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Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq WarAuthor(s): Efraim KarshSource: Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring, 1990), pp. 256-268Published by: Middle East InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328101 .

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GEOPOLITICALDETERMINISM: THEORIGINS OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Efraim Karsh

XVAR, like anysocialphenomenon, as both ts general ndspecific auses.

On the general evel, warcanbe an occasional outburstof a deep-rootedhistorical

conflict. Sucha conflictmayarise fromethnic, national,or religious enmity, from

competition over natural resources or territory, or over regional or global

hegemony. The specificcauses of warlie in the subjective nterpretations f such

historical conflictand assessments regardingadequatemeansfor handling t at a

givenmoment. Assessments derive from such factors as the worldviews, images,

and beliefs of the relevant leaders, from bureaucraticpolitics (power struggles

withinthe rulingelites), and froma combinationof these factors.

In the case of the Iran-IraqWar,the general cause is often attributed o the

ethnicandreligiousdivide thathas separatedArabsandPersians,Shi'i and Sunni

Muslims since at least the seventh century. One scholar's view is that, "Seen in

a long-termhistoricalperspective, the currentIran-IraqWaris just anotherphasein a strugglebetween the two countriesthatstretchesback a milleniumor more."I

The war is "the latest outbreak n an age-old strugglebetween the Persians and

Arabs for dominationof the Gulf and the richTigrisand EuphratesValley to its

north," accordingto anotherobserver of the conflict.2

1. Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled (New York: Praeger for theGeorgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1982), The Washington Papers Series, no.92, p. 1.

2. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 291. For

a similar view on the origins of the war see Jasim M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis(London: Croom Helm, 1984), chapter 1.

Efraim Karsh is a lecturer on regional security at the Department of WarStudies, King's College, theUniversity of London. He is the author of The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987) and the editor of The Iran-Iraq War: Impact andImplications (London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1989).

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 44, NO. 2, SPRING 1990



IRAN-IRAQ 257

On the immediate evel, the outbreakof the war is commonly explainedby

what may be called the granddesign theory. According to this theory, the Iraqi

invasion of Iranin September 1980 reflected President SaddamHussein's ambi-tions. These ranged romthe occupationof Iranian erritory theShatt al-Araband

Khuzistan),through he inflictionof "a humiliating ndperhapsdecisive defeaton

the Iranianrevolution,which he foundtroublesome,"3 o the desire to assert Iraq

casthe preeminentArab and Gulf state.

This article offers an alternative explanation for the occurrence of the

I]ran-IraqWar. It argues that geopolitics is the most importantsingle factor that

has influencedIranian-Iraqi elations for generationsand, in consequence, ac-

counts for the outbreak of the war. The eruptionof the war, accordingto thistheory, is neitherthe directextension of the ancient Arab-Persian ivalrynor the

outcomeof a premeditated randdesign;rather t is the productof the geopolitical

interactionbetween two disparateneighbors. More concretely, the war began

because the weaker state, Iraq, attemptedto resist the hegemonic aspirationsof

its strongerneighbor,Iran,to reshapethe regionalstatusquo according o its own

image.

ORIGINS OF IRANIAN-IRAQIRELATIONS

Intriguingas it is, the emphasis on the deep-rooted historical animosity

between Arabs and Persians suffers from two majorflaws. First, it overlooks

lengthy periods of cooperation between these two groups, motivated both by

sharedreligiousand culturalaffinitiesandby convergingeconomic interests such

as trade. Second, intensive as it was during he Umayyad (661-750)and the early

Abbasid(750-945) caliphates,Iraqi-Persiannteractionwas disrupted n the latter

partof the tenthcentury, with the de facto demise of the Abbasid Empire, to be

resumedonly in the aftermathof WorldWar I.Thus, from945 until the early sixteenthcentury, the vast territoriesoccupy-

ing present-day Iran and Iraq were controlled, with occasional intervals, by

successive dynasties, mainly of Mongol and Turkish origins: the Buwayhids

(945-1055), the SelUukTurks (1055-1157), the Hulagu, Timur, and Il-Khan

Mongols (1219-1408), and the TurkomanTurks (1408-1499). With the reemer-

gence of Persia as an independentregional empire under the Safavid dynasty

(1500-1736),the area that is now Iraqbecamethe battlefield or intermittentwars

between the Ottomansand the Persians.These wars, nevertheless, hadnothingtodo with Persian-Arabanimosity;ratherthey were the manifestationof a power

3. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (London: Counterpoint, 1986), p. 125. For asimilar view see also R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 57; Anthony Cordesman, TheGulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 645-46; William0. Staudenmaier, "A Strategic Analysis," in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., TheIran-Iraq War (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 37.



258* MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

struggle between the two empires, colored with strong religious elements, for

hegemony and domination.

Inotherwords, geopoliticalrealitiesformedthe major mpetusfor the Safavidpolicy while ideological-religiousfactors played a supportive role, however

important, by rallyingpublic will behind the regime's strategicgoals. Although

religious zeal would occasionally cause Safavid rulers to overlook geopolitical

considerations,to the Persians the landmassto theirwestern frontierwas merely

a medium of advance for expansion or, alternatively, a useful buffer zone to

separate Persia's holdings from its majorregional rival, the Ottoman Empire.

With the mutualdecline of the Turkishandthe Persianempiresover the centuries

and the appearanceof new and more menacingthreatsfrom other directions-

Russia and Great Britain-these two rivals were graduallydriven towardaccom-

modation. Then followed a long host of bilateral treaties, most notably the

Erzerum agreements of 1823 and 1847. Indeed, the vagueness of these two

agreementson the issue of borderdemarcation,not dispelledby the 1911Tehran

and 1913Constantinopleprotocols, was to remain a majorbone of contention

between Iran and Iraq into the late twentieth century. Just as the geopolitical

factorhadfiguredprominentlyn Persian-Ottomanffairs,so has itconstitutedthe

frameworkfor twentieth-century raqi-Iranian ilateralrelations. By and large,

this relationshiphas reflected both the inherentproblems and the converginginterests emanating romdirectphysicalcontiguity between two uneven powers.

To the newly establishedstate of Iraq(1921)geographyposed an existential

challenge. Virtuallya landlockedcountry,whose coastline on the Gulf is only 15

kilometers ong, andsurroundedby fourcountries with at least two-Turkey and

Iran-larger and irredentist,Iraq sufferedfrom an inherentfeeling of insecurity

from the earlydays of its statehood. This "encirclementcomplex" is understand-

able. First, Iraq's major source of income, oil, cannot be exported without the

goodwill of its neighbors, Syria and Turkey, or "without coming so close toIranian erritory n the south that it cannotbe said to enjoy territorial ecurity at

all for its principalmeansof survival."4Second, as one of the successor states to

the OttomanEmpire, Iraqinheritednot a few Ottomanprivileges- particularlyfavorable border agreements-without at the same time enjoying the imperial

power or statureto supportthese gains. This state of affairsarousedTurkishand

Iranian rredentism,which in turnexacerbatedIraq'sfeeling of vulnerability.5

The proximity of Iraq's majorstrategic and economic assets to the Turkish

and Iranianfrontiers has been no less worrisome for Baghdad. The northern

oil-richprovincesof Mosul andKirkuk, or example, lie close to TurkeyandIran.whereas BaghdadandBasraare only 120and 30 kilometersrespectivelyfrom theIranianborder. The Shattal-Arab,Iraq'sonly outlet to the PersianGulf, could be

4. Claudia Wright, "Implications of the Iran-Iraq War," Foreign Affairs, vol. 59 (Winter1980/81), p. 277.

5. Indeed, there is a long-standing Turkish claim for the province of Mosul. Moreover, in 1922Turkey backed up this claim by military action.



IRAN-IRAQ* 259

easily controlled by Iran. Finally, Iraq'sinternal ragmentationalong ethnic and

religious lines-Kurds versus Arabs, Sunnis versus Shias-has had a weakening

effect on the countryby impeding he crystallizationof an Iraqinationalidentityand by constitutinga lodestone for external interference.6

Comparedwith these geostrategicpredicaments,Iran'sposition seems envi-

able. Not only is Irana much largercountry in territoryand population,but its

majorstrategiccenters arelocated, by andlarge,deep insidethe country-Tehran

is some 700 kilometers inside Iran-and enjoy better topographicalprotection

than do their Iraqi counterparts.Also, and in sharp contrast to Iraq's highly

restricted access to the Gulf, Iranpossesses a long Gulfcoastline of some 2,000

kilometers which makes it the major contender for regional hegemony and

prevents a cripplingencirclementsimilarto that faced by Iraq.

Yet, Iranfaces a primegeostrategicconstraintthat for a long time mitigated

its relative advantages over Iraq-namely its 1,700-kilometerborder with the

Soviet Union. Duringthe two centuries since the early 1720s, when Peter the

Great for the first timecapturedPersianterritory,to the seizure of power by the

Bolsheviks in 1917,Russia graduallyemergedas the principalsecurity threat to

Iran.Employinga wide spectrumof means thatranged romdiplomaticpressures

to economic penetration, o directmilitary ntervention,czaristRussia conducted

a persistent drive southward. In the peace treaties of Gulistan (1813) andTurkumanchai 1828), Persia lost to Russia most of its Caucasianpossessions,

gave up its rightto maintaina navy on the CaspianSea, which therebybecame a

Russianlake, and paida humiliatingndemnityof 20 millionrubles.7

The fact that the Russianthrust southwardcoincided with a growing British

interestin the PersianGulfdid little to ease Iran'sposition. Onthe contrary,from

the nineteenthcenturyonward, Persia becameyet anotherarenafor Great Power

competition with its adverse implicationsfor this country. In 1907, following

Russian-Britishreconciliation n the TripleEntente, the two powers partitioned

Persia into spheres of influence, leaving a buffer zone between them as an

independentand neutralentity.8

Endingthe Russianmilitarypresence in Persiaandabrogatingall the treaties

andconcessions securedby the czaristregime, the communistrevolutionaroused

Persianhopes of a modification n Russianpolicy. Yet Persia's rulerswere quick

to realize that Bolshevik Russia was not willing to distance itself from the

traditionalczarist ambitions in their country, and, in May 1920, Soviet forces

invaded and established the Soviet Republic of Gilan, the first case of a

Soviet-sponsored communistregimein Asia.

6. Marr, History of Iraq, p. 5: Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1969),pp. 3-5; UrielDann,Iraq UnderQassem(New York:Praeger,1969),pp. 1-2.

7. It is interesting o note, however, that these treatiesfollowed decisive Persiandefeats intwo wars initiated by them, not Russia. For the full texts of the treaties see J.C. Hurewitz,ed.,Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record (Princeton, NJ: D. Van NostrandCo., 1966),vol. I, pp. 84-6, 96-102.

8. For the full text of the 1907partitionagreeement ee Hurewitz,ibid., pp. 265-7.



260 * MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL

Persia's apparentadvantagesin comparisonto Iraqwere also mitigated by

Baghdad'sspecial relationshipwith GreatBritain.Until 1932,Iraqconstitutedan

integral part of the British Empire, and from that date to 1958-when theHashemitedynasty was overthrownby General Abd al-Karimal-Qasim-it was

an importantblock in the edifice of Britain'sregional position. Thus, it was the

British factor that improved Baghdad's bargaining position vis-'a-vis Tehran

during the 1930s, as illustrated by Iraq's gains in the 1937 Shatt al-Arab

agreement.Duringthe 1920s,Britainhad also shieldedIraqfrom Saudiencroach-

ments.

BALANCE OF WEAKNESS

This was the geopolitical backgroundagainst which Iranian-Iraqi elations

developed. On the one hand, there was Persia with its markedgeopolitical and

geostrategicpreponderanceover Iraq, yet heavilyconstrainedby its contiguityto

a GreatPowerandfullymindfulof Iraq'sclose associationwithGreat Britain.On

the other hand lay Iraq, plaguedby domestic fragmentation,sufferingfrom an

inherent "encirclement complex," and smaller and weaker than Persia. This

delicate "balance of weakness" dictated mutualcaution and restraintand led to

a peaceful coexistence that lasted, with occasional vicissitudes, until the late

1960s. To be sure, overriding interests to coexistence did not prevent the

occasional emergenceof differencesor frictions, most of which revolved around

territorial ssues. Yet both sides were equally inclinedto resolve their disagree-

ments throughpeaceful means, and even in those crises that most uncharacter-

istically involved the risk of a frontalconfrontation,such as the 1959and 1961

crises, realismprevailedover rhetoric,dictatingstrategicretreats.

Recognizing Iran's fundamentalsuperiority, especially in the Gulf, Iraq

directed its energies toward the Arabworld, a potentiallymorerewardingarena.This resulted in Hashemite Iraq's (1921-1958) championshipof the cause of

pan-Arabismand its efforts to unite the FertileCrescent; it also explains in part

Iraq's repeated attempts to bring about a union with Syria, as well as its

occasional encroachmentson Kuwait.

Iranfor its part, largelypreoccupiedwith the eliminationof foreigninterfer-

ence in its domestic affairsadopted a two-prongedpolicy. In addition to dealing

successfully with GreatBritainand the Soviet Union on a bilateralbasis,9 Reza

Shah (1921-1941) opted for closer relations with Iran's Muslim neighbors,

Afghanistan,Turkey, and Iraq. Accordingly, on April 25, 1929, Iran extended

official recognition to Iraq, thereby paving the way for the evolution of close

9. Reza Shah succeeded in maneuvering Soviet troops out of Iran and destroying the GilanRepublic by signing a treaty of friendship with the Soviets in February 1921. The treaty, nevertheless,opened the door for possible Soviet military intervention in Iran if Iranian territory were to become aspringboard for external aggression against the Soviet Union. For the full text of the treaty seeHurewitz, ibid., vol. II, pp. 90-5.



IRAN-IRAQ* 261

Iranian-Iraqi ooperationwhich culminated n King Faysal's officialvisit to Iran

in April 1932.Thegeneraldirectionof bilateralrelationswas set earlier n 1929by

a provisional agreement,and was followed duringthe coming years by mutualcollaboration n quellingthe Kurdish nsurgency n both countries.10

On July 4, 1937, havingdebated the issue at the League of Nations' Council

for three years, the two countries signed a boundarytreaty (outside the frame-

work of the league) that sought to resolve the disputedterritorial egacy of the

OttomanEmpire. Accordingto the treaty, the Iraqi-Iranianrontierwas to run

alongthe lines delineatedby the ConstantinopleProtocolof 1913and the findings

of the Frontier Commission of 1914. This, in turn, meant complete Iraqi

sovereigntyover the Shatt al-Arab,with the exception of a four-mileanchorage

area near Abadan where the border ran along the thalweg (median) line.

Furthermore, raqassumed responsibility or the navigationregimein the Shatt,

namely such duties as pilotage, collection of dues, and health measures.'1

Requiringmutualconcessions-substantial on Iran's part,minoron the Iraqi

side12-the 1937 treaty clearly reflected a keen recognition of the need for

accommodation,if not cooperation. Reinforcedas a result of the gatheringwar

clouds in Europe and the 1935Italian invasion of Ethiopia, this awareness was

further illustrated by the conclusion of a bilateral treaty of friendship and,

perhaps, more significantly,by the signingof the Sa'adabadPact between Iran,Iraq,Turkey, and Afghanistanon July 18, 1937.This treaty representedthe first

attemptafter WorldWar I to ensure regionalsecurity throughexclusive reliance

on the combinedresources of indigenous eaders.13

POST-WORLDWARH

This delicate balance of weakness, which had stood at the root of friendly

relationsbetween Iranand Iraq, extendedinto the post-WorldWarII era. Greatlyalarmedby the transformationof the Soviet Union into one of the two most

powerful states on the international scene,14 both Iran and Iraq sought to

counterbalance he Soviet presence by drawingcloser to the Westernpowers and

by continuingtheirpeaceful coexistence. In June 1949,duringan officialvisit to

10. Abdulghani,raq and Iran, p. 10.11. These responsibilitieswere renderedo Iraqona temporary asis-for a periodof one year,

or more if an extensionwas effected-so as to enable the two partiesto signa convention regulatingthenavigational egime n the river. Thefactthatsuch a conventionwas not reachedwas exploitedby

Iran in justificationof repeated demands to alter the delimitationof the frontieralong the river, ingeneral,and injustificationof its 1969unilateralabrogation f the 1937treaty, in particular.12. Prior o 1937Iran was adamantly pposedto the ConstantinopleProtocolof 1913which it

viewed as favoringIraq. The Iraqiconcessions in the 1937agreementwere confined o recognitionofthe principleof thalweg near Abadan.

13. For the full text of the Sa'adabadPact see Hurewitz,Diplomacy in the Near and MiddleEast, vol. II, pp. 214-16.

14. This developmentwas of particularconcernfor Tehran in view of the manifest Sovietinterest n northern ranas evidencedby the establishment f the communistAzarbayjanepublicandsupport or an independentKurdishrepublic.



262* MIDDLE EASTJOURNAL

Tehran by the Iraqi regent, Prince Abd al-Ilah, a treaty of "good neighborly"

relations was signed,and the two countriesembarkedon ajoint effort to resolve

their unsettled territorialproblems.As late as 1957,only a short while before theoverthrowof the monarchy nIraq,the two sides reachedanagreement o appoint

a joint commissionfor the administration f the Shatt al-Araband to submitthe

issue of boundarydemarcation o a Swedish arbitrator.5 Cooperationreachedits

peak with the participationof the two states in the BaghdadPact (1955-58).

The overthrowof the Hashemitedynasty in Iraq by GeneralQasimin July

1958, with its attendant surge of communist power in Iraq and intensified

Iraqi-Sovietrelations, aroused deep concern in Tehran and drove Iranto enter

into a defense agreementwith the UnitedStates in 1959.To a certainextent, until

that time bilateral relations had been governed by a spirit of royal solidarity

similar to the one characterizing he monarchicalpost-WestphalianEuropean

state-system; geopoliticalinterests apart,neitherregimehad soughtto discredit

its counterpartsince both derived their legitimacy from the same principle of

dynastic sanctity. With the delegitimization f the Iraqimonarchical ystem, Iran

couldonly hope thatthe new regimewouldalso recognizea basic convergenceof

interests between the two countries.

Tehransoon realized thatgeopoliticalrealitieswere stronger han revolution-

ary rhetoric. To be sure, Qasim's break with his predecessors' pro-Westernconduct and the reorientation f Iraq'sforeignpolicy in the directionof the Soviet

Union was by no means a minordevelopment.As noted by a long-timeobserver

of Iraqipolitics, however, "Qasim's foreign policy was governed by essentially

the same forces thatshapedthe foreignpolicy of the Old Regime. 16 A protege of

the formerprimeminister,Nurial-Said, Qasimapparently nheriteda measure of

his patron's awareness of both Iraq's relative weakness vis-a-vis its non-Arab

neighbors and its common interests with them. This awareness was already

reflected n the proclamationof the JulyRevolution,which stated Iraq'sintention

to cultivate brotherlyties with Arab and Muslimstates and to honor previously

signedinternationalundertakings.Accordingly,Qasimwas extremelyreluctant o

dissociate Iraq from the BaghdadPact, taking the ultimatestep of withdrawing

from the defense organizationon March 24, 1959, only in the face of heavy

internaland externalpressures.17

Notwithstandingtwo severe bilateralcrises-December 1959-January1960

and February-April 196118-the general pattern of Iraqi-Iranianrelations,

namely, Iraq's awarenessof Iran's potentialand Tehran'sinability to transform

its inherentdominance into regionalhegemony, was fundamentallymaintained

15. R. K. Ramazani,Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973 (Charlottesville:UniversityPress ofVirginia, 1975), p. 402.

16. M. Khadduri,Republican Iraq, p. 181.17. Ibid., pp. 182-4.18. For a detaileddescriptionof the crises see Ramazani, ran's Foreign Policy, pp. 401-2;

ShahramChubinandSepehrZabih,TheForeign Relations of Iran, (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1974),pp. 172-6;Abdulghani,raq and Iran, pp. 15-6.



IRAN-IRAQ* 263

during he Qasim years and furtherconsolidated n the post-Qasimera. It was not

accidental that Egypt, rather than neighboring Iraq, spearheaded the Arab

campaignagainst Iranduringthe 1950s and the 1960s. Indeed, while Egypt wasvoicing the claim for Arabistan(that is, Khuzistan), Iraqwas preoccupiedwith

removing sources of bilateralfriction, such as Iraniansupportfor the Kurds in

Iraqandoffshoreoil concessions. Within hisframework, he Iraqipresident,Abd

al-RahmanArif, dispatcheda high-ranking elegation ed by the foreignminister

and ministerof state to Tehran n February1964 o discuss bilateral ssues. In late

1965a vigorous exchange of notes took place between the premiers. Relations

betweenthe two states reachedtheirpeakin March1967when PresidentArif paid

an official visit to Iran.Although failing to produce any concrete results, these contacts alleviated

mutualapprehensionsand distrustand, above all, depicted the persistent joint

interestin accommodation.Yet this spiritwas soon to give way to antagonismand

bitterrivalryas externaldevelopmentsupset the long-heldbalanceof weakness,

thereby drivingIran to attemptto translate its geopolitical superiorityvis-a-vis

Iraq into the concrete currencyof hegemony.

Iran's Road to Regional Hegemony: 1968-1975

The 1970switnesseda gradualevolution froma balanceof weakness to Iran's

ascendancyto military eadership n the PersianGulf. This process, whichbegan

in the late 1960sand became an established act in 1975withthe conclusion of the

borderagreementbetween IranandIraq,was the result of Shah MuhammadReza

Pahlavi's ambitions-a combinationof hegemonial, indeed, even imperial,aspi-

rationsand a desire for absolute security.

Because of a series of events, the shah embarkedon an ambitiousdrive aimedat assertingIran'spositionas the leadingpowerin the Gulf: the announcement n

1968of Britain's ntentionto withdraw romits militarybases east of Suez, Iraq's

growingalignmentwith the Soviet Union, the diminutionof a direct Soviet threat

followingthe significant mprovement n Iranian-Soviet elations beginning n the

early 1960s,andrisingoil revenues. Tojustify this policy, the shahargued hat the

responsibility or maintainingGulfsecurity ay solely withthe local states andthat

no externalpowers were to be allowedto interfere n the affairsof the region. As

the largest and most powerful Gulf country, Iran had a moral, historical, andgeopoliticalobligation o ensurestability n this region not only for benefits ocally

but also for the benefit of the world.19

19. The shah on many occasions emphasized his views as reported by the Guardian (London),

October 9, 1971; Agence France-Presse, June 24, 1974, from Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS-MEA), June 24, 1974, p. RI; Deutsche Presse Agentur, June 10, 1976, from FBIS-MEA, June11, 1976, p. R2.



264* MIDDLEEAST JOURNAL

The shah'sperceptionof Iranas the "guardian f the Gulf,' 20 a regular heme

in his pronouncements n the 1970s,manifested tself in an impressiveexpansion

of Iran'smilitarycapabilitiesthat turned it into the most powerfulcountry in theGulf. This new prowess was highlightedby a series of Iranianactions intendedto

signal-both to the Gulf countriesand the GreatPowers-exactly who had the

finalsay in the region.These included, nteralia, the occupationon November30,

1971, of the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, near the

Straitof Hormuz,which were at the timeunder the sovereigntyof the emiratesof

Shara and Ras al-Khaymarespectively. Also included was the military nterven-

tion in Oman rom 1972-76at the requestof SultanQabusto suppressthe Dhofari

rebels then operatingalongOman's borderwith South Yemen (and supportedbythe latter).

The most salient manifestation of the shah's mounting ambitions was the

intensifying pressure on Iraq,a neighborthat was clearly less powerfulbut one

that constitutedthe only potential obstacle on Iran'sroad to militarysupremacy

in the Gulf. In July 1969, Tehran was implicatedin an abortive coup attempt

against the Baath regime in Iraq.21During that same year Iran had already

challengedthe prevailingstatusquo by unilaterally brogating he 1937agreement

on the navigationregimein the Shattal-Arab.These actions were followed by a

series of Iranianmoves in the early 1970s that severely exacerbated bilateral

relations:amongthem, attemptspoliticallyto isolate Iraq from other Arabstates

of the Gulfthrough he establishmentof a regionaldefense organizationcompris-

ing Iran,SaudiArabia,andKuwait,and the provisionof extensive economic and

militaryassistance to the Kurdishrebels in northernIraq. The growinghostility

between the two countries eruptedinto violence in the winter of 1974-75 with

fierceborder clashes involving tanks, heavy artillery,andaircraftwhichvirtually

left the Iraqiarmyon the verge of collapse.

Unable to suppressan insurgencythat imposed an intolerableburdenon itsdomestic system, Iraqhadno alternativebut to seek some kindof agreementwith

Iranthatwould leadto the withdrawalof Iranian upport or the Kurds.This took

the form of the Algiers Agreementof March 6, 1975,which containedsignificant

Iraqi territorialconcessions, including the demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab

waterway's boundaryon the basis of the thalwegline.22

20. See, for example, TehranDomestic Service, October 6, 1970, in BritishBroadcastingCorporation(BBC), Summaryof World Broadcasts,October 8, 1970, ME/3502/A/1;Guardian,

October 9, 1971; Financial Times, May 31, 1973; Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1973.21. FredHalliday, ran:DictatorshipandDevelopmentHarmondsworth,UK:Penguin,1979),p. 274.

22. The AlgiersAgreementstipulated he demarcation f the landfrontier n accordancewiththe 1913Protocol of Constantinople ndthe verbalaccord of 1914; greement o demarcate he Shattal-Arabwaterway'sboundary n the basis of thethalweg ine;agreemento "re-establish ecurityandmutualconfidence along their common frontiers"and undertake o exercise a strict and effectivecontrolwith the aimof finallyputtinganend to "allinfiltrations f a subversivecharacter romeitherside"; the pledge of both partiesto regard the provisionsnegotiated at the 1975OrganizationofPetroleumExportingCountriesmeeting as indivisibleelements of a comprehensive ettlement,such



IRAN-IRAQ* 265

The Algiers Agreementopeneda new era in regionalrelations,the era of Pax

Irana. The agreement reflected Baghdad's painful realizationthat an effective

enforcement of Iraq's internal sovereignty depended on the goodwill of itsneighborto the east. Within ess than a decade, the shahhadmanaged o achieve

his goal-to substitute a relationship that presupposed unquestioned Iranian

dominancefor the old Iraq-Iran tatus quo based on the 1937agreement.Having

attained his goal, Irannaturally volved froma revisionist nto a statusquo power

and beganto advocate the perpetuationof stabilityin the Gulf. Iraq, for its part,

was neitherin the positionto undermine he newly establishedregionalordernor

did it have any inclinationto do so. Instead, the Baathregimeturned inward to

halt the Kurdish nsurgency,to reconstruct ts armedforces, and to stabilize thecountry's social, economic, and political systems. Consequently, the Algiers

Agreement was followed by a periodof much reducedtension between Iraqand

Iran,a period that lasted for four years until the overthrowof the shah.

GOING TO WAR: RAQAND REVOLUTIONARYIRAN

The Iranian Revolution and the inception of the Islamic Republic changed

Iran'sstrategicrelationshipwith Iraqfundamentally,as the revolutionaryregime

sought to overturnthe status quo providedfor by the Algiers Agreement.Even

thoughrevolutionaryambitionswere also relatedto the rest of the Gulf states as

well, several factors madeIraqthe primary argetfor the exportof the revolution.

WithShiasaccounting or approximately 0percentof Iraq'stotalpopulation,the

revolutionaryregimein Tehrancould, andcertainlydid, entertainhopes that this

community,which had always viewed itself as a deprivedgroup, would emulate

the Iranianexample and rise againstits "oppressors." These expectations were

furtherfueled not only by the secular "heretic" nature of the Baath, which wasadamantlyopposedto the very notion of anIslamicpoliticalorder,butalso by the

location of the holiest Shi'i shrines-Karbala, Najaf, and Kazimiyya-on Iraqi

territory,a combination hatcould serve as a potentiallypowerfulweapon in the

handsof the Islamicregime.

Above all, however, the mullahsin Tehranwere confronted with the same

geostrategic dilemmafaced by the shah a decade earlier:Iraq's position as the

majorpotentialobstacle to Iran'squestfor regionalhegemony. Just as the shah's

road to supremacy nvolved subduingIraq, the replacementof the status quo inthe PersianGulfby an Islamicorderhad to begin with the removal of the primary

hindrance o this goal, the secularBaathregime. In the words of Hujjatal-Islam

SadeqKhalkhali,"We have takenthe path of trueIslamand our aim in defeating

that a breach of any one would be considered a violation of the spirit of the Algiers Agreement. Forthe English text of the agreement see the New York Times, March 8, 1975.



266mMIDDLEEAST JOURNAL

Saddam[Hussein] lies in the fact that we consider Saddamthe mainobstacle to

the advance of Islam in the region.' 23

Interestinglyenough, Iraq's initialresponse to the shah's departureand theemergenceof AyatollahRuhollahKhomeiniwas by and large positive. Not only

did the Baathregime not attemptto take advantageof the civil strife in Iranto

revise the Algiers Agreement,but it was also quickto indicateits willingness to

abide by the status quo between the two states. As then-Vice President Saddam

Hussein put it, "A regimewhich does not support he enemy againstus and does

not intervenein our affairs,and whose worldpolicy correspondsto the interests

of the Iranian and Iraqi people, will certainly receive our respect and

appreciation. "'24

This positive attitudetowardthe revolutionaryregimecontinuedthroughout

the springand summer of 1979. The Iraqi government took the opportunityof

Iran's withdrawal rom the CentralTreatyOrganizationCENTO) o offerits good

offices in case Iranshoulddecide to join the Non-AlignedMovement,andas late

as August 1979Iraqi authoritiesextended an invitation to the Iranianpremier,

MehdiBazargan,to visit Iraq.25The Iraqileaders at the time referredto Iran as

a brotherlynation, linked to the Arab people of Iraq by "strong ties of Islam,

historyandnobletraditions,"andpraisedthe revolutionaryregimein Tehranfor

pursuinga policy that underlined hese "deep historicalrelations." 26

Tehran did not, however, reciprocate this goodwill. In June 1979, the

revolutionaryregime began publicly urgingthe Iraqipopulationto rise up and

overthrow the Baath regime.27A few months later, Tehran escalated its anti-

Baathcampaignby resuming ts support or the Iraqi Kurds(which had ended in

1975), providingaid to undergroundShi'i movements (in particular he Da'wa

Party) in Iraq, and initiatingattacks againstprominentIraqiofficials, the most

significantbeing the failed attempt on the life of TariqAziz, the Iraqi deputy

premier,on April 1, 1980.

To check these pressures, Baghdad resorted to suppressing Shi'i under-

ground organizations, expelling Iranian citizens (as well as Iraqi citizens of

Persian origin) en masse, attempting to organize a united Arab front, and

supporting ranianseparatistelementssuch as the IranianKurdsand the Arabsin

Khuzistan. These countermeasures ailed to impress the revolutionaryregime,

and, responding o Hussein's pledge to take revengefor the attempt on the life of

Aziz, AyatollahKhomeinicalledon the IraqiShiason June9, 1980, to overthrow

Saddam'sgovernment.Iran'sforeignminister,SadeghGhobtzadegh,revealedon

the same day that his governmenthad made the decision to topple the Baath

23. Tehran Domestic Service, July 24, 1982, in BBC Summary, July 27, 1982, ME/7088/A/2.24. Iraqi News Agency, February 14, 1979, from FBIS-MEA, February 15, 1979, p. El.25. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, pp. 58-9.26. See, for example, interview with President Ahmad Hasan Baqr, in BBC Summary, May 22,

1979, ME/6122/A/1-2.27. See, for example, BBC Summary, June 8, 1979, ME/6144/A5 and June 9, 1979, ME/

6145/A7.



IRAN-IRAQ* 267

regime. The same theme was reiterated wo days later by the Iranianpresident,

Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr,who also warnedthat Iran wouldgo to war in the event

of further deterioration in the situation on the border.28In April 1980, theIranian-Iraqi onfrontationentereda new phase with clashes along the common

frontier; n Augustthese escalatedinto heavyfighting nvolvingtank andartillery

duels and air strikes.

Iran'sactivities in general, and the protractedandescalating border fighting

in particular, ed Iraqidecision makers to the conclusion that Baghdadhad no

alternativebut to contain the Iranian hreatby resortingto arms. Faced, for the

second time within a decade, with Iran's determination o reshape the regional

status quo according to its own design and with the bitter memory of armed

conflictswith Iran n the early 1970s,the Baathleadersseriouslydoubtedthatthe

Iraqi political system could sustain anotherprolonged,exhaustingconfrontation

with Iran. Added to these concerns was the view of the nature of the new

theocratic regime with its uncompromisingand revolutionary goals and the

growingevidence that the Iranianregimewas set upon destabilizingthe Baath.

Consequently, the Iraqi governmentgraduallycame to realize that the only way

to containthe Iranian hreat was to exploit Iran'stemporaryweakness following

the revolutionand to raise the stakes for both sides by resortingto armedforce.

CONCLUSIONS

Iranian-Iraqi elations in general, and the outbreak of the Iran-IraqWar in

particular, llustratethe validityof the generalrule that "vicinity, or nearness of

situation,constitutes nations[sic] natural nemies."29These factors also describe

the limits of this rule. On the one hand, the elements of competitionand rivalry

inherent n almost any neighborly nteractionhave not been absent from Iranian-

Iraqi relations, as evidenced by the various crises and wars between the twostates. On the other hand, notwithstanding he ethnic and religious divisions

amongPersians andArabs, the periodsof convergenceandcooperation between

twentieth-centuryIran and Iraq have exceeded by far those of hostility and

antagonism.

This state of affairsstems from the markedgeopolitical inequality between

Iran andIraqthat moderated he acuteness of the inherentsources of antagonism

and generated a mutually recognized modus vivendi. This compromise was

maintained or nearly five decades and was characterizedby Baghdad'saware-

ness of Iraniangeopolitical superiorityand by Tehran's inability to impose itshegemony over Iraq. Moreover, even after the disappearanceof the balance of

weakness and the consequent Iraniandrive for regional hegemony, Iraq, after a

28. Guardian, April 3, 1980; Financial Times, April 12, 1980; International Herald Tribune,April 10, 1980; Daily Telegraph, April 9, 1980.

29. Alexander Hamilton, as quoted in Martin Wight, Power Politics (Harmondsworth, UK:Penguin, 1979), p. 157.



268* MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

brief period of resistance, proved willing to abide by the new status quo

establishedby the AlgiersAgreement.

It was only after 1979 when the revolutionaryregimein Iranhad begun itsdetermined hrust to replacethe regionalsettingwith the hithertounprecedented

idea of an Islamic order-a thrust that inscribed on its ideological flag the

overthrow of the Baath regime-that Iraqno longerfelt able to live with Iran's

position of superiority because of the simple fact that acquiescence could

eventually lead to the regime's demise. In the Iraqiview, then, the geopolitical

relationshipbetween Iraq and Iran was transformedby the revolution from a

.'mixed motive game" into a zero-sumgame. The shah, for all his militarypower

and ambitiousobjectives was perceivedby Iraqisas rational,even if unpleasant.

Certainlyhis goals from the late 1960sonward were opposed to Iraqi national

interests, and he could satisfy them only at Iraq's expense. Withthe exception,

however,of the 1969plot,the shahwas not so much nterested n toppling he Baath

regimeas he was in preventing raqfromcompetingmilitarilywith Iran.Once the

shah'saspirationsor Gulfhegemonywererecognized,a deal-disadvantageousas it

was for Iraq-was struckandbothpartieswereexpectedto live up to it.

Paradoxically, he Gulfwar, the most acute direct outcome of Iran'sattempt

to export its revolutionary message, introduced a fundamental, though not

precipitous, shift in Iran'sperception of its regionalrole towardthe direction ofthe shah's geopoliticalworld view. WithIran'sill-equippedarmedforces unable

to breach the Iraqiline of defense, the civilianpopulationdecisively exhausted,

and the economy largely devastated, most of the Iranian decision makers

increasinglybecame disillusioned with the far-reachingaspirationsto shape the

GulfalongIslamiclines; they optedinsteadto agreeto a cease-fire on the basis of

the 1975 status quo. As Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, hen speaker of the

Iranianparliamentandthe strongestpoliticalfigure n TehranafterKhomeini,putit in February 1986 at one of Iran'sbrightestmomentsin the war, the captureof

the Faw Peninsula, "We do accept that halfof the Shattal-Arabbelongs to Iranand the other half to Iraq. We do accept the thalwegwhich is international aw.Weseek nothing more than that."30

In short,Tehran'sacceptanceof UnitedNations SecurityCouncilResolution

598 andits insistence during he peace talkson the perpetuationof the 1975status

quo depict a keen awareness on the part of the revolutionaryregime of the

reemergenceof the balanceof weakness in Iranian-Iraqielationsand, therefore,the consequent need to scale down, however temporarily,Iran's regionalambi-

tions. Whetherand for how long this newly establishedbalance will survive stillremains to be seen.

30. Tehran Domestic Service, February 24, 1986, in BBC Summary, February 26, 1986,ME/8193/A/3, emphasis added.

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