LCDR  Wade  W.  Gough  USCG  Sector  Puget  Sound  (srm)  

Chief,  Incident  Management  Division  

Purpose  

•  To  idenCfy  improvements  for  a  coordinated  response  involving  hazardous  substances  using  local  case  studies  and  focusing  within  the  State  of  Washington.    

Why?    The  Cost  is  too  high  for  mistakes.  

“Experience  is  simply  the  name  we  give  our  mistakes”    -­‐  Oscar  Wilde  

Vision  

•  To  prepare  in  order  to  miCgate  impacts  of  a  potenCal  disaster  to  maximize  resiliency  in  keeping  with  the  goal  of  the  2010  DraO  NaConal  Disaster  Recovery  Framework  that  states:  “successful  recovery  depends  on  all  stakeholders  and  every  level  of  government  being  prepared  to  work  collaboraCvely  and  effecCvely  prior  to  and  aOer  a  disaster.”  (p.  15).    

AssumpCons  

•  Radiological  incident  does  NOT  involve  U.S.  DOE  or  DoD  facility  

•  Response  does  not  focus  on  the  medical  &  public  health  factors  (e.g.,  medical  a[enCon/triage)  of  a  Nuk/Rad  Incident  

Oil  Spills  vs.  HAZMAT/HAZSUB  Incidents  

Oil  Spill     Radiological/Nuclear  Incident  

Sharing  InformaCon   Open  disseminaCon   Limited  DistribuCon?  

Common  OperaCng    Pic   Numerous  opCons   Limited  –  HSIN?  Fusion  Center?  

NaConal  Security  Interests   None  to  low   Medium  to  High  (unCl  cause  determined)  

Command  Post   Fully  staffed   May  not  exist  locally  

Support  Staff       Large  Planning  SecCon   OperaCons  SecCon  only?  

Equipment  Technology   Low   High  

Level  of  local  involvement   High   Low  (depends  of  technical  capabiliCes  of  locaCon)  

Use  of  Volunteers   Yes   No  

DuraCon  of  Response   Short  (relaCvely)   Can  be  prolonged  

Visible   Yes   No  (radiaCon)  

Funding  (Federal)   OSLTF   CERCLA  

Media  /  Public  Interest   Moderate  –High   High  -­‐  panic  

Responding  to  Radiological  /  HAZMAT  Incidents  

• What makes Radiological/Nuclear Response Different ?

• Maritime / Terrestrial / Rail HAZMAT Incidents – are there inherent differences in how we respond to these categories of incidents?

• What are the primary resources for policy / guidance for responding to a HAZSUB incident?

Case  Study  #1  

MariCme  Incident  

M/V  MCP  ALTONA  Uranium  Ore    PotenCal  Incident  

After leaving Vancouver, BC on 23 Dec for Zhanjiang, China, the M/V MCP ALTONA encountered heavy seas causing below deck containers with drums to shift and release a low level radiation material. The ship’s hold remains covered, watertight, and there is no damage to the ship.

•  Lead is Canadian Gov’t: (Transport Canada, Canadian CG, etc)

•  USCG Key Actions:   Validate status of cargo   Monitor transit via JHOC/VTS   Work with Transport Canada Marine Safety on

inspection requirements   Evaluate need for tug escort   Cutter shadow & aircraft flyover (pictures) •  U.S. Government Coordination:   USCG Sector Puget Sound lead   Trustees: EPA, Dept of Interior, & NOAA

  Support: U.S. Dept. of Energy   State OSC Co-Lead: WA Dept of Ecology & Dept of

Health

U/W 05 JAN 2011

Authority  to  Respond  

•  NRF  -­‐>  NUK/Rad  Incident  Annex  -­‐>  – CERCLA  :  gives  Fed  Gov’t  authority  to  compel  RPs  to  respond  to  releases  of  hazardous  substances.  

– NCP:    Mechanism  of  implementaCon  of  CERCLA  authority  (uses  OCSs)  

– Title  50,  USC,  War  &  NaConal  Defense:  Military  Commander  can  establish  “NaConal  Defense  Area”  around  incident  to  protect  nuclear  weapons  &  materials  in  DOD  custody  

Ch  7000  Contents    

•  AuthoriCes  •  DefiniCons  •  OrganizaCon  (refers  to  CG  IMH)  

•  NoCficaCons  •  References  some  resources  

USCG  Internal  AcCons  (QRC)  

•  Level  2  (Know  the  rad  source)  •  PotenCal  for  “possible”  terrorist  or  threatening  intent  at  any  Cme  during  boarding  – Fed  LE  &  DADSAFE  (naConal  noCficaCon  alert)  – AcCvates  naConal  policy  guidance  &  need  for  informaCon  sharing  

•  IdenCfied  Most  Likely  Port  (Port  Angeles)  –  allowed  for  County  coordinaCon/  planning  

USCG  Lessons  Learned  

•  1°  Response  Partner/SOSC:  WA  Dept  of  Health,  not  WA  DOE  (note  1)  

•  Immediate  availability  of  U.S.  DOE  RAP  Team  8    

•  InformaCon  sharing  was  problemaCc  –  InformaCon  control  

– Timely  sharing  among  key  partners  

Note 1: USCG Sector liaised frequently w/ WA DOE and kept abreast of information but WA DOH staffed command post and served key role in Fed decision making processes.

Case  Study  #2  

Railway  Incident  

BNSF  Derailment  

KFI

KFI

KFI

WRS

CW

CW

CW

CW

CW

CW

CENTRAL WASHINGTON

PORTLAND VANCOUVER JUNCTION RR.KETTLE FALLS INTERNATIONAL

WESTERN RAIL SWITCHING

PVJR

WIR

EWG

* WASHINGTON & IDAHO RR.

* EASTERN WASHINGTON GATEWAY

* ROYAL SLOPE RR. * STATE OWNED RAIL LINE

PVJR

EWGEWG

WIR

WIR

CW

WRS

KFI

Coast  Guard   BNSF  Railway  

Typing  Incidents   Type  1  =  Most  Complex   Level  1  =  Least  Complex  

Number  of  ClassificaCons  to  measure  scale  of  emergency  response    

5  (1  =  worst/  5  =  single  unit  response)  

3  (Level  3  involves  mulCple  agencies,  sustained  evacuaCons)  

Response  Contractors/  Support  

OSROs/  BOAs   Organic?  

Primary  response  interacCon  

Other  federal  &  state  agencies,  contractors,  local  gov’t  

Internal  support  &  fire  chief  on  scene  as  applicable  

LocaCon  of  C2  Center   Sea[le  ,  WA   Forth  Worth,  TX  

Regulatory  Oversight   U.S.  DHS   U.S.  DOT  

ICS  Capability   Full  ICS  Staffing   OperaCons  SecCon/Technical  

NaConal  CoordinaCon  Center  for  Crises  

NaConal  OperaCons  Center  (NOC),  Wash,  DC  

Network  OperaCons  Center  (NOC),  Fort  Worth,  TX  

Comparing  USCG  to  Railway*  

*Comparison based from USCG Sector Puget Sound focusing on Washington State only and comparing solely to BNSF Railway.

Complexity  of  Rail  Incident  

USCG  Lessons  Learned  

•  SOSC  was  WA  Dept  of  Ecology  but  not  o/s  enCre  Cme  

•  Site  access  can  be  difficult  

•  RR  reported  full  use  of  NIMS  ICS  but  in  reality  were  not  familiar  /clarity  of  roles  &  compeCng  prioriCes    

•  InformaCon  sharing  was  problemaCc  – Be[er  scene  /  site  info  disseminaCon  could  have  reduced  footprint  onsite      

Case  Study  #3  

Fixed  Terrestrial  Site  

Challenges  to  Response  Mgt    

•  Technical  response  -­‐>  Assignment  of  Personnel  •  Use  of  NIMS  ICS  during  slow  response  –  hard  to  implement  

•  LocaCon  of  Command  Team  –  Onsite  or  connected  via  C.O.P.  medium?  

•  Technical  Skills  Required  of  Oversight  Tms  –  use  responders  or  acCvate  technical  support  (e.g.,  Pacific  Strike  Team)  

Your  Turn  

•  Explain  how  your  local  jurisdicCon,  unit,  or  organizaCon  aligns  w/  a  major  Railway  during  a  specific  hazardous  substance  incident?    Do  you  train  with  them  rouCnely?  

•  InformaCon  sharing:  how  can  we  meet  the  needs  of  agency,  internaConal,  &  local  partners  need  to  know  while  sCll  controlling  with  whom  we  share?  

“It’s  not  what  you  look  at  that  ma[ers,  it’s  what  you  see”    

–  Henry  David  Thoreau