what i learned in 40 years of doing intelligence

8/11/2019 What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing Intelligence

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Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)13

Al l stat ement s of fact, opin ion, or an alysis expr essed i n th is ar ti cle ar e th ose of the

person i nterviewed. N othin g in the art ic le should be constr ued as assert in g or i mpl y-

in g U S govern ment endorsement of i ts factual statements and in ter pretations.

Every intelligenceproduct must be rootedin a strong

understanding of the

audience it is written for.

M ar ti n Petersen i s a reti r ed seni or CI A D ir ectora te of I nt ell igence (DI )

officer a nd t he aut hor of a num ber of ar ti cles on i nt ell igence and in tell i-

gence ana lysis. I n l ate 2009 h e was asked by t hendi r ector of

i nt ell i gence M i chael M orell to cr eate a cour se for m anagers on review-

in g analyt ic produ cts and t eachi ng tr adecraft, w hi ch became th e Ar t of

Review Sem in ar. Th is art icle is adapt ed fr om remar ks deli ver ed t o DI

managers in September 2010.

An a dva nt ag e of getting older is increa sed perspective. I ha vebeen doing, thinking an d writ ing about int elligence a nd intelli-

gence ana lysis for a lmost 40 yea rs now. The business we a re in ha s

cha nged a great deal in tha t t ime, but more in i ts form th an in i ts

fundamentals .

I wa nt to focus on th ree broad topics: understa nding t he cus-

tomer, the importa nce of a service ment a lity, an d th e six th ings I

lear ned in doing a nd st udying intell igence an alysis during my

career in t he DI . While these experiences ar e draw n from w ork in

th e CIA, I believe the principles a pply across the I nt elligence Com-

mun ity (IC).

In the First Person

What I Learned in 40 Years of Doing IntelligenceAnalysis for US Foreign Policymakers

Martin Petersen

Un der st a n d i n g t h e Con sumer : F i v e Fun dam en t a l T r u t h s

I believe every intelligence

product m ust be rooted in a

strong understand ing of the

a udience it is writ ten for, an d I

believe there ar e five funda -

menta l t ru ths about the ana ly t-

ical products and their

consumers.

T r u t h n um ber o n e: t h ep r o d u ct i s op t i o n a l

equ i pm en t for ma ny key

consumers .

The m ost precious comm odity

in Wash ingt on is not informa -

tionthere is an overabun-

dan ce of informa tion, data ,

opinion, an d secretsbut t ime.

The fut ure in Wa shingt on is

four years at its longest point

an d every da y i t is one day

shorter. It is not sur prising

th en th at consumers of our ser-

v ices are in a hurry and t ha t

th ey ar e very busy people; th epresidents day is actually

plan ned in five minute incre-

ment s. These people ha ve

ma ny, ma ny sources of informa-

tion, an d ma ny of the people w e


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Lessons in Serving Policymakers

14Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 1 (Extracts, March 2011)

serve believe they a re better plugged int o the

world tha n we a re. And in man y cases, they are.

Our customers in the policyma king realm often

do not underst an d our mission, our values, or our

sta nda rds. They t end t o be skeptica l of int elli-

gence, especia lly if they a re new to th e policyma k-

ing w orld. They formed their views a bout w ho we

are, wha t w e do, and h ow w e do i t from th e same

sources other America ns do: popula r media , th e

press, an d congressiona l reportsnot a lwa ys th e

most a ccura te or sophisticat ed of sources and

generally not th e most flat tering. Our consumers

ha ve strong world views a nd clea r policy a gen-

das, a nd t hey often a ssume we have a policy

agenda , t oo.

I t is not surpris ing t hen t ha t policymakers donot a lwa ys see how w e ca n help them: After a ll,

I, the policy-

maker, am smart

an d ha ve excel-

lent sources of

informat ion (including all t he ones you have), a nd

I a m very busy, so wh y should I spend some of my

most pr ecious commodity on you? The rea lity for

intelligence officers is tha t w e must woo them,

sell them on t he need for our services, an d dem-

onstra te th e value of our ma terial da ily through

its t imeliness a nd i ts sophisticat ion. I f you are a nint elligence officer, th e tit le will often get you in

th e door, especia lly th e first t ime, but it will not

keep you there. Newcomers to th e IC ma y not

realize tha t t he CIA presence in th e Oval Office

during the G eorge W. B ush a dministrat ion w a s

th e exception, not th e rule.

If th e IC is going t o be part of th e regular rou-

tine in t he White H ouse, not only must w e have

something t o say t ha t people there can not get

somewhere elsewh ich ha s to be more th a n ha v-

ing secretsbut w e ha ve to be mindful of how w e

deliver it. We a re not only optional equipment; w e

ar e also guests a t t heir dinner part y. If we spill

the w ine, insult th e host , a nd oversta y our wel-

come, we w ill not be invited ba ck.

Speaking t rut h to power first req uires access to

power. My personal experience is tha t our con-

sumers will take frequent ba d news an d unha ppy

assessments as long as they are well-reasoned,

supported by data an d argu ment, and presented

wit hout ra ncor, value judgment s, or a rrogan ce.

T r u t h n um ber t wo : t h e w r i t t en p r o d u c t i sfo r ever .

A collea gue wh o spent h a lf his ca reer in the DI

an d ha lf in th e Nat iona l Clandestine Service

(NC S) once said only ha lf jokingly, You know

wh a t t he DI s problem is? You guys wr ite th ings

down. In t he NCS we believe in the oral tr adi-

tion. He was r ight in t he sense tha t t he written

word is for ever. Once it is printed, th ere is no ta k-

ing it ba ck or modifying it.

B r ief ings and background notes a re importa nt

par ts of doing t he mission, but th ey leave no per-man ent record. One can f ight over wha t w a s said

in a briefing,

bu t the wr i t ten

word is in bla ck

an d white. I t is

the WorldIntel-

ligenceReview (WIR e) a rt icle, the seria l flyer, th e

intelligence assessment, a nd the na tional intell i-

gence estima te (NIE ) th a t end up in th e archives,

an d i t is the paper product tha t gets held up a t a

congressional hea ring or eviscerat ed on a n edito-

r ial page.

And w hen I sa y forever, I mean for ever. Rela-

tively few people ha ve read t he now infa mous

NIE done in 2002 on Ir a qs w eapons of mass

destruction (WMD), but everyone knows w ha t it

say s. And everyone yea rs a nd yea rs from now will

know wha t i t sa id , because i t is viewedrightly

or wronglyas fat a lly flaw ed and r esponsible for

the second Iraq wa r. I t w il l never go awa y, and i t

joins th e pant heon of other real a nd ima gined

CI A fa ilures. Every t ime we publish, we go on

th e record an d t he record is there for ever,for the

second guessers, the hindsight experts, an d an y-one wit h a n a genda . Thus, our judgments need to

be as precise as w e ca n ma ke them, supported by

evidence a nd argument , a nd a ccura tely ref lect

our level of confidence every ti me.

Policymakers do not always see how we can help them.


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T r u t h nu mber t h r ee: t he pub l i c does no t

segr ega t e success an d f a i l u r e.

Crit ics of int elligence, our customers, an d t he

general public do not sa y th at th e products of a

certa in office in CIA or DI A a re really grea t, buttha t the products of another office in tha t agency

are a wful . Nor do they say t ha t one type of ana ly-

sis, say politica l, can be trust ed, but t ha t our

work on something else, say S&T is unreliable.

Nor wil l they say tha t a l though they were wrong

last t ime, we ca n trust them this t ime.

No, customers remember, a nd t hey q uestion.

Sometimes th ey question fa irly, but often th ey do

not, especia lly those customers w ho find wha t is

being said to be inconvenient or unhelpful in

ad van cing a policy position th ey favor. From th eCI A a lone, I ca n produce a list of wha t I call

everybody

knows: every-

body know s

th e CIA failed to

predict t he fall

of the Sh a h of Ira n in 1979 or t he collapse of the

Soviet Un ion in 1991 or the India n nuclear t est in

1998 or this or th at . The facts a re often fa r more

complex, but t hey ha ve entered the popula r

mythology. And the consumers of intelligence say

out loud Why sh ould I tru st y ou on t his issue

wh en you were w rong on tha t one? Weak perfor-

man ce in one DI a rea immediat ely calls into

quest ion a ll w ork in th e CIA.

P resident K ennedy famously sa id of the CIA

th a t it s successes will be secret a nd its fa ilures

will be tru mpeted. To which I a dd my own corol-

lar y: in t he intelligence business success is tra nsi-

tory, a nd fa i lure is permanent.

T r u t h f ou r ( cl o sel y r e l a t ed t o t r u t h t h r ee) :

ou r i n d i v i d u a l a n d c ol l ec t i ve c r ed i b i l i t y

an d t h us ou r ab i l i t y t o do t hem i ssi onr i des on ever y p i ece of f i n i sh ed

in t e l l i gence th a t goes ou t t he doo r .

Sa d to say, no one cares wh at I th ink about a

part icular issuea nd no one car es wha t you per-

sonallyt hink eith er. They do car e tr emendously

about wha t the CIA orD IAorname the IC orga-

nizationthinks. The finished intelligence prod-

ucts tha t go out the door a re not persona l

products but corporat e ones.

IC products ha ve bra nd na mes, and t hey are

importa nt a nd powerful ones. They can open

doors , but they w il l not keep a ny a na lyst inside

circles of pow er if tha t bra nd na me is devalued by

shoddy w ork. Our customers rea d our products

for many r easons: to lear n, to make better deci-

sions, to know wha t the P residents Da ily B rief-

ing t ells th e president, t o look for a mmun ition in

a policy f ight, or to discredit wha t the IC says .

E very poorly-rea soned piece of finished int elli-

gence tar nishes a bra nd na me a bit a nd over t ime

can produce cracks in t he trus t t hey place in us to

live up to our t radecraf t . When tha t h appens

there is nothing one ca n say an d eventua lly t hebroader t rust is

lost . Ask BP an d

Toyota . One bad

oil well and a

few sticky accel-

erat ors undid

year s of excellent performa nce, an d shouting but

our record is still bett er th a n t ha t of [someone

else] m a kes no d ifference. We do not drill oil

w ells or build cars. We do the missiont he mis-

sion of protecting the U nited St at es. Our a bili ty

to ra ise th e level of the deba te or t o help policy-ma kers ma ke th e best decisions possible or t o

speak t rut h t o powerhowever one defines the

missionrests on one thing a nd one thing only:

our reputa tions for a na lytic rigor, objectivity, and

tota l integrity. Lose that a nd w e lose everyth ing.

T r u t h f i v e: ou r c ust omer s a r e sma r t er an d

mor e soph i st i c a t ed th an we g i ve th em c r ed i t

f o r ; t h ey have the i r own in depend en t sou r ces

o f i n f orm a t i o n a n d a n a l y si s w i t h wh i ch we

a r e comp et i ng .

And t hese customers a re continua lly cha nging.

We ha ve to esta blish our credibility a ndusefu l -

nessindividual by individual , a dministrat ion by

a dministra tion. There is no down time wh en it

comes t o qua lity.

Every poorly reasoned piece of finished intelligence tarnishesa brand name.


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These five trut hs dema nd t ra decra ft excellence,

they deman d exacting s tan dards. (see the D I

Quality Framework above for an example), and

th ey dema nd t he pursuit of perfection. They

demand th at we lear n from our past , an d they

demand t ha t we a sk the best of ourselves every

tim e. To do the m ission; t o serve th e policy-

ma ker; to protect the na tionrequires nothing

less.

Th e Im po r t a nce o f a Ser v i c e M en t a l i t y

Excellence requires more than a standard of

qua lity. I believe it a lso dema nds a specific

approach t o the cra ft of int elligence ana lysis: it

requires a service menta lity. A service menta lity

is th e opposite of a product menta lity, w hich often

seems to drive the w ork of intelligence an a lysis,

an d th e difference is easiest t o explain by compar-

ing th e tw o. In a product men ta lity, the focus is

on th e producer, w ho thin ks of a product a s his or

hers . I t is a lso about pa ckaging t ha t product a nd

disseminat ing it w idely. Success is measur ed in

num bershow ma ny unit s were produced or how

ma ny r eceived each unit . It is a bout filling a book

or producing a product t o demonstrat e tha t a n

an alyst is ready for the next big s tep in a career.

In a service menta lity, the focus is on the cus-

tomerthe consumer of our servicesand specifi-

cally on how best t o meet th e customers needs. It

is not a bout t he a uth or or t he producing compo-nent ; it is a bout the recipient . It is a bout h elping

tha t customer understand a n issue. I t is about

being timely, releva nt , expert, a nd corporatein

our approaches to providing service, intelligence

a na lysis. Su ccess is measur ed not by the number

of units produced, but by how w ell the product

a ddresses and a nsw ers the specific concerns of an

identified and targeted audience.


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P roduct a nd service are not mu tu ally exclusive.

Idea lly every product we produce should be

infused w ith a service menta li tya lthough we

often a ct like we a re in th e product business.

What difference does it make? When the productis more import a nt t ha n t he service it provides, we

relax our s ta nda rds to get t he productan other

unit of productionoff th e assembly line a nd out

th e door. Cl ose enough becomes good enough , an d

th e br and name suffers.

To infuse every product w ith a service menta l-

ity requires tw o th ings of intelligence an a lysts:

One is a set of s ta ndar dsthe DI Quali ty Fra me-

work in C IAs case; the other is ma stery of a sim-

ple techniqu ea sking t wo qu estions before

wr iting or briefing: wh o is the primaryau di ence

for t hi s pi ece and wh at i s th e speci fi c i nt el l i gence

questi on t hey

need h elp wi th?

I t is very hard

for th e aut hor of

a piece to ha ve a

service menta lity w hen he or she is focused on a

broad int elligence topic rat her t ha n a specific

intelligence quest ion. It is th e difference betw een

w e need a piece on t he demonstra tions in Tuni-

sia a nd w e need a piece on t he options t he Tuni-

sian government has for addressing the cause ofth e demonstra tions. A good int elligence question

ha s th e followin g propert ies: it bounds or na r-

rows th e subject ma tt er to be a ddressed; it gener-

ally conta ins a w ha t, w ho, why, or w here is i t

going element ; it is specific as t o the t opic or

event being addressed; an d i t is a question a nd

generally not a yes or no quest ion.

It is possible to ha ve man y different intelli-

gence quest ions for the same event. Curr ent int el-

ligence pieces genera lly work best w hen t hey a re

organized around one central question, although

th ey ma y touch on oth ers. Which question to

focus on is determ ined by w ho is selected as th e

primary a udience an d wha t tha t a udience is most

interested in or most needs to understa nd.

Forty years of experience have ta ught me tha t

failing t o identify a specific a udience a nd a n int el-

ligence question up front is often a t t he root of th e

w eakest a na lytic efforts. In t he Art of Review

Seminar we t a lk about The Road t o Ruin, the

first st ep on w hich is not clearly defining th e

issue to be addressed. This in t urn ea sily lea ds to

other, too common, failings in an aly tical w riting:

A fa i l u r e to p r esen t a c lea r ba si s fo r

j u d gm en t s.

A wea k piece typica lly specula tes on wha t h a p-

pens next but seldom provides the reason a n a na -

lyst believes the speculation is correct. The most

underused w ord in CIA DI a na lysis is beca use.

Every ma y a nd l ikely to an d could requires a

beca use s tat ement or i ts equivalentthe rea -

son we believe wh a t we believe. Absent t he

beca use, or its equiva lent, th a t a rt icle is just

a nother opinion in a tow n full of opinions.

Th e u se of

imp rec ise

l a n g u age .

It is not so

much tha t lan-

guage in a work of ana lysis is opaque but t ha t t he

point it is try ing t o make does not come through.

I t is s tat ing tha t X benefi ts from Y with out pro-

viding a s ta ndard by which to measure th e bene-

fit or spelling out precisely how a nd w hy X

benefits. Words like limits, ben efits, sug -gests, and a ll adverbs need a because or why

or how t o convey precise meaning. In tern a l

inconsistencies, not surprisingly, are often rooted

in imprecise langua ge.

Th e S i x Th i n g s I L ea r n ed

We all learn th e cra ft of intelligence ana lysis by

doing. The lessons are itera tive an d frequently

opaque, a nd t hey genera lly come slowly. Often

th ey a re only clear in looking ba ck. Now looking

back over nearly 40 yea rs, I think I ha ve lear nedth e followin g six thing s.

F i r st , how one th i n k s abou t t h e m i ssi on

a f fec ts deep l y how on e does th e m i ssi on .

I t hink t he intelligence an aly sts mission is less

a bout connecting t he dots (alt hough sometimes

it is) or predicting t he futu re (alt hough some-

times it is) or spea king tru th to power (alth ough

Excellence requires a service mentality approach to the craft ofintelligence analysis.


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we often do) tha n i t is a bout un derstanding t he

world. Dots a nd prediction and t ruth ca n cause us

to na rrow our focus in a w orld of intelligence

cha llenges tha t ar e cha ra cter ized by t heir com-

plexity a nd most importa nt, by t heir dynamicna ture. In 40 years I learned th at quite often th e

most importa nt piece of the puzzle, a nd often t he

ha rdest one to get a ha ndle on, is wha t t he

U nited St a tes is doing in a given situa tionor, in

milita ry intelligence terms, understan ding t he

B lue component of a sit ua tion.

I a lwa ys th ought of my job a s bounding u ncer-

ta inty a nd by doing so helping ma ke my guy

smart er tha n their guy, whether i t wa s across a

conference table or across a ba tt lefield and

ena bling our policymakers t o make t he best deci-

sions possible given th e time a nd informa tion

available. Some-

t imes tha t

involved conn ect-

ing dots or pre-

dicting cours es of

action or provid-

ing warning , bu t i t a lways meant unders tanding

the forces at work in an y s i tua tionthe key var i-

a bles a nd drivers an d our adversa rys perspec-

tive. It is th e difference betw een stra tegic

understanding a nd ta ctical comma nd of an issue.

Second , i n t el l i gence fa i l u r es com e f r om

f a i l i n g t o st ep ba ck t o t h i n k a bou t

un der l y i n g t r end s, f or ces, and assum p t i o n s

no t f r om fa i l i n g to conn ec t do t s o r t o

p r e d i c t t h e f u t u r e.

When our focus becomes too tactical we fail to

see the str a tegic. We must learn to step ba ck from

time to t ime and a sk ourselves: wha t a re we not

seeing th a t we w ould expect to see if our line of

a na lysis w ere correct . The IC s 24-hour pr oduc-

tion cycle often m akes t his ha rd t o do, but

because i t is ha rd to do, it is essential th at we doit .

An underst a nding of history and cultur e is key

to coming to gr ips with t he assumptions t ha t

underpin much of our an a lysis. And I a m not

ta lking a bout our history and culture, but t he his-

tory a nd culture of the count ries we work on as

th e people and l ead er s of those coun tr i es und er-

stand t hem. Every a na lystregar dless of disci-

pline or roleneeds a deep apprecia tion of how a

people see themselves, their historical a mbitions,

a nd t heir grievan ces. For an a lysts focused on for-

eign lea ders, or politics, or economics, it is essen -tial th at they understa nd how power is acquired,

th e preferred w ay of exercising power, and th e

a ccepta ble and una ccepta ble uses of power, as

well a s t he defining life experiences of the key

a ctors in the count ries they specialize in.

Th i r d , good an a l ysi s ma kes th e comp le x

com pr ehensi b l e, wh i ch is no t th e sam e as

s imp le .

The key t o makin g t he complex compreh ensible

is having in mind a specific a udience a nd a very

precise intelligence question for t he a na lysis tota ckle. Dat a dumps and murky a na lysis a lmost

a lways are

rooted in tr y-

ing to write

about a devel-

opment w ith-

out f irs t asking, Who is my a udience an d w ha t

specifi c questi on does it n eed a nswered? I t is tha t

difference betw een we n eed a piece on the r iot-

ing in Athens a nd w e need a piece on t he gov-

ernment s options for a ddressing th e underlying

cause of th e rioting.

We do very well a s a rule in responding to qu es-

tions from policymakers. We come up short when

weha ve to supply the a udience a nd t he question

ourselves andwe star t t o wr i te before we have

done al l the thi nk i ng. If we think in t erms of

a nsw ering well defined quest ions, w e ca n ma ke

complex situa tions comprehensible, a nd w e a lso

sta nd a better chance of ma king clea r wh at we

know a nd do not know a ccura tely, conveying our

level of confidence, and presenting a convincing

basis for our judgments.

Fou r t h , t her e i s no subs t i t u t e fo r k now i ng

wh a t o n e i s t a l k i n g a bou t , wh i c h i s n ot t h e

sam e as kn ow i ng th e fa c t s .

Former C IA Director Michael H ay den once

fam ously said, If it is a fa ct, it a int int elligence.

The business of int elligence ana lysts is more

about putt ing facts in perspective tha n i t is ha v-

Absent the because, or its equivalent, an article is just anoth-er opinion in a town full of opinions.


7/8



ing comma nd of th e facts. We a re paid n ot for

wha t w e know, but for our a bili ty to th ink about

wha t w e knowor think w e know. I t is about

knowing w ha t is importa nt. I t gets back to those

as sumptions, drivers an d varia bles I dwell on.

Sourcesclandestine, open source, technical,

diploma tic, etc.a re not t he sa me as kn owledge.

Sources a re not the equiva lent of, or a subst itut e

for, expertise, the type of knowledge I talked

about in t he second th ing I learn ed. All sources

ar e best t hought of as opinions, some more

aut horita tive tha n others , but a l l should be sub-

ject to careful reflection a nd compa rison to wh a t

we know a nd believe. The da ngers in sources are

three-fold:

We tend to give greater credence to those tha tsuppor t wha t

we a l ready

believe.

S ou r ces a r e not

a scientific

sample but a small s l ice of a much larger a nd

more complex information picture.

They never answer the cr i t ical question of wha t

a re we not seeing but should see if our a na lysis

were correct.

Dur ing one of the most cha llenging times in my

an alyt ical career, I w orked for t he f inest a na lyst I

ever knew. In th e middle of th e Tian a nmen C ri-

sis in 1989w hen every ones ha ir wa s on fireI

found h im lat e one aft ernoon going through a

sta ck of musty old report s. I asked him wha t he

wa s doing. He said , I a m looking for t hings tha t

did not ma ke sense th en, but do now. He found

some, an d it profoundly a ffected our line of a na ly-

sis.

F i f t h , i n t el l i g ence an a l y si s sta r t s wh en w estop repor t i n g on even t s an d sta r t exp l a i n i n g

t h em .

Our production cycle puts a premium on being

ag ile, quick, an d sma rt. I t is often 24 hours or

less. The DI is one place where a consumer ca n

ask a question and get an a nswera thoughtful

an d considered oneovernight . It is one of t he

DIs great est s trengths. I t is a lso one of i ts great

vulnerabilities. It makes it harder to step back

an d t hink a bout underlying causes, dr ivers, a nd

var iables, especially in a crisis situa tion. My

Tian a nmen st ory is the exception. My career a san a na lyst ta ught me tha t lesson one (how we

th ink a bout th e mission) a nd lesson t w o (under-

sta nding forces at w ork) a re the key to operat ion-

a lizing lesson fiveth e need t o explain events.

S ix t h , man ager s of i n t el l i g ence ana l y st s get

th e beha v io r th ey r ewa r d , so they had bet t er

k n ow wh a t t h ey a r e r ewa r d i n g .

This is a message for a l l mana gers and a l l who

aspire to man agement. I t is my experience that i f

you have clea r s ta ndar ds an d a re seen as consis-

tent a nd fair in a pplying them, your unit w ill l iveup to the s ta ndard. And , you m ust also hold your-

sel f t o th e same

standards. If

you va lue ana -

lytic trade-

craf t , ta lk

a bout it a nd pra ctice it. If you wa nt open commu-

nicat ion wh ere different int erpreta tions are con-

sidered, invite it. I f you wa nt honesty, be honest.

And rew a rd t he behavior you profess to value.

There is a Chinese proverb: If your vision

extends one year, grow wh eat ; if it extends 10

year s, pla nt tr ees; if it extends 10,000 years, grow

a nd develop men. Ma na gers, your job is t o grow

men a nd w omen who can do the mission. The

standard of success, I believe, is uncompromis-

ingly simple: Did I lea ve the unit I led stronger

tha n I found i t?

Why I t A l l Ma t t er s

I f there is an underlying reali ty to al l tha t I

ha ve learn ed, it is the obvious: we a re in a very

difficult business. It is more life a nd dea th nowth a n it wa s in my h eyday. The consequences of

getting a na lysis wrong a re much great er now.

Int elligence is a lso more political now in t he

sense tha t w ha t is done today is more open th an

it ha s ever been a nd a s a result m ore subject to

part isan sniping.

If we think in terms of answering well-defined questions, wecan make complex situations comprehensible.


8/8



There are some who say th e United St at es is a

declining power or tha t it is the source of ma ny of

th e worlds problems. Time w ill tell on th e first

question, but I believe the U nited St at es is a force

for good in the w orld, and h ow powerful a forcedepends as mu ch on our knowledge a s on our mili-

ta ry a nd economic might. I tell intelligence ana -

lysts I teach that more often tha n not they a re the

source of tha t know ledge. It is their professiona l-

ism and tra decraft tha t provide checks on t he sys-

tem, light t he wa y, an d levera ge US pow er. All the

dolla rs spent on int elligenceth e collectors in th e

field, the t echnical systems, and the lives at

riskar e for

naught, unless

tha t knowledge

comes t ogeth er in

wha t ana lysts do

every da y.

As th e deputy executive director at th e CIA, I

a ddressed each class of just -promoted CI A Senior

Int elligence Service officers, an d ea ch t ime I

asked for a show of ha nds of those who believed

th ey would never see WMD u sed on U S soil in

th eir lifetimes. The question alw a ys sta rtled

them, an d I never saw a s ingle hand raised. We

can not af ford to accept a nyth ing less tha n th e

pursuit of perfection. We ca nnot a ccept a nyt hing

less th a n holding ourselves to the highest st a n-da rds. We ca nnot a ccept an yt hing less th a n our

best effort every time, every day. The potential

consequences ar e too great .

And I know it is damn h ar d. Intell igence ana ly-

sis is less fun tha n a policy rota tion or an over-

seas a ssignment. I t is less honored and

romanticized tha n other aspects of the G reat

G a me. I t is frustrat ing. I t is exha usting. And even

th e best effort s w ill be picked at . The a na lysts

work w ill be criticized by the knowledgeable an d

th e ignora nt a like. It w ill even be demonized attimesindependent of its qua lityand it w ill

a lwa ys be hostag e to the politics of th e moment .

B utand I say t his with my four decades of per-

spectivewhat intelligence analysts do has

impact. It m a tt ers. I ha ve seen the quiet victories

of intell igence an d t he mista kes averted, and I

have seen critics become advocates because of

w ha t ana ly s t s

do every da y.

We a ll chose

careers in intel-ligence for the

sa me reason: t o make a difference, to do the mis-

sion. The colleague who teaches the Kent Schools

Art of Review Semina r w ith me t ells a s tory

a bout Abra ha m Lincoln, who in one of the da rk-

est hours of the C ivil War at tended a Sunda y ser-

vice in tha t l i t t le church tha t s t i ll s ta nds a cross

from the White H ouse. On his wa y ba ck, he wa s

asked by a fellow parishioner wh at he thought of

th e young reverend. Lincoln replied tha t he ha d a

strong voice and clea r messag e, but t ha t he fa iled

to do one t hing; he fa iled to ask u s to do some-thing grea t .

I a m asking every an alyst w ho reads t his to do

something great . Do wha t brought you here. Do

th e mission every da y t o the best of your a bility.

And, ma y G od bless you for doing it .

What intelligence analysts do matters. I have seen the quietvictoriesmistakes avertedand critics become advocates.

what i learned in 40 years of doing intelligence

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