural resources fuelledby population expansion, in combination with adwindling supply of natural resources brought onby ecological degradation, will inevitably augmentinternational competition over existing supplies ofnatural resources. This increased competitioncould give way to escalating tensions, and mayeventually foment international episodes.

While renewable resources such as croplands,fish, and forests have been identified as resourcesthat might produce international competition, it iswater — in particular river water — that has gar-nered the most attention from researchers.Proponents contend that water, like oil or othermonetarily lucrative and non-renewable resources,can potentially constitute a significant source ofeconomic and military strength for a nation. Whenwater demand outstrips available supply, a nationis able to justify military action (whether offensive

or defensive) in the name of economic preserva-tion and national security.15

Direct Intranational ConflictThere is little theoretical literature pointing to

the possibility of direct conflict over access toresources within national boundaries. This is notsurprising given that countries usually containlegal/institutionalized mechanisms for resolvingdirect conflicts that occur within national bound-aries, whereas the international system is charac-terized by relatively impotent legal/institutionalizedmechanisms for resolving nation-nation conflicts.

One recent example of “direct intranationalconflict”, however, is the violence that has eruptedin India over irrigation rights to the CauveryRiver.16 This dispute demonstrates that the dearthof theoretical literature in this area does not ruleout the general possibility that more direct intrana-tional conflicts will not occur.

Indirect International ConflictA number of analysts have recently predicted

that, rather than emanating from direct competi-tion over access to resources, international conflictwill likely arise when renewable resource scarcityinteracts with other economic and social factors toinflame tensions between nations. These analysespredict a trend, whereby wholesale clear-cutting ofvirgin forests, overfishing, soil erosion, contami-nation of water and agricultural resources, climatechange, and countless other forms of ecologicaland environmental degradation, lead to massmigrations, deteriorating human health condi-tions, and chronic poverty. These dire social effects,in turn, interact with smoldering hostilitiesbetween nations; the outcome is escalatinggrievances between nations which ultimately findtheir outlet in armed conflict.17

The majority of analyses on “indirect interna-tional conflict” have tended to focus on the conse-quences of large scale environmental changes suchas global warming and ozone depletion. For theseanalysts, large-scale environmental changes willgenerate a series of disturbing environmental con-ditions, which in turn will aggravate existing socialconditions and create circumstances ripe for inter-national conflict. Global warming, for example, hasthe potential for reducing agricultural output andraising sea-levels, two conditions that could exac-

Page 8

erbate poverty and human suffering, foment massmigrations, and eventually lead to internationalconflict.18

Indirect Intranational ConflictThe focus of much research on environmental

conflicts pertains to intranational conflicts thatarise when environmental scarcity interacts withother social circumstances to create conditions ripefor violence. Similar to “indirect international con-flict”, “indirect intranational conflict” occurs whenenvironmental factors such as soil erosion, agricul-tural contamination, and water pollution, exacer-bate and interact with other societal problems suchas poverty, ethnic cleavages, mass migrations, andan uneven distribution of political and economicresources. Researchers have also demonstrated thelink between the spread of micro-organisms andinfectious disease (emanating from deterioratingenvironmental conditions), and the physical andsocio-economic health of populations.19 The resultof these volatile combinations is often intranationalviolence which could take the form of revolution-ary insurrections, ethnic violence, urban crime, orstate-sponsored civilian repression.20

CONCLUSIONS TO OVERVIEW

The field of “environment and conflict” is asub-field of “environmental security.” Recentworks on environmental conflicts have shiftedfocus from non-renewable resources to renewableresources. Work on renewable resource conflictscan broadly be categorized under: (1) “direct” or“indirect” conflict; (2) international or intrana-tional conflict.

Based on this categorization, a typology wasdeveloped in this Overview with the purpose ofachieving two goals: (1) to help researchers andpolicy-makers better situate themselves in the vastliterature in the field of “environment and con-flict”, and more generally, “environmental secu-rity”; and (2) to establish the framework for a datacollection on environmental conflicts which, inturn, will help researchers and policy-makers iden-tify patterns in the linkages between environmen-tal resources and conflict, thereby facilitatingconflict resolution and prevention.

The following section will offer a data collec-tion of direct international conflict as well as indi-rect international and intranational conflict. The

data collection is followed by a series of brief syn-opses on selected case studies of indirect interna-tional and intranational conflicts. Finally, in theGeneral Conclusions, a summary and brief analy-sis of the material contained in this report will beoffered.

Page 9

The data collection below, although notexhaustive, lists environmental conflicts accordingto the typology laid out in the Overview.

The case studies which follow the data collec-tion are summaries of larger works written by var-ious researchers and experts in the field of“environment and conflict.” Not all of the environ-mental conflicts listed in the data collection arecovered in the case studies. The selected case stud-ies shall serve as examples and illustrate the theo-retical framework discussed in the Overview. Factsand arguments are those of the specific authorsand are in no way meant to convey the opinions ofeither the authors of this report or the UnitedNations Environment Programme.

Occasionally, secondary sources are used tocomplement the information provided. All sec-ondary sources have been duly endnoted. Thestudies will be grouped according to the afore-made typology.

The diagrams and summaries are not meant toconvey the complexities of the case study as dealtwith by the various authors. For a detailed accountof each case study refer to the original work inquestion.

Further, the focus of these case studies is on themanner in which environmental pressures play acausal role in conflict. In most cases there is morethan one causal variable generating episodes. Thefocus in these case studies, however, is on onecausal connection in particular: the environmentas a catalyst in the spawning of conflict.

How each case study is set up:

Summary. A brief overview of the case study isprovided.

Environmental Factors. The key environmen-tal factors that have contributed to the generationof conflict are explained in brief. Populationgrowth is considered here to be a demographic fac-

tor rather than an environmental factor.Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that popula-tion growth plays a primary role in generatingmost of the environmental factors consideredbelow. Soil erosion, deforestation, and water pollu-tion, for example, are all engendered, in large part,by population growth. Therefore, populationgrowth should be considered a major factor in eachof the case studies below.

Social Effect of Environmental Factors. Thissection gives a brief synopsis of the manner inwhich the environmental factors interact withother social and economic factors.

Conflict. Finally, the outcome of the interac-tion between environmental factors and othersocial and economic factors is briefly explained.

The map on the following page illustrates theareas affected by environmental conflicts andpotential conflicts.

Page 10

Data Collection and Selected Case Studies

Env

ironm

enta

l C

onfli

cts

— P

ast,

Pre

sent

and

Pot

entia

l

Indi

a

Indi

rect

Int

rana

tiona

l Con

flict

s

Dire

ct I

nter

natio

nal (

Pot

entia

l) C

onfli

cts

Ove

r W

ater

Mex

ico

Eth

iopi

a

Ken

ya

Pak

ista

n

Per

u

Phi

lippi

nes

Sud

an

Isra

el (

Gaz

a)

Mau

ritan

ia a

nd S

eneg

al

Pap

ua N

ew G

uine

a

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Indo

nesi

a

El S

alva

dor

- H

ondu

ras

Isra

el -

Pal

estin

e (W

est

Ban

k)

Som

alia

- E

thio

pia

Isra

el -

Pal

estin

e (G

aza)

Mau

ritan

ia -

Sen

egal

Indi

rect

Int

erna

tiona

l Con

flict

s

Key

:

Ban

glad

esh,

Ind

ia

Cam

bodi

a, L

aos,

Tha

iland

, V

ietn

am,

Chi

na

Isra

el,

Jord

an,

Syr

ia

Isra

el,

Pal

estin

e

Iraq

, S

yria

, T

urke

y

Kaz

akst

an,

Uzb

ekis

tan,

Tur

kmen

ista

n

Cze

chos

lova

kia

(for

mer

), H

unga

ry

Isra

el,

Syr

ia

Egy

pt,

Sud

an

Ecu

ador

, P

eru

Mex

ico,

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

Bra

zil,

Par

agua

y

Arg

entin

a, B

razi

l, P

arag

uay

Arg

entin

a, P

arag

uay,

Per

u

Eth

iopi

a, S

omal

ia

Bos

twan

a, N

amib

ia

Liby

a, E

gypt

, C

had,

Nig

er,

Sud

an

Egy

pt,

Eth

iopi

aIndi

a, P

akis

tan

Iraq

, S

yria

Primary Source(s)

Bingham et al., 1994;Wolf, 1997

Butts, 1997; Samson& Charrier, 1997

Wolf, 1997; Samson& Charrier, 1997

Wolf, 1997

Murphy & Sabadell,1986

Wolf, 1997

Wolf, 1995 & 1997

Wallenstein & Swain,1997

Gleick, 1993 & 1994;Wolf, 1997

Gleick, 1993 & 1995

Gleick, 1993

Samson & Charrier,1997; Wolf, 1997

Samson & Charrier,1997

Conflict?

No

No

Yes (both dates)

Yes

No (military manoeuvres)

Yes

Yes

No

No (military forcethreatened in 1974;military manoeu-vres in 1975)

No

No (military manoeuvres)

Yes

No

Time Frame

1947-1960s

1947-1996

1951; 1953

1958

1962-1967

1963-1964

1965-1966

1970s

1974; 1975

1990

1992

1995

1960s-present

Page 12

Direct International Conflicts and Potential Conflicts*Over Water Resources†

Countries

India, Pakistan

Bangladesh, India

Israel, Jordan, Syria

Egypt, Sudan

Brazil, Paraguay

Ethiopia, Somalia

Israel, Syria

Argentina, Brazil,Paraguay

Iraq, Syria

Israel, Syria, Turkey

Czechoslovakia,Hungary

Ecuador, Peru

Cambodia, Laos,Thailand, Vietnam,China

Body of Water/Territory

Indus, Sutlei

Brahmaputra,Ganges

Jordan River,Yarmuk, Litani

Nile

Parana

Ogaden Desertwater resources

Jordan River

Parana

Euphrates

Euphrates

Danube

Cenepa

Mekong

Key EnvironmentalFactors

Irrigation

Water flow, siltation,flooding

Water flow, drainage, diversion

Water diversion, flooding, siltation

Water supply

Water supply

Water diversion

Water flow

Water flow

Water flow

Water flow, diversion

Water supply

Water flow, flooding

* “Potential conflicts” refer to current or past disputes that threaten(ed) to erupt into conflict because of tensions.† Sources: Gleick, 1998; Renner, 1996.

Countries

Kazakstan,Uzbekistan,Turkmenistan

Mexico, UnitedStates

Israel, Palestine*

Egypt, Ethiopia

Argentina,Paraguay, Peru

Bostwana, Namibia,Angola

Libya, Egypt, Chad,Niger, Sudan

Time Frame

1960s-present

1960s-present

1970s-present

1978-present

1980s-present

1980s-present

1991-present

Body of Water/Territory

Aral Sea

Rio Grande

West Bank waterresources

Nile

Pilcomayo

Chobe

Okavango


Shrinking sea, waterscarcity, salinization

Water flow, salinization, pollution

Water allocation, aquiferwater rights

Water flow

Industrial pollution

Water diversion

Water diversion

Conflict?

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Primary Source(s)

Calder, 1998


Renner, 1996

Gleick, 1991 & 1994




Direct International Conflicts and Potential ConflictsOver Water Resources (cont’d)

* Neither UNEP nor the authors of this report seek to pass judgement on the legal status of Palestinians by labeling theIsrael-Palestine conflict under the heading of “International Conflicts.” That the conflict is listed under this heading is a reflection of the manner in which it is treated in the literature from which this study derives its information. See, for example, Kelly and Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: The Case of Gaza, 1995; Miriam R. Lowi, “West Bank Water Resources and the Resolution of Conflict in the Middle East, in Gleick, Water and and Conflict, 1992; Renner,Fighting for Survival, 1996.

Country(ies)

Philippines

Ethiopia

Mexico

Indonesia

India(Northeast)

Peru

Pakistan

Sudan

Mauritania andSenegal

Papua New Guinea

India (Bihar)

Time Frame ofConflict

1970s & 1980s

1980s

1994

1965-present

1979-present

1980-present

1981-present

1983-present

Mid-1980’s-present

1988-present

1980s-present

Page 14


Ecological degradation ofland

Soil degradation

Deforestation, soil erosion

Resource extraction, deforestation

Deforestation, flooding

Soil erosion

Soil erosion, water pollution, deforestation

Deforestation, desertifica-tion

Soil degradation, damconstruction

Pollution, mine tailings,toxic contamination

Cropland scarcity, defor-estation, desertification

Key Social/EconomicFactors

Poverty, mobilization ofsocially marginalized peoples

Declining agricultural out-put, increased competitionfor scarce resources

Ecological marginalization,increased opportunities foruprising

Uneven distribution of bene-fits from resource extraction

Reduction of agriculturalland, migrations, shifts inpolitical power

Economic decline, increasedrelative deprivation of peasants

Economic decline, migrations, increased com-petition for resources

Ecological and socialmarginalization, mobilizationof marginalized peoples

Migrations, competition forresources

Resentment byBougainvillians over pollu-tion from mine, perceivedlack of economic benefitsfrom mine

Rural-urban migration

Nature of Conflict

Anti-governmentcampaign

Group conflict

Group rebellion

Group conflict

Ethnic conflict


Ethnic and groupconflict

Ethnic and groupconflict

Ethnic conflict


Urban group con-flict

Indirect Intranational Conflicts

PrimarySource(s)

Myers, 1989 &1993

Molvoer, 1991

Howard &Homer-Dixon,1995

Barber, 1997

Hazarika, 1993;Homer-Dixon &Percival, 1996

Homer-Dixon &Percival, 1996

Geweski &Homer-Dixon,1996

Ahmed, 1989


Renner, 1996

Homer-Dixon,1997

PrimarySource(s)

Lume, 1996

Lang, 1995

Renner, 1996

Kelly & Homer-Dixon, 1995;Falkenmark,1989

Nature of Conflict

Ethnic group -state conflict

Ethnic conflict

Group-state conflict

Group-governmentconflict


Desertification, soil degradation

Overfishing, water pollution, inappropriatecultivation practices,deforestation

Pollution from oil exploration

Over-use of aquifer, agricultural pollution


1990-present

1991-present

1993-present

1994-present

Page 15

Country(ies)

Niger

Kenya

Nigeria

Israel (Gaza)

Key Social/EconomicFactors

Economic decline, relativedeprivation

Poverty, migrations,increased competition forresources

Resentment over pollutionand perceived lack of economic benefits from oilexploration

Health problems, loss oflegitimacy by PalestinianAuthority

Indirect Intranational Conflicts (cont’d)

PrimarySource(s)

Durham, 1979

Molvoer, 1991



Kelly & Homer-Dixon, 1995

Page 16

Countries

El-Salvador - Honduras

Somalia -Ethiopia

Israel -Palestine (West Bank)*

Mauritania-Senegal

Israel -Palestine(Gaza)*


1969

1977-1978

1987-1992

1989-1992

1995-present


Deforestation, SoilDegradation

Over-grazing of bush, deforestation

Over-pumping of aquifers,salinity, water pollution

Soil Degradation, dam construction

Over-use of aquifer, agricultural pollution

Key Social/Economic Factors

Agricultural land scarcity, migrations

Economic decline, migrations

Agricultural decline, migrations, urban poverty

Migration, competition forresources

Economic decline, rise of fundamentalism

Nature of Conflict

100-Day War

Military confrontations

Group uprising

Military confrontations

Protracted confrontations

Indirect International Conflicts

* Neither UNEP nor the authors of this report seek to pass judgement on the legal status of Palestinians by labeling theIsrael-Palestine conflict under the heading of “International Conflicts.” That the conflict is listed under this heading is a reflection of the manner in which it is treated in the literature from which this study derives its information. See, for example, Kelly and Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: The Case of Gaza, 1995; Miriam R. Lowi, “West Bank Water Resources and the Resolution of Conflict in the Middle East, in Gleick, Water and and Conflict, 1992; Renner,Fighting for Survival, 1996.

INDIRECT INTRANATIONAL

CONFLICTS

Philippines

SummaryThe New People’s Army (NPA) waged a insur-

gency in the rural Philippines during the 1970’sand 1980’s. Support for the NPA is bounteousamongst poor Filipinos', who have seen their eco-nomic situation grow progressively bleak.Economic woes can be traced, in part, to demo-graphic and environmental pressures such as pop-ulation growth, deforestation, and soil erosion,which have reduced the agricultural productivityof the land.

Environmental FactorsThe average amount of arable land per rural

inhabitant has declined to less than one acre, withsome experts predicting a fall to 0.6 acres per capitaby the year 2000. Three percent of landowners con-trol one-quarter of the country, while 60 percent ofrural families either cannot survive on their tinyplots or have no land at all. Alongside an unevendistribution of land resources, two importantcauses of land scarcity in the Philippines have beendeforestation and soil erosion.

Deforestation and Soil Erosion. Once teemingwith forests, woodlands are now confined to the

uplands in the Philippines. Deforestation has exac-erbated soil erosion in the lowlands, causing agri-cultural productivity to fall in this area.Consequently, peasants have been force to migrateto the ecologically fragile upland regions en masse.The uplands population now totals more than 20million people, or almost one-third of all Filipinos,with a rate of increase half again as large as that ofthe national population. This migration is nowthreatening the forests in the upland areas, forcingfarmers onto ever more steep slopes, and perpetu-ating a cycle of deforestation, soil erosion, declin-ing water supply (due in-part to uplanddeforestation), declining agricultural productivity,and relocation.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsAbout 70 percent of Filipinos depend on agri-

culture and fishing for their livelihood. Becausemany Filipinos’ incomes are closely related to theproductivity of the land , decreasing productivityhas augmented poverty for many. There is a perva-sive perception amongst poor Filipinos that thegovernment has been particularly unresponsive totheir plight.

Conflict: PhilippinesChronic poverty has raised grievances

amongst poor Filipinos, who have subsequentlybeen easily mobilized by the NPA’s anti-govern-ment campaign.

Page 17

Social & EconomicOutcomes & Factors

EnvironmentalFactors

DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

AgriculturalLand Scarcity

Rural Migrationsto EcologicallyFragile Lands

Deforestation and Soil Erosion

Decrease inAgriculturalProduction

IncreasedPoverty

Mobilization ofEcologicallyMarginalizedby NPA

NPA Conflicts Against Government

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Philippines Case Study

Ethiopia

SummaryDuring the famine that plagued Ethiopia in the

1980’s, Afar pastoralists migrated into settled agri-cultural areas, which led to clashes between theagriculturalist and pastoralist groups. While thefamine was brought on primarily by drought, con-ditions were aggravated by other demographicand environmental pressures including populationgrowth and soil degradation.

Environmental FactorsOne key environmental factor has combined

with low seasonal rainfall, poor moisture balance,and recurrent invasion of desert locusts, to pro-duce famine in Ethiopia: soil degradation.21 It isestimated that 50 percent of the highlands are sig-nificantly eroded, while 25 percent are seriouslyeroded and 4 percent are beyond recovery.22

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsFamine, brought on by a combination of

drought conditions and environmental stresses,forced the Afar pastoralists to seek out fertile landin areas that were traditionally farmed by agricul-tural groups.

Conflict: EthiopiaThe migration of pastoralists to land tradition-

ally farmed by agricultural groups, increased com-petition for already scarce resources, and led toprotracted conflicts between the two groups.

Mexico

SummaryThroughout the history of Chiapas, the wealth-

ier social groups have gained access to the mostagriculturally productive lands, while the the indí-genas (indigenous peoples) and campesinos (span-ish-speaking subsistence farmers) have only beenable to access the less fertile lands. While the 1917Mexican Constitution aimed to redistribute land toecologically marginalized peoples, there was awidespread feeling among the indígenas andcampesinos that the Partido RevolucionarioInstitutional (PRI) was intentionally sidesteppingthis principle as part of its overall 1992 economicreform policies.

This perceived inaction, combined with aweakened Mexican government and an increas-ingly dissatisfied peasantry — impoverished fromdeclining environmental conditions and expand-ing cropland scarcity — generated an opportunityfor a rebellion led by the Ejercito Zapatista deLeberacion Nacional (EZLN or commonlyZapatistas).

Page 18



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Ethiopia Case Study

Soil Degradation Land ScarcityDecliningAgriculturalOutput

Conflict BetweenPastoralists &Agriculturalists

DroughtConditions

Environmental FactorsTwo key environmental factors have interacted

with an uneven distribution of land and credit —as well as inadequate access to social infrastructuresuch as potable water and electricity — to producea scarcity of agricultural land for the Chiapan peas-antry: deforestation and soil erosion.

Deforestation. In Chiapas, deforestation hasbeen severe, especially in the Lacandon Rain Forestwhich is situated in the eastern lowlands. Manyecologically marginalized peoples have beenforced to earn a living in the eastern lowlands, andthe eastern lowlands is also where the Zapatistasdraw their greatest support. Deforestation hasbeen especially acute in this region, in part becauseof the peasantry’s reliance on fuel wood for theirenergy supplies. Between 1974 and 1986, theLacandon Rain Forest was reduced by 7.7 percentannually, and 42 percent was overtaken by sec-ondary forests.

Soil Erosion. Caused by a combination of nat-ural factors such as heavy rainfall and winds,deforestation, and unsustainable agricultural prac-tices, soil erosion has also been severe in severalparts of Chiapas: over 6 percent of the LacandonRain Forest was lost to soil erosion between 1974and 1986; between 20 and 50 percent of the high-lands is affected by soil erosion; and up to 5 per-cent of the major coffee producing region along thecoast has been severely degraded by waterlogging.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsAs a result of increasing cropland scarcity and

the widespread perception amongst Mexico’speasantry of the inaction on the part of the PRIwith regards to land rights, the wealthier socio-economic groups in Chiapas were able to solidifytheir control over the most agriculturally produc-tive land. Peasants were thereby forced to move tothe periphery of the Lacandon Rain Forest, wherenewly cleared land was either quickly degradedby over-use and unsustainable agricultural prac-tices, or usurped by the land-owning groups. Thisprocess of ecological marginalization intensified,inflicting chronic land shortage and poverty on theindígenas and campesinos.

Conflict: ChiapasThe Zapatista-led rebellion of 1994 bred from a

combination of: increasing grievances by an eco-logically marginalized peasantry; decreasing statecapacity to fulfill the social requirements of thesegroups of people; and an expanding occurrence ofgrass-roots action inspired by liberation theology.The Zapatistas were able to utilize this set of cir-cumstances. They effectively used long-standingsocial cleavages, and successfully laid blame forthe plight of the peasantry on the governmentregime.

Page 19

India (Northeast)

SummaryWhile Bangladesh has always been prone to

natural disasters, environmental pressures such asdeforestation and human encroachments haveexacerbated flood conditions and reduced theavailability of natural resources for Bengalis.Consequently, millions of Bengalis have migratedinto the states of Assam and Tripura in NortheastIndia. The migrations have shifted the balance ofpolitical power in these states, threatened indige-nous culture, and increased competition overresources. As a result, ethnic clashes have brokenout in both states, claiming the lives of thousandsof individuals.

Environmental FactorsTwo key environmental factors have played a

role in the exacerbation of natural flooding andreduction of available fertile agricultural land inBangladesh: deforestation and increasing humanencroachments close to river banks.

Deforestation and Human Encroachments.Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to natural dis-asters and experiences a regular cycle of floods,cyclones, and drought. Many experts agree, how-ever, that by reducing forest coverage throughupstream deforestation of the Himalayas, soil is

exposed to rain and winds, and flooding is exacer-bated.

Flooding reduces the availability of fertilecropland. During the annual floods, one-third ofthe country is covered in flood waters, making alltypes of agriculture virtually impossible. The 1988floods — one of the worst Bangladesh has everexperienced — reduced rice production by 1.6 mil-lion tons.

Human encroachments and settlements havealso exacerbated flooding in Bangladesh: naturaldrainage systems have been blocked, embanked ordamned (embankments designed to keep floodsout often end up trapping flood waters within vastareas for months at a time); natural depressionsand wetlands continue to be usurped for agricul-tural purposes; and road construction has madelow-lying areas more vulnerable to flooding byusing up large quantities of soil.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsPartly as a result of the environmental pres-

sures, subsequent impoverishment of the people,and relative attraction of neighboring India, over10 million Bengalis — close to 20 million whentheir descendants are included — have migratedto Northeast India in the last four decades, with asubstantial portion of that migration occurringafter 1974.

Page 20



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Deforestation

HumanEncroachmenton Natural Drainage Systems

Reduced AgriculturalLand

RegularFloodingExacerbated

Migration ofBengalis toIndia

Competition for Land

Shifting inBalance ofPolitical Power

Conflict

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for India (Northeast) Case Study

Conflict: Assam and TripuraBengali migration to Northeast India has trig-

gered a series of episodes in the states of Assamand Tripura. In Assam, Bengali migrants were per-ceived as an economic competitor (e.g. increasedcompetition for agricultural land), religious out-siders (Bengali migrants are primarily Muslimwhile the indigenous Assamese are mostly Hindu),and a political threat (Muslim migrants developedsignificant political and institutional sway).

Between 1979 and 1985, the differencesbetween the native population and newcomersemerged after a hotly contested plebiscite on theissue of “illegal aliens,” and ethnic riotingoccurred, resulting in the death of more than 4,000people.

As a consequence of Bengali migration (pre-dominantly Muslim migrants) into the state ofTripura, the indigenous population (mostlyBuddhists and Christians) have become a minor-ity. Frustrated by their demise in political power, adispute began in 1980, leading to the death of hun-dreds of Bengalis. Although the tension has ceased,attacks on government officials still occur.

Peru

SummaryIn May of 1980, Peru’s Sendoro Luminoso, or

“Shining Path”, began a campaign that spanned adecade and claimed tens of thousands of lives.Sendoro Luminoso arose because a subsistence cri-sis — that was causing severe economic declineand hardship in Peru’s southern highlands, espe-cially in the Ayacucho area — roused grievancesand a sense of relative deprivation in the region’speasantry.23 Although the economic plight of thehighland peasants can, in part, be traced to neglectfrom successive governments, the particularlydrastic decline in agricultural production was theresult of environmental pressures.

Environmental FactorsThe southern highlands are an ecologically

fragile area, unsuitable for agriculture. By 1980,population growth reduced cropland availabilityto below 0.2 hectare per capita. Soil degradation,caused by erosion and nutrient depletion, furtherdegraded this resource base. The land becameunable to produce a sufficient amount of food forthe region’s subsistence-based farmers.

Page 21



DemographicFactors

Conflict

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

SoilErosion

DecreasedCroplandAvailability

UnevenDistributionof Resources

Decline inAgriculturalOutput ofHighlands

EconomicDecline

Increased RelativeDeprivation ofHighland Peasants

FailedAgrarianReform

Rise ofShining Path

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Peru Case Study

Social Effect of Environmental ConditionsDecreasing agricultural output created an eco-

nomic crisis for the southern highland peasantry.Family incomes dropped severely in the 1970’s and1980’s. In 1980, per capita income in the Peruvianhighlands was 82 percent of the 1972 level. As aresult, food intake for the peasantry dropped wellbelow internationally accepted standards: In 1980,people in the southern highlands had less than 70percent of the UN Food and AgriculturalOrganization daily requirement.

Conflict: PeruCoupled with the perceived failure of a major

agrarian reform attempt, instituted by the militarygovernment between 1968 and 1980, grievanceswithin the population mounted.24 Young, univer-sity-educated radicals, who had little opportunityfor employment upon graduation, forged analliance with the region’s peasantry. A socialprotest movement began, which quickly turnedinto a terrorist movement led by SenderoLuminoso. A strong correlation developedbetween the degree of suffering felt by areas withinthe highlands and the degree of support shown forthe Sendero Luminoso.

Pakistan

SummaryIn the last decade, Pakistan has experienced a

growing number of incidents. The clashes are usu-ally social or ethnic-based, and occur most fre-quently in large urban centers such as Karachi.

The root of the violence can be traced, in part,to growing demographic and environmental pres-sures such as population growth, soil erosion,deforestation, and water pollution. These pressureshave generated a shortage of land and water inPakistan. In the rural areas of the country, smallfarmers have been forced off the land by largeland-owners, which has heightened tensionsbetween the have and the have-nots and led toperiodic violence between these two groups. Thedecreased agricultural output stemming from thescarcity of land and water has also induced a mas-sive rural migration to large urban centers in

Pakistan. The inability of an already weak govern-ment to meet the increased demands of these over-crowded urban centers has deepened ethniccleavages and generated numerous incidents.

Environmental FactorsThree key environmental factors have com-

bined with an already uneven distribution ofresources, to produce water and land scarcity inPakistan: water pollution, deforestation, and soildegradation.

Water Pollution. The increasing demands onwater resources from a swelling population, hascombined with a naturally arid climate to producea chronic shortage of water in Pakistan. Furtheraggravating this water scarcity is the heavy siltingof water reservoirs, which prevents Pakistan fromstoring excess water (from periods of high precipi-tation) for periods of drought; and an inadequatesewage system which had polluted Pakistan’srivers with domestic and industrial waste.

Deforestation and Soil Degradation. Due toan increasing demand for new agricultural landand a continued reliance on fuel wood, forest coverhas decreased from 14.2 percent to 5.2 percent ofPakistan’s total land area. Deforestation, coupledwith salinity, sodicity, waterlogging, flooding, andloss of organic matter, have rendered 62 percent ofPakistani land unfit for crop, livestock, andforestry production.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsLand and water scarcity in Pakistan has threat-

ened to produce a significant decline in total agri-cultural production, and has already led to adecline in the efficiency of small farms. While totalagricultural output has been rising at an averageof 4 percent per annum, unsustainable agriculturalactivity has rendered output highly vulnerable tosharp downturns.

Constraints on agricultural activity has pro-duced significant economic hardships for mayrural Pakistani farmers. About one-quarter offarmers are forced to supplement their agriculturalearnings by other means, and underemploymentis severe.

Declining agricultural activity has produced anoverall economic downturn, especially formarginal societal groups. While overall GDP has

Page 22

been strong, structural weaknesses in the economyhave weighed disproportionately on the poorersegments of Pakistan’s population. Agriculturaland economic decline, in turn, have reduced thecapacity of the state to respond to the growingnumbers of economically marginalized individu-als in Pakistan.

Conflict: Rural and Urban PakistanIn rural Pakistan, land scarcity has prompted

the economically strong social groups to access themost productive land and forests, thereby forcingsmall farmers to ecologically marginal lands. In thewake of their ecological marginalization, orga-nized gangs have formed with increasing regular-ity. Their illegal activity has sparked a series ofreprisals from the land-owning elite. Althoughwidespread conflict has been avoided, incidentsoccur regularly.

Ecological marginalization has also forcedmany rural Pakistanis to migrate to large urbancenters. Swelling urban populations have exacer-bated urban slums which suffer from a chronicshortage of basic urban resources such as tapwater. Coupled with the authorities’ difficulties tomeet these growing demands, the economicallystrong social groups have successfully appropri-ated urban amenities which they rent or resell atexcessively high costs to poor immigrants.Economic inequalities have heightened tensions

between long-standing ethnic rivals, and createdconditions with a high potential for violence.Urban violence has been occurring in the cities ofHyderabad, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi. The mostsevere incidents have occurred in the nation’s cap-ital, Karachi. In Karachi, competition over increas-ingly scarce urban resources such as electricalpower, have induced a series of incidents betweenthe Punjabis, Pathans, and Sindhi peoples.

Sudan

SummaryDevastated by civil war between north and

south that engulfed the nation from 1966-1972,Sudan once again witnessed an outbreak of north-south violence in 1983 that continues to the presentdate.

Impelled by a restructuring of the internationaleconomy, and constrained by a legacy of colonialrule that conferred only the capability for resourceextraction to the exclusion of industrialization, theJallaba (Arab Sudanese with relative wealth andpolitical power) introduced large-scale mecha-nized farming to Northern Sudan after indepen-dence was achieved in 1956. By the 1980’s, arableland scarcity, induced in part by the environmentalramifications of mechanized farming and in-partby a shortage of rainfall, forced the Jallaba to move

Page 23



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

RuralConflict

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Pakistan Case Study

UrbanConflict

WaterPollution

Soil Erosion

Deforestation

WaterScarcity

AgriculturalLand Scarcity

UnevenDistribution ofLand Resources

ReducedAgriculturalOutput

EconomicDecline

DecreasedStateCapacity

Rural-UrbanMigration

UrbanDecay

Appropriation ofRemaining Fertile Land by Owning Classes

Appropriation ofUrban Amenitiesby Wealthy Classes

Deepening ofEthnicCleavages

southward in search of virgin land and untappedresources. Development projects in SouthernSudan incited grass-roots mobilization by south-ern Sudanese and ecologically marginalized north-ern Sudanese. With the formation of the SudanPeople’s Liberation Army (SPLA, later the SudanPeople’s Liberation Movement - SPLM), themarginalized people had a means to pursue action.Violence broke out not long after, when the SPLAorganized attacks against the installations of theJonglei Canal and several oil-exploration compa-nies.

Environmental FactorsThree environmental factors were responsible

for producing a scarcity in the amount of availableagricultural land in Northern Sudan: soil degrada-tion, deforestation, and a reduction in rainfall.

Soil Degradation. Large-scale mechanizedfarming has contributed to increasing soil degra-dation and desertification in Sudan. Half of thetotal usable land has experienced severe topsoilloss in Northern Sudan.

Deforestation. With an increasing demand forfuel wood (caused in part by a growing popula-tion) and the advent of large-scale mechanizedfarming (which demand a constant pursuit of vir-gin soil), forests in Northern Sudan have been dec-imated. At current rates of consumption versusregeneration and afforestation, all forest area in

Northern Sudan is expected to be denuded by theyear 2003.

Reduced Rainfall. Sudan experienced a pre-cipitation decrease of nearly 50 percent over thelast 15 years. Consequently, periodic droughts suf-fered by certain regions in Sudan have intensifiedand been prolonged significantly. While “natural”causes have been blamed for the intensificationand prolongation of droughts, many expertsbelieve that both overgrazing and deforestation aswell as global warming, have exacerbated droughtconditions.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsThe exhaustion of northern resources forced

the Jellaba to expand their search for virgin landsinto Southern Sudan. By the end of the 1970’s, theJellaba had begun a number of schemes based onthe oil, water, and land resources in the south (e.g.Chevron oil explorations and export-pipelinescheme, construction of Janglei canal, and expan-sion of mechanized farming into southernKordonfan and the northern sections of the upperNile).

Conflict: SudanThe southern Sudanese responded to the

development schemes of the Jellaba by forming theSPLM/SPLA. The first attacks by the SPLM/SPLA

Page 24



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Sudan Case Study

Desertification

Deforestation

IncreasedFamine

DroughtConditions

InternationalEconomicPressures

Increased Needfor Cash Crops

EcologicalMarginalizationof Poor Sudanese

Mobilization by, and Identificationwith SPLA/SPLM

IncreasedMechanizedFarming inSouthern Sudan

Conflict

were directed against the installations of oil explo-ration companies and the Jonglei Canal. A grow-ing number of ecologically marginalized andimpoverished Northern Sudanese joined theSPLM/SPLA.

Mauritania and Senegal

The intranational portion of this conflict is cov-ered under the Mauritania-Senegal case study inthe “Indirect International Conflicts” sectionwhich follows.

Kenya

SummaryThe ability of Kenyan society to avoid large-

scale civil war (despite numerous analysts’ predic-tions to the contrary) notwithstanding, the countryhas experienced significant violence. Ethnicclashes, between various tribes, such as amongstpastoralists as well as between pastoralists andfarming tribes, has become more evident and acuteover time. In particular, the clashes between theKalenjin (as well as other pastoralists) andKikuyus, have become acute since 1991. Clashes

have claimed the lives of thousands of individuals,and continue to the present date.

Environmental and demographic stresses haveoften precipitated these episodes. A growing pop-ulation combined with unsustainable ecologicalpractices have resulted in a significant depletion ofavailable resources, which in turn has led toimpoverishment, migrations and clashes overaccess to remaining resources.

Environmental FactorsThree key environmental factors have played a

role in the decrease of available fertile agriculturalland and depletion of fish stocks: overfishing andwater pollution, deforestation, and desertification.

Overfishing and Water Pollution. LakeVictoria, by surface area the third-largest freshwater lake in the world and an extremely impor-tant source of fish for Kenya, has experienced sig-nificant reduction in fish stock levels. Thisreduction can be attributed in part to overfishingand toxic chemicals flowing in from the sevenKenyan rivers that feed lake Victoria.

The sustainable yield for Lake Victoria isapproximately 100,000 metric tons per year. Thisfigure has been exceeded numerous times in thelast decade. In 1991, Kenyans alone caught 186,000metric tons. Kenyan share of Lake Victoria is about10 percent. Therefore the total degree of overfish-ing in Lake Victoria is a magnitude higher.

Page 25



DemographicFactors

Conflict

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Overfishing

Water Pollution

InappropriateCultivationPractices

Deforestationand SoilErosion

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Kenya Case Study

DecreasedFish Stocks

Desertification

Scarcity ofFertileAgriculturalLand

Poverty

PopulationDisplacement and Migration

HeightenedCompetitionfor Resources

Deepening ofEthnic Cleavages

Rivers carrying pollutants (e.g. smoke particlesderiving from the burning of forests and fields inthe hinterland) flow into Lake Victoria. These pol-lutants have resulted in a massive influx of nitro-gen, phosphorus, and sulphur, which has boostedthe reproduction of oxygen-usurping seaweed inthe lake and led to a “death zone” for fish which isalready over 40 meters thick.

Deforestation. Between 1970 and 1990, Kenyalost 11,450 hectares of forests. One of the primaryeffects of this deforestation has been a reduction insoil quality. By exposing the soil to wind and rain,deforestation has led to a reduction in croplandavailability and cropland production.

Silting caused by soil erosion has also resultedin the near disappearance of Lake Jipe and LakeBogoria, and has systematically reduced the watertable of Lake Turkana — Kenya’s second largestlake.

Desertification. Inappropriate cultivationpractices, over-cultivation, and the use of toxicchemicals and pollution, have all contributed toKenya’s alarming desertification. Nearly 483,860km2 (83 percent of the total area of Kenya) areaffected by desertification to varying degrees.Close to 110,000 km2 can be considered severelyaffected, while 53,000 km2 show moderate signs ofdesertification.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsDepleted fish stocks and increasingly scarce

fertile land have resulted in two social effects: eco-nomic decline and migrations.

Economic Decline. While Kenya has faceddroughts for many decades, the effects of thesedroughts in combination with the pressures of ascarcity in viable agricultural land and renewablefish stocks contributed to economic hardship forKenyans. Food imports and food aid are stillneeded in Kenya.

Migrations. The Kikuyu peoples, who receivedspecial privileges during colonial rule have beenmigrating out of fertile highlands in search of newland since the 1960’s. Migrations have intensifiedin the last two decades. Many Kikuyu peopleshave migrated to the Rift Valley, where the Kalenjinpeoples and other pastoralists reside.

Conflict: KenyaClashes between various groups began in

1991, intensified in 1992, and continue to the pre-sent date. The most prominent clashes haveoccurred between the Kalenjin “warriors” as wellas members of pastoralist tribes such as theMasaai, and the Kikuyu peoples. Tribe members ofthe Luo, Luhya, Kisii, Kamba, Meru, and Teso,have also been targets of the Kalenjin “warriors”and the Masaai.

Migrations have contributed to these clashes.Economic decline has also fuelled these conflictsby making competition over already scarceresources more intense. The violence has taken aserious toll on the Kenyan nation. Before the endof 1993, some 1,500 persons had been killed, about1 percent of the population has been displaced, andthe area affected covered about 25 percent ofKenya. More recently, in 1994, the clashes spreadto areas that formerly were calm, such as parts ofthe Coast and Western Pokot. In that area, up to10,000 people are feared dead.

Israel (Gaza)

The intranational portion of this conflict is cov-ered under the Israel-Palestine (Gaza) case studyin the “Indirect International Conflicts” sectionwhich follows.

Page 26

INDIRECT INTERNATIONAL

CONFLICTS

El Salvador - Honduras

SummaryOn July 14, 1969 El Salvador launched an inva-

sion of Honduras commencing a battle that hasbeen coined the “Soccer War.” The war lasted only100 days, but claimed the lives of several thousandindividuals, turned 100,000 into homeless and job-less refugees, and inflicted severe economic losseson both nations.

Environmental and demographic stressesplayed a key role in the outbreak of war betweenEl Salvador and Honduras. A combination of rapidpopulation growth, inequitable access to resources,and degradation of available resources, forcedmarginal groups in El Salvador to migrate toHonduras in search of new resources. Large land-owners in Honduras redirected blame for the eco-nomic plight of poor Hondurans, by pointing tothe new immigrants as the primary culprits in adiminishing and increasingly degraded resourcesbase. Hondurans reacted by expelling the ElSalvadoran immigrants. El Salvador responded tothis expulsion by closing its borders to Honduranrefugees, and eventually declaring war onHonduras.

Environmental FactorsTwo key environmental factors interacted with

an uneven distribution of land to create a scarcityof arable land, and a subsequent decrease in agri-cultural productivity in both El Salvador andHonduras: deforestation and soil degradation.

The role that inequitable resource distributionplayed in both the migration of El Salvadorans toHonduras, and in the increased scarcity ofresources in Honduras that precipitated the expul-sion of El Salvadoran immigrants is emphasizedby the underlying research.

Deforestation and Soil Degradation. In 1969,El Salvador had depleted nearly the entire stock ofits virgin forests. Combined with the over-irriga-tion of the small tracts of land that they had beenforced onto by large landowners, soil quicklyeroded and food production fell rapidly. Similarconditions prevailed in Honduras.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsFaced with growing resource shortages and

declining agricultural activity, small farmers inEl Salvador began to migrate to Honduras —which was perceived as a country with greaterresource abundance. Close to 300,000 Salvadoransmigrated to Honduras.

Page 27



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Deforestation

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for El Salvador - Honduras Case Study

SoilDegradation

AgriculturalLand Scarcity inEl Salvadorand Honduras


DecreasedAgriculturalProduction inEl Salvadorand Honduras

Migration ofEl-Salvadoriansto Honduras

Land-owners in Honduras Success-fully Lay Blame forEconomic Declineon New Immigrants

HondurasExpels El-SalvadoranImmigrants

El SalvadorResponds byClosing Bordersto HonduranRefugees

WarBetween

El Salvador andHonduras

Conflict: El Salvador and HondurasSmall farmers in Honduras, like their

Salvadoran counterparts, were forced onto smalltracts of land by large landowners in the 1960’s. Acycle of poverty for small Honduran farmersbegan, which increased environmental degrada-tion and diminished agricultural productivity.

The arrival of Salvadoran immigrants exacer-bated resource competition between the large andsmall farmers in Honduras. Large landownersblamed the Salvadoran immigrants for the eco-nomic woes of the small Honduran farmers. TheSalvadoran immigrants were subsequentlyexpelled from Honduras, which prompted ElSalvador to retaliate with refugee restrictions oftheir own. The political battle quickly escalated,and climaxed on July 14, 1969, when El Salvadorinvaded Honduras.

Somalia - Ethiopia

SummaryConflicts between the Ishaq and Ogaden (two

Somali pastoralists groups; the latter of whomoccupy the Haud in eastern Ethiopia), have beenoccurring for decades. In the last two to threedecades, however, these conflicts have been exac-erbated by environmental stresses, which have

contributed to conflict by escalating competitionover increasingly scarce resources.


with increasing drought and famine conditions, toprovoke increased migrations of the Ishaq into theOgaden areas: desertification due to congestionand overgrazing.25 Environmental stresses wereintensified as the animal population increasedvastly with the growing demand for meat exportsto the Middle East in the 1950’s, 60’s, and 70’s.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsDue to population growth and concomitant

desertification, the Ishaq of northern Somalia havebeen forced to augment the rate of their periodicmigrations to the Haud.

Conflict: Ethiopia and SomaliaIn 1947, an official report about northern

Somalia expressed fear that “irreversible ruin”may hit the soil and vegetation of the area due tocongestion and overgrazing; and the “OfficialReport” for 1952-53 stated that 80 persons had diedin disputes over grazing and watering rights.26

In more recent decades, the increased migra-tion of the Ishaq into the Haud has generated con-

Page 28



DemographicFactors

Conflict

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Somalia - Ethiopia Case Study

Over-grazingof Somali Bush

DeforestationandDesertification

DroughtConditions

EconomicDecline andFamine

Migration ofSomalis intoEthiopianTerritory

IncreasedCompetitionOver ScarceResources

flict between this latter pastoralist group and theOgaden. These clashes contributed to the warbetween Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-78, and “thedispute between the two main clan families hashad repercussions in internal Somali politics rightup to the present.”27

Israel - Palestine (West Bank)

SummaryIn 1967 Israel went to war against the Arab

nations, partly because the Arabs had tried todivert Jordan River headwaters that feed Israel.28

Since the 1967 war, water has remained a priorityin Israel’s security strategy. Water is intimately tiedto Israel’s political culture, and the West Bankaquifer provides 25-40 percent of Israel’s water.29

The state of Israel has, however, been unable toadequately address the issue of water scarcity inthe West Bank. Consequently, water shortages con-tinue to hamper Israeli-Arab relations. TheIntafadah, which began in the West Bank andlasted from 1987 to 1992, was in part a function ofmounting poverty and ascending grievancesinduced by water scarcity. More recently, the tran-sition to Palestinian autonomous rule in the WestBank remains vulnerable to the economic andsocial pressures created by water shortages.

Environmental FactorsOne key environmental factor combined with

an uneven distribution of water in the West Bankproduced water scarcity: pollution of waterresources.

The uneven distribution of water in the WestBank is a primary factor in the water shortagefaced by West Bank Palestinians. Palestinianexperts generally acknowledge that Israel providesrequisite water to the West Bank for domestic andindustrial use. They nevertheless claim that Israelrefuses to provide sufficient water for agriculturalexpansion, which is viewed as the life-force of eco-nomic viability for West Bank Palestinians.30

Water Pollution. Israel’s population, whichcurrently stands at 5.8 million, is expected toincrease to over 6.7 million in the year 2020.Although this population growth rate is not alarm-ingly high, the current demand for water resourcesalready exceeds the available supply. Israel’sannual renewable freshwater supply is roughly1,950 m3, while current demand is 2,150 m3. By theyear 2020, the country’s water demand will exceed2,600 m3.

As a result of the increasing demand, the Israelgovernment limited the prerogative of Palestiniansto drill wells, while simultaneously allowing thispractice of Jewish West Bank settlers. Where well-drilling for Jewish settlements is carried out inclose proximity to Palestinian springs or wells, the

Page 29



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

UprisingAgainstIsrael

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Israel - Palestine (West Bank) Case Study

Pollution

Over-Pumpingof Aquifers

Salinity

WaterScarcity


AgriculturalDecline

Migration ofPalestiniansto Towns

IncreasedPoverty

IncreasedGrievances ofPalestinians

result has frequently been a marked decline in theoutput of these springs and a lowering of the waterlevels in the wells. Moreover, the shallower andless geologically-sound wells dug by thePalestinians are more susceptible to salinizationand salt-water intrusion, as well as to pollutionfrom industrial and agricultural run-off. Thus, thesupply of water is also reduced by contamination.

Social Effect of Environmental ConditionsThe scarcity of water, felt most acutely by the

Palestinian population, has severely reduced agri-cultural output in the West Bank. The proportionof Palestinian's cropland that is irrigated hasdropped from 27 percent in the mid-1960’s tobetween 3.5 percent and 6 percent currently.Because of the declining profitability of agricul-ture, the loss of cultivated land to settlements, andan increasingly saline water supply, a large seg-ment of the Palestinian population has abandonedagriculture. Many Palestinians have turned tounskilled day labor inside the Green Line, whileothers are unemployed.

Conflict: West BankThe economic hardships incurred by the

Palestinians has augmented grievances against thestate of Israel, and contributed to the Intafadahuprising. Currently, water scarcity continues togenerate economic decline for West BankPalestinians, which in turn threatens to underminethe peace process as well as the transition to lim-ited autonomy.

Mauritania - Senegal

SummaryA combination of persistent drought, soil

degradation induced by unsustainable agriculturalpractices, and a rising population, fosteredresource shortages in the Senegal-Mauritaniaregion during the 1970’s. The inability to satisfy thefood demand for both black Africans residing inthe Senegal River Valley and Arabic Moors livingin Northern Mauritania, motivated the region’sgovernments to build a series of dams along theSenegal river. The dams were completed in 1988.

Encouraged by the prospects of more productiveagriculture and higher property values, theNorthern Moors migrated south during the mid-1980’s. Mauritanian black Africans claim that withthe assistance of the Mauritanian government, theNorthern Moors systematically expropriated landpreviously owned by them. This perceived expro-priation deepened historically entrenched ethniccleavages between black Africans and Moors in theSenegal-Mauritania region, and prompted attacksand counter-attacks between the two ethnicities inboth countries. Regional stability was also threat-ened when tensions climaxed in a standoffbetween the two nations.

Environmental FactorsRecurrent droughts combined with one key

human-induced environmental pressure to createagricultural land scarcity and food shortages: soildegradation. A 1982 UN study concluded that bothMauritania and Senegal could not support theirprojected populations without a large increase inagricultural productivity.

Soil Degradation has been induced by winderosion, loss of nutrients, salinization due to over-irrigation, and soil compaction caused by theintensification of agriculture.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsAs a direct result of the land scarcity and

inability to meet the food demand, the govern-ments of both Senegal and Mauritania sought andreceived international finance to build a series ofdams along the Senegal river. The dams weredesigned to regulate the river’s flow to producehydro power and expand irrigated agriculture.

By the mid-1980’s, competition for the landand its enhanced productivity escalated. Moorsbegan to migrate from drought-stricken NorthernMauritania. Simultaneously, Mauritanian blackAfricans allege that the Moor-dominatedMauritanian government facilitated the expropria-tion of their property by abolishing the traditionallandholding system. They further claim that blackAfrican farmers were denied any legitimaterecourse to protect their lands from seizure andwere forcibly expelled from the country.

Page 30

Conflict: Mauritania and SenegalThe perceived harsh treatment incurred by

Mauritanian black Africans at the hands of theMauritanian government conjured historically-rooted memories of enslavement and economicdomination of black Africans by Moors. Due to theclose ties of black African Senegalese to theirMauritanian counterparts, they rallied behind thecause of their fellow Mauritanians, once againbringing to the surface an historic ethnic dividebetween southern ethnic groups and Moors.

A series of attacks and counter-attacks ensuedin April of 1989. Across the nation bands of youthsviolated the homes and businesses of Moors,destroying and/or looting almost every one of the17,000 Moor-owned shops in Senegal. At least 35Moors were killed in Senegal, and between 15,000and 20,000 had to be safeguarded under militaryprotection. Rioters in Mauritania, in turn, killed200 black Africans over a period of several days.

The ethnic clashes strained relations betweenthe two nations. After severing diplomatic tieswith each other, military confrontations ensued.The two countries exchanged rounds of artilleryacross the border on numerous occasions.

Although ethnic clashes have subsided andofficial diplomatic ties were restored in 1992, ten-sions stemming from the episodes continue tohamper both intranational and international rela-tions to the present date.

Israel - Palestine (Gaza)

SummaryThe achievement of limited autonomy for

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip has not been fol-lowed by the peace and stability that many hadhoped would follow. The Palestinian Authority(PA), led by Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) leader Yasser Arafat, has faced politicalopposition from Islamic groups — who have alsounleashed a series of attacks on Israel.

Environmental factors have played a causalrole in both the intra-Palestinian violence and thePalestinian-Israeli violence. Due in part to achronic shortage of usable water, the Gazan econ-omy has declined significantly. Economic declinehas challenged the legitimacy of the PLO, andgiven an opportunity for the support of Islamicgroups such as Hamas. The chronic shortage ofusable water is due to a number of factors includ-ing: an uneven division of water resources in favorof Israel; “natural” ecological conditions such aslow precipitation; overuse of the one freshwateraquifer in Gazan territory; and pollution of muchof the available water supply from both industrialand agricultural runoff.


with an already arid climate and an uneven distri-

Page 31



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Mauritania and Senegal Case Study

Soil Degradation

Dam Construction

Migration ofMoors to South

Capture ofResourcesby Moors

Deepening of EthnicCleavages

EthnicConflict

Land Scarcityin Northand South

FoodShortages

DroughtConditions

MilitaryConfrontations

bution of water resources to produce severe waterscarcity in Gaza: agricultural contamination.

Agricultural Contamination. As a result ofpopulation growth in Gaza, water supplies are nolonger sustainable: water use by GazanPalestinians ranges from 100 to 140 m3 a year,whereas the sustainable supply is around 65 m3 ayear. Taxation of the aquifer (combined with theproximity of the aquifer to the surface as well as itsproximity to another saline aquifer), has led tofalling water tables, which in turn has allowed forsaltwater intrusion from the Mediterranean. Someexperts predict that total salinization of the aquiferwill occur in the near future.

The proximity of the aquifer to the surface alsorenders it vulnerable to agricultural and industrialrunoff which pollutes the aquifer. Often unregu-lated use of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers,as well as leachate from industrial waste and bio-logical contaminants from sewage, have renderedmuch of Gaza’s water supply unfit for human con-sumption and agricultural use.

Social Effects of Environmental ConditionsA corollary to the scarcity of water resources

and contamination of available supply, has beenboth agricultural decline and human health prob-lems for Gazans. These effects have combined with

an already highly indigent economy and have ledto further economic decline in Gaza.

Agricultural GDP has declined nearly 20 per-cent in the last decade. Within the agricultural sec-tor, farmers have been forced to turn tosalt-tolerant crops and permeable soil. As a result,Gazan farmers have replaced citrus productionwith vegetable production — a far less profitableventure. Health effects emanating from the humanconsumption of contaminated water are pro-nounced. Water contamination in Gaza has beenlinked to infant mortality, infectious disease, andhypertension.

Agricultural decline and human health prob-lems have exacerbated economic decline in Gaza.Unemployment in Gaza is estimated at 60 percent,and many workers have been forced to depend onwage labor from Israeli jobs which are vulnerableto border closures.

Conflict: GazaA rapidly declining economy has combined

with a widespread sentiment among GazanPalestinians that Yasser Arafat sacrificed too muchin the deal for limited autonomy. These factorshave generated a perceived reduction in the legiti-macy of the PLO and the PA, which has extendedthe opportunity for Islamic organizations to fill thevoid. The Islamic group Hamas, in particular, hasresponded to the economic plight of the

Page 32



DemographicFactors

Conflict

PopulationGrowth

Flow Chart of Environmental Conflict for Israel (Gaza) Case Study

Over-Useof Aquifer

AgriculturalPollution andIndustrialRunoff

WaterScarcity

Human HealthProblems

AgriculturalDecline

EconomicDecline

Loss ofLegitimacyby PA

IncreasedOpportunity forRise of Islam

IncreasedIsraeli Pressureon PA

Intra-PalestinianConflicts

ConflictAgainstIsrael

Palestinians, thus augmenting their popularity.Hamas have used the increased support to furtherlegitimize their attacks on Israel as well as to legit-imize their opposition to the PLO/PA. Tensionsbetween the PA and Islamics came to a head inNovember 1994, when sixteen people died and twohundred were wounded in an eruption of hostili-ties between the official police force and support-ers of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In August 1995, athousand protesters confronted Palestinian policewho were trying to arrest a suspected Hamasleader. Hamas has also launched a number of sui-cide raids on Israel, which in turn has provokedretaliations.

Page 33

This report has highlighted a disturbing trendin the international system: increasingly, interna-tional and intranational conflict appears to belinked to deteriorating environmental conditionsand resources. This linkage reflects deterioratingenvironmental conditions worldwide, but recogni-tion of the linkage is due in large part to a post-Cold War shift in discourse at the internationallevel; a shift away from traditional “high politics”issues of war between major powers, to “low poli-tics” issues such as poverty, population growthand environmental degradation.

The report demonstrates that the nexusbetween the environment and conflict is notalways straightforward. Most often, environmen-tal factors are enmeshed in a complex web ofsocial, economic and political factors that functiontogether to engender conflict. Nevertheless, if it isby understanding the nature and causes of conflictthat we will enable the fabrication of solutions,then both the theoretical and empirical evidencecontained in this report suggest that environmen-tal conditions and resources should be a focal pointfor conflict resolution and conflict prevention atboth the international and national levels.

The typology presented in the Overview wasdevised in order to facilitate this resolution andprevention of environmentally-related conflicts.This typology provides policy-makers andresearchers with a concise guide to the fields of“environment and conflict” and “environmentalsecurity”, and allows them to better situate the lit-erature within these increasingly complex fields.Familiarization with the literature and issuesshould allow policy-makers and researchers toengage in a more informed and fruitful discourseof these issue-areas, which, in turn, should facili-tate efforts of conflict resolution and prevention.

Moreover, by arranging the empirical evidenceaccording to the break-down indicated by the

typology, policy-makers and researchers will bebetter positioned to identify patterns in the link-ages between environmental conditions and theoutbreak of conflict. And by continuing to add casestudies to the data collection, these patterns shouldincreasingly come into sharper relief, thereby facil-itating the resolution and prevention of environ-mental conflicts. While it is not the intention ofthis report to engage in an analysis of these pat-terns, some trends are immediately discernible:

• Conflicts over water resources are the mostlikely source of “direct international” environmen-tal conflict. In particular, water flow, diversion,saliniation, flooding, and pollution are the mostcommon environmental elements around whichconflict over water resources erupt.

• The most common environmental factorsthat lead to both “indirect international” and “indi-rect intranational” conflicts are deforestation, soilerosion, desertification, flooding, and pollution.These environmental factors, in turn, combine withpopulation growth and an uneven distribution ofresources to engender and interact with a series ofsocial effects, the most common of which arepoverty, relative deprivation, migration, shifts inpolitical power, and state failure or loss of statelegitimacy.

• From the empirical evidence across all cate-gories, it appears that the vast majority of environ-mentally-related conflicts occur within andbetween developing nations.

Each of these trends points to avenues for con-flict resolution and prevention. The first twotrends, for example, suggest that certain environ-mental factors require prioritized attention if con-flict is to be countered. The transboundary natureof many of these environmental factors places theemphasis for the mitigation of environmentaldegradation on international institutions such as

Page 34

General Conclusions

the United Nations. Stewardship of theseenvironmental factors, however, requires efforts bygovernmental and non-governmental bodies atboth national and local levels.

The third trend, indicated above, suggests thatwhile environmental conditions in the “develop-ing world” are not necessarily inferior to those ofthe “developed world”, the level of “technicalingenuity” required to overcome deterioratingenvironmental conditions is often inadequate.31

The level of “technical ingenuity” in a societyrefers to its capacity to systematically marshal sci-entific and social solutions to societal quandaries.Efforts at conflict resolution and prevention, there-fore, should be directed not only at improvingenvironmental conditions, but also should beaimed at heightening the level of “technical inge-nuity” required to mitigate environmental degra-dation. A high level of “technical ingenuity”,however, is no call for complacency. Recent deple-tion of fish stocks in the “developed world”, andthe subsequent ascension of international tensionsarising from this scarcity (e.g. witness the tensionsbetween Canada and Spain over Atlantic Oceanfisheries resources in the 1990s), indicate that evensocieties with high levels of “technical ingenuity”are subject to environmentally-related conflicts.The most direct mitigation of such conflicts, there-fore, can only come from efforts at “sustainabledevelopment” and proper stewardship of keyenvironmental resources.

There is evidence to suggest that the relation-ship between the environment and conflict, andmore generally between the environment andsecurity, is beginning to garner attention at boththe international and national levels. At the inter-national level, for example, the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) recently conducted amajor symposium on these related issue-areas. Atthe national level, the United States Department ofDefense created a new position in 1993, entitled theDeputy Under Secretary for EnvironmentalSecurity.

It is the intention of this report to not onlydevelop systematic efforts at analyzing environmen-tal conflicts, but more fundamentally to spur interestin this area. As it becomes increasingly clear thatenvironmental issues have moved from the realmof “low” to “high politics”, it is simultaneouslybecoming evident that enhancement of environ-mental conditions and resources may hold the keyto future peace.

Page 35

1 Kaplan, 1994.2 “Conflict” is meant to refer to disputes thatcause significant property damage and/or humaninjury and/or the loss of human life. 3 Brown, 1977.4 For examples of the pessimist/neo-Malthusianposition, see Erlich, 1968; Meadows et. al., 1972;Erlich and Erlich, 1990. For examples of the opti-mist/neo-classical economist position, see Cole et.al., 1973; Simon, 1981; Bailey, 1995.5 Dabelko and Simmons, 1996 (cited with per-mission from the authors).6 Proponents of redefining security includeBrown, 1977; Ullman, 1983; Westing, 1986; WCED,1987; Mathews, 1989; Renner, 1989; Brown, 1989;Myers, 1989, 1993; Gore, 1990, 1992; Porter, 1990,1992; and Pirages, 1991, 1995.7 Opponents of redefining security includeDeudney, 1990, 1991; Walt, 1991; Conca, 1994;Dalby, 1992; Lipschutz, 1995; and Levy 1995a,1995b. For more complete reviews of this debatesee, Geoffrey Dabelko and David Dabelko,“Environmental Security: Demystifying theConcept, Clarifying the Stakes”, both in Simmons,1995.8 The idea for this category comes from Dabelkoand Simmons, “Environment and Security” (citedwith permission from the authors).9 Proponents include Butts, 1993, 1994;Fleishman, 1995; and Dreyfuss, 1995.10 Opponents include Deudney, 1990, 1991, 1992;Finger, 1991; Conca, 1994; Kakonen, 1994;Lipschutz, 1995; and Woever, 1995.11 These opponents include Finger, 1991, 1994;Pirages, 1991; Erlilch and Birks, 1990; Renner, 1991;and Westing, 1984, 1986, 1990.12 For example, see Choucri and North, 1974;Ullman, 1983; and Westing, 1986. For a detailed list

of the authors that recognize the link between envi-ronmental resources and the outbreak of interna-tional conflict, see Appendix 1 in Westing, 1986.13 An important exception is Lipschutz, 1989,who argues that non-renewable resources havealways been a secondary factor in the outbreak ofinternational conflict.14 It is somewhat debatable whether watershould be considered a renewable or non-renew-able resource, although the consensus appears tofavor the former categorization. The distinctioncan cause some confusion; for example Westing,1986, considers water to be “non-living” and there-fore a non-renewable resource. For purposes of thisreport, however, water will be considered a renew-able resource.15 Proponents include Cooley, 1984; Westing,1986; Gleick, 1992, 1993; Falkenmark, 1986; Starr,1991; Myers, 1993; Postel, 1992; Ohlsson, 1992; andSwain, 1993. Opponents include Bershorner, 1992;and Homer-Dixon, 1995.16 Gleick, 1998.17 Proponents include Myers, 1993; Gleick, 1993;and Lowi, 1993a, 1993b.18 Proponents include Mathews, 1989; Wirth,1989; Gleick, 1989; Lipschutz and Holdren, 1990;Lonergan, 1991; Lund, 1991; Postel, 1992; Smil,1992; Myers, 1993; Winnefeld and Morris, 1994;and Kaplan, 1994. Opponents include Homer-Dixon, 1991.19 Pirages, 1996.20 Proponents include Ullman, 1983; Gurr, 1985;Timberlake and Tinker, 1985; Mathews, 1989;Libizewski, 1992; Boge, 1992; Kumar, 1993; Graegerand Smith, 1994; Winnefeld and Morris, 1994;Kaplan, 1994; Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996;Renner, 1996; and Spillman, 1996. Opponentsinclude Gee, 1994; Levy, 1995, 1996; and Goldstone,1996, who advocates the “weak position.”

Page 36

Annotations

21 Bekure W. Semait, “Ecological Stress andPolitical Conflict in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia,”p. 43 in Ornas and Salih, 1989. Note: Ornas andSalih (and Molvoer) are extremely careful to notethat their findings do not indicate a strong causeand effect relationship between environmentalstress and conflict. Only a situation of contempo-raneity can be shown to exist; which has led theauthors to offer conjectures of a cause and effectrelationship. 22 Michael Stahl, “Environmental Degradationand Political Constraints in Ethiopia,” p. 181 inOrnas and Salih, 1989.23 McClintock, 1984.24 Ibid.25 John Markakis, “The Ishaq-Ogaden Dispute,”p. 158 in Ornas and Salih, 1989.26 Ibid., p. 160.27 Ibid., p. 160.28 Cooley, 1984.29 Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy, No.82, Spring 1991, p. 24; Malin Falkenmark, “Middle-East Hydropolitics: Water Scarcity and Conflicts inthe Middle East,” Ambio, 18 (6), 1989, p. 350.30 Starr, “Water Wars,” pp. 24-25.31 Homer-Dixon, 1996.

Page 37

Bailey, Ronald, ed., The True State of The Planet,New York: The Free Press, 1995.

Beschorner, Natasha, Water and Instability in theMiddle East, Adelphi Paper 273, The InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies, 1992.

Boulding, Elise, New Agendas for Peace Research:Conflict and Security Reexamined, London: LynneRienner Publishers, 1992.

Brown, Janet Welsh, ed., In the U.S. Interest:Resources, Growth, and Security in the DevelopingWorld, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Brown, Lester, “Redefining Security,”Worldwatch Paper No. 14, Washington D.C.:Worldwatch Institute.

Brown, Neville, “Climate, Ecology, andInternational Security,” Survival, 13 (6), Nov./Dec.1989, pp. 519-532.

Butts, Kent Hughes, Environmental Security:What is DOD’s Role, Carlisle, Penn.: StrategicStudies Institute U.S. Army War College, 1993.

—————, ed., Environmental Security: A DODPartnership for Peace, Carlisle, Penn.: StrategicStudies Institute U.S. Army War College, 1994.

Choucri, Nazli, and Robert C. North, Nations inConflict: National Growth and International Violence,San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1974.

Cole et. al., eds. ,Models of Doom: A critique ofthe Limits to Growth, New York: Universe Books,1973.

Conca, Ken, “In the Name of Sustainability:Peace Studies and Environmental Discourse,”Peace and Change 19 (2), pp. 91-113.

Connelly, Matthew, and Paul Kennedy, “MustIt Be The Rest Against The West?,” AtlanticMonthly, Dec. 1994, pp. 60-91.

Cooley, John, “The War Over Water,” ForeignPolicy, No. 54, Spring 1984, pp. 3-26.

Dabelko, Geoffrey and P.J. Simmons,“Environmental Security: Core Ideas and PolicyInitiatives,” unpublished paper, May 1996.

Dalby, Simon, “Security, Modernity, Ecology:The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War SecurityDiscourse,” Alternative 17 (1), 1992.

Deudney, Daniel “The Case Against LinkingEnvironmental Degradation and NationalSecurity,” Millennium 19, 1990, pp. 461- 476.

—————, “Environment and Security:Muddled Thinking,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,April 1991, pp. 23-28.

————— and Richard Matthew, eds.,Contested Ground: Security and Conflict in the NewEnvironmental Politics, New York: SUNY Press,Forthcoming.

Dreyfuss, Robert, “Spying on theEnvironment,” E Magazine, Jan./Feb. 1985, pp. 28-35.

Ehrlich, Paul, The Population Bomb, New York:Sierra Club-Ballantine, 1968.

Ehrlich, Paul, and Anne Ehrlich, The PopulationExplosion, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

Falkenmark, Malin, “Middle EastHydropolitics: Water Scarcity and Conflicts in theMiddle East,” Ambio, (6), 1989, pp. 150-152.

Finger, Matthias, “The Military, the NationState and the Environment,” The Ecologist 21 (5),pp. 220-225.

Fleischman, Rachel, “Environment Security:Concept and Practice,” National Security StudiesQuarterly 1 (2), 1995.

Gee, Marcus, “Apocalypse Deferred,” TheGlobe and Mail, 9 April 1994. pp. D1, D3.

Gleick, Peter H., “Climate Change andInternational Politics: Problems Facing DevelopingCountries,” Ambio, 18 (6), 1989, pp. 333-339.

Page 38

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—————, “Water and Conflict: Fresh WaterResources and International Security,” InternationalSecurity, 18 (1), (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112.

—————, The World’s Water: 1998-1999,Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

Gore, Al., “SEI: A Strategic EnvironmentInitiative,” SAIS Review 10, Winter/Spring, 1990.

—————, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and theHuman Spirit, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1992.

Gurr, Ted Robert, “On the PoliticalConsequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline,”International Studies Quarterly, 29, 1985, pp. 51-75.

Hillel, Daniel, Rivers of Eden: The Struggle forWater and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East,Oxford: University Press, 1994.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F., “On the Threshold:Environmental Change as Causes of AcuteConflict,” International Security 16, Fall 1991, pp.76-116.

—————, “Is Anarchy Coming? A Responseto the Optimists,” The Globe and Mail, 10 May 1994,p.[1 page].

—————, “Environmental Scarcities andConflict: Evidence from Cases,” InternationalSecurity, 19 (1), 1994, pp. 5-40.

—————, “The Myth of Global Water Wars,”The Globe and Mail, 9 Nov. 1995.

—————, “Environmental Scarcity, MassViolence, and the Limits to Ingenuity,” CurrentHistory, Nov. 1996, pp. 359-365.

————— and Valerie Percival, EnvironmentalScarcity and Conflict: Briefing Book, AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science,University College, University of Toronto, 1996.

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Levy, Marc A., “Time for a Third Wave ofEnvironment and Security Scholarship?,” TheEnvironmental Change and Security Project Report,Issue 1, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow WilsonInstitute, 1995a, pp. 44-46.

————-, “Is the Environment a NationalSecurity Issue?,” International Security, 20 (2), Fall1995b, pp. 35-62.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D., When Nations Clash: RawMaterials, Ideology, and Foreign Policy, BallingerPublishing Company, 1989.

—————, ed., On Security, New York:Columbia University Press, 1995.

Lipschutz, Ronnie D. and John P. Holdren,“Crossing Borders: Resource Flows, the GlobalEnvironment, and International Security,” Bulletinof Peace Proposals, 21 (2), 1990, pp.121- 133.

Lonergan, Stephan, “Climate Warming, WaterResources and Geopolitical Conflict: A Study ofNations Dependent on the Nile, Litani and JordanRiver Systems,” Canadian Department of NationalDefense, March 1991.

Lowi, Miriam R., Water and Power: The Politicsof a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin,Cambridge: University Press, 1993a.

—————, “Bridging the Divide:Transboundary Resource Disputes and The Caseof the West Bank Water,” International Security, 18(1), Summer 1993b, pp.113-138.

Lunde, Leiv, “North/South and GlobalWarming — Conflict or Cooperation?,” Bulletin ofPeace Proposals, 22 (2), 1991, pp.199-210.

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, “RedefiningSecurity,” Foreign Affairs, No. 68, Spring 1989,pp.162-177.

Meadows, Donella, et. al., The Limits to Growth,New York: Universe Books, 1972.

Myers, Norman, Ultimate Security: TheEnvironmental Basis of Political Stability, London:W.A. Norton & Company, 1993.

—————, “Environment and Security,”Foreign Policy, no. 74, Spring 1989, pp. 23-41.

Ohlsson, Leif, ed., Regional Case Studies of WaterConflicts, Padrigu Papers, 1992.

Ornas, Anders Hjort af Onas, and M.A.Mohamed Salih, eds., Ecology and Politics:

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Environmental Stress and Security in Africa,Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989.

Pirages, Dennis, “Social Evolution andEcological Security,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 22(3), 1991, pp.329-334.

—————, “Microsecurity: Disease Organismsand Human Well-Being,” The WashingtonQuarterly, 18 (4), Fall 1995.

Porter, Gareth, “Post-Cold War GlobalEnvironment and Security,” The Fletcher Forum,Summer 1990, pp. 332-344.

—————, “Economic and EnvironmentalSecurity in the U.S. National Security Policy,” ADiscussion Paper for the Environmental andEnergy Study Institute Roundtable onEnvironment, Economics and Security in the Post-Cold War World, May 19, 1992.

Postel, Sandra, Last Oasis: Facing Water Scarcity,London: W.A. Norton & Company, 1992.

Renner, Michael, “National Security: TheEconomic and Environmental Dimensions,”Worldwatch Paper No. 89, Washington D.C.:Worldwatch Institute, 1989.

—————, Fighting for Survival: EnvironmentalDecline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity,Worldwatch Institute, New York: Norton & Co.,1996.

Simmons, P.J., Environmental Change andSecurity Project Report, Issue 1, Washington D.C.:Woodrow Wilson Institute, Spring 1995.

—————, Environmental Change and SecurityProject Report, Issue 2, Washington D.C.: WoodrowWilson Institute, Spring 1996.

—————, Environmental Change and SecurityProject Report, Issue 3, Washington D.C.: WoodrowWilson Institute, Spring 1997.

Simon, Julian L., The Ultimate Resource,Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Spillman, K., Environmental Degradation as aCause of War, Vols. 2 and 3, Ruegger Verlag, 1996.

Starr, Joyce R., “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy,No. 82, Spring 1991, pp. 17-36.

Swain, Ashok, “Conflict over Water: TheGanges Water Dispute,” Security Dialogue, 24 (4),Dec. 1993, pp. 429-439.

Ullman, Richard H., “Redefining Security,”International Security, 8 (1), Summer 1983, pp. 129-153.

Vaclav, Smil, “Potential EnvironmentalConflicts Involving Countries of the NorthPacific,” North Pacific Cooperative SecurityDialogue, Working Paper Number 4, February1992.

Walt, Stephan M., “The Renaissance of SecurityStudies,” International Studies Quarterly, 35 (2),1991, pp. 211-239.

Westing, Arthur H., Environmental Warfare,London: Taylor and Francis, 1984.

—————, Global Resources and InternationalConflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy andAction, Oxford: University Press, 1986,UNEP/SIPRI.

————-, The Environmental Hazards of War:Releasing Dangerous Forces in an Industrialized World,Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990

Winnefeld, James A., Mary E. Morris, WhereEnvironmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet:Green Conflict in Asia and the Middle East, Rand,1994.

Wirth, David, “Climate Chaos,” Foreign Policy,No. 74, Spring 1989, pp. 3-22.

World Commission on Environment andDevelopment, Our Common Future, New York:Oxford University Press, 1987.

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DIRECT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

AND POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OVER

WATER RESOURCES

Bingham, G., A. Wolf, and T. Wohlegenant,“Resolving Water Disputes: Conflict andCooperation in the United States, the Near East,and Asia,” U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), Bureau for Asia and theNear East, Washington, D.C., 1994.

Butts, K., ed., Environmental Change andRegional Security, Carlisle, Penn.: Asia-PacificCentre for Security Studies, Center for StrategicLeadership, U.S. Army War College, 1997.

Calder, J., “Trade and Environment Database,”<http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/ARAL.html>,1998.

Gleick, P.H., “Environment and Security: TheClear Connection,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,April 1991, pp. 17-21.

—————, “Water and Conflict,” InternationalSecurity, 18 (1), Summer 1993, pp. 79-112.

—————, “Water, War, and Peace in theMiddle East,” Environment, 36 (3), 1994, pp. 6-on.

—————, “Water and Conflict: CriticalIssues,” Presented to the 45th Pugwash Conferenceon Science and World Affairs, Hiroshima, Japan:23-29 July, 1995.

—————, The World’s Water: 1998-1999,Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1998.

Murphy, I.L. and J.E. Sabadell, “InternationalRiver Basins: A Policy Model for ConflictResolution,” Resources Policy, 12 (1), 1986, pp. 133-144.

Renner, M., Fighting for Survival: EnvironmentalDecline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity,Worldwatch Institute, New York: Norton & Co.,1996.

Samson, P. and B. Charrier, “InternationalFreshwater Conflict: Issues and PreventionStrategies,” Green Cross International,<http://www.gci.ch/water/gcwater/study.html>,1997.

Wallenstein, P. and A. Swain, “InternationalFreshwater Resources - Conflict or Cooperation?,”Comprehensive Assessment of the FreshwaterResources of the World, Stockholm: StockholmEnvironment Institute, 1997.

Wolf, A.T., Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River:Scarce Water and its Impact on the Arab-IsraeliConflict, Tokyo: United Nations University Press,1995.

—————, “Water Wars and Water Reality:Conflict and Cooperation Along InternationalWaterways,” NATO Advanced ResearchWorkshop on Environmental Change, Adaption,and Human Security, Budapest, Hungary, 9-12Oct., 1997.

INDIRECT INTRANATIONAL CONFLICTS

PhilippinesPrimary Sources:Myers, Norman, Ultimate Security: The

Environmental Basis of Political Stability, New York:W.A. Norton & Company, 1993, pp. 85-100.

Myers, Norman “Environment and Security,”Foreign Policy, No. 74, Spring 1989, pp. 23-41.

Page 41

References for Data Collection and SelectedCase Studies

Secondary Source:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,

Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: Briefing Book,The Project on Environment, Population, andSecurity, University of Toronto and the AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science, 1996.

EthiopiaPrimary Source:Molvoer, Reidulf K., “Environmentally

Induced Conflicts?,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 22(2), June 1991, pp. 175-188.

Secondary Sources:Saviano, Scott, “Environmental Change and

Acute Conflict: The Ethiopian Famine of 1984-85and Civil War,” Paper presented at the AnnualMeeting of the International Studies Association,Washington, D.C., March 1994.

Ornas, Anders Hjort af and M.A. MohamedSalih, eds., Ecology and Politics: Environmental Stressand Security in Africa, Scandinavian Institute ofAfrican Studies, 1989.

MexicoPrimary Sources:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,

Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: BriefingBook, The Project on Environment, Population, andSecurity, University of Toronto and the AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science, 1996.

Howard, Phillip and Thomas Homer-Dixon,Environmental Scarcity and Conflict: The Case ofChiapas, Mexico, The Project of Environment,Population, and Security, University of Torontoand the American Association for theAdvancement of Science, 1995.

IndonesiaPrimary SourceBarber, Charles Victor, The Case Study of

Indonesia, Project on Environmental Scarcities,State Capacity, and Civil Violence, Cambridge:American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1997.

India (Northeast)Primary Sources:Hazarika, Sanjor, Bangladesh and Assam: Land

Pressures, Migration and Ethnic Conflict, OccasionalPaper Series of the Project on EnvironmentalChange and Acute Conflict, University of Toronto,No. 3, March 1993.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: BriefingBook, The Project on Environment, Population, andSecurity, University of Toronto and the AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science, 1996.

PeruPrimary Source:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,


Secondary Sources:McClintock, Cynthia, “Peru’s Sendero

Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory,”Power and Popular Protest: Latin American SocialMovements, edited by Susan Eckstein, Berkley,California: University of California Press, 1989.

McClintock, Cynthia “Why Peasants Rebel:The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso,” WorldPolitics, 37 (1), Oct. 1984, pp. 48-84.

PakistanPrimary Source:sGeweski, Peter and Thomas Homer-Dixon,

Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Caseof Pakistan, The Project of Environment,Population, and Security, University of Torontoand the American Association for theAdvancement of Science, 1996.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: BriefingBook, The Project on Environment, Population, andSecurity, University of Toronto and the AmericanAssociation for the Advancement of Science, 1996.

Page 42

SudanPrimary Source:Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffar M., “Ecological

Degradation in the Sahel,” Ecology and Politics:Environmental Stress and Security in Africa, eds.Anders Hjort af Ornas and M.A. Mohamed Salih,Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989, pp.89-99.

Secondary Sources:Molvoer, Reidulf K., “Environmentally


Suliman, Mohamed, Civil War in Sudan: TheImpact of Ecological Degradation, ENCOP OccasionalPaper No. 4, Environment and Conflicts Project,Swiss Peace Foundation, Berne, and Centre forSecurity Studies and Conflict Research, Zurich,Switzerland, December 1992.

Suliman, Mohamed, “Civil War in the Sudan:From Ethnic to Ecological Conflict,” The Ecologist,23 (3), May/June 1993, pp. 104-109.

Mauritania and SenegalSee Mauritania - Senegal reference in “Indirect

International Violent Conflicts” section which fol-lows.

Papua New GuineaPrimary Source:Renner, Michael, Fighting for Survival:

Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the NewAge of Insecurity, Worldwatch Institute, New York:Norton & Co., 1996.

India (Bihar)Primary Source:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,

Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Caseof India (Bihar), <http:www.library.utoronto.ca/www/pos/state/india/indiasun.htm>.

NigerPrimary Source:Lume, William, “The Ecological Background to

the Struggle Between Tuaregs and the CentralGovernment of Niger,” K. Spillman, EnvironmentalDegradation as a Cause of War, Vol. 3, Zurich:Ruegger-Verlag, 1996.

KenyaPrimary Source:Lang, Christopher I., Environmental Degradation

as a Cause of Political Conflict, Social Stress, andEthnic Tensions, ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 12,Environment and Conflicts Project, Swiss PeaceFoundation, Berne, and Centre for Security Studiesand Conflict Research, Zurich, Switzerland, 1995.

NigeriaPrimary Source:Renner, Michael, Fighting for Survival:

Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the NewAge of Insecurity, Worldwatch Institute, New York:Norton & Co., 1996.

Israel (Gaza)See Israel - Palestine (Gaza) reference in

“Indirect International Violent Conflicts” sectionwhich follows.

INDIRECT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

El-Salvador - HondurasPrimary Source:Durham, William H., Scarcity and Survival in

Central America: Ecological Origins of the Soccer War,Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979.

Page 43

Secondary Source:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,


Somalia - EthiopiaPrimary Source:Molvoer, Reidulf K., “Environmentally


Secondary Source:Ornas, Anders Hjort af and M.A. Mohamed

Salih, eds., Ecology and Politics: Environmental Stressand Security in Africa,, Scandinavian Institute ofAfrican Studies, 1989.

Israel - Palestine (West Bank)Primary Source:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,


Secondary Sources:Cooley, John K., “Middle East Water: Power for

Peace,” Middle East Policy, 1 (2), 1992.

Cooley, John K., “The War over Water,” ForeignPolicy, No. 54, Spring 1984, pp. 3-26.

Falkenmark, Malin “Middle EastHydropolitics: Water Scarcity and Conflicts in theMiddle East,” Ambio, 18 (6), 1989, pp. 350-352.

Hillel, Daniel, Rivers of Eden: The Struggle forWater and Quest for Peace in the Middle East, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1994.

Kally, Elisha, Water and Peace: Water Resourcesand the Arab- Israeli Peace Process, Praeger, WestportCT, 1993.

Kliot, N., Water Resources and Conflict in theMiddle East, London: Routledge, 1994.

Kolars, John, “The Course of Water in the ArabMiddle East,” American-Arab Affairs 33, Summer1990, pp. 57-68.

Lowi, Miriam “Bridging the Divide:Transboundary Disputes and The Case of WestBank Water,” International Security, 18 (1), Summer1993, pp. 113-138.

Starr, Joyce R., “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy,No. 82, Spring 1991, pp. 17-36.

Mauritania - SenegalPrimary Source:Homer-Dixon, Thomas, and Valerie Percival,


Israel - Palestine (Gaza)Primary Sources:Homer-Dixon, Thomas and Valerie Percival,


Kelly, Kimberly and Thomas Homer-Dixon,Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Caseof Gaza, The Project of Environment, Population,and Security, University of Toronto and theAmerican Association for the Advancement ofScience, 1995.

Falkenmark, Malin “Middle EastHydropolitics: Water Scarcity and Conflicts in theMiddle East,” Ambio, 18 (6), 1989, pp. 350-352.

Secondary Sources:Gleick, Peter, “Water and Conflict in the

Middle East.” Environment 36, 1994, pp. 6-15, 35-42.

Naff, Thomas, and Ruth C. Matson, eds. Waterin the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?, Boulder:Westview Press, 1984.

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