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VLASON ENTERPRISES CORPORATIONv.COURT OF APPEALS and

DURAPROOF SERVICES,

represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr.

FACTS:

Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of OmegaSea

Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega) when it requestedpermission

for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing engine trouble, tounload its cargo and

have it stored in the Philippine Ports Authoritycompound in San Fernando, La

Union while awaiting transhipment toHongkong.

The Bureau of Customs approved the request. Despite the approval, the customs

personnel still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it wasthe

hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that itscargo would

be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo wereseized.

A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong TradingCo. of

Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd of Thailand.While seizure

proceedings were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, andthe vessel ran agroundand was abandoned. A salvage agreement wasentered into with the respondent

Duraproof Services to secure and repair the

vessel.

The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud.

However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a clearance andeven

forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for theforfeiture and sale

of the cargo in favor of the government.

Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition forcertiorari,

prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Manila attacking theactions of theBureau. PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils.were named as

respondents. Subsequently, Duraproof amended its

petition as to include former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager

Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises Singkong Trading Company, Dusit

International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United TradingCo., Ltd

as respondents. In both its petitions, there was failure to allegeagainst Vlason

Enterprises or pray for a relief against it.

Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents andtheir

counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be served upon thealienrespondents who had no representatives in the country.

The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds oflitis

pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declarethem in

default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents indefault. There

was no record that these motions were acted upon.

Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental petition.

The rest of the respondents were declared in default and Duraproof wasallowed topresent its evidence. With regard to Vlason Entreprises, it wasalleged that it

exhibited constant intimidation and harassment and incurredheavy overhead

expenses causing irreparable damages. The trial courtrendered a decision in favor of

Duraproof.

Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration on thegrounds it

was not impleaded, served summons or declared in default. It alsofiled a special

appearance before the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its

properties, or a TRO be issued against the auction. Its motion was grantedand the

previous decision was reversed. However, Duraproof countered thatalthough Vlason

filed the motion for reconsideration in a timely manner, it hasotherwise failed to

include a notice of hearing making its motion a mere scrap

of paperDuraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition impleading Vlason

asone of the respondents. It was granted by the CA.

Furthermore, it was able toobtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the

respondents to preventthem from interfering in the transfer of the vessel and its

cargo from the PPAcompound.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served withsummons.

RULING: No.

A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers whounder the

Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summonsaddressed to a

corporation and served on the secretary of its president bindsthat corporation. This is

based on the rationale that service must be made ona representative so integrated

with the corporation sued, that it is safe toassume that said representative had

sufficient responsibility and discretion torealize the importance of the legal papers

served and to relay the same tothe president or other responsible officer of the

corporation being sued. The

secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires, however,that the

secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to besummoned. Only in

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this manner can there be an assurance that thesecretary will bring home to the

corporation [the] notice of the filing of theaction against it.

In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who waspresident of

both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not ofpetitioner. The

piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to whenserving summons.

Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members

and stockholders who compose it. However, when the corporatefiction is used as a

means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existingobligation, circumventing astatute, achieving or perfecting a monopoly or, ingenerally perpetrating a crime, the

veil will be lifted to expose the individualscomposing it. None of the foregoing

exceptions has been shown to exist inthe present case. Quite the contrary, the

piercing of the corporate veil in thiscase will result in manifest injustice.

This we cannot allow. Hence, thecorporate fiction remains.

Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it,because the

former had not been served summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for

the Second Amended Petition with SupplementalPetition.

We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleadingsupersedes the

original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no longerconsidered part of the

record, it does not followipso factothat the service ofa new summons for amended

petitions or complaints is required. Where the

defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of asummons on

the original complaint, the amended complaint may be servedupon them without

need of another summons, even if new causes of actionare alleged.

After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the caseis finally

terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared incourt and no

summons has been validly served, new summons for theamended complaint must be

served on them. It is not the change of cause ofaction that gives rise to the need to

serve another summons for the amendedcomplaint, but rather the acquisition of

jurisdiction over the persons of thedefendants. If the trial court has not yet acquiredjurisdiction over them, anew service of summons for the amended complaint is

required.

In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impressionthat

petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it hadbeen served

summons through the secretary of its president. Thus, itdispensed with the service

on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent

amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the firstservice of

summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court neveracquired

jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a new serviceof summons for

the amended Petitions.