Open Letter to President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putinjune 27, 2017

Dear President Putin and President Trump,

The chasm between Russia and the West appears to be wider now than at any point since the Cold War. In the absence of new initiatives, the knot of distrust is being tightened, choking off the ability of governments to discuss, let alone advance, steps essential for improving the security of all people living in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Your first meeting in Hamburg will be a unique opportunity to underscore that, despite significant differences, the United States, Russia, and Europe can and must work together on areas of existential common interest — chief among them reducing nuclear and other military risks, and preventing catastrophic terrorist attacks.

The starting point could be a new Presidential Joint Declaration by the United States and the Russian Federation declaring that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This would make clear again that leaders recognize their responsibility to work together to prevent nuclear catastrophe, and would be positively received by global leaders and publics.

A second step could be to increase military-to-military communication through a new NATO–Russia Military Crisis Management Group. Restarting bilateral military-to-military dialogue between the United States and Russia, essential throughout the Cold War, should be an immediate and urgent priority. The focus of these initiatives should be on reducing risks of a catastrophic mistake or accident by restoring communication and increasing transparency and trust.

A third step could be to collaborate to prevent ISIS and other terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear and radiological materials through a joint initiative to prevent WMD terrorism. There is an urgent need to cooperate on securing vulnerable radioactive materials that could be used to produce a “dirty bomb.” Such materials are widely available in more than 150 countries and are often found in facilities, such as hospitals and universities, that are poorly secured.

Fourth, discussions are imperative for reaching at least informal understandings on cyber dangers related to interference in strategic warning systems and nuclear command and control. This should be urgently addressed to prevent war by mistake. That there are no clear “rules of the road” in the strategic nuclear cyber world is alarming.

Russia, the United States, and Europe are confronting a range of significant issues today. But none should distract from urgently pursuing practical steps now that can stop the downward spiral in relations and reduce real dangers. The steps we have identified here are a good place to begin. We respectfully urge you to start now in Hamburg.

Des Browne, a former British defense secretary, is Chair of the European Leadership Network

Wolfgang Ischinger, former German Ambassador to the United States, is Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Professor for Security Policy and Diplomatic Practice at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin

Igor S. Ivanov, former Russian Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation from 2004 to 2007, is President of the Russian International Affairs Council

Sam Nunn, a former US senator and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is CoChairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative

Russia and NATO: A Paradoxical CrisisRussia and NATO: A Paradoxical CrisisFuture historians analyzing the collapse of our relations after the Ukrainian revolution will certainly find it paradoxical. This is one of those rare and unpredictable cases where a crisis occurred under conditions that were entirely conducive to constructive dialogue and cooperation. Usually, such crises are preceded by the mutual buildup of military capabilities and fierce rivalry. This time, nothing of the kind happened. Of course, there were problems in relations. But no one could have predicted that they would grow to such dimensions within so short a period. The Euro-Atlantic security system was plunged into a real disaster – sudden, brief and all-embracing.

After the Cold War, Russia and NATO largely demilitarized and significantly curtailed their military capacity. The likelihood of a military conflict in Europe was reduced to a minimum. Moscow was aggrieved by NATO enlargement, but its formal expansion was accompanied by reductions in the military capacity of member states. The new members’ material and financial contributions were symbolic, most of them becoming consumers, not suppliers, of security. Several years before the Ukrainian crisis, the trend towards reducing military capacity only grew stronger. With the Afghan campaign winding down, the allies were consistently cutting their defense spending. The United States also curtailed its military presence in Europe. Russia was engaged in military reforms that were badly needed after 15 years of decline in its armed forces. But the reforms were aimed largely at optimizing the army and adapting it to deal with local crises. No open confrontation with NATO was even contemplated.

The collapse of the conventional arms control regime was a bad sign for security in Europe. Many also criticized the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act as outmoded and out of tune with the new realities. But in fact both Russia and NATO conformed to the adjusted CFE Treaty ceilings. Their military activities could hardly be called excessive. Before the Ukrainian crisis, none of the new NATO members were building up capacity, while Russia’s military activity in the contact zone with NATO remains moderate to this day. Speculation about far-reaching imperial designs of the West and Russia on each other could be safely left to armchair strategists on both sides.

Russia and the West: How to Deal with the Threat of Extremism

If that is the case, what triggered the new cold war? As I see it, there are three main causes. First, Russia and the West have fundamentally different and increasingly divergent perceptions of security. We often believe that foreign policy decision-making is rational. But decisions are taken by people, not all-knowing and dispassionate computers. People have different experiences and perceptions of the world. Occasionally the latter are diametrically opposed. Their strategic cultures and identities (friend or foe) differ as well. Everyone has a

rationality of his own and reads a subjective meaning into developments. Both Russia and the West have evolved distorted perceptions of each other, which over time became increasingly divorced from reality. But foreign policy establishments can also have diametrically opposed perceptions of this sort. In such cases, official and unofficial contacts that offer insight into each other’s perceptions was of vital importance. Unfortunately, since the early 2000s, such contacts have become increasingly ritualistic, degenerating into the banal, irritated exchange of points of protocol. Hawks and even some open radicals confidently dominate foreign policy, something that makes polarization only worse.

The second cause is the weakness of post-Soviet states, their immature and imbalanced sovereignty, and the resistance of great powers to engaging in equitable cooperation to “extinguish fires” in transit states. The Ukrainian crisis emerged as an internal problem that caught everyone off guard. The revolution was superimposed on the latent Russia-West competition for influence in the post-Soviet space. Both parties were unable to effectively cooperate to address problems and fell into a security trap where each move by the opposite side was regarded as hostile and a preemptive strategy seemed the best option. Thus, the West “preempted” Russia in supporting the Ukrainian revolution, while Russia preempted the West in solving the Crimea problem. As a result, everyone lost. To quote Wolfgang Ischinger, “Ukraine has lost Crimea and Donbass, Russia has lost Ukraine, Europe has lost Russia, and the world has lost stability.” The problem of states in crisis clearly goes far beyond the Ukrainian disaster, and includes Libya, Syria and generally all Arab Spring countries. The European Union’s new global concept and Russia’s strategic documents quite rightly define the weakness of statehood as a priority threat.

The third cause is the series of interventions that followed the Cold War – the “humanitarian intervention” in Yugoslavia in 1999, the intervention in Iraq in 2003, Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia in 2008 and the Russian “peace enforcement” operation in response, Western intervention in the Libyan conflict in 2010, Russian intervention in the Ukrainian revolution, and the overlapping interventions in Syria. All these actions could be endlessly justified by citing circumstances and strategic interests, but taken together they have undermined trust, international law and the UN’s role as the key institution for global governance. In addition to the erosion of conventional arms control, INF and START are now under threat. The lack of agreement on antimissile defense is eroding strategic stability. Cyberspace interventions no longer seem fantastical. We have come to a highly dangerous red line: differences and uncertainties may pile up and produce a cumulative effect, triggering a snowballing crisis, escalation and full-scale war.

A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations. Executive Summary of the CSIS and RIAC Report

What is to be done? We have clearly passed the point of no return in many areas and it is futile to hope that the world will go back to what it was in 2013. It is necessary to stabilize the situation and prevent it from getting out of control. “Stable containment” might be the optimal option under the circumstances. As is clear, no one now can afford to retreat even one step or show weakness in rhetoric or position. But profound political differences can be accompanied by restraint in efforts to expand military capacity. The biggest threat today is an uncontrolled and rapid arms race that matches or outpaces the political rhetoric.

In terms of military capacity, the moves undertaken by Russia and NATO after the Ukrainian crisis, despite the severity of its consequences, have been quite moderate. We can hardly expect Moscow to welcome the deployment of new military units in the Baltic states and on the Black Sea coast, or the strengthening of NRF, or the development of VJTF. It is also true that the Western capitals are unlikely to welcome Russia’s greater capacity in its western part or large-scale military exercises. And yet, these actions do not go beyond the commitments the parties assumed under the Founding Act in 1997.

The short-term challenge for today is to avoid new crises, refrain from a new race to expand military capacity, retain the INF Treaty and, if possible, launch a discussion on new arms control and conflict resolution principles.

In the Skies over Syria: Rivalry Instead of Coordinated Actionsjune 27, 2017On June 19, 2017, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation announced it was halting interaction with the United States as part of the memorandum of understanding to minimize the risk of in-flight incidents between aircraft operating in Syrian airspace. The move came in reaction to the downing of a Syrian Air Force Sukhoi Su-22 warplane by a U.S. Boeing F/A-18E Super Hornet. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) member and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Aksenenok offers his appraisal of the current situation in the east and southeast of Syria in an interview with RIAC.

Do you believe the actions of the United States can be construed as a deliberate act of aggression?When it comes to the Syrian conflict, which is very specific and multifaceted in every respect, nothing can be stated with absolute certainty. Many aspects are intertwined here, relating to diplomacy, the military, politics (both global and regional), media and propaganda. Very often one aspect contradicts and even eclipses another. As a result, an extremely vague picture emerges.

From a formal legal standpoint, the actions of the United States can indeed be construed as an act of aggression. And this would hold true in reality as well if it were not for the specifics of the political and military situation in Syria. External military intervention in the Syrian conflict has long been a reality, at least since 2012 when the U.S.-led anti-terrorist coalition was created. Unlike the Russian Armed Forces which are present in Syria at the request of the Syrian government, the coalition’s operations in the country have no formal international legal basis. The same can be said of the military presences of Turkey, the United Kingdom, France and other coalition members in the country.

At the same time, if we look at the situation from the standpoint of Realpolitik, then the involvement of a great number of external actors effectively turns Syria into a country with limited sovereignty. This is all the more so given the fact that vast territories in the east of the country are not controlled by the Syrian government. Despite this, Russia has maintained regular military and diplomatic contacts with the United States and the other western members of the coalition throughout the conflict. Close cooperation has been established with Turkey following the normalization of mutual relations. However, if [the actions of the United States] are to be described as aggressive, then the question arises as to why Russia’s response to the actions of the United States and its allies in Syria so often lacks understandable logic and consistency: at times we call them aggressors, at others we see them as partners or even potential allies in a global anti-terrorist coalition.

The Syrian Armed Forces Seven Years into the Conflict: From a Regular Army to Volunteer Corps

The answer to the question of how to assess the actions of the United States lies in the context of the specific situation that has developed in the east and southeast of Syria. It appears that the military operations being carried out by all the parties involved in those regions have entered a new and more dangerous phase.

The government forces have consolidated their control over the western parts of Syria, while the Islamic State is under attack from different sides. The focus of the hostilities has shifted to the area of Daraa in the south of the country, close to the border with Jordan and Iraqi. Who will take the territories that are currently being liberated from Islamic State? Who will capture such strategic and economically important areas such as Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Mayadin and Al-Bukamal? Will it be the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which enjoy military support from the United States and whose core is comprised of Kurdish combat detachments? Or will it be the government troops and the pro-Iranian Shiite militia forces, which maintain contacts with Russia?

The incident involving the Syrian aircraft fits into the complex context of the rivalry that is currently observed in Syria, rather than coordinated actions. Both Russia and the United States have their theories as to what happened. There is, however, a serious threat to be found elsewhere. In the absence of multilateral agreements, it is quite possible that diverse and unexpected forces could resort to acts of provocation in order to set Russia and the United States against each other. This happened more than once in the past, especially as the two countries were nearing mutually acceptable compromises. It is equally possible that provocations will be staged by Islamic State terrorists, who are not only leaving their positions in Raqqa now under pressure from the SDF advancing from the south, but are also being drawn out of a number of important population centres in the north, thus clearing the way for a confrontation between the forces that have never managed to become allies in the fight against the common terrorist threat.

Russia has warned the U.S.-led coalition that it will now be viewing manned and unmanned coalition aircraft as possible targets. Is it possible that this statement will be backed up in practice?

Will U.S. Attack on Syria Be a Game-Changer?

Such categorical statements certainly raise Russia’s status as a strong power whose interests are to be reckoned with, particularly in Syria. On the other hand, they burn bridges

for Russia should it be forced to deliver on its warnings. In such a situation, failure to act would be perceived as a sign of weakness. Strong words do not bring benefits in the Syrian context. They may backfire catastrophically.

Apart from accusing Washington of violating Syria’s sovereignty and international law, Moscow has also announced that it is halting communications aimed at preventing possible friendly fire incidents between Russian and U.S. forces. Could this channel of communications be restored in the near future, and if it could, then on what conditions?The experience of de-escalation in different conflicts suggests that in such cases communications need to be boosted along available military channels in order to prevent inadvertent incidents. Events will no doubt take this turn soon. An alternative would be a clash between Russia and the United States, which would have unpredictable grave consequences.

Breaking the U.S.-Russia Impasse: Keeping the Door Open to Dialoguejune 28, 2017Relations between the U.S. and Russia appear to be almost at the point of no return 1. Whether justified or not, each side has accused the other of interfering in their respective election processes. Moscow has accused the United States of backing protests that opposed the results of Russia's parliamentary elections in 2011, and of directly interfering in the Russian presidential elections in March 2012 that brought Vladimir Putin to power. Washington has also accused Moscow of interfering in the November 2016 presidential elections that brought Donald Trump to power.

Open Letter to President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin

These are serious issues that directly impact domestic politics and popular attitudes. Accusations of interference in the electoral systems raise questions about the legitimacy of the electoral process and about the leaders that are chosen 2. Such issues can make it even more difficult for the respective administrations to reconcile complex issues and disputes.

A number of key issues and disputes are already proving difficult to resolve, not even considering the added problem caused by accusations of mutual election interference. These include security concerns and disputes revolving around NATO and European Union

enlargement, Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, as well as the nature of the conventional and nuclear arms race that has been escalating at least since the turn of the 21st century.

In June 2017, Moscow canceled talks with Washington in protest against the new political and economic sanctions placed on Moscow for its annexation of Crimea and its political military interference in eastern Ukraine. In the struggle against violent extremism, the U.S., Europeans and Russia generally agree on the need to control the Islamic State. However, there has been a significant lack of coordination that has been further antagonizing relations.

First, NATO-member Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft in November 2015 — an action that tested the NATO-Russia relationship, even if Turkey and Russia eventually came to terms in the aftermath. Then, in early April 2017, the U.S. fired 59 cruise missiles at Syrian airbase on grounds that the Syrian military had allegedly used chemical weaponry 3. The U.S. likewise refused to participate in a conference involving 11 regional actors on the conflict in Afghanistan, which had been sponsored by Moscow on April 14. In June 2017, the U.S. military downed a Syrian aircraft that was purportedly threatening U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Force militias, which Washington says were fighting the Islamic State. For its part, Damascus claims that its fighter jet was likewise attacking Islamic State forces.

The latter incident led Russian Ministry of Defense to announce that it would suspend the de-escalation discussions with the U.S. and that any Coalition aircraft flying west of the Euphrates River would be tracked and "considered air targets.” By contrast, the U.S. chief of staff of the Air Force claimed that the de-confliction line "remains open… So our hope of course is that we return to a little bit sense of normalcy and we continue to keep the dialogue open.” U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson likewise affirmed that the U.S. remains committed to future discussions about eastern Ukraine and Crimea, as well as Afghanistan.

But given increasingly bitter imprecations, and question remains: For how long will the possibility of dialogue remain open? And how profound will that dialogue prove to be?

This essay will propose some questions for a more profound discussion that is intended to provoke thought about the future of U.S.-European-Russian relationship. These questions seek to keep the door open to a discussion of realistic options that could help lead to the eventual resolution of a number of disputes.

USA and NATO: Who Needs Who?

Geostrategic ConcernsAt the roots of the crisis is the fact that NATO and the European Union (EU) have now expanded to states that border the Russian Federation in such a way as to directly or indirectly impact what Moscow considers its “near abroad” — or its self-defined sphere of influence and security.

Moscow initially opposed NATO membership for eastern European states, and particularly to the three Baltic States — which President Boris Yeltsin had previously called a “red line.” Moscow has now made clear its opposition to the further enlargement of both NATO and the EU to Ukraine and Georgia, among other former Soviet-bloc states. Moscow has also opposed the deepening of NATO military infrastructure, including Missile Defense systems, on the territory of new member states. Moscow has likewise been pressuring EU members Sweden and Finland not to join NATO 4.

NATO enlargement in the Baltic region now reinforced since 2014 with the deployment of “rotating” forces, has resulted in a Russian military buildup in northwest Russia and in Kaliningrad. Yet it is highly unlikely that Washington will retract NATO membership for eastern European states that have already joined NATO, despite President Trump’s previous statements that NATO was “obsolete” and his threats not to support NATO members that did not spend 2% of their GDP on defense.

Given the above geo-strategic concerns, what could break the impasse? What could be done to ameliorate tensions between U.S./NATO, EU and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)?

Instead of engaging in a major military build-up, and as a means to establish security and confidence-building measures, could NATO, the EU and Russia engage in joint over flights, joint patrols, joint military maneuvers and peacekeeping operations through Combined Task Forces, for example, among other options, in the Baltic region?

What would happen if the European Union developed more autonomous defense structures and peacekeeping forces? Could a more integrated EU system of defense and security play a role as an intermediary between U.S./NATO and Russia? Or would the Europeans be seen as too closely linked to the U.S. and NATO?

What would happen if the U.S. and NATO would formally call off the possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine? What if Ukraine was formally made “neutral” so that it could not join either NATO or the CSTO — in accord with Kiev’s own initial claims to be a non-aligned independent state after Soviet collapse?

And what would be the impact on Poland and Baltic States and other NATO members of a formally “neutral” Ukraine?

New Weapons SystemsPrior to Trump’s arrival to power, the Obama administration had already begun the modernization of American ICBMs, cruise missiles, such as the Long-Range Standoff Weapon, and nuclear bombers, such as the B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber. For its part, Moscow has been in the process of developing new ICBMS, such as the RS-28 Sarmat thermonuclear-armed ballistic missile (SATAN 2). Washington has accused Moscow of developing new intermediate range missile systems that purportedly violate the 1987 INF Treaty.

Many of these ICBMs on both sides have been set at 'launch on warning’. Can Washington and Moscow find ways to take these missiles off the status of 'launch on warning’?

It has been proposed that Washington could eliminate its land-based ICBMs and then rely solely on its sea-based and air-based nuclear deterrents 5. How would Moscow, in turn, respond to this proposal, given Russia’s heavy reliance on land-based ICBMs?

What other proposals might also help end a new nuclear arms race? Should the INF treaty and other treaties be updated or expanded to include other states, such as the European states and China?

Washington is also in the process of modernizing its tactical nuclear weapons systems, such as the B-61-12, in part by extending its range. For its part, Moscow has threatened to deploy its Iskander tactical nuclear weapons systems in Kaliningrad and Crimea. Russian nuclear strategy purportedly sees tactical nuclear weaponry as a potential means to “de-escalate” a conventional conflict — as opposed to “deterring” a conventional conflict as in the American strategic perspective.

Is it too much to ask for a total ban on such “tactical” systems that lower the nuclear threshold and could prove ‘easier’ to use? Or, if neither side can agree to banning such weapons altogether, would it be possible to engage in deeper reductions and international inspections?

What if there was a mutual NATO-Russia agreement of "no first use" of nuclear weaponry or other forms of weapons of mass destruction? Could this “no first use” agreement then become accepted internationally as a step toward the elimination of nuclear weaponry?

And should French, UK, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and undeclared Israeli nuclear weapons systems be taken into account? How will these countries, plus North Korea and others, respond to the U.S. and Russian conventional and nuclear weapons buildup? And would they necessarily respond positively to U.S-Russian nuclear reductions?

Missile Defenses

How to Make Russia-U.S. Relations Great Again?

In 2002, the George W. Bush administration unilaterally dropped out of the 1972 ABM Treaty without renegotiating a new accord with Moscow or with other states. For the most part, Moscow has stated that it will respond by asymmetrical means to U.S. Missile Defense deployments and radar systems in Poland and Romania, as well as in Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East.

How might the 2013 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear accord with Iran impact U.S. Missile Defense deployments in Europe — particularly given the fact that Iran’s presumed nuclear weapons program and its missile program primarily justified those deployments.

Can the U.S., Russia, China and Japan find ways to at least freeze North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities through diplomacy rather than through U.S. military threats and U.S. Missile Defense deployments that are opposed by both China and Russia?

Are these MD deployments needed? Will these MD systems actually work in light of the development of stealth systems and hypersonic weapons, among other devices that could possibly make such MD systems obsolete?

But if Missile Defenses do prove to be effective, at least against some missile systems, is it possible to develop some form of dual key Missile Defense system against third party threats? How can the U.S. best reassure Russia and China that the US deployment of MD systems is not aimed a developing a first strike capability?

Russia–Crimea–Eastern UkraineIn June 2017, just after the U.S. re-imposed sanctions on Moscow, the U.S. State Department insisted that the new sanctions measures were intended to reinforce existing sanctions and that they were “designed to counter attempts to circumvent our sanctions… Our targeted sanctions were imposed in response to Russia’s ongoing violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbor, Ukraine… If the Russians seek an end to these sanctions… (Then Moscow needs to fully honor) its obligations under the Minsk agreement… (And end) its occupation” of Crimea.

Crimea

Russia–US Relations: Unstoppable Escalation?

As the above State Department statement indicates, the U.S., NATO and Kiev have demanded that Moscow end its “occupation” and return Crimea to Ukraine. This position appears to represent a major barrier to any possible U.S.-EU-Russian reconciliation and serves to militarize all sides.

As it appears very unlikely that Moscow will return Crimea back to Ukraine, is it possible to imagine any feasible policy alternatives that might be acceptable to both sides and eventually bring about a modicum of peace? Such alternative options would appear to lie somewhere between permitting the conflict to continue to escalate and returning Crimea back to Kiev.

What if the Crimea became a free trade zone—under Russian sovereignty—as form of geo-economic compromise if exchange for an end to sanctions? Could this lead to a reduction in political-military tensions in the region? Would both Moscow and Kiev accept it? What are the possibilities for joint Ukrainian-Russian sovereignty? 6

Eastern UkraineAs the above State Department statement indicates, Moscow has been blamed for not fulfilling its part of the Minsk accord, but Ukraine has not fulfilled its obligations either.

What are prospects for initiating serious talks between Kiev and the autonomist movements? What are the prospects for a "decentralized" Ukraine? How much autonomy should eastern Ukraine possess? Or will the Donbas region separate from the rest of Ukraine?

Is a new format for the Minsk talks needed? Should the U.S., and possibly Turkey, join the Minsk talks along with Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany?

Would a peacekeeping mission under OSCE auspices prove acceptable if Kiev, Moscow and the eastern Ukrainian autonomists could agree? What would be the conditions needed for both sides to accept peacekeepers, if a settlement can be reached?

Southern Caucasus

A Roadmap for U.S.-Russia Relations. Executive Summary of the CSIS and RIAC Report

Can Turkey now help mediate between the U.S., Europeans and Russia over the disputes in the Caucasus and Black Sea, as well as in Syria? How should the U.S., EU and Russia respond to Ankara’s new turn toward authoritarianism?

What if NATO also dropped efforts to draw Georgia, in addition to Ukraine, into NATO membership? Could the 2008 Turkish proposal for a “Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform” be revived for the Caucasus and the entire Black Sea region — if the questions of the Russian annexation of Crimea and issues surrounding the Black Sea and eastern Ukraine can eventually be addressed? Could the U.S. and EU, as well as Ukraine, likewise participate in the creation of a new Caucasus peace and development community?

Can Turkey assist the Europeans, Ukraine and Russia to find a way to cooperate over pipelines and energy disputes? Or what can be done to unleash the tremendous economic potential of the Black Sea region?

Could peacekeeping forces be deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, where tensions appear to be heating up, or in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, if political settlements could be forged in these regions? Would it be possible to deploy a joint NATO-EU-Russian peacekeeping force, somewhat similar to the peacekeeping deployments in ex-Yugoslavia in 1995, under OSCE auspices, in the southern Caucasus?

And how would this possibility impact the Russian-controlled northern Caucasus?

The Western Balkans

Lawrence McDonnell:Lies, Spies and Big Data: How Fake News Is Rewriting Political Landscapes

In the aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia and NATO’s war “over” Kosovo in 1999, can the Balkans in some way serve as a model of political and inter-ethnic reconciliation for the Caucasus and Black Sea regions?

What will be the impact of Montenegro’s membership in NATO? How will Serbia and other regional states react? How will NATO expansion in this area impact the relations between the U.S., NATO, the EU and Russia? How will it impact the process of inter-ethnic reconciliation and stability in the Balkans?

How is the global refugee crisis in general impacting the Balkan region? What should be done about the massive refugee crisis in general?

Syria and Turkish-Saudi-Iranian Conflict

When a Turkish F-16 pilot shot down a Russian fighter jet in late November 2015, it might have provoked war between NATO and Russia. But international diplomacy helped to defuse tensions, and Turkey and Russia have subsequently worked to improve relations — even if the incident negatively impacted NATO, Russian and Turkish relations.

Turkish-Russian relations were once again tested by the assassination by a Turkish Islamist of the Russian ambassador to Ankara who was key to restoring Russian-Turkish relations. This incident took place just before the planned meeting of Turkey, Iran and Russia over the Syrian crisis and just after the UN Resolution on Aleppo in December 2016.

Now, U.S.-Russian relations have been tested once again by the April 2017 decision of the Trump administration to fire 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian airbase on grounds that the Syrian military had allegedly used chemical weaponry 7. Then, in June 2017, the U.S. military downed a Syrian aircraft that was purportedly threatening U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Force militias, which Washington says were fighting the Islamic State. For its part, Damascus claims that its fighter jet was likewise attacking Islamic State forces 8.

Can the U.S. and Europeans find ways to better coordinate their strategy with Russia, Syria and Iran — and seek out a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran? Can Turkey and other states help mediate the Syrian conflict while ultimately bringing the Syrians, Iranians and Saudis into a peace accord?

How should the U.S., Russia, and Europeans deal with the conflict between Turkey, Syria and the Kurds, and between Iraq and the Kurds, given Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi option to the possibility that the Kurds might use the Syrian conflict to achieve independence in differing regions? Can a loose Kurdish confederation — that does not challenge existing borders — remain a possibility? 9

Will the al-Assad regime be able to regain and sustain control all of Syrian territory? Can at least some of the Syrian opposition work with the Assad regime? Or can al-Assad step back and eventually remove himself from direct rule after a period of time? Could a confederal solution help mitigate demands that Assad step down? Or will Syria break apart?

If a peace settlement can be found — perhaps involving a loose confederation — would it be necessary to deploy a UN peacekeeping force involving different Arab and neutral states?

What is the best international means to support the refugees from Syria and other countries?

War against the Islamic State

In the Skies over Syria: Rivalry Instead of Coordinated Actions

What is the best way to fight the Islamic State? Will the International Coalition be able to forge a common strategy? Are the states involved in the conflict more interested in defeating the Islamic State or in overthrowing the al-Assad regime?

Can there be a military “solution” to the global war on terrorism? Will the Islamic State movement really be destroyed in Iraq and Syria? Or will it simply drift like a nomad to other regions, into the Russian Caucasus, North Africa, Egypt and the Sinai, southwest Asia and Afghanistan, as well as Kashmir?

How will the entry of the Islamic State into Afghanistan impact the ongoing war between NATO and the Taliban? The U.S. refused to participate in the third round of a conference on Afghanistan that involved 11 regional actors, and that had been organized by Moscow on April 14 2017. Just a day prior to Afghan conference, the U.S. dropped its largest non-nuclear bomb, MOAB, on an Islamic State positions in Afghanistan. In addition to opposing Russian talks with the Taliban, U.S. officials have accused Russia of providing arms to the Taliban, an accusation that has been officially denied by Moscow.

Will it be possible to achieve a more concerted approach, involving both Washington and Moscow, in the Afghan peace talks? Will the threat of Islamic State activities be sufficient to bring Washington and Moscow into a common position?

What will be the impact on major and regional powers of the spread of terrorist activities throughout the ‘wider Middle East’, with periodic attacks in countries throughout much of the world? How should the Coalition against the Islamic State deal with such a scenario?

The Question of QatarAs the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran intensifies throughout the ‘wider Middle East,’ U.S. and Russian mediation appears absolutely crucial to calm tensions between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. After Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain accused Qatar (and Qatari individuals) of supporting the Moslem Brotherhood and Hamas, among other “terrorist” groups, including the Islamic State — in addition to accusing Qatar of working closely with Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s 13 demands on Qatar — with Turkey backing up Qatar — appear eerily reminiscent of Austro-Hungarian demands on Serbia in July 1914 not to support terrorist groups such as the Black Hand of that epoch. Could conflicts in the wider Middle East,’ much like conflicts in the Balkans prior to World War I, similarly draw in regional and major powers — and then spark a global war? 10

Political Economic Concerns

Qatar С risis: What’s Next?

Now that Washington has tightened sanctions against Moscow in June 2017 — in part due to perceived Russian interference in the U.S. presidential elections and in part due to lack of progress on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine — will it eventually prove possible for the U.S., Europeans and Russia to wind down trade and other sanctions that generally hurt all sides, even if unevenly?

Given the negative Russian reaction to the EU Eastern Partnership, and the expansion of EU influence into post-Soviet states, including Ukraine and Belarus, what if EU took steps to

bring Russia into a new form of EU partnership? Could the EU and Russia forge new trade and monetary arrangements, for example?

Could both Kaliningrad and Crimea become free trade areas, yet under Russian sovereignty? Would this be of interest to Moscow? Would it help reduce political-military tensions in both the Baltic and the Black Sea regions? 11

What is the best means to advance the social, economic and political development of eastern Ukraine and Crimea?

What should be done about refugee crisis from eastern Ukraine to Russia and from Syria and other countries to the European Union countries? How should Russia and the European Union respond?

Impact of rise of ChinaChina is the elephant in the room, or as Mao might say, the monkey watching two tigers fight. Is Beijing benefiting from U.S.-European-Russian rivalries?

How does Moscow see the rise of China as a political-economic and military power? Is a Russia-China alliance in the making? Or are there significant disagreements between Moscow and Beijing that could create disputes between the two sides?

How should the U.S., EU and Russia approach China and India as rising powers? Can the US, Europeans and Russia forge a common strategy with respect China and India without alienating either? How will Russia’s new rapprochement with Pakistan impact India? Can China play a positive role in the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, among other disputes? Could India help mediate between the U.S., Europeans, Japan, Russia and China? 12

Questions Awaiting ResolutionAs stated in the introduction, this essay has not been intended to propose solutions, but only to raise some questions that will hopefully provoke a more profound dialogue about the future of U.S.-European-Russian relationship. These questions await responses — and hopefully solutions to a number of disputes. And yet these questions could possibly raise even more questions than responses or solutions. Nevertheless, the purpose is to keep the dialogue open — in the hope that a general U.S.-European-Russian reconciliation can ultimately be achieved.

The risks of a major power war are real, as many of the conditions that provoked major power war in the past appear to be re-occurring. Yet even if a major power war does not take place, a new nuclear and conventional arms race is not in the world’s interests. In the effort to prevent a new arms race, and to prevent the further destabilization of the global system, the U.S., European and Russian leaderships should begin to engage in a sincere and profound dialogue — in working with the other key actors — in a concerted effort to find resolutions to the disputes and conflicts that continue to divide them.

How is Russia Capitalizing on US-Iran Tensions in Syria? 

The United States demanded Russia addresses the movements of Iran, Bashar al-Assad, and their

allied militias, following an agreement to create “de-escalation zones” in Syria. However, Moscow,

most probably, ignored US demands and, instead, prioritized commitment to the outcome of the

agreement. 

This commitment was put to test for the first time during the battle for al-Tanf border area, where Russia did

nothing but alerted Tehran and the militias, who continued to advance to the Iraqi-border avoiding only the US

military al-Tanf air base. Moreover, Iran, once again, stepped up the challenge launching six missiles from its

Kermanshah Province into Deir Ezzor City in eastern Syria in an unprecedented engagement that elicited no

reaction from Russia. 

It is important to note that US-Russian relations, in context of developments in Syria, is an indicator of

Moscow's position on Tehran's movements in the war torn country. In other words, When Russian- US mutual

understanding is in place, Moscow works on setting the pace of Iran’s actions in Syria. However, at times of

crisis, Moscow ignores Iran’s behavior, and would, at best, send a tacit or veiled message to its ally Tehran.

Moreover, friction between Russia and Iran comes within the context of Moscow’s attempts to maintain a

critical balance between Iran and Turkey as its two contestant regional allies competing for influence in Syria.

However, it can be said that there are two stages in the Russia-Iran relations in Syria that are linked to

geostrategic movements on the Syrian scene. That is to say, when the conflict was going on within the so-

called “useful Syria”, the friction between Russia and Iran was at a higher level than in operations conducted

west of the Euphrates River. Later, when the US expanded its military presence and launched preparations for

the battle for Raqqa, the level of Russian-Iranian disagreement went down, adding ambiguity to Russia’s

position on Iran’s project of a Shiite crescent  in the region as well as on Iran’s recent use of missiles in Syria. 

This has raised several issues within this context. For one, Russian pressures have often forced Iran to

change the rules of the game. And while Iran’s ambitions in Syria have no ceiling, the consequences of these

issues, in turn, raise questions over the future of the the relationship between Tehran and Moscow. 

Limited Rift

Collaboration between Russia and Iran in Syria has escalated recently, although limited cracks between them

emerged. In one situation, for instance, a crisis broke out in August 2016 when Russia announced that its jet

fighters will use Nojeh Air Base in Iran's western province of Hamadan to conduct military operations in Syria.

Iran viewed its ally’s announcement as an act of embarrassment before its domestic public opinion. However,

the crisis was gradually contained. 

Less than four months later, another crisis erupted while settlements were being worked out in Aleppo City,

northern Syria. To the resentment of Tehran, Russia touted the settlement as a victory achieved by Bashar al-

Assad regime and Moscow, while ignoring the Iranian role. However, overlooking this attitude could not

prevent a recurrence. Tehran came under fire from the international community for the Iranian sectarian

behavior that dominated a settlement involving the towns of Foua and Kefraya in Idlib, northern Syria. Both

Russia and the international community put pressures on Iran. 

In March 2017, Russia’s Izvestia newspaper said that Iran agreed to withdraw its Shiite militias from some

areas in Syria under oversight from Russia, which warned Iran not to deploy other militias to replace withdrawn

ones. Iran heeded the warnings. 

Divergent positions between Russia and Iran, about the participation of the United States, resurfaced again in

the run up to the Astana peace talks. While Russia was in favor of a role for Washington, Iran took a

diametrically opponent position. 

However, in all these occasions, Russia succeeded in putting pressures on Iran. 

In the lead up to a military action in Raqqa by the US-led Global Coalition To Counter ISIS, at the beginning of

the President Donald Trump's term, friction between the US and Iran escalated. Washington relied on Moscow

to curb Tehran, and, following the understanding that was reached about four de-escalation zones in Syria,

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was asked to restrain Iranian movements. 

With the first Iranian movement towards these zones, US forces positioned at the al-Tanf air base near the

Iraqi border with Syria bombarded a military convoy of pro-Iranian militias. The strike came after Moscow

demanded the advance of these militias towards the US base be halted. Russia announced that its contacts

with Iran in this regard were useless. 

In fact, Moscow has not tried to prevent the US strike, rather Russia overlooked it, according to some views.

Moscow saw the strike as a punishment for Iran’s trespassing and unilateral moves. Russian media outlets

reported that Russia coordinated with Iran and  al-Assad regime. 

It appears that Russia also opposes Iranian tactics coordinated with its People's Mobilization Forces (better

known as the Hashd al-Shaabi) to reach the Iraqi border with Syria. However, Russia has not expressed its

opposition and it is likely detaching itself from a mediation role in this situation or seeking to capitalize on the

US-Iranian friction in Syria to serve its own interests at a later stage.

Complicated Scene 

Cases of Russian-Iranian polarization, from which Washington was not very much distant, show that

Tehran responds only formally to warnings from Moscow. This does pose several issues, including that

Russian pressure is also only formal, or tactical.

For instance, Moscow expressed its opposition to Iran’s advances towards the Iraqi border with Syria in the

battle for al-Tanf area, but has not prevented these movements when the pro-Iranian militias changed their

path only to advance towards the same target. This is a sign that Moscow’s view is, perhaps, that Tehran may

move freely only away from the contact lines of the four de-escalation zones. This may be in line with

statements from Syrian military officials, carried by Izvestia's defense commentator, Nikolay Surkov, that

movements towards the Iraqi border is to prevent the US-backed Free Syrian Army battalions from reaching

the highway connecting Palmyra to Deir Ezzor thus preventing the Syrian regime’s forces from breaking the

siege laid on Deir Ezzor. 

It can possibly be said that if true, this view does not contradict plans developed by Russia and its allies for

Raqqa. This may support the fact that the United States is currently building a new military base in the Zakf

area where it plans to deploy defense systems as part of the Badia region in southern Syria. 

Moreover, Russia has not made any reaction to the Iran’s missile strike on Deir Ezzor while it was quick to

condemn the United States’ recent shooting down of a Syrian regime’s Sukhoi Su-22 bomber, and even

suspended the deconfliction channel and hotline with the United States. What can be concluded from this is

that Moscow’s view is that the margin of disagreement with Iran can be used on a case by case basis within

the framework of its relations with Washington. That is, in some cases Moscow acts as a mediator between

Tehran and Washington, and in others capitalizes from the United State’s military targeting of Iran, and even

seeks to exploit the two parties’ preoccupation with the conflict. 

In conclusion, it can be said that the margins of disagreement between Russia and Iran remain under

control, no matter how wide they become. However, there are factors prompting certain levels of

Russian reaction. These include Russia’s relations with other states, such as the United States and

Turkey. Nonetheless, all developments have proved that no party to the conflict will sacrifice its

alliance with other parties, and that the mechanism of dialogue is an effective tool in settling

disagreements that can break out between any two parties. Hence, this mechanism is not likely to lose

effectiveness in the short term but is also unlikely to prevent friction between parties within a certain

margin that would not allow their convergence to break down.