united states government accountability office …2010/05/14 · washington, dc 20548 gao-10-633r...
TRANSCRIPT
GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548
May 14, 2010 The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney Chair Joint Economic Committee House of Representatives The Honorable Charles E. Schumer Vice Chairman Joint Economic Committee United States Senate Subject: State-Level Information on Negative Home Equity and Loan Performance
in the Nonprime Mortgage Market The decline of home prices in many parts of the country has left millions of homeowners with negative home equity, meaning that their outstanding mortgage balances exceed the current value of their homes. As we reported to you previously, a substantial proportion of borrowers with active nonprime mortgages (including subprime and Alt-A loans) had negative equity in their homes as of June 30, 2009.1 For example, among the 16 metropolitan areas examined, we estimated that the percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity ranged from about 9 percent (Denver, Colorado) to more than 90 percent (Las Vegas, Nevada). Research indicates that negative home equity substantially increases the risk of mortgage delinquency, making it an important dimension of ongoing problems in the nonprime market. To provide insight into how negative equity and loan performance among nonprime borrowers have varied by location and over time, this report examines, at the state level, the estimated proportion of nonprime borrowers with active loans that were in a negative equity position and the proportion that were seriously delinquent on their loan payments from 2006 through the end of 2009.2 This report is part of our broader examination of the evolution and condition of the nonprime market segment.3 As agreed with your offices, in a subsequent report we will provide more detailed 1GAO, Loan Performance and Negative Home Equity in the Nonprime Mortgage Market, GAO-10-146R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2009). 2We considered loans to be seriously delinquent if borrowers were 90 days or more late on their mortgage payments or in the foreclosure process. 3See GAO-10-146R and GAO, Characteristics and Performance of Nonprime Mortgages, GAO-09-848R (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2009).
information on the performance of nonprime mortgages through the end of 2009, the influence of nonprime loan and borrower characteristics and economic conditions on the likelihood of mortgage default, and the features and limitations of primary sources of data on nonprime mortgage performance and borrower characteristics. To conduct our work, we used data from CoreLogic’s (formerly LoanPerformance) Asset-Backed Securities Database for nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007 and CoreLogic’s state-level Single Family Combined House Price Index (CoreLogic index). The CoreLogic database contains loan-level data on a large majority of nonagency securitized mortgages in subprime and Alt-A pools.4 For example, for the period January 2001 through July 2007 the CoreLogic database contains information covering, in dollar terms, an estimated 87 percent of securitized subprime loans and 98 percent of securitized Alt-A loans. Researchers have found that nonprime mortgages that were not securitized (i.e., mortgages that lenders held in their portfolios) may have less risky characteristics and better performance histories than those that were securitized. For purposes of our analysis, we defined a subprime loan as a loan in a subprime pool and an Alt-A loan as a loan in an Alt-A pool.5 We focused our analysis on first-lien purchase and refinance mortgages for one-to-four-family residential units. We included only loans that were active in a given quarter; loans that were inactive because they had been paid off or had completed the foreclosure process were excluded. The CoreLogic index, like other house price indexes, measures house price changes in a geographic area based on sales of the same properties at different points in time. The use of repeat transactions on the same homes helps to control for differences in the quality of the houses in the data. The CoreLogic index is based on all usable transactions from CoreLogic’s public record, servicing, and securities databases of single family attached and detached homes with all types of financing, including prime and nonprime loans.6
4Nonagency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), also known as private-label MBS, are backed by nonconforming conventional mortgages securitized primarily by investment banks. Nonconforming mortgages are those that do not meet the purchase requirements of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac because they are too large or do not meet their underwriting criteria. About 75 percent of subprime and Alt-A mortgages originated from 2001 through 2007 were securitized. 5The CoreLogic database has a loan-level indicator for loan class (i.e., subprime or Alt-A), but it is not well populated. Therefore, we used the pool-level classification. According to mortgage researchers, some of the loans in subprime pools may not be subprime loans, and some of the loans in Alt-A pools may not be Alt-A loans. 6Single family attached and detached homes include condominiums, townhouses, and cooperatives. Newly constructed homes are necessarily excluded from the index because they have not been sold repeatedly. The CoreLogic index uses a value-weighted regression model that gives greater weight to price trends for more expensive homes than other homes. To limit the influence of atypical changes in the value of individual homes, the CoreLogic index also excludes certain transactions, such as nonarms length sales, those with outlier prices, closely spaced sales that may represent investor churning or “flipping,” and sales with unusually high appreciation rates that likely indicate significant property improvements.
Page 2 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
To estimate the proportion of nonprime borrowers with active loans that had negative equity, we used the CoreLogic index to adjust the appraised value of each home at loan origination to an estimated value at the end of each quarter from March 2006 through December 2009, the most recent quarterly data that we could analyze within the time frames of our review. We then subtracted the unpaid mortgage balance from the estimated house value as of each quarter to estimate the borrower’s home equity. We divided the number of nonprime borrowers with negative home equity by the total number of active nonprime loans in each quarter to determine the proportion with negative equity (negative equity rate).7 Due to data limitations, our analysis did not account for nonprime borrowers with second liens or multiple mortgaged properties.8 Additionally, the CoreLogic index that we used represents price trends at the state level. Depending on the degree to which homes financed with nonprime loans were concentrated in areas with house price trends that differed from statewide trends, our estimates could overstate or understate the number of nonprime borrowers with negative equity. To determine the proportion of nonprime borrowers that were seriously delinquent on their mortgage payments, we divided the number of nonprime loans that were more than 90 days past due or were in the foreclosure process by the total number of active nonprime loans in each quarter (serious delinquency rate). In addition, we analyzed the extent to which changes in estimated negative equity rates were associated with changes in serious delinquency rates from the first quarter of 2006 through the end of 2009. Specifically, we measured the statistical correlation between percentage point changes in the estimated proportion of nonprime borrowers with negative equity in each state and the proportion of nonprime borrowers that were seriously delinquent in each state.9 We assessed the reliability of the data used in this report by reviewing documentation on the process CoreLogic uses to collect and ensure the reliability and integrity of the data and by conducting reasonableness checks on data elements to identify any missing, erroneous, or outlying data. We also interviewed CoreLogic representatives to discuss the interpretation of various data fields. We concluded that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this engagement in Washington, D.C., and Chicago, Illinois, from March 2010 through May 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
7Our analysis focused on whether or not a nonprime borrower was in a negative equity position. We did not estimate the extent to which a nonprime borrower’s outstanding loan balance exceeded the estimated value of the home, a factor that could affect the probability of serious delinquency for a given loan. 8To the extent that nonprime borrowers had second liens, our analysis may understate the extent of negative home equity. To the extent that some nonprime borrowers had more than one mortgaged property, our results may overstate the actual number of individual nonprime borrowers with negative home equity. 9Correlation is the degree to which two variables’ movements are associated. Our analysis used a statistical measure of association—the Pearson’s correlation coefficient—which ranges in value from negative 1 to positive 1, with negative 1 indicating a perfect negative correlation, 0 an absence of correlation, and positive 1 a perfect positive correlation.
Page 3 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. Summary
For most states and the District of Columbia, the estimated percentage of nonprime borrowers with active loans that were in a negative equity position increased from 2006 through mid-2008 and then remained fairly stable through the end of 2009. Growth in negative equity rates during that period varied widely among the states. Negative equity rates rose by at least 30 percentage points in 7 states, by 10 to 29.9 percentage points in 17 states, and by 5 to 9.9 percentage points in 9 states. Eighteen states’ negative equity rates grew by less than 5 percentage points, including 3 states where the percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity increased negligibly.
For all states and the District of Columbia, the percentage of nonprime borrowers that were seriously delinquent—90 days or more late in payments or in the foreclosure process—increased from the first quarter of 2006 through the end of 2009, with growth ranging from 5.3 percentage points in Louisiana to 43.3 percentage points in Florida. Additionally, across all states and the District of Columbia, our measures for increases in estimated negative equity and serious delinquency rates exhibited a positive statistical correlation. Consistent with this observation, 6 of the 10 states that experienced the largest percentage point increases in negative equity rates also were among the 10 states with the largest percentage point increases in serious delinquency rates. However, the remaining 4 states ranked from 12th to 26th in their increases in serious delinquency rates. Background
The nonprime mortgage market has two segments:
• Subprime. Generally serves borrowers with blemished or limited credit
histories, and the loans feature higher interest rates and fees than prime loans. • Alt-A. Generally serves borrowers whose credit histories are close to prime,
but the loans have one or more high-risk features, such as limited documentation of income or assets or the option of making monthly payments that are lower than would be required for a fully amortizing loan.
Active mortgages can fall into any one of several payment categories:
• Current. The borrower is meeting scheduled payments. • Delinquent. The borrower has missed one or more scheduled payments.
Page 4 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
• Default. The borrower is 90 days or more delinquent.10 At this point,
foreclosure proceedings against the borrower become a strong possibility. • In the foreclosure process. The borrower has been delinquent for more than
90 days, and the lender has elected to foreclose in what is an often lengthy process with several possible outcomes. For instance, the borrower may sell the property or the lender may repossess the home.
In this report, we describe borrowers whose mortgages are in default or in the foreclosure process as “seriously delinquent.” Typically, home equity—that is, the difference between the value of a property and the amount still owed on the mortgage—increases over time as the mortgage balance is paid down and home values appreciate. However, if the home value falls below the mortgage balance, the borrower will be in a position of negative equity. Borrowers with nonprime loans may be particularly vulnerable to negative equity because they typically make small down payments and thus have less equity at the outset than a typical prime borrower. Also, some nonprime borrowers have loans with payment options that allow them to defer payment of accrued interest, thereby increasing the outstanding loan balance and decreasing equity. In general, lower levels of home equity (as a percentage of home value) are associated with relatively poorer loan performance. Homeowners with negative equity may find it difficult to sell or refinance the property to avoid foreclosure. They may also have incentives to stop making mortgage payments to minimize their financial losses. Across States, Negative Home Equity Generally Increased from 2006 through
Mid-2008 before Leveling Off, While Serious Delinquency Rates Continued to
Grow through the End of 2009
Estimated Rates of Negative Equity Generally Increased through Mid-2008 and Then Remained Relatively Stable The estimated percentage of nonprime borrowers in a negative equity position generally increased from 2006 through mid-2008, with negative equity rates holding more steady through the end of 2009.11 Across all states and the District of Columbia, the estimated percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity increased from 13 percent in the first quarter of 2006 to 35 percent in the first quarter of 2008, and
10There is no uniform definition of default across the lending industry. For purposes of this report, we use the definition provided. 11Our quarterly estimates of negative equity include only borrowers whose loans were active at the end of each quarter.
Page 5 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
then remained between 36 and 37 percent through the end of 2009 (see fig. 1).12 The number of nonprime borrowers in a negative equity position increased from about 940,000 in the first quarter of 2006 to about 2.52 million at the end of 2007, and then declined to about 1.86 million by the end of 2009.13 The percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity remained relatively stable while the number with negative equity decreased because the total number of active nonprime loans also decreased from mid-2007 through the end of 2009, as mortgages were prepaid or completed foreclosure. Figure 1: Estimated Number and Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity from March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009 Number of borrowers in millions Percentage
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
2006
Estimated number of borrowers
Estimated percentage
2007 2008 2009
Note: The analysis includes nonprime loans originated from 2000 through 2007, so the number of active nonprime loans increased from about 7 million in the first quarter of 2006 to nearly 8.4 million in the second quarter of 2007. As loans became inactive as a result of prepayment and completed foreclosures, the number of active nonprime loans decreased to about 5.1 million by the end of 2009. The decrease in the number of active loans accounts for the stable percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity even as the number decreased.
12Using a different house price index, we previously estimated that 25 percent of borrowers who obtained nonprime mortgages from 2000 through 2007 and whose loans were active as of June 30, 2009, had negative equity as of that date (see GAO-10-146R). That estimate used the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) All-Transactions Index for 384 metropolitan areas covering approximately 84 percent of the U.S. population. The FHFA index does not include data for homes with certain types of financing, including subprime mortgages. We noted that our estimates using the FHFA index likely understated the extent of negative equity among nonprime borrowers. The CoreLogic state-level house price index, by contrast, includes all types of financing and transactions outside of metropolitan areas. 13At the end of 2009, 66 percent of the borrowers with negative equity had mortgages on homes in Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada, the four states with the largest percentage point increases in negative equity rates.
Page 6 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
The extent to which estimated negative equity rates increased varied widely among the states. Seven states had an increase of at least 30 percentage points from the first quarter of 2006 through the end of 2009 (see fig. 2). The largest increases occurred in Arizona and Florida, each of which saw negative equity rates rise by 44 percentage points (from 24 percent to 68 percent in Arizona and from 28 percent to 72 percent in Florida). Eighteen states had an increase of less than 5 percentage points during the period—including North Dakota, South Dakota, and Oklahoma, which had negligible increases of less than 1 percentage point. Across all states, the median increase was about 9 percentage points, represented by South Carolina (rising from 1.6 percent to 10.4 percent).14 In general, the states’ negative equity rates grew through the second quarter of 2008 and then held relatively steady through the end of 2009.15 For example, California’s negative equity rate increased by 4.2 percentage points per quarter from the first quarter of 2006 through the second quarter of 2008 (rising from 23.5 to 60.9 percent), and then grew just slightly (0.06 percentage points per quarter) to end 2009 at 61.3 percent. See Enclosure I for quarterly information on the estimated number and percentage of nonprime borrowers with negative equity in each state from 2006 through 2009.
14That is, South Carolina ranked in the middle (26th) among the 50 states and the District of Columbia in the increase in negative equity rates. 15Some states experienced a modest decrease in their negative equity rates from the second quarter of 2008 through the end of 2009. For example, Hawaii’s rate decreased by 0.4 percentage points, Kentucky’s decreased by 0.2 percentage points, and Mississippi’s decreased by 0.9 percentage points.
Page 7 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Figure 2: Percentage Point Change in the Estimated Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity by State, March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index; MapInfo (map).
>0 to 4.9 percentage points
5.0 to 9.9 percentage points
10.0 to 19.9 percentage points
20.0 to 29.9 percentage points
30.0 or more percentage points
Note: Our quarterly estimates of negative equity include only nonprime borrowers whose loans were active at the end of each quarter.
Serious Delinquency Rates Rose from 2006 through 2009, and Some States with the Most Growth in Negative Equity Rates Were Among Those with the Most Growth in Serious Delinquency Rates From 2006 through 2009, serious delinquency rates among nonprime borrowers increased in all states and the District of Columbia. Across the states, the serious delinquency rate—the percentage of nonprime borrowers with active loans that were at least 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure—increased throughout the period, from 4 percent (280,000 loans) in the first quarter of 2006 to 28 percent (1.4 million loans) at the end of 2009. Among the states, the growth in serious delinquency rates ranged from 5 percentage points (Louisiana) to 43 percentage points (Florida). Michigan’s increase of 17.1 percentage points represented the median change. Enclosure I includes quarterly information on serious delinquencies in each state from 2006 through 2009.
Page 8 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Across all states and the District of Columbia, our measures for increases in estimated negative equity and serious delinquency rates exhibited a positive statistical correlation.16 Consistent with this observation, 6 of the 10 states with the largest percentage point increases in negative equity rates from 2006 through 2009 also were among the 10 states with the largest percentage point increases in serious delinquency rates over that same period.17 For example, Arizona experienced the largest increase in negative equity rate (rising by 44.3 percentage points over the 4-year period) and the fifth largest increase in serious delinquency rate (rising 28.7 percentage points) (see fig. 3). However, the remaining 4 states ranked from 12th to 26th in their increases in serious delinquency rates.18
Figure 3: Estimated Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity and Seriously Delinquent in Arizona, March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009
Negative equity
Serious delinquency
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1
Percentage
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
2006 2007 2008 2009
In addition, 5 of the 10 states with the smallest growth in negative equity rates also were among the 10 with the smallest growth in serious delinquency rates.19 North Dakota, for instance, had virtually no increase in its negative equity rate from 2006 through 2009 (0.2 percentage points) and the fourth smallest increase in serious 16Specifically, the correlation coefficient between our measures for increases in negative equity rates and serious delinquency rates was 0.72. (The correlation coefficient is a statistical measure of association, with a value of 1 indicating a perfect positive correlation.) 17The six states were Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and Nevada. 18The four states were Idaho, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Virginia. 19The five states were Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.
Page 9 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
delinquency rate (10.5 percentage points) (see fig. 4). However, the remaining 5 states (including the District of Columbia) ranked from 11th to 41st in their increases in serious delinquency rates.20
Figure 4: Estimated Percentage of Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Home Equity and Seriously Delinquent in North Dakota, March 31, 2006, through December 31, 2009
Negative equity
Serious delinquency
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1Q4Q3Q2Q1
Percentage
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
2006 2007 2008 2009
Research has shown that negative equity is one of several factors that affect loan performance. As previously noted, in a forthcoming report, we will examine the influence of a broader range of factors—including loan and borrower characteristics and economic conditions—on the likelihood of mortgage default. __________________________________________________________________________ As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional parties and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
20The five were the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, and Montana.
Page 10 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8678 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. In addition to the individual named above, Steve Westley (Assistant Director), William Bates, Jan Bauer, Julianne Dieterich, DuEwa Kamara, John McGrail, Marc Molino, Bob Pollard, and Jennifer Schwartz made key contributions to this report.
William B. Shear Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Enclosure
Page 11 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Enclosure I: Estimated Negative Equity and Serious Delinquency Rates by
State and Quarter from 2006 through 2009
Figure 5 contains the results of our analysis of the extent to which borrowers with active nonprime mortgages were estimated to be in a negative equity position or were seriously delinquent on their payments—that is, they were 90 days or more late on payments or were in the foreclosure process. The analysis uses CoreLogic’s loan-level data and the CoreLogic state-level house price index and covers nonprime mortgages originated from 2000 through 2007. Due to data limitations, we could not identify borrowers with multiple mortgaged properties. For purposes of this analysis, we treat the number of borrowers and the number of loans as equal. To the extent that some nonprime borrowers had more than one mortgaged property, our results may overstate the number of individual nonprime borrowers with negative equity. For additional information on the methodology for this analysis, see pages 2 and 3.
Page 12 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Figure 5: Nonprime Borrowers with Negative Equity and Seriously Delinquent Loans by State and Quarter, 2006 through 2009
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
66,043
69,426
72,756
75,749
78,174
78,222
74,314
70,271
66,014
62,150
58,877
56,183
53,510
51,228
49,156
47,390
253
591
1,026
1,433
1,868
2,361
2,433
2,444
2,443
2,423
2,416
2,393
2,325
2,259
2,156
2,047
4,409
4,496
4,917
5,468
5,122
5,581
6,367
7,120
7,046
7,050
7,313
8,074
8,161
8,609
9,052
9,441
6.7
6.5
6.8
7.2
6.6
7.1
8.6
10.1
10.7
11.3
12.4
14.4
15.3
16.8
18.4
19.9
%0.4
0.9
1.4
1.9
2.4
3.0
3.3
3.5
3.7
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.4
4.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentAlabama
7,388
7,970
8,485
8,965
9,295
9,433
8,927
8,340
7,716
7,133
6,698
6,383
6,015
5,710
5,426
5,184
26
58
105
146
230
306
332
343
342
315
297
292
282
267
257
245
189
211
261
274
311
377
452
462
533
599
573
573
686
771
820
814
2.6
2.6
3.1
3.1
3.3
4.0
5.1
5.5
6.9
8.4
8.6
9.0
11.4
13.5
15.1
15.7
%0.4
0.7
1.2
1.6
2.5
3.2
3.7
4.1
4.4
4.4
4.4
4.6
4.7
4.7
4.7
4.7
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Alaska
Figure continued on next page
Page 13 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
250,669
263,808
278,330
290,056
304,221
313,893
301,036
285,604
268,869
251,238
234,256
219,628
205,511
191,908
179,696
169,016
60,434
81,307
104,068
124,323
145,515
167,351
171,296
172,180
170,713
165,159
157,036
148,678
140,407
131,626
123,239
115,576
2,329
2,661
4,039
6,358
8,272
11,429
17,281
25,876
31,438
35,217
38,675
45,771
49,669
49,616
49,883
50,139
0.9
1.0
1.5
2.2
2.7
3.6
5.7
9.1
11.7
14.0
16.5
20.8
24.2
25.9
27.8
29.7
%24.1
30.8
37.4
42.9
47.8
53.3
56.9
60.3
63.5
65.7
67.0
67.7
68.3
68.6
68.6
68.4
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentArizona
26,943
28,141
29,159
30,221
31,244
32,000
30,501
28,950
27,295
25,798
24,532
23,476
22,498
21,581
20,792
20,095
207
418
657
899
1,141
1,365
1,405
1,415
1,411
1,384
1,360
1,327
1,273
1,219
1,164
1,126
1,494
1,560
1,778
1,996
2,005
2,224
2,612
2,980
2,911
2,915
3,097
3,237
3,274
3,321
3,546
3,738
5.5
5.5
6.1
6.6
6.4
7.0
8.6
10.3
10.7
11.3
12.6
13.8
14.6
15.4
17.1
18.6
%0.8
1.5
2.3
3.0
3.7
4.3
4.6
4.9
5.2
5.4
5.5
5.7
5.7
5.6
5.6
5.6
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Arkansas
Figure continued on next page
Page 14 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
1,393,739
1,436,446
1,497,959
1,557,729
1,618,116
1,660,868
1,602,499
1,527,338
1,439,545
1,345,041
1,258,514
1,197,317
1,139,357
1,076,878
1,024,339
976,522
327,653
418,205
525,337
629,943
730,228
835,340
860,913
866,385
859,456
819,290
769,797
734,364
702,661
664,010
630,152
598,342
17,551
23,109
34,584
51,901
66,909
90,456
129,363
179,176
214,118
227,611
231,392
263,312
295,535
301,484
308,240
309,926
1.3
1.6
2.3
3.3
4.1
5.4
8.1
11.7
14.9
16.9
18.4
22
25.9
28.0
30.1
31.7
%23.5
29.1
35.1
40.4
45.1
50.3
53.7
56.7
59.7
60.9
61.2
61.3
61.7
61.7
61.5
61.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentCalifornia
190,855
196,712
201,457
206,397
209,060
207,172
196,009
183,880
172,297
162,451
153,535
146,052
139,274
132,319
126,302
120,889
2,151
2,959
4,307
5,659
6,868
8,499
8,914
9,058
8,850
8,458
8,074
7,772
7,366
6,744
6,418
6,156
8,051
8,277
9,511
11,556
12,239
12,640
13,683
15,250
15,669
16,157
15,353
15,970
17,119
18,134
18,955
19,308
4.2
4.2
4.7
5.6
5.9
6.1
7.0
8.3
9.1
9.9
10.0
10.9
12.3
13.7
15.0
16.0
%1.1
1.5
2.1
2.7
3.3
4.1
4.5
4.9
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.3
5.3
5.1
5.1
5.1
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Colorado
Figure continued on next page
Page 15 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
78,883
80,912
83,505
85,530
87,695
89,238
85,334
80,821
76,450
72,430
69,087
66,520
64,240
61,873
59,704
57,749
5,428
7,466
9,909
12,055
13,956
16,287
16,877
17,060
16,973
16,705
16,574
16,421
16,120
15,511
15,087
14,728
2,859
3,125
3,843
4,769
5,147
5,950
7,319
8,645
9,516
9,842
10,546
11,963
13,073
13,947
15,204
16,363
3.6
3.9
4.6
5.6
5.9
6.7
8.6
10.7
12.4
13.6
15.3
18.0
20.4
22.5
25.5
28.3
%6.9
9.2
11.9
14.1
15.9
18.3
19.8
21.1
22.2
23.1
24.0
24.7
25.1
25.1
25.3
25.5
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentConnecticut
18,349
19,117
20,232
21,056
21,927
22,499
21,437
20,256
19,086
18,057
17,251
16,569
15,964
15,378
14,870
14,450
195
336
558
785
1,041
1,390
1,454
1,488
1,481
1,464
1,452
1,433
1,402
1,356
1,302
1,267
700
754
902
1,090
1,184
1,397
1,719
2,073
2,251
2,434
2,622
2,965
3,143
3,360
3,628
3,829
3.8
3.9
4.5
5.2
5.4
6.2
8.0
10.2
11.8
13.5
15.2
17.9
19.7
21.8
24.4
26.5
%1.1
1.8
2.8
3.7
4.7
6.2
6.8
7.3
7.8
8.1
8.4
8.6
8.8
8.8
8.8
8.8
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Delaware
Figure continued on next page
Page 16 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
13,556
14,279
15,186
15,975
16,521
16,847
16,044
15,184
14,379
13,616
12,995
12,505
12,018
11,525
11,040
10,698
82
130
208
254
321
414
441
450
446
432
417
407
387
360
346
339
199
231
327
503
595
724
943
1,180
1,347
1,459
1,612
1,837
1,987
2,052
2,109
2,211
1.5
1.6
2.2
3.1
3.6
4.3
5.9
7.8
9.4
10.7
12.4
14.7
16.5
17.8
19.1
20.7
%0.6
0.9
1.4
1.6
1.9
2.5
2.7
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquent
District ofColumbia
674,480
718,506
771,416
816,521
858,558
889,755
861,511
828,517
793,343
758,163
726,083
697,365
668,623
641,838
615,464
590,632
189,875
253,744
325,472
391,736
455,416
519,200
531,149
533,978
530,627
520,674
507,176
492,655
476,629
460,255
442,367
424,319
16,087
17,116
21,839
31,410
41,534
59,833
89,123
128,129
158,712
183,040
205,769
233,105
250,640
258,295
265,387
269,721
2.4
2.4
2.8
3.8
4.8
6.7
10.3
15.5
20.0
24.1
28.3
33.4
37.5
40.2
43.1
45.7
%28.2
35.3
42.2
48.0
53.0
58.4
61.7
64.5
66.9
68.7
69.9
70.6
71.3
71.7
71.9
71.8
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Florida
Figure continued on next page
Page 17 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
248,154
260,866
274,104
285,691
293,092
294,337
279,569
262,943
246,510
232,692
221,129
211,277
202,014
193,825
186,390
179,534
16,058
20,209
26,534
32,266
38,606
45,092
46,461
46,870
46,407
45,464
44,532
43,675
42,172
40,149
38,736
37,523
12,020
12,853
15,359
18,371
18,941
21,618
25,219
28,492
29,047
29,377
30,350
33,879
35,477
37,377
40,021
42,383
4.8
4.9
5.6
6.4
6.5
7.3
9.0
10.8
11.8
12.6
13.7
16.0
17.6
19.3
21.5
23.6
%6.5
7.7
9.7
11.3
13.2
15.3
16.6
17.8
18.8
19.5
20.1
20.7
20.9
20.7
20.8
20.9
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentGeorgia
33,186
34,436
36,285
37,645
38,849
40,289
38,884
37,201
35,365
33,725
32,501
31,506
30,342
29,187
28,123
27,142
49
138
303
473
575
802
849
887
883
865
843
823
799
733
649
596
351
410
553
806
1,048
1,264
1,670
2,213
2,629
2,935
3,570
4,519
5,402
6,064
6,542
6,925
1.1
1.2
1.5
2.1
2.7
3.1
4.3
5.9
7.4
8.7
11.0
14.3
17.8
20.8
23.3
25.5
%0.1
0.4
0.8
1.3
1.5
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.5
2.3
2.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Hawaii
Figure continued on next page
Page 18 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
38,986
41,043
42,956
45,126
46,712
47,158
44,684
42,053
39,346
36,842
34,890
33,293
31,508
29,778
28,224
26,767
1,287
3,008
5,007
7,068
9,194
11,566
12,057
12,220
12,194
12,081
11,894
11,726
11,426
10,854
10,285
9,743
761
761
854
1,072
1,216
1,430
1,893
2,488
2,928
3,134
3,577
4,389
4,961
5,397
5,638
5,619
2.0
1.9
2.0
2.4
2.6
3.0
4.2
5.9
7.4
8.5
10.3
13.2
15.7
18.1
20.0
21.0
%3.3
7.3
11.7
15.7
19.7
24.5
27.0
29.1
31.0
32.8
34.1
35.2
36.3
36.5
36.4
36.4
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentIdaho
265,717
275,236
285,198
291,620
296,968
297,740
280,788
261,732
244,188
228,493
216,023
206,161
197,355
188,519
181,216
174,749
20,386
28,174
38,808
49,727
61,007
72,645
74,864
75,334
74,856
73,495
72,273
71,237
69,725
66,854
65,108
63,587
14,768
16,108
19,120
23,029
24,196
27,194
32,957
38,222
40,305
41,408
43,292
47,414
50,173
52,246
55,919
58,667
5.6
5.9
6.7
7.9
8.1
9.1
11.7
14.6
16.5
18.1
20.0
23.0
25.4
27.7
30.9
33.6
%7.7
10.2
13.6
17.1
20.5
24.4
26.7
28.8
30.7
32.2
33.5
34.6
35.3
35.5
35.9
36.4
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Illinois
Figure continued on next page
Page 19 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
124,601
128,730
132,245
134,667
137,193
136,111
129,015
121,978
114,902
107,865
101,874
96,751
92,424
88,286
84,593
81,466
10,737
13,366
16,522
19,325
22,326
25,200
25,701
25,854
25,732
24,819
23,912
23,024
21,926
20,686
19,879
19,222
11,555
12,047
12,915
14,262
14,328
15,237
16,972
18,900
18,547
17,993
18,015
18,407
18,277
18,715
19,091
19,290
9.3
9.4
9.8
10.6
10.4
11.2
13.2
15.5
16.1
16.7
17.7
19.0
19.8
21.2
22.6
23.7
%8.6
10.4
12.5
14.4
16.3
18.5
19.9
21.2
22.4
23.0
23.5
23.8
23.7
23.4
23.5
23.6
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentIndiana
34,071
34,642
35,255
35,755
36,281
35,976
33,612
31,307
29,358
27,554
26,033
24,794
23,622
22,635
21,713
20,891
171
241
362
485
561
608
628
628
625
561
561
554
514
471
453
447
2,397
2,508
2,815
3,098
2,975
3,199
3,662
3,956
3,940
3,826
3,842
3,906
3,781
3,811
3,964
4,142
7.0
7.2
8.0
8.7
8.2
8.9
10.9
12.6
13.4
13.9
14.8
15.8
16.0
16.8
18.3
19.8
%0.5
0.7
1.0
1.4
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.0
2.2
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.1
2.1
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Iowa
Figure continued on next page
Page 20 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
38,605
39,556
40,282
40,931
41,075
40,568
38,244
35,959
33,776
31,699
30,057
28,713
27,504
26,253
25,170
24,196
856
1,208
1,665
2,082
2,525
3,008
3,123
3,140
3,137
3,065
2,995
2,928
2,801
2,710
2,597
2,487
2,044
2,147
2,243
2,582
2,486
2,647
2,913
3,237
3,151
3,128
3,101
3,369
3,353
3,458
3,718
3,799
5.3
5.4
5.6
6.3
6.1
6.5
7.6
9.0
9.3
9.9
10.3
11.7
12.2
13.2
14.8
15.7
%2.2
3.1
4.1
5.1
6.1
7.4
8.2
8.7
9.3
9.7
10.0
10.2
10.2
10.3
10.3
10.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentKansas
53,606
55,849
57,950
59,592
61,170
60,536
57,255
53,947
50,654
47,463
44,765
42,427
40,524
38,723
37,133
35,684
610
954
1,428
1,836
2,215
2,514
2,562
2,571
2,525
2,390
2,303
2,192
2,056
1,900
1,796
1,738
3,890
4,109
4,598
5,173
5,194
5,740
6,434
6,970
6,878
6,776
6,693
6,803
6,574
6,733
7,142
7,285
7.3
7.4
7.9
8.7
8.5
9.5
11.2
12.9
13.6
14.3
15.0
16.0
16.2
17.4
19.2
20.4
%1.1
1.7
2.5
3.1
3.6
4.2
4.5
4.8
5.0
5.0
5.1
5.2
5.1
4.9
4.8
4.9
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Kentucky
Figure continued on next page
Page 21 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
57,946
59,327
61,079
62,442
63,736
64,273
61,310
58,506
55,432
52,642
50,445
48,685
47,005
45,491
44,060
42,832
174
359
650
1,032
1,349
1,640
1,692
1,706
1,696
1,621
1,601
1,598
1,508
1,431
1,422
1,392
10,691
8,661
7,922
7,702
6,981
6,793
7,027
7,597
7,398
7,492
7,952
8,563
8,354
8,647
9,400
10,165
18.4
14.6
13.0
12.3
11.0
10.6
11.5
13.0
13.3
14.2
15.8
17.6
17.8
19.0
21.3
23.7
%0.3
0.6
1.1
1.7
2.1
2.6
2.8
2.9
3.1
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.2
3.1
3.2
3.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentLouisiana
19,950
20,652
21,264
21,821
22,549
23,163
21,994
20,854
19,679
18,600
17,780
17,091
16,436
15,772
15,213
14,664
93
144
229
350
420
573
611
620
617
588
569
546
519
486
472
462
953
1,122
1,387
1,653
1,834
2,167
2,484
2,858
3,166
3,221
3,314
3,522
3,603
3,660
3,797
3,947
4.8
5.4
6.5
7.6
8.1
9.4
11.3
13.7
16.1
17.3
18.6
20.6
21.9
23.2
25.0
26.9
%0.5
0.7
1.1
1.6
1.9
2.5
2.8
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.1
3.1
3.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Maine
Figure continued on next page
Page 22 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
166,555
174,591
185,017
192,580
201,872
206,749
195,745
183,743
171,413
161,994
155,307
149,385
142,977
136,653
131,508
126,717
7,912
15,377
25,114
35,041
45,486
56,024
57,965
58,586
58,343
57,925
57,391
56,811
56,052
53,955
52,168
50,372
2,858
3,379
4,622
6,289
7,285
9,711
13,381
17,569
19,943
22,573
26,379
30,400
32,376
33,242
35,142
36,273
1.7
1.9
2.5
3.3
3.6
4.7
6.8
9.6
11.6
13.9
17.0
20.4
22.6
24.3
26.7
28.6
%4.8
8.8
13.6
18.2
22.5
27.1
29.6
31.9
34.0
35.8
37.0
38.0
39.2
39.5
39.7
39.8
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentMaryland
122,395
125,077
128,304
131,021
134,003
135,646
129,094
121,824
114,471
108,067
103,170
99,268
95,736
92,244
89,035
85,826
12,072
14,463
17,116
19,452
21,367
23,455
23,679
23,572
23,064
22,295
21,710
21,202
20,560
19,265
18,721
18,182
4,941
5,658
7,162
9,053
9,888
11,237
13,849
16,680
18,220
19,156
19,972
21,575
22,880
23,996
25,568
26,542
4.0
4.5
5.6
6.9
7.4
8.3
10.7
13.7
15.9
17.7
19.4
21.7
23.9
26.0
28.7
30.9
%9.9
11.6
13.3
14.8
15.9
17.3
18.3
19.3
20.1
20.6
21.0
21.4
21.5
20.9
21.0
21.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Massachusetts
Figure continued on next page
Page 23 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
232,899
239,929
247,109
251,685
253,611
251,169
236,715
221,865
206,931
193,870
182,737
173,418
165,720
157,965
151,101
144,262
109,511
122,205
135,628
147,213
157,779
164,983
162,939
159,259
153,321
145,035
137,548
131,191
125,721
119,942
114,887
109,720
17,627
19,195
21,975
24,983
24,211
26,345
29,829
32,567
31,174
29,473
29,025
30,309
31,421
32,541
34,940
35,607
7.6
8.0
8.9
9.9
9.5
10.5
12.6
14.7
15.1
15.2
15.9
17.5
19.0
20.6
23.1
24.7
%47.0
50.9
54.9
58.5
62.2
65.7
68.8
71.8
74.1
74.8
75.3
75.7
75.9
75.9
76.0
76.1
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentMichigan
114,018
117,636
122,531
126,102
128,951
128,899
121,364
112,977
105,123
97,870
91,831
86,619
82,169
78,097
74,284
70,801
15,624
19,604
24,381
28,626
32,297
35,593
35,951
35,845
35,358
34,189
33,227
32,308
31,272
29,287
27,629
26,377
5,733
6,344
7,661
9,212
9,892
11,248
13,334
14,411
14,544
13,993
13,755
14,146
14,723
15,577
15,811
15,821
5.0
5.4
6.3
7.3
7.7
8.7
11.0
12.8
13.8
14.3
15.0
16.3
17.9
19.9
21.3
22.3
%13.7
16.7
19.9
22.7
25.0
27.6
29.6
31.7
33.6
34.9
36.2
37.3
38.1
37.5
37.2
37.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Minnesota
Figure continued on next page
Page 24 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
%%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquent
115,077
118,999
122,501
125,452
127,364
126,689
118,813
110,428
102,554
95,806
90,216
85,442
81,349
77,659
74,372
71,430
6,073
8,295
10,898
13,569
16,200
18,769
19,190
19,142
18,754
17,970
17,343
16,762
15,930
14,941
14,293
13,775
5,990
6,286
7,490
8,751
8,290
9,462
10,944
11,869
11,303
10,836
11,460
12,378
12,310
12,570
13,465
14,089
5.2
5.3
6.1
7.0
6.5
7.5
9.2
10.7
11.0
11.3
12.7
14.5
15.1
16.2
18.1
19.7
5.3
7.0
8.9
10.8
12.7
14.8
16.2
17.3
18.3
18.8
19.2
19.6
19.6
19.2
19.2
19.3
%%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
34,556
35,898
37,022
37,932
38,686
39,049
37,184
35,324
33,496
31,759
30,267
29,070
27,998
27,051
26,157
25,399
221
480
799
1,165
1,563
1,867
1,910
1,927
1,915
1,851
1,786
1,678
1,545
1,408
1,297
1,243
5,589
5,081
5,059
5,079
4,518
4,531
4,950
5,514
5,378
5,103
5,239
5,613
5,609
5,821
6,183
6,547
16.2
14.2
13.7
13.4
11.7
11.6
13.3
15.6
16.1
16.1
17.3
19.3
20.0
21.5
23.6
25.8
0.6
1.3
2.2
3.1
4.0
4.8
5.1
5.5
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.8
5.5
5.2
5.0
4.9
Mississippi
Figure continued on next page
Missouri
Page 25 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
11,890
12,457
13,057
13,775
14,258
14,182
13,393
12,549
11,632
10,771
10,119
9,642
9,082
8,536
8,073
7,713
9
27
69
114
170
259
287
296
296
289
283
274
257
245
228
224
311
320
342
396
397
467
511
604
690
741
813
976
1,137
1,267
1,329
1,374
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.9
2.8
3.3
3.8
4.8
5.9
6.9
8.0
10.1
12.5
14.8
16.5
17.8
%0.1
0.2
0.5
0.8
1.2
1.8
2.1
2.4
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.8
2.8
2.9
2.8
2.9
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentMontana
22,872
23,647
24,213
24,599
24,938
24,651
23,207
21,805
20,565
19,338
18,344
17,534
16,854
16,153
15,479
14,861
239
334
470
597
723
805
823
825
794
732
705
673
641
600
574
551
1,243
1,315
1,467
1,716
1,642
1,725
1,938
2,162
2,149
2,018
2,066
2,168
2,155
2,281
2,392
2,428
5.4
5.6
6.1
7.0
6.6
7.0
8.4
9.9
10.4
10.4
11.3
12.4
12.8
14.1
15.5
16.3
%1.0
1.4
1.9
2.4
2.9
3.3
3.5
3.8
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Nebraska
Figure continued on next page
Page 26 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
157,510
168,728
180,208
189,621
198,269
202,603
195,372
186,439
176,541
165,632
154,792
145,350
136,066
126,796
117,823
111,225
63,160
77,034
91,447
103,996
116,268
128,247
130,380
130,498
129,173
123,624
117,104
111,158
105,424
99,550
93,492
88,965
2,424
3,066
4,374
6,729
8,716
11,543
15,894
22,090
25,873
27,842
29,484
34,330
38,765
40,390
40,795
42,239
1.5
1.8
2.4
3.5
4.4
5.7
8.1
11.8
14.7
16.8
19.0
23.6
28.5
31.9
34.6
38.0
%40.1
45.7
50.7
54.8
58.6
63.3
66.7
70.0
73.2
74.6
75.7
76.5
77.5
78.5
79.4
80.0
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentNevada
27,619
28,288
29,341
30,138
31,093
31,505
29,857
28,071
26,402
24,967
23,767
22,767
21,877
20,982
20,235
19,508
1,033
1,314
1,681
2,024
2,289
2,603
2,638
2,615
2,549
2,445
2,358
2,270
2,171
2,020
1,947
1,897
878
1,069
1,365
1,547
1,714
2,058
2,411
2,780
2,900
2,826
2,948
3,358
3,492
3,681
4,086
4,343
3.2
3.8
4.7
5.1
5.5
6.5
8.1
9.9
11.0
11.3
12.4
14.7
16.0
17.5
20.2
22.3
%3.7
4.6
5.7
6.7
7.4
8.3
8.8
9.3
9.7
9.8
9.9
10.0
9.9
9.6
9.6
9.7
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
New Hampshire
Figure continued on next page
Page 27 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
166,581
171,893
179,419
185,242
192,289
198,238
189,113
178,894
168,194
159,115
152,217
147,112
141,968
136,511
131,742
127,617
8,331
12,842
19,026
24,516
29,517
34,973
36,047
36,328
36,012
35,564
35,136
34,759
34,278
33,418
32,573
31,858
5,832
6,645
8,271
10,289
12,001
14,467
18,466
23,057
26,325
28,853
31,157
34,946
38,927
41,330
43,834
45,699
3.5
3.9
4.6
5.6
6.2
7.3
9.8
12.9
15.7
18.1
20.5
23.8
27.4
30.3
33.3
35.8
%5.0
7.5
10.6
13.2
15.4
17.6
19.1
20.3
21.4
22.4
23.1
23.6
24.1
24.5
24.7
25.0
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentNew Jersey
30,688
31,805
32,944
34,111
35,367
35,910
33,917
31,889
29,824
28,010
26,643
25,490
24,414
23,367
22,399
21,556
94
315
737
1,234
1,930
2,876
3,124
3,163
3,155
3,088
3,025
2,941
2,851
2,743
2,633
2,534
920
961
986
1,098
1,126
1,276
1,493
1,933
2,193
2,369
2,606
3,042
3,346
3,594
3,793
3,961
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.2
3.2
3.6
4.4
6.1
7.4
8.5
9.8
11.9
13.7
15.4
16.9
18.4
%0.3
1.0
2.2
3.6
5.5
8.0
9.2
9.9
10.6
11.0
11.4
11.5
11.7
11.7
11.8
11.8
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
New Mexico
Figure continued on next page
Page 28 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
256,904
264,774
277,069
287,638
299,792
310,238
300,685
288,844
276,456
265,129
255,980
249,082
242,280
234,900
228,274
222,570
4,278
7,440
11,332
15,299
19,558
24,470
25,650
25,991
25,866
25,734
25,526
25,308
25,030
24,450
23,858
23,333
10,892
12,212
14,957
18,266
20,647
24,340
29,921
36,123
40,068
43,160
46,766
52,936
58,519
62,725
66,911
71,234
4.2
4.6
5.4
6.4
6.9
7.8
10.0
12.5
14.5
16.3
18.3
21.3
24.2
26.7
29.3
32.0
%1.7
2.8
4.1
5.3
6.5
7.9
8.5
9.0
9.4
9.7
10.0
10.2
10.3
10.4
10.5
10.5
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentNew York
146,359
152,973
159,767
165,586
170,128
171,411
162,733
153,294
143,104
133,882
127,369
122,244
117,739
113,022
108,823
105,043
350
653
1,392
2,128
3,044
4,363
4,664
4,782
4,771
4,713
4,699
4,675
4,605
4,421
4,309
4,170
7,145
7,614
8,458
9,650
9,175
10,055
11,551
13,199
13,226
12,874
13,578
15,286
16,530
17,678
19,139
20,346
4.9
5.0
5.3
5.8
5.4
5.9
7.1
8.6
9.2
9.6
10.7
12.5
14.0
15.6
17.6
19.4
%0.2
0.4
0.9
1.3
1.8
2.5
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.7
3.8
3.9
3.9
4.0
4.0
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
North Carolina
Figure continued on next page
Page 29 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
3,743
3,935
4,162
4,393
4,590
4,604
4,332
4,077
3,852
3,566
3,328
3,168
3,013
2,852
2,693
2,564
0
1
2
6
8
8
8
7
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
102
133
192
209
210
227
218
256
265
270
262
297
305
315
343
338
2.7
3.4
4.6
4.8
4.6
4.9
5.0
6.3
6.9
7.6
7.9
9.4
10.1
11.0
12.7
13.2
%0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentNorth Dakota
219,060
225,814
231,493
236,397
240,557
238,436
226,976
215,063
203,161
192,071
182,235
173,962
167,197
160,533
154,560
148,838
31,149
35,745
41,518
46,439
50,757
53,780
53,619
52,990
51,521
48,957
47,538
45,985
43,733
40,762
39,131
37,767
23,434
24,746
27,480
30,315
30,390
32,371
35,382
37,976
37,139
35,793
34,556
34,664
34,589
34,688
35,986
36,286
10.7
11.0
11.9
12.8
12.6
13.6
15.6
17.7
18.3
18.6
19.0
19.9
20.7
21.6
23.3
24.4
%14.2
15.8
17.9
19.6
21.1
22.6
23.6
24.6
25.4
25.5
26.1
26.4
26.2
25.4
25.3
25.4
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Ohio
Figure continued on next page
Page 30 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
51,526
53,797
55,782
57,348
58,865
59,406
56,649
53,951
51,247
48,439
45,889
43,781
41,999
40,201
38,469
37,029
69
100
132
168
194
223
226
227
225
225
223
223
219
209
205
202
3,268
3,372
3,614
3,990
4,092
4,330
4,812
5,405
5,440
5,258
5,175
5,323
5,553
5,761
6,125
6,369
6.3
6.3
6.5
7.0
7.0
7.3
8.5
10.0
10.6
10.9
11.3
12.2
13.2
14.3
15.9
17.2
%0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentOklahoma
100,485
103,473
106,757
111,349
115,616
117,029
111,095
104,577
97,952
91,759
86,785
82,590
78,719
74,571
70,930
67,718
654
1,718
3,533
5,614
7,813
10,843
11,631
11,930
11,912
11,822
11,714
11,555
11,353
10,868
10,365
9,973
1,936
1,911
2,105
2,492
2,797
3,475
4,384
5,568
6,625
7,288
8,158
9,753
11,799
12,685
13,136
13,412
1.9
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.4
3.0
3.9
5.3
6.8
7.9
9.4
11.8
15.0
17.0
18.5
19.8
%0.7
1.7
3.3
5.0
6.8
9.3
10.5
11.4
12.2
12.9
13.5
14.0
14.4
14.6
14.6
14.7
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Oregon
Figure continued on next page
Page 31 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
182,236
189,003
197,878
205,029
212,495
216,417
207,437
197,475
187,588
178,608
170,989
164,677
159,116
153,823
149,022
144,506
1,812
2,799
4,455
6,405
8,221
10,023
10,399
10,514
10,458
10,255
10,088
9,941
9,743
9,444
9,191
8,995
10,890
11,489
12,922
14,598
14,760
16,241
18,557
21,263
22,095
22,890
23,901
25,864
26,812
28,471
30,527
32,362
6.0
6.1
6.5
7.1
6.9
7.5
8.9
10.8
11.8
12.8
14.0
15.7
16.9
18.5
20.5
22.4
%1.0
1.5
2.3
3.1
3.9
4.6
5.0
5.3
5.6
5.7
5.9
6.0
6.1
6.1
6.2
6.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentPennsylvania
27,133
27,701
28,321
28,461
28,799
28,919
27,144
25,261
23,390
21,860
20,669
19,600
18,674
17,853
17,180
16,590
5,193
6,561
8,090
9,364
10,609
11,753
11,899
11,847
11,625
11,320
11,038
10,538
10,042
9,605
9,244
8,925
928
1,128
1,402
1,820
2,020
2,454
2,952
3,465
3,553
3,573
3,707
3,940
3,995
4,077
4,364
4,596
3.4
4.1
5.0
6.4
7.0
8.5
10.9
13.7
15.2
16.3
17.9
20.1
21.4
22.8
25.4
27.7
%19.1
23.7
28.6
32.9
36.8
40.6
43.8
46.9
49.7
51.8
53.4
53.8
53.8
53.8
53.8
53.8
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Rhode Island
Figure continued on next page
Page 32 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
74,095
77,637
80,981
83,608
86,335
87,757
83,852
79,414
74,573
70,201
66,779
64,096
61,487
59,391
57,321
55,452
1,184
1,966
3,071
3,944
5,158
6,608
6,900
6,979
6,921
6,763
6,665
6,541
6,366
6,132
5,930
5,775
4,633
4,678
5,156
5,847
5,810
6,358
7,370
8,401
8,456
8,502
8,689
9,500
9,859
10,808
11,695
12,294
6.3
6.0
6.4
7.0
6.7
7.2
8.8
10.6
11.3
12.1
13.0
14.8
16.0
18.2
20.4
22.2
%1.6
2.5
3.8
4.7
6.0
7.5
8.2
8.8
9.3
9.6
10.0
10.2
10.4
10.3
10.3
10.4
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquent
SouthCarolina
5,977
6,257
6,533
6,767
6,947
6,865
6,410
5,968
5,563
5,157
4,832
4,529
4,281
4,042
3,827
3,644
7
14
19
24
31
33
34
34
33
17
17
17
17
17
17
17
267
298
371
427
410
434
524
548
529
538
521
526
544
589
602
605
4.5
4.8
5.7
6.3
5.9
6.3
8.2
9.2
9.5
10.4
10.8
11.6
12.7
14.6
15.7
16.6
%0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
South Dakota
Figure continued on next page
Page 33 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
124,054
130,056
135,739
141,100
145,102
145,855
138,431
130,718
122,819
115,450
109,391
104,082
99,021
94,680
90,781
87,268
720
1,476
2,514
3,621
5,037
6,327
6,559
6,636
6,626
6,531
6,461
6,362
6,134
5,798
5,597
5,404
7,766
8,227
9,649
11,122
10,757
12,219
13,726
15,341
15,069
15,100
15,963
17,114
17,185
17,721
18,539
19,011
6.3
6.3
7.1
7.9
7.4
8.4
9.9
11.7
12.3
13.1
14.6
16.4
17.4
18.7
20.4
21.8
%0.6
1.1
1.9
2.6
3.5
4.3
4.7
5.1
5.4
5.7
5.9
6.1
6.2
6.1
6.2
6.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentTennessee
476,668
504,222
525,598
548,152
569,197
577,337
556,051
533,337
507,667
483,433
464,006
448,503
432,332
417,210
403,092
389,891
3,511
7,042
11,389
15,439
19,706
25,317
26,364
26,680
26,623
25,846
24,975
24,145
23,058
22,068
21,387
20,590
25,183
26,621
28,877
31,926
31,515
34,221
39,490
45,081
44,077
42,459
44,830
51,594
50,081
52,452
57,460
61,809
5.3
5.3
5.5
5.8
5.5
5.9
7.1
8.5
8.7
8.8
9.7
11.5
11.6
12.6
14.3
15.9
%0.7
1.4
2.2
2.8
3.5
4.4
4.7
5.0
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.4
5.3
5.3
5.3
5.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Texas
Figure continued on next page
Page 34 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
75,194
78,183
81,113
84,501
87,599
88,619
82,612
76,011
69,437
63,439
58,640
54,611
50,940
47,642
44,886
42,389
200
730
1,832
3,487
6,383
10,948
12,050
12,372
12,350
12,220
12,029
11,779
11,463
10,841
10,333
9,837
2,336
2,083
2,093
2,280
2,264
2,525
3,097
4,027
4,613
5,022
5,566
6,507
7,475
8,271
8,774
9,045
3.1
2.7
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.8
3.7
5.3
6.6
7.9
9.5
11.9
14.7
17.4
19.5
21.3
%0.3
0.9
2.3
4.1
7.3
12.4
14.6
16.3
17.8
19.3
20.5
21.6
22.5
22.8
23.0
23.2
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentUtah
6,404
6,502
6,659
6,817
7,063
7,245
6,847
6,515
6,170
5,850
5,577
5,356
5,169
4,929
4,731
4,580
67
96
146
229
290
388
417
428
425
417
401
389
382
356
345
342
229
270
319
391
441
485
573
666
756
764
762
845
893
927
987
1,068
3.6
4.2
4.8
5.7
6.2
6.7
8.4
10.2
12.3
13.1
13.7
15.8
17.3
18.8
20.9
23.3
%1.0
1.5
2.2
3.4
4.1
5.4
6.1
6.6
6.9
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.2
7.3
7.5
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Vermont
Figure continued on next page
Page 35 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
182,012
192,710
204,395
213,736
222,857
226,632
215,130
202,000
187,931
174,658
164,209
156,343
148,449
140,879
134,210
128,789
26,285
36,103
46,654
55,880
63,574
70,337
71,258
71,122
70,069
68,064
66,111
63,355
59,621
55,888
52,766
50,596
3,127
3,608
4,844
6,651
7,902
10,549
14,503
18,888
20,604
20,857
21,239
23,778
25,289
25,725
26,243
26,715
1.7
1.9
2.4
3.1
3.5
4.7
6.7
9.4
11.0
11.9
12.9
15.2
17.0
18.3
19.6
20.7
%14.4
18.7
22.8
26.1
28.5
31.0
33.1
35.2
37.3
39.0
40.3
40.5
40.2
39.7
39.3
39.3
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentVirginia
181,739
187,261
193,217
201,197
208,084
210,721
199,751
187,108
174,642
163,169
154,490
147,331
140,487
133,385
127,317
122,290
739
2,472
5,644
9,358
13,723
19,826
21,645
22,351
22,351
22,222
22,045
21,843
21,512
20,721
20,020
19,452
4,100
4,174
4,802
5,562
5,987
6,713
8,548
10,663
12,053
13,174
14,696
17,897
21,440
23,696
25,251
26,660
2.3
2.2
2.5
2.8
2.9
3.2
4.3
5.7
6.9
8.1
9.5
12.1
15.3
17.8
19.8
21.8
%0.4
1.3
2.9
4.7
6.6
9.4
10.8
11.9
12.8
13.6
14.3
14.8
15.3
15.5
15.7
15.9
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Washington
Figure continued on next page
Page 36 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
10,516
10,994
11,612
12,336
12,716
12,961
12,411
11,751
11,106
10,556
10,124
9,722
9,355
8,943
8,581
8,273
1,142
1,320
1,640
1,948
2,220
2,465
2,499
2,449
2,404
2,331
2,281
2,252
2,214
2,122
2,039
1,972
647
682
747
827
737
825
1,040
1,290
1,254
1,305
1,464
1,557
1,571
1,589
1,618
1,689
6.2
6.2
6.4
6.7
5.8
6.4
8.4
11.0
11.3
12.4
14.5
16.0
16.8
17.8
18.9
20.4
%10.9
12.0
14.1
15.8
17.5
19.0
20.1
20.8
21.6
22.1
22.5
23.2
23.7
23.7
23.8
23.8
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentWest Virginia
71,766
74,395
77,953
80,259
82,662
83,262
78,243
72,957
67,914
63,384
59,768
56,623
53,803
51,303
48,998
46,992
2,400
3,451
5,002
6,368
7,802
9,094
9,305
9,362
9,158
8,803
8,626
8,447
8,180
7,657
7,362
7,114
4,477
4,886
5,822
6,789
7,131
8,188
9,706
10,948
11,181
11,056
11,338
11,592
11,608
11,912
12,531
12,770
6.2
6.6
7.5
8.5
8.6
9.8
12.4
15.0
16.5
17.4
19.0
20.5
21.6
23.2
25.6
27.2
%3.3
4.6
6.4
7.9
9.4
10.9
11.9
12.8
13.5
13.9
14.4
14.9
15.2
14.9
15.0
15.1
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Wisconsin
Figure continued on next page
Page 37 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity
Source: GAO analysis of CoreLogic loan data and CoreLogic's state-level house price index.
7,989
8,294
8,563
8,918
9,311
9,291
8,654
8,012
7,425
6,832
6,375
5,970
5,655
5,330
5,039
4,792
30
64
118
173
274
414
448
464
464
460
459
448
441
421
396
370
173
213
243
259
261
275
338
387
401
396
405
449
486
575
657
659
2.2
2.6
2.8
2.9
2.8
3.0
3.9
4.8
5.4
5.8
6.4
7.5
8.6
10.8
13.0
13.8
%0.4
0.8
1.4
1.9
2.9
4.5
5.2
5.8
6.2
6.7
7.2
7.5
7.8
7.9
7.9
7.7
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Number of borrowers Percentage of borrowers
With activeloans
With negativeequity(estimated)
Seriouslydelinquent
With negative equity(estimated)
Seriously delinquentWyoming
7,042,247
7,332,583
7,660,361
7,949,339
8,221,852
8,358,373
7,992,184
7,577,782
7,143,347
6,728,294
6,374,170
6,090,063
5,821,670
5,556,210
5,319,566
5,106,683
940,794
1,215,056
1,539,004
1,845,318
2,145,353
2,453,835
2,514,270
2,523,852
2,497,956
2,412,966
2,314,600
2,229,881
2,143,119
2,039,041
1,946,828
1,861,880
279,177
299,930
354,594
431,636
469,503
558,255
703,785
876,555
969,626
1,021,676
1,077,138
1,204,241
1,294,916
1,342,652
1,400,282
1,439,903
4.0
4.1
4.6
5.4
5.7
6.7
8.8
11.6
13.6
15.2
16.9
19.8
22.2
24.2
26.3
28.2
%13.4
16.6
20.1
23.2
26.1
29.4
31.5
33.3
35.0
35.9
36.3
36.6
36.8
36.7
36.6
36.5
%Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total (all states and the District of Columbia)
(250532)
Page 38 GAO-10-633R Nonprime Negative Equity