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Financial Services
US Mortgage Finance what should the future look like?
authors
James Wiener, Partner
Michael Zeltkevic, Partner
IntroductIon
the cataclysm of 2008-2011 exposed fundamental deficiencies in the uS mortgage finance
system. Economic growth and financial stability require a comprehensive redesign of all
aspects of the financing of single-family home purchases. A new approach should be driven
by a coherent set of policy objectives, including:
• Stability of the overall financial system
• Explicit government support for low to moderate income borrowers
• Privatization of risk taking outside of low to moderate income borrowers
• Enhanced protection for consumers
the new architecture will also need to address the large size of mortgage outstandings relative
to the aggregate banking balance-sheet, changes to the risk profile of mortgages housed in the
regulated financial system, and challenges in the current model for mortgage servicing.
A central element of any redesign will be a re-conception of the role of the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs1) – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. currently, the overwhelming
majority of uS mortgage market originations are funded by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
the FHA/VA. In February of last year, the treasury laid out three options to significantly
reduce the role of government in the mortgage market2 by phasing out Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. the options maintain that the government’s role should be limited to oversight
and consumer protection, targeted assistance for lower-income homeowners and renters,
and support for market stability under severe stress.
the mechanics of the redesigned role are where the three options differ. the treasury’s plan
to phase out the GSEs is meant to encourage more private sector involvement by increasing
guarantee pricing to reflect the same capital standards as private institutions, primarily
banks. this would encourage GSEs to pursue additional credit-loss protection from private
insurers, adjust conforming limits on loan size and minimum down payments, and wind
down investment portfolios. In February, the FHFA (conservator of the GSEs)3 had taken first
steps in this direction through its three-pronged strategic plan: Build – lay the framework for
the secondary market; Contract – reduce the dominance of the GSEs; Maintain – continue
the offering of foreclosure alternatives and fostering credit availability.
In this paper, we examine the options for the future of the GSEs and make recommendations
for the design of a new uS mortgage finance system. these include:
• design of a new risk intermediation structure to provide liquidity and efficiently transfer
risk to the capital markets
• Explicit guidelines for risk taking within the regulated financial system
1 For simplicity, we will use the term “GSEs” to refer exclusively to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.2 department of the treasury and department of Housing and urban development, “reforming America’s Housing Finance Market: A
report to congress” (Feb 2011).3 Federal Housing and Finance Agency (FHFA), “ A Strategic Plan for Enterprise conservatorships: the next chapter in a Story that
needs an Ending” (Feb 2012).
copyright © 2012 oliver Wyman 1
• creation of a centralized registry for all mortgage liens with names of the servicer
• changes to servicer compensation to an activity based model
• Harmonization of regulator and investor servicing guidance and modification programs
• Greater clarity on reps & warrants risk and servicing liabilities
tHE FuturE oF tHE SEcondAry MortGAGE MArkEt: WHAt ArE tHE oPtIonS?
In the current model (Exhibit 1), the GSEs, by standardizing mortgage terms, have created a valuable source of capital markets based funding. In doing so, they transferred interest rate risk from borrowers to investors (one of the under-appreciated aspects of the current GSE model is the efficiency of pricing the 30-year prepayment option to the borrower). As Exhibit 2 illustrates, uS mortgage assets are far too large to be funded on bank balance sheets via deposits. Accordingly, any proposal for the future of mortgage finance needs to maintain a vibrant role for capital markets funding.
ExHIbIt 1: oVErVIEW oF currEnt conForMInG MortGAGE MArkEt ModEl And rolE oF GSES
MORTGAGE BANK
Originator
Primaryservicer
PRIMARY MARKET
SERVICING
SECONDARY MARKET
BORROWER(Potentiallyvia broker)
CORRESPONDENTORIGINATOR
FANNIE OR FREDDIE
Investmentportfolio
Securitizer& guarantor
Agreement to buyloans at specific price
Market trading
ScheduledP&I payments
Sales of MBS withcredit guarantee(e.g. TBA market)
Floor of loans to be aggregated
Warehouseline of credit
Contractual paymentsClaims
Delivery of loan pools(servicing retained)
Masterservicer
Serving standards
Aggregation
Monthly payments
Collections/modifications
A
A
B
C
D
D
Borrowers: Mortgage products with desirable features (long term, protection from inflation, no prepay penalties) through efficient pricing of credit risk and management of prepayment risk
Originators: Standardization of underwriting standards, pipeline hedging, massive driver of added funding
Investors: Protection from credit loss, increased liquidity through TBA market and investment portfolio activities
Servicers/collections: Standardizing of protocols
KEY VALUE-ADDS OF GSES TO MORTGAGE MARKET PARTICIPANTS
MORTGAGEINSURER
(for high LTV)
INVESTOR
BC
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ExHIbIt 2: uS MortGAGE outStAndInGS VErSuS coMMErcIAl bAnk bAlAncE SHEEt coMPonEntS, yEAr-End 20114
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
$ TN
Securities
Cash
Other assets
Loans and leases(approx. 1/3residential
10.2
7.3
2.9
1.3
2.5
$1 TN
Residential mortgagedebt outstanding
11.1
Commercial bankdeposits
Commercial bankassets
In the following subsections, we consider three potential options for restructuring mortgage securitization:
1. Private securitizers, with government playing reinsurer role
2. Industry consortium
3. covered bonds
oPtIon 1: PrIVAtE SEcurItIZErS, WItH ExPlIcIt GoVErnMEnt rEInSurAncE
this is effectively the third of the three options that has been laid out by the treasury5. A small
set of large banks or private insurers could step into the void left by the GSEs and provide
guarantees of timely principal and interest payments on MbS. these private guarantors
would price credit risk and demand risk mitigation mechanisms (e.g. PMI) as they see fit,
and the existence of multiple guarantors would foster competition. However, this structure
involves significant “wrong way risk”. When mortgages go bad, there is a high chance
that financial institutions will also be in trouble, regardless of how high their credit rating.
therefore, ensuring today’s levels of market liquidity would require a government backstop.
the government’s role would be that of a reinsurer of last resort. It would charge a fee for its
role and it would be called upon only once considerable private guarantor capital had already
been consumed. In the rare event of private insurer failure, the government should have some
flexibility to adjust fees as appropriate to offset losses and maintain zero taxpayer loss over
a reasonable time horizon (as the FdIc does). the government’s main role during times of
calm would be the oversight of private mortgage guarantors and underwriting standards and
4 Federal reserve statistical release on Mortgage debt outstanding and FdIc Statistics on depository Institutions (all insured commercial and savings banks). residential mortgage includes both single-and multi-family loans.
5 department of the treasury and department of Housing and urban development, “reforming America’s Housing Finance Market: A report to congress” (Feb 2011).
copyright © 2012 oliver Wyman 3
reasonable pricing of reinsurance. the last of these is important in order to prevent guarantors
from using the system and taking excessive risks because reinsurance is underpriced.
IMPlIcAtIonS oF tHIS oPtIon:
borrowing costs are likely to increase somewhat once the GSEs’ ability to leverage without
paying a risk-premium is reduced. However, the approach should maintain a high level of
investor demand for mortgages to help mitigate increases in borrowing costs and allow for the
origination of mortgages which banks may not want to hold on balance sheets en masse (e.g.
prepayable 30-year FrM).
this approach would require strong regulation; without it, the following could result:
• Increased fragmentation and different rules by guarantor, which is detrimental to
investor transparency. (there needs to be a de facto setter of underwriting and
servicing standards)
• bias towards larger institutions – as smaller lenders and community banks could face
unfavorable pricing from private guarantors due to lower volumes
As noted by the treasury, an added benefit is that the government reinsurer’s broad
presence in the market would allow it to more effectively provide additional support during
times of severe market stress.
We should also note that this option would not require massive changes in the way the
industry operates. Much of today’s existing operational and business mechanics could be
preserved under this option.
oPtIon 2: InduStry conSortIuM
the government could remove itself from the conforming space by mandating that a private
consortium of banks and mortgage companies (and potentially even investors) pool assets
to provide the credit guarantees on low-risk loans, similar to the Freddie Mac structure
pre-1990s when it was owned by the FHlb system. Mortgage market participants sharing
credit risk may drive prudent behavior, resulting in a guarantor entity that is safer than any
individual institution from an investor’s perspective.
the detailed mechanics of this consortium must be structured to incentivize owners to
maintain the guarantor function as a low-risk, efficient service provider rather than simply a
provider of profit. to prevent riskier lenders from arbitraging the system, each lender’s costs
would likely be tied to the performance of their own loans. over time, guarantee fees charged
could be adjusted as needed to maintain an appropriate capital base.
AdVAntAGES rElAtIVE to oPtIon 1: • better inclusion of smaller institutions
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• May help promote better risk-taking
• Greater consistency could be achieved across the industry as the consortium will be able
to set industry-wide standards (with regulatory oversight)
IMPlIcAtIonS oF tHIS oPtIon:
As noted in the treasury report, a downside of such an approach is that it may be difficult
for the government to step in if needed as a final support mechanism in a severe crisis.
borrowing costs would go up in general, and possibly more than in option 1 depending
on whether the market buys into the solidity of the consortium entity. Again, the approach
would help maintain a high level of investor demand to allow for mortgages, such as 30-year
FrMs, which banks may not want to hold on their balance sheets.
option II would also not represent a dramatic departure from the operational infrastructure
of the industry.
oPtIon 3: coVErEd bondS
the covered bond structure for future securitizations could be combined in the two options
presented above, but given that this concept has been raised as a possibility by a number of
market observers since the crisis, we want to address it separately.
the covered bond has been a popular financing tool in Europe for a long time but has not
made much headway in the uS. covered bonds are corporate debt securities secured by
a pool of assets (in this case mortgages) on the issuer’s balance sheet. the investor has
recourse to both the pool and the issuer. this provides the issuer lower cost funding than
unsecured corporate debt (these bonds are usually rated triple-A) and provides investors
with a way to make slightly higher yields relative to similarly-rated securities. the assets in
the cover pool are subjected to monthly monitoring and, should one of the loans become
nonperforming, the issuer is obliged to remove it and replace it with a performing loan.
usually there will be overcollateralization – that is, more mortgage collateral than the
bond’s notional value – as an added measure of protection for investors. bond payments
generally come from the issuer’s cash flows and in the event of a default by the issuer, the
cover pool of assets is segregated and used to pay principal and interest payments on the
associated bond.
this product has been noted as an interesting alternative structure to the current securitization
model. It does not involve the sale or resale of loans, offers fixed terms desirable by investors,
and incentivizes good underwriting. of course, the success of the product for an issuer
depends on the institution’s ability to evaluate and price the credit risk of the pool.
While the covered bond framework works in some markets, uS issuances have been severely
limited6, mainly due to lack of clarity and agreement on how the bonds behave in the case
6 two recent uS issuances have occurred: one by Washington Mutual in 2006 and one by bank of America in 2007.
copyright © 2012 oliver Wyman 5
of bankruptcy. In the event of a bank failure, assets pledged to a covered bond including
overcollateralization cannot be used to make depositors whole, which presents a risk to the
FdIc. Given the dearth of other alternative investments, several foreign mortgage players
have taken advantage and issued dollar-denominated covered bonds, in particular to uS
institutional investors. the uS congress is working toward enacting legal rules to allow for
covered bonds to be viable for uS issuers7.
If legal details are resolved in the uS to make covered bonds a viable alternative to
securitization structures, the investor demand means it could work for certain segments,
such as jumbos. However, there are considerations which will hinder its usefulness in
the “mainstream” conventional space. Although lower in risk, covered bonds present a
more complex risk for investors to understand and analyze. residential Mortgage-backed
Security (rMbS) analysis was complicated enough, but for covered bonds hybrid corporate
and mortgage risks need to be understood to assess potential losses. Given the focus on
investor transparency, this could be an obstacle and it may hinder smaller investors from
entering the market.
With this option, the system-wide cost of credit risk will increase due to covered bonds
being on banks’ balance sheets, unless leverage limits are changed, which will lead to higher
borrowing costs. Given the sheer magnitude of the uS mortgage market, moving any sizable
portion to the balance sheet would effectively be contradicting the push against “too big to
fail” institutions. Since the end of 2010, only 25% of the over $11 bn of uS single and multi-
family mortgage debt outstanding was on commercial and savings bank balance sheets8.
In addition, option III would represent the greatest departure from today’s operational
state. Much of the existing capital markets and funding infrastructure would have to be
fundamentally re-thought and re-built; this would be no small undertaking.
ProPoSEd APProAcH
We believe that the option I has the most promise for maintaining efficient access to capital
markets-based funding and effective risk aggregation and intermediation. In this model,
we expect the existing GSEs to continue to function but to rely on private sector capital and
insurance and the government reinsurance on explicit rather than implicit terms. We believe
that this model is the best way to leverage the advantages of the current system where
standardization, risk transparency, and government ownership of the tail risk allows a highly
liquid and efficient market for mortgage securities.
7 See House of representatives bill H. r. 940 (March 8, 2011).8 Federal reserve board statistical release: Mortgage debt outstanding (release date: March 2011).
copyright © 2012 oliver Wyman 6
MAnAGInG rISk In tHE SyStEM: GuIdElInES For rEGulAtEd FInAncIAl InStItutIonS
Addressing the secondary market alone will be insufficient. the origins of the financial crisis lay in the collapse of the uS single family home prices and the associated mortgage and real estate derivatives defaults. one empirical fact from the crisis is that different segments of mortgage credit experienced widely varying performance. At a high level, the most predictive factor was mark-to-market ltV (MltV), the origination ltV adjusted for current changes in the home price since origination. All other factors being equal, mortgages with MltV < 90 experienced a low level of credit losses through the crisis. Mortgages whose MltV increased to between 95 and 100 experienced rapidly escalating losses and mortgages with MltV in excess of 100 experienced inordinately high credit losses. A similar pattern can be observed by looking at credit performance by consumer behavior score.
In addition, other aspects of risk layering such as negative amortization products, low or no documentation of income and assets, and payment options dramatically worsened credit performance.
our recommendation is that guidelines be established for the risk profile of single family first mortgage loans originated and/or held within the regulated financial system. our recommended starting point would be:
• Full documentation of income and assets
• origination ltV < 90
• FIco > 680
• dtI < 40
loans outside of these risk parameters should be originated either via FHA programs to support low to moderate income borrowers or by non-bank financials to finance subprime borrowers.
oVErHAul oF SErVIcInG: cHAnGInG tHE StructurE And AlIGnInG IncEntIVES
A striking aspect of the crisis is that it is repeating itself the first time as tragedy and the second time as servicing. the immense volume of seriously delinquent 1st mortgages (through the crisis over 5 MM loans have been seriously delinquent) that require time and resource intensive actions has overwhelmed the system. Added to the sheer volume are a long list of new mortgage foreclosure alternatives that need be implemented and a high level of legal and regulatory scrutiny with respect to the integrity of the foreclosure process. the servicing crisis has highlighted a number of issues:
• legal uncertainty if using the Mortgage Electronic registration System (MErS) to stand in the place of debenture holders in foreclosure proceedings
• Quality control around all aspects of the foreclosure process
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• capacity and flexibility to implement new modification programs and
foreclosure alternatives
• lack of clarity around allocation of responsibility in rep and warranty agreements
• Severe misalignment of servicer, investor, regulatory, and policy maker incentives in the
default servicing process
these issues are leading to negative consequences for the housing recovery. uncertainty
with respect to these large potential costs and liabilities has led originators to exceptionally
conservative underwriting standards (most tellingly tighter standards for GSE products
than GSE requirements where they bear no credit risk but retain the servicing) and extreme
caution in implementing new public policy initiative where they might waive their rights
or incur new liabilities with respect to these issues. At a more strategic level, most large
mortgage players are planning to downsize their commitment to the business.
A contributing factor to these issues has been the structure of servicer compensation.
Servicers are compensated by receiving an interest only strip of cashflows equal to 25 bps
of unpaid balance (uPb). Servicers have service level agreements with investors but the
compensation structure still incents them to limit investment in infrastructure. In addition,
the servicing strip is highly volatile and must be capitalized on their balance sheet. It creates
significant risk management challenges for the servicer.
We believe that a number of changes to the structure and compensation of servicing are
necessary to restore the economic viability of mortgage businesses.
• crEAtIon oF A cEntrAl rEPoSItory oF MortGAGE lIEn And tItlE InForMAtIon:
this will facilitate greater transparency and efficiency throughout the default servicing
process and potentially facilitate the replacement of MErS in the foreclosure process with
the actual debenture holder. It will also allow first lien holders to force restructuring of
second liens (when they exist) before impairing first liens
• StrEAMlInInG ForEcloSurE AltErnAtIVES: Agreement on a small standard set of
modifications and foreclosure alternatives along with government incentive payments to
allow servicers to optimize the efficiency and quality of these programs
• AlIGnInG IncEntIVES: change the structure of servicing compensation to 12.5bps of
uPb and a series of activity based payments. this will greatly reduce the financial risk in
the servicing asset, keep investor and servicer incentives aligned, and create incentives to
invest in complex and resource intensive default servicing activities
• clArIFyInG rEPS And WArrAntS: Standardizing representations and warranty
contracts to clarify legal treatment and ensure comparability of loans with the same/
similar characteristics. this would significantly reduce the occurrence of loan buyback
disputes (as are being observed in this crisis)
restoring the health of the uS mortgage market will require changes across the board from
origination to securitization to servicing over the life of the loan. both the public and private
sector will need to be involved in moving the agenda forward.
copyright © 2012 oliver Wyman 8
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About tHE AutHorS
James Wiener is a Partner and Head of the Americas Public Policy Practice
Michael Zeltkevic is a Partner and Head of the Americas retail & business banking Practice