value orientations among late modern youth – a cross-cultural study
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Value orientations among late modernyouth – a cross-cultural studySakari Karvonen a , Robert Young b , Patrick West b & OssiRahkonen ca Department of Social and Health Policy and Economics , THL –National Institute for Health and Welfare , Helsinki, Finlandb MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit , University ofGlasgow , Glasgow, UKc Department of Public Health , University of Helsinki , Helsinki,FinlandPublished online: 10 Oct 2011.
To cite this article: Sakari Karvonen , Robert Young , Patrick West & Ossi Rahkonen (2012) Valueorientations among late modern youth – a cross-cultural study, Journal of Youth Studies, 15:1,33-52, DOI: 10.1080/13676261.2011.617734
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Value orientations among late modern youth � a cross-cultural study
Sakari Karvonena*, Robert Youngb, Patrick Westb and Ossi Rahkonenc
aDepartment of Social and Health Policy and Economics, THL � National Institute for Healthand Welfare, Helsinki, Finland; bMRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit, University of
Glasgow, Glasgow, UK; cDepartment of Public Health, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland
(Received 30 May 2011; final version received 23 August 2011)
Few studies have sought to test whether changes in value orientation proposed bysocial theories can empirically be found. This study aims to rigorously test theextent to which there is similarity in values, in two large samples representative of15-year-olds. We hypothesised that youth from Helsinki are more likely to holdmore late-modern values and Glaswegian youth more modern values with moretraditional elements. The material was drawn from two comparable school-basedsurveys conducted respectively, in Glasgow in 1999 (n�2196) and Helsinki in1998 (n�2420). Using structural equation modelling (SEM) techniques we wereable to identify similar constructs representing values towards sex roles, workethic, citizenship, authority, environment and equity. Glasgow youth showedmore consensus typical of modern societies, whereas Helsinki youth were morevaried in their patterns of attitudes. There were many signs of Helsinki youthbeing more late modern in their values. Yet, four out of 10 subordinate hypothesesderived from our main hypothesis were not supported by the findings. This studyis compatible with the view that young people from Helsinki appear more latemodern in their value orientation, but there are clearly local adaptations to thegeneral value shift thesis.
Keywords: attitudes; consumption; late modernity; cross-cultural comparison
Introduction
A shift from modernity to late modernity implies that both young people’s personal
experiences and their relationship with public institutions have changed radically.
This change means that as identity, values and role orientations are less and less
defined by tradition, adolescents face new demands in relation to the core societal
institutions, notably family, work, authorities, the political system and the state. In
modernity the construction of identity is understood to be largely dictated by
tradition, national culture and structural position, whereas in late modern societies
the task is increasingly individual, or at least it appears to be largely independent of
social structure and national cultural influences (e.g. Furlong and Cartmel 1997).
Along with the erosion of tradition as a guide for social action, new structures gain
power to shape identities, potentially more transnationally than before. For example,
Best (2009) claims that consumption has replaced social roles, norms and institutions
in structuring the lives of young people experiencing flexible capitalism.
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
Journal of Youth Studies
Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2012, 33�52
ISSN 1367-6261 print/ISSN 1469-9680 online
# 2011 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2011.617734
http://www.tandfonline.com
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These changes have been labelled somewhat differently by various scholars
(Giddens 1991, Inglehart 1997, Bauman 1998, Hofstede and Hofstede 2005), but
the essence of the argument remains the same: especially with respect to young
people for whom it is proposed that traditional values have been replaced by moreindividualistic and less coherent values. In short, the argument suggests two
interrelated, yet disparate notions. First, late modern value orientations arise from
the rejection of tradition (traditional family roles, traditional political antagonisms,
national values such as protestant work ethic, etc.). Second, regardless of one’s
position value orientations do not form a coherent construction either for individuals
or for cultures or nationalities. The second notion suggests that established sets of
values are becoming more fragmented suggesting it is increasingly possible to have
dissonant, even conflicting values. This would coincide with the fragmentation ofidentity in a postmodern condition. Another view suggests that there are other
forces, notably globalisation, that lead to more uniform value orientations and that
the effect is cross-national. Globalisation predicts convergence of young people’s
values due to global consumerism (Schaefer et al. 2004, Best 2009), while other
theories predict differences attributable to a nation’s economic development, history
and culture (Inglehart 1990, p. 97). This trend, sometimes referred to as the global
teen hypothesis has, however, to-date received little empirical support (Schaefer et al.
2004).Focused comparative studies of young people are quite scarce. The few studies
available (e.g. Gibbons et al. 1991, Stiles et al. 1993, Fuligni et al. 1999, Wee 1999,
Schaefer et al. 2004) are based on simple comparisons that unfortunately fail to use
the appropriate methodology required to explicitly test dis/similarities between
countries; in order to make valid cross-cultural comparisons, some evaluation of
measurement equivalence is a prerequisite. Further, most of the earlier studies are
based on small samples. This study aims to contribute to the field by rigorously
testing the extent to which there is similarity in values in two large samplesrepresentative of 15-year-olds in two locations, Glasgow and Helsinki. A cross-
cultural comparison is essential to further our understanding of the way values
pattern and of the extent to which tradition and national culture still have a hold on
adolescents’ value orientations.
Theoretical framework
The two locations featured in this study � Glasgow, Scotland and Helsinki, Finland �are very similar in terms of economic and urban context but diverge in the extent to
which social background and tradition are characteristic of the society in general.
Both locations represent post-industrial societies. Further, in terms of demographic
development each faces similar changes, as the aging of population is rapidly taking
place thus challenging the relationship between generations as well. Currently, in
terms of population share both countries are equally ‘youthful’: in 2008 the
proportion population aged 15�24 years was 12.4 Finland and 13.4 in the UK
(Eurostat, Population Data 2009). At the time of our surveys (1998�1999) the shareswere equal between the two countries (12% both).
On the other hand, the social structure of British society can be characterised as
more rigid than in Finland. For example young people have fewer options for social
mobility in the former. In Europe, in 2004�2006, the OECD found low mobility
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across generations (as measured by a close link between parent’s and children’s
earnings) to be particularly pronounced in the UK, Italy and France, while higher
mobility was found in the Nordic countries (Causa and Johansson 2009). Similarly,
summing up earlier evidence on intergenerational earnings mobility, D’Addio (2007)
concluded that mobility was higher in the Nordic countries (including Finland) and
lower in Italy, the US and the UK. There are also many social representations of a
more conservative orientation in the UK than in Finland, one notable example beingthe presence of a throne, even though Scots may take a more critical position.
Finland, on the other hand, is a Scandinavian democracy headed by a parliamentary
president. Further, the two societies differ in the extent to which another source of
tradition, religion, is present in the everyday lives of young people. Even though
neither country could be generally described as religious, religion continues to have a
stronger relevance in Scotland than Finland. Finland is a strongly Protestant nation
while Scotland, particularly Glasgow, has a mixture of Catholic and Protestant
influences, exemplified by denominational schools, football clubs and highly visible
political-religious demonstrations. In addition, gender roles appear more liberal in
Scandinavia, as indicated for example by an almost equal share of women taking part
in the labour force. According to the latest OECD statistics in Finland (2009) the
employment to population ratio for males and females is 70 and 69 compared with
78 and 67 in the UK. At the beginning of the decade the equivalent rates were 71/65
for Finland and 81/67 for the UK (OECD 2011).
Given these differences, we hypothesised that youth from Helsinki more closelyrepresent late modern value orientation and Glaswegian youth more modern values
with more traditional elements. This notion is further supported e.g. by Inglehart’s
(1997) thesis according to which ‘the Scandinavian youth should represent’ � in his
terminology � ‘the vanguard of postmaterial value shift’.
There is some empirical support for the hypothesis that Scottish and Finnish
youth differ in terms of consumerism, as in our earlier study we found those in
Glasgow to be more involved in commercial youth culture than those in Helsinki
(Karvonen et al. 2001). Further, compared with Finland, Scotland can be placed in
closer proximity to the US, which many globalisation theorists would pinpoint as an
exemplar of consumerist society. Given the strong historical, cultural and political
links with America, together with a common language, Scotland (and the UK as a
whole) should, therefore, be less resistant to American consumerism (e.g. the
McWorld phenomena) than Finland, which has closer cultural links to other Nordic
countries. That differences in values between these two nations should arise mainly
from cultural influences, is supported by the fact that materially adolescents in the
two countries do not differ. For example, family affluence � measured in terms ofpossession of cars and computers, the size of family apartment and the prevalence of
family holidays � is similar in Finnish and Scottish youth (Currie et al. 2004).
There is a large literature on young people’s value orientations, but few based on
carefully designed comparisons (see however, Ger and Belk 1996, Kamano 1999,
Schaefer et al. 2004). Consequently, we have limited our focus to themes central to
the construction of identity among young people, such as their relationship with
work, sources of authority (ranging from the family to the police and religion) and
society (the political system, citizenship and welfare state) in general, as well as
gender relations. As an example of a contemporary theme among present-day youth
we include attitudes towards nature and environment (Morris and Schagen 1996).
Journal of Youth Studies 35
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We see value orientations to be formed in the context of everyday interaction with
agents and institutions of local culture including their experiences related to
transitions and trajectories. We also anticipate, as the global teen hypothesis
suggests, that factors such as the global media and the Internet impose increasinglysimilar influences upon youth from different parts of the world.
Empirical evidence
In many ways, the protestant work ethic epitomises modernist values of progress,
linearity and security. Based on a comparison between two British cohorts of young
adults (born respectively in 1958 and 1970), Bynner and Parsons (2000) reported less
commitment to employment among the later cohort suggesting that traditional goalsof employment and affluence may have been rejected to a greater extent by the
younger generation. Finnish Youth Barometers have followed work-related attitudes
since 1994 but there are no signs of weaker commitment to employment. More than
80% of 15�29-year-olds would accept even a temporary job instead of unemployment
benefit (Myllyniemi 2007). This evidence seems to counter our broad hypothesis but
the incongruity may be due non-comparable sources. Kelly (2009) notes, however,
that crude generalisations concerning young people’s apparent lack of work ethic
mask the fact that youth is confronted with new demands, more precariousness andeven a new work ethic resting on ‘cultivation of self ’. Similarly, Julkunen (2007)
illustrates how in Finland despite its better economic performance, youth unemploy-
ment has not decreased. Rather their labour market position has been deteriorating
and they face new requirements from the welfare system (i.e. heavier activation
policies, stricter unemployment schemes).
Complementing these findings, Kamano (1999) found less support for con-
sumerist ideals in Britain among a younger generation who had experienced material
well-being since their childhood. However, and perhaps typical of late modernityitself, there appears to be (at least) two interpretations of these changes (see Jones
2001), the more optimistic of which anticipates the prospect of a less goal-oriented
lifestyle together with more humane and collective attitudes (e.g. Inglehart 1997). By
contrast, the more pessimistic interpretation suggests that post-materialist values are
associated with hedonistic lifestyles and consumerism in an ever-increasing range of
areas of life (Best 2009, Young and West 2010).
In Finland, based on studies of young peoples’ attitudes from the end of the
1980s to mid-1990s, Heleve (2000) concluded that a complete break from themodernist paradigm was imminent. However, the evidence is not entirely consistent
with this conclusion since during this same period, which was characterised by a fall
in the standard of living, there was also an increase in negative attitudes towards
refugees, development aid and unemployment support together with less tolerance of
welfare ‘indulgence’ (such as abuse of social welfare). Notwithstanding this, Finnish
youth do not appear particularly consumerist: social relations were perceived as by
far the most important area of life in the future, while only a third of 15�19-year-olds
found it important to have a car by the age of 35. A high standard of living was seenas important by an even smaller group of young Finns. (Saarela 2002) This lack of
emphasis on material factors is compatible with the finding that among young Finns
the main condition on accepting a job was its correspondence with educational level.
By contrast, and suggestive of a more consumerist value, among British youth pay
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was the major condition (Eurobarometer 2003). In sum, while the evidence regarding
consumerism remains mixed, there is more suggesting British youth are more
consumerist than Finnish youth.As already outlined, theories on late modernity imply a change in individual
attitudes towards authority from one emphasising traditional views to another more
individualised and potentially fragmented position. Changes in young people’s
attitudes have also been described in respect of several key societal issues. For
example, several studies have found young people to have become more cynical about
politics (see e.g. Buckingham 1999). In the US, values reflecting the pursuit of one’s
own well-being � in terms of financial security and prestigious status � have been
increasing, while concern for the welfare of the broader community appears to have
decreased for decades among young people (Kirkpatrick Johnson and Monserud
2009). At the same time, concern has risen over their sense of belonging to society or
citizenship (see e.g. Hall et al. 1999) and over the excess of forms of citizenship,
namely strong patriotism and nationalism. While the politics of the 1960s and 1970s
was about equal rights for different social groups (such as gays, the disabled and
children), the media currently represents an image of youth associated with
narcissistic and pleasure-oriented lifestyles and disengaged from politics, in the
conventional parliamentary form at least. Despite these representations, it is clear
that many young people profess a keen orientation towards environmental issues
(Morris and Schagen 1996, Skogen 1999) and that their political involvement extends
beyond the traditional political arena (Paakkunainen 2007) incorporating new issues
and new political forms on the agenda (for example animal rights). Cross-cultural
comparisons show that young Finns are more involved in social and political
organisations than their UK counterparts (Eurobarometer 2003), suggesting a
stronger sense of citizenship. It is also the case that concern about the disengagement
of young people has been especially marked in the UK (see Catan 2004) although
there is evidence that a significant minority of UK youth do engage in a range of
activities (e.g. volunteering) indicative of a strong sense of citizenship. In broad terms
the limited evidence thus suggests that the sense of citizenship is stronger in Glasgow.
On the other hand, while the evidence remains mixed in terms of political
involvement generally, environmental issues in particular seem to be more on the
political agenda of young Finns.
Finally, gender roles are another core area subject to rapid social change which is
likely to be reflected in changing attitudes. Burt and Scott (2002) argue that despite
consistently documented gender differences in gender role attitudes, there is evidence
that British males (both adults and adolescents) increasingly accept non-traditional
female roles. To our knowledge, there is no direct evidence about gender role
attitudes among young Finns as compared with their UK counterparts, but on the
basis of the much longer historical involvement in the labour market by Finnish
women, coupled with much greater levels of state support for childcare (e.g. one
month paternity leave), it might be expected that young people in Finland would be
less traditional in their attitudes than those in the UK.
The value orientations derived from theoretical formulations of the conditions of
late modernity as opposed to modernity, together with predictions based on
empirical evidence, are summarised in Table 1 under eight value dimensions of
relevance to youth. There is a lack of evidence concerning some of the value
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dimensions as well as value coherence, which is due to the general lack of rigorous
cross-cultural studies.
Our main purpose in this paper is to compare the structure of attitudes among
15-year-olds resident in the two contrasting locations of Helsinki and Glasgow,
hypothesised as occupying different points on a continuum of modernity to
postmodernity. Following research on the consistency of individuals’ political
opinions (Converse 1964, West 1984) our interest lies more in the structure ofyoung people’s value orientations and their spatial correlates than of population
values per se. First, in order to make comparisons, it is necessary to identify
dimensions of values common to young people in both places. Second, we examine
the extent to which young people in Helsinki are more likely (substantively) to hold
late-modern values compared with those in Glasgow. Finally, we examine the extent
to which values towards a range of issues are inter-correlated (structured), lower
correlations being potentially indicative of greater fragmentation of values. Broadly,
we expect to find less value consensus and more fragmentation among youth inHelsinki compared with Glasgow. The study remains, however, exploratory, given
that late-modern value shifts are clearly not simply imposed over local (youth)
culture but assimilate and interact with it. Further, even though the data derive from
the end of the 1990s, given the persistence of structural differences referred to earlier,
we expect the material to reflect adequately the diversity of value structures between
the locations also today.
Material, measures and methods
The material for the study is drawn from two comparable surveys conducted on 15-
year-olds, both administered at school. The Glasgow data were collected between
Table 1. Value definitions, their theoretical and empirical predictions for youth in two
locations.
Definition of values
Theoretical prediction
(modern-late modern prediction) Empirical prediction
Consumerism Equivalent Glasgow more consumerist:
Americanization
Work ethic More traditional work ethic in
Glasgow
Inconsistent evidence: Finnish
evidence does not support less
commitment
Authority Less respect for authorities in
Helsinki
Lack of evidence
Equity/fairness More support for equity in
Glasgow
Lack of evidence
Political cynicism Helsinki more cynical Inconsistent evidence
Citizenship Stronger sense of belonging in
Glasgow
Consistent
Environmental values More support for environmental
issues in Helsinki
Consistent
Sex roles Glasgow more traditional Consistent
Value coherence More fragmented and less
consensus in Helsinki
Lack of evidence
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January and March 1999 within the framework of the ‘West of Scotland 11 to
16 Study’ (West and Sweeting 1996) and refer to pupils in their final year of
compulsory education in 43 mainstream secondary schools in the Glasgow area. This
was the third phase of a longitudinal study and involved 2196 respondents (1116males and 1080 females; average age, 15 years 5 months) completing questionnaires
in the school setting, representing 79% of the eligible baseline sample (Sweeting and
West 2000).
The Helsinki data were collected from a 75% random sample of 35 mainstream,
Finnish-speaking schools, also representing young people in their final year of
compulsory education (Karvonen and Rahkonen 2000). Fifteen-year-olds completed
similar questionnaires over two school hours in the last two weeks of April 1998. In
all, 2420 respondents (1236 males, 1152 females, 32 sex not recorded; average age, 15years
10 months) participated, representing a 71% response rate. The Helsinki study was
cross-sectional.
Both studies shared a similar core of questions covering young people’s living
conditions, lifestyles, health-related behaviours and health. The questionnaires also
incorporated an identical 32-item list of attitudes designed to reflect the values of sex
roles, authority, work ethic, environmentalism, citizenship, equity, political-cynicism
and consumerism, derived from a number of earlier studies including the BritishESRC’s ‘16 to 19’ Initiative (Bynner 1987), an earlier study in Glasgow (Macintyre et
al. 1989) and Helve’s (2001) studies in Finland. The items were presented in a single
block at the end of the questionnaire in Helsinki and in three separate blocks in
Glasgow, each containing a mix of items with varying poles, both designed to avoid
response set. Each item was measured on a five-point Likert-type scale. The two
data-sets were pooled in order to test the similarity of value structures.
Statistical methods and description of the baseline latent value model assessment
First, by means of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) we identified dimensions
based on prior social scientific knowledge of values, and then selected only
component items that empirically fitted these dimensions (see Table 1). The method
combines theoretical and empirical approaches to scale construction, thus reducing
the danger of producing theoretically meaningless constructs (Kamano 1999).
Following CFA, poorly loading items were eliminated, leaving 17 equivalent
(indicator) items for analysis. As shown in Figure 1, six constructs were identified bytwo or more of these indicators. Two further constructs used single items as dummy
latent values (political-cynicism and consumerism) and consequently their loading
paths were set to 1.00, i.e. uncorrected for measurement error. In both samples, items
relating to sex roles, work ethic and citizenship are represented by three items,
authority, environment and equity by two. Ideally, latent value measures should be
represented by at least three indicators. However, as other researchers (Davidov et al.
2008) have shown, it is possible to make valid, though qualified, inferences about
equivalence and latent differences between nations with fewer items per factor.Structural equation modelling (SEM) was implemented via the AMOS statistical
package (Arbuckle and Wothke 1999), its particular strength being the capacity to
include missing data (using full-information maximum-likelihood) allowing minimal
loss of available data. Within SEM, the null model proposes no relationship between
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Helsinki Sample
Glasgow Sample
(Respect)Authority
V13 V14V12 V24 V26V6 V15 V20 V19 V21 V32 V22
.80 1.00.78 .77 .51 .59 .52 .37.68
WorkEthic
.60.55
V8
(Pro)Environment
V5V4
.62.63
V1
1.00
V31
V13 V14V12 V24 V26V6 V15 V20 V19 V21 V32 V22V8 V5V4 V1 V31
Sex Role(Equity)
Consum-erism
Politicalcynicism
(Pro)Equity
.52.49.61
.78 .65.67 .32 .59 1.00 .32 .40.52 .48 .29 .58 .47 1.00 .41 .47 .54
(Good)Citizenship
Figure 1. Measurement model of values, Glasgow and Helsinki samples. Circles represent the latent values; the squares refer to the specific value items
(see Appendix Table 1. for item details). Factor loadings are standardised and all are significant with the exception of the latent values, Political
cynicism and consumerism, which are measured by a single item and therefore have their loadings fixed to 1.00. Overall fit for Glasgow, x2�346.65,
CFI �0.92, RMSEA �0.04; Helsinki, x2�558.88, CFI �0.93, RMSEA �0.05.
Note: Parenthesis indicates direction of scoring for values.
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the latent values and their indicators, and constitutes a baseline with which to
compare other models, the change in model chi-square together with other fit
statistics being used to indicate how well new models fit the data. Here, in addition to
chi-square, we used the comparative fit index (CFI), which varies between 0 and
1 and should exceed 0.9 to demonstrate adequate fit. Since with large sample sizes
the CFI may be overly sensitive, leading to the rejection of correctly specified models,
we employed another measure, the root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA). The RMSEA is a residual-based statistic, relatively unaffected by sample
size. An excellent fit is found with values below 0.05 (Rigdon 1996).
The SEM analysis proceeded in five nested stages. Firstly, we tested the validity of
our latent value model when applied to the Glasgow and Helsinki samples,
separately and in combination. Secondly, we tested the extent to which the structure
of values in the two samples was similar. This was achieved in a series of models, each
constraining key structural aspects to be equal and testing the impact on the chi-
square and other fit statistics: specifically (1) equality of value item loadings, to test
similarity of latent value indicators, (2) equality of latent value correlations and (3)
equality of latent value variances. Thirdly, we tested equality of item intercepts for
single value items, which tests for culture-specific bias such as a higher tendency for
affirmative answers in one culture. Fourthly, we tested for equality of latent value
means, which tests the extent to which values are substantively equivalent in the two
locations. Finally, we tested for equality in means for specific latent values allowing
us to test hypotheses for each specific value.
Results
Comparison of single items
As our principal aim is not to analyse differences in specific attitude items between
the two locations, we provide here only a general overview of the major differences
(and similarities) between 15-year-olds in Glasgow and Helsinki. Frequencies of all
17 items by location are shown in the Appendix Table 1 (the five point Likert-scale
being reduced to three [agree/neither/disagree] for simplicity).
In broad terms, 15-year-olds in Glasgow appeared more supportive of the work
ethic than those in Helsinki, a higher percentage endorsing all three (pro-work)
component items. Glaswegians were also generally more supportive of parental
authority, equity as reflected in approval of government involvement in the economy
and had a stronger sense of citizenship as represented by all three items relating to
belonging to society (Appendix Table 1). Furthermore, Glasgow youth appeared
more consumerist as more than four out of five felt that there is nothing wrong with
having a big house or an expensive car. In Helsinki, the respective rate was
approximately two-thirds. Glaswegians were also more likely (on each component
item) to espouse egalitarian views about sex roles compared with their Finnish
counterparts. 15-year-olds in Helsinki, on the other hand, were more affirmative
towards environmental issues, in accepting a lower standard of living to safeguard
the environment.
Despite these differences, in many respects 15-year-olds in Glasgow and Helsinki
held similar views about key issues. For example, in each location around two-thirds
thought their own nationality was a privilege, about a third felt that there was too
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little respect for traditional values, while only a quarter could be characterised as
politically cynical.Variation by location could in principle be due to difficulties in responding to the
attitude items in one of the locations. Generally, 15-year-olds in Helsinki found it
slightly more difficult to take a stance which may reflect the fact that, unlike in
Glasgow, the items were presented as a list at the end of a long questionnaire. They
might, therefore, have been more likely to select the middle category (‘neither agree
nor disagree’). However, any such tendency is unlikely to have produced a large bias
as the general pattern of responses to the middle category was similar in each
location. Items with high proportions endorsing the middle category were possibly
misunderstood and constituted one of the major reasons for exclusion from the CFA.
Cross-national validity and reliability
As earlier indicated, an empirical exploration of the factor structures of the complete
list of attitude items did not suggest a coherent picture between the two samples
(data not shown). The alternative SEM strategy, adopted to reveal the structure of
the hypothesised relationships between indicator variables (attitude items) and latent
variables (hypothesised value dimensions) produced the final measurement models
for Glasgow and Helsinki shown in Figure 1.
In both samples attitudes related to sex roles, work ethic and citizenship are
represented by three items while the authority, environment and equity dimensions
are captured by two items. An orientation towards traditional sex roles implies
approving that in marriage the husband is the dominant partner, that he is the main
breadwinner and that the female role implies home and family nurture. Protestant
work ethic is represented by items concerning determination to gain employment,
commitment to work and the value of work per se. The citizenship dimension is
represented by two items relating to the importance of belonging to collectives, such
as society in general or the (Finnish/Scottish) nation and a third referring to social
exclusion. The authority dimension refers to approval of parental authority and
respect for traditional values in general. The environmental dimension is represented
by items critical of contemporary life in terms of standard of living and private
transport. The equity dimension contains items relating to the prerequisites of a
society perceived to be just, e.g. the role of government in promoting work
opportunities and income distribution. Finally, the model includes two single items,
one representing attitudes towards the political system and the other a consumerist
orientation.
In technical terms, despite some relatively moderate item to factor loadings the
results appear to be broadly comparable across samples (Table 2 first two rows,
Figure 1). The measurement model in each sample gives acceptable results
(CFI�0.93 in Helsinki, 0.92 in Glasgow, RMSEA B0.05 in both locations)
suggesting the specified model is an adequate fit to the data in both locations. The
loadings of component value items to latent values (see Figure 1) are also rather
similar, and particularly so for sex roles and equity. However, there are exceptions
to this (notably work ethic and environmentalism where all component items have
lower loadings in Glasgow) which suggests that even though the general model
appears cross-culturally valid, there are subtle differences in the latent value
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structures. Model estimates for the combined sample provided adequate fit (third
row in Table 2).
To explore the issue further, we tested the extent to which the models for Glasgow
and Helsinki differed under three different assumptions (using a change in the overall
chi-square to indicate the degree of divergence. p values are not shown in Table 2 as
due to the sample size all models were significantly different from the previous
model). In model 1, cross-national reliability and validity was tested by re-running
the model with the item to latent value loadings constrained to be equal. The results
showed little change (CFI 0.92, RMSEA 0.029) which indicates that valid
comparisons can be made between Glasgow and Helsinki.
Value fragmentation and consensus
In model 2, value fragmentation was tested by exploring the variation between the
samples in the pattern of intercorrelation between values. There was a marked
change in the chi-square, indicating that under this assumption the model was no
longer as good a fit to the data (CFI 0.87, RMSEA 0.04), and demonstrating
Table 2. Structural equation modelling results testing equality of value loadings, correlations,
variances and latent means between Glasgow and Helsinki.
Structural models Tests n x2/Dx2a df CFI RMSEA
Location
Baseline model:
Glasgow
Model validity in Glasgow 2196 346.653 93 0.916 0.035
Baseline model:
Helsinki
Model validity in Helsinki 2420 558.876 93 0.928 0.046
Glasgow Vs Helsinki
Baseline model:
Combined sample
Model validity and for both
locations simultaneously
4616 905.526 186 0.924 0.029
Model 1: Value item
loadings equal (Vs
combined sample
baseline model)
Items are similar indicators of
values in both locations
(Cross-national reliability &
validity)
� 37.229 9 0.921 0.029
Model 2: Latent value
correlations equal
(Vs model 1)
Latent value correlations are
similar in both locations
� 546.524 28 0.870 0.035
Model 3: Latent value
correlations &
variances equal
(Vs model 2)
Latent value correlations and
variances are similar in both
locations
� 40.277 6 0.866 0.035
Latent value means
Model 4: Locations
value item intercepts
equal (Vs model 1)
Equality of value item
intercepts (i.e. cultural bias in
reporting values)
� 359.069 17 0.884 0.034
Model 5: Locations
latent value means
equal (Vs model 4)
Equality of latent value means
(Values equal in each nation)
� 813.319 6 0.799 0.044
aAll x2/Dx2 test of significance pB 0.001.
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that there were significant differences between Glasgow and Helsinki in value
fragmentation. A more detailed output (not shown) reveals that youth in Glasgow
demonstrate greater value fragmentation, the univariate results (correlations between
values) supporting this conclusion.The third model tested for value consensus by assuming values to be equally
variable in each country. The results of this model produced little further change in
the chi-square and remained a borderline (partially acceptable) fit to the data (CFI
0.87, RMSEA 0.04).
In sum, the overall results of these analyses suggest that while the relationship of
value items to latent values is similar in Glasgow and Helsinki, the interrelationship
between latent values, and variation in values, differs by location to a measurable
degree. Further analysis (not shown) demonstrated higher correlation between latentvalues. In other words, while there is empirical support for similar value dimensions
and the structure of values in the two locations, in Glasgow values appear more
fragmented than in Helsinki.
Cultural bias and global teen hypothesis
The two final models in Table 2 test the assumption (model 4) that the intercepts of
the value items are equal in each location, or whether the results suggest a systematic
cultural bias. This shows that there is evidence of significant but tolerable cultural
bias, indicated by a borderline fit of the model (CFI 0.88, RMSEA 0.03). Model 5 on
the other hand tests whether latent means are equal which would support the global
teen hypothesis. In this case, there is a further dramatic reduction in fit (CFI 0.80,RMSEA 0.04) which indicates clear differences in latent means showing that a broad
hypothesis of similar values across samples is not supported.
Comparison of values and consensus
A general test (model 5) cannot pinpoint differences between locations in specific
values. The penultimate part of the analysis therefore, examines the extent to which
specific latent means differ between the two locations.1 The results show (mean latent
value columns in Table 3) that there are significant differences on all dimensions
between locations. The largest difference occurred in respect of environmentalism,
15-year-olds in Helsinki being significantly more concerned with such issues than
those in Glasgow. They were also slightly more cynical politically and more equitablethan their counterparts in Glasgow. The next largest difference is found for sex roles,
which conversely involves Glasgow youth being less traditional in their values. On all
other values, however, 15-year-olds in Glasgow had higher mean scores, the
differences being most marked in relation to citizenship, work ethic, authority and
consumerism.
Lastly, the extent to which the variance of specific latent values differs between
locations was examined, critical to testing the value consensus hypothesis. The results
(Table 3, latent value variance columns) show that there are significant differences inthe variances of all but one value (political cynicism) between locations. The largest
difference occurs in respect of consumerism, 15-year-olds in Helsinki showing
significantly more variation in consumerist values than those in Glasgow. In order of
magnitude, significant variation in values was also found for work ethic, citizenship,
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Table 3. Latent value scores and latent value variance by location, Glasgow and Helsinki.
Mean latent value Latent value variance
Latent valuea Glasgow Helsinki SE CRa p Glasgow SE Helsinki SE CRa p
Sex roles (equality) 0.317 0.000 0.033 9.575 *** 0.742 0.036 1.087 0.051 6.551 ***
Authority (respect) 0.225 0.000 0.023 9.628 *** 0.152 0.021 0.246 0.025 3.298 ***
(High) work ethic 0.243 0.000 0.020 12.141 *** 0.123 0.011 0.291 0.022 8.199 ***
(Pro) equity/fairness 0.000 0.086 0.022 3.814 *** 0.158 0.021 0.260 0.026 2.572 **
(Good) citizenship 0.204 0.000 0.021 9.734 *** 0.132 0.013 0.303 0.023 7.354 ***
(Pro) consumerismb 0.260 0.000 0.027 9.692 *** 0.550 0.017 0.949 0.030 11.623 ***
Political cynicismb 0.000 0.155 0.033 4.746 *** 1.073 0.032 1.152 0.037 1.600 ns
(Support) environmentalism 0.000 0.332 0.024 13.742 *** 0.134 0.016 0.250 0.024 4.968 ***
CR �The critical ratio statistic used to calculate significance; ns, non-significant.aParenthesis indicates direction of scoring for values.b‘Dummy’ latent value.**pB0.01; ***pB0.001.
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sex roles, environmentalism, authority and equality; in all cases Helsinki youth were
more varied in their values.
In summary, the picture emerging from this analysis of young people’s values
between the two locations in relation to late modernity is a mixed one. Young people
in both contexts appear to endorse the value of an equal and fair society, though
rather more so in Helsinki, whereas those in Glasgow tend to be both more
consumerist and less traditional in their orientation towards sex roles, these findings
being against our initial hypotheses. However, supporting evidence of greater
endorsement of late modern values in Helsinki are the findings that 15-year-olds
in Glasgow are more traditional both in relation to authority and the work ethic.
Their counterparts in Helsinki are also more environmentally concerned. Further,
Helsinki youth demonstrate much less value consensus thus characterising late-
modern rather than modern condition.
Discussion
The main focus of this study was to compare value structures among 15-year-olds in
two locations and to explore whether young people in Helsinki were more likely to
hold late-modern values compared with those in Glasgow. We also studied whether
these values were associated with less value consensus and more value fragmentation
among Helsinki youth at the turn of the century. How well have these hypotheses
fared in predicting the results?
Of the 10 hypotheses (outlined in Table 1), six received empirical support from
our analysis. In line with predictions Glasgow youth were more traditional in their
attitudes than their Helsinki counterparts, as evidenced in stronger support for the
(protestant) work ethic, attitudes to authority generally and especially in relation to
the family. However, it has to be kept in mind that this construct captures only some
aspects of authority. Another feature supporting the view that Glasgow is less late
modern refers to the fact that Helsinki youth were more cynical towards party
politics. Even though in both contexts young people tended to be less interested in
traditional politics it appears that the Scottish political system has managed to
engage young people more than the Finnish system. Finland can generally be
characterised as a society relatively lacking in strong antagonisms, indicated for
example in strong and persistent support for the Nordic welfare state (Forma 2002)
and stable coalition governments. Scottish politics, by contrast, demonstrates greater
polarity between two traditional parties together with a third espousing a strong
national sentiment. In Glasgow, more support for citizenship was found, especially
on themes that were against social exclusion and in favour of general belonging to
society. Further, Helsinki youth supported environmental issues more, which we
hypothesised to be typical of late modern universalism. Also the hypothesis
suggesting less consensus in Helsinki was supported by the rigorous SEM method
used. In other words, we found Helsinki youth to have a lower level of values shared
by majority. Four hypotheses, however, were not supported by the findings and
require alternative explanations. Glasgow youth appeared more consumerist and
more dissonant in their value patterns, while Helsinki youth oriented more
traditionally towards sex roles and supported equity more than in Glasgow.
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The more consumerist orientation of young Glaswegians is indicated by the fact
that nine out of 10 saw symbols of affluence as unproblematic compared with seven
out of 10 in Helsinki. Consumer-orientation can be regarded as perhaps the most
emblematic characteristic of a late modern way of life. Late modernity appears to
lack structural divisions (Furlong and Cartmel 1997) by cherishing an individualised
ideology (Bauman 2000). Yet this ideology seems to fit better into the experiences of
Glaswegian young people, perhaps indicating an acceptance of larger income
inequalities. Interestingly, it appears that in the eyes of young people it is such
representations of inequalities (‘big house, fancy car’) that become their justification.
In Helsinki, inequalities are smaller and luxury items such as cars are heavily taxed.
As income inequalities have risen rapidly (OECD 2008), the latter half of the first
decade of the 2000s has, however, seen greater visibility of luxury items in Helsinki,
too. An obvious explanation of Glasgow youth being more consumerist is their
greater exposure to American influence and a heavily consumer-oriented market.
Heavier exposure to consumer-oriented market probably also explains why Glaswe-
gians manifest more dissonance in their values. Halman (1996) suggests that
fragmentation in values appears as ‘young people. . .are faced with a large number
of [value] alternatives they are free to choose from’ which is also how the consumer-
oriented market appears. This also underlines the fact that the late modern
hypothesis on fragmentation can be misleading without taking into account of the
powerful effects of consumerism.
The finding of greater support for equality in Helsinki is most probably explained
with the large and persistent support for the universal welfare state referred to earlier.
In Scotland social benefits are mostly means tested which may account for lower
support. We also found a surprisingly low level of sex role (equality) attitudes in
Helsinki youth, which could � at least speculatively � be due to that in Finland
gender equality has meant gender neutrality (Julkunen 2001) with the consequence
that gender issues are not directly addressed in school. By contrast, young people in
Glasgow may have less sexist attitudes by virtue of greater exposure to anti-sexist
messages in the Scottish educational curriculum. Gender cuts obviously across many
of the other attitudes as well. In many cases gender differences can be even larger than
those found between locations, but these could not be presented here extensively.
Another limitation of the study results from the use of full matrix for the data on
attitudes. As the Helsinki data included more missing cases, using only complete
cases may have produced more consensus for these results. Those who did not
provide full answers may have been more deviant in their attitudes than those who
did. Further, the reliability of the study is enhanced by matching the two datasets
closely in terms of sample size, age and phase of life. Also the list of attitudes was
identical in the two surveys. An earlier study associating the attitudes with health
behaviours in Glasgow provides further indirect support for the measures (Karvonen
et al. 2001).
In conclusion, this study suggests that young people from Glasgow appear less
late modern in their value orientations than their Nordic counterparts. However,
there are clearly local adaptations to the general theory which shows that the broad
theoretical models need to be tested against solid empirical material. Carefully
designed cross-cultural comparisons provide one fruitful source for such testing.
Even though our data comes from the end of the previous decade, it shows the merit
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of such design. The comparison allowed us to rigorously test hypotheses on the
structure of values and to identify comparable dimensions. Given that underlying
structures tend to be more persistent than their overt manifestations, we suspect
these patterns to have endured into the twenty-first century.
One way of making sense of the mixed picture emerging from this study is to
suggest that culture, local traditions and national values continue to play a strong
role in the lives of late modern young people. This runs counter to theories of global
convergence (Schaefer et al. 2004) and implies that many of the spatial differences in
values can only be understood by reference to local traditions, cultural patterns and
national values. In a sense this is sociologically trivial but at the same time it shows
that the extreme notion of profound and ground-breaking social change has to be
questioned. Even though young people are clearly subject to new ways of
constructing values, in the face of rapid social change earlier cultural representations
continue to offer meaningful ways of understanding their experiences.
Note
1. The means for environmentalism and political cynicism were set to zero in Glasgow withthe remainder set to zero in Helsinki. Originally all latent means in Glasgow were set tozero, but in order to avoid producing negative parameter estimates they were adjusted andmodels re-run.
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Appendix Table 1. Items included in the structural equation model depicted in Figure 1.
Glasgow Helsinki
Item
Item description and
associated latent valuea Agreeb Neither Disagree Agreeb Neither Disagree
Sex-roles (Equality)
V6 Some equality in marriage is a
good thing but by and large the
husband ought to have the
main say
12.3 18.8 68.9 20.6 24.0 55.3
V15 A husband’s (man’s) job is to
earn the money; a wife’s
(woman’s) job is to look after
the home and family
12.2 13.5 74.3 14.4 25.1 60.5
V20 Women rather than men should
look after relatives who need
care
9.0 29.8 61.3 16.0 32.4 51.6
(Respect) Authority
V8 If you live with your parents
they can tell you what to do
47.9 29.0 23.0 19.5 46.8 33.6
V13 Young people today don’t have
enough respect for traditional
values
34.7 44.4 20.9 30.7 47.7 21.7
(High) Work ethic
V12 If you’re really determined it is
possible to find a job
79.9 13.2 6.9 62.6 30.0 7.4
V24 Having almost any job is better
than being unemployed
71.0 17.9 11.1 49.7 34.5 15.7
V26 Even if I didn’t like the work, I
would still want to do it as well
as I could
80.1 14.5 5.4 63.1 29.3 7.5
(Pro) Equity
V1 The government should help
people to get jobs where they
live rather than expecting them
to move to get work
70.0 24.0 5.9 59.7 32.5 7.8
V5 The government should tax the
rich more in order to help the
poor
44.9 29.8 25.1 39.6 36.7 23.8
(Good) Citizenship
V19 It is a privilege to be Scottish/
Finnish
69.3 24.1 6.7 61.0 28.8 10.2
V21 It is important for (young)
people to feel they belong to
society
76.0 21.1 2.9 65.8 28.8 5.4
V32 A lot of society’s problems are
caused by people feeling
excluded from it
48.2 45.5 6.2 29.5 54.0 16.5
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Appendix Table 1. (Continued )
Glasgow Helsinki
Item
Item description and
associated latent valuea Agreeb Neither Disagree Agreeb Neither Disagree
(Pro) Consumerism
V31 There’s nothing wrong with
having a big house or an
expensive car
87.5 9.8 2.7 69.0 24.2 6.9
Political-Cynicism
V22 It does not really make much
difference which political party
is in power in Britain/Finland
23.9 40.4 35.8 27.8 41.1 30.7
(Support) Environmentalism
V4 People should accept a lower
standard of living to decrease
pollution and environmental
problems
23.8 41.8 34.4 49.4 36.4 14.3
V14 There should be restrictions on
car drivers in the city to cut
down on pollution
42.9 38.8 18.4 45.4 36.7 17.8
aParenthesis indicates direction of scoring for values.bNote includes collapsed agree with strongly agree and disagree with strongly disagree.
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