white paper on security of european electricity distribution draft 17.4.2007 antti silvast joe...
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White Paper on Security of European Electricity DistributionDraft 17.4.2007
Antti SilvastJoe Kaplinsky
UNDERSTAND Project meeting arranged by NESA , Finland3-4 May 2007
05/02/072
Structure of the White Paper
Analysis of the European power system and review of current national and EU-wide policies on energy supply management
a view to distilling essential drivers, future trends and current best practice
Key themes Resilient systems Globalisation Sustainability Public acceptability Emergency responses
Data Surveys, literature and research articles The internal energy market country reviews by the European Commission
(all member states) The annual reports that EU member states prepare for European Regulators’
Group for Electricity and Gas (24 member states) Discussions with electricity experts Also, the ongoing PhD project of A. Silvast
05/02/073
Presentation today
Technical factors Organisational factors Social factors Defining security of electricity supply Blackouts – examples and impacts Training and standards Outputs for UNDERSTAND project
05/02/074
Technical factors
Expanded grids Complex and intelligent components Intermittent sources of production Ageing infrastructure
05/02/075
Organisational factors
Internationalisation Privatisation Outsourcing Competition
05/02/076
Social factors
Climate change and managing demand
Climate change and renewable energy
Risk: power lines and cancer Consumer sovereignty Demographics?
05/02/077
Defining security of electricity supply
Electricity end-use
05/02/078
Why electricity supply is critical infrastructure “Critical infrastructure include those physical resources, services,
and information technology facilities, networks and infrastructure assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Citizens or the effective functioning of governments.” (Green paper On a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 2005)
Key event: Terrorist strikes towards commuter trains in Madrid in 2004
Electrical supply as a series of tightly interlocking technical and social networks.
Primary fuels, generation, transmission & distribution, end-use Commercial, legal and regulatory networks Training and professional networks A break at any point in the chain will result in disruption
05/02/079
Blackouts
05/02/0710
Major blackouts in EU
Country, yearNo of end-users
interrupted
Duration, energy not supplied
Estimated costs to whole society
France, 1999 1.4-3.5 million,
193 million m3
wood damaged
2 days - 2 weeks, 400 GWh
11,5 billion €
Sweden/Denmark, 2003 0.86 million in Sweden and 2.4 million in Denmark
2.1 hours, 18 GWh
145 - 180 million €
Italy/Switzerland, 2003 55 million 18 hours, ? ?Sweden, 2005 0.7 million, 70
million m3 wood damaged
1 day - 5 weeks, 111 GWh
400 million €
Central Europe, 2006 15 million households
Less than 2 hours, ?
?
05/02/0711
Case 1: Europe 2006
Key event Disconnecting a high voltage line in Germany for the transfer of a ship
Main causes The non fulfilment of the N-1 criterion Insufficient inter-TSO co-ordination
Recommendations (UCTE) The application of N-1 criteria Transmission system operator’s defence plans Developing standard criteria for regional and inter-regional transmission system operator
co-ordination Real-time information platform of the actual state of the UCTE system Adapting the regulatory and legal framework of electricity transmission (more information
and control for transmission system operators)
Other possible issues “Short term commercial objectives” “Strict constraints through regulation” The role of wind generation
05/02/0712
Case 2: Italy and Switzerland 2003 Key event
Overloaded lines between Switzerland and Italy, resulting to flashovers with trees
Main causes The inability of the Swiss system operator to reclose a line The subsequent responses by the Swiss and Italian system operators
UCTE area recommendations (UCTE) Mandatory emergency procedures The application of N-1 criteria Day ahead congestion forecasts Real-time data exchange Minimum requirements for generation equipment, defence plans and restoration plans Load-frequency control strategies Wide area measurement system
National recommendations (UCTE) Enforce minimum requirements for generation units Enforce defence and restoration plans for operators Evaluate tree trimming practices The blocking of on load tap changers of transformers
Other possible issues “The opening of the electricity market” Tree trimming practices
05/02/0713
Case 3: Sweden and Denmark 2003 Key event
A Swedish nuclear plant shut down followed by a 400 kV substation failure in Sweden
Main cause Two major faults within 15 minute period
Recommendations (Elkraft System, Svenska Kraftnät) Planning and operational standards of the Nordic system Automatic load shedding Possible consumer disconnection Protecting the infrastructure vs. maintaining services during emergencies Strengthen restoration processes Enforce technical requirements for generators Integrated information of the whole Nordic system Communication strategies (distributors, consumers, authorities and the media ) Eliminate the risks of flashovers between two busbars Enforce inspections and scheduled replacements of critical parts Review outsourced maintenance Investments into transmission lines between Denmark and Sweden New generation to southern Sweden
Other possible issues Absent: non-problematic blackout
05/02/0714
The social impacts of blackouts Loss of computers, appliances, lights, electric heating,
communication, waste disposal, drinking water, sewage management and mobile phone systems
Discovering the impacts Method 1: economic product (e.g. GNP) / electricity
consumption Method 2: ask costs directly from users
• On average, higher costs than with method 1• But notable dispersion: very high costs for some users, low for
others Method 3: interview users about experiences
• Fatalism towards easy blackouts• Criticism towards difficult blackouts• Technical explanations are usually unacceptable• Nature-related explanations are usually acceptable
05/02/0715
Technical measures for handling blackouts Coordinated planning
e.g. Pan-Nordic process: Exchange forecasts for capacity, dimensioned faults, plans for generator shutdowns, investments in interconnections
Reserve generation capacity Return to N-1 secure state through ”fast disturbance
reserve” Maintenance engineering
Reliability centred maintenance: an optimal mix of preventive and reactive maintenance
Computerised maintenance management systems
05/02/0716
Demand-side measures for handling blackouts The customer’s role: awareness of “true
costs” of consumption The responses’ impacts in amount of
energy For large-scale consumers of industrial,
public sector, commercial sector and agriculture, impacts quite well-known
For household consumers, impacts are still research-in-progress
The moral and value of reducing energy use The ”life politics” of energy use: promoting
awareness of energy and energy use as life style
05/02/0717
Training measures for handling blackouts
Education and training for emergency response
Team working and communication
The importance of common purpose
05/02/0718
Standards as alternative to regulation and market protectionism The rise of market protectionism
Securing supply as political counterforce to market liberalization
The rise of regulation Higher continuity and more secure transmission and
distribution systems Bureaucratic requirements on the existing institutions
and practices Standards
Common cross-industry bench-mark knowledge standards
Security of supply requires shared tacit assumptions about common goals
A forum with industry participation
05/02/0719
Outputs for the UNDERSTAND project
Resilient systems Globalisation Sustainability Public acceptability Emergency responses
05/02/07
Thank you for your attention
05/02/0721
Electricity regional markets in the EU
05/02/0722
Physical flows of energy in the UCTE system
05/02/0723
Cross-border exchanges and coordination In market-based
model, future capacity has to be estimated
Available transfer capacity for cross-border exchanges is estimated daily typical seasonal
base load flow models
On this basis, yearly, monthly, weekly, daily or intra-daily auctions of capacity are held
http://www.nordpool.com
05/02/0724
Outsourcing maintenance
Background: demands for competition and cost-effectiveness in public and private sector
Outsourced service can carry on with less workforce, machines and facilities (too much resources vs. just enough resources)
The activities that can be delegated outside electricity companies: Network planning Network monitoring Preventive maintenance Reactive maintenance Customer service
05/02/0725
Investments and personnel
Much of the present electricity infrastructure put in place in the 1950s to 1960s
a typical design life of 40 to 50 years
In EU, investments have often been reduced to a matter of internal markets, renewables and energy saving
And regulation: ”Member States must have a regulatory framework in place which supports investments.”
The number of personnel in electricity industry, especially under the age of 30, is decreasing
Year persons1990 207031991 207841992 202161993 181231994 168481995 164621996 163991997 159491998 155991999 149962000 149002001 136922002 129232003 12323
The number of personnel in electricity and district heating in Finland
05/02/0726
Regulation of electricity distribution and transmission The natural monopoly problem ⇒ electricity companies are
monitored and given incentives for competition Regulator as a “protector of consumer rights”
Types of regulation Electricity price caps Measuring actual and perceived levels of electricity supply quality Promoting continuity improvement of electricity companies Ensuring good supply continuity levels to consumers
A European network of independent regulators (“ERGEG+”): Structures binding decisions for regulators and relevant market
players, such as network operators, power exchanges or generators, relating to cross border issues
05/02/0727
Decentralised generation
Centralised systems are too large and structurally coupled?
Decentralised: electricity generation near point of use, responsive demand from the users and renewables that require no fuel supplyEfficiency + renewability +
decentralisation + security? The example of SmartGrids
05/02/0728
The electric power system in the EU Infrastructural modernity
(1950-2000) Large-scale transmission Central planning Monopolistic provision Long-term contracts
between producers and users
Over-investment in generation
State investment and intervention
Provision of welfare Infrastructure as project of
modernization
Neoliberal reform of infrastructure (2000-)
EU internal energy market Economic rationality as
grounds for decisions Independent power
producers Increased electricity flows
over longer distances Customer utility switching But also: tightening
regulation of electricity prices, supply quality and continuity improvement
Infrastructure as project of economic rationality and assessment
05/02/0729
Public acceptability of generation and fuels Much public attention on greenhouse emissions, fossil fuel
depletion and nuclear safety Even overshadowing the security of the grid: e.g. move to wind
The rise of climate change policies Restricting the choice of generation: The European Commission’s
binding target of renewable energy in the EU's overall mix to 20% by 2020
The new rise of nuclear with its low carbon emissions, stable costs and economic efficiency
Market-based mechanisms for renewable generation The EU Emissions Trading Scheme The Green Certificate Scheme
Non-market-based mechanisms for renewable generation Feed-in-tariffs State subsidies