and strategic objectives from U.S. forces. In addition,the IDF historically—for example, in Jerusalem in1967, Beirut in 1982, and Jenin in 2002—has provedwilling to take high casualties in urban warfare.

Dating from the siege of Beirut in 1982, Israel haspracticed a complex and limited form of urban war-fare. In Beirut, this involved a cordon around the city,accompanied by limited attacks with artillery, ground,and air forces to put pressure on the PalestinianLiberation Organization (PLO) and Syrian forcesinside. The IDF did not launch a genera! assault onthe city; it awaited a political solution that resulted inevacuation of enemy forces under the auspices ofoutside powers. Despite the IDF's restraint, it wasdepicted as little short of barbaric by much of theinternational media. The PLO's evacuation was treat-ed as a victory parade, rather than the retreat it was,and the PLO lived to fight another day. The battle wasa tactical victory for Israel, but a strategic defeat.

The Beirut experience and ongoing domestic andinternational pressures color Israeli doctrine.Throughout the current struggle, the IDF generallyhas not occupied Palestinian cities, a notable excep-tion being seizure of the Jenin refugee camp. (TheJenin operation is the exception that proves the rule:the IDF was castigated for its assault on Jenin andfalsely accused of perpetrating a massacre.) IDF urbanwarfare doctrine effectively bans the use of fixed-wing aircraft and artillery in support of ground oper-ations. Troops rely on attack helicopters and directfire weapons—usually only small arms and machineguns. Israeli units cordon Palestinian cities and towns,seize a few key buildings or areas, and launch raidsagainst suspected terrorists. Although these opera-tions tend to be quite effective tactically, they result instrategic stalemate because Palestinian forces are leftin place after the IDF withdraws.

Tactically and operationally, fighting Israeli style inan urban setting requires a heavy commitment ofground troops to make up for reduced fire support,and to intimidate rather than confront enemy forces.This allows Israeli units to achieve limited objectives.In June 2004, the IDF's tunnel raids in Rafah, a smallcity in Gaza, required deployment of almost a divisionof Israel troops. (Israeli divisions are somewhat small-er than their U.S. counterparts, and the force in Rafahwould have operated without artillery and other sup-porting elements). Rafah has about half the popula-

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tion of Fallujah (167,000) and it is tiny in comparison:5-6 square kilometers.

In Valiant Resolve, U.S. tactics and highly restric-tive rules of engagement closely mirrored Israeli tech-niques. Owing to these restrictions and too small aforce, the operation was aborted, with arguably disas-trous results for U.S. policy in Iraq. Many mistakeswere corrected during al-Fajr. Heavy armor wasemployed, and air and artillery strikes were more lib-erally authorized. Even so, dropping four 500-poundbombs on the first day of a major assault remains anextremely selective application of firepower. Despitepredictable claims that Fallujah was devastated, pho-tos reveal superficial damage to most buildings andan occasional structure demolished. Television cover-age of Marines engaged in harrowing room-to-roomcombat belie hysterical stories that entire city blockswere leveled.

What would have happened had we met atougher, more professional opponent in Fallujah? Theinsurgents were formidable because many were will-ing to fight to the death—but in the main, they werean indifferently armed rabble who could inflict casu-alties because of the nature of urban warfare and U.S.sensibilities. What if U.S. forces find themselves facingSyrian commandos or well-trained Hezbollah guerril-las?

Conclusions

Large ground forces are necessary when U.S. unitsadopt Israeli-style urban warfare tactics—which, to alarge extent, the Marines appear to have done inFallujah. To accomplish their mission in Valiant

Resolve, they needed a considerably larger force tooperate in the absence of heavy air and artillery sup-port. Further, Israeli urban tactics are designed prima-rily for isolating selected areas, not seizing and hold-ing terrain and buildings. If U.S. forces intend to takeand clear an urban area block by block, as they didduring al-Fajr, they are going to pay a heavier price.The result in Valiant Resolve was similar to whatIsraeli forces have achieved against the Palestinians:indecisive outcomes that keep the enemy in business.Operation al-Fajr weakened the Iraqi insurgency, butit came too late and too temperately to have brokenthe insurgency's back, despite the claims of some U.S.officers. The men who killed the U.S. contractors—

the act that precipitated the battle—have not beenfound, much less prosecuted. Many insurgentsescapdd Fallujah during the buildup after ValiantResolve, and al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawiremains at large.

Was the battle of Fallujah a victory or a defeat? TheMarine Corps' military operations in urban terraindoctrine recognizes that tactical success does not nec-essarily translate to strategic victory. It notes theIsraeli's tactical victory in Beirut was a strategicdefeat—and observes the same about the battle ofHue in the Vietnam War, when Marines defeated anenemy that sought to put up a good fight but neverexpected to win. Much the same can be said ofFallujah's defenders. In spite of the heating they tookin November, they will continue to assert theyrepelled the initial attack and fought well thereafter.

The potential problem for the Marine Corps andU.S. deterrence in general is more than just local.During a visit to Israel in the early 1980s, an Israeliacquaintance described his military service to me as"an Israeli Marine." Israel does not have Marines; hemeant he had been in the paratroops, which were thebest and toughest soldiers in the IDF. He assumed thatan American would understand a comparison withU.S. Marines—and I did.

At that time, the IDF could deploy paratroops todisturbances in the West Bank or Gaza who, by sim-ply showing up in their red berets, could settle thingsdown. Much has changed in 20 years. Today, noIsraeli paratrooper would be so foolish as to wear hisberet in Nablus or Ramallah. Israeli paratroopers con-tinue to fight well. Nonetheless, a couple of decadesof persistent and inconclusive combat in Lebanon andurban combat in the territories have done much toerode their regional, if not international, reputation.

The handwriting is on the wall. The battle ofFallujah was not a defeat—but we cannot afford manymore victories like it.

NotesUS. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2005, 57-

61. Reprinted by permission. Copyright © 2005 byU.S. Naval Institute (www.usni.org).

1. Robert D. Kaplan, "Five Days in Fallujah," AtlanticMonthly, July-August 2004, 118.

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2. Pamela Constable, "Troops Gaining Grip on sections ofFallujah" Washington Post, 7 April 2004.3. GySgt Mark Oliva, "Marines Suspend Fallujah Offensive,Push Humanitarian Aid," Marine corps News(www.usmc.mil), 13 April 2004.4. Brendan Miniter, "The Fallujah Brigade," The Wall StreetJournal, I June 2004.5. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "We Won: Fallujah Rejoices inWithdrawal," Washington Post, 2 May 2004.6. "Marines Suspend Fallujah Offensive," Marine CorpsNews, 13 April 2004.7. Military Operations on Urban Terrain, Marine CorpsWarfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3 (Quantico, VA: April1998), 1-16.8. MCWP 3-35.3, 1-16, 1-17.9. Kaplan, "Five Days in Fallujah," 126.10. MCWP 3-35.3, 1-17, 2-7.11. Christian Lowe, "U.S. Israeli Armed Forces Trade Urban-Warfare Tips," Marine Corps Times, 31 May 2002. Ii. shouldbe noted that Israeli battalions tend to be smaller than com-parable Marine units, and most of the Israeli troops involvedin the Jenin battle were reservists.12. See www.globalsecurity.org.13. Jackie Spinner and Karl Vick, "U.S. Forces Meet FierceResistance in Fallujah," Washington Post, 13 November2004.14. Jackie Spinner, "Artillerymen Clear Path for the Infantry,"Washington Post, 11 November 2004; Associated Press, 8November 2004.15. Sameer N. Yacoub, "Foreign Fighters Arrested inSouthern Iraq," Associated Press, 25 November 2004; DexterFilkins, "In Taking Falluja Mosque, Victory by the Inch,"New York Times, 10 November 2004.16. Jackie Spinner and Karl Vick, "Troops Battle for LastParts of Fallujah," Washington Post, 14 November 2004.17. E.g., Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Two, Three, ManyFallujahs," Weekly Standard, 6 December 2004; Jack Kelly,"U.S. Tactic, Training Kept Casualties Down in Fallujah" (cit-ing author and retired Army LtCol Ralph Peters), PittsburghPost-Gazette, 21 November 2004.18. It is also nearly 50 percent of total U.S. casualties suf-fered in the initial campaign (OIF) between 19 March and30 April 2003: according to DoD, 109 killed and 426 wound-ed and not returned to duty.19. About 45 percent of U.S. forces wounded in Iraq arereturned to duty and not evacuated. Karl Vick, "August:1,100 Troops Wounded," Los Angeles Times, 5 September2004; Spinner and Vick, "U.S. Forces Meet Fierce Resistancein Fallujah."

About the AuthorJonathan F. Keiler teaches world history and art history in Prince

George's County, Maryland. He is a former Army Judge Advocate

General Corps officer and a graduate of Salisbury University and

Washington and Lee University.

II MarineExpeditionary ForceSummary of Action

by Commandei (IS. Marine Corps Forces,Central Command

Unit: II Marine Expeditionary ForceRecommended Award: Presidential Unit CitationPeriod of Award: 1 March 2005 to 28 February2006Status: Secretary of the NavyOriginator: Commander, U.S. Marine CorpsForces Central Command

Cit atiow

For extraordinary heroism and outstandingperformance of duty in action againstenemy forces in support of Operation Iraqi

Freedom 04-06 from 27 March 2005 to 28February 2006. II Marine Expeditionary Force(Forward) executed a campaign plan utilizingkinetic and non-kinetic methods to establish asecure environment enabling Iraqi self-gover-nance and self-reliance. Under the constructs ofOperations Patriot Shield, Liberty Express, andSayaid II, hundreds of aggressive counterinsur-gency operations, ranging from informationoperations and reconstruction programs to highintensity offensive combat, were carried out.These operations, conducted in every majorpopulation center in the area of operations,resulted in over 1,700 enemy killed in action,over 10,500 detentions, and over 210 tons ofexplosives captured and destroyed. Anti-IraqForces in al-Anbar Province were effectivelyneutralized, setting the conditions for a 2,700percent increase in voter participation in theconstitutional referendum and the parliamentaryelection. Iraqi security forces were transformedfrom an unorganized body numbering less than1,600 into a structured force with over 21,000volunteers serving in army, police, and l)Order

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enforcement units. By their outstanding courage,resourcefulness, and aggressive fighting spirit incombat against the enemy, the officers andenlisted personnel of II Marine ExpeditionaryForce (Forward) reflected great credit uponthemselves and upheld the highest traditions ofthe Marine Corps and the United States NavalService.

Operation Patriot ShieldThis operation was designed to maintain

Coalition force momentum and to disrupt anti-Iraqi force elements throughout al-AnbarProvince and to train and integrate Iraqi securityforce units for combined counterinsurgencyoperations.

Ground Combat Element

During April and May, 2d Marine Division unitssimultaneously conducted over 30 major coun-terinsurgency operations and trained, integrated,and operated with newly formed and arriving Iraqisecurity force units in order to maintain tempo anddisrupt Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF). During OperationPatriot Shield, the focus of effort was neutraliza-tion of insurgent forces in the city of Ramadi, theprovincial capital. Regimental Combat Team 2(RCT-2) continued interdiction operations alongthe Hit and Haditha corridor, while RegimentalCombat Team 8 (RCT-8) conducted operations toestablish control of Fallujah, Zaydon, andAmiriyah. The subordinate operations Matadorand New Market were especially noteworthy dur-ing this period, as they were conducted in theinsurgent hotspots of al-Qaim and the Hadithahtriad. This region was used as a staging area forforeign fighters who crossed the Syrian border ille-gally along traditional smuggling routes. In theseareas, foreign fighters received weapons andequipment in order to conduct attacks in the morepopulated key cities, i.e. Baghdad, Ramadi,Fallujah, and Mosul. These operations resulted ina significant disruption of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)operations along the western Euphrates River val-ley and served as the starting point for what wouldbecome a series of operations designed to main-tain Coalition forces' momentum and neutraliza-

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tion of AQI as a threat by denying them sanctuaryand restricting their movement and ability to planlarge-scale operations.

The combined success of those operationsresulted in almost 350 enemy killed in action andthe detainment of over 2,000 insurgents. A numberof high value individuals were among the cap-tured or killed, dealing a blow to the leadership ofAQI. The 2d Marine Division units also discoveredalmost 200 weapons caches which includedapproximately 8,000 mortar and rocket rounds,almost 20 SA-7s, and SA-13 surface-to-air-missiles,two complete mortar systems and eight 500-poundbombs.

Air Combat Element

During Operation Patriot Shield, the air com-bat element flew approximately 4,723 sorties and7,609 flight hours. The missions flown by 2dMarine Aircraft Wing (Forward) (2d MAW [Fwd])in support of Patriot Shield included assault sup-port, close air support, aerial reconnaissance,offensive air support, and intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance. Marine Wing SupportGroup 27 (MWSG-27) during this and other oper-ation provided forward arming and refuelingpoint support and other aviation ground supportfunctions, and one tactical recovery of aircraftand personnel mission. 2d MAW (Fwd) executed90 casualty evacuation missions, transporting 254wounded Marines to higher level medical carefacilities.

Combat Service Support Element

2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) (2d MLG[Fwdl) mounted a complex logistic support planthrough the distribution of Classes I, III, IV andIX supplies. A coordinated air and ground move-ment plan expedited the delivery of these sup-plies and made efficient use of all available trans-portation assets. Challenging the flexibility andcapabilities of all involved, it demonstrated 2dMLG (Fwd)'s ability to provide a quick responseand consistent logistical support.

During Operation Matador, Combat LogisticsBattalion 2 (CLB-2), with support from 2d MLG(Fwd), provided critical combat logistical supportcontributing to another successful phase in corn-

bat operations. Logistical support included:Explosive Ordnance Demolition teams, femalesearch teams, fiscal support, mortuary affairs,medical aid as well as a consistent stream of sup-plies (classes I, II, III, V, VIII, and IX). This con-sistent and ready effort ensured a healthy andsuperior combat force.

Operation Guardian Sword

This operation commenced on 6 June andlasted through the month of July, focusing onneutralizing insurgents and strengthening theIraqi security forces.

Ground Combat Element

On 6 June, 2d Marine Division began a seriesof counterinsurgency operations in support ofOperation Guardian Sword. This division opera-tion focused on shaping conditions to supportthe upcoming Iraqi constitutional referendumand national elections by preventing anti-Iraqiforces from intimidating the Iraqi populace.Most importantly this Operation effectively pre-vented AQI disruption of the relief in place ofOIF 04-06-1 and 04-06-2 forces. ThroughoutOperations Khanjar and Scimitar (RCT-8) andSpear, Scimitar, and Saber (RCT-2); and 2dBrigade Combat Team's (2 BCT) small unit coun-terinsurgency operations in Ramadi, the division•killed over 250 insurgents while detaining over2,000. In addition, units discovered over 150weapons caches containing 2,500 mortar androcket rounds and 23,500 pounds of bombs. Oneof the most significant caches was discoveredduring an RCT-8 operation in Karmah. Coalitionforces discovered a subterranean insurgent com-plex, consisting of a series of undergroundbunkers in an old rock quarry approximately 170meters wide by 275 meters long. Within variousrooms, Coalition forces discovered four fully fur-nished living spaces, a kitchen with fresh food,two shower facilities and a working air condi-tioner. Other rooms were filled with numerousweapons and ammunition to include varioustypes of machine guns, ordnance, to includemortars, rockets and artillery rounds, black uni-forms, ski masks, night vision goggles, and corn-

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munications equipment. The net effect of theseoperations were a series of efficient transfers ofauthority between 35 maneuver units. Incomingunits assumed their responsibilities and battle-space with no loss in continuity of operations.

Air Combat Element

During this operation, 2d MAW (Fwd) flewapproximately 8,134 sorties and 13,974 flighthours. 2d MAW (Fwd)'s direct support of combatsustainment included strip alert assets constantlymaintained at the ready to provide casualty evac-uation / medical evacuation, of which there were49 casualty evacuation missions for 598 casual-ties, tactical recovery of aircraft andpersonnel/quick reaction force (QRF), and bothrotary-wing and fixed-wing close air support inresponse to troops in contact and the needs of IIMEF (Fwd).

Combat Service Support Element

2d MLG (Fwd), Combat Logistics Battalion 2(CLB-2), and Combat Logistics Battalion 8 (CLB-8) provided a variety of combat support toinclude the recovery of vehicles with their main-tenance detachments, repair of vital alternatesupply routes and main supply routes to denythe insurgents improvised explosive deviceemplacement opportunities. Alternate supplyroutes and main supply route maintenance wascritical in keeping Multi National Force-West(MNF-W) stocked with combat supplies (classesI, II, III, V, VIII, and IX.

During Operation Spear, from 15-19 June 2005in the al-Qaim region, CLB-2 provided a varietyof combat support to include the recovery ofvehicles with their maintenance detachment anda personnel recovery mission by Mortuary AffairsMarines. This service was critical in keeping 2dMarine Division mobile and strong.

During Operation Dagger, CLB-8 assistedgreatly with combat logistic resupply of Classes I,II, III, V VIII and IX. Due to the unique weatherpatterns of the Shamal, or sandstorm, seasonwhich occurred during the timeframe of thisoperation, exceptional logistic support measureshad to be taken. Because of the potential that air-field operations would be shut down and aircraft

grounded, CLB-8 forward deployed a forwardresuscitative surgical section, in order to providea level II surgical capability for the units partici-pating in Operation Dagger. CLB-8 also assistedRCT-8 in securing the main supply routes in thearea of operations during this timeframe by cre-ating Team Truck, a task organized force of bothmotor transport and military police vehicles andpersonnel that assisted in patrolling the mainsupply routes and alternate supply routes.

During Operation Sword, conducted in the Hitand Haditha region, CLB-2 provided combatresupply and maintenance support. The 2d MLG(Fwd) developed, and enacted a survivabilityplan that supplied protective barriers to reinforcethe camps from indirect fire, as well as vehicularthreats, along with multiple resupply missions tomaintain a superior force. This effort continuedthroughout the month of June.

Triad RegionGround Combat Element

Operation River Gate was conducted from 3-19 October in the cities of Hadithah, Haqlaniyahand Barwanah. Iraqi security forces; 3d Battalion,1st Marines; 1st Light Armored ReconnaissanceBattalion; and the 3d Battalion, 504th InfantryRegiment (U.S. Army), conducted counterinsur-gency operations to continue the disruption ofinsurgents and secure the triad region. Coalitionforces encountered numerous small arms fireattacks and 13 improvised explosive deviceattacks during the operation. Over 172 insurgentswere detained, 12 enemy killed in action, 32caches were discovered along with 95 impro-vised explosive devices and mines. At the com-pletion of the operation a permanent firm basewas establish to provide continued security.

Air Combat Element

The air combat element once again foundthemselves participating in several combat oper-ations. The major operation throughout themonth was Operation River Gate. The operationwas the first thrust of a planned string of opera-tions to clear the Euphrates corridor of insurgentactivity. The operation lasted over three weeks,

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with MAG-26 assets successfully launching heli-borne assaults with ground elements of the 82dAirborne, 1st Recon, 2d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1stDivision of the Iraqi Army and 2d MarineDivision with the units surrounding the town ofHaditha.

Combat Service Support Element

During Operation River Gate, CLB-2 providedcombat logistics support to RCT-2 throughout theoperation. From the onset of the operation, CLB-2 pushed forces from al-Asad and established arepair and replenishment point, as well as a refu-eling point south of the Euphrates River betweenHadithah and Haqlaniyah. CLB-2 put a provision-al rifle platoon, a transportation and materialhandling detachment, recovery vehicles, engi-neers, heavy equipment, maintenance detach-ments and classes I, III (bulk fuel), IV, and V sup-plies at the repair and replenishment point. CLB-2 would eventually place over 300 Marines andsailors at this location while offensive counterin-surgency operations were conducted less than1.5 miles away in Hadithah and Haqlaniyah. Tofree up combat power, CLB-2 assisted the regi-mental combat team in manning the defensivepositions at the repair and replenishment pointallowing the ground combat element forces tofocus more combat power on the operation. .

Western Border ControlSecuring Iraq's border with Syria became a crit-

ical necessity to achieving Coalition force strategicobjectives. Anti-Iraqi forces using historical smug-gling routes through the porous border, were fuel-ing the insurgency by introducing a steady flow ofarms, foreign fighters, and cash into the province.Under the construct of Operation Sayaid, a seriesof subordinate operations were planned and exe-cuted. These high-intensity, kinetic efforts: IronFist, River Gate, Steel Curtain, and Iron Hammereffectively disrupted and neutralized insurgentactivities throughout the western Euphrates Rivervalley, and more importantly set the conditionsfor the introduction of Iraqi security forces in theregion. This permanent presence of Iraqi securityforces has been a critical factor in preventing

insurgent groups from reestablishing themselvesfollowing Coalition force kinetic operations. Theaforementioned operations culminated in a 30November Iraqi border control ceremony held inHusaybah to symbolize the securing of the bor-ders through cooperation of the Ministry ofDefense, Ministry of the Interior, and MultiNational Corps-Iraq.

Ground Combat Element

While Operation Liberty Express was still inprogress, the division adjusted its main effort fromthe 2d Brigade Combat Team (2 BCT) to RCT-2 forOperation Sayaid. RCT-2 was assigned operationaland tactical control of three additional Armymaneuver battalions to provide additional maneu-ver capability for Operations Iron Fist, River Gate,and Steel Curtain. Operation Steel Curtain, thelargest of the three, was a major counterinsur-gency operation in the cities of Husaybah,Karabilah, Ubaydi, and Ramana in support of theMulti National Corps-Iraq Operation Sayaid.Operation Steel Curtain focused on disrupting anddenying AQI safe havens and freedom of move-ment in western al-Anbar Province, establishing apersistent presence in this region, restoring Iraqicontrol of the border with Syria, and setting theconditions for the constitutional referendum andnational election.

In order to effectively restrict and channelinsurgents, RCT-2's area of operations wasexpanded north of the Euphrates River. Tasked toestablish Iraqi control of the Iraq-Syrian border,RCT-2 began attacks from the Syrian border westinto Husaybah with three reinforced battalionspreceded by a mechanized feint into the Ubaydipeninsula. The 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, alongwith the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines and supportingIraqi Army units, successfully attacked andcleared Husaybah, Karabilah, and New Ubaydi.Operation Steel Curtain was instrumental in caus-ing a significant disruption to the AQI xganiza-tion that has had lasting effects across al-AnbarProvince. In addition to destroying much of theAQI leadership and command-and-control func-tions, this operation significantly improved atmos-pherics among the local population of western al-Anbar. Insurgent organizations in western a!-

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Anbar had subjected the local populace to anintense murder and intimidation campaign thatwas successful in preventing locals from assistingCoalition forces. Al-Qaeda freedom of movementand sanctuary were denied. The AQI infrastruc-ture and terror campaign was neutralized. A per-manent Iraqi security force presence is now estab-lished across much of the western Euphrates Rivervalley, consequently eliminating AQI influenceand restoring a sense of security among the localpopulace, who are now more willing to cooper-ate and assist Coalition and Iraqi Army forces.

Essential to the effort of securing the .borderhas been the integration of the Iraqi border policeinto Coalition force activities. The 2d MarineDivision in concert with Iraqi Defense BorderEnforcement has helped to stem the flow of ter-rorists, weapons and money from Syria by contin-uing with the construction of a series of borderforts along the entire length of the Iraqi-Syrianborder. A brigade of Iraqi Border Defense Policehas also been trained and equipped with assis-tance from the division. These border guards arenow conducting patrols, detaining smugglers andinfiltrators, and maintaining an active presence onthis critical border..

Air Combat Element

2d MAW (Fwd) executed special planning andcoordination for Operation Sayaid Phase II Bravoand Steel Curtain. At the completion of SteelCurtain fixed-wing and rotary-wing reconnais-sance and on-call missions in the Husaybah areaenhanced the security and logistical support forthe 30 November Multi National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) Boarder Control Ceremony by facilitating thecoordination and scheduling of assault supportand F/W aircraft for combat air patrol. Extensivecoordination between MNF-W, MNC-I, MarineAircraft Group 26 (MAG-26) and varioussquadrons was also conducted to facilitate thesuccessful movement of Iraqi Ministry of Defensepersonnel and their freshly recruited and ortrained Iraq personnel in support of the DesertProtector program variant 2 and 3.

Combat Service Support Element

Cumulatively, support for these Operations

was provided by the 2d MLG (Fwd)'s CLB-2, withaugmentation by Combat Logistics Regiment(CLR-25) and 8th Engineer Support Battalion(ESB). Logistical support included: explosive ord-nance demolition teams, construction of 13 firmbases or battle positions and a steady stream ofsupplies (classes I, II, III, V, VIII, and IX) as wellas medical aid from forward located repair andreplenishment points established by CLB-2. Thelogistics forces established repair and replenish-ment points within contested areas of the opera-tion in order to provide expeditious support tothe ground combat element. This consistent andready effort ensured the success of this series ofintense, dynamic and wide ranging operationsacross the entire western al-Anbar Province.

During Operation Steel Curtain, CLB-2 estab-lished a forward command cell in foreign operat-ing base al-Qaim. This command cell was origi-nally intended to support Contingency OperatingLocation South construction. Knowing that theywould have to surge forces to the al-Qaim region,CLB-2 planned accordingly by building an infra-structure to support up to 400 of its Marines andsailors in forward operating base al-Qaim. Fromthis operating base the Marines pushed suppliesand equipment in support of Operation SteelCurtain. Once again, materials, equipment,Marines and sailors could not be staged early inorder to ensure Coalition forces kept the elementof surprise. CLB-2 forces, supplies and equipmentwere surged to forward operating base al-Qaimjust before the operation commenced and contin-ued to push supplies forward from al-Asadthroughout it. As the assault moved from west toeast, CLB-2 established a repair and replenish-ment point at Camp Gannon and provided a pro-visional rifle platoon for security, vehicle recoverysupport, maintenance support, and Classes I, III,

IV, and V supplies for the assault on Husaybahand Karbala. As these towns were secured, engi-neers moved in from forward operating base al-Qaim to build firm bases. The firm base fortifica-tions provided force protection for units occupy-ing these firm bases and provided a large physi-cal presence in the towns. Speed was essential toprovide force protection when the Coalitionforces were most vulnerable (immediately after

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taking objectives) and to show townspeople thatCoalition forces were there to stay. After securingtowns, Iraqis woke up to heavy vehicles deliver-ing hundreds of Texas (10,000 pounds each) andJersey barriers as well as heavy equipment to for-tify firm bases with HESCO barriers, guard towers,and bunkers. They built two firm bases in thetown of Husaybah and a third firm base inKarabilah. CLB-2 also built a detainee holdingfacility and assisted in constructing and supply ofa humanitarian camp for Iraqis fleeing the fightingduring this phase of the operation.

To take advantage of the forces available andto exploit its momentum, RCT-2 extendedOperation Steel Curtain into the towns of NewUbaydi and Old Ubaydi and the Ramana area,north of the Euphrates River across from Ubaydi.CLB-2 continued to provide logistics similar towhat was provided for the assault on Husaybahand Karabilah but from forward operating base al-Qaim. This involved building several more firmbases and moving forces across the river. Also,CLB-2 supported another humanitarian camp nearNew and Old Ubaydi.

Iraq Security Forces

In order to help Iraq secure its sovereign bor-ders, II MEF (Fwd) successfully engaged the IraqiMinistry of the Interior and the Multi NationalSecurity Transition Command-Iraq organization toobtain the support and resources to produce moreborder police and to build the necessary borderfort infrastructure to defend over 1,000 kilometersof border area with Syria, Jordan, and SaudiArabia. Additionally, II MEF (Fwd) and its sevenborder transition teams played a• vital role in theorganization, training, and equipping of a virtual-ly ineffective border force. The Iraqi border forcesgrew from approximately 2,300 personnel spreadover three brigades to 3,600. II MEF (Fwd) coor-dinated the construction of 30 permanent andexpeditionary border forts. These border defenseforces employed at the forts continue to grow inoperational capabilities due to the employment ofBorder Transition Teams that •are focused ondeterring AIF activities along the Syrian border.

The G-5/civil-military operations cell pur-chased critically needed humanitarian assistance

supplies that were delivered and stored at CampFallujah. They were then shipped from CampFallujah to support Operation Sayaid II in thewestern Euphrates River valley. The humanitarianassistance supplies were used to supportInternally Displaced Persons camps and otherhumanitarian requirements. In addition, supplieswere used to support the humanitarian missionthroughout the MNF-W area of operations includ-ing initiatives in area of operations Biloxi helpingthe Army civil affairs companies successfully com-plete their missions.

Referendum/Elections(Operation Liberty Express)

Operation Liberty Express, conductedSeptember through December, focused onexpanding Coalition forces and the Ministry ofDefense/Ministry of Interior control throughout al-Anbar Province, while providing support to theIndependent Electoral Commission in Iraq for theconstitutional referendum and national elections.These two historic events were benchmarkachievements in the story of II MEF (Fwd)'sinvolvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom 04-06.

Ground Combat Element

2d Marine Division units conducted over 30major battalion/regimental operations designed toimprove the security situation across the area ofoperations and create an environment conduciveto safe and secure elections. Counterinsurgencyoperations were conducted in nearly every cityacross al-Anbar, including Fallujah, . Amiriyah,Zaydon, Karmah, Saqliwiyah, Ramadi, Khalidiyah,Hit, the Haditha triad, Ubaydi, Karabilah, andHusaybah to capitalize on the progress made thusfar in disrupting and defeating the insurgencywhile preparing the province for the upcomingelections. In addition to killing almost 1,000 insur-gents and detaining almost 4,000 others, over 500weapons caches were discovered Some of themore significant weapons cache contents includ-ed well over 10,000 mortar, artillery, and rocketrounds, 5 surface-to-air missile systems, and 70250-pound bombs.

The numerous operations conducted by 2d

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Marine Division in al-Anhar Province helped dis-rupt and limit the ability of al-Qaeda in Iraq tomurder and intimidate the local populace, there-by ensuring the safety and maximum participationof Iraqi citizens in the constitutional referendumand national elections. The Iraqi security force(1SF), demonstrating significant progress, wasresponsible for providing security inside pollingsites and the area immediately around the outsideof polling locations. The presence of the Iraqisecurity force proved significant as it provided thevoting populace with a sense of security andgreatly enhanced voter turnout. The 2d MarineDivision provided a wide range of support to bol-ster the efforts of the Independent ElectoralCommission's Election Support Teams.

During the October constitutional referendum,2d Marine Division provided security and logisticssupport for over 140 polling centers throughoutthe province. While tons of materials were movedto support the force protection requirementsaround many of the centers, another key activitywas the movement of Iraqi poll workers fromBaghdad International Airport to the two specialpoll worker camps in al-Anbar, and from there tothe forward operating bases where they wouldstage prior to final movement to their actualpolling centers. Over 1,300 Iraqi poll workerswere safely transported and provided meals andquarters at the forward operating bases beforeand after Election Day. Additionally, 2d MarineDivision personnel moved all ballots cast to theappropriate recovery locations. Overall, approxi-mately 260,000 Iraqis voted in al-Anbar Provincewithout incident. This total represented a 1,775percent increase in voter turnout compared to theJanuary 2005 election, and was a significant mile-stone on Iraq's road to democracy.

Two months later, 2d Marine Division replicat-ed the security and logistics support for thenational elections. With robust planning andsmooth execution, the division provided extensive "long-haul" logistics support to 30 pollingcenters across the western al-Anbar Province andcoordinated the movement and care of over 800poll workers flown in from Baghdad. In theRamadi and Fallujah areas, an additional 135Independent Electoral Commission operated

polling centers were established to support theelection in east al-Anbar. The expansion of thissecurity model, limited to Fallujah during the con-stitutional referendum, was a testament to the rap-idly improving capabilities of the Iraqi Securityforces, as they again provided internal and pointsecurity at polling sites in a larger geographic areaof responsibility.

The coordination of the support for theIndependent Electoral Commission polling cen-ters in Ramadi and Fallujah was especially com-plex since it involved synchronization with vari-ous commission officials, Iraqi police, and Iraqipoll workers. However, the movement of hun-dreds of thousands of ballots and related materi-als to three distribution points for Iraqi acceptancewas executed with minimal difficulty.Furthermore, all ballots and poll workers in thewestern al-Anbar Province were retrograded asplanned.

There were no significant insurgent attacksduring the election period which recordedunprecedented Sunni voter turnout. Over1,617,000 voters participated in the national elec-tions in the MNF-W area of operations. Accordingto official results from the Independent ElectoralCommission, al-Anbar Province voter participationcontinued to increase, with nearly 374,000 voterscasting ballots, accounting for a 2,690 percentincrease in voter participation from the January tothe December elections. Improved security condi-tions brought about by members of the 2d MarineDivision provided hundreds of thousands of citi-zens in al-Anbar Province the opportunity to vote.

The national election was the first time Iraqisecurity force had an opportunity to vote in anational election. With extensive division supportin opening 15 polling centers manned byIndependent Electoral Commission poll workersaround the province, about 12,000 Iraqi soldierswere able to safely vote on the 12th of Decemberfor the political party of their choice. The securityoperations and logistic support provided duringthe elections assured the smooth execution ofboth electoral events. Operation Liberty Expressculminated in the successful 15 December 2005election of a representative government for thecountry of Iraq.

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Air Combat Element

MAG-26 helicopter assets provided aerial lift

for over 1,000 Iraqi voting committee members tovarious polling stations throughout the al-AnbarProvince for the October Referendum.Additionally, Marines and sailors from units of theair combat element provided security and searchprocedures at the polling stations. The success ofthe referendum was a direct result of OperationRiver Bridge and the aerial assets, which support-ed both events.

2d MAW (Fwd) also provided the flightsrequired for Operation Liberty Express in supportof the 15 December Iraq national elections. Thisincluded the coordination and scheduling ofassault support and MNF-W and Combined ForcesAir Component Commander/F/W aircraft for com-bat air patrol and aerial refueling. Extensive coor-dination between MNF-W, MNC-I, MAG-26, andvarious squadrons was also conducted to facilitatethe successful movement of Iraqi Ministry ofDefense personnel and their freshly recruited andor trained Iraq personnel in support of the DesertProtector program variant 4 and 5.

Throughout the months of September throughDecember, the air combat element flew approxi-mately 11,172 sorties and 22,012 flight hours insupport of Sayaid, Liberty Express, and RiverGate. Again, they flew over 1,000 Iraqi votingcommittee members to various polling stationsthroughout the al-Anbar Province.

Combat Service Support Element

Operation Liberty Express was a resoundingsuccess as the 2d Marine Logistics Group (Fwd)assisted the Independent Electoral Commission-inal-Anbar Province in the planning and executionof the delivery and recovery of balloting materialsand polling center equipment at more than 140polling sites during the 15 October referendum,the 12 December election voting by the Iraqisecurity force and the 15 December general par-liamentary election. CLR25 was instrumental inthe sorting, packaging, and delivering of all ballot-ing materials throughout the al-Anbar Province aswell as the eventual recovery and storage ofreusable items following the elections.

Additionally, 2d MLG (Fwd) provided life supportto and throughput of over 700 IndependentElectoral Commission poll workers. To supportthe poll workers at Camp Taqaddum, a fully func-tioning temporary workers' camp was construct-ed, capable of housing up to 1,600 workers. Thecamp included biometric automated tracking andscanning .of personnel upon arrival. The campwas constructed with numerous force protectionbarriers, and had security, command and billetingtents with environmental control units, sanitationfacilities and a kitchen tent. In addition to gener-al support for the entire area of operations, 2d•MLG (Fwd) was directly involved in the detailedplanning for the security for two polling siteswithin 2d MLG (Fwd)'s battlespace in towns nearCamp Taqaddum.

During both the October referendum and theDecember national, elections in the western partof the area of operations, CLB-2 assisted RCT-2and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)with the delivery of balloting materials andpolling station kits in cities throughout the entirewestern portion of al-Anbar Province. CLB-2 alsodelivered and emplaced force protection barrierssurrounding voting locations in Hit, Haditha, al-Qaim, and the Korean Village area, providing theability to have polling stations protected from thethreat of vehicle borne improvised explosivedevices and indirect fire. In addition to deliveringforce protection materials, CLB-2 Marines assistedin the set up of polling centers across their area ofoperations. Once voting had been completed dur-ing the October referendum and December Iraqisecurity force/national elections, CLB-2 Marineswere instrumental in securing and transferringballots and ballot materials back to MNF-W for-ward operating bases for initial tallying andonward movement back to Baghdad forIndependent Electoral Commission election vali-dation.

In the eastern part of the area of operationsduring the October referendum, CLB-8 continuedto provide direct support to RCT-8 in order toenhance the security throughout the area of oper-ations, as well as 'ensure that the - IndependentElectoral Commission was prepared to conductthe election with all materials necessary. This

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included three harrier-emplacements, task organ-ized around motor transport and engineer pla-toons, placing over 80 barriers that blocked offstreets, allowing traffic to be more easily con-trolled in the city of Fallujah. For the Iraqi nation-al election in December, CLB-8 was again emplac-ing barriers to support the RCT-8 security plan.This involved four task-organized harrieremplacement teams moving over 120 barriers.Two teams operated in the city of Fallujah, one inthe city of Kharmah, and one operated in bothAmiriyah and Ferris in the southern portion of thearea of operations. As in the October referendum,CLB-8 ensured that the Independent ElectoralCommission received all materials necessary forthe election, and retrieved all material after theelection. In both the October referendum and theDecember national election, CLB-8 established aBravo command group at the Fallujah civil-mili-tary operations center, as well as establishing twomaintenance/recovery quick reaction forces, andone clean-up/consequence management quickreaction force to rapidly respond to any develop-ing situation.

II MEF Headquarters Group

In October of 2005 and again in December of2005, the Marines and sailors of II MEFHeadquarters Group established a camp at theBaghdad International Airport (BIAP). This campwas established to process Iraqi civilians whowould then board aircraft for movement forwardto Polling Centers throughout the western half ofIraq. Working closely with USAF flight crews, theIndependent Electoral Commission, the U.S.Army's 3d Infantry Division and many others, IIMHG moved 1,300 personnel to western Iraq inOctober, and nearly 400 personnel in December.Demonstrating exceptional diplomacy, skill andenergy, these Marines worked through logistical,political, and security-related challenges to ensurethat poll workers were present to support bothevents. . .

Iraq Security Forces

At the time II MEF (Fwd) assumed responsibil-ity for the MNF-W area of operations there were

two under strength brigades and no police in theal-Anbar region. As of 28 February 2006, there areover 21,000 Iraqi security force operating andfunctioning in the area. The growth and develop-ment of the Iraqi Army in al-Anbar has been par-ticularly significant, growing from a force of about1,600 to over 16,000 soldiers. These forces nowconsist of two full divisions, seven brigades, and21 battalions.

Recognizing the need to establish conditions toenable the rule of law and an effective operatinggovernment, II MEF (Fwd) developed a compre-hensive and integrated strategy to build andemploy the requisite number of Iraqi army, policeand special border police forces in the MNF-Warea of operations. This. strategy was wholly con-sistent with the theater commander's prioritiesand, the U.S. national strategy to achieve victory inIraq.

Iraqi Army Development

As II MEF (Fwd) set out to execute this inte-grated strategy, one of first priorities to build acapable Iraqi security force was focused on thedisestablishment of the ineffective 60th IraqiNational Guard (eight battalions) stationed in theal-Anbar Province. These sectarian forces provedto be unreliable and susceptible to local insurgentthreats and intimidation. Therefore, in March2005, II MEF (Fwd) began to methodically andcarefully disband the force by recovering allweapons and equipment and then offering theopportunity to integrate those that were interest-ed into the regular army. By June 2005, six battal-ions were stood down and nearly 2,000 formerIraqi National Guard soldiers were assimilatedinto the regular Iraqi Army.

Once this effort was complete, II MEF (Fwd)realized that another Iraqi Army division wasneeded in the al-Anbar Province to neutralize theinsurgency and create the conditions to developlocal control and domestic security. To that end, IIMEF (Fwd) immediately began the difficult task ofstanding up the 7th Iraqi Army Division headquar-ters and three brigades. This was a huge under-taking, but II MEF (Fwd) successfully stood up allheadquarters; planned and coordinated all equip-ping and training; and deployed these forces to

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intermediate and final locations. This was asuperb achievement that greatly improved thesecurity situation in al-Anhar. Additionally, II MEF(Fwd) built and managed a temporary camp for7th Iraqi Army division headquarters within theconfines of Camp Fallujah; provided a militarytransition team out-of-hide for that headquarters;supported training of headquarters personnel; andsuccessfully executed a move of the divisionheadquarters to its permanent location in Ramadi(Camp Blue Diamond).

Another significant accomplishment was theemployment and integration of the 1st DivisionIraqi Army Headquarters and its subordinateforces. II MEF (Fwd) partnered and worked dili-gently to prepare and deploy the 1st Iraqi Armydivision headquarters into al-Anbar Province fromits initial location in Tadji. In addition to prepar-ing the facilities and infrastructure at Habbaniyah,II MEF (Fwd) coordinated and managed the suc-cessful and incident-free movement of 1,700 divi-sion headquarters personnel from Tadji to theirnew location in Habbaniyah during Novemberand December 2005.

As II MEF (Fwd) continued to operationalizethe Iraqi Army, one problem encountered wasmaintaining sufficient unit manning levels. Due tothe harsh operating environment and violenceassociated with the insurgency, the 1st and .7thDivisions forces experienced high attrition. Sincethe national force regeneration system was notable to provide sufficient replacements, II .MEF(Fwd) responded by utilizing the East FallujahIraqi Camp to conduct local boot camp training inorder to produce trained combat replacements. Asa secure training environment the East FallujahCamp proved to be quite useful and helped trainand produce more than 1,100 soldiers during OIF04-06. II MEF (Fwd) continued to maximize theutility of the East Fallujah Camp and expanded itsuse for other Iraqi security force purposes, such asIraqi police screening, and training Iraqi trafficpolice and public order forces. In this capacity IIMEF (Fwd) used the East Fallujah Iraqi Camp toscreen over 1,700 police candidates which con-tributed directly to building the Fallujah policeforce.

One of the key components of II MEF (Fwd)'s

strategy to develop the Iraqi Army were theembedded transition teams. These teams werecritical to the Iraqi security force's continuedimprovement, assessment, and tactical employ-ment. These 45, 10-man teams, a third of themformed internally from II MEF (Fwd) structure,lived with their Iraqi security force unit to facili-tate their partnership and mentorship. The contri-butions of these teams were diverse and far-reach-ing. They provided critical links to training oppor-tunities, access to Coalition effects, administrativetasks, a host of logistical support, and essentialfeedback on the current state of Iraq security forcereadiness. Coupled with effective partnering fromMNF-W Coalition force units, the transition teamsmentored and trained battalion and above head-quarters and were instrumental in assisting theirrespective Iraqi Army units improve their capabil-ities to the point where most units can performplatoon, company and some battalion level oper-ations. By January 2006, four of the Iraqi Armybrigades and 10 battalions were either controllingtheir own battlespace or preparing to assume it.The Iraqi Army demonstrated their resolve andincreasing capabilities during Operation Sayaid inthe western Euphrates River valley and in othersubordinate named operations. Additionally, theseforces performed extremely well during securityoperations in support of the constitutional refer-endum and national election.

Iraqi Border Police and Iraqi PoliceService Development

Concurrent with integrating soldiers intoCoalition forces-led counterinsurgency operations,II MEF (Fwd) expanded and improved a regionaldepartment of border enforcement and policeacademy in order to meet MNF-W training needs.This academy was one of the first in the countryto provide advanced, follow-on group tacticalskills training for policemen who had recentlycompleted their entry-level national training. It

also provided basic training to Department ofBorder Enforcement forces. In just a six-monthperiod, 24 II MEF (Fwd) Marines trained a com-bined total of 1,000 Iraqi police service and Iraqiborder police personnel.

With Iraqi security forces established at cities

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along the Euphrates River valley, and along theborder, the conditions existed to introduce Iraqipolice. To date, II MEF (Fwd) has enabled thetraining of 3,100 new Iraqi policemen for servicein the al-Anbar Province. These efforts werespearheaded by out-of-hide police parinershipprogram teams operating at the provincial andpolice district level. These teams conductedscreening, training, advising, and follow-onassessment. MNF-W equipped over 10,000 police-men in four provinces with weapons, individualequipment, communications equipment, andvehicles. Starting in March 2005, II MEF (Fwd)built a 1,700-man police department in the city ofFallujah from the ground up, restoring lawenforcement services to an area of 240,000 peoplethat had been without since prior to the Battle forFallujah in November 2004. MNF-W also beganthe first meaningful police force reconstruction inother areas of the al-Anbar Province in over ayear. These actions are set to be repeated in thedistricts along the Euphrates River valley. InDecember, II MEF (Fwd) initiated an aggressivepolice assessment plan in the cities of al-Qaim. Bymid-February, II MEF (Fwd) assisted theProvincial Governor in shipping 1,400 candidatesto the Baghdad police academy. Through thisaggressive plan II MEF (Fwd) has set the condi-tions for the rapid growth of police and improvedsecurity throughout the western Euphrates Rivervalley, as well as being able to achieve the goalsand objectives outlined in the theater comman-der's "2006 year of the police" campaign Plan.

Iraqi Security Force Logistical Support

In order to successfully equip, sustain and sup-port the Iraqi security force during OIF 04-06, IIMEF (Fwd) developed and executed a compre-hensive logistical support and infrastructuredevelopment strategy. II MEF (Fwd) worked tacti-cal and strategic logistical issues through MultiNational Corps-Iraq, Multi National Forces-Iraq(MNF-I) and Multi National Security TransitionCommand-Iraq; which included procurement, mil-itary construction, developing Iraqi security forcelogistic policy, sustainment, life support, healthservices, maintenance, Iraqi camp managementand distribution in direct support of training and

equipping an effective Iraqi security force. Themagnitude of these efforts cannot be understated.To field, train and equip the Iraqi security force,325 contracting actions valued at 27 million dol-lars were executed for life support, equipment,maintenance, services, sanitation and sustainmentto the Iraqi security force operating in the MNF-Warea of operations. Additionally, to support thematerial needs of the Iraqi Army, police and bor-der forces, II MEF (Fwd) coordinated the trans-portation, security and delivery of 1,250 vehicles,10,000 small arms weapons, 11 million rounds ofammunition, 1,400 pieces of communicationsequipment, 2,500 sets of individual police equip-ment, 8,400 sets of initial issue for Iraqi Army sol-diers, 10,000 sets of cold weather gear, and 100short tons of sustainment cargo. These monumen-tal efforts ensured that the ever increasing num-bers of Iraqi security force in the area of opera-tions were adequately provisioned to focus on thematuration of their basic skills.

Many of the initial Iraqi security force needsrelated to facilities and life support. The Iraqisecurity force had few organic capabilities to sup-port them, so close coordination was vital toensuring Iraqi security force forces could sustainoperations. One element of life support was awide-ranging array of camps and bases in the areaof operations to support Iraqi security forceemployment. II MEF (Fwd) coordinated construc-tion of 17 Iraqi Army bases totaling $183 million,nine Iraqi police stations costing $10.9 million,and six border forts valued at $1.9 million. Thesebases and camps enabled an additional IraqiArmy division to be located in western al-AnbarProvince. Beyond these fixed facilities, II MEF(Fwd) developed and executed an up-armor pro-gram for Iraqi security force vehicles valued at$760,900, providing better protection for 383 vehi-cles of the Iraqi Army and police from small armsand improvised explosive devices. To sustain theoperational readiness of these vehicles and otherequipment, II MEF (Fwd) coordinated and estab-lished over $300,000 in maintenance contracts.

Ground Combat Element

During the past year the Iraqi police forceshave gone from being nonexistent to contributing

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to the security of Fallujah and other surroundingareas. The Iraqi highway patrol is patrolling theroads around Fallujah and Ramadi. The trafficpolice are directing traffic and performing otherfunctions. The Iraqi police in Fallujah arepatrolling the streets and arresting insurgents. InFallujah, over 90 percent of the police force haveattended formal training and are fully equipped toperform law enforcement duties. During thenational elections in December, the Iraqi policeprovided security for the polling sites and pollworkers. Their efforts combined with the IraqiArmy and 2d Marine Division resulted in thelargest voter turnout to date in the province.

The division partnered Iraqi Army units withthe division's RCTs and BCTs. Despite consider-able logistical and life support challenges, thedivision was able to put in place all necessaryresources in addition to force protection measuresin time to receive Iraqi security forces. Within ashort period of time the division established andequipped 16 Iraqi security force camps through-out the area of operations, in addition to morethan a dozen firm bases. Division units demon-strated versatility and resourcefulness in theirimplementation of creative training programs forpartnered Iraqi security force units. Their effortsconsiderably enhanced each unit's training andcombat effectiveness in an accelerated time frame.The division's efforts, in concert with improvedprovincial relations resulted in a continuallyincreasing Iraqi Army that grew from a platoon of34 reconnaissance soldiers to two full divisions of18,000 plus soldiers, a Border Defense Force ofover 2,000 that patrols the Syrian and Jordanianborders and an Iraqi police force of over 11,000.During this period, the Marines, sailors, and com-manders of 2d Marine Division worked tirelesslyto train and fully integrate Iraqi security forcesinto unit operations, while overcoming the chal-lenges of language and cultural barriers. Afteronly six months, the Iraqi security forces are nowinvolved in 100 percent of the division's unitoperations. The success of their training and theirunilateral involvement has been essential to thedivision's success during the electoral process andthe growing progress toward positive opinions ofthe Multi National Forces by the Iraqi people. To

date, three Iraqi Army brigades and eight Iraqibattalions conduct independent operations andcontrol their own battlespace.

Iraqi Security Force and Coalition ForceBasing

30th Naval Construction Regiment: The 30thNaval Construction Regiment (30th NCR) plannedand executed over 173 projects totaling over240,000 man-days of engineering support whileplacing $49 million worth of materials and con-ducting over 1,100 convoy security missions(56,000 miles) in support of the continued devel-opment of the Iraqi security force and enablingIraqi self reliance and self governance.

The 30th NCR provided engineering designs,bills of materials, CL IV material acquisition anddelivery, construction of three combat outpostsand seven Iraqi security force battalion basecamps throughout the area of operations. Thiseffort was timed to provide direct support toOperation Sayaid in the western Euphrates Rivervalley and completing camps in time to field Iraqisecurity force forces prior to the Decembernational election.

Critical supporting projects constructed and/ordesigned by 30th NCR include the following:

• Command Outpost South was designedand constructed to house and sustain 750troops near the Syrian border south of al-Qaim. This project needed 8,000 man-daysat a cost of $2.4 million in constructionmaterials.

• Command Outpost North was designedto house and sustain 1,950 troops near theSyrian border just north of al-Qaim. The30th NCR provided the designs and bill ofmaterials for the construction of this $34 mil-lion contractor-constructed project andresponded with an emergency camp mainte-nance detachment when a contractor solu-tion proved unsuccessful.

• The Iraqi security force Battalion andBrigade Headquarters in al-Qaim wasdesigned to house and sustain 1,100 troopsand senior leadership of the Iraqi securityforce which provides the command and

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control of Syrian border operations. Theproject required 9,200 man-days to constructat a cost of $3.5 million.

Command Outpost Rawah wasdesigned to house and sustain 1,500 troopsat a cost of $4.3 million and 14,000 man-days. This project was completed in similarfashion as the other command outposts.

The 30th NCR extended this capability to houseand sustain over 5,000 thousand Iraqi securityforce and associated Coalition force battalion andunit personnel throughout the area of operationsby designing, and constructing nine forward oper-ating bases (FOBs). Each FOB provided berthing,dining and cooking facilities, force protection,maintenance yards, administrative facilities,armory, ammunition storage, fuel farms, andhygiene facilities for the troops.

Projects by location and cOst of constructionperformed by 30th NCR include:

• Iraqi security force Base CampHadithah $ 596K

• Iraqi security force Hadithah Battalion$1 .8M

• Iraqi security force al-Qaim Battalionand Brigade $2.1M

• Iraqi security force Hit Battalion $2.3M• Iraqi security force Tiger Battalion and

Brigade $1.2M• Iraqi security force Ranger/Law College

Battalions $309K• Iraqi security force Commando

Battalion $317K

Health Service Support: A key supporter to theII MEF (Fwd) Iraqi security force directorate,health service support facilitated both Coalitionforces and Iraqi Ministry of Health medical sup-port to Iraqi Army training and combat opera-tions. The application of timely and persuasiveinfluence on Multi National Security frainingCommand-Iraq assisted in formation of a medictraining school and Iraqi Army Medical clinic atHabbaniyah Base. This action also resulted inestablishment of the first Iraqi base support unitin al-Anbar Province. Additionally, a battlefield

distribution system using MNF-W medical logisticsassets to deliver start up equipment sets and re-supply items for all Iraqi Battalions with medicalpersonnel was set up to assist Iraqi logisticsdevelopment.

Health service support coordinated medicalsupport plans with the Iraqi security force direc-torate to provide medical support to 20,000 IraqiArmy soldiers and 30 U.S. transition teams. Theestablishment of level one and level two medicalcare for the Iraqi Army was critical to the survivalof innumerable wounded Iraqi soldiers. Healthservice support communicated with multipleorganizations to facilitate the movement of med-ical supplies to Iraqi Ministry of Health facilities inal-Anbar Province in support of civil affairsactions.

Reconstruction

The security and support of the provincial andlocal governments were critical to the success ofCoalition forces throughout al-Anbar Province.Prior to February 2005, the provincial governmentof al-Anbar and the city councils of most majorcities in the province were completely ineffective.Those governing bodies that did exist were inti-mated and infiltrated by insurgents. Fallujah wasthe only major city in which the insurgents hadbeen driven out and the citizens were attemptingto begin self-governance. During the past year the2d Marine Division has driven the insurgents Outof all the major cities; Ramadi, Habbaniyah, a!-Qaim, and Rutbah. In the process several smallertowns have also been made safe for the citizensof Iraq. Immediately after each city or town wascleared of insurgents the 2d Marine Divisionbegan to work with the leadership of the city. The2d Marine Division commanders maintained acontinuous dialogue with local officials in orderto address their needs and determine priorities forprojects to improve the quality of life for Iraqi cit-izens. The division has also greatly assisted theprovincial government. When the newly electedgovernor was kidnapped and later killed during agun battle with insurgents, the division helped theprovincial government work through the transi-tion of authority in accordance with the estab-

lished Iraqi rules applicable to the situation.Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

installed a communications network at theprovincial civil-military• operations center to sup-port Coalition efforts to bolster capabilities of theIraqi transitional government. This service helpedfacilitate a more expeditious flow of informationto research and staff reconstruction projects onbehalf of the Iraqi people. RCT-8's civil affairsdetachment rehabilitated the Fallujah mayor'sbuilding. The facility was later used to relocateFallujah governance and create a backdrop ofgovernmental autonomy and self-sufficiency.

2d Marine Division integrated several civil-mil-itary operations center staffed with civil affairspersonnel and translators located within closeproximity of the provincial government facilitiesin order to provide around-the-clock support andimmediate access to key personnel. These effortsresulted in progressive movement within the Iraqipolitical process, a favorable shift in the overallopinion of Coalition forces and coordinated plan-ning efforts for projects that met the cultural andcivic needs of the Iraqi people.

Division units, Iraqi forces, and civil affairsgroup (CAG) personnel worked diligentlythroughout every operation to build positive rela-tionships and secure the trust of Iraqi citizens andinfluential local officials. This process began withmoving and distributing over 150 billion Iraqidinars as financial compensation for damages andloss caused as a result of anti-Iraqi forces insur-gent activities. The Iraqi provincial reconstructiondevelopment committee was established to buildprovincial government capacity and legitimacy tohelp identify how chief of mission Coalition proj-ects are planned and executed. Two water treat-ment facilities were restored in addition to theconstruction of five water treatment facilities forvillages in al-Anbar Province that will providefresh water for over 100,000 people. The divi-sion's relationship with electrical representativesresulted in improvements to three substations andthe installation of additional electrical transform-ers increasing electrical output to over 500,000residents of al-Anbar Province. The divisionassisted in refurbishing over 25 schools for use bymore than 10,000 students. Several areas received

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much needed medical supplies, incubators andfunding for new medical clinics. The GAG pro-vided food, water, shelter, clothing, blankets, andmedical assistance to 4,000 displaced persons inUbaydi. In the Hit area 1,200 hygiene kits, 2,000water buckets, 1,600 kerosene heaters, 1,700sweaters and 10,000 blankets and several thou-sand pounds of food items were provided.Additionally, GAG personnel delivered 39 pri-mary care health care kits enabling the IraqiMinistry of Health to provide service to 1.5 mil-lion citizens of al-Anbar Province. The division'sreconstructive efforts have resulted in the com-pletion of 483 projects worth $18.3 million and183 projects valued at $13.3 million still inprogress. The division's reconstructive effortshave done a great deal to influence the supportof the local government and Iraqi people.

155th Brigade Gombat Team (Army NationalGuard) (155 BGT): The 155th BCT was an ener-getic force and a catalyst in transitioning localand provincial responsibilities to the Iraqi peo-ple. •The 155 BGT built Police PartnershipPrograms in three provinces. Two of theseprovinces converted to provincial security con-trol, the first provinces in MNF-W to attain suchstatus. Through their diligent efforts, they havebeen instrumental in converting the remainingprovince to local control.

The 155th BCT was also responsible for thenon-kinetic efforts which included over 100 mil-lion dollars in projects that secured andimproved critical infrastructure through establish-ing local confidence in Goalition forces andstrengthening local and provincial Iraqi govern-ments. The 155th BGT, working with local Iraqicontractors, built schools, improved roads, andprovided water irrigation. They were instrumen-tal in helping the Iraqi police build police sta-tions to provide centralization of local city policeand a visible sign of a force dedicated to serviceand peace.

MNF-W had almost $15 million inGommander's Emergency Response Program(GERP) funds to spend before the end of the fis-cal year. Projects organized by Sth/6th GAG hadto be quickly identified, quotes and legal require-ments completed. The G-5/civil-military opera-

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tions cell of II MEF (Fwd) was able to spendmore than $15 million in GERP purchasing HAitems, generators, pumps, farm equipment and atelecommunication project for Fallujah alongwith coordinating with the U.S. Army Gorps ofEngineers to pay for five water treatment plantsin Ramadi.

The G-5/Givil Military Operations Gell(GMOG) found there was no function plan foreconomic development. Utilizing key individu-als, a plan was developed to engage MNG-I,MNF-I along with the U.S. embassy to determineprograms for economic development and whatfunding was available to move an econoni ic planforward. From this, an engagement plan wasdeveloped to begin pursing an economic devel-opment plan in Fallujah. Fallujah was chosenbased on the security situation. Execution beganwith a simple meeting with Iraqi businessmen,and quickly grew in size to include more busi-nessmen, key leaders, representatives fromUnited States Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), Iraq ReconstructionManagement Office (IRMO), and nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs). Members of theGMO cell were able to develop relationships tofund a micro financing program, development ofa business center to promote economic growth,training and better business practices. The planwill inject more than $5 million in the IraqReconstruction Management Office funds formicro-financing into al-Anbar. USAID will com-plete training for the Iraqis who will manage theloans. The overarching part of the plan was toestablish a mechanism to initiate large-scalereconstruction projects anywhere in theprovince. From its beginning in Fallujah, thesame plan was moved to Ramadi where 6i:h GAGbegan developing a business center and micro-financing.

The planning process continued with theattempt to develop an overall economic plan foral-Anbar attempting to tie together the MNG-Iplan, the division Strategic Reconstruction planalong with the Fallujah based economic plan.

The G-5/civil-military operations cell alsoestablished an agriculture development planaddressing irrigation as the primary means to

improve crop production. Utilizing primarilyUSAID Office of Transitional Initiative Funds,canals were cleared of debris.

The G-5/civil military operations cell support-ed the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) con-cept development and fielding in Babil Province.The G-5/civil-military operations cell supportedthe provincial reconstruction team (PRT) pro-gram helping shape its development throughinteractions with the MNC-I and MNF-I Staffs.The civil military operations cell coordinatedwith the regional embassy in Hilah to ensure theinitial move of soldiers there would be expectedand supported. This was followed up by a sitevisit to ensure the soldiers were being taken careof and completing an assessment of the currentsituation. This assessment along with assess-ments of the Najaf and Karhala government sup-port teams allowed MNF-W to develop a positionand direction for the PRT engagement forRamadi.

Equally significant, MNF-W's engineers pro-vided detailed planning input and subject matterexpertise to develop a vulnerability assessmentof critical infrastructure throughout the battle-space. The most significant efforts in this criticalactivity were centered on the Hadithah hydro-electric dam. This critical infrastructure provideselectrical services to over 500,000 citizens in east-ern al-Anbar Province. With a strong Marinepresence to provide security, MNF-W engineerskeenly identified the requirement to safeguardthe facility from the effects maintenance neglect.The Marine air-ground task force tenaciouslycommunicated this critical vulnerability to theoperational commander and affected the deploy-ment and employment of personnel with thehighly specialized and technical subject matterexpertise required preserve this strategic infra-structure and ensure the continued efficientoperation of the dam in support of Iraqi citizens.

MNF-W's explosive ordnance demolition tech-nicians also led and mentored the Iraqi NationalMine action authority representatives in theireffort to work with civil military affairs in MNF-W. The extensive coordination required toaccept an action authority de-mining contractor,synchronize the efforts with the U.S. State

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Department representatives, 5th CAG, publicaffairs staff, information operations staff, and the2d Marine Division Operations Section enabledthe clearing of minefields and unexploded ord-nance that set the conditions for significantreconstruction operations to commence withinthe city of Fallujah.

The conditions of the main supply routes andalternate supply routes are critical to the execu-tion of ground operations and the safety of thetroops conducting the missions. It is imperativethat these routes remain operative and in goodcondition. The 30th NCR has maintained theseroutes in the best possible condition supportingthousands of missions each month. Delivering$960,000 in repair materials to complete projectsconsisting of crater repairs, new route construc-tion and repairing existing roads, bridges andhighways, 30th NCR ensured these critical linesof communications remained open and servicea-ble.

The 30th NCR also provided the subject mat-ter experts who conducted route reconnaissanceand provided the designs of a new supply routewhich will serve as the primary sustainmentroute for command outpost North and otherfacilities north of the Euphrates River. The com-mand provided the logistical and constructionsupport of this project through the procurementof 50,000 cubic meters of gravel required for thisproject. The 30th NCR executed this project witha company augment from the 947th CombatSupport Equipment Battalion, and was furtherdirected to extend the scope of work to includerepairing an 18-kilometer road to augment sus-tainment options north of the Euphrates River.

Regional Reconstruction OperationCenter (RROC)

The RROC provided support to MNF-W, theIraqi government, chief of mission, and all organ-izations involved in the reconstruction of Iraq inthe area of operations by coordinating recon-struction efforts, information, logistics, and secu-rity between the contracting community, military,and Iraqi government in order to better enableall responsible for the reconstruction effort.

Acting as the central point of contact for

reconstruction projects in MNF-W, the RROCaccomplished three mission areas: reconstructionprogram management oversight, support to thePRDC, and facilitating contractor convoy move-ments.

Reconstruction Program Management Over-sight. Advocated, monitored, and reported on theMNF-W reconstruction program driven by a teamof agencies under the chief of mission and exe-cuted by the Army Corps of Engineers GulfRegion Division. The reconstruction programincluded 531 projects for MNF-W, valued at $440million with 92 percent contracted and 45 per-cent work-in-place. The reconstruction projectsprovided restoration of essential services in sev-eral infrastructure sectors including: electrical,water, wastewater, health, education, security,justice, transportation, and communication.

Iraqi Government Provincial ReconstructionDevelopment Council Support (PRDC).Engineering support to the PRDC; advising andassisting in planning, prioritizing, contracting,and implementing the commander's emergencyresponse program (CERP) funded projects.PRDC/CERP projects within the four MNF-Wprovinces (al-Anbar, an-Najaf, Karbala, and NorthBabil) have totaled 79 successfully completed

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projects totaling almost $6.5 million. In addition,the RROC is working with the PRDC on an addi-tional 182 projects with an estimated value of$51.5 million. These efforts increase the gover-nance capacity of the provincial governmentsand legitimize the governments by helping themprovide essential services.

Contractor Support and MovementCoordination. Facilitated civilian contractor sup-port and movement within the MNF-W area ofoperation through Aegis Defense Services.Disseminated threat warnings and unclassifiedintelligence to relevant reconstruction agencies,contractors, and vendors; providing over-watchfor civilian personnel and equipment move-ments; and, by providing security escort teams(SETs) and reconstruction liaison teams (RLTs).Provided over 390 intelligence reports, and theRROC provided over-watch for over 1,700 civil-ian convoy movements. Over-watch includescalling in military quick reaction forces or casu-alty evacuation when needed.

NotesReprinted from the II Marine Expeditionary

Force Unit Award Recommendation (2006).

Efforts to Counter the lED Threat

&y Colonel Eric T LitakerMarine Cops Gazette, January 2005

s Coalition forces involved in both OperationEnduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqireedom (OIF) continue to come under

attack from improvised explosive devices (TEDs), theMarine Corps and the Department of Defense (DoD)have taken decisive action to counter this threat.

Working Group

In late 2003, Lieutenant General Edward HanlonJr., then-Deputy Commandant for CombatDevelopment and the Commanding General (CG),Marine Corps Combat Development Command(MCCDC), directed the formation of an TED counter-measures working group (TED WG) to:

raise TED situational awareness, reduceredundant efforts, capitalize on Joint/otherService initiatives, leverage science and tech-nology, and evaluate initiatives across theDOTMLPF [doctrine, organization, training,materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities]spectrum.1

Initially the lED WG consisted of a single engi-neer officer from the Expeditionary ForceDevelopment Center (EFDC) and several part-timemembers. As the WG expanded, organizational con-trol transitioned to the Marine Corps WarfightingLaboratory (MCWL). Today, MCWL has the lead in arobust organization consisting of eight full-time andmore than 20 part-time members from the spectrumof Marine Corps, DoD, and other federal organiza-tions. The group meets weekly to review threattrends and to develop opportunities to counter thethreat, either through the use of technology orthrough the use of modifications to tactics, tech-niques, and procedures (TIP).

The mission of the TED WG is to identify, evalu-

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ate, and facilitate the delivery of materiel and non-materiel counter-lED solutions to ensure that operat-ing forces have unencumbered freedom of maneu-ver. Its functions include evaluating and prioritizingMarine Corps counter-lED requirements and solu-tions and providing a focal point for MarineTED/counter-TED situational awareness through theuse of intelligence information, technology, TIP, andtraining. The TED WG's approach is to reduce redun-dancy, capitalize on joint/other Service initiatives,and leverage the science and technology communi-ty.

The group is divided into teams focusing on intel-ligence, technology evaluation and integration, com-munications, training and UP, technical support,and programmatic support. This provides a centralfocus to Marine Corps efforts to defeat the lED threatand to facilitate the development and implementa-tion of joint and Marine Corps-specific solutions.

Although not organizationally a part of the EFDC,the MCWL-led effort requires a close working rela-tionship with EFDC, Marine Corps SystemsCommand (MarCorSysCom), and HeadquartersMarine Corps (HQMC). Together, the TED WG teamworks with deployed operating forces to determinein-theater requirements and how best to providethese capabilities to the operating forces.

In addition to working closely with continentalUnited States-based organizations, the TED WG alsomaintains close contact with I Marine ExpeditionaryForce (I MEF) forces in theater and at CampPendleton through the I MEF G-9 and the MCWL liai-son officers (LNOs). The free flow of communica-tions between these organizations has been the keyto their ability to maintain close contact and coordi-nation on a wide variety of TED-related issues.

Contributions

The TED WG has been able to contribute tocounter-TED efforts by combining information fromI MEF sources on the specific nature of the threat,

and their thoughts on how to counter it, with infor-mation on technologies either already available orcurrently in development. Some of these effortshave been made directly by using MCWL or MarineCorps resources, while others have been made indi-rectly by facilitating access to external resources.

Given the emerging nature of the TED threat,there are limitations on what existing programs ofrecord can accomplish to counter the threat. As aresult, a portion of the work done by the TED WGis to coordinate the resources available throughassociated Marine Corps programs of record withthose available through other channels.Additionally, the expeditionary force developmentprocess, including the use of urgent universal needsstatements, has been used with great success to sup-port deployed operating forces.

Nevertheless, there are also limitations on theextent to which existing funds can he repro-grammed for an effort that, because of its emergingnature, has not yet been incorporated into the nor-mal budget process. One of the challenges facingthe lED WG is to find and leverage resources thatcan be used for these purposes. The formation ofthe Joint lED Defeat Integrated Process Team (IPT)within DoD has given the TED WG a forum in whichto pursue resources to support Marine forces.

In early June 2004, General John Abizaid,Commander, U.S. Central Command (CentCom),sent a memo to the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS) stating, "TEDs are my number one threatin Iraq. I want a full court press on TEDs."2 In par-ticular, General Ahizaid noted that TEDs continuedto be the primary cause of casualties in Iraq, andquestioned whether there was the equivalent of aManhattan Project working to counter the TEDthreat. He further indicated that the enemy quicklyadjusts to new methods and that the conflict in Iraqprovides the opportunity to experiment with effortsto defeat IEDs. One of the conclusions to be drawnfrom the memo is that there is no need to wait fora perfect solution; providing partial solutions on anexperimental basis will save lives in the near termand will doubtless lead to increasingly better solu-tions in the longer term.

In part because of General Abizaid's memo, inJuly 2004 Deputy Secretary of Defense PaulWolfowitz approved the establishment of a Joint TED

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Defeat IPT (JIDI). The purpose of this IPT is to"focus all counter lED efforts within the Departmentof Defense" and to identify, prioritize, and resourcemateriel and non-materiel solutions.3 The CGMCWL is the Marine Corps participant in the JIDI.The JIDI has become one of the principal externalorganizations with which the TED WG coordinatesin order to support deployed Marine forces.

The JIDI's approach to countering the TED threatis to consider an TED defeat continuum, consistingof what must be done to predict where TEDs mightbe used, detect their emplacement, prevent theirdetonation, neutralize them before they can be usedin attacks, or to mitigate the effects of these attacks.In recent months the TED WG has been successfulin leveraging resources, either through the JIDI orthrough other channels, to contribute to the processof helping to meet the needs of I MEF in counteringthe lED threat.

These efforts include arranging funding for thepurchase of existing technologies, working towardthe development and testing of new technologies,coordinating the delivery of training, and participat-ing in the development of new UP. The goal con-tinues to be to facilitate the rapid deployment ofsuitably mature technologies or the development ofnonmateriel solutions.

Adaptation and improvement of current capabil-ities to counter the TED threat is a continuousprocess. As the only Marine Corps organization thatlooks specifically at defeating the TED threat, theTED WG understands the stakes involved and isdedicated to doing whatever is necessary to helpdeployed Marines. To date, the TED WG, in partner-ship with the organizations represented by its part-time members, such as MarCorSysCom; MCCDC;HQMC Plans, Policies, and Operations; andPrograms and Resources, has been involved in thedelivery of a number of types of technologies andequipment involved in OEF and OIF. These includedetection technology, robots, electronic counter-measures equipment, and protective devices, suchas ballistic shields and body armor.

Work Continues

For as long as this threat exists, there will he con-certed efforts to seek out the people who make the

IEDs, to detect when and where they are emplaced,to find ways to neutralize their components, and toprotect our Marines from the effects of TEDs.

The lED WG seeks to facilitate an ability to antic-ipate, as well as to learn from past experiences, aspart of its effort to find solutions to the lED threat.Lessons learned include:

• While technology is both useful andimportant, the most effective counter-TEDweapon is a well-trained, vigilant, and offen-sive-minded Marine.

• The TED fight is now largely an intelli-gence battle. Units at all levels must be able toprocess information quickly so that it becomesactionable. Our Marines have an outstandingability to kill the enemy; we need to be effi-cient, adaptive, and effective in intelligencegathering and staff planning in order to ensurethat they have the opportunity to do so.

• IEDs are not a new threat, but they arean evolving one. We need to provide ourMarines with the ability to seize the initiativein the effort to defeat IEDs. Whoever movesfaster wins.

• There is no "silver bullet" in sight. For theforeseeable future, the key to defeating the

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lED threat will almost certainly be a combina-tion of technology, UP, and an offensivemindset.

For as long as Marines are deployed in supportof operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, counteringthe TED threat will continue to be a priority, and theTED WG will continue its efforts to focus and coor-dinate the activities of all relevant organizations todefeat the threat.

Notes

Marine Corps Gazette, January 2005, 29-31.Reprinted by permission. Copyright Marine CorpsGazette.

1. LtGen Edward Hanlon Jr., CG, MCCDC, e-mail to fel-low general officers, 22 December 2003.2. CentCom memorandum to GJCS, dated 4 June 2004.3. JIDI information paper of 10 September 2004.

About the AuthorColonel Eric T. Litaker retired from the U.S. Marine Corps in

2009. At the time of this article's publication, he was operations

officer at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Quantico, Virginia.

Rules of Engagement

by William LangewiescbeVanity Fair, November 2006

I: One Morning in November

The Euphrates is a peaceful river. It mean-ders silently through the desert provinceof Anbar like a ribbon of life, flanked by

the greenery that grows along its banks, sustain-ing palm groves and farms, and a string of well-watered cities and towns. Fallujah, Ramadi, Hit,and Haditha. These are among the places madefamous by battle—conservative, once quiet com-munities where American power has beenchecked, and where despite all the narrow meas-ures of military success the Sunni insurgencycontinues to grow. On that short list, Haditha isthe smallest and farthest upstream. It extends

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along the Euphrates' western bank with a popu-lation of about 50,000, in a disarray of dustystreets and individual houses, many with walledgardens in which private jungles grow. It has amarket, mosques, schools, and a hospital with amorgue. Snipers permitting, you can walk it topto bottom in less than an hour, allowing timeenough to stone the dogs. Before the Americaninvasion, it was known as an idyllic spot, wherefamilies came from as far away as Baghdad towhile away their summers splashing in the riverand sipping tea in the shade of trees. No longer,of course. Now, all through Anbar, and indeedthe Middle East, Haditha is known as a city ofdeath, or more simply as a name, a war cryagainst the United States.

November 19, 2005, is the date peopleremember. Near the center of Haditha the U.S.Marines had established a forward operating

base they called Sparta. It was manned by theroughly 200 Marines of Kilo Company of the 3dBattalion, 1st Marine Division, Out of Camp Pen-dieton, California. This was Kilo Company's thirdtour in Iraq. It had participated in the invasion,in the spring of 2003, and again in the hard-fought battle for Fallujah in the fall of 2004.Because of normal rotations, however, onlyabout two-thirds of its current members hadbeen to Iraq before. The average age was 21.The company commander was a captain, anAnnapolis graduate named Lucas McConnell,who was 32 and, like all but one of his lieu-tenants, was on his first tour at war. McConnellwas a can-do guy, more of a believer than athinker, disciplined, moderately religious, some-what moralistic, and deeply invested in hisbeloved Marine Corps.

Winter was coming. At dawn Haditha wascool and clear. McConnell dispatched a convoyof four armored Humvees on a routine missionto deliver hot breakfasts and a radio-coding cardto an observation post, a fortified checkpointabout three miles away, on River Road south oftown. Some of the Humvees were equipped withtop-mounted machine guns; two were "high-back" vehicles with open rear beds like those ofpickup trucks, designed to carry troops and sup-plies, and wrapped in high protective siding.Between them the four Humvees held a squad of12 heavily armed Marines, which was consideredto be the minimum desirable force even for sucha milk run as this. The men carried grenades,9mm pistols, and variations of the basic assaultrifle, the M16. They were led by a sergeantnamed Frank Wuterich, aged 25, who of all thesergeants of Kilo Company was known to be themost unassuming and considerate, the slowest toanger. He was another first-timer at war.

They rolled south toward the outpost, rattlingthrough sleeping neighborhoods in single file,spaced well apart. Any insurgents watching themfrom the houses—and there likely were some—would have perceived the men behind the top-mounted guns as robotic figures swaddled inprotective armor and cloth, and would barelyhave glimpsed the others through the smallpanes of thick, dusty, bulletproof glass, or above

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the armored high-back sides. Over the years onthe streets of Iraq, living outside the Americanprotective bubbles, I have often imagined thatkilling Americans is easier for their anonymity,because it allows insurgents to take on themachines or the uniforms without dwelling onthe individuals inside. This was the experience ofresistance fighters when slaughtering haplessGerman conscripts during World War II inFrance, and presumably also of the mujahedeenwhen killing Russians in Afghanistan. But themen on the receiving end of an attack have a dif-ferent view of the effects. They know one anoth-er as individuals and friends. Even the newcom-ers to Kilo Company, for instance, had spent atleast six months together already, and had grownso close that they could identify one another onsight, from behind, when all geared up andwalking on patrols at night.

It was a 15-minute drive from Sparta Base tothe outpost south of town. Sergeant Wuterich'ssquad unloaded the hot breakfasts and othersupplies, and picked up several Iraqi soldiersfrom the apprentice Iraqi Army—traineesattached to the company, who lived in their owncompound adjoining that of the Marines. TheIraqis were armed with the ubiquitous Iraqiweapon, the banana-clip, Russian-designed AK-47. After a brief delay the squad headed up RiverRoad for Sparta Base. It is possible to judge themood. Because the conflict in Iraq is a guerrillawar without progressive front lines, andAmerican combat troops operate from immobileforts with fixed zones of responsibility, mostpatrols consist of predictable but-and-returns.The pattern is well known to the insurgents.Routes can be varied, but the choices typicallyare limited, especially if the patrols must stick tothe roads and the distances are short. As a result,one of the basic facts of life for those troops whoare actually in the fight is that the return to baseis the most dangerous trip in Iraq: if the mujá-hedeen are going to hit you at all, the chancesare they'll hit you then. Nonetheless, for individ-ual soldiers even in places as threatening asHaditha, most days are quiet, and weeks can goby with little sign of the enemy. There is no rea-son to believe that Wuterich's men were pumped

up for the drive home. Were they alert? Sure,why not, but another fact of life is that you can-not see much out of an armored Humvee, andeven if you could, you have no chance of iden-tifying the enemy until first you come underattack. You've got all these weapons, and you'vebeen told that you're a mighty warrior, a Spartan,but what are, you going to shoot—the dogs?You're a Marine without a beach. So you sitzipped into a filthy Humvee, trusting the guys upon the guns to watch the rooftops and the trafficon the road, trusting your driver to keep his eyeson the ground ahead, holding your M16 muzzle-up between your knees, calmly enduring theride. The radio crackles. Your head bobs with thebumps. You don't talk much. There's not muchto say. If you're dumb you trust your luck. Ifyou're smart you're fatalistic. Either way it usual-ly works out fine.

They turned west off River Road, onto a streetknown to them as Route Chestnut—a wide thor-oughfare running through a district of clusteredhouses. It was 7:15 in the morning. Up aheadand unbeknownst to them, insurgents had plant-ed a land mine, probably weeks before. In thebureaucratized language of this war, such minesare known as improvised explosive devices, orTED's. The ordinary ones are made from smallartillery rounds, and rigged to detonate uponreception of an electronic signal from a short-range line-of-sight transmitter—a cordless tele-phone, a garage-door opener, a toy-car remotecontrol. The insurgents of Haditha producedplenty of them; Kilo Company had discovereddozens in the previous weeks, and in the follow-ing weeks would discover many more. Most hadbeen laid hastily and were poorly tucked intosoft dirt or trash beside the roads, sometimeswith wires showing. But the land mine thismorning was different. It was a sizable propanetank stuffed with high explosives. More impor-tant, it had been buried directly in the road, andso lovingly paved over that apparently no sur-face disturbance was visible. The first Humveerolled across it without incident. On board werethree Marines, named Salinas, Rodriguez, andSharratt. The second Humvee crossed, carryingMendoza, De La Cruz, and Tatum. The third

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Humvee was the command vehicle. It crossed,with Wuterich, Graviss, and a medic namedWhitt. Somewhere in these vehicles sat the Iraqisoldiers as well.

The fourth Humvee carried the final threeMarines. It was a high-back model. At the steer-ing wheel was a veteran of the Fallujah fight, aplump 20-year-old named Miguel Terrazas, fromEl Paso, Texas, who was one of the most popu-lar soldiers in Kilo Company, known for certainkills he had made, and yet also for his irrepress-ible good humor. Sitting to his right was anotherFallujah veteran, James Crossan, aged 20, fromNorth Bend, Washington. Crossan was frustratedwith the mission in Haditha, which he saw as anattempt to play policeman in the midst of anactive war. In the open back was SalvadorGuzman, aged 19, a first-timer to Iraq, who wasknown as a typically easygoing Marine. Guzmanwas from Crystal Lake, Illinois. He faced rear-ward in the Hurnvee pointing his weapon overthe protective siding, watching the street behind.

As this trio passed unsuspectingly over theburied land mine, a spotter watching from near-by, probably in one of the houses, pushed a but-ton. With a boom that shook the surroundingneighborhood, the device detonated directlyunder Terrazas in a fireball of violently expand-ing gases. The blast simultaneously lifted theHurnvee and split it in two, separating the tophalf from the bottom. Guzman was blown clearand landed in the dirt behind the wreckage. Helay there bruised and stunned, with a brokenfoot but no serious injury. Crossan, in the rightfront seat, was not so fortunate. He was blownthrough the right door and then had part of theHumvee fall on him. He lay pinned under theheavy steel, suffering from multiple bone frac-tures and internal injuries. Others from the squadcame running up. He heard someone shouting,"Get some morphine!" and he passed out.

The morphine can only have been meant forCrossan, because Guzman was not so badly hurt,and Terrazas was already beyond such needs. Itis a requirement of understanding the events inHaditha—and the circumstances of this war—notto shy away from the physical realities here, orto soften the scene in the interest of politics or

taste. Terrazas was torn in half. His bottom halfremained under the steering wheel. His top halfwas blown into the road, where he landedspilling his entrails and organs. He probably didnot suffer, at least. He must have lost conscious-ness instantly and have died soon after hittingthe ground. He had a hole in his chin. His eyeswere rolled back. He did not look peaceful at all.He looked bloody and grotesque.

Get morphine? No, not for Terrazas. ForWuterich and the nine intact members of thesquad, Terrazas's fate was extremely disturbing.They were all of them professional soldiers whohad willingly assumed the risk. But just a minuteago Terrazas had been driving home, relaxedand good-humored as usual, and now in a flashhe was irretrievably gone. Such is the nature ofdeath in Iraq: you are alive, and the streets seemcalm and normal, until suddenly, inevitably, withno warning, you are dead or maimed for the restof time. With no distant thunder to approach, theloss seems worse for the lack of any ability toprepare.

The wreckage smoked black. The air smelledof cordite, dust, and burned rubber. Wuterichcalled for backup, and for medical helicopters toevacuate the casualties. He did what a squadleader is supposed to do. A few Marines strug-gled to free Crossan. After a period of confusionthe others crouched with weapons to their shoul-ders, scanning the nearby rooftops, walls, andwindows in the hope of spotting the spotter, andalert to the possibility of further attack. Theyordered the Iraqi soldiers to do the same. TheIraqis complied, hut somewhat reluctantly, as ifperhaps they thought this was not really theirfight. In any case, though much remains con-fused about the immediate aftermath of theattack, and indeed about the hours that followed,what is nearly certain is that at first the squadtook no fire. When reinforcements arrived fromSparta Base, after about 10 minutes, one of themwas able to kneel gently over Terrazas's remains.He said, "You are my brother by another moth-er. I love you, man." He covered Terrazas with aponcho, closing him off from sight.

By that time the killing of Iraqis had alreadybegun, though here again uncertainty reigns.

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From transcripts, conversations, documents,press reports, and above all a sense for the plau-sible in Iraq, it is possible to reconstruct a lot.Nonetheless, given the complexities of guerrillawar, and the confusion that exists in the minds ofthose closest to battle, only the barest facts areindisputable. After the land-mine explosion,Wuterich's Marines remained in the immediatevicinity throughout the morning and beyond.Over the next few hours, until maybe aroundlunchtime, they killed 24 Iraqis. To accomplishthe job, they used a few grenades, and maybe apistol, but primarily their assault rifles. They suf-fered not a single casualty during this time. Fiveof the dead were young men who hadapproached in a car. The remaining 19 were peo-pie from the neighborhood, found and killed inthe rooms or yards of four family houses, two onthe south side of the road, and two on the north.They included nine men, four women, and sixchildren. Many had been sleeping, and werewoken by the land-mine blast. Some were shotdown in their pajamas. The oldest man was 76.He was blind and decrepit, and sat in a wheel-chair. His elderly wife was killed, too. The deadchildren ranged in age from 15 to 3. They includ-ed boys and girls. The Marines later delivered thecorpses to the morgue, where they were cata-logued by the local coroner. Photographs andvideos were taken independently by Americansand Iraqis in the neighborhood and at themorgue. The images showed blood-splatteredrooms, as well as victims. The dead did not lookpeaceful. They looked bloody and grotesque.You are my brother by another mother, you aremy daughter by my wife. The dead were buriedby angry, grieving crowds.

On the second day, a Marine Corps press offi-cer at the big base downriver in Ramadi issued awildly misleading statement attributing the civil-ian deaths to the enemy's lED, as if the familieshad crowded around the device before it explod-ed. That statement was later held out to he adeliberate lie, a cover-up, but in fairness it result-ed from the isolation of the base, and was moreself-delusional than underhanded. The pressstatement was not seen by Captain McConnell orhis men, who had no chance therefore to correct

it. Once it was issued, it became an official truththat the Marine Corps, even today, has rigidlyrefused to retract, despite the fact that within theCorps a more plausible official truth existedalmost from the start: the day after the pressstatement was issued, McConnell visited the bat-talion headquarters at a dam five miles north ofHaditha, where he gave his commander,Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Chessani, aPowerPoint briefing on the action, explainingthat some number of civilians had been killed byWuterich's squad while they suppressed a "com-plex ambush" that had started with the explosionof the land mine and had continued with anattack by hidden gunmen. Most of the briefingconcerned other small firefights that had eruptedin Haditha the same day. Chessani authorized themaximum compensation payments of $2,500 tothe families for each of the dead who could becertified not to have been insurgents. A Marinemajor was assigned to do at least that much of aninvestigation. McConnell's version was passed upthe chain of command. McConnell returned tohis fight for Haditha.

But one month later a reporter at Time maga-zine's Baghdad bureau, Tim McGirk, viewed agruesome video of the aftermath, which suggest-ed that people had been shot and killed insidethe houses. Such is the nature of this war, withits routine collateral horrors, that had McGirkbeen privy to McConnell's report the video mightnot have surprised him. But with only the pressstatement about a land mine to go by, it wasobvious that something about the officialdescription was very wrong. McGirk's initialqueries to the Marine Corps were rebuffed withan e-mail accusing him of buying into insurgentpropaganda, and, implicitly, of aiding and abet-ting the enemy in a time of war. Whoever wrotethe e-mail was out of his league. Negative pub-licity does indeed help the insurgency, but it'sthe killing of bystanders that really does the trick.Iraq is a small country with large family ties. Afterthree years of war, the locals hardly needed Timeto tell them the score. Rather, it was theAmericans back home who needed help—anylittle insight into why the war kept getting worse.McGirk and others in the Baghdad bureau con-

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tinued with their inquiry, focusing increasinglyon the possibility that a massacre and cover-uphad occurred. They did not draw conclusions,but laid out what was known and, in mid-March2006, published the first of several carefully con-sidered accounts.

Knowing that the articles were coming, theMarine Corps had been forced to accept twoindependent military investigations, one led byan Army general, concentrating on the responsi-bilities of command, and the other by the crimi-nal investigative branch of the Navy, whichfocused on reconstructing events on the ground.News from the investigations occasionallyemerged, and did not look good for the Marines.

Pennsylvania congressman John Murtha, a for-mer Marine and a powerful friend of thePentagon, stated bluntly that his sources weretelling him that a massacre had indeed occurred;he said that there had been no firefight, and thatWuterich's squad had simply gone berserk.Murtha's larger point was that impossible pres-sure was being placed on U.S. troops, and thatthey should be withdrawn from a self-destructivewar. Following his statements, Haditha becameyet another test in a polarized nation, and nevermind the details: if you liked President GeorgeW. Bush, you believed that no massacre hadtaken place; if you disliked him, you believed theopposite. As part of the package, Time came infor Internet attacks, hate-filled attempts to findany small discrepancies in its reporting, and,again, never mind the underlying truth.

Amid the vitriol came allegations of other U.S.atrocities in Iraq, some of which turned Out to bereal. The Iraqi prime minister, Nun Kamal al-Maliki, who had enjoyed the strong support ofthe U.S. government, stated publicly what haslong been obvious on the streets—that the abuseof Iraqi civilians by American soldiers is routine.He did not say what is equally obvious—thatabuse of Iraqis by Iraqis is even more routine,and that, along with horrors inflicted by Sunnigroups, much of the worst is done by Shiite mili-tias, who constitute a significant portion of thegovernment's own forces as Iraq slips into civilwar. Al-Maliki vowed to launch his own inde-pendent investigation of the Haditha killings—

wishful thinking for a government leader forcedto hunker down in Baghdad's fortified GreenZone. But tempers were fraying in both Iraq andthe United States.

Meanwhile, Kilo Company and the rest of the3d Battalion had returned to California on sched-ule in the early spring of 2006, and had beengreeted with the usual fanfare. But one weeklater the division's top general relieved CaptainMcConnell and Lieutenant Colonel Chessani oftheir commands, stating that he had lost confi-dence in their abilities to lead. The two officersremained on duty in other roles, though strainingagainst bitterness, and anxious about the future.McConnell hoped that by remaining silent hemight prevail, standing against the assault as aSpartan would. Semper fi. Nonetheless, it seemseventually to have dawned on him that his ownbeloved Corps might not be at his side.Reluctantly, McConnell hired a private defenselawyer, as did Wuterich and others. The navalinvestigation dragged on, and in midsummerproduced a 3,500-page report. The report has notbeen made public, but apparently suggests thatsome members of the squad had engaged inmurder, and that afterward they and perhaps oth-ers had agreed on a narrative to hide the crime.The Marine Corps began to ready charges, and toprepare for military trials and lesser career-end-ing disciplinary actions. The trials will take placeat Pendleton, probably sometime before spring.The penalties may include capital punishmentand prison for life. In the most general terms theoutcome is already known. A former officer closeto McConnell said to me, "The Corps has thisreflex when it feels threatened at home. It has ahistory of eating its young."

II. The Fallujab Legacy

Who among these young should be eaten,and how, are questions that Marine Corps justicewill decide. But the story of Haditha is aboutmore than the fate of just a few men, the loss oftheir friend, or the casualties they inflicted alongthe Euphrates River one cool November morn-ing. More fully explored, it is about the observ-able realities of an expanding guerrilla war—

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about mistakes that have been made and, regret-tably, about the inability to fix what is wrong.Those limitations appear to be inherent in&themilitary, and though they certainly have much todo with the reactions and resentments of theleast competent soldiers, they also, in a differentway, apply to the very best. No matter howsophisticated or subtle our military thinkers maybe, ultimately they have use of only this veryblunt device—a heavy American force that issimply not up to suppressing a popular rebellionin a foreign land. Despite all the fine words andintentions, the U.S. military turns out to he a toolthat is too large and too powerful to be sharp-ened. Our soldiers collectively did not want thiswar, and many have come to believe that it can-not be won, but they are not in positions to acton those thoughts, and have no choice hut toperform their assignments as their capacitiesallow.

The starting point of the Haditha killings isearly 2004, when the occupation was nearly ayear old, and the Marines were brought back toIraq to take over from the U.S. Army west ofBaghdad, in the Sunni strongholds of AnbarProvince. Anbar was said to be restive, but it wasalready dangerous as hell. The Army had blun-dered there. Soon after the invasion, in April2003, soldiers from the 82d Airborne Divisionhad gone into the center of Fallujah, where theyset up an observation post in a schoolhouse. Thebest account yet of the consequences, andindeed of the entire war, is contained in therecent book Fiasco, written by Thomas E. Ricksof the Washington Post. Ricks quotes the Armycolonel in command, who said, 'We came in toshow presence just so the average citizen wouldfeel safe." But it didn't work out that way, as ithas not worked out for all the iterations of "pres-ence" ever since.

This is an aspect of the war still poorly accept-ed by the military, and by critics who believe thatby sending more troops the U.S. might havedone a better job, or could do so today. Theview from the street has always been different.Iraq steps aside to let soldiers pass by, and thenimmediately fills in the void behind them. Thesoldiers are targets as hapless as any German

conscript ever was. Reduced to giving candy tochildren, and cut off by language and ignorancefrom the culture around them, they work in suchisolation that the potentially positive effects oftheir presence usually amount to nil. The poten-tially negative effects, however, are significant.Back in April 2003, the U.S. colonel's averageIraqi citizen might have told him, "You don'tknow what you don't know, and, sir, you don'tknow a lot."

The colonel's soldiers had set up the observa-tion post high in the schoolhouse, from whichthey could see over the tops of garden walls andinto family compounds where unveiled womendid housework and hung laundry to dry. The sol-diers did not understand that this amounted to aviolation of the local women, and a serious insultto their men. An angry crowd gathered in frontof the school to demand the soldiers' withdraw-al. From their positions in the building, the sol-diers eyed the demonstrators warily for a while,but then rifle rounds began to hit the walls, firedperhaps from both a rooftop and the street, andthe soldiers responded by firing directly into thecrowd. Massive response had been the normduring the recent invasion, when the opponentswere enemy troops, but times had changed andthese were mostly noncombatants on the street.As. many as 71 people were wounded, andbetween 5 and 17 died, depending on the truthof the American or Iraqi versions. The command-er.• of the 82d Airborne, General CharlesSwannack Jr., later claimed that his men's marks-manship had been precise—and indeed so accu-rate that every one of the casualties (he countedfive or six) was an identifiable instigator whodeserved what he got. In other words, within theArmy there was no question of disciplinaryaction. But the schoolhouse shootings had giventhe insurgency a cause, and the guerrilla war hadbegun.

•By the time the Marines arrived in early 2004,nearly two years before the killings in Haditha,the war was out of hand. This was true not justin Anbar but all through central Iraq, where itwas obvious that the crude tactics of the Armywere failing, and playing into the insurgents'plans. Individual soldiers were brave, but the

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Army as an institution was averse to risk, and itwas making a show of its fear by living on over-protected bases, running patrols only in armoredvehicles, and overdoing its responses to the pin-prick attacks by the insurgents—arresting far toomany men, and answering rifle fire with tanks,rockets, artillery, and air strikes. It became socommon to call down precision bombs againsteven individual suspected insurgents (forinstance, someone spotted by drone, walkingwith a shovel along a road at night) that a newterm was coined, based on the physical effectsthat could sometimes he observed on video."Pink misting," some soldiers called it, and intheir growing frustration they said it with glee.

Excessive force was employed not merelybecause the weapons were available but alsobecause high technology had led Americans toexpect low-casualty wars. Especially in the con-text of a conflict that had never been adequatelyexplained, the U.S. military for political reasonscould not afford any implication that jt wassquandering its soldiers' lives in Iraq. It is diffi-cult to argue publicly that the military's cautionwas not a good thing. Strictly in gaming terms,however, there was a problem: by squanderinginnocent Iraqi lives instead, in order to saveAmerican soldiers, the Army in particular wasspawning untold numbers of new enemies whowould mount more frequent attacks againstthose same soldiers in the future. This was hap-pening, and fast. The Army was locked into aself-defeating cycle by the very need to keep itscasualties down. Meanwhile, the insurgent cam-paign was expanding in proportion to the num-ber of noncombatants dishonored, brutalized, orkilled. It was expanding in proportion to Out-rage.

Perhaps because of their history in irregularwars, the Marines seem to have a special sensefor such cycles of violence. Despite their publicimage as leathernecks and fighters, they possessa contemplative strain, and their organization,because it is relatively small, is also relativelyamenable to change. When they returned to Iraqin 2004, they knew that the fight had grownmuch trickier than before, and they announcedthat in Anbar they would demonstrate a new

approach to winning the war. They would shedthe excess of armor, use military precision ratherthan power, get out of their vehicles and walkthrough the towns, knock on doors rather thanbreak them down, and go out of their way toaccommodate the Iraqi culture. They would basetheir tactics on good intelligence. They wouldnot overreact when provoked. They would shootinsurgents, and even enjoy the kills, but theywould be careful not to hurt innocentbystanders. They would provide the necessarystability to allow a civil Iraqi society to grow.They would be understood, and they wouldmake friends.

It was to be a textbook counterinsurgencycampaign. In abstraction the strategy madesense, and it was the obvious choice—indeed,the only potentially productive one remaining. Inpractice, however, it quickly encountered anuncooperative Iraq. With its population of250,000, Fallujah was particularly tough. In addi-tion to all the native insurgents there, it con-tained foreign fighters from elsewhere in theMiddle East, who had arrived to do battle underthe banners of God. Within a couple of weeksthe Marines were being forced by hostile fireback into their armored vehicles, and wereencountering the same frustrations that the Armyhad, of not speaking Arabic, not having reliabletranslators, not knowing whose advice to trust,and not being able to distinguish between theenemy and ordinary people on the streets. As forthe Iraqis in Anbar, the distinction so dear to theAmerican forces, between the Army and theMarines, meant little to them. The view from therooftops was that all these guys wore the samestars and stripes, and were crusaders for Zionistsand oilmen, if not necessarily for Christ. Recentlyon Capitol Hill, John Murtha, the congressmanand former Marine who has been so vocal aboutthe killings in Haditha, mentioned those earlyencounters with reality to me. He said, "TheMarines came over here to my office and said,'Jesus, they're shooting at us!' And I said, 'Well,where did you think you were going?"

The Marines did not formally abandon theirstrategy, but they saw it torn from their grasp. OnMarch 31, 2004, precisely two years before

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Captain McConnell and his Kilo Company camehome from their momentous tour in Haditha,four American employees of a security firmcalled Blackwater were ambushed and killed inFallujah. Their corpses were hacked apart andburned, and two of them were hung from abridge amid celebrations on the street. Imageswere beamed around the world. Judging correct-ly that it could not leave the insult unanswered,the Bush administration, after brief considerationof the options, decided on an all-out assaultagainst the city. That decision continues to standas one of the worst of the war, ranking onlybelow the decision to disband the Iraqi Armyand the initial decision to invade. At the time, forthose of us living independently in Iraq outsideof the American security zones, and with somesense therefore of the mood on the streets, itdemonstrated once again the inability of officialsto imagine the trouble that the United States wasin, and the astonishing insularity of Washington,D.C.

The Marines knew better. They wanted torespond to the Blackwater ambush by going afterthe individual killers, and then following throughwith a well-crafted counterinsurgency campaignto stabilize and mollify the city. But when theywere overruled and ordered to do the oppo-site—to mount an immediate full-frontal offen-sive—they set aside their theories, and as profes-sional soldiers they dutifully complied. It was adisaster. Backed up by tanks and combat aircraft,the Marines went into Fallujah dealing destruc-tion, and quickly bogged down in house-to-house fighting against a competent and deter-mined foe. To make matters worse, the showcasebattalion of the new Iraqi Army mutinied andrefused to join the fight. The battle cost severaldozen American dead and many more wounded,and did immeasurable damage to the prospectsfor American success. It turned into a humiliationfor the United States when, after four days ofstruggle, the Marines were ordered by a nervousWashington to withdraw. Again they dutifullycomplied. Afterward, the jubilant insurgents tookfull public control of the city, and with the helpof the foreign fighters turned it into a fortifiedhaven which U.S. forces did not dare to enter.

To get a feeling for Kilo Company and thekillings in Haditha, it is necessary to rememberthis. After the spring battle was lost, Fallujahbecame an open challenge to the American pres-ence in Iraq. There were plenty of other chal-lenges, and to speak only of Fallujah is grossly tosimplify the war. Still, Fallujah was the most obvi-ous one, and the United States, unless it was toquit and go home, had no choice but to take thecity back. Everyone knew it, on all sides, and formonths the antagonists prepared. Because of thefortifications and the expectation of active resist-ance, there was no question this time of a patientcounterinsurgency campaign: the Marines weregoing to have to go in and simply smash the citydown. In November of 2004, they did just that,with a force about 10,000 strong. Before attack-ing they gave the city warning, and allowed anexodus to occur. Nearly the entire populationfled, including most of the insurgents, whospread into Baghdad or up the Euphrates to carryon the rebellion, leaving behind, however, a rearguard of perhaps 1,000 gunmen who, exception-ally, wanted to make a stand. This was their mis-take. The Marines attacked with high explosivesand heavy weapons. Over the 10 days it took tomove through Fallujah, and the following weeksof methodical house-to-house clearing, theywrecked the city's infrastructure, damaged ordestroyed 20,000 houses or more, and did thesame to dozens of schools and mosques. Theywere not crusaders. They did not Christianize theplace. They turned Fallujah into Stalingrad.

Many insurgents survived the initial assaultsand emerged to contest the Marines at closequarters, room to room and in the rubble. It issaid to have been the most intense battle byAmerican forces since Vietnam. The insurgentswere trapped inside cordon upon cordon ofAmerican troops, and they fought until death.For the Marines the rules of engagement werenecessarily loose. Rules of engagement arestanding orders that limit the targets of soldiers,defining the difference between appropriate andinappropriate killing according to strategic andtactical goals, and between legal and illegalkilling according to interpretations of internation-al law. In Fallujah the rules allowed Marines to

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kill anyone they believed to he dangerous, andothers who got in the way. In addition to thoseseen carrying weapons, in practice this meanteveryone in every structure from which hostilefire came, and any military-age male seen mov-ing toward the Marines or running away.Obviously, the Marines were not allowed to killwounded prisoners, but in a televised case oneof them did, and Marine Corps justice averted itsgaze.

The men of Kilo Company fought through thethick of Fallujah. Lance Corporals Terrazas andCrossan, and most of the other men of futureHaditha note, ran the course from start to finish.Kilo Company lost four Marines killed and atleast 20 seriously wounded, and was involved inthe best-known close-quarters combat of the bat-tle—a desperate attempt to clear insurgents fromthe rooms of a house, which came to be knownas the Hell House fight. Toward the end of it, aNew York—based photographer named LucianRead snapped an iconic picture of a blood-drenched sergeant who had been shot seventimes and blasted with an enemy grenade, butwho nonetheless was emerging on foot from thehouse, holding a pistol in one hand, supportedby a Marine on each side. The photographshowed the Marines as they like to be seen, andas some like to see themselves. There's a lot tobe said for going to war with a photographer intow, until something happens that you wouldrather forget.

Fallujah was a victory for the Marine Corps,but a victory narrowly defined. The reality is thata quarter-million people were forced from theirhomes and, when they returned, were faced witha city in ruins, surrounded by concertina wireand watched over by armed men in towers.Marine General John Sattler, who had led theassault, claimed that the insurgency had beenbroken. But as the seasons slid by in 2005, guer-rillas slipped back into Fallujah, or sprang upfrom its ruins, and they surged forward throughall the other towns of Anhar, including Haditha.Sattler was wrong, and embarrassingly so. Withinmore contemplative circles of Marines, the battleof Fallujah became less of a triumph than awarning. The consequences were not difficult to

discern. A hard-pressed combat officer once putit this way to me: "Yeah, we won Fallujah. Butbefore that we made Fallujah. And we definitelycan't afford to make another."

The hell of it was that the reasonable alterna-tive—a nuanced counterinsurgency campaign—was not showing much promise either. At itscore, the counterinsurgency campaign asked alot. On the Iraqi side, it required the people ofAnbar to place their faith in a United States gov-ernment that had repeatedly blundered over theprevious few years, and that was unable to pro-tect collaborators from the insurgents' knives, Onthe American side, it required young Marineswith little worldly experience to show trust in aforeign population on alien streets where theywere being shot at and blown up. Indeed, theformula asked so much from everyone involvedthat it was becoming difficult to know when itwas realistic anymore. Specialists in Washingtonadvocated patience and wisdom, and said thestandard thing about our instant-gratificationsociety. Officials in the Green Zone highlightedthe slightest positive signs. But on the ground inAnhar the trends were all wrong.

III: First, Do No Harm

After Fallujah and the Hell House fight, KiloCompany flew home to California, spent a half-year retraining under its new captain, LucasMcConnell, and then returned to Iraq inSeptember 2005, with Haditha in its sights.Haditha at that point had been largely ignored bythe Marines for nearly a year. It was being ruledby an uncompromising group of insurgents whohad instituted Islamic law and done some gooddeeds, hut had also carried out public floggingsand beheadings, and were using Haditha as abase from which to launch attacks in the region.In April of 2005 they had taken 19 Shia fisher-men to a soccer field and slaughtered them all.The few policemen in town had resigned or fledto avoid similar fates. Then, on August 1, rough-ly two months before Kilo Company returned toIraq, six Marine snipers from an Ohio-basedcompany of reservists had been ambushed andkilled on the outskirts of the city, in a scene that

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was videotaped by the insurgents and madeavailable on DVDs in the market. Two days lateranother 14 Marines from the, same reserve com-pany were killed when their armored personnelcarrier was destroyed by an improvised mine. Bythe end of its tour, primarily around Haditha, thatcompany had suffered 23 dead and 36 wounded,earning it the unfortunate distinction of havingbeen the most badly mauled of any company inthe war thus far. Upon returning to Ohio, one ofthe sergeants described his rage after the destruc-tion of the personnel carrier. He had busted intoa nearby house and had barely restrained himselffrom shooting two women and a teenage boywhom he found inside. He said he realized thenthat he had been too long in Iraq. He had beenthere seven months. He left in September 2005,when Kilo Company arrived.

The Marines decided to clean out Hadithaonce and for all. At the start of October theypositioned about 3,000 troops in an arc to thesouth, west, and north, around the town.Roughly 700 of the troops were from Pendleton's3d Battalion under its new commander,Lieutenant Colonel Chessani. The men of KiloCompany were assigned the lead. They waited inthe desert west of the city center. Before theoffensive began, they knelt with their helmets offand prayed. They expected intense resistance inthe form of rifle fire and rocket-propelledgrenades. The plan called for them to advanceon foot on a broad front, and to push the insur-gents through the city until. they were backedagainst the Euphrates, where they would surren-der or die. The strategy was odd—as if theMarines had forgotten exactly which war theywere in. Before dawn three bridges that crossedthe river were bombed to cut off the enemy'sescape. Later, at a Baghdad press briefing, MajorGeneral Rick Lynch said, "We took out a portionof each of those bridges to deny the terroristsand foreign fighters—the insurgency—the abilityto come from north to south, or south to north,across the Euphrates River. It was a precisionstrike so that when we indeed defeat the insur-gency in these areas—and we're on a glide pathto do that—we can go back and replace thosesegments of the bridges so that the people in that

area can regain their own freedom of move-ment." It was a tidy plan for an orderly war,everything in its place. Lynch continued, "Putthat original chart up, please, the one that I justtook down."

When the Marines advanced into Haditha, onthe first day of Ramadan, October 4, 2005, theyencountered a town so peaceful that at first it

seemed deserted. They knew that it was not—that they were being watched from behind thecompound walls, and that the residents wereplaying it safe by staying off the streets. The frus-tration was that the insurgents were lying equal-ly low, and not standing to fight or run away, asconventional combatants would. They could dothis because of a reality soon evident to ordinarygrunts but stubbornly denied by the U.S. com-mand, which was that in Haditha the insurgencyenjoyed widespread public support, and all themore so now with American soldiers suddenlywalking around. The insurgents did not need toconsult with experts to understand guerrilla war.Why bother to confront these Americans imme-diately, when you could let them pass by andlater hunt them down? Why bother to go north tosouth or south to north when you could simplystay at home?

Within hours the Marines had walked all theway through Haditha and had reached theEuphrates with little to show. Over the next twoweeks Chessani's battalion remained in town,searching house to house and encounteringhardly any opposition. Evidence of the insur-gency was all around. By the time the offensivewas formally called off, the Marines had netted119 improvised mines, several facilities for mak-ing them, two car bombs, 14 weapons caches,and a propaganda shop equipped with comput-ers, copiers, and several thousand blank CDs andaudiotapes. They had found a note pinned to thedoor of a mosque, on which a former policemanrenounced his collaboration with the invadersand begged the insurgents for their forgiveness.Finally, they had detained about 130 suspects, ofwhom they released about half and shipped offthe others for interrogation. Against the scale ofthe rebellion, these were illusory accomplish-ments.

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When Chessani's battalion withdrew in mid-October, it shifted a few miles to the north andsettled into its comfortable quarters at the damabove Haditha. McConnell and his Kilo Companywere left behind to maintain a full-time presencein the center of town. They set up Sparta Base ina former school administration building, in awalled compound that could accommodate theirgenerators and Humvees. The perimeter wasreinforced with coils of concertina wire, sand-bagged machine-gun emplacements, and blastwalls made of HESCO barriers—large dirt-filledcubes heavy enough to limit the effects of mor-tars and rockets. The administration building wasH-shaped and low-slung. It contained about 15rooms of various sizes, all with linoleum floorsand painted concrete walls. One of the roomswas made into the company's office and calledthe Combat Operations Center. Two others weremade into a chow hall and a kitchen. Thekitchen once burned because the cooks were notpaying attention, but the food that was servedwas surprisingly good, and later sometimesincluded crab. Most of the building was madeinto general living quarters, where the men slepton cots and kept their personal gear, includingan abundance of iPods, video games, and DVDplayers. As a final special touch there was evena makeshift photography studio where LucianRead, who had rejoined the company, shot indi-vidual portraits of the men. Despite all that issaid about difficulties endured by Americanforces in Iraq, as time passed the Marines atSparta Base tended to feel that, if anything, theywere not roughing it enough.A sign on the wall read:

Habits of Thought1. Sturdy Professionalism2. Make yourself hard to kill.3. No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy4. First, Do No Harm5. The Iraqi People are not our enemy, butour enemy hides amongst them.

Corollary 1: You have to look at these peo-ple as if they are trying to kill you, but youcan't treat them that way.

Corollary 2: Be polite, be professional,have a plan to kill everyone you meet.

This was standard Marine Corps stuff, passeddown from above. It was meant as a guide to thewar in Iraq, but it was unclear and overwrought.The men of Kilo Company had a culture of beingassertive and tough, partly because of the HellHouse fight and the publicity that had followed.But now that this latest offensive had fizzled,they were being asked to do exactly what? Theywere wandering around Haditha just waiting toget hit. Lieutenant Colonel Chessani, up at thedam, was a strange guy to them. He had a repu-tation of being standoffish, intensely religious,and uncommunicative; he seemed to know theenlisted men only by the nametags on theirchests, and they felt he offered them little guid-ance at best. Captain McConnell was a differentstory. He was seen as an accessible and straight-forward guy, but also as a military lifer, whosetalks to his men, though intended to be inspira-tional, were dulled by Marine Corps clichés andpre-fabricated thoughts. He was always talkingabout responsibility and honor. He seemed sin-cerely to believe that in Haditha they were fight-ing the global war on terror—oh yes, and win-fling it, too. He insisted that the insurgents werecowards who lacked values, when the oppositewas evidently true. He made Wagnerian vowslike "We will not falter in the clashing of spears."At Sparta Base sometimes it got a little thick,especially for a place with no enemy in sight. Infairness, however, officers who can inspire enlist-ed Marines are rare, and McConnell, because hewas new, was perhaps just trying too hard.

Meanwhile, the Marines mounted patrolsevery day, often for no better reason than to spotsomething unusual on streets that to themremained strange. This was said to be an intelli-gence-based war, hut the intelligence was poor.Sometimes the Marines detained men whosenames appeared on their lists; more often theywent into houses, asked a few questions, andwalked away empty-handed. Officially their rulesof engagement were only slightly more restrictivethan those that had applied to the free hunting inFallujah, with their tolerance for the killing of

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people who got in the way. In Haditha, howev-er, there were civilians all around. Reflexively thecity was known as a battlespace, and perhaps itwas one, but if so it was barely recognizable.Simply put, though Haditha was still largely con-trolled by the insurgents, during all the weeksprior to the killings of November 19, the Marinesof Kilo Company saw very little action there.Battlespace? They killed one man—a town idiotwho insisted on crossing their perimeter wire.They found some munitions caches in sandy soilalong the riverbanks. They talked to some triballeaders. But the largest measure of their successwas a circular one—the continuing discovery ofimprovised land mines, which were laid eachnight, but which would not have been planted inthe first place were it not for the presence ofAmerican troops in town. Indeed, the whole warhad become a chicken-or-egg question, aroundand around with no answer possible.

The enlisted men of Kilo Company rarely phi-losophized. Many had joined the Corps inresponse to the September 11 attacks, now fouryears past, but the emotions that once had moti-vated them had been reduced by their participa-tion in an enormously bureaucratic enterprise,and by the tedium of war. Fine—they were prob-ably better soldiers for it. These were not the tautwarriors portrayed in action movies. As theyshed their helmets and body armor, theyemerged as ordinary five-foot-nine-inch, 150-pound middle-class Americans, sometimes pim-ple-faced, and often sort of scrawny. Some ofthem were mentally agile, and some quite obvi-ously were not. By the stringent standards of theU.S. military, they were not always well behaved.At Sparta Base there was a bit of illicit drinking,a touch of pornography. There are rumors aboutthe use of narcotics as well. BUt the unit's moralewas good enough, largely because the men hadbecome close friends. They liked motorcycles,they liked cars, they liked guns. They especiallyliked girls a lot. Some could not speak withoutf**k For instance, they f**king did not want to bein Iraq. Not anymore, if they ever did. Thosewho were returning felt they had come back waytoo f**king soon. And no, they did not respectthe Iraqi culture—who the f**k would? Iraqi men

wear man-dresses. Iraqi men think everyonewants to eyef**k their precious wives. Iraqi menkill their own people, then turn around and killMarines. It's f**king bulls**t. God should paintballthe genuine bastards so the Marines could thenblow them away. Sometimes on the streets ofHaditha it seemed like every man would getsplattered.

But the Marines did not sit around Sparta Baseand worry this to death. They talked about otherthings, their exploits, their party binges, the real-ly dumb moves of their friends. They laughedand gave each other hard times. They gave eachother names. When they mounted their patrols,they went up and down the designated streetsand did their jobs as they were told. Be politeand have a plan to kill everyone you meet? Yes,sir, roger that, and on streets like these thatwould mean shooting the guy from up close, sir,at any false move on his part—is that what youmean by a plan? If the counterinsurgency missionin Haditha seemed half-cocked, so did any realchance for success in Iraq, but that was for oth-ers to decide—not for the soldiers who had tocarry out the fights. The Marines of KiloCompany were well-intentioned guys who tookpride in their conventional battlefield skills and,partly as a result, now just wanted to go home.As a group they were not like people who jointhe police for the satisfaction of hurting others.They were more like people who join OutwardBound. Until the killings of November 19, thereis no evidence that in Haditha they abused thef**king Iraqis even once.

Then suddenly on Route Chestnut, Guzmanand Crossan were wounded, Terrazas was torn intwo, and Sergeant Wuterich was calling for back-up. The events that followed will never be recon-structed completely, no matter what the courtsmay find. Through the dust and noise on thatHaditha street, they played out in a jumble ofsemi-autonomous actions, complicated by per-ceptions that had been narrowed by the attackand further confused by the ambiguities associat-ed with fighting a guerrilla war on foreignground. Some of the Marines may have suspect-ed that a line had been crossed, and that crimesmight have been committed, but in the urgency

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of the moment it would have seemed less likelythen than it seems now, and even today the prin-cipal view of those involved is anger that theaccusations are cheap, and that Kilo Companyhas been unfairly singled out. There is probablya feeling of remorse as well, but, to generalize, itis regret that the killing of noncombatants had solittle to do with the intentions of the men, andthat the story cannot somehow be taken backand run all over again.

IV: From House to House

The boom of the land mine exploding washeard throughout Haditha. Immediately after-ward the city went quiet, except near the con-voy, from which the Marines piled out shouting.Some ran back to the shattered Humvee to ren-der aid as they could; the others quickly settleddown, and indeed milled around uncertainlyuntil Wuterich ordered them to spread out intodefensive positions. It was still barely 7:15 in themorning, the Humvee boiled with black smoke,and the possibility existed that its destructionmarked the start of an ambush that would nowexpand into overlapping attacks with automaticfire and rocket-propelled grenades. All throughIraq the insurgents were laying such lethal traps.For the moment, the houses on both sides of thestreet showed no sign of activity, though certain-ly they contained people lying low, if only out offear.

Again it is important to face, the realities here.According to counterinsurgency doctrine, thesepeople were not necessarily the enemy, butTerrazas was nonetheless spilling his guts intotheir street. Among these very houses was onewhere the Marines had discovered a bomb facto-ry just a few days before. Moreover, even if theneighbors were not directly involved, they musthave known the location of this land mine,which could not have been planted without thelocals taking notice. Surely some residents couldhave found a way to warn the patrol; if theywere not the enemy, surely some could haveacknowledged that Kilo Company during its stayin Haditha had been showing goodwill andrestraint. But no, it was apparent that to these

people Terrazas was just another dead American,like roadkil, and good riddance to him. ForWuterich's squad the silence of the neighbor-hood was therefore less reassuring than omi-nous. It was the quiet before the storm, the prel-ude to an attack. The Marines were angry andtense. They sighted their rifles at the walls androoftops, thinking every variation of f**k andwaiting for the incoming rounds.

Instead, a white Opel sedan came driving upthe street. It was an unmarked taxi carrying fiveyoung men, four of them college students boundfor school in Baghdad, the fifth their driver. Theywere only about a hundred yards away from theblast site when they happened upon the scene.Through their windshield—dirty, bug-splattered,against the sun—they would have seen one ofthe most dangerous sights in Iraq: smoke risingfrom a shattered Humvee, a stopped convoy,and American soldiers in full fighting mettle com-ing at them down the street. The Marines haltedthe car:from a distance. When soldiers do this inIraq, they are supposed to follow a progressiveescalation of force, with hand signals first, fol-lowed by raised weapons, then warning shotswith tracers visible, then shots to the engineblock, and finally, if the car keeps coming, shotsdirectly into the driver. Because of the risk of carbombs, however, the procedure is typicallyshortened; weapons go up, and if the car does-n't stop, the driver and other occupants are liber-ally sprayed with fire. Those are the rules of theroad, and so be it; given the circumstances, theyare well enough understood to seem fair.

This time the driver stopped, as most driversdo. Some witnesses in the nearby houses latersaid that he tried to back away but then desisted.The Marines came running up, shouting andcursing. Presumably they told the occupants toget out of the car and to kneel on the street withtheir hands on their heads. What the Marinesthought of them is not clear. Later they said theybelieved the men were associated with the land-mine explosion, and were perhaps the spotterswho had pushed the button, or were followingup now with a car-bomb attack. This strainscredulity for several reasons, not the least ofwhich is that five people in a car are about four

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too many for either purpose. Equally unlikelywas another explanation sometimes mentioned,that these were insurgents driving up to do bat-tle. But the truth is that the Marines neither knewnor needed to know why they stopped the car.The stop was legitimate. It was a necessary act tolimit the risks to the squad, and to keep the con-fusion from growing.

The problem is what happened next, after aquick search revealed that the car contained noweapons or explosives, or any other evidencethat linked the men to the insurgency. The Iraqisperhaps should have been held for a while or,better yet, allowed to take their car and leave.Instead, all five of them were shot dead by theMarines. Later, the Marines reported that theykilled them because they had started to runaway. Even if true, by normal standards this rais-es the question of what threat these men couldhave posed when they were fleeing unarmed—or at least what threat could have justified shoot-ing them down. But in Iraq the question wasmoot, and for reasons that give significance tothe Haditha story beyond mere crime and pun-ishment. The first and simplest reason is that,because of reluctance to second-guess soldiers ina fight, the rules of engagement allow for suchliberal interpretations of threat that in practicethey authorize the killing of even unarmed mili-tary-age males who are running away. The sec-ond reason derives from the first. It is that thekilling of civilians has become so commonplacethat the report of these particular ones barelyaroused notice as it moved up the chain of com-mand in Iraq. War is fog, civilians die, and thesefools should not have tried to escape.

The incident reemerged only because of theinsistent inquiries of Time magazine. During thesubsequent military investigations that wereforced onto the Marine Corps in the spring andsummer of 2006, grainy images from an aerialdrone were found that appeared to show the fivebodies lying clustered together beside the sedan,with one sprawled partly atop another. Perhapsthey had been dragged back and placed there,but this was not part of the original story.Certainly the pattern as seen from overhead wasnot one of men killed while trying to scatter.

Equally troubling were the statements of one ofthe Iraqi soldiers who was with the convoy, andwho four months later was questioned by a navalinvestigator. The questioning was incomplete,full of opportunities never pursued, and furtherweakened by an incompetent interpreter. Alawyer in court could tear such testimony apart.Nonetheless, what emerged was a picture ofmurder. The Iraqi soldier said he had been onlyabout 25 yards away from the Opel sedan, andhad watched the entire scene. It was obvious tohim that the Iraqis were noncombatants—other-wise, why would they have driven up like this?He said the Marines had yanked open the Opel'sdoors, taken the men Out, forced them to kneelwith their hands on their heads, and, withoutbothering to search them, had quickly gunnedthem down. The investigator said, "Bang, bang,bang, bang, bang." Well yeah, well no, well actu-ally the Iraqis were sprayed with rifle rounds.The M16 is a light, clip-fed weapon, with a plas-tic stock and a metal barrel. It fires a three-roundburst when it is switched to automatic. It doesnot bang then, but ripples sharply. The Iraqi sol-dier said he saw a head come apart and a facesplit in two. He also said that one of the Marinesused a pistol, and he called that man a captain,but he did not appear to know any of the squadmembers' names, and this element he seems tohave gotten wrong. By my calculation, therewere no officers yet on the scene.

Errors are too easy to make when assigningindividual blame. Sergeant Wuterich, forinstance, has been repeatedly singled out. If thefive Iraqi civilians from the car were summarilyslain, Wuterich was probably elsewhere, closerto the center of concern, placing his men intodefensive positions and watching the houses forhostile fire. Indeed, it is wrong to brand any ofthe Marines of his squad without knowing whateach was doing, and where each one was. I donot know those details, though by now the mili-tary prosecutors must. It appears that only a fewof the Marines handled the people from the car,and that, while all of them were angry, only twolet loose with their guns. The killing was notagreed upon or planned. It started without warn-ing and finished too fast to stop. Claims have

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been made of an extensive conspiracy to coverup murders and protect the Marine Corps fromembarrassment—but no such conspiracy wasnecessary, and it is unlikely that any occurred. Asfor the killings of the car's occupants, all thatwould have been required was a shift at the out-set contained in two simple words. They ran. Itwould not matter who first uttered the words, orif these were the ones actually spoken. Amongthe men of Wuterich's squad the elegance wouldimmediately have been understood. We arebrothers by other mothers. The dead do notreturn to life, but some mistakes can he undone.Killing is not wrong in Iraq, if you can say therules allowed it.

Within minutes the force from Sparta Basearrived. It was a squad of about the same size asWuterich's, led by the only officer present onRoute Chestnut the entire morning, a young lieu-tenant named William Kallop. Like other lieu-tenants in Kilo Company, Kallop was junior in allbut rank to the senior enlisted men, to whom henaturally deferred. He had a reputation of beinga little soft, a little lost. He was the pleasant sonof a wealthy New York family, who had joinedthe Marine Corps, it was believed in KiloCompany, to prove something to himself beforereturning to a life of comfort. As a soldier he wassaid to be average. When the allegations againstKilo Company surfaced in the spring of 2006, hisparents vigorously reacted. They hired a NewYork public-relations firm that specializes in legalcases, and then engaged a defense attorney whois a former Marine general and was once one ofthe top lawyers in the Corps. The implicit warn-ing may have had some effect. While McConnelland Chessani were humiliated and relieved oftheir commands, and Wuterich was fingered inpublic, Kallop was left untouched, though tech-nically upon his arrival at Route Chestnut onNovember 19he had become the commander onthe scene.

Apparently his command didn't amount tomuch. For the most part he remained on thestreet by the Humvees with the rest of his squadand allowed Wuterich and his men to work theirway through the four houses where, to repeatthe number, they killed the additional 19 Iraqis—

children, women, and men. It is virtually certainthat none of the dead were combatants, but littleelse about the case is so straightforward. Strangethough it seems at first glance, the military courtswill probably have a very difficult time decidingif war crimes were coimnitted inside the houses.The difficulty will not be due to a Marine Corpsagenda. Indeed, the expedient solution for theentire U.S. military would be to treat Wuterichand his men as criminals, and to destroyMcConnell and Chessani as well, thereby avoid-ing the alternative conclusion, that the debacle inHaditha is related to normal operations in thewar. But it just does not seem plausible, as JohnMurtha and others have claimed, that these par-ticular Marines, who had enjoyed a relativelylow-key tour, went so berserk after Terrazas'sdeath that, having already slaughtered the fiveIraqis by the car, they proceeded without specif-ic reason or provocation to enter people's hous-es and execute even the children at point-blankrange in a feverish rampage sustained for sever-al hours, even while Lieutenant Kallop and theother recent arrivals listened to the rippling ofgunfire and the screams of the soon dead. Thekillings in the houses on November 19 wereprobably nothing so simple as that.

Wuterich may have explained it best, becausehe has insisted that his Marines came under AK-47 attack, and defended themselves as they hadbeen trained to do, by returning fire and surgingforward to suppress the aggressors. Critics haveexpressed skepticism, pointing out that there waslittle evidence of exterior damage to the houses,and that certain neighborhood witnesses heardno firefight before the first house was stormed.Other witnesses, however, did hear firing, andthe same Iraqi soldier who gave the damningdescription of executions by the car, and whowas certainly no friend of the Marines, repeated-ly described coming under attack from the southside of the street.

When the naval investigator asked for details,the interpreter summarized the soldier's answers.He said, 'Fire open at them. Shots were shootingat them. Fighting between them and forces arefighting at us, shooting at us.- The Americansspread through the houses, and they stayed.

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They were going to take care of this. So theywent where the fire was coming, receiving fire,in that direction.... Somebody's shooting at us,we're shooting at them, but they are just shoot-ing at us and we're shooting back."

The investigator said, "Okay. And how manyMarines did that?"

Translating directly now, the interpreter said,"It was all mixed up. Even I was a little shaken.

I didn't see who's shooting at us.""Did you shoot your weapon at all?""I shot in the air. Yeah, we shot, but we shot

in the air.""Why did you shoot in the air?""He says, Who am I going to shoot? I got to

see somebody I'm shooting.""Okay. So why shoot at all?""When they start firing, the Marines were like,

'Oh come on, you shoot too.' Everybody shotfive, six rounds."

Maybe this investigator had not been aroundthe Iraqi Army before. He said, "In the air?"

"In the air, yes, sir I mean, we have noeffect when we go out there. We have no effecton anything because they take orders from what-ever they tell us." The Iraqi soldier obviouslywanted to make it clear that he had not killedany of the dead.

"So you shot in the air?""Yes, I did.""Who told you to shoot in the air?""They told.""But who told you?""Not all, not everybody, sir."Evidently, the investigator tried to recover his

balance. He said, "Did you ever see anybody—you said that you were taking shots from theneighborhood. Did you ever see anybody shoot-ing at you or the Marines?"

"No, I haven't seen. I know the fires werecoming at us, but from where, I don't know."

"But you're sure that you were being shot at?""Yes, yes. They want to kill us.""Was it a lot of shots or just here and there?""Spray. It was spray continuous.""Spray continuous. For about how long?""When we first received spray, and then after

that, hell break loose. All Americans were firing

and everything. I couldn't tell which one'swhich."

"Okay. And you shot in the air?""Yes sir."The testimony rings all too true, with compen-

sation for some light twisting of facts. It is verylikely that the Marines did indeed begin takingfire on Route Chestnut, a short while after theoccupants of the car were killed, and possibly inangry response. Someone is bomb me, I amshoot him, but he is just shoot at me, and I amjust shoot him back. This is the kind of fight thatDonald Rumsfeld could not imagine.

It was now perhaps 7:30 in the morning.Kallop had arrived with his reinforcements. Thefire seemed to come from a house on the southside of the street. In hindsight we know that noinsurgents were discovered there, but chancesare they were present nonetheless, if not in thathouse, then in others nearby. The evidenceremains uncertain, but Wuterich, for one, insiststhat his men believed the house containedaggressors, and that they proceeded with a by-the-hook operation to clear them Out, exactly asthe rules of engagement allowed. This may verywell be. If you assume it is true, you can watchHaditha play out from there, largely within thelegal definition of justified killing—a baselinenarrative that becomes the happiest possible ver-sion of the morning's events.

With Kallop in place among the Humvees,Wuterich led his men from the front. They got tothe house, kicked through the door, and in theentranceway came upon the owner, a middle-aged man, whom one of them shot at closerange, probably with a three-round burst to thechest. The Marine's M16 would barely havekicked in his hands. Beyond the sound of theshots, he might have heard the double pops ofthe rounds entering and exiting the man, theheavier snap of bullets against bone, perhaps themetallic clatter of spent cartridges hitting theground. The Iraqi was not thrown by the roundsas people are thrown in the movies. If no boneswere broken, he may not have felt much pain,except for some stinging where his skin wastorn. Unless he was struck in the heart, he didnot die immediately, but soon succumbed to

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massive hemorrhaging. Chances are his bloodfirst splattered against the wall, then flowed intoa dark-scarlet puddle beneath him until his heartstopped pumping.

The power was out in the house, and the lightinside was dim, all the more so for the Marines,who were piling in from the sunshine of thestreet. Inside a hostile house, survival requiresfast reactions. The Marines fired on a figuredown the hail, who turned out too late to be anold woman. There could have been a messagethere, but guerrilla wars are tricky, and theMarines were not about to slow down. Shescreamed when she was hit, apparently in theback, and then she died. The Marines wereshouting excitedly to one another. They workeddown the hallway until, busting open a door,they came upon a room full of people. Latersome of the squad said they had heard AK-47sbeing racked, though whatever they heardturned out not to be that. The room was dim,and the people were glimpsed rather than clear-ly seen. The Marines rolled in a grenade, huggedthe hallway for the blast, and then charged intothe dust and smoke to mop up with their riflesas they had been trained to do. This is myweapon, this is my gun. It was the Hell Housefight all over again, though, as it happened, with-out the opposition. Nine people had sheltered inthat room, three generations of the same family,from an ancient man paralyzed by a stroke to aninfant girl just three months old. When thegrenade exploded, it blew some of them apart,wounded others with penetrating shrapnel, andlittered the room with evil-smelling body parts.In the urgency of the moment the old man for-got that he was paralyzed and tried to stand up.He took rounds to the chest, vomited blood ashe fell, and then lay on the floor twitching as hedied. In that room four residents survived. Ayoung woman left her husband behind, grabbedthe infant girl, and managed to run away; a 10-year-old girl and her younger brother lay wound-ed beside their dead mother and remained con-scious enough to be terrified.

The Marines went on to the neighboringhouse, still seeking insurgents, as they believed.What happened there was a repeat of what had

just happened next door, only this time theAmericans knocked before they shot the man atthe gate, and a grenade tossed into an emptybathroom ignited a washing machine, and agrenade tossed into the room where the familywas sheltering failed to go off, and perhaps onlyone American came in and sprayed the roomwith automatic fire. This time there was just asingle survivor, a girl of about 13, who later wasable to provide some details of her family'sdeath. There was a lot of smoke, but:

Daddy was shot through the heart. He was 43.Mommy was shot in the head and chest. She

was 41.Aunt Huda was shot in the chest. She was 27.My sister Nour was shot in the right side of her

head. She was 15.My sister Saba was shot through the ear. She

was 11.My brother Muhammad was shot in the hand

and I don't know where else. He was 10.My sister Zainab was shot in the hand and the

head. She was five.My sister Aysha was shot in the leg and I don't

know where else. She was three.The brains of at least one of the little girls

were shoved through fractures in her skull by theimpact of a bullet. This is a standard effect ofhigh-velocity rounds fired into the closed cavityof a head. Later that day, when a replacementMarine came in to carry out the bodies, the girl'sbrains would fall onto his boot.

Wuterich's men pursued the search to thenorth side of Route Chestnut, where they put thewomen and children under guard and killed fourmen of another family. There on the north sidethey found the only AK-47 that was discoveredthat day—apparently a household defensiveweapon, of the type that is legal and common inIraq. No one has claimed that the rifle had beenfired.

On Route Chestnut the killing was over, andthe cleanup began. Nearly a year later, theMarines who were involved unanimously insistthat it was just another sty Anbar morning. Bynarrow application of military law, the upcomingtrials may indeed leave it as such. If so, howev-er, those trials will have to justify the shootings

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around the car and, furthermore, will have toaccount for certain statements by witnesses thatcall into question the scenes inside houses as Ihave described them in the happiest possibleversion of the events. Those statements, whichagain are full of contradictions and uncertainties,raise the possibility that, behind the privacy ofthe walls, Wuterich's men were carrying outdeliberate executions and laughing about it, thatone aimed and said "You! You!" before he shotthe old man down, that they made return trips tothe killing rooms to finish people off, and that onthe north side of the road they herded their vic-tims into a wardrobe before shooting themthrough the door. Unless the Marines ofWuterich's squad suddenly start confessing towar crimes, these are questions only the courtswill be able to decide.

V: A Thanksgiving Prayer

On the afternoon of November 19, when thereports of civilian casualties reached Captain LucasMcConnell, it did not cross his mind that anythingunusual had occurred: the killing by Americanforces of noncombatants in Iraq is simply so com-monplace. Sergeant Wuterich reported on the fightas he defined it. Lieutenant Kallop acquiesced. Anintelligence sergeant who surveyed the carnagesaid much the same thing. Captain McConnellscarcely reacted, because this slaughter seemed tolie within the rules of engagement, and in thatsense was little different from any other.McConnell inhabited a military world, full ofacronyms and equipment, and peopled by identi-fiable combatants—a place where spears clashedand civilians unfortunately sometimes came toharm. For him it had been a very active day. Soonafter the land-mine explosion that had killedTerrazas, ambushes and firefights erupted else-where in Haditha, and all four of his platoonswere engaged.

The main thread started at 8:35 in the morning,when an explosives-and-ordnance squad headingto Route Chestnut for a post-blast analysis cameunder fire from a palm grove. The squad returnedfire and drove on. Twenty-five minutes later, andslightly to the south, an aerial drone observed 10

men meeting on a palm-grove trail between RiverRoad and the Euphrates. The men appeared to heMAMs, or military-age males, and clearly were notjust farmers. Two came on foot, one by motorcy-cle, and seven by car. They loaded gear into thecar and, leaving three men behind, drove slowlysouth along the trail. McConnell called this"egressing." The drone circled lazily overhead,performing well in the global war on terror. Thetime was approximately 9:12. At 9:48, about a kilo-meter away, a Kilo Company patrol was attackedby small-arms fire, and the Marines shot back,resulting, they believed, in three enemy woundedin action, or EWIA, though all of them got away.

The men in the car on the palm-grove trail werein no particular hurry. They stopped beside othercars on the trail, presumably to coordinate futureattacks. Eventually they came to River Road, notfar south of Route Chestnut, where they parkedthe car and entered two houses. McConnell calledthe houses "safe houses," perhaps because themen calmly entered them. There was little doubtthat all seven men were insurgents, but it wasimpossible to tell who else was in the houses, andspecifically whether families were shelteringinside. Force-protection standards precluded thepossibility of checking, and since the rules ofengagement sanctioned collateral casualties withthe enemy so near, a flight of Cobra helicoptersarrived and fired two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles,one into each house, to soften things up. KiloCompany Marines then rushed forward to clear therooms as required. The first house was empty, butas they approached the second one they weregreeted by small-arms fire and grenades. TheMarines pulled back—way back—and called in anAV-8B Harrier jet to drop a guided 500-poundGBU-12 Paveway bomb. The bomb crashed intothe house with impressive precision, but did notexplode.

At this point the drone saw two MAMs leavethrough the back door and run into a little palm-grove patch to hide. The Marines brought theHarrier around to pink-mist these guys with a sec-ond 500-pound bomb—this one guided into thepatch—but it, too, turned out to be a dud.Undaunted, the troops switched weapons and hitthe patch with a $180,000 air-launched AGM-65

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Maverick missile. The strike resulted in one EKIA.The surviving MAM egressed the patch andingressed the house again. It was ridiculous. TheHarrier came back around and dropped a third500-pound bomb directly through the roof, blow-ing the whole house and everyone in it to bloodyshreds.

This was McConnell's reality as Haditha settleddown for the night. He gave a talk at Sparta Base,in which for once he did not overstretch. He said:Men, we've had a tough day, it's sad aboutTerrazas, but everyone functioned pretty well, sogood job and keep at it. He did not mention—andapparently did not much think about—all the non-combatants who had died. Look, this was Iraq.The clearing operations on Route Chestnut did notstand out as being significantly different from theother main act of the day, the use of missiles andbombs against a house that may well have con-tained a family. God knows there were enoughbody parts now scattered through the ruins. Killingface-to-face with an M16 allows you at least somechance to desist from slaughtering women andchildren, which is not true once a bomb is calleddown on a house. But there is no evidence thatMcConnell was even thinking about these matters.The photographer Lucian Read, who had beentraveling elsewhere in Anbar, returned the dayafter the killings and later snapped digital picturesof shrouded corpses in the houses by RouteChestnut. Read believes McConnell was aware ofthe pictures; if so, he did not try to suppress themor to limit their distribution. McConnell was such acompany man, such a by-the-book Marine, that,like the entire chain of command above him, hewas numb to the killings of noncombatants solong as the rules of engagement made the killingslegal. If there was a failure here, it was not that ofMcConnell but of the most basic conduct of thiswar.

Five days after the killings, Kilo Company cele-brated Thanksgiving with a turkey dinner, includ-ing stuffing and potatoes. The occasion wasrecorded on video. Before the meal McConnell ledthe men in prayer. He said,

Father, we thank you for this food whichyou have prepared for us. Please bless this

food with your great grace, and please let ustake the sustenance that you provide for us,and go forth and do great things in yourname. We are very grateful here in KiloCompany for many things. We thank you forthe mission that you have provided for us, toleave America and go into foreign lands andtry to do good things for the world and forour country. It's our greatest honor, and wethank you for that. We thank you for ourfamilies, who support us back in the States,and the brotherhood that we have here. It isour greatest strength, and we thank you forthat as well. We also want to thank you forthe veterans and those who have gonebefore us, because without them therewould he no Marine Corps legacy, and therewouldn't be that great standard to uphold.So we thank you for that because it guidesus, it keeps us on the right track, and it's thatsteering factor that helps us go forth and dogreat things. We thank you for the memoryand the life of Lance Corporal MiguelTerrazas, who did great things in his life, didgreat things for all of us, was a great friendand a great Marine. We just ask that you helpus take this food that you've provided ushere today, help it maintain, sustain our bod-ies so we can uphold that legacy that ourfallen comrades have provided for us. Wesay all these things in your great name.Amen.

The men answered with Marine Corps Hoo-rahsand Amens.

McConnell said, "Hey, please enjoy the meal.Make sure you pat the cooks on the back. Theywork hard. And if you see someone from the Fourshop here in the near future that you know, patthem on the back, because they get all that stuff outhere, and it's not the most safest place to be push-ing food around But I appreciate you all beinghere, and first and foremost Happy Thanksgiving.Go forth and do great things. Hoo-rah!"

Hoo-rah. Iraqis live in an honor-bound society,built of tight family ties. When noncombatants arekilled, it matters little to the survivors whether theAmerican rules allowed it, or what the U.S. military

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courts decide. The survivors go to war in return,which provokes more of the same in a circular divethat spirals beyond recovery. Haditha is just a smallexample. By now, nearly one year later, hatred ofthe American forces in the city has turned so fiercethat military investigators for the trials at Pendletonhave given up on going there. That hatred is bloodhatred. It is the kind of hatred people are willing todie for, with no expectation but revenge. This wasimmediately apparent on a video that was taken theday after the killings by an Iraqi from the neighbor-hood—the same video that was later passed alongto Time. The Marine Corps was wrong to dismissthe video as propaganda and fiction. It is anauthentic Iraqi artifact. It should be shown to thegrunts in training. It should be shown to the gener-als in command. The scenes it depicts are raw.People move among the hideous corpses, wailingtheir grief and vowing vengeance before God. "Thisis my brother! My brother! My brother!" In one ofthe killing rooms, a hard-looking boy insists thatthe camera show the body of his father. Sobbingangrily, he shouts, "I want to say this is my father!God will punish you Americans! Show me on thecamera! This is my father! He just bought a carshowroom! He did not pay all the money to theowner yet, and he got killed!"

A man cries, "This is an act denied by God. Whatdid he do? To be executed in the closet? Those bas-tards! Even the Jews would not do such an act!Why? Why did they kill him this way? Look, this ishis brain on the ground!"

The boy continues to sob over the corpse on thefloor. He shouts, "Father! I want my father!"

Another man cries, "This is democracy?"Well yeah, well no, well actually this is Haditha.

For the United States, it is what defeat looks like inthis war.

Notes

Vanity Fair, November 2006, 3 12-28, 350-55.Reprinted by permission from Vanity Fair andDarhansoff, Verrill, Feldman Literary Agents onbehalf of the author.

1. Josh White and Sonya Geis, "4 Marines Charged inHaditha Killings: Deaths of Iraqi Civilians Also Lead to

Dereliction Counts Against 4 Officers," WashingtonPost, 22 December 2006 (http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/1 2/21/AR20061221001 24.html).2. Mark Walker, "Haditha Case Continues to Jnrave1,"North County Times, 28 June 2008 (http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2008/06/28/mi1itary/zcaed43dd200c477388257472005a24b4.txt).

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About the AuthorWilliam Langewiesche is an international correspon-dent for Vanity Fair. He previously worked forAtlantic Monthly. He is the author of severalbooks, including Fly by Wire (2009), The AtomicBazaar (2007), The Outlaw Sea (2004), andAmerican Ground (2002).