Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, 22 February 2008G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner,vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.D E C I S I O NREYES, R.T., J.:THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has aprospective, not retroactive, effect.1However, penal laws that favor a guilty person,who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-aThese are the rule,the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusang bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal nakriminal.We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on certiorari ofthe decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegalpossession of a firearm.The FactsOn July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the CriminalInvestigation Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order2from the desk officer.3The order directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve awarrant of arrest4issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C.Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with ransom.5After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checkinghis hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.6Eventually, the team proceeded to theIntegrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where theysaw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.7SPO2 Disuanco and his teamapproached petitioner.8They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutionalrights, and bodily searched him.9Found tucked in his waist10was a Charter Arms,bearing Serial Number 5231511with five (5) live ammunition.12Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.13A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at CampCrame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul PalenciaSalvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.14Epifanio Deriquito, the records verifier, presented acertification15to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief records officer of theFirearms and Explosive Division.16Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition underPresidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,17as amended.petitioner pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996.19Trial on the meritsensued.Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house ofhis children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.20He wasroused from his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted theroom.21They trained their guns at him22and pulled him out of the room. They then tiedhis hands and placed him near the faucet.23The raiding team went back inside andsearched and ransacked the room.24SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him.25Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuhaakong baril sa loob!"26Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we are authorized to shoot you becausetheres a shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning do so something, do itright now."27He was also told that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.28However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for it.29Neither was the raidinggroup armed with a valid search warrant.30According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gunseized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was,however, unable to present the documentation relative to the firearm because it wasconfiscated by the police.SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner aMemorandum Receipt dated July 1, 199333covering the subject firearm and itsammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3Timbol identified his signature34on the said receipt.35RTC and CA DispositionsOn May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as chargedPetitioner moved to reconsider47but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.48Heappealed to the CA.On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition.The fallo of the CA decision reads:Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decisionappealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.SO ORDERED.49His motion for reconsideration50having been denied through a Resolution datedAugust 3, 2004,51petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.IssuesOur Ruling.The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through thetestimony of SPO2 Disuanco.54Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.55Itsexistence was likewise admitted by no less than petitioner himself.56As for petitioners lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that averification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with theFirearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the seized pistol wasnot issued to petitioner.Penal and civil liabilitiesPetitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitionunder the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that"[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shallbe imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool orinstrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm orammunition."P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed theoffense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6,1997,81during the pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states:SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession ofFirearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in theManufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of prision correccional in itsmaximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall beimposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and otherfirearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool orinstrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm orammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring supplied)As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest theyacquire the character of an ex post facto law.82An exception to this rule, however,is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief JusticeAraullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles onwhich the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based,and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rulefounded on principles of strict justice."83Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same isstill advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered toprision correccional in its maximum period84from reclusion temporal in its maximumperiod to reclusion perpetua85under P.D. No. 1866.Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum whichranges from (4) years, (2) months and (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penaltyand will form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum termshall be one degree lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period ( [2]years, [4] months and [1] day to [4] years and [2] months).86Hence, the penaltyimposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccionalmaximum, as maximum term,WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 isAFFIRMED in full.SO ORDERED.PNBv.OfficeofthePresident,G.R.No.104528,18January1996PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORYBOARD, ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P. REYES, JORGEC. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA,FLORENCIA CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTOSANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON,NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO, FELICIDAD GARCIA,ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL, represented bytheir duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND SPOUSESLEOPOLDO AND CARMEN SEBASTIAN, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers oninstallment of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots whichthey previously bought from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on thetheory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree",is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been executedprior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is the question confronting the Court in thisPetition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992 of the Office of the Presidentof the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive Secretary, FranklinM. Drilon, "by authority of the President."Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from MarikinaVillage, Inc. (represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstandingthe land purchase agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developermortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of thismortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers andconstructed their houses on the lots in question.Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on themortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), theHLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decisionrendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB - without prejudice to seeking reliefagainst Marikina Village, Inc. - may collect from private respondents only the"remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they hadpreviously entered into with" Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel privaterespondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from saidsubdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boardaffirmed this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D.957, likewise concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or finalorders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . ."However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submittedfor decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the saidCircular in the interest of speedy justice.Petitioner bank raised the following issues:1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law wasenacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed onDecember 18, 1975; and2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents andmortgagor-subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in orderingpetitioner Bank to accept private respondents' remaining amortizations and issue thecorresponding titles after payment thereof.Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "(l)aws shall have no retroactiveeffect, unless the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable thatP.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one atissue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured inthe preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protectinginnocent purchasers is to be achieve:WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling andfraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominiumsellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free fromliens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the samesubdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;1(Emphasis supplied).While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the samecan be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lotbuyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers andthe gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that thelaw - as an instrument of social justice - must favors the weak. Indeed, the petitionerBank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loanactivities, and therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence"checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular inspection or other modes ofinvestigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of the propertyoffered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built onby small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerlessto discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold tothem. It was precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 wasenacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle overhelpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers."The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstancesand condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-knowntreatise on Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case ofconsequence, Ongsiako vs. Gamboa2), says:The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to thepurpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. Theintention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforcedwhen ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent andpurpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose ofthe act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construingstatutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature andto adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullestmanner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.3Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictlyprospective application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years throughblood and tears would be deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As theSolicitor General, in his comment, argues:Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract,the vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivisionsellers will be translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the ironhand of the State cannot particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with thefortunate accident of having been constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957.Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force andeffect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the firstinstance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot beapplied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent could not haveconceivably permitted a loophole which all along works to the prejudice of subdivisionlot buyers (private respondents).4Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitutestrong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole. These areSections 20, 2l and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect andwill impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957'senactment:Sec. 20. Time of Completion. - Every owner or developer or shall construct and providethe facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, includingwater supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approvedsubdivision or condominiun plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or inany form of advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the licensefor the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may befixed by the Authority.Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. - In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units soldor disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon theowner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliancewith his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years fromthe date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless anadequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof.Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and thepreceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 ofthis Decree.Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. - No installment payment made by a buyer in asubdivision or condominium project for, the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall beforfeited in favor, of the owner or developer when the buyer, after, due notice to theowner or developer, desist from further payment due to the failure of the owner ordeveloper to develop the subdivision or condominium project according to theapproved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same. Such buyermay, at this option, be reimbursed the total amount paid including amortizationinterests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the legal rate.(emphasis supplied)As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find thefollowing statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case atbench:Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may belegally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is aproper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract.Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation ofthe police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter, affecting the publicwelfare. Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is itssusceptibility to change by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.5This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez vs. Court of Appeals6:The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate theimpairment clause. The argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now nolonger inviolate; in fact, there are many who now believe it, is an anachronism in thepresent-day society. It was quite useful before in protecting the integrity of privateagreements from government meddling, but that was when such agreements did notaffect the community in general. They were indeed purely private agreements then.Any interference with them at that time was really an unwarranted intrusion that couldproperly struck down.But things are different now. More and more, the interests of the public have becomeinvolved in what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have, as a resultbeen removed from the protection of the impairment clause. These agreements havecome within the embrace of the police power, that obtrusive protector of the publicinterest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed. As long as the contract affects the publicwelfare one way or another so as to require the interference of the State, then must thepolice power be asserted, and prevail, over the clause.The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor vs. Lao, et al.7penned bythen Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member ofthis Court, is persuasive, the factual circumstances therein being of great similarity tothe antecedent facts of the case at bench:Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchaseon installment a tiny home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of everyFilipino is to be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build ahouse. It has, however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals aretaken advantage of, with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities,including the most essential such as water installations not completed, or worse yet, asin the instant case, after almost completing the payments for the property and afterconstructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted by the stark reality, contrived orotherwise, in which another person would now appear to be owner.xxx xxx xxxWe cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue thatsimply because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance orlien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step to verify the over-reachingimplications should the subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could nothave closed its eyes that it was dealing over a subdivision where there were alreadyhouses constructed. Did it not enter the mind of the responsible officers of the BANKthat there may even be subdivision residents who have almost completed theirinstallment payments? (id., pp. 7 & 9).By the foregoing citation, this Court, thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part ofthis Decision.The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 andoutside the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appealswhich found in favor of subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed withthe mortgagee bank's right to foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that caseupheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void.As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions ofArticle 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land purchaseagreement," cannot be made to take the developer's place.We disagree, P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bankto accept the payment of the remaining unpaid amortizations tendered by privaterespondents.Sec. 18. Mortgages. - No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner ordeveloper without prior written approval of the Authority, Such approval shall not begranted unless it is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for thedevelopment of the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures havebeen provided to ensure such utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered bythe mortgage shall be determined and the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified beforethe release of the loan. The buyer may, at his option, pay his installment for the lot orunit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the payments to the correspondingmortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for, with a viewto enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full paymentthereof. (emphasis supplied)Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grantsto the buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to themortgagee (petitioner), which is required to apply such payments to reduce thecorresponding portion of the mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot orunit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is without prejudice to petitioner Bank'sseeking relief against the subdivision developer.Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only onthe strictly legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the largerissues including social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in theConstitution; firstly, because legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum butwithin the context of existing social, economic and political conditions, law beingmerely a brick in the up- building of the social edifice; and secondly, petitioner, beingTHE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an instrument for the implementation ofstate policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These consideration are obviouslyfar more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the acquisition of anyspecific property. Thus, as the country strives to move ahead towards economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of "NIC-hood" and social well-being for the majorityof our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country,which has in recent years made record earnings and acquired an enviable internationalstature, with branches and subsidiaries in key financial centers around the world,should be equally as happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents,who were almost deprived and dispossessed of their very homes purchased throughtheir hard work and with their meager savings.WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is herebyDENIED, petitioner having failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR orGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed decision. No costs.SO ORDERED.ABS-CBN v. CTA, G.R. No. L-52306, 12 October 1981G.R. No. L-52306 October 12, 1981ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNALREVENUE, respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of TaxAppeals in C.T.A. Case No. 2809, dated November 29, 1979, which affirmedthe assessment by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, dated April 16,1971, of a deficiency withholding income tax against petitioner, ABS-CBNBroadcasting Corporation, for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 in therespective amounts of P75,895.24, P99,239.18, P128,502.00 and P222,260.64, or a total of P525,897.06.During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner corporation was engaged inthe business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreigncorporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. for whichpetitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the filmrentals.In so far as the income tax on non-resident corporations is concerned, section24 (b) of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No.2343 dated June 20, 1959, used to provide:(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations.There shallbe levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposedby the preceding paragraph, upon the amount received by every foreigncorporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from ansources within the Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages,premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or otherfixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income, a taxequal to thirty per centum of such amount. (Emphasis supplied)On April 12, 1961, in implementation of the aforequoted provision, theCommissioner of Internal Revenue issued General Circular No. V-334 readingthus:In connection with Section 24 (b) of Tax Code, the amendment introduced byRepublic Act No. 2343, under which an income tax equal to 30% is levied uponthe amount received by every foreign corporation not engaged in trade orbusiness within the Philippines from all sources within this country as interest,dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations,remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodicalgains, profits, and income, it has been determined that the tax is still imposedon income derived from capital, or labor, or both combined, in accordance withthe basic principle of income taxation (Sec. 39, Income Tax Regulations), andthat a mere return of capital or investment is not income (Par. 5,06, 1 MertensLaw of Federal Taxation). Since according to the findings of the Special Teamwho inquired into business of the non-resident foreign film distributors, thedistribution or exhibition right on a film is invariably acquired for aconsideration, either for a lump sum or a percentage of the film rentals,whether from a parent company or an independent outside producer, apart ofthe receipts of a non-resident foreign film distributor derived from said filmrepresents, therefore, a return of investment.xxx xxx xxx4. The local distributor should withhold 30% of one-half of the film rentals paidto the non-resident foreign film distributor and pay the same to this office inaccordance with law unless the non- resident foreign film distributor makes aprior settlement of its income tax liability. (Emphasis ours).Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner dutifully withheld and turned over to theBureau of Internal Revenue the amount of 30% of one-half of the film rentalspaid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within thePhilippines. The last year that petitioner withheld taxes pursuant to theforegoing Circular was in 1968.On June 27, 1968, Republic Act No. 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the TaxCode increasing the tax rate from 30 % to 35 % and revising the tax basis from"such amount" referring to rents, etc. to "gross income," as follows:(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations.A foreigncorporation not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines including aforeign life insurance company not engaged in the life insurance business inthe Philippines shall pay a tax equal to thirty-five per cent of the gross incomereceived during each taxable year from all sources within the Philippines, asinterests, dividends, rents, royalties, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,compensations, remunerations for technical services or otherwise, emolumentsor other fixed or determinable annual, periodical or casual gains, profits, andincome, and capital gains, Provided however, That premiums shah not includereinsurance premiums. (Emphasis supplied)On February 8, 1971, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued RevenueMemorandum Circular No. 4-71, revoking General Circular No. V-334, andholding that the latter was "erroneous for lack of legal basis," because "the taxtherein prescribed should be based on gross income without deductionwhatever," thus:After a restudy and analysis of Section 24 (b) of the National Internal RevenueCode, as amended by Republic Act No. 5431, and guided by the interpretationgiven by tax authorities to a similar provision in the Internal Revenue Code ofthe United States, on which the aforementioned provision of our Tax Code waspatterned, this Office has come to the conclusion that the tax therein prescribedshould be based on gross income without t deduction whatever. Consequently,the ruling in General Circular No. V-334, dated April 12, 1961, allowing thededuction of the proportionate cost of production or exhibition of motion picturefilms from the rental income of non- resident foreign corporations, is erroneousfor lack of legal basis.In view thereof, General Circular No. V-334, dated April 12, 1961, is herebyrevoked and henceforth, local films distributors and exhibitors shall deduct andwithhold 35% of the entire amount payable by them to non-resident foreigncorporations, as film rental or royalty, or whatever such payment may bedenominated, without any deduction whatever, pursuant to Section 24 (b), andpay the withheld taxes in accordance with Section 54 of the Tax Code, asamended.All rulings inconsistent with this Circular is likewise revoked. (Emphasis ours)On the basis of this new Circular, respondent Commissioner of InternalRevenue issued against petitioner a letter of assessment and demand datedApril 15, 1971, but allegedly released by it and received by petitioner on April12, 1971, requiring them to pay deficiency withholding income tax on theremitted film rentals for the years 1965 through 1968 and film royalty as of theend of 1968 in the total amount of P525,897.06 computed as follows:1965Total amount remitted P 511,059.48Withholding tax due thereon 153,318.00Less: Amount already assessed 89,000.00Balance P64,318.00Add: 1/2% mo. int. fr. 4-16-66 to 4-16-69 11,577.24Total amount due & collectible P 75,895.241966Total amount remitted P373,492.24Withholding tax due thereon 112,048.00Less: Amount already assessed 27,947.00Balance 84,101.00Add: 11/2%mo. int. fr. 4-16-67 to 4-116-70 15,138.18Total amount due & collectible P99,239.181967Total amount remitted P601,160.65Withholding tax due thereon 180,348.00Less: Amount already assessed 71,448.00Balance 108,900.00Add: 1/2% mo. int. fr. 4-16-68 to 4-16-71 19,602.00Total amount due & collectible P128,502.001968Total amount remitted P881,816.92Withholding tax due thereon 291,283.00Less: Amount already assessed 92,886.00Balance P198,447.00Add: 1/2% mo. int. fr. 4-16-69 to 4-29-71 23,813.64Total amount due & collectibleP222,260.441On May 5, 1971, petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal ofthe assessment. However, without acting thereon, respondent, on April 6,1976, issued a warrant of distraint and levy over petitioners personal as well asreal properties. The petitioner then filed its Petition for Review with the Court ofTax Appeals whose Decision, dated November 29, 1979, is, in turn, the subjectof this review. The Tax Court held:For the reasons given, the Court finds the assessment issued by respondenton April 16, 1971 against petitioner in the amounts of P75,895.24, P 99,239.18,P128,502.00 and P222,260.64 or a total of P525,897.06 as deficiencywithholding income tax for the years 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968, respectively,in accordance with law. As prayed for, the petition for review filed in this case isdismissed, and petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation is herebyordered to pay the sum of P525,897.06 to respondent Commissioner of InternalRevenue as deficiency withholding income tax for the taxable years 1965 thru1968, plus the surcharge and interest which have accrued thereon incident todelinquency pursuant to Section 51 (e) of the National Internal Revenue Code,as amended.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed at petitionerscost.SO ORDERED.2The issues raised are two-fold:I. Whether or not respondent can apply General Circular No. 4-71 retroactively and issue a deficiencyassessment against petitioner in the amount of P 525,897.06 as deficiency withholding income tax for theyears 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968.II. Whether or not the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess the deficiency withholdingincome tax for the year 196,5 has prescribed.3Upon the facts and circumstances of the case, review is warranted.In point is Sec. 338-A (now Sec. 327) of the Tax Code. As inserted by Republic Act No. 6110 on August9, 1969, it provides:Sec. 338-A. Non-retroactivity of rulings. Any revocation, modification, or reversal of and of the rulesand regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circularspromulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall not be given retroactive application if therelocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, except in the following cases: (a)where the taxpayer deliberately mis-states or omits material facts from his return or any documentrequired of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue: (b) where the facts subsequently gathered by theBureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based; or (c)where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. (italics for emphasis)It is clear from the foregoing that rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of InternalRevenue have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Theprejudice to petitioner of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question.It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes underGeneral Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholdingincome tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. Petitioner wasno longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted allfilm rentals and no longer had any control over them when the new Circular was issued. And in so far asthe enumerated exceptions are concerned, admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any of them.Respondent claims, however, that the provision on non-retroactivity is inapplicable in the present case inthat General Circular No. V-334 is a nullity because in effect, it changed the law on the matter. The Courtof Tax Appeals sustained this position holding that: "Deductions are wholly and exclusively within thepower of Congress or the law-making body to grant, condition or deny; and where the statute imposes atax equal to a specified rate or percentage of the gross or entire amount received by the taxpayer, theauthority of some administrative officials to modify or change, much less reduce, the basis or measure ofthe tax should not be read into law."4Therefore, the Tax Court concluded, petitioner did not acquire anyvested right thereunder as the same was a nullity.The rationale behind General Circular No. V-334 was clearly stated therein, however: "It ha(d) beendetermined that the tax is still imposed on income derived from capital, or labor, or both combined, inaccordance with the basic principle of income taxation ...and that a mere return of capital or investment isnot income ... ." "A part of the receipts of a non-resident foreign film distributor derived from said filmrepresents, therefore, a return of investment." The Circular thus fixed the return of capital at 50% tosimplify the administrative chore of determining the portion of the rentals covering the return of capital."5Were the "gross income" base clear from Sec. 24 (b), perhaps, the ratiocination of the Tax Court could beupheld. It should be noted, however, that said Section was not too plain and simple to understand. Thefact that the issuance of the General Circular in question was rendered necessary leads to no otherconclusion than that it was not easy of comprehension and could be subjected to different interpretations.In fact, Republic Act No. 2343, dated June 20, 1959, supra, which was the basis of General Circular No.V-334, was just one in a series of enactments regarding Sec. 24 (b) of the Tax Code. Republic Act No.3825 came next on June 22, 1963 without changing the basis but merely adding a proviso (in boldletters).(b) Tax on foreign corporation.(1) Non-resident corporations. There shall be levied, collected andpaid for each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amountreceived by every foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from allsources within the Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums annuities,compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains,profits, and income, a tax equal to thirty per centum of such amount: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THATPREMIUMS SHALL NOT INCLUDE REINSURANCE PREMIUMS. (double emphasis ours).Republic Act No. 3841, dated likewise on June 22, 1963, followed after, omitting the proviso and insertingsome words (also in bold letters).(b) Tax on foreign corporations.(1) Non-resident corporations.There shall be levied, collected andpaid for each taxable year, in lieu of the tax imposed by the preceding paragraph, upon the amountreceived by every foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines, from allsources within the Philippines, as interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical ORCASUAL gains, profits and income, AND CAPITAL GAINS, a tax equal to thirty per centum of suchamount.6(double emphasis supplied)The principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by re-enactment clearly obtains in thiscase. It provides that "the re-enactment of a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive indication ofthe adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction.7Note should be taken of the fact that thiscase involves not a mere opinion of the Commissioner or ruling rendered on a mere query, but a Circularformally issued to "all internal revenue officials" by the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue.It was only on June 27, 1968 under Republic Act No. 5431, supra, which became the basis of RevenueMemorandum Circular No. 4-71, that Sec. 24 (b) was amended to refer specifically to 35% of the "grossincome."This Court is not unaware of the well-entrenched principle that the Government is never estopped fromcollecting taxes because of mistakes or errors on the part of itsagents.8In fact, utmost caution should be taken in this regard.9But, like other principles of law, this alsoadmits of exceptions in the interest of justice and fairplay. The insertion of Sec. 338-A into the NationalInternal Revenue Code, as held in the case of Tuason, Jr. vs. Lingad,10is indicative of legislativeintention to support the principle of good faith. In fact, in the United States, from where Sec. 24 (b) waspatterned, it has been held that the Commissioner of Collector is precluded from adopting a positioninconsistent with one previously taken where injustice would result therefrom,11or where there has beena misrepresentation to the taxpayer.12We have also noted that in its Decision, the Court of Tax Appeals further required the petitioner to payinterest and surcharge as provided for in Sec. 51 (e) of the Tax Code in addition to the deficiencywithholding tax of P 525,897.06. This additional requirement is much less called for because the petitionerrelied in good faith and religiously complied with no less than a Circular issued "to all internal revenueofficials" by the highest official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and approved by the then Secretary ofFinance.13With the foregoing conclusions arrived at, resolution of the issue of prescription becomes unnecessary.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals is hereby reversed, and the questionedassessment set aside. No costs.SO ORDERED.Makasiar (Acting Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, * JJ., concurActs Contrary to Mandatory or Prohibitory Provisions are Void (Art. 5)1. Exceptionsa. The law makes the act valid BUT punishes THE VIOLATORb. The law itself authorizes its validityc. The law makes the act only voidabled. The law declares the nullity of an act but recognizes its effects as legally existingWaiver of Rights (Art. 6)1. Requisites2. Exceptionsa. Waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs;b. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized bylaw.c. Alleged rights which really do not yet exist, as in the case of future inheritanced. If the right is a natural right, such as right to be supported.D.M. Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.KAPUNAN, J.:At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy andfiled a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manilawhere he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errolde Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A.Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work ascarpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14thfloor of the Tower D, Renaissance TowerBuilding on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its fourcorners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which wasmerely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causingthe whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of theelevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victimof death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he wasthen on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due tothe removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connectingpoints of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of thebenefits from the State Insurance Fund.After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of theRTC in toto.D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds: THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOTPRECLUDED FROMRECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of resipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption orinference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge ofthe instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsaloquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facienegligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute forspecific proof of negligence.20Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the deathbenefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claimingfrom the deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code.Article 173 of the Labor Code states:Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the StateInsurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities ofthe employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receivedamages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensationunder this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 ofthe Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one,as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic ActNumbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws whose benefitsare administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the WorkmensCompensation Act, provided that:Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by thisAct to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shallexclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personalrepresentatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Codeand other laws because of said injury x x x.Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under saidAct as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. TheCourt finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30whichinvolved a cave-in resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex MiningCorporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of government rules andregulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the employees,the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in theCourt of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed thecomplaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of theCourt En Banc,31following the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in theaffirmative.WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs incase of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselvesof the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regularcourts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from theemployers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they mayavail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensationunder the Workmens Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regularcourts.In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from theemployer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecutean ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursueboth courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed withtheir suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under theWorkmens Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismissdated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees,namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturninosubmitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the thenDepartment of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967,except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments x x x.Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion todismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that theclaims were filed under the Workmens Compensation Act before they learned of theofficial report of the committee created to investigate the accident which establishedthe criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwardedby the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter datedOctober 19, 1967 only x x x.WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under theWorkmens Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an actionbefore the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has beenremiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receivingcompensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation ofgovernment rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not havesought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded alesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignoranceor a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. Thecase should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the paymentsmade under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the damagesthat may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated inYsmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33andMarcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34In the last case, the Court again recognizedthat a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code.The Court said:In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in thecourse of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens CompensationLaw, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrinewas abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either theWorkmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to theconsequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that theacceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim foradditional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who hasalready been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damagesunder the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring afterhe opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception becauseprivate respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim fordeath benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civilcomplaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report andthe Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitionerspersonnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents inthe complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all,"the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence ofappellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigators report.The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police investigatorconcerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge ofthe accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting toHomicide" against appellants employees. It was the investigator who recommendedthe filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the prosecutors office.This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which appellee may nothave even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in thepreliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did nothave a chance to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from thefollowing statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant toLaw waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no reasonfor the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of appellantsnegligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for death benefits underECC or before she received the first payment therefrom. Her using the policeinvestigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be anafterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of theProsecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence,stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on thepart of the respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature."(Underscoring supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believeappellees allegation that she learned about appellants negligence only after sheapplied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that willmake this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but ofher rights as well:x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school forher educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recoveredfrom the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recovermore from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed toallege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC wereattended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial,the trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the factsbecause as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in acriminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitionersemployees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in thelower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there wasinsufficient evidence against petitioners employees, the case was "civil in nature."These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC onJanuary 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the twochoices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefitsfrom the ECC.When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistentremedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent withthe elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of electionacts as a bar.37Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed tomitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fairto hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not toprevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a singlewrong.38The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recoveryunder the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code.The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights,but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming awaiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge,actual or constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of all material facts uponwhich they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis uponwhich waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waivercannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a rightexists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, withan awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligentlymust be illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis forthe exception in Floresca.It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, toallege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus,erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue.On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did inpages 2-3 of its Answer;41otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexingfor petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue whenpetitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to herhusbands death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. Inthis case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence ofpetitioners employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after theprosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, itwas the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules andregulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for thatmatter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts havethe final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. Itappears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiverhas been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died inthe elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application forbenefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalfon November 27, 1990.There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to herwhen the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testifiedthat she was not aware of her rights.Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the lawexcuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying orinterpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system(Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courtsruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory andprohibitory laws.42This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with thelaws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neithermandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held againsther.Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do notindicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although itappears from Exhibit "K"43that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representingthe accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension,according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension wasP716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is lessthan the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject tospeculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Shouldthe trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, paymentsalready received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deductedfrom the trial court award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, thisadjudication aims to prevent double compensation.WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City todetermine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC.Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC,payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall bededucted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurCui vs. Arellano University 2 SCRA 205G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,vs.ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.CONCEPCION, J.:Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance ofManila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costsagainst the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency ofproof thereon.In the language of the decision appealed from:plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in thedefendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in theCollege of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished hislaw studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of thefourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law indefendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, wasthe dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiffenrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed topay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed hisconnection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of theCollege of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law collegeand enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of theAbad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university.Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awardedscholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returnedto him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him.The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him bythe latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year inthe college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law fromAbad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permissionto take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant ArellanoUniversity. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. Thedefendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refundedto him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without thosetranscripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum whichplaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he wasmade to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive myright to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issuedMemorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "Allheads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schoolsoffer full or partial scholarships to deserving students for excellence in scholarshipor for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but giftedstudents should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships aregood only if the students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principleof merit in the award of these scholarships.2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that suchscholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other feescorresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipientstudents when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyedscholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schoolssince their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the feescorresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that theright of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right toauthorize such transfer.that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked theBureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript ofhis record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum ofP1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiffand so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issuesaid transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to saidBureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release said transcript ofrecord, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As abovestated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, saidsum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside fromP2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, andP500 as expenses of litigation.In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of PrivateSchools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and bindingand that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up acounterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract betweenplaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to anotherschool without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is validor not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground thatthe aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; thatthe provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although thecontractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quitstudying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted tofollow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that theaforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and voidbecause said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neitherapproved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, thequestion whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendantUniversity to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its farreaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the casefrom a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validityof said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that thestipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. Theaforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As theDirector of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to thedefendant,There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contractentered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void asagainst public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill.180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state,courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, thestatutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a governmentbureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in yourcommunication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one of thefour factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held inAmerica that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied tothe law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction whichits object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, tosound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139;Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If ArellanoUniversity understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives whichprompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not enteredinto a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation ofour Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of PrivateSchools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. Andfinally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read:'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that thecontract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some establishedinterest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearlyto undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in MemorandumNo. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not tokeep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of thatuniversity scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the businesspotential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent withsound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. Itis good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have receivedsome kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarshipsto attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it receivedsome kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as inArellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 ofArticle XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships togifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of thescholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges anduniversities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies arepatterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keepbrilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or helpgifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasissupplied.)WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall beentered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, withinterest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of thiscase, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon andNatividad, JJ., concur.Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his votePNB v. Nepomuceno Productions, G.R. No. 139479, 27 December 2002PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,vs.NEPOMUCENO PRODUCTIONS, INC., FILM ADVERTISING MEDIAEXHIBITIONS, INC. (FAME),LUIS NEPOMUCENO, AMPARO NEPOMUCENO, and JESUSNEPOMUCENO, respondents.D E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appealsin CA-G.R. CV No. 475001affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of PasigCity (Branch 155) in Civil Case No. 28809 which set aside the foreclosure proceedingsand auction sale of respondents properties and ordered petitioner to pay attorneysfees.The relevant facts of the case are undisputed.On November 28, 1973, petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) grantedrespondents a 4 Million Pesos (P4,000,000.00) credit line to finance the filming of themovie "Pacific Connection."2The credit line was later increased to 7.5 Million Pesos (P7,500,000.00) on September8, 1974.6Respondents defaulted in their obligation. Petitioner sought foreclosure of themortgaged properties with the Sheriffs Office of Pasig, the auction sale proceeded onDecember 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest bidder in the amount ofP10,432,776.97.8Aggrieved, respondents filed Civil Case No. 28809 with the Regional Trial Court ofPasig (Branch 155), an action for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages withinjunction.9Respondents contended that the foreclosure sale is null and void because:(1) the obligation is yet to mature as there were negotiations for an additional loanamount of P5,000,000.00; (2) lack of publication; (3) the purchase price was grosslyinadequate and unconscionable; and (4) the foreclosure proceedings were initiated bypetitioner in bad faith.10In its Decision, the court a quo ordered the annulment and setting aside of theforeclosure proceedings and auction sale held on December 20, 1976 on the ground thatthere was lack of publication of the notice of sale.11The court a quo also orderedpetitioner to pay P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.12Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.During completion stage of the appeal, the appellate court dismissed petitioners appealwith regard to the Forbes Park property as the same was already the subject of a Deedof Reconveyance executed by petitioner in favor of respondents on November 22,1994, as well as a Compromise Agreement dated September 13, 1994 between thesame parties.13Said Resolution having become final and executory on February 26,1996, entry of judgment was made on March 27, 1996.14Hence, resolution of theappeal in the Court of Appeals pertained only to the Malugay property.On December 11, 1998, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, whichaffirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo.15Hence, herein petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.Petitioner maintains that:"I"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING PNBS FORECLOSURESALE OF RESPONDENTS PROPERTIES NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OFREPUBLICATION DESPITE THE PARTIES AGREEMENT TO WAIVE THEREPUBLICATION AND RESPOSTING OF SHERIFFS SALE"II"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE RESPONDENTSIN ESTOPPEL TO ASSAIL THE VALIDITY OF THE FORECLOSURE SALEAFTER THEY INDUCED PNB TO EXECUTE THE AGREEMENT TO POSTPONESALE WAIVING THE REPUBLICATION AND REPOSTING OF THE SHERIFFSNOTICE OF SALE"III"THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THAT RESPONDENTSARE NOT THIRD PERSONS IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE LAW"16The focal issue in this case is whether the parties to the mortgage can validly waive theposting and publication requirements mandated by Act No. 3135.We answer in the negative.Act. No. 3135, as amended, governing extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages on realproperty is specific with regard to the posting and publication requirements of thenotice of sale, to wit:"Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twentydays in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property issituated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shallalso be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the municipality or city."On this score, it is well settled that what Act No. 3135 requires is: (1) the posting ofnotices of sale in three public places; and, (2) the publication of the same in anewspaper of general circulation.17Failure to publish the notice of sale constitutes ajurisdictional defect, which invalidates the sale.18Petitioner, however, insists that the posting and publication requirements can bedispensed with since the parties agreed in writing that the auction sale may proceedwithout need of re-publication and re-posting of the notice of sale.19We are not convinced. Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no right to waive theposting and publication requirements of Act No. 3135.In People v. Donato,20the Court expounded on what rights and privileges may bewaived, viz.:"x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,since the word 'waiver' covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that aperson may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right orprivilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legallyentitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed byconstitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended forhis sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiverof the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy;and the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive,the advantage of a law or role made solely for the benefit and protection of theindividual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished withoutinfringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large x x x."Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute orguaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right isnot favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights ofothers, or would be against public policy or morals and the public interest may bewaived."While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute andguaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutionalprovisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of theconstitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver."21While it is established that rights may be waived, Article 6 of the Civil Code explicitlyprovides that such waiver is subject to the condition that it is not contrary to law, publicorder, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with aright recognized by law.22The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much tonotify the mortgagor as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of theproperty to be sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the sale. Notices are given tosecure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property.23Clearly, the statutoryrequirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagors benefit,but for the public or third persons. In fact, personal notice to the mortgagor inextrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not even necessary, unless stipulated.24Assuch, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon would beinconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.Moreover, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosuresales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate thenotice and render the sale at the very least voidable.25"Where required by the statute or by the terms of the foreclosure decree, public noticeof the place and time of the mortgage foreclosure sale must be given, a statute requiringit being held applicable to subsequent sales as well as to the first "advertised sale of theproperty. It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale incompliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidatingthe sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the noticeinsufficient and vitiate the sale."26Thus, in the recent case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Aguirre,27theforeclosure sale held more than two (2) months after the published date of sale wasconsidered void for lack of republication.28Similarly, in the instant case, the lack ofrepublication of the notice of the December 20, 1976 foreclosure sale renders it void.The right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagors failure to pay hisobligation must be exercised according to its clear mandate, and every requirement ofthe law must be complied with, lest the valid exercise of the right would end.29Theexercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abusedespecially to the prejudice of others.30WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47500 ishereby AFFIRMED with modification that the award of attorneys fees is reduced toP25,000.00.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, 20 June 1997G.R. No. 118435 June 20, 1997PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MARIO SERZO, JR., accused-appellant.PANGANIBAN, J .:The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of Court. During custodial investigation,arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given the option to be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects orrefuses to exercise this option during arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for him. While the right to be repr esented by counsel isabsolute, the accuseds option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics,to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the state and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.This will be amplified in this appeal seeking the reversal of the August 23, 1994 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal,Branch 72,1in Criminal Case No. 90-5997 convicting Appellant Mario Serzo, Jr. of murder under Article 248of the Revised Penal Code.Appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal AssistantProvincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata, worded as follows:2That on or about the 22nd day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed withbladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniouslyattack, assault and stab one Alfredo Alcantara y Casabal at the back, thereby inflicting upon him stabwounds which directly caused his death.Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and trial,appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced thus:3WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds accused GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLEDOUBT of having committed the crime of MURDER and as prescribed under Article 248 of the RevisedPenal Code, hereby sentences accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify thevictims wife in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as actual damages and TWENTYFIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) as moral damages and costs.The AntecedentsSummarizing the testimonies of Adelaida Alcantara (the victims widow), Medico-Legal Officer Dario L.Gajardo and Epifania Andrade, the trial court found the following facts:4Alfredo Alcantara Y Casabal never knew that death was just around the corner inevitably meeting hisway. That fateful night of August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were (sic)staying inside their house comfortably watching television when at around 11:30 in the evening, SusanaSerzo, mother of the accused, and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at their doorsteps andpleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son, theaccused in this case. Unhesitatingly, the couple heeded their call and went with them at (sic) their house,located just across the private complainants residence. The spouses were able to rescue thegrandchildren and to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara whowas walking just armslength ahead of h