values in culture herskovits

8/13/2019 Values in Culture Herskovits

1/11

Tender- and Tough-Minded Anthropology and the Study of Values in Culture

Author(s): Melville J. HerskovitsSource: Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1951), pp. 22-31Published by: University of New MexicoStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3628648.

Accessed: 22/01/2014 03:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

University of New Mexicois collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Southwestern

Journal of Anthropology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 196.3.96.193 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 03:15:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=unmhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3628648?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3628648?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=unm


2/11

TENDER- AND TOUGH-MINDED ANTHROPOLOGYAND THE STUDY OF VALUES IN CULTURE

MELVILLEJ. HERSKOVITSI

THE PROBLEM OF VALUES in culture, long implicit in anthropology,has been precipitatedout as a questionfor analysis and discussionby theformulation of the principleof cultural relativism.The concept, in its undif-ferentiatedstate, is really nothingnew. Many years ago Boas, for example,writ-ing to the problemsof his day, could say, It is somewhatdifficult for us torecognizethat the value which we attributeto our own civilizationis due tothe fact that we participate n this civilization,and that it has been controllingall our actionssince the timeof ourbirth;but it is certainlyconceivable hat theremaybe othercivilizations,basedperhapson different raditionsand on a differentequilibrium f emotionand reason,which areof no less value thanours,althoughit may be impossible or us to appreciate heir values without having grown upundertheir influence. 'Or, in 1934,Ruth Benedictcould write: No man everlooksat the worldwithpristineeyes.Evenin his philosophicalprobingshe cannotgo behind these stereotypes;his very conceptsof the true and the false will stillhave reference o his particular raditionalcustoms. 2In theseterms,the significanceof the differencesbetweenpeoples,as concernsthe relationbetweencustom and sanction,reduced tself to a questionof culturalsuperiorityor inferiority.To this question,Americananthropologists,at least,have given a clear and unequivocalanswer; n the vast majority,we are agreedthat objective ndicesof cultural nferiorityand superiority annot be established.The publicationof the Statementon Human Rights 3submittedby theAmericanAnthropologicalAssociationto the United Nations in 1947, and theanalysisof relative values in culture in Man and His Works4 publisheda yearlater,broughtto the foregroundof consciousness ome of the broaderphilosophi-cal andpractical mplications f this position, hat had come to be acceptedwith-out too muchquestioning.And since,in the worldof freescholarshipt is throughdiscussion hat conceptand theoryare clarified,this paper represents n attempt

1 The Mind of Primitive Man (first edition, New York, 1911), p. 208.2 Patternsof Culture (New York, 1934), p. 2.3 American Anthropologist,vol. 49, pp. 539-543, 1947.4 Melville J. Herskovits, Man and His Works (New York, 1948), pp. 61-78, 653-655.22

VOL.7, 1951

This content downloaded from 196.3.96.193 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 03:15:42 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/11

TENDER- AND TOUGH-MINDED ANTHROPOLOGYto analyzesome of the reactionswhich these presentations timulated,and thusto carry our thinking on this importantproblem of values in culture a stepfarther. II

Many yearsago, William James,with his gift for homely phrasing, uggestedthat people could be divided into those who are tended-minded nd who aretough-minded. 5We neednot herego into thewayin whichJamescharacterizedthe modes of thoughtof those who fitted his categories, or he himself set themforth merelyto illuminate his concepts.He was too wise a man to accept anypolar type as characteristic f any individual,and he made this quite clearin hisdiscussion.The initial trait he set downfor eachtype-the tender-minded going

by 'principle' (rationalistic)and the tough-minded going by 'facts' (empiri-cist)-is enough for our purpose.For whateverthe meritsof his specifications,the fact remains hat he did put his fingeron two kinds of thought that set offpersonsand,as has beenincreasingly ecognized, lso set off ideasfromeach other-designations so shrewdand vivid that it is easy to understandwhy they caughton and moved into commonspeech.

They are particularlyapplicable, t would seem, in considering he problemof cultural relativism;for make no mistake, cultural relativismis a tough-minded philosophy. t requires hose who hold to it to alter responses hat ariseout of some of the strongestenculturativeconditioning o which they have beenexposed,the ethnocentrismsimplicit in the particularvalue-systemsof their so-city. In the caseof anthropologists,his meansfollowingthe implicationsof datawhich,when opposedto our enculturated ystemof values, sets up conflictsnotalwayseasyto resolve.There are other reasonswhy the acceptanceof cultural relativismby anthro-pologistshas meantholdingto a tough-minded oint of view. One friendlycriticof ourdiscipline,morewitty than wise in his assertion,has definedan anthropolo-gist as a personwho respectsevery culture-pattern ut his own. Like any otherbonmot, it is true and not true;but the partthat is true is to the point here. Thatis, anthropologists, s with any membersof any society,live in a climateof opin-ion whose nfluence s so strongandyet so gentle that it is only by an effort of willthat one becomesawareof it. And on this point the present-day limateof opinionin the United States-and in this paperwe are concernedonly with Americananthropologists,since cultural relativism has not as yet evoked any responsesfrom elsewhere n the world-is quite confused. For despite the deep-seated eel-

5 Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (New York, 1907),p. 11 ff.

23



4/11

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGYingwe holdto in thiscountryhat theideasandwaysof theWesternworldarebestformankind,he climate f opinion t the same imemaintains firmbeliefinthe mportancenddesirabilityf politicalreedomorallpeople.Thisdualityof sanction asset up powerful mbivalenceshat come ntoplaywhena rela-tivisticpointof view s put forthconcerninghevalidityof thediffering alue-systemso be found n themyriadultures f mankind.Moreover,iscussionsf relativismeem ometimeso be facing nmore hanonedirection.This is becausehe relativistic ositionhas of itself threequitedifferent spects;distinctionshat heretofore avetended o go unrecognized.One of theseaspects, hat is, is methodological,ne is philosophical,nd onepractical.6

As method, elativismncompassesheprinciplef our sciencehat, nstudy-inga culture, neseeks o attainasgreata degree f objectivityspossible;hatonedoesnot judgethe modesof behavior ne is describing,r seek to changethem.Rather, ne seeks o understandhesanctionsf behaviorn termsof theestablishedelationshipsithin he culturetself,andrefrainsrommakingnter-pretationshat arisefrom a preconceivedrame of reference.Relativism sphilosophyoncernshe natureof cultural aluesand,beyondhis,the implica-tions of an epistemologyhat derives from a recognition f the force ofenculturativeonditioningn shapinghoughtandbehavior.ts practicalspectsinvolvethe application-thepractice-of the philosophicalrinciples erivedfrom hemethod,o thewider, ross-culturalorld cene.In theseterms, he threeaspectsof cultural elativism an be regarded srepresentinglogical equence hich,na broad ense, he historicalevelopmentof the idea has also followed.That is, the methodologicalspect,wherebyhedatafromwhich heepistemologicalropositionslowaregathered,rdered,ndassessed,ame irst.For t is difficultoconceivef a systematicheory f culturalrelativism-asagainsta generalizeddea of live-and-let-live-withouthe pre-existence f the massivethnographicocumentationathered yanthropologistsconcerninghesimilaritiesnd differences etween ultureshe worldover.Outof thesedatacame hephilosophicalosition, ndwiththephilosophicalositioncamespeculationas to its implications or conduct.

6 BernardSiegel (Currents of Anthropological Theory and Value Concepts, SouthwesternJournal of Anthropology, vol. 4, pp. 199-210, 1948) adumbrates this tri-partiteapproach,butdid not differentiate relativism in method, philosophy, and practice except by inference. Seeespecially pages 203-204.

24



5/11

TENDER- AND TOUGH-MINDED ANTHROPOLOGYIII

Kroeber, n a recent summaryof developments n anthropologyduring thelast half-century,7 nitially stresses what would seem to be the methodologicalaspectof the relativisticapproach o the study of culture. Anthropologists owagree, he states, that each culture mustbe examined n termsof its own struc-ture and values,insteadof beingratedby the standardsof some othercivilizationexaltedas absolute-which in practiceof course is alwaysour own civilization.In the sentences that follow, he moves to the philosophical mplicationsof themethodologicalprecept: This anthropologicalprincipleleads, it is true, to arelativisticor pluralisticphilosophy-a belief in manyvaluesratherthan a singlevaluesystem. Butwhynot, he continues, if the facts so demand?The domainof life is certainlypluralistic,whatwith a millionspecieson our ownsmallplanet.I havenot heardof biologistsbewailingthe diversityof species.Rather,they tryto find some kind of orderin it.

At this point,however,Kroeber njectsa new note, and, in doing so, exempli-fies the need for clarification f the relativisticapproach n its varied mplications.For the note that he injectsliesneither n the modalityof method,norphilosophy,nor practice. Quite correspondingly, e says, anthropologistsry to treat allcultures, ncludingour own civilization,as parts of nature-without preferentialandpartisanpriorities.This maybe distastefulto partisans,but it is certainly heonly wayof science. This is the note to whichhe returnsat the conclusionof hisarticle, where, n describing the commonattitude that has held anthropologiststogether, despitetheir special interests,and has made for an integratedattackon the biological,the socioculturaland the linguistic phenomenapresentedbyman, he says, This attitude is expressedby the principle of the relativisticapproach. t might equallybe calledthe naturalisticapproach.It is not within the compassof this discussion o considerwhetherthe studyof culture lies in the domainof the natural sciences or the social sciences-or,indeed, consideringthe philosophicalaspects of the question of our concern,whether t lies in the realmof the humanities.For our purpose,it is enough topoint out how, in a single discussion,relativismcan variouslybe conceived.The importantthing to realizeis that, in his method, the present-day ield-workeracceptsthe relativisticprincipleas a basicpostulate.Grantingwe have notgiventhe attentionto methodthis importantphaseof our workdeserves,nonethe-lesssuchdiscussions f it as we have arealwaysbasedon the premise hat objectiv-ity is a primaryrequirement f our scientificendeavors. n our field-workwe ask

7 Anthropology (Scientific American, vol. 183, pp. 87-94, Sept., 1950).

25



6/11

SOUTHWESTERNJOURNALOF ANTHROPOLOGYquestions;and if we challengea response, t is a calculatedchallenge, to elicita reactionthat will revealan underlyingvalue, or a rationalization f the kindthat tells one much about a value-judgment.We couch our findingswithin theframe of referenceset by the culture we are studying;in short, the behaviorweconcernourselveswith is analyzed n terms of its relevance o the total structureof culturalformandsanctionof which t is a part.

IVIt is inevitable hat the area of disagreementbetweenanthropologists houldwidenas we moved from the methodological o the philosophical mplicationsofculturalrelativism, houghpublishedstatementsof disagreementwith the relati-

vistic philosophyare not easy to find. We may take as an examplethe mostexplicit anthropologicaldemurrer hat has thus far appearedas an exampleofthe line criticismhastaken.This demurrer,8 y Kluckhohn,exemplifies he ambivalence hat arises out ofthe conflictingpointsof view that, as has beenstated,are simultaneously resentin the currentof contemporaryAmerican hought.Its initial statementconcerningculturalrelativism s as follows: To understand the meaningof a way of lifeto those who have it' is a significantand indeeda noble undertaking.To under-stand,however, hould not necessarilymeanto acceptor even to remaincontentwith description. One cannot but speculateon the intent of thispassage.Does it

signify that if an anthropologist tudies the sanctionsof a marriage ystembasedon polygyny,he should not acceptthese sanctions or himself,in his own thinkingaboutvalues,or in his ownbehavior, n which case he mightbecomepolygynous?And how, one asks, shouldan anthropologistmanifest his refusalto remaincontent with description ? f this implies that he should seek deeper levels ofintegration n studyinga culture,none will disput the point. But in its context,one cannot but wonderif this does not imply the duty of an anthropologist oseek to change those elements of the culture of which he disapproves-in thecase of our example,to advocatemonogamyor polyandryfor the polygynouspeoplebeingstudied.Kluckhohndoespropose,as a test for extrinsicvalues theformulasuggested by Thorndike- are the means effectiveto the ends? Yet,at this stage of anthropological ophistication, ne would think that it might betaken as self-evident hat this so-called est, in actuality, s met by everyfunction-ing value-systemn every functioningculture.We may follow this argumentfurther. The doctrine that science has noth-ing to do with values, Kluckhohnstates, is a perniciousheritage from Kant

8 SaturdayReviewof Literature,Sept. 18, 1948, pp. 11-12.

26



7/11

TENDER-AND TOUGH-MINDED ANTHROPOLOGYand other thinkers. Scientists dare not abdicate the right to study values byscientificmeans. n somebewilderment, ne wondershow the relativisticposition,which stresses he understanding f values-something that obviously,under therubricof anthropological cience,can mean only their study and analysis-canbe contorted nto an abdication f the right to study them. Does this exem-plify how in the searchfor social laws that has occupiedso manyanthropolo-gists, and the preoccupationwith making of anthropologya science -as if itwere not one-our traditionalhumanisticconcernshave been lost sight of? Is itthis latter aspectof our interests,which involves an understanding f the rangeof the creativedrive in man and the value-systemshat give point to his living,that we aretold is being abdicated ecausesomeanthropologists aveput asidethe searchfor meaning n theirpreoccupationwith form and structure?The amnestywhich the anthropologist ives to the exuberantvarietyof cul-tural patterns, we are told, must be that which the psychiatrist gives toincestuousdreams. It is difficultto believe that this is more than an exuberantfigure of speech.Are anthropologists,workingcross-culturally, eally to decidewhat is good and bad in cultureand, as socialpsychiatrists,attemptto cure thebad and promotethe good? The psychiatrist,workingwith individualswho aredeviantin terms of their own culturalprescriptions,ramesprocedures o permithis patient in the everydayround to fill the cultural prescription n a sociallyapprovedway. But where are the cross-cultural uides for the anthropologist?He, like all human beings, has undergoneenculturativeconditioningsto thestandardsof his properculture. Can his judgmentsbe so Olympianthat theyare not influencedby these standards?The inevitable basic questions enter:Whose good? Whose bad?Whose means?Whose ends?Kluckhohn'sanswerto these questionsis found in the final passage of hisdiscussion. Some values, he says, maywell be regardedas within the realmof taste or choice or circumstance.But other valueswouldseemto be appropriateand necessaryto all men-given the nature of the human organismand theconditions o which all men,regardlessof raceand culture,must adjust. And toachieve this, one must recognizewhat must eventuallybe the most importanttask of our science,the discoveryand testing in the scientificcrucible of themanyvaluesthat transcendcultural variation.One againmustask,however,what are thosevalues that seem o be appropri-ate andnecessary o all men, and especially hose that transcend ulturalvaria-tion. Is it possiblethat this is an attemptto have one's relativisticcake and eatit? Has an ambivalence risingout of conflictingcurrentsof thought made it sodifficultto recognizethe critical point of the difference,preciselyin the cross-

27



8/11

SOUTHWESTERNJOURNALOF ANTHROPOLOGYcultural tudyof values,between niversalsndabsolutes?9More thanthis, isit possiblewe see herea failure o apply he elementaryessonof culturalpsy-chology,hat all menareso conditionedn theirperceptions,heiremotions,ndtheir udgmentshat theseareframed, s far as themembers f anygroupareconcerned, ithin he limitsof variationnbeliefandbehavioranctionedythegroupat a givenmomentnitshistory?Onemaywish ominimizehedifference,for the sakeof argument,etween he absolute alueson whichmanypeoples,especially urselves,nsist,and thosegeneralized rientations f culture, heuniversals,hat we findin all societies.Dialecticians,uch as Child,maywishtoapply o relativismhe exercisef a sterileogicwhichproved, fterthe mannerof Zeno, hatone couldnever eacha givenpoint n space,or in medievalimes,disputedhe choreographyf angels. t hasindeedoccurredo anthropologiststhat he basisof moral udgmentmightbe foundelsewherehan n logic,fact,or custom... ;10but thisleadsus into a realmof mysticismnd undebatablebeliefwithwhichwe cannotbeconcerned hen,asscientists, e follow hefactswhereheymay eadus,afterthetough-mindedmpiricismf a science f man.

VDespite he demurrerhat hasbeencited,Americannthropologists,n thewhole,seemquitepreparedo acceptthe philosophicalmplicationsf their

scientificindings. his is evident,orexample,n thecriticismsf theAmericanAnthropologicalssociation's Statement n HumanRights hat followed tspublication.n all of these,discussionenterednthe thirdaspect f theculturalrelativisticosition,ts applications.n thesediscussions,ndeed, he objectionsseemed ot so much o rise fromreservationso the philosophicalositionromwhich he Statement erived s froma feeling hatthelogicof relativism asnotbeen ollowedwithenough igor,andthat theapproachf the Statementcontained hidden thnocentrismhattended o vitiate hepositiont assumed.Barnett,orexample,eminds s1' that peoplesf all degrees f sophisticationwillstillprefer heiropinionso oursdespitehequantitiesf 'evidence'hat wecanbring o bear. Or Stewardl2aysthat a declarationbouthumanrightscan comeperilouslyloseto advocacyf Americandeologicalmperialism.

9 Cf. Man and His Works, pp. 76-78.10 Arthur Child, Review of Man and His Works (Ethics, vol. 59, pp. 222-225, 1949).Another critique of cultural relativism by a philosopher, more extended than that of Childand in the full philosophical tradition, in contrast, of calm examination of an intellectualposition, appeared too recently to permit any considerationof it here. See Eliseo Vivas, TheMoral Life and the Ethical Life (Chicago, 1950), especiallyCh. I.11 On Science and Human Rights (AmericanAnthropologist,vol. 50, pp. 352-355, 1948).12 Comments on the Statement on Human Rights (American Anthropologist,vol. 50, pp.351-352, 1948).

28



9/11

TENDER- AND TOUGH-MINDED ANTHROPOLOGYThe pointat issueherewouldnot seem o berelativism,s such,but whetheranthropologists,s scientists,anspeakas scientists n matters f practicalon-cern.This is thepoint o whichBennettwrote13n discussinghetwocomments

on the Statement hathavejustbeencited,whenhe says, The criticisms fSteward ndBarnett ould ead to this:Because f the possibility f . . . dis-agreement,we must blind ourselveso the implicationsf our work.This,however, irtuallydeniesa socialhumanityo the scientist.We wouldappearto needdebate ndargumentver heimplicationsf anthropologicalesearch-not a pretenseat purity.Of similar import are certain reaction to the implicationsof relativism asset forth in Man and His Works.Thus Hoebel, writingto the point made that,in practice,the philosophyof relativism s a philosophyof tolerance,and recog-nizing that a larger measure of toleranceis needed in this conflict-tornworldneeds no arguing, feels that relativism fails to give due consideration o theneed for selectivityand integration n the formationof culture. It is a socialneed, he continues, for any society to select but a few, and reject many, outof all possible lines of behavior. .. . And because a world society means aworldculturewith a certainmeasureof integration,and all presentculturalsys-tems are mostcertainlynot compatiblewith eachother, then somesocial normswill have to give along the way. Not all can be tolerated. 14On the otherhand, Bennett'spositionon the Statement hat we are justi-fied, while speakingas scientists, n using only those findingsof our sciencethatcontribute o the ends we, as citizensdesire,15would seem to be far too cynicalfor most scientists.This is scarcelythe answerto the problemthe scientistmustface as citizen, if the franchise of science as a means of achievingan objective

analysisof experiences to be maintained. t is simplynot true,as Bennettasserts,that in discussionsof racism,anthropologists uppressed he known facts con-cerningthe existenceof differencesbetweenhumangroups n their desireto stresssimilarities. t wouldbe exceedinglydifficult o document he statementhe makesin this connection, hat Scientifically,we know that differencesbetweenhumanvarietiescanand do exist;ideologically, t serves our purpose o deny them. It isapparent hat Bennetthas forgottenthe differencebetweena scientist'sorderingof knownfact for the laymanso as to placethemin scientifically alidperspectiveand the propagandist's uppressionof facts to attain a given end.These discussions,with their varying emphases,also have to do with the

13 Scienceand HumanRights:Reasonand Action (AmericanAnthropologist,ol. 51,pp.329-337,1949).14 AmericanAnthropologist,ol. 51, pp. 473-474,1949.15 Op.cit.,p. 334.

29



10/11

SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGYbroaderproblemof the relation betweenthe researchaspect of our science andits applications,a topic that is outsidethe scopeof this paper.This is clear, forexample,when Stewardstates, As a scientificorganization, he Associationhasno businessdealingwith the rightsof man. Barnett,likewise,is writingto thissameproblemwhen he says, It is an inescapable act that we cannot at the sametime be moralists (and policy makers) and scientists. The questionsraisedbythe problemof the scientistas citizenare not only being facedby anthropologists,but by all scientistsand, indeed,byscholars n the humanitiesas well. Admittedly,it is especiallydifficult n the disciplineswheremanstudiesman.Here we may onlycall attentionto the fact that, as has beenpointedout elsewhere,16manyof thesedifficultieswould be resolvedif social scientists would recognizethe differencebetweenwhathas beencalled the curiosity unction of theirwork- pure science-and the applicationof their findings-engineering.This would not resolveallthe problems,as the exactand natural scienceshave learned,but it wouldgreatlyreduce he numberof them thatwould have to be faced.

Only one more point may be made of the criticism evelled at the attemptsthat have been madeto point the practical mplications f the relativistic indingsof anthropology. t is difficult o see how the recognitionof a culturaldifferenceis the same as an advocacyof it. There can be no questionas to the selectivityof cultures;the primary esson of cultural diffusionteachesthis. It would seemthat whatculturalrelativismimplies n its recognitionof the existenceof culturalpluralism s just this: that the values every humangroup assignsto its conven-tions arise out of its own historicalbackground,and can be understoodonly inthe light of that background.Relativismestablishes the fact, and forces therecognitionof the processas a continuingone; and on the level of application,stresses he importance f allowing,ratherthan imposingacceptancesof culturalelementsnewly experienced.Steward'sdoubt that in urgingthat values be respectedbecause man is freeonly whenhe lives as his societydefinesfreedom,'we reallymean to approvethesocial castesystemof India,the racialcastesystemof the United States,or manyof the other varietiesof social discriminationn the world only confuses theissues. To recognizethe force of conventions n culturesother than one's ownthat are not congenialto one'senculturatedpatternsof thought is one thing; toinsist on suppressing hem is quite another.In addition,it is somethingentirelydifferentwhenwe, as Americans, ry to do something o correct the racialcastesystemof the United States of whichwe, as membersof the societyof whoseculture this is a part, do not approve.In recognizing he validityof all ways of

16 Man and His Works, pp. 649-653.

30



11/11

TENDER- AND TOUGH-MINDED ANTHROPOLOGY 31life for thosewho live in accordancewith them,culturalrelativismdoes not denythe dynamicsof cultureby insistingon an unchangingacceptanceby a peopleoftheir pre-existingways of life, or by failing to take into account the influenceof culturaltransmissionn making for culturalchange.It acceptsthese, and inits acceptanceachievesthe most fruitful approach o the problemof the natureand significanceof differentialvalues in culture that has yet been devised.For,as scientistsconcernedwith the problemof value, we will deny our professedmethodologicalassumptionsand the empiricism f our scientificpoint of view ifwe do not movefromthe facts as we haveestablished hemin arrivingat generali-zations regardingthis phase of culture which we realize is so importantfor usto understand.

NORTHWESTERNNIVERSITYEVANSTON,LLINOIS

values in culture herskovits

Documents