FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 79664, August 11, 1992 ]

ANDRES VILLAVILLA AND ESTER GADIENTE

VILLAVILLA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION,

REYNALDO MERCADO, AND MARCELO COSUCO,

RESPONDENTS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,

INTERVENOR.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court

of Appeals dated April 10, 1987, affirming the Order[2] of the Social

Security Commission dated November 28, 1984, dismissing the

complaint of herein petitioners for lack of cause of action, as well as

the Resolution[3] of respondent court denying the motion of petitioners

for reconsideration.

The antecedents: Arturo Villavilla, son of petitioners, was employed as

"tripulante" (crew member) of the fishing boat "F/B Saint Theresa"

from 1974 until September 11, 1977, when the boat sank off Isla

Binatikan, Taytay, Palawan. Arturo was not among the known

survivors of that sinking and had been missing since then.[4]

On November 20, 1979, petitioners Andres Villavilla and Ester

Gadiente Villavilla, parents of Arturo, filed a petition with the Social

Security Commission against Reynaldo Mercado and Marcelino

Cosuco, owners of the ill-fated fishing boat, for death compensation

benefits of Arturo whom respondents failed to register as their

employee.[5]

On May 29, 1981, the Social Security System (SSS) filed a petition in

intervention alleging that records from the SSS Production

Department showed that "F/B Saint Theresa", owned by Marcelino

Cosuco and operated by Reynaldo Mercado, was a registered

member-employer, and that in the event petitioners succeeded in

proving the employment of Arturo with private respondents, the latter

should be held liable in damages equivalent to the benefits due the

petitioners for failure to report Arturo for coverage pursuant to Sec.

24 (a) of the Social Security Act, as amended.[6]

Respondent Cosuco filed his answer denying all allegations in the

petition and claiming that he already sold the fishing boat to

respondent Mercado on December 10, 1975, and from then on he did

not participate anymore in the operation and management of the boat

nor in the hiring of its crewmembers.[7]

Meanwhile respondent Mercado was declared in default for failure to

file his answer.

After petitioners had presented their evidence and rested their case,

respondent Cosuco filed a motion to dismiss (demurrer to evidence)

on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action.[8]

On November 28, 1984, respondent Social Security Commission

issued an Order dismissing the petition for lack of cause of action.[9]

On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals in its decision of April 10,

1987, affirmed the questioned Order of respondent Commission there

being no reversible error.[10]

Petitioners are before Us predicating their petition for review on the

following issues: whether there was an employer-employee

relationship between petitioners' deceased son, Arturo Villavilla, and

herein private respondents; whether private respondents are liable for

death compensation benefits of Arturo Villavilla; and, whether there

was a violation of the Social Security Act, as amended, by private

respondents for not registering Arturo Villavilla with the System as

their employee as mandated by law.

Petitioners argue that it was private respondent Reynaldo Mercado

who recruited Arturo Villavilla sometime in 1974 to be a crew member

of the fishing boat "F/B Saint Theresa" with a daily wage of P20.00.

The boat was then owned by private respondent Marcelino Cosuco and

operated by Reynaldo Mercado. On December 10, 1975, Cosuco sold

the fishing boat to Mercado.

Invoking Negre vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission,[11]

petitioners assert that "fishermen-crew members are individual

employees and not industrial partners as in the case at bar" so that

the "mere presence of Arturo Villavilla in the fishing boat of Mercado

makes him an employee of the employer, Mercado." Further citing RJL

Martinez Fishing Corporation vs. NLRC,[12] petitioners posit that "the

main factor that determines whether a person is an employee of the

employer is the kind of work being performed by that person. If the

work of the laborer is part of the regular business or occupation of the

employer, the said laborer is a regular employee of the employer."

Petitioners thus contend that since Arturo was recruited by Mercado

himself sometime in 1974 as one of his fishermen-crew members and

that the crew members were uniformly paid by Mercado, there can be

no other conclusion but that Arturo was an employee of Mercado at

the time his fishing boat sank.

A careful and assiduous review of the records, however, completely

undermines the base of petitioners’ position. The records disclose that

the relationship between Mercado and the crew members of the ship

headed by its skipper, Capt. Pedro Matibag, is one positively showing

the existence of a joint venture. This is clearly revealed in the

testimonies of Capt. Pedro Matibag and Gil Chua, a crew member,

both witnesses for petitioners, to wit:

"Atty. Aganan (to witness Pedro Matibag):

Q. Mr. Witness, will you tell us who your employer is?

A. Mr. Cosuco, Ma'am.

x x x x

Q. Who pays your salary?

A. The procedure is sharing. If we have a catch, we share

the catch.

Q. What is the nature of 'partihan' or sharing?

A. Upon selling the fish to the market, a certain portion

will be deducted for the expenses and taken by the

checker and the remaining amount will be shared by the

crew-members.

Q. By crew-members, you mean, those who are fishing

or who catch fish?

A. Yes, Ma'am.

x x x x

Q. Is the checker also paid and also included in the

sharing?

A. Yes, Ma'am.[13]

x x x x

Atty. Riva:

Q. Mr. Captain, is Arturo Villavilla a member of the crew?

A. A fisherman.

Q. As a fisherman, what is his duty?

A. His duty is, he will ride the fishing boat and he will

'mangangawil.'

Q. By the way, who hired him?

A. There was a master whom we talked to.

Q. And this master is the one who hired him and gave

him the share for fishing?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. So, assuming that Marcelino Cosuco is the owner, he

has nothing to do with Arturo Villavilla?

A. Yes, Sir, it was the master.

Q. And the same was through (true) with Reynaldo

Mercado that he has nothing to do with the hiring of

Arturo Villavilla because it is the master fisherman who

hired him, is that right?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. And Mr. Mercado only buys fish from them?

A. Yes, Sir.[14]

x x x x

Hearing Officer:

Q. Do you want to convey to this Honorable Commission

Mr. Matibag, that you went to fishing venture to fish?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. In this fishing venture, do you have any agreement to

(with) the owner of the fishing boat?

A. Our agreement with the owner was to go to high seas

for fishing.

Q. Do you receive monthly salary from the owner of the

fishing boat?

A. None, Sir, because it was a sharing basis.

Q. So, what is the contribution of the owner of the fishing

boat to your fishing venture?

A. Food and other equipment.

Q. Mr. Matibag, who supplied you the gasoline?

A. The owner of the fishing boat, Sir.

Q. Who gave you provisions or food in your fishing or

during the duration of your fishing?

A. The owner.

Q. While you were in high seas, was there anybody who

supervised you?

A. None, Sir, there was no radio. I gave the order.

Q. Before you go (sic) to the high seas for fishing

purposes, did you receive any instruction from the

owner?

A. There was no instruction given.[15]

x x x x

Atty. Agana (to witness Gil Chua):

Q. Will you please inform the Honorable Investigator how

much is your salary and where did you get your salary?

A. It was given to us by the captain when there is (sic) a

sale.

Q. So, I understand from you, Mr. witness, that

whenever there is a sale of fish, you get a share?

A. We received P200 or P300, not the same always.

x x x x

Atty. Riva:

Q. Depending on the volume of sale of fish, is it not?

A. That is all I know.[16]

x x x x

Hearing Officer:

Q. Was there a time that you did not receive any share?

A. If we have a trip, we usually receive.

Q. How about if there is no trip, did you receive any

salary from Mr. Mercado as owner of fishing boat St.

Theresa?

A. No., Sir.

x x x x

Q. So, you are sure Mister Witness, that when your

fishing boat has no catch, you did (sic) riot receive any

share?

A. Yes, Sir."[17]

It is thus clear that the arrangement between the boat owner and the

crew members, one of whom was petitioners’ son, partook of the

nature of a joint venture: the crew members did not receive fixed

compensation as they only shared in their catch; they ventured to the

sea irrespective of the instructions of the boat owners, i.e., upon their

own best judgment as to when, how long, and where to go fishing;

the boat owners did not hire them but simply joined the fishing

expedition upon invitation of the ship master, even without the

knowledge of the boat owner. In short, there was neither right of

control nor actual exercise of such right on the part of the boat owner

over his crew members.

Consequently, respondent Court of Appeals is correct in upholding the

application by respondent Social Security Commission of the ruling in

Pajarillo v. Social Security System[18] where We held:

"x x x an employee is defined as a ‘person who performs

services for an employer in which either or both mental

and physical efforts are used and who receives

compensation for such services, where there is an

employer-employee relationship’ (Sec. 8[d], Rep. Act

1161 as amended by Rep. Act 2658). In the present

case, neither the pilots nor the crew-members receive

compensation from boat-owners. They only share in their

own catch produced by their own efforts. There is no

showing that outside of their one third share, the boat-

owners have anything to do with the distribution of the

rest of the catch among the pilots and the crew-

members. The latter perform no service for the boat-

owners, but mainly for their own benefit.

"In the undertaking in question, the boat-owners

obviously are not responsible for the wage, salary, or fee

of the pilot and crew-members. Their sole participation in

the venture is the furnishing or delivery of the equipment

used for fishing, after which, they merely wait for the

boat's return and receive their share in the catch, if there

is any. For his part, a person who joins the outfit is

entitled to a share or participation in the fruit of the

fishing trip. If it gives no return, the men get nothing. It

appears to us therefore that the undertaking is in the

nature of a joint venture, with the boat-owner supplying

the boat and its equipments (sic), and the pilot and

crew-members contributing the necessary labor, and the

parties getting specific shares for their respective

contributions.

x x x x

"Add to this extreme difficulty, if not impossibility of

determining the monthly wage or earning of these

fishermen for the purpose of fixing the amount of their

and the supposed-employer's contributions (See Secs. 18

and 19, Ibid.), and there in every reason to exempt the

parties to this kind of undertaking from compulsory

registration with the Social Security System."

Certainly, petitioners' reliance on Negre v. Workmen's Compensation

Commission, supra, and RJL Fishing Corp. v. NLRC, supra, is

misplaced. The observations of respondent Social Security

Commission are more persuasive and correct. Thus -

"The case of Jose Negre vs. Workmen's Compensation,

et. al., 135 SCRA 651, invoked by the petitioners-

appellants in support of their claim that there existed an

employer-employee relationship between their son Arturo

Villavilla and private respondent Reynaldo Mercado

cannot be applied to the instant case for the simple

reason that the facts in the aforesaid case are different

from those in the case at bar. A look at the Jose Negre

case will show that it made referral to the case of Abong

vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 54 SCRA 379,

wherein this Honorable Court stated, and we beg to

quote:

x x x x

'In Abong vs, Workmen's Compensation Commission (54 SCRA 379)

we held that fisherman crew-members Manuel and Miguel are

employees and not industrial partners.'

x x x x

"It is to be noted, however, that in the case of Abong vs.

Workmen's Compensation Commission, this Honorable

Court stated and we again beg to quote:

x x x x

'As pointed by the Commissions finding, the fundamental bases

showing that petitioner Dr. Agustin R. Abong is the employer, are

present, namely, the selection and engagement of the employee; the

payment of wages; the power of dismissal and the employer's a power

to control the employees conduct. These powers were lodged in

petitioner Abong, thru his agent, Simplicio Panganiban, whom he

alleges to be his partner. On this score alone, the petition for review

must fail. It is well-settled that employer-employee relationship

involves findings of facts which are conclusive and binding and not

subject to review by this Court. (underscoring supplied).’

x x x x

"Interestingly, the aforementioned fundamental bases for

the existence of employer-employee relationship are not

present in the case at bar. As mentioned earlier, private

respondent Reynaldo Mercado had no connection with

the selection and engagement of Arturo Villavilla (pp. 38-

39, T.S.N. 12-6-83); exercised no power of dismissal

over Arturo Villavilla; neither had he any power of control

or had reserved the right to control Arturo Villavilla as to

the result of the work to be done as well as the means

and methods by which the same is to be accomplished,

and there was no such uniform salary involved (pp. 41-

43, T.S.N. 12-6-83)."

In the case before Us, it is clear that there was no employer-employee

relationship between petitioners's son Arturo and private respondent

Mercado, much less private respondent Cosuco. As such, Arturo could

not be made subject of compulsory coverage under the Social Security

Act; hence, private respondents cannot be said to have violated said

law when they did not register him with the Social Security System. A

fortiori, respondents as well as intervenor are not answerable to

petitioners for any death benefits under the law.

Culled from the foregoing, the inexorable conclusion is that

respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the judgment of

respondent Social Security Commission.

It may not be amiss to mention that while petitioners merely raise

factual questions which are not proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, We nevertheless went to great lengths in dissecting the facts of

this case if only to convince Us that petitioners, who are pauper

litigants and seeking claims under a social legislation, have not been

denied its benefits. For, We are not unaware that in this jurisdiction all

doubts in the implementation and interpretation of provisions of social

legislations should be resolved in favor of the working class. But, alas,

justice is not fully served by sustaining the contention of the poor

simply because he is poor. Justice is done by properly applying the

law regardless of the station in life of the contending parties.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned judgment

of the appellate court, the same is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

[1] CA-G.R. No. SP-05668, per Justice Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr; Justice

Bienvenido C. Ejercito and Justice Segundino G. Chua, concurring.

[2] Annex "E", Petition, Rollo, pp. 40-42.

[3] Annex "I", Petition, Rollo, pp. 57-58.

[4] Petition, p. 1; Rollo, p. 11.

[5] Annex "A", Rollo, pp. 20-21.

[6] Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 24-25.

[7] Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 22-23.

[8] Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 26-38.

[9] Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 40-41.

[10] Annex "C", Rollo, pp. 50-53.

[11] No. L-43795, April 5, 1985; 135 SCRA 651.

[12] G.R. Nos. 63550-51, January 31, 1984; 127 SCRA 455.

[13] T.S.N., pp. 29-31, December 6, 1983.

[14] T.S.N., pp. 37-39, December 6, 1983.

[15] T.S.N., pp. 41-43, December 6, 1983.

[16] T.S.N., pp. 23-24, January 6, 1984.

[17] T.S.N., pp. 37-38, January 6, 1984.

[18] No. L-21930, August 30, 1966; 17 SCRA 1014, 1016-1017.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library

This page was dynamically generated

by the E-Library Content Management System (E-LibCMS)