western community policing

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Internationai Journal of Poiice Science Management Voiume 14 Num

Integrating Eastern programme features inW estern community policing: balancingindividual freedom and collectivewellbeingYumin R. Wang+ and Richard Lumbt(Corresp onding author) Department of Social Work, M eiho University, Taiwan, 23 Ping-Kuang Rd., Nei-pu, Pingtung 912, Taiwan. Tei: +011 886 8 779 0501 or +011 886 987 696768;email: [email protected]^Department of Criminal Justice, SUNY Brockport, Wilton, ME 04294, USASubm itted 10 October 2 011; revision subm itted 18 June 2012; accepted21 July 2012Keywords: community policing,koban, polit ics and policing, comm unism,terrorism

YuminR angcompleted his doctorate degreeat the School of Criminal Justice, SUNY atAlbany. He was an assistant professor of theDepartment of Criminal Justice, SU NY Brockportand the Department of Police Administration,Keimyung University Korea), i-le currentlys rv sas an associate professor of the Department ofSocial Work, Meiho University Taiwan). Prior tothat career he served as a police officer and apolice lieutenant in three departments of theNational Police Agency of Taiwan.Richard Lumb completed his doctorate degreeat Florida State University. He is a former asso-ciate professor at the University of North Caro-lina Charlotte and Emeritus Associate Professorand Chair at SUNY Brockport, both in CriminalJustice. Prior to that career he was a policeofficer and Chief of Police in two departments.

services k o b a n community policing effectivelyprevented crime as well as anti-government activ-ities. The strategy was successfully replicated inTaiwan and Korea the two colonies of Japanbefore World W ar II. The k o b a n system has beentransformed to become a strategy that deliverspolice services to citizens and simultaneouslysustains national security while collaborating withthe intelligence services. Western communitypolicing programmes intensify police service deliv-ery to citizens. In the post-9/11 era th e influ-ence of ederal law enforcement has expanded toinclude a collaborative and occasionally super-seding role. If balancing individual freedom andcollective wellbeing becomes possible in Westerncountries. Eastern community policing modelsmay serve to enlighten the path in this quest.

ABSTRACTThe community policing innovation was con-ceptualised on the basis of the Japanese k o b a nsystem. It was introduced to the USA to demo-cratise policing. However the Empire of Japaninitially learned modern policing from Westerncountries. In collaboration with the intelligence

INTRODUCTIONIn his book orces of Order Bayley (1976)compared pohcing in Japan and the USA,and deterrrned the reform agenda mani-festing the importance of involving thecommunity in crime-campaign endeavours.It has been three decades since the debut of

International Journal of PoliceScienee and Management.Vol. 14 No, 4. 2012. pp. .M.V.161.DO I: 10.1.' 50/ijps.2012.14.4.287


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astern programme features in Western comm unity policing

t t innovation in the USA, which subse-quently became prevalent across the world.While attention has generally been paidto the service orientation of the strategythat denotes most of the programmesimp lemen ted in the West, few have caredabout how it was variously provided incommunities in the East. Literature exam-ining the difference has been absent.Research can be attempted taking a politicalperspective because both eastern and west-ern hemispheres, policing has been a meansof serving the political purposes of thegovernment in different ways.This study scrutinises how citizens hving inEastern and Western societies wh ere thereare community policing programmes arepoliced and served. Moreover, it discussesthe features of community policing in theEast that can be integrated in the West topromote effectiveness. olitics and policingThe political system of a country deter-mines how its government interacts with itscitizens, which, in turn, influences howcommunities are policed. The particularityof the social milieu in which police acrossthe world operate causes forces to differfrom one another in many characteristicways (Bayley, 1977). Environmental change,especially when it comes to transformingthe political system of a country, contri-butes to the evolution of ts policing.Early in the last century, when modernpolice forces were in place, Fosdick (1915)observed the British pohce:

In Great Britain the pohce are the ser-vant of the community. Their officialexistence would be impossible if theiracts persistently ran counter to theexpressed wishes of the people . . . Apoliceman has no right superior to thatof a private person in making arrest orasking questions or compelling theattendance of witnesses, (pp. 2829)

Flynt (1903) described the residents London at that time:

The mass of the inhabitants are lawobserving citizens who not only maevery effort not to break the law themselves, but who also take a friendinterest in helping the police to carry otheir orders, (p. 438)Across the Atlantic, there appeared a sinificantly different world of policing. N ew York it is a notoriou s fact that sup eriofficers, as well as patrolmen, have takenvery active part in electioneering. By cotrast, in London, when a pohceman caught electioneering, or in any way maing use of his office for political purposehe is discharged from the force instan(Flynt, 1903, p. 449).

Politics has long been involved in Ameican pohcing. As early as 1910, in advocaing police professionahsation, RichaSylvester, the chief of poh ce of WashingtoD C , made the point that in order to carreffect this system the department must bfree from pohtical appointments or controand, aside from having and expressinopinion, the men should not be permitteto participate in poh tics (Sylvester, 191p. 413). Th e endeavour has not been fruful, however, because in the USA, McBain (1921) points out, the police funtion is not simply a matter of technicadm inistration . M oreover, politics will plwith and upon the American police funtion as long as it is possible for electofficers to apply varying policies in tmatter of law enforcement by the polic(pp. 143, 144).

Chaney and Saltzstein (1998) argue ththe police have always been bureaucrasubordinates of their pohtical superiors government. The arrest of domestic vilence abusers, for example, is mainly a decsion made under the influence of the locpohtics where the pohce department


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located. Similarly, Brown and Warner(1992) found that under pressure from localpolitics to maintain public order, the policein large American cities with a massiveimmigrant influx aggressively made arrestsfor drunkenness, a misconduct frequentlyassociated with the new residents.Taking a conflict theoretical perspective,Jacobs (1979) found that economicallymore unequal metropolitan areas werelikely to have larger police forces. Th e argu-ment is that differences in economicresources allow elites to meet their demandsfor the maintenance of order to secure theirongoing relationships through control ofthe coercive apparatus of the state. Thepolice is the direct approach to meeting thisdemand.With reference to the three functionsthat local American police forces variouslyoperate law enforcement, service deliv-ery and peacekeeping, James Q. Wilson(cited in Langworthy and Travis, 2003)identified three different styles legalistic,service and wa tchm an. The legalistic style ofpolicing emphasises the law enforcementfunction, and officers in these types ofagencies fi-equently and formally interactwith citizens. Officers working within ser-vice departments frequently deliver polic-ing, but intervene informally in the hvesof citizens. Officers in watchman-styleagencies in which the peacekeeping func-tion of policing is stressed have fewerinformal contacts with citizens. Similarly,Ostrom and W hitaker (1973) found thatsmall police forces under local communitycontrol meet citizen demands for neigh-bourhood police protection more effect-ively than large, city-wide control poHcedepartmen ts. Th e first type of police agencyis more responsive to citizen demands thantheir counterparts of the latter type.Although different in terms of policepractice, the USA and the UK have incommon their democratic poHtical systems.By contrast, policing in Continental states is

based on distinct pohtical theory. Fosdick(1915) described the police forces appearingon the Continent at the beginning of lastcentury:

The Continental theory which, evolvedfrom the necessities of autocratic go vern -ment, makes the police force the strongarm of the ruling class. Th e Co ntine ntalpoliceman is the servant ofth Crown orthe higher authorities; the people haveno share in his duties, nor, indeed, anyconnection with them. He possessespowers greatly exceeding those of thecitizen, (p. 29)

The power with which the Continentalpolice were authorised seemed unHmitedcompared with that of their Anglo-American counterparts. In Germ any . . .and to a large extent in Austria and France. . . A simple list of their functions coversforty-six pages of the official police hand-book. Many of the functions have nocounterpart in any governmental functionof Great Brita in (Fosdick, 1915, p. 31).No matter how the police in Conti-nental states subsequently evolved as thepolitical system transformed, they remaineddifferent from their Anglo-Americancounterparts because they belong to a dis-similar legal system. Democracy is practisedin various forms across the world, and so ispohcing. As Fosdick (1915) points out: theintention of the Continental cities in shift-ing fi-om municipal supervision to statesupervision could not be realized in a coun-try organized on a thoroughly democraticbasis (p. 37).

Criminal justice serves the purpose ofcontrolhng aberrant social behaviourdeemed improper by the authorities. Thepolice are at the forefront of the endeavourto impose the wiU of the governing regime.Before democracy, police, with the appro-priate permission, controlled the commun-ity for the king or emperor. They do the


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same jo b for th e wellbeing of the citizensafter a country becomes democratised.Kohancom mun ity policing in Japan, Taiwanand Korea, three states with the Continentallegal system, best illustrates how pohticaltransformation led to a change in policepractice.

THE EVOLUTION OFKOB N OMMUNITY POLI INGKoban is an informal name that is no longerin use but remains the term by which theJapanese refer to their police boxes. Akobanis a place where officers rotate shifts andassignments. Ko in Japanese means chan geand ban means nu mb er . It is a police unitwhere officers perform various assignmentsassociated with the daily functions of akoban. The formal name of the pohce boxnowadays is composed of three Chinesecharacters that are pronounced asha tsu shoin Japanese,pai tsu so in Taiwanese and pa-chul so in Korean. The meaning of the nam ecan be verbally comprehended as a policesend ing-ou t place (Wang, 1993).Japan has been credited as being theworld s best im itator (Vogel, 1979). Wh enJapan learns and imitates anything from anyother country, the end product is always achemical compound rather than a mixture.The Japanese usually collect informationrelevant to the target object from varioussources, add their own ideas, and the result-ing product is adapted to their use.Kobancommunity policing is an imitation thatcame out of such a process during the era ofthe Em pire of Japan. Revisions were madeto the system after World War II (hereafter the war ), using the same approach.

Prior to Sir Rob ert Peel s modernisationof policing in Great Britain, the countryhad been democratised. Japan remained atotalitarian state when it sensed the need toestablish a police force to serve foreignembassies in the country. The first policeforce appeared in Yokoham a as a result of ts

open-port policy when Emperor Meiinitiated the modernisation movement i1868 (Ames, 1981). Learning, imitating anrevising the modern policing model Great Britain originally, and of France anGermany thereafter, Japan invented, and hasince set forth, its unique communityoriented koban system in 1868 (AmeBayley, 1976).

Holding the police accountable to ciizens and their government has been priority concern in the history of Britispolicing since the first modern pohce forcwas initiated (Loader, 2000). Howevewhen the then totalitarian Japan began texperiment with the experience, the democratic notion behind British policing wareplaced by the ideology of unconditionloyalty to the emperor. The police werthus given unlimited powers. Citizens werequired to be loyal to their emperor awell; at the time, social control in Japan wapolitically directed. The pohce worked partnership with national security organistions and watched the behaviour of citizenclosely to prevent them from not only committing crime, but also engaging in antgovernment activities. Thekobansystem wan effective tool for this purpose. ThJapanese community pohcing strategy thuoriginally developed in a totalitariaembryo with democratic genes. The policservice was oriented toward controllinrather than providing a service to, citizen

In addition to being a part of the criminal justice system, the police were a component of the national security system, ankoban effectively pu t citizens in intensivcustody. Officers were responsible for colecting intelhgence that goes beyond crimActing as a neighbourhood watchdog andsecret service agent, the police kept intesive track of the politics and behaviour citizens hving within the communities thpohced. Famihes, villages, businesses another small social units formed the repower behind social control Japan (Pempe


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1992). Th e c omm unity intelligence net-work was informative because residentswere organised into a number of neigh-bourhood associations that were attentive topeople and events, reporting abnormahtiesto their koban officers (Chw ialkow ski,1998).In studying Japanese com munity poh c-ing. Western scholars are impressed by howomnipresent the police are in delivering aservice to c itizens. Western scholarsobserved tsu-zai-shos themini-ha-tsu-shoskoban) staffed by only one officer, that werefound even in extremely rural areas wherethere are very few residents (Ames, 1981;Bayley, 1976; DCAF, 2011). Before the endof the war, however, these officers werethere to closely observe citizens more thandeliver a police service. In high, mountain-ous areas devoid of residents,tsu-zai-shos areestablished to prevent politically rebelliouscitizens from hiding there and organisinganti-government forces. This explains howthe emperor effectively eradicated the com-munists and held onto his royal positionbefore the war ended.Rapid modernisation caused anomie inearly 1920s Japan, a nd the num bers of left-ists increased. Fierce government repressionofthe sociahsts in 1910 led to a strengthen-ing of pohce power. In this manner, thegovernment utilised the pohce, supportedbyjudicial, educa tion, and m ihtary officials,to crush dissent (Mitchell, 19 73, p. 319).

Along the way, modernisation pro-gressed, Japan initially learned laws fromFrance and later from Germany, and theG e r m a n Begriffsjurisprudenz (conceptua ljurisprudence) constituted the legal theoryof Japan d urin g the first quarter of the 2 0thcentury (Verwayen, 1999). Th e fascistPeace Preservation Law was enacted to con -trol leftist radicals in 1925. It was devised bythe government as a measure to unify thethought of the people (Mitchell, 1973,p. 321).

An American student cannot escape theconclusion that the European pohcedepartment is an excellent piece ofmachinery. To its construction a highorder of creative inteUigence has beendevoted; in its operation an equaUy highorder of inteUigence is constantlyemployed. (Fosdick, 1915, pp. 37-38)

This explains why the Japanese model wasextremely effective before the war ended.Th e old system was characterized by anextreme centralization of authority and awide range of pohce powers going wellbeyond the Continental European modelsfrom w hich it was derived (Braibanti,1949, p. 17). A variety of laws renderedunlimited power to the Japanese pohce. Forexample, the Pohce Offense Direct TrialDecree authorised high-ranking officers,such as the commanders of a pohce station(at the city or tow n level), to act as judg eshandling pohce offence cases (misdemean-ours). The pohce detained, fined or closeddown the businesses of those who broke thelaw (Nakano Bunko, 2012). Definition ofthe offence (entitled ikeizat) was vague, andofficers applied the law at their discretion.The arbitrary pohce process involved arrest,prosecution, verdict and execution.

During the AUied Occupation(1945-1952), General McArthur endeav-oured to democratise the police in Japan.The revision of Japan s Imperial Constitu-tion was aimed atthe demilitarization and decentrahzationof the government and its subordinateagencies, and to eliminate feudal andtotahtarian practices and those relation-ships between government and businessthat tended to continue the Japanese warpotential and to hamper the achievementof occupation objectives. (Kades, 1989,p. 219)

Braibanti (1949) noted that a police forcewhich wiU be the servant, not the master of


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the people is the aim of the drastic reorgan-isation of the Japanese police system whichwas inaugurated in 1948 (p. 17). As a result,the pa ra-military organizations w ere ab ol-ished by MacA rthur s orders; the neighb or-hood associations, which had allowedJapanese neighbors to spy on each other forthe benefit of the poHce, were ehm inated .Moreover, the constitution was rewrittenaccording to US principles, guaranteeingeach citizen the right to counsel, a speedytrial, the right to examine witnesses, free-dom from torture and coerced confessions,along with protections against arbitraryarrest and search and seizures (Kades,p. 219).

Police manuals were revised, severelyrestricting the role of the police officer(Chwialkowski, 1998). Of these, the PohceLaw (of 1954) and the Police Duties Execu-tion Law (of 1948) were the two mostsignificant. The first defines the structureand organization of the pohce, as well as itsprocedures and functions on the nationaland prefectural level ; the latter describesthe rights and duties of police officers(DCAF, 2011 , p. 9).

Sissons (1959) points out that theamendment to the Pohce Duties Law afterthe war was associated with the evolution ofJapanese pohcing, which made the policethe servants of the Government of the day(p. 44). However, according to the DCAF(2011) report, the amended Pohce DutiesExecution Law that came into effect in1948 has remained, giving the police wide-ranging power. For example, with regard toquestioning, officers can bring anyone sus-pected of having comm itted or being aboutto com mit a cri me (p. 26) to police stationsand boxes. In dangerous situations, officerscan enter any person s land, bud ing, vesselor vehicle, within the limits reasonablyjudge d necessary , and the person con -cerned cannot deny the officer entry(p. 26). In other words, officer discretionremains vaguely defined by the revised law.

In discussing the BiU, critics frequentheld up the British police system as model. All the same, subsequent amenment of the Police Duties Law in 195expanded pohce authority. Sissons (1959points out that, ofth powers approved, thmost controversial was the one that providwhe re a crime is likely to o ccur which clearly hkely seriously to violate publorder, to take coercive prevention actioand to enter private property when necesary for the performance ofhisduty (p.37Moreover, for whereas a suspe tbefobeing questioned must, in accordance witthe Code of Criminal Procedure (a. 198be notified of his right to remain silent, person questioned under the Pohce DutiLaw is not regarded legally as a suspect antherefore the pohce are under no duty tinform him that the Law provides that hneeds not answer or hands over anything his possession against his will (Sissonp. 41).

Shelley (1992) notes that Japanese lawyers have brought to international attentiohuman rights abuses conducted by thpolice during criminal investigations and which the government fails to intervenThe police still apply coercive force anintimidation during interrogation and prtrial detention. Citizens accept police brtahty due to the worry that resistance miglead to a more violent response from pohofficers (Angel, 1998).

Citizens plead for strict control of the uof force by the pohce, but they tolerate tgrowth of police powers. Th e po hce mofrequently use the vague aspects of contemporary laws to expand their authoritNevertheless, polls indicate that citizens apositive in their attitudes toward laenforcement, and those coUege graduatwho score high on the civil service exaare eager to join the police force (Fletch1993).


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The Japanese poHce force was decen-tralised during the Allied Occupation, andrandom patrol teams replaced kob ncom-munity policing. Unfortunately, crime rateswere elevated. Soon after the occupationended, the kob n system was restored, andthe Japanese poUce became a centralisedforce on ce again (Ames, 198 1; Bayley,1976). Th e rew ritten C onstitution has notbeen abandoned since. Although still sus-pected of human rights infringements,Japanese poHce have changed their task ori-entation from community control to com-munity service, while employing the samekoban philosophy and system.However, evolution of the goals of thepolice organisation was disrupted bynational security considerations before theend ofthe cold war. Fletcher (1993) notesthat the Japanese pohce force grew sig-nificantly in size after 1960 as a result ofconcerns over internal security that wasunder threat from left-wing radicals. Severemeasures were undertaken. In an operationnamed Apartment Roller initiated in1971-72, for example, 260,000 apartmentswere targeted for weapon searches.

Imperial Japan was anti-communist tosecure the rule of the emperor. During thecold war, Japan was part of the WesternAllies. Acc ording to P aragraph 2, Article 19,of the Pohce Law (of 1954), the SecurityBureau was one of five bureaux making upthe National Police Agency, and the For-eign Affairs and InteUigence Departmentremains a constituent of the organisationtoday (DCAF, 2011). In other words, intel-ligence collection has always been part ofkoban community pohcing.

The Japanese Communist Party (JCP)has been legal since the end of the war.D uring the cold war, Japan campaignedagainst communist infiltration that camefrom overseas rather than affihates of theJCP. Members of the party have thus par-ticipated actively in politics.

The main tasks of koban and chuzaisho[tsu zai sho] police officers are to regu-larly visit au houses and offices in theirdistrict, in order to stay informed aboutthe general condition and situation ofresidents as well as to give crime preven -tion advice. (DCAF, 2011, p. 9)

Working in partnership with citizens hasbeen successful in maintaining a safe societyand keeping crime rates low (Parker, 1984).As far as security threats from overseas areconcerned, Japan has never been the victimof any international terrorist attack. It seemsthat the effectiveness of the Japanese polic-ing strategy has deterred international ter-rorists from including Japan in their list oftargets. The same holds for Taiwan andKorea, the two countries with koban com-munity policing that duplicated theJapanese model following establishment ofthe modern police force. he two successful duplicationsThe police in Taiwan and Korea, the twoformer colonies of Japan, we nt thro ughchanges similar to those of their Japanesecounterpart. After the war, the two total-itarian governments began to experiencenational security issues under the threat ofcomm unism. D mocratisation took place inTaiwan in 1988 and in Korea in 1993.Similar to democratised Japan, koban com-munity pohcing in these two countries haschanged from a model of political controlto o ne of service to the country s citizens.

Taiwan originally learned modern pohc-ing from Japan, which can be traced back toas early as in 1911, when the governmentoverthrew the Qing Dynasty and began toexercise sovereignty in C hina. Japan was th eonly modernised country in Asia before theend of the war. It was the country fromwhich China learned and experimentedwith modernisation, including policing.Thekoban system has since been adopted asthe pohce model. The Rep ubhc of China


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astern programme features in Western comm unity poiicing

(Taiwan) w ithdrew to th e island of Taiwanin 1949 w hen the People s R epublic ofChina was born. Mainland police officersfollowed their national leader to the islandofTaiwan.

These Chinese officers moved into thevacated kob ns and began performing theirduties in a similar way to that in China.Local residents did not sense any change inpolicing, except that their officers dressed ina uniform they had not seen previously andspoke different dialects that were difficult tounderstand. Nonetheless, it is said thatresidents were as obedient to the poUce asthey had been during the colonial era,largely because these compatriot wardenswere as arrogant as their formercustodians.

Under threat from Chinese communists,the Taiwanese government declared martiallaw in 1949, and this was not abohsheduntil 1987. Similar to the way in which theJapanese emperor efficiently defused thethreat of communism and successfullymaintained his royal status, kob n commun-ity policing contributed to the security ofthe national leader s p osition and deterre dthe infiltration of Chinese communism.Before the dmocratisation movement initi-ated by a new national leader of nativeTaiwanese background in 1988, the pohcehad unboun ded powers. They detected andoversaw not only criminals, but also polit-ical dissidents advocating Taiwanese inde-pendence. Dissidents included those whowere suspected of being politically left andthose who were not satisfied with the cur-rent government administration.

As noted earher, the Taiwanese govern-ment was the regime that overthrew theQing Dynasty and exercised sovereigntyover China. Chiang Kei-Shek, the general-issimo who came into power 15 years afterthe regime was established, attended amihtary academy in Japan. All Chinesepolice practitioners and scholars learnedmodern policing from the same country.

The declaration of martial law allowethe government to exercise their administration in an autocratic manner. BeforChiang retreated to the island ofTaiwan i1949, the laws relevant to pohcing imperiJapan were copied in their entirety anintroduced into China. A Chinese versioof the Japanese laws appeared and came inteffect in Taiwan following the withdrawaIn other words, Chiang was not so differenfrom the governor-generals appointed bthe Japanese emperor during the coloniperiod (1895-1945) as far as the issue oadministration style was concerned.

Japan modernised criminal justice in Tawan during colonisation in such a way thawhen it came to the more liberal aspects oWestern criminal law, hke due procesquality of punishment, individual responibility, and a non-partisan judiciarymodernization was not forthcominreflecting both the iUiberal elements oJapan s domestic c riminal law and the coecive nature of colonial rule (Barclay, 20 01p. 157). Hishida (1907) observed ththe laws of Japan w ere applicable to thJapanese residing on the island. To thChinese and the natives, however, justice administered with due regard to their usagor customary law . Moreover, in executinthe laws and in conducting his official busness, the governor-general can issue hown administrative decrees, violation which may be punished with imprisonmeup to twenty-five days or fine up to twentfive yen (p. 270).

Most of the Japanese laws were intrduced to the colony, and so was thimperial police process. Because the criminal justice systems of Japan and Ch ina wealmost identical, Taiwanese citizens hardsensed the change of regime. The sampolicing scenario remained, repeating itseevery day. For example, at midnight eanight, a number of residents gathered at thneighbourhood precinct waiting for trelease of relatives who had been arreste


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on police offence charges, and convictedand detained (for up to 7 days) at the pohcestation. The scenario did not disappear until1991, when the Pohce Offense PunishmentLaw (the equivalent of the Japanese PoHceOffense Direct Trial Decree) wasaboHshed.

D uri ng the pe riod of martial law, Taiwanexercised democracy in an autocratic man-ner. Citizens enjoyed freedom only to theextent the government allowed. Politicalnonconformists were no t given an open andfair trial. Those who committed generalcriminal offences were entitled to due pro-cess. However, if the wrongdoing wasprohibited by martial law, civilian offenderswere arraigned in court and frequentlyreceived a more severe penalty.

The police formed part of the nationalsecurity system and were effective in intelli-gence collection and the surveillance ofpohtical dissidents and criminals. obanofficers classified the family members ofpohtical nonco nformers as a Type I h ouse-hold and paid them a visit twice a mo nth.Type II households, those with ex-convictfamily members w ere visited once a mo nth.The pohce acted as a special type of proba-tion officer, openly putting these offenderson indefinite custody. Severe penalties,coupled with tight control, meant thatTaiwanese citizens enjoyed the same secur-ity they had experienced during Japaneserule. They involuntarily surrendered theirhuman right to freedom to a certain extentand ironically enjoyed the entitlement tobeing free firom the fear of crime.

Scenarios simuar to those that took placein Allied Occupation Japan appeared inTaiwan. In 1976, a heutenant general, theformer commander of the marine corps,was appointed to head the national pohceagency. At a time when American policewere agonised by soaring crime rates andwere searching for an effective new strategyto substitute for the failing tactic of randompatrols, the n ational pohc e of Taiwan w ere

replacing kobancomm unity poh cing withan incident-driven approach. All kobansacross the country were closed, and officerswere reorganised to act only as patrolmen(Wang, 1993).

This was at a time w hen telephones w erenot yet common in family homes. Citizensran to the neighbouring kob n to report acrime or to send for the pohce, but w ith thechange, they found the shelter closed whenthey arrived. Civilian gun ownership wasprohibited and residents in rural areasbecame extremely vulnerable. Moreover,owing to a budget deficit, the police werenot equipped with sufficient cars andmotorcycles to conduct their business. As aresult, crime rates skyrocketed, the lieuten-ant general stepped down, the policemodernisation programme ended after a5-year endeavour, and kobans werereopened.

The dmocratisation movement beganand the period of martial law ended w hen anew president with a native Taiwanesebackground took office in 1988. Sincethen, no citizen has been charged with anypohtically oriented offence. Ten years later,dissidents who had been persecuted andharassed came into power. The threat fromcommunism had virtually disappearedbecause the dmocratisation movement wasinitiated owing to the Taiwanese conduct-ing business with China. Currently, of apopulation of 23 million, 2 million Tai-wanese citizens reside permanently inChina. Citizens are guaranteed the right tofree speech. One can openly express dis-content with the government or thenational leader without being punished orharassed.

Type I and Type II offender in-hou seinspections no longer take place. obanofficers are responsible only for collectingintelligence associated with crime andespionage. Officers interact intensely withresidents to dehver services to a communityrather than fulfil their surveillance mission.


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asfern programme feafures in Wesfern comm unify policing

Similar to their Japanese counterparts,Taiwan's community pohcing has beentransformed from a control model to aservice orientation.Korean policing changed following aprocess similar to that experienced inTaiwan. Both countries were colonised byJapan during the war and were ruled bynational leaders with a tnihtary background(who attended Japanese military academy)for decades afterwards. Japan introduc ed thekoban system into Korea during its 35-yearcolonisation of the country, from 1910 to1945 (Moon, McCluskey & Lee, 2005).Police operations were employed in thesame effective way as in the Japanese ho m e-land. During Japanese occupation,unbounded police power infiltrated everyaspect of Korean people's hves (Moon,2004). Iyenaga (1912) notes:

To cut down these [Korean] robbers andstamp out the insurrection, Japan wasforced to organize a large body of policeandgendarmerie in addition to the garri-son army of a Davidson and a halfDuring four years these forces have shotover 14,000 of these insurgents, whichnaturally accentuated the bitter feehngsof Koreans toward Japanese, (p. 212)

Koreans were persecuted and were fright-ened of the Japanese police in the samemanner stheir Taiwanese co unterp arts. 'ShThe Sunsa Japanese policeman) is comingto get you to stop babies from crying', saida Korean mother (Moon, 2004, p. 130).Correspond ingly, a Taiwanese moth er fre-quently found it effective to stop her baby'scrying by saying: 'Shee Stop crying, or thesuen-za (Japanese pohce) wiU come to catchyou '

The Korean War ended, and the R ep ub -hc of Korea was created as an independentstate. Kang (2002) argues that 'a typicalproblem in developing countries is thestate's abihty to resist society's demand'

(p. 183). As a result, 'knowing the politicstory is essential to understanding how thdevelopmen tal state functions' (p. 202).Similar to its Taiwanese cou nterp arKorea has been constantly threatened bthe communist regime of North KoreaCoupled with ignorance of democratiprinciples, Korean citizens experienced thdUemma of being an ally of the West, whilenjoying limited freedom. The connectiobetween pohtics and the police wasignificant.Regimes headed by leaders with a miliary backgrou nd used the police as an effec

ive tool for maintaining their ruhng poweFor example, the police were found to havbeen involved in manipulating variounational elections, including the presidentiacampaign in 1960. T he constitutional, awell as human, rights of Korean citizenwere frequently violated by police processes, making pohcing in the countrpohtically rather than citizen oriente(Moon, 2004). Since its establishment, thnational police force had never been assureof political neutrality and structural autonomy until the success of democratisinthe country in 1993 (Moon). Th e roof the police, as well as their relationshiwith the pubhc, narrowed. The pohcserved as the only legitimate and effectivmeans of suppressing anti-governmedemonstrations and harassing citizens anpohtical rivals (Moon et al., 2005).

In 2001, there were 2,928 mini-pohcstations kobans) staffed by nearly 43.1 cent of the total police personnel. Thespolice boxes had four basic roles. First, eacunit functioned to maintain pubhc ordeprevent crime and deal with criminal actiities within its designated geographicarea. Officers performed foot or vehicpatrols and responded to citizen requestSecond, as a mini-pohce station, each unindependently operated programmes thorganised and involved citizens in the enteprise of maintaining order and preventin


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crime. The most successfiil agendas involvedthe Voluntary Patrol Orgarzation and theCrim e Re porting Agents Programme .Third, each unit served as a point of directcontact with citizens, in that officers fre-quently visited residents to ascertain theirneeds and concerns regarding the safety ofthe community. Fourth, box officers wereassigned to assume the various tasks thattheir supervising pohce station performedday, including criminal investigation,crime prevention, traffic control and secur-ity maintenance (Moon et al., 2005).Because these police boxes were closelyconnected to the communities they served,coupled with an image of pohce powerinflation that citizens acquired before dm-ocratisation, corruption inevitably occur-red. This misconduct led the pubhc toperceive that their police were unprofes-sional. In addition, to operate in accordancewith the dmocratisation movement, thenational police aimed to rebud itself as aself-governing and professional force(Moon et al.).The change in policing strategy fromkoban to an area random patrol divisionsystem began on 1 August 2003, and thenumber of mini-pohce stations has beenreduced dramatically. Most of the remainingpolice boxes are located in rural areas andare restricted to activities irrelevant to theenforcem ent of law. Regio nal patrol stations(called gi-gu-dei in Korean) have beenestablished throughout the country. In addi-tion to serving the goal of providing a rapidresponse to crime, these regional patrolstations were created for the efficient use ofmanpower (Moon et al., 2005), whichincorporated a theory of change differentfrom that of their Taiwanese counterparts.Constructing theories based on the con-temporary community policing literature,Korean criminologists have examined theproblems resulting from these changes. Shinand Jang (2003) surveyed 7,617 local pohceofficers of all rarcs, from poHce chief to

rank-and-fe officer. They found thatofficers generally suffer from anxiety andneed encouragement from their supervisors.Moreover, Shin and Jang observed a lack ofinteraction between officers and residents,and the establishment of cooperative rela-tionship between the two parties is needed.Ch oi and Jeo ng (2004) observed that thefull-scale change in policing strategy beganindiscriminately, without taking intoaccount the variety in geographical anddemographical characteristics of localregions across the Korea. Citizens anxietiesabout safety increased in certain areas as aresult. Th e officers interviewed urged thereopening ofkob ns and the efficient use ofpublic peace centres (settings designated forreceiving residents) to promote communityrelationships.

Roh (2007) points out that Koreanpolicing was more effective when per-formed proactively, as in the past (the kob nsystem), than in the current reactive model(the gi-gu-dei patrol division system). Thepatrol strategy should be carried out withinthe pattern of problem-oriented as well asintelligence-led policing. Park and Kim(2008) advocate activating communitypolicing by initiating walking patrol rein-forcement, advancing civihan coaborationgroups, holding an area security conference,operating road checkpoints, improvingpatrol car services, widely estabhshingclosed-circuit televisions, building rapportwith private security firms, changing theleadership attitudes of managers, promotingofficer attitudes to service, and re-educ atingrank-and-file officers. Nam and Lee (2009)surveyed 338 citizens living in Seoul, thelargest city in Korea, and Won-ju, a smallcity in the south ofthe country. They foundthat citizens had a negative attitude towardssecurity in their locality. Moreover, resid-ents beheved that it is important for thepolice to estabhsh relationships with thecommunity in order to preserve the peace.


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What occurred with policing in Taiwanwas also seen in Korea. The observabledifference lies in the duration of the pro-gramme in that it lasted five years in Taiwanand eight years in Korea. Since the begin-ning of 2010, kobans have been reopenedacross Korea.

The three koban community pohcingcountries have maintained low crime rates.Their police forces are centralised and areaffiliated with the national security system. oban officers in the three societies estabhshan intimate rapport with citizens. Residentsactively provide the officer with inteUigenceregarding crime and matters of nationalsecurity if they come across any in theirsocial gatherings. In the past, in the case ofJapan and Taiwan whe n the two countrieswere under communist threat, coUectingnational security inteUigence was one ofthekoban officer s im por tan t tasks. S ince thetension eased, crime prevention has beenthe goal of kobanofficers endea vours toachieve citizen participation, the feedbackthat results from satisfaction with the policeservice. Although Korea remains underthreat from North Korea, service-orientedcom mu nity po licing is unde r way. Th e lowcrime rates and silence regarding commun-ist infiltration tend to suggest that the pohc-ing strategy is a success.

Con tempo rary policing in Japan, Taiwanand Korea is ostensibly service-oriented.The crime rates in these three countries arerelatively lower than in W estern cou nter -parts of equivalent national wealth. Thetransformation of policing in these threekoban system countries failed, which iUus-trates the fact that, where there is no com-munity orientation, there is a reduction insuccessful pohcing.

None of the three countries has everbeen targeted or attacked by internationalterrorists. In any community in Japan,Taiwan and Korea, neighbours warm ly w el-come the arrival of the stranger (a terrorist,for example). Thekoban officer learns about

the newcomer the next day during his/hsociahsation with residents. Going extremely rural areas in the three countrito hide, the stranger (terrorist) wiU find ththe tsu zai shoofficer, along with a smanumber of residents wiU invite their neneighbour for dinner. The hospitahty offered with an assumption to which thpeople are commonly committed: humabeings are born kind and friendly.Practices in the WestWhen Japanese community pohcing waintroduced to the USA, the system warevised with regard to three correlates the government, the people and the policLocal police forces in the USA are indpendently funded by local government, anresidents decide how they want to bpoliced. Moreover, the Anglo-Americajudicial system is different from its Continental counterpart, except for inteUigenccoUection, the content of which is nevtold.

In fact, community policing is a lonforgotten wisdom in the West since m ode rpolicing was first documented (Lumb anWang, 2006). This is due to changes criminal justice policy every 5070 yea(Duffee, 1980), and pohc ing is not exem pbeing a component of the criminal justicsystem (W ang, 2007). Th e re invention thappeared in the East was carried out on thbasis of information originaUy acquirefrom the West. It was subsequently learneby and introduced back into the West bresearchers under the central idea of seekincommunity collaboration, a strategaccommodating democratic societies. othe r words, the soft part of the strategwas put into practice, whereas the harpart was ignored. The Japanese policisystem, which was originally autocratic essence, was thus converted and employ Western law enforcement as an approato democratising policing.

Community pressure plays a notable ro


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in police politics in the USA. The pro-fessionalisation that began in the 1940sultimately failed, owing to local politicalinfluence on the police, resulting in theirbecoming isolated from citizens. Forexample, in Oakland and Seattle, in the late1980s and early 1990s, crim e e merg ed as apolitical problem and community policingappeared in each city's agenda as a solutionto citizen concerns about crime (Bass,2000).Immediately after the idea was intro-duced to the USA, community pohcingbecame fashionable and was pursued bypolitically affiliated police administratorsacross the country. It is suspected that somepolice chiefs, those policing traditionaltowns and cities in particular, might haveperceived that the imported inventionseems to be a backward step in the evolu-tion of policing. However, they engaged inthe new model for political reasons becausethey wished to demonstrate to citizens, thevoters, that they were performing their dutyto the community efficiently. Moreover, theidea was first introduced in the late 1970swhen the police nationwide were crippledby the soaring crime rates. A number ofalternative approaches such as team poHcing(Sherma n, M ilton Kelly, 1973) wereexperimented with and failed to achieve thedesired outcomes. A variety of programmesunder the same title began to appear inlarge American cities. Early notable suc-cesses were many, and include the DirectedArea Responsibility Team (DART) inHouston (Brown, 1985), Citizen Oriented

PoHce Enforcement (COPE) in Baltimore(HayesHp Cordn er, 1987), Co m mu nity-Oriented Police Education (COPE) inPhiladelphia (Greene, 1989) and Commun-ity Patrol Officer Program (CPOP) in NewYork City (McElroy, Cosgrove Sadd,1990). Similar programmes with compar-able names are found in countless policedepartments across the USA and theworld.

The 50-70-year change interval in crim-inal justice policy tha t Duffee (1980)observes as taking place in communitypoHcing, has prevailed for more than threedecades. Thinking by analogy, what hasbeen in progress in the evolution of poHc-ing seems parallel to what has been takingplace in the change in prison poHcy.Lumb and Breazeale (2003) state that thedegree to which community policing prac-tices are adopted is in part a reflection ofhow departments deal with change. Withinthe rush to implement and profess the newfaith in community poHcing, there is alsoconcern that, without adequate planning,training, resources and, importantly, propergrounding and employee acceptance, themovement may go the way of the formerwatchmen and professional approaches topolicing. To survive, employees must adoptits principles and practices and commit toits success.

Since Martinson's (1974) report 'WhatWorks' was published, the policy debate onemploying the 'just deserts' model versusreaffirming rehabilitation has remainedinconclusive. What has followed, however,is the introduction of various new pro-grammes that involve features of boththeoretical perspectives. Restorative justicetends to serve as an example. Recently,similar change scenarios have been takingplace in British policing.

Similar to its American counterpart,although having been a democratic andprofessional model that manifests its tradi-tional principles of 'poHcing by consent','minimum use of force' and 'crime preven-tion' (Mawby, 1999; Savage, 2003), ideo-logy and political practicaHty have beenobservably involved in the politics of BritishpoHcing (Loader Mulcahy, 2003; Savage;Sullivan, 1998). SuUivan points out that,from 1979 to 1997 in particular, the poHticsof British poHcing was guided by ideologyand poHtical practicality. Making society


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astern programme features in Western community policing

safer became a poHtical mandate of theConservatives.Modern policing was born as a result ofcitizens demands for safety in Great Britainin the early 1800s. Sir Robert Peel, thefounder of modern policing, included com-munity as a priority consideration, as Lumband Wang cite:

To maintain at all times a relationshipwith the public that gives reality to thehistoric tradition that the pohce are thepubhc and that the pubhc are the police;the police being only members of thepubhc who are paid to give fliU timeattention to duties which are incumbenton every citizen, in the interests of com-munity welfare and existence. (Lumb andWang, 2006, p. 179)

Although the idea of policing with a com-munity orientation was adopted, it wasrevised when put into practice.In Great Britain, neighbourhood polic-ing (NP) programmes are facihtated by

estabhshing police community supportofficers (PCSOs) and street and neighbour-hood wardens as ancillary order main-tenance forces, which patrol the parks andstreets of the larger cities. Th e presence oflaw enforcement is promoted, which inturn reduces citizens fear of crime.Reassurance policing (RP), a programmecompatible with zero-tolerance pohcing inAmerica, appeared as a result of strategicevolution, as well as political de man d, and is

gradually replacing NP. Innes states:The current second generation versionof NP is a wholly political construct. Itwas adopted by pohtical actors withinthe Home Office and the LabourGovernment to try and bring togetherand give a sense of cohesiveness to severaldifferent reform-oriented projects thathave been established within the UKpohcing sector over the past few years.

First and foremost there is ReassurancPohcing. (Innes, 2005, p. 158)

These projects, along with private securitfirms, regress policing to one of ts originfunctions. The basis of the modern policforce was founded in Great Britain in thearly 1800s and across the globe in the 19tcentury. Pohcing at the time took in broader scope of tasks; other than crimdetection and prevention, pohce agencieacted to involve and coordinate locauthorities in fulfilling their demand obeing multifunctional (Helms, 2007). Todahowever,

advocates of the narrow mandaapproach maintain that the proper role othe police is to focus upon the control ocrime and that this should not be dilutedIn contrast to which, supporters of thbroader mandate suggest a wider socirole for pohcing requiring them to conduct a range of soft:er policing functionto manage public security and providfor the emergency-maintenance of sociorder. Reassurance Policing and NP aboth examples of this second positioAs such, total pohcing would integraboth soft and hard pohcing flinctionwithin a coherent framework. (Inne2005, p. 167)

These programmes aim to achieve the goof promoting police visibility, accessibiliand familiarity.In whatever variety of patterns, sinccommunity policing reappeared in Ameican and British society, the difficult strtegic aspect has not been involved practice. Pohtical influence on policing the West is different from that in the Eain its intensity and consequences. The USand Great Britain passively change thepolicing programmes in response to publdemand, as opposed to the governments Japan, Taiwan and Korea, who assertive


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retain the strategy of social control whileignoring the voices of their citizens.However, people in the East and theWest are different in terms of what theydemand from democracy. What Japanese,Taiwanese and Koreans can live with, interms of individual freedoms, might beintolerable to Americans and the British.The collective weUbeing, a low crime ratesociety, is achieved in the three Easterncountries by sacrificing individual freedomsto a certain extent. The pattern of com-munity policing and the approach to theresulting success might not be appreciatedby citizens of the two Western countries.

BALANCING INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMAND COLLECTIVE WELLBEING THEPOLICY IMPLICATIONSKang (2003) argues that Asia has differenthistorical traditions, different geographicaland political realities, and different culturaltraditions (p. 84). Similarly, Ram seyer(1998) argues that aU of us who make ourhving off matters Japanese would agree thatsom e aspects of Japanese life differ from lifeelse where. Most of us would agree thatculture captures some of that difference(p. 883).

The specific types of government, soci-ety, citizens to be policed and laws to beenforced determine the corresponding pat-tern of a society s police force. Planningpolice strategies is therefore a task thatdemands high inteUigence. A specific mo delof community pohcing works only whenthe four conditions are met.

The above comparative analysis revealsthat politics is involved in communitypohcing in two distinguishable ways inEastern and Western practices. The Westernstyle shows how the government respondsto the demand from its citizens for a morecaring service. By contrast, the Eastern pat-tern can be denoted as integrating the con-trol purpose of the government in

delivering its service to the pubhc. Thehistorical dilemma of how the police cansuccessfully fulfil their goals without affect-ing the rights to which the policed areentitled remains unsolved.

Societal and cultural differences betweencountries located on opposite sides of theworld affect the application of pohcingstrategies owing to a lack of uniform stand-ards for evaluating fairness as well as effect-iveness. Eastern community policing,which is autocratic in essence, might beaccepted by the West when the internalsecurity ofthe countries is constantly underthreat. Langworthy and Traviss (2003,p. 446) argue:

O n the o ne h and, there is clearly a desireto strengthen protection against terroristattacks. On the other, the fragmentednature of pohcing in America impedesefforts to centraUze police authority. Atthis moment, the war on terrorism seemsto have caused a reassessment of thecurrent balance between liberty andciviUty.In other words, when the fight againstterrorism is a concern. Western citizensmight voluntarily abandon a certain level offreedom in exchange for a safer environ-ment. This seems analogous to the way inwhich their Eastern counterparts have ahigher level of tolerance to police servicedelivery in order to be assured of the diffu-sion of the threat from communist rivals. Ifcommunity pohcing is deemed to be prac-tised more effectively in the East, because ofthe relatively lower crime rates and theabsence of terrorist attacks, it is attributableto the fact that citizens living in thesesocieties are policed more easily in that theyare more cooperative with the police,although perhaps involuntarily. The Japan-ese pohce, for example, engage in less mis-conduct than the American police, becausethe society they regulate is far less diverseand divided (Johnson, 2003).


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astern programme features in Western community policing

As noted earUer, before the end of thewar, Japanese community policing success-frilly defused the threat of com mun ism byeradicating its affiliates who aimed to over-throw the emperor. Taiwan and Koreareserved the intelligence collection functionof the kobanand have effectively de terre dthe infiltration of spies from China andNorth Korea. Moreover, there have beenno international terrorist attacks in thethree countries.

Today, the Japanese, Korean and Taiwan-ese pohce remain part of their nationalintelhgence system. oban officers arerequired to collect and report intelligencenot only on crime, but also on issues ofnational security. Although the three coun-tries are democratic, the Japanese police areviewed as remaining above the law in someregards. For example, integrity issues, suchas officer misconduct, are expected to beeffectively covered by the department,which makes the accountability of the forcequestionable. Taking that statement intoaccou nt, Japan s being a Western styledemocratic country is questioned (Johnson,2003).

Moon (2004) argues that current prob-lems experienced by the Korean police,namely the loss of legitimacy, corruptionand brutality, can be attributed retrospect-ively to the influence of the Japanese occ u-pation and the fact that a negativeimpression of law enforcement acquired bycitizens remains active. Although policingreforms have been made, whether thepolice are independent of political influenceis unknown, because higher ranking admin-istrators of the force are appointed on thebasis of their political affiation.In Great Britain, a country of policing byconsent (Mawby, 1999), the use of softpohcing is performed through persuasionand by attracting the public and otheragencies to its objectives (Innes, 20 05,p. 157). However, soft pohcing is difficult to

deliver at times (Innes). Community poUing, as in the case of the Japanese, is relatively easy task for the police, becausthey perform hard policing within a sopattern. If a similar strategy were designeand practised in the West, criminologistaking a radical view toward pohcing, sucas Quinney (1980) and Jacobs and Bri(1979), would posit that law enforcemenserves the function of control by the statAs a result of the politicisation of securitissues. Ferret (2004) found that there habeen a political form of evaluation on thcommunity policing programme sinc1999.

However, as a national security consideration, which is essentially a politicmatter, pohcing in Australia was once rearranged during the cold war era. Similaactivities have been taking place since th9/11 global terrorist crises. Based on thargument that civil rights and liberties arpreserved when national security is assuredthe Australian Government has expandecounterterrorist legislation and powers thseem corrosive to democracy. A ustrahasecret service (Australian Security Intellgence Organization) relies heavily upon thSpecial Branches of the state police foproviding intelligence (Firmane, 2008).

Officers from the Housing Bureau of thN ew York Pohce D epa rtme nt regularly visthe city s residents. Closed -circuit TV s apopularly set up in every corner of Ameican and British cities. These programmetend to indicate that the hidden part oEastern community pohcing seems gradually present itself in the West. On thbasis of the results of the General SociSurvey, Shaw, Shapiro, Lock and Jacob(1998) note that roughly half of threspondents in both 1985 and 1990 suported telephone taping and overnigdetention; more than 90 percent supportesurveillance; but only ab out one-fifwould have allowed the opening of thsuspect s m a (p. 408).


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The police in Japan, Taiwan and Koreaalways acknowledge that policing can beperformed most effectively in a soft ratherthan a hard manner. Walker (1994) arguesthat the 'War on Crime' was a mistake inconceptualisation, in that crime is some-thing that cannot be fought. By the sametoken, the most effective police response tocrime is to be informed of its dynamics.

Koban commuity pohcing is designed toperform proactive pohcing by establishinginformative neighbourhood inteUigencenets.Although it is performed at the risk oferoding hberty, it is effective in controUingcrime as weU as the infiltration of com-munism. Thinking by analogy, since West-ern law enforcements have recently beenmoving along the same track in response tothe threat from terrorism, renovating theircommunity pohcing by integrating the pro-gramme features of their Eastern counter-parts seems worthwhile.

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