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PWR 1: Writing Wrongs
Asserting Control
Unpacking the True Mechanisms of China’s Internet Censorship
In recent years, with the spread of social media and the
increased activity on blogging sites, the Internet has been praised as
a tool that enables social change and encourages public debate. The
claim was dramatically proven this spring by the events in the Middle
East, as social networking sparked revolts that had reverberating
effects. However, when it comes to discussions of political
involvement and freedom of speech, China is always cited as an
example where censorship has unjustly kept a population in fear and
ignorance. The nation’s dictatorial hold on media both in print and
online has been decreed an assault on freedom of speech and an
infringement of basic human rights, and the government is depicted
as an oppressor, suppressing a nation that longs for democracy.
However, if it is true that China is indeed rising up in its demands for
greater political freedom, why did it not follow in Egypt and Libya’s
footsteps? Is it possible that the Chinese government may not in fact
be a ‘Big Brother’ as is depicted by the foreign press?
In this essay, we will explore the precise means by which
Internet censorship places restraint upon public debate and social
mobilization in China. The belief that Internet controls and lack of
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access to information cultivates popular ignorance is a concept that is
fundamentally simplistic. Case studies will be included to illustrate
and strengthen points of argument, while comparisons will also be
drawn to other nations. By demonstrating that censorship does not
prevent access to information, but instead imposes a threatening
presence that encourages self-censorship given the current social,
economic and cultural context, we can begin to unpack the true
mechanisms behind China’s control of the Internet. It is not the
censorship of information itself that is suppressing public debate and
the push for greater political freedom; rather, it is the assertion of
control and the conscious display of power by the Chinese
government that discourages criticism and keeps dissidents in check.
Such a display is effective as it works in conjunction with the current
economic, social and cultural conditions that exist in China, forming a
argument that must be examined in two parts: the effect of censorship
upon behavior, and the pre-existing attitudes towards social revolt
that exists in China today.
Censorship: a Brief History
Censorship in China takes many forms, encompassing print
media, public broadcasting, and most infamously, the Internet. Only
by understanding the role of the Internet in Chinese society, and the
exact methods and strategies employed by the government in
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censoring online material can we hope to understand the effect that
censorship has had on the populace.
In 1978, when faced with a stagnating economy following the
events of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the
Communist Party of China at the time, implemented vast economic
reforms that transformed China and brought it into the modern age.
Urban areas became hubs of industry and economic growth, and
according to researcher Marina Yue Zhang, an estimated 400 million
people were lifted out of poverty over the past 30 years (2). Promoting
widespread use of technology became an integral part of Chinese
developmental strategies, skyrocketing the country and its citizens
into a modern age at unprecedented rates. As quoted by the scholar
John Lagerkvist, the China Internet Network Information Center
reported in July 2010 that 420 million Chinese – a larger number than
the entire population of the United States – now accesses the Internet
via Chinese networks, and that number is expected to continue
increasing (12).
The project of censoring the Internet was initiated by the
Chinese Communist Party in 1998, and began operations in 2003.
Peter Marolt classifies censorship into four categories: the “Great
Firewall of China”, ISP-enforced blacklisting of specific words and
phrases, the control of multinational technology corporations and
real-world access controls (2). Websites providing access to
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information about the Falun Gong, the Tiananmen Square Protests of
1989 and the Free Tibet movement are blocked, as are some Chinese-
language foreign news websites. Blog posts containing the names of
government officials and keywords are heavily monitored, while
access to social media sites such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and
Flickr is infamously prohibited. Although these restrictions generally
do not interfere with normal day-to-day activities of Internet, the
effects of censorship are nonetheless pervasive and ever-present,
asserting a presence that subtly guides all online activities in China.
Failings, Foucault, and the Power of Fear
Censorship clearly exerts an extremely tangible online
presence, affecting each and every Internet user in China. However,
the question of what effect these acts of censorship have had upon the
Chinese online community, and the nature of this effect is subject to
debate. Certainly, knowledge about certain issues is difficult to access
in China, and access to non-Chinese-based social media sites is largely
restricted. Nonetheless, what matters is whether these censors are
fulfilling their intended purpose of concealing truth from individuals,
cultivating ignorance and promoting government propaganda.
Of all the subjects that the Chinese government seeks to hide,
perhaps no other event evokes stronger emotions than the Tiananmen
Square Massacre. Despite diligent attempts made by the Chinese
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government to promulgate their version of the events that took place,
the Chinese public remains aware of the atrocities that were
committed by the State, to a greater degree than an outside observer
might expect. Although there is no concrete data examining
awareness within China itself, the relatively recent event – having
occurred a mere 22 years prior – is vividly remembered by all those
who are of middle age. The China-based organization Tiananmen
Mothers, founded by Deng Zilin in response to her son’s death during
the massacre, continues to campaign peacefully within China for the
recognition and remembrance of the tragic event (Time Magazine).
Many artists and filmmakers, including Ai Weiwei and Yue Minjun,
also produce work in reference to the event. Awareness is of a
sufficient level that prior to the event’s 20th anniversary, officers in
both uniforms and plainclothes patrolled the square, subjecting
visitors to bag searches, requesting identification and restricting
entry for both local and foreign journalists (BBC).
In this day and age of rampant globalization, when China is
integrally connected to the rest of the world, completely covering up
information is no longer a realistic goal. No matter what restrictions
are applied, savvy individuals with tech know-how will find means of
circumventing censors and accessing banned sites. For some
individuals, including casual Internet users, the act of censoring a
website is enough to discourage interest. However, the conclusion is
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that though China’s censors make it difficult for the average Internet
user to stumble upon knowledge that has been deemed a threat to the
Chinese government, a determined individual could easily find the
means of accessing the information that they wanted. Therefore,
censorship serves as discouragement, but no firewall is realistically
capable of hiding truth from an entire nation of Internet users.
Clearly, although censors have an effect, the full influence of
Internet censorship in China cannot solely be the product of limited
access to information and cultivation of ignorance. Instead, it is public
displays of control and indirect intimidation that discourages public
dissent online, essentially creating a society in which people are
motivated to censor their own actions, adhering to regulations without
the need of excessive governmental
intervention. This balance of power can be
described as a “Panopticon” – a term first coined by Jeremy Bentham
in 1787, and later developed into a model of social control by French
philosopher Michel Foucault. This model serves as a good point of
reference to which Chinese strategies of censorship may be compared
and explained, clarifying the factors that currently influence the
public’s behavior as a society.
The Panopticon itself consists of a multistoried, circular prison
with individual cells lined up along the circumference, all of which
open up onto a central courtyard. A watchtower stands in the middle,
Figure 1. An original drawing of a Panopticon and its envisioned layout. Note the cells around the
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lined with windows that allow guards to
look out, but not allowing prisoners to look
in. The inability of inmates to judge
whether a guard is actually present forces
them to believe that they are always
watched, enforcing obedience even when
guards are not actually present (13). Foucault takes this model one
step further, applying it to politics and social control. He argues that
if a government can assert a strong enough presence and generate
enough intimidation, they would “induce in the ‘inmate’ a state of
conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic
functioning of power” (201). Thus, by reminding the public of their
own permanent visibility, while preventing the masses from ever
knowing the extent to which they are watched, order can be easily
maintained within any system.
Online censorship in China mirrors Foucault’s model of social
control, cultivating a form of “self-censorship” that may play a
considerably larger role in suppressing dissent than direct action
does. As Foucault states, such a setting, “arranges things in such a
way that the exercise of power is not added on from the outside, like a
rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions it invests, but is so subtly
present in them as to increase their efficiency” (206). These words are
a remarkable summary of the means by which the Chinese
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government exerts its power over the Chinese population – rather
than fight a losing battle against the penetrative power of Internet-
assisted knowledge, censorship works in more complex ways,
discouraging interest in dangerous topics. These ‘subtle constraints’
include the replacement of Western social media sites with Chinese-
based alternatives, and the active monitoring of blogs and discussion
forums, both serving as ‘watchtowers’ that intimidate the public into
self-censorship.
Censorship represents an assertion of power and authority, and
– as demonstrated by Foucault’s model – is most effective when the
populace is acutely aware of its presence. Perhaps the most visible
and infamous aspect of online policies in China is the banning of
Western social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube –
online staples for many Internet users around the world. As a result,
Chinese entrepreneurs have exploited the gap in the Chinese market
by providing their own versions of banned sites, sites that willingly
conform to local online regulations while satisfying a nation of
consumers. For instance, Tudou (土豆 ) and Youku (优酷 ) are both
video-hosting sites that possess similar capabilities to that of
YouTube. Both were founded by Chinese entrepreneurs who, following
the banning of YouTube in 2009, sought to control the Chinese
market.
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At first it seems as though the government’s motives are clear;
replacing foreign-based websites possessing large global networks
with solely China-based versions limits the spread of potentially
subversive ideas that would otherwise filter in from other nations.
However, the government’s monopolistic hold on social media serves
an additional purpose, ultimately forcing the nation to use a form of
social media that exposes users to monitoring and control. Currently,
Renren is China’s predominant social media site, with over 31 million
active users in April 2011 (Wall Street Journal). The website is also
one of the most heavily censored, with built-in filters that prevent the
posting of content relating to Tiananmen Square, the names of
government officials, the Falun Gong and the Free Tibet movement.
Thus, by maintaining control over the single social media site that
exists in China, the government creates an effective monitor and filter
that the populace has no choice but to participate in.
The fear of being caught and identified, and potentially
punished by such control, plays a major role in discouraging dissent,
creating a strong culture of self-censorship motivated by fear.
According to expert Peter Marolt, the Internet police monitors,
identifies, and expunges subversive posts online using specially
designed software that automatically targets key phrases (53). Direct
action ranges from deleting posts and blocking websites to physical
incarceration. However, the latter only occurs on a sporadic basis,
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following repeat or highly severe offences (54). For example, the high-
profile arrest of the artist Ai Weiwei in April this year for alleged tax
evasion was heavily publicized by foreign media, provoking rumors
that the true reason for his incarceration was the maintenance of a
daily blog pushing for political reform (The New York Times).
Although such measures subject the government to heavy criticism,
their actions also serve as a thinly veiled warning to others in China
who might seek to disseminate similar messages, reminding the
population of their vulnerability under China’s gaze.
As can be seen from the illustrations given above, censorship
serves purposes other than the simple restriction of access to
material. By reminding the populace of the government’s ability to
block information, monopolize social media, and actively block posts
made on blogs and in forums by individuals, China is asserting its
presence online. Therefore, the mechanism by which censorship
works within the nation is not so much an issue of suppression and
cultivation of ignorance, but of intimidation and self-censorship. By
employing such indirect means and ingraining desired behavior into
the mindsets of Internet users, China promotes a situation in which
heavy-handed forces is usually not required. However, such tactics
must be evaluated within the context in which they are used. Clearly,
such an approach must be supported by current economic, social and
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cultural conditions unique to China, factors that will be explored in
the following section.
The Specificities of Time and Place
Up to this point, discussions have focused on the ways in which
the Chinese government actively discourages and threatens those that
voice open criticism online, while encouraging self-censorship.
However, the perception that Chinese citizens live in constant fear is
a vast oversimplification of a highly complex issue. The relative lack of
political activism in China at present is not only influenced by
government policies, but also by a myriad of situational factors.
Within a population, the desire to revolt and instigate political change
is a phenomenon that is inextricably tied to social, economic, and
cultural factors – factors that have to be explored if we are to gain a
full understanding of China’s current political clime in relation to the
topic of censorship.
Firstly, from an economic perspective, China’s economy is not
only stable, but also growing at a steady rate. Increasing wealth, a
swelling middle-class and rapid industrialization is causing China to
be heralded as the world’s next great superpower, and the Chinese
populace is keenly aware of it. A healthy economy means that the
people are content, and even willing to overlook issues of free speech.
For example, to illustrate the points made above, during the Egyptian
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uprising that took place in early 2011, some political commentators
were already speculating about the possibility of the Arab Spring
being followed by a Chinese Winter – an event that clearly never
occurred.
There are several flaws that made such a prediction highly
unlikely, the most significant of which are the current economic
differences between Egypt and China. Egyptians protested against
rampant corruption, escalating poverty, and severe unemployment;
these qualities are simply not currently present in China to the same
degree. According to a Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted two
years ago, “Twenty-eight percent of Egyptians were “satisfied” with
their country’s direction, down from 47 percent a few years earlier; 87
percent of Chinese were satisfied, up from 83 percent. Only 23
percent of Egyptians were optimistic about their own life prospects
over the next five years, versus 74 percent of Chinese (and 52 percent
of Americans)” (The Atlantic). Although the data may be questionable,
given that respondents were predominantly urban dwellers, the
results indicate that the motivation for violent revolt simply was not
there.
China’s current economic strength, and the role that technology
has played in the nation’s modernization has led to different
perspectives of Internet’s place in society. As researcher Jen Damm
elaborates, “Western discourses have focused on democratization and
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political change…The Chinese discourse, on the other hand, is very
technology-deterministic, focused entirely on the potential economic
and modernizing benefits of the new communication technologies”
(93). This perception of the Internet as a tool for economic
development simply is more pervasive than views of the Internet as a
tool for social development, and social media does not hold the same
value that it does in other societies. Admittedly, these two views are
not mutually exclusive, and clearly there are those that do see the
potential of using online media as a means of communication and
access to information. Nonetheless, China’s history of immense
economic growth and the current satisfaction of the population with
the Chinese government, when combined with existing censorship,
enhance the population’s reluctance to openly criticize.
Secondly, from a social perspective, demographics of Internet
users are highly skewed, representing a section of the population that
may not be representative of the nation’s beliefs as a whole.
According research conducted by Junhua Zhang, over 80% of Internet
users in China are below the age of 35, and the majority live in urban
environments (45). This means that it is primarily those individuals of
higher educational background and social status that are accessing
blogs and social media sites, representing a section of the population
that is currently in a position of relative comfort and economic
satisfaction. Many of those living below the poverty line in rural parts
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of China do not have access to the Internet, and do not possess
sufficient levels of education to actively participate in social debate,
effectively cutting them out of the picture. Instead, the individuals
that do, number among the growing urban middle class – a
demographic that may be more unwilling than others to place
themselves at risk.
Some analysts argue that it is precisely the rising generation of
youthful intellectuals in China that will be the primary arbiters of
social change. It was such a generation that organized the public
protests of 1989, and many believe that it is precisely the Internet
users that will most strongly advocate for social change. However,
researcher Junhua Zhang argues that this view does not take into
account the changing attitudes of modern youths and young adults
who were not direct witnesses to the Tiananmen Square massacre,
and therefore do not attach the same emotions the event that older
generations do (91). Having grown up accustomed to restricted sites
and the practice of self-censorship, there is some evidence that
younger generations do not so much see the Internet as a tool for
social change, as they see it as a tool for entertainment and personal
pleasure.
Data collected online reveals interesting trends about patterns
of behavior. According to the eBusiness Knowledgebase website,
which ranks blogs based on each website's Alexa Global Traffic Rank,
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and U.S. Traffic Rank from both Compete and Quantcast, Huffington
Post is the top blog viewed by Americans, followed by business and
entertainment sites such as Business Insider, Perez Hilton and
Gizmodo. In contrast, a study conducted in 2007 by Johan Lagerkvist
revealed that not a single one of Mainland China’s top 100 bloggers
discussed political issues or advocated social change (73). Instead,
popular blogs in China are overwhelmingly focused on fashion,
lifestyle, gossip and the stock market, reflecting different patterns of
behavior online. Whether this is a result to censorship or social
changes, it clearly reveals the dominant preoccupations of Internet
users in China, demonstrating that the technology’s potential for
inciting social change has not been heavily utilized.
Thirdly, from a cultural perspective, Chinese attitudes and
beliefs are still deeply rooted in Confucian principles, as well as
mindsets cultivated by recent historical events such as the Cultural
Revolution. Many of these mindsets encourage respect for authority,
adherence to social and political hierarchies and a non-confrontational
approach to politics – attitudes that continue to subtly play a role in
shaping Chinese society. What many Western commentators overlook
is the fact that issues such as democracy and elections are viewed in a
very different context in many non-Western nations, and may not in
fact be seen as the ultimate goal of the people. China’s government –
officially known as the Chinese Communist Party – gained its position
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of power during the Cultural Revolution, a period that continues to
evoke strong memories within the populace.
Confucianism plays a large part in shaping Chinese culture,
despite past attempts made by the Chinese government to quash the
belief system. It is a philosophy that places great emphasis upon
harmony, and as researcher Rodney Wai-Chi Chu states, “does not
emphasize treating individuals on equal terms, but rather focuses on
the relationships between people as the basic unit of society” (27).
This view implies that Chinese individuals do not view the significance
of democracy to be as paramount as Western individuals might
consider it to be, and instead prefer to maintain stable relationships
between the people and the state. In Confucian terms, social
development would therefore best be achieved not by endowing each
and every individual with increased freedom, but instead by improving
the moral values of both state and society (29). This represents a key
difference that separates Chinese and Western viewers, resulting in
different interpretations and value judgments that affect perceptions
of censorship.
The reality in China today is that Chinese citizens – as stated by
Peter Marolt – “are ignoring or avoiding such discourses of legitimacy
and their attendant narratives of control and censorship” (60) for
reasons that go beyond censorship itself. The lack of public dissent
and criticism online is not a mere product of government efforts and
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the spreading of fear; instead, social, economic and cultural contexts
play a large role in providing motivations for civil debate. At this time,
the condition of the Chinese populace is positive – despite its
shortcomings, the government is viewed as a force that has
modernized China and brought millions out of poverty. The potential
costs of overthrowing the current powers are far too great for the
sake of gains that are negligible in Confucian belief, resulting in a
population willing to bow down to governmental power at this present
time.
Looking Forward
Censorship is not a direct means to an end. Rather, censorship
in China is used as a demonstration of control, discouraging public
criticism and reminding citizens of the government’s far-reaching
gaze. In the first half of the essay, this phenomena was discussed in
detail: while suppressing the dissemination of subversive information
online creates an effective obstacle for many, this form of censorship
alone is not enough to cultivate a society of docile ignorance. Instead,
the Chinese government has chosen – consciously or not – to mirror
Foucault’s Panoptic model of social control. By limiting forms of social
media to those monitored by the government, and scanning millions of
individual blog posts for subversive material, the government
constantly reminds the populace of its presence. These acts serve as
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an effective “watchtower”, intimidating the populace into a state of
self-censorship.
In the second half of the essay, we explored the social, economic
and cultural conditions that make the intimidation imposed by China’s
censorship policies effective. As it currently stands, China’s trend of
steady economic growth, rising levels of wealth and increasing living
standards temper the nation’s desire for greater political freedom.
The trend in Internet users also consists of a demographic that is
satisfied with China’s current social and economic stability, with no
desire to voice critical dissent at the risk of losing their place in
society. Finally, China’s history of having undergone the Cultural
Revolution, and its long history of Confucian influence have left many
people reluctant to upset a social hierarchy that is currently
successful from an economic standpoint. With different views towards
freedom of speech and human rights, coupled with the ample
discouragement enforced by Internet censorship, the majority of the
Chinese population simply does not feel compelled to upset the status
quo at this point in time.
China’s system of censorship is so effective that it has left many
observers in awe, marveling at the relative efficiency with which a
nation’s critical opinion and dissent is subdued by the government.
Yet when critiquing foreign systems of governance and control, it is
important to recognize the complexity and multifaceted qualities of
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such regulations. The attitude of China’s populace towards the
limitations that have been placed upon their Internet usage is one that
results from a variety of factors – and not all of them have to do with
censorship itself. As Foucaultian model, China successfully maintains
the boundary between overt suppression and gentle encouragement
of self-censorship, never quite overstepping into the role of Big
Brother. Additionally, China has also proven to the world that it
remains a rising power, demonstrating the strengths of its
government despite external political criticism. Eventually, China will
have to come to terms with its political system and the issues
surrounding free speech; however, for now we must be content as
spectators, impartially evaluating the interactions taking place within
this complex nation.
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Works Cited
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