why don’t people vote?: a quantitative study and …
TRANSCRIPT
WHY DON’T PEOPLE VOTE?: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY AND ANALYSIS OF VOTER
TURNOUT IN MAYORAL ELECTIONS IN LARGE AMERICAN CITIES
Michael Patison
TC660H
Plan II Honors Program
University of Texas at Austin
Supervisor: Dr. Zachary Elkins, Department of Government
Second Reader: Dr. Daron Shaw, Department of Government
Abstract
Author: Michael Patison
Title: Why Don’t People Vote?: A Quantitative Study and Analysis of Voter Turnout in Mayoral
Elections in Large American Cities
Supervising Professors: Dr. Zachary Elkins, Department of Government, and Dr. Daron Shaw,
Department of Government
Voter turnout is one of the most important keys to a fully functioning representative
democracy. Without an actively voting electorate, the American democratic experiment ceases to
function properly. As such, voter turnout is of paramount importance in understanding the health
of American democracy and the institutional and demographic hurdles that stand in its way.
Most research on voter turnout as a general concept in American democracy is focused on the
national and state levels, but municipal governments arguably have a greater impact on the day-
to-day lives of the citizenry. Four questions were examined by the study. These questions
revolved around why turnout in mayoral elections is so low, what factors are most important is
helping dictate how high municipal voter turnout is, and how these factors may help explain
differences in turnout between cities with different levels of turnout. The analysis found that, at
least in the largest American cities, turnout in mayoral elections is largely contingent on when
elections are held, how important the highest office on the ballot is, and how competitive the
electoral contest is.
Acknowledgements
Much credit for my success with the thesis goes to my parents, John and Michelle, for
their unending support.
I would also like to thank my advisor and second reader, Drs. Zachary Elkins and Daron
Shaw, for their advice and recommendations.
Finally, I would like to thank Plan II for giving me a second chance to try to get it right
the second time around.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: Literature Review ...........................................................................................................8
Chapter 3: Data Methodology, Presentation, and Analysis ...........................................................21
Chapter 4: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ........................................................43
Appendices .....................................................................................................................................47
Works Cited ...................................................................................................................................59
Patison 1
Chapter 1: Introduction
Voter turnout is one of the most important keys to a fully functioning representative
democracy. Without an actively voting electorate, the American democratic experiment ceases to
function properly. As such, voter turnout is of paramount importance in understanding the health
of American democracy and the systemic and demographics hurdles that stand in its way. Robust
voter turnout is not only an important component of a healthy U.S. democracy, but also in a
representative democracy that represents all the nation’s citizens. After all, it was Founding
Father John Adams who said that a “representative assembly…should be, in miniature, an exact
portrait of the people at large” (Adams, 1776). As such, much attention has been paid to voter
turnout, both in terms of what drives it and in terms of what its effects are.
Most research on voter turnout as a general concept in American democracy is focused
on the national and state levels, be it in Presidential elections or congressional ones (find two or
three examples to cite). While certainly most valued, at least in public reckoning, offices on the
national stage often have less bearing on peoples’ day-to-day lives than do municipal officials,
namely those on city councils, local boards, and county commissions.
Municipal governments truly are the unsung heroes of American government and
administration. City councils and mayors make sure residents have clean water and sewage
services and decide where to put parks and how to manage their upkeep. City governments
decide how often garbage is collected and make sure it gets picked up. They also make decisions
regarding public transportation, zoning, and law enforcement, not to mention acting as city-brand
ambassadors to potential business investment in the area in the form of new offices and new
jobs.
Patison 2
While less attractive politically and interest-wise than flashy national bodies, municipal
governments arguably have a greater impact on the day-to-day lives of the citizenry.
Nevertheless, in a country known for relatively low voter turnout in even the most high-profile of
electoral contests, voter turnout in municipal elections is particularly abysmal. As such, more
contemporary research is needed to fully understand the issues at play in municipal electoral
politics.
This contemporaneous aspect is key. Starting in the mid-1960s, political scientists
worked tirelessly on urban politics in generally, and urban voting more specifically (Alford &
Lee, 1968). These works were intersectional in focus, spending the majority of their time
examining the systems and institutions that depress voter turnout. This trend continued through
the early 1990s (Bullock, 1990), with Who Votes? occupying a landmark position in the dialogue
(Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). These other works furthered the conversation, discussing not
just the systems and institutions, but the political and social cultures and stakes involved. In other
words, voter turnout has been studied in terms of how it was driven rather than which people
actually vote and what that population segment voting leads to.
Research Problem Statement
The dialogue since roughly 2000 has focused much more on examining both the effects
of low voter turnout and how specific aspects of demographics or institutionalism impact voter
turnout. These blindered approaches are overly cautious and conservative and fail to account for
important inter-variable connections and applications that could help better explain voter turnout
in cities. In addition, it has left a dearth of more modern information and findings about cities
people live in today. This has left the academic community reliant upon outdated information
and analysis gathered from cities sometimes as much as half a century ago.
Patison 3
This thesis will provide an update to the intersectional dialogue established decades ago
by examining voter turnout in a more syncretic context. Instead of asking how race or
demographics in general affect turnout, this thesis will discern whether race and/or demographics
are important urban voter turnout indicators in the first place, before determining what effect
they might have on eventual turnout. This is important because, for many, deciding whether or
not to vote involves a cost-benefit analysis. In a pool of thousands of votes, how much does a
single vote really matter, and, as such, how much benefit does it really bestow upon the voter.
The largest benefit to a voter is arguably the sense of satisfaction one has after voting, but even
this may be outweighed by high costs and barriers to entry involved in voting in some contests.
This thesis will also examine institutional factors of municipal government in an attempt to
discern the impact they have on voter turnout at the local level. Only if these institutional and
demographic factors are indeed important indicators is their study in a voter turnout context
wholly worthwhile.
Research Questions
This thesis will examine and answer four interrelated research questions in order to
provide a thorough exploration of mayoral election voter turnout.
Firstly, why is voter turnout in mayoral elections in so low? Voter turnout in the United
States is already low, rarely, if ever, surpassing 60% in national elections. This is one of the
lowest voter turnout rates of any fully functioning democracy in the world. But despite how low
turnout is, voter turnout in mayoral and other municipal elections plumbs new depths, with many
cities hovering around 30% participation, and multiple falling below 10% (Morlan, 1984).
Patison 4
Secondly, which are the most important variables for predicting a municipal election’s
voter turnout? As previously stated, there seems to be a proclivity to chalk low voter turnout up
to race or some other demographic factor. But is this really a rational viewpoint?
Thirdly, why is voter turnout lower in some cities than in others? Despite some cities’
abysmal turnout figures, other cities manage to soar about the rest.
Finally, what factors may or may not account for these disparities in voter turnout
between cities? Are they the same factors that help predict turnout more generally? Are policy
and campaign issues more potent in some cities than in others. Do some cities just have a more
vibrant culture of political engagement and voting?
Research Method and Presentation
I took a two-pronged approach to answering these questions. First, I conducted a
literature review. Second, I utilized a data set of my own compilation to assess voter turnout in
the nation’s 107 largest cities, which accounts for all American cities with populations over
200,000, as of the 2010 U.S. Census. Both of these aspects are discussed in more detail below.
Literature Review Process
The literature review will examine the history of the available literature and discourse on
voter turnout and urban voting, synthesizing them through comparison and contrast of research
with similar focuses.
The review will begin with an examination of the existing literature on both voter turnout
theory and voter choice theory. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, urban voting was an important
topic in political academics. Since then, however, the discourse has been replaced by largely
reductionist examinations that either focus exclusively on national elections or that examine
urban politics solely as an issue of race rather than any sort of complex, intersectional issue that
Patison 5
certainly includes race, but is not limited to it. The literature review will identify common
thematic elements and arguments between works to paint a more complete picture of the existing
literature, rather than a segmented one. It will do so by tracing the discourse on five groups of
variables
The first section will be a discussion of the impact of low voter turnout on representation
and other factors, predominantly in a local context. The following sources will be included:
Alford and Lee (1968), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Morlan (1984), Bullock (1990),
Hajnal and Lewis (2003), Hajnal and Trounstine (2005), Hajnal (2010), and Oliver, Ha, and
Callen (2012).
The second section will focus on political structure and will be subdivided in four
separate sections: statutory nonpartisanship, form of government, election format, and election
scheduling. The larger section with be introduced using Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).
Statutory nonpartisanship will focus on whether municipal elections are held on a
nonpartisan basis or a partisan one. This section will utilize work from Kessel (1962), Schnore
and Alford (1963), Alford and Scoble (1965), Alford and Lee (1968), and Hajnal and Lewis
(2003).
Form of government will deal with whether a city has a mayor-council or a council-
manager form of government. This political versus administrative divide will be contributed to
by Kessel (1962), Schnore and Alford (1963), Alford and Scoble (1965), Alford and Lee (1968),
Wood (2002), and Hajnal and Lewis (2003).
Election format will center on how people are elected, namely whether first-past-the-post,
ranked-choice voting, or some form of limited voting is used. Mcdaniel (2016) will form the
entirety of this shorter discussion.
Patison 6
Election scheduling will be focused on Hajnal’s works with Lewis and Louch (2002,
2003), with some input from Wood (2002). Election timing is when the elections is held, such as
in May of an off-year, or in November of a Presidential election year.
The third section will cover demographics and socioeconomics, focusing on voter turnout
with respect to race and economic circumstances. This section will utilize the following sources:
Alford and Lee (1968), Wolfinger and Rostenstone (1980), Wood (2002), Hajnal and Trounstine
(2005), and Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012).
A short section will look at the work done on political participation in urban areas. This
section will look at work done by Oliver (2000), Kelleher and Lowery (2008), and Carr and
Tavares (2012).
The final section will look at the impact of a city’s intangible political culture on voter
turnout in local elections. Alford and Lee (1968), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady (1995), Oliver (2000), Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch (2002), Kaufmann
(2004), Oliver, Ha, and Callen (2012), and Rolfe (2012) will form the basis of this section.
Quantitative Analysis of City Demographics and Voter Turnout
The quantitative analysis will utilize institutional, demographic and voter turnout data
from each of the three most recent mayoral elections in each of the nation’s 107 largest cities by
population, according to the 2010 U.S. Census. These 107 cities constitute every American city
with a population over 200,000, as of 2010. A list of these cities, along with their population as
of 2010, are included in Appendix A. These elections total 321 separate independent data points.
Citizens of voting age population (CVAP) and other data ranging from race and election timing
to educational achievement and household income levels and from population density to voter
registration laws complete the data set. Multiple regression statistical analysis techniques will
Patison 7
then be applied to determine variable correlation to voter turnout, thereby revealing the most
potent factors in determining physical civic engagement in electoral politics. The statistical data
compiled falls into two main categories: institutions and demographics.
The election data is composed of the following 14 data points: election scheduling by
month; whether the incumbent ran; the length of the term up for election; whether the city has a
strong mayor with a city council or a strong city council with a city manager; whether there is
same-day voter registration; how many potential elections it could take to elect the mayor; which
election stage was decisive; whether the elections are officially partisan or nonpartisan; whether
first-past-the-post or ranked-choice voting is used; the voter turnout (CVAP/raw turnout
excluding invalid votes); the number of candidates in the decisive round of voting; what the
highest elected office on the ballot was; and a competition index. The competition index is
expressed mathematically as follows:
(Margin of Victory/Square Root (Number of Candidates))
________________________________
Raw Turnout
The demographic data entails the following nine variables: racial demographics, limited
to white, African American, Hispanic, Asian, and Others; median household income; high school
graduation rate; bachelor’s degree rate; the rate of married people with children under 18;
percentage over 65; which Census Bureau region the city is located in; and the population
density.
Patison 8
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Psephology, the study of elections, has seen a fruitful discourse in the United States since
its origins in the early 1960s. From Alford and his associates and Wolfinger and Rosenstone, to
the more current works of Hajnal and Oliver, elections have seen a constantly evolving set of
important variables and varying degrees of interest in others. First, this literature review will look
at voter turnout as it pertains to the impact municipal government has on citizens’ everyday life
in big cities, as well as how turnout affects election results and representation of minorities and
members of lower socioeconomic groups in government. This literature review then will
undertake a methodical, variable-by-variable scrutiny of voting at the municipal level in
America. The variables examined will be: political structure, demographics, and city size.
Political structure will be divided into five subheadings: voter registration, statutory
nonpartisanship, form of government, election format, and election scheduling.
Impact of Low Voter Turnout
High level issues and the decisions made about them at the highest levels of government
rarely interact with residents’ lives on a consistent daily basis. On the other hand, municipal
government decisions impact residents’ lives more keenly on a daily basis. While there are
discrepancies between the services that larger and smaller municipalities directly provide for
their citizens, the majority of large cities in American provide street repair, parks, water, and
sewage for their citizens, in addition to police and fire departments (Oliver, Ha & Callen, 2012).
These important services alone should indicate the impactful day-to-day operation of cities and
their local government infrastructures.
Yet the voter turnout for these important local contests is exceedingly low. Turnout in
city elections average roughly half of the 50-55% seen in national elections. This, along with an
Patison 9
observable downward trend in these already low turnout levels, points to a growing problem in
our democratic system’s most basic units (Alford & Lee, 1968; Morlan, 1984; Hajnal & Lewis,
2003).
The impact of low turnout has been an issue of record for quite some time. Until recently,
however, this focus has been on its impact on national elections. Surveys of voters and non-
voters, for instance, have found that both groups tend to have similar preferences (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone, 1980). Additionally, further attempts to establish whether either major political
party would benefit more from elevated turnout have been either inconsistent with other findings
or insignificant or both. (Hajnal, 2010).
There has been some evidence, more anecdotal than longitudinal, that minority
candidates tend to encourage minority participation (Bullock, 1990), but this seems outweighed
by evidence that the opposite is true. This oppositional evidence shows that, if minorities were to
vote in higher numbers in cities with larger minority populations, there is a high likelihood that
they could sway the outcome of the election in about one-third of the cases, and have a
significant impact on the victory margin in most other instances. Despite this finding, however,
African Americans largely lack the voting power necessary in America’s largest cities to have
the outsized impact necessary to sway elections in the same way that Hispanic constituencies do.
Nevertheless, There is little evidence that minorities do vote more in local elections when
someone who looks like them is running (Hajnal & Trounstine, 2005).
Some argue, however, that “low turnout is not a problem [for the overwhelming number
of American municipalities] because of the types of people who vote in local contests” (Oliver,
Ha & Callen, 2012). The argument here, however, seems to be a based on assumptions about the
representativeness of long-term residents and other politically active groups. It also seems to
Patison 10
vastly underestimate, or otherwise ignore, the importance of ethnic and racial representativeness
not just at higher levels, but at the local level as well. The fact of the matter is that “those who do
turn out to vote look very different from those who do not,” which results in a skewed vote that
often fails to take into account the concerns of all interest groups (Hajnal & Trounstine, 2005).
Political Structures
Arguably the largest amount of literature to do with voter turnout at the local level at least
partially focuses on the effect that various political structures have on turnout. The conversations
involved in the considerations of these topics are important, including more concrete issues like
voter registration, mayoral power, statutory nonpartisanship, and more amorphous things like
political vibrancy and innate political interest, knowledge, and engagement.
Voter Registration
Voter registration is a logical place to start examining these political structures and
strictures as it is the first step necessary to be able to vote in any governmental election. The
most commonly repeated theories are 1) that turnout will be higher where there are fewer
obstacles to voting, and 2) those with the least education, who are often also the poorest, with
have the most trouble navigating the bureaucratic elements of voter registration. Due to the
relatively recent passage of the Voting Rights Act and its subsequent Amendments in 1965 and
1970, respectively, Wolfinger and Rosenstone devote quite a bit of time to voter registration
requirements and laws and the impact they have on turnout. They found that the most powerfully
depressive laws were registration closing dates. Without these closing dates, they estimated there
would have been a turnout 6.1% higher in the 1972 national elections (Wolfinger & Rosenstone,
1980). While this is based on old data and national elections, it still stands to reason that same-
Patison 11
day voter registration, which the study seems to be advocating for in practice though not in
name, would still be likely to encourage higher turnouts.
Statutory Nonpartisanship
The differences in turnout between partisan and nonpartisan local elections has also had
focus on it since arguably the beginnings of local voter turnout examinations. Cities began
adopting nonpartisan municipal offices in the late 1890s and early 1900s, and as late as the
1910s, as part of the larger Progressive Reform Movement. These reforms were aimed at
reducing, and hopefully eliminating, the corruption and anti-democratic practices often seen in
some of America’s biggest cities, particularly those run by political machines. Making municipal
elections nonpartisan was one aspect of these reforms. The goal was to eliminate the ability to
vote purely based on partisanship, eliminating corrupt officials’ abilities to dictate voters’
choices completely along on party lines. While this reform proved an effective anti-corruption
tool, it also has hurt turnout as the often white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant groups that predominated
the Progressive voting blocs no longer predominate quite so much. For many less-educated
voters and many educated voters who are not particularly interested in municipal politics, the
nonpartisanship of elections often proves to be a barrier to entry. As such, nonpartisanship tends
to reduce voter participation. The participation gap created between partisan and nonpartisan
elections can vary greatly, but nevertheless exists, and has been measured to be as high as 20%
(Kessel, 1962; Schnore & Alford, 1963; Alford & Scoble, 1965; Alford & Lee, 1968). This
depression of turnout brought on by nonpartisanship has been a consistent finding (Hajnal &
Lewis, 2003).
Patison 12
Form of Government
In addition to statutory nonpartisanship, the Progressive Reform Movement chose
municipal government forms as a primary target for change. Until that point, cities usually had
been run by a mayor, supported by a city council, which will heretofore be called the mayor-
council form. Reformists, for essentially the same reasons as statutory nonpartisanship, called for
a more technocratic approach, in which the mayor may be directly and separately elected, but is
otherwise the first-among-equals. In this form, heretofore called council-manager, the mayor has
the power of a normal councilmember, but little more, and an unelected city manager handles the
day-to-day operation of the city. Like statutory nonpartisanship, these reforms were most
predominantly undertaken in “‘white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, growing, and mobile cities’”
(Kessel, 1962; Schnore & Alford, 1963; Alfred & Scoble, 1965; Alford & Lee, 1968). This
outsourcing of decision-making to unelected officials has often been cited as an important
contributor to lower turnout (Alford & Lee, 1968; Wood, 2002; Hajnal & Lewis, 2003).
In a mayor-council system, the mayor has more influence over policy and administration,
so they get all the credit and all the blame for the city’s successes and/or failures. Constituents,
therefore, have a much better understanding both of the mayor’s importance, and of their
opinions of the mayor’s abilities. In a council-manager system, the mayor acts almost as a
figurehead. The mayor may have policies in mind but often needs city council approval to make
the policy actionable, and the unelected, hired city manager is the person who actually makes the
administrative decisions that enact the policy. As such, the mayor in a council-manager system is
has roughly two degrees of separation between their choices and actual action, greatly reducing
the position’s power. Studies of size have found statistically significant correlation between form
of government and voter turnout (Wood, 2002).
Patison 13
There are other important administrative aspects that differentiate how turnout might look
on a city-to-city basis, too, including how many basic services, like water, electricity, or garbage
collection. This aspect of city service outsourcing seems quite a potent one. If the municipal
government does not provide electricity or water or garbage collection or a fire department, there
is reason to presume that the government is not as near to the forefront of the everyday person’s
mind. As such, it also stands to reason that this lower government visibility would harm both
public interest and public knowledge of their elected municipal officials, lowering turnout
(Hajnal & Lewis, 2003).
Election Format
The United States has always either used the first-past-the-post system or the two-round
runoff system. There has been some expression of hope in psephology circles that alternative,
more proportional electoral methods, such as ranked-choice voting (RCV), would yield higher
voter turnout. A study of San Francisco’s mayoral and city council elections, however, has found
that this is not the case. It seems that the information costs are too constraining for many casual
and/or less educated voters. RCV tends to necessitate a more complicated ballot structure, which,
combined with San Francisco’s decision to limit preferences to three, has corresponded to a
higher overvote percentage more on-par with hanging chads on punch-cards. These more
complicated ballots tend to overwhelmingly harm the African American and Hispanic
communities, as well as foreign-born voters, particularly those with language difficulties. Not
only has turnout in San Francisco remained stagnant, the percentage of voters utilizing the
ranking mechanism to its fullest extent has experienced a roller-coaster-like fluctuation, first
dropping by more than half, before more than doubling just one election later. RCV also tends to
obscure the benefits potentially reaped by minority groups, or at the very least how minority
Patison 14
voting behavior influences elections, by making it more difficult to accurately judge minority
voter first preferences, and decreasing racial group competition, which has the potential to lower
turnout. This decrease in racial group competition has had the effect of lowering minority
turnout, particularly among African Americans, who experienced a turnout decrease of over
20%. That said, a viable, competitive candidate within a voter’s racial or ethnic group did
noticeably increase turnout among all groups other than Hispanics (Mcdaniel, 2016).
Election Scheduling
Yet another by-product of the Progressive Reform Movement was the decision to make
municipal elections non-concurrent with national elections. This decision was ostensibly made to
wrest power from political parties and corrupt bosses of political machines, who, it was felt, used
the concurrent elections to their own benefit. For instance, it is much easier to sway an election
by illegal means, such as vote-buying or double-voting, when every election is happening at the
same time (Goodnow, 1908). Whether this reform had the desired effect is debatable, but there is
considerable evidence that non-concurrent elections have had deleterious effects on voter turnout
in local elections. This non-concurrence with elections for higher office seems to make local
elections extraordinarily costly, with little reward, for the average resident on multiple levels
(Hajnal & Lewis, 2003). First, learning about municipal election candidates is not always easy.
Second, many urban residents do not have the financial ability to leave their jobs in order to vote,
and an election with significantly lower stakes is rarely a good enough reason to lose an hour’s
wages or more. Third, while turnout in local contests is low, the time cost-benefit analysis of
spending the time waiting in line to vote for municipal offices rarely resolves in favor of the
potential benefits.
Patison 15
On the other hand, it seems almost obvious that turnout in local elections would increase
if they were held simultaneously with national elections. All voters would need to do is take a
few extra minutes to complete voting for the local offices, greatly reducing the costs associated
with voting in local elections. Not only would it aid in the reduction of voters’ decision costs, it
would also lower monetary costs for cities, which, along with the counties in which they are
located, tend to be in charge of paying for all elections and runoffs held non-concurrently with
national elections (Hajnal & Lewis, 2003).
There is evidence to suggest that holding concurrent local, state, and national elections
has an impact three times the size on voter turnout than does form of government, with total
concurrency yielding turnout nearly 30% higher than average (Wood, 2002). Peak-cycle
elections, which are classified as presidential primaries and general elections, as well as
congressional midterms, negate the importance of local institutions. Similarly, when focusing on
election timing, the importance of mayoral power is also insignificant. These findings stick to the
overall idea of the vast majority of research that “institutional features that tend to increase the
stakes of city elections also tend to increase turnout” (Hajnal & Lewis, 2003). This increasing of
stakes, however, does not seem to translate or transfer to non-institutional features, like general
senses regarding the competitiveness of a given local election. Even “high-stakes” contests that
seem competitive and might be expected to have higher levels of participation rarely do (Hajnal,
Lewis, & Louch, 2002). As such, it stands to reason that these institutional factors, specifically
election timing, are more significant players in driving voter turnout in local contests than more
abstract things like political culture and environmental and electoral competitiveness.
Patison 16
Demographics and Socioeconomics
Focus on the demographic and socioeconomic factors is a longstanding avenue of inquiry
into voter turnout and who votes. On a national election level, there have long been a few
generally accepted facts. Citizens of higher socioeconomic status vote more. This is true
regarding education level, income, or occupation. College graduates vote more than high school
graduates, and white-collar workers vote more than blue-collar workers. Additionally, the rich
generally vote more than the poor. When separated into individual, disaggregated variables,
education has the highest and most predictable influence on voter turnout in national elections,
with college graduates 38% more likely to vote than those with low levels of schooling. On the
other hand, income has a smaller effect on voter turnout. Beyond incomes providing
comfortability, income does not matter. The only identifiable difference in turnout is between
those with the lowest incomes and the middle class. Even this 14% difference pales in
comparison to the turnout differential found in education levels. The richest groups are no more
likely to vote than the middle classes. Finally, the white collar-blue collar dichotomy is not
significant. Instead, occupational responsibilities and job and time requirements are more
significant in determining turnout. This lack of linearity makes occupational impact on voter
turnout difficult to predict at the national level (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).
At the local, rather than the national, level, these socioeconomic factors are not as
pronounced. Some studies have found that cities with higher ethnic diversity and lower levels of
educational attainment actually have higher turnout (Alford & Lee, 1968). Other studies have
found the opposite, including a negative relationship between black population percentage and
voter turnout. There is also evidence that, contrary to Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s findings, at
the local level, income level, level of educational attainment, and African American population
Patison 17
percentage are statistically insignificant (Wood, 2002; Hajnal & Trounstine, 2005; Oliver, Ha, &
Callen, 2012). Despite this last finding, there is still evidence that, at the local level, whites vote
at much higher levels than Hispanics, Asians, and African Americans (Hajnal & Trounstine,
2005). There is also significant difference in turnout between homeowners and renters (Oliver,
Ha, & Callen, 2012).
City Size and Population Density
One of the newer modes of inquiry into voter turnout, and political engagement more
generally, is city size and density. There is some speculation that lower-density suburbs have
lower turnout, but that smaller cities have higher turnout than larger cities, particularly those in
metropolitan areas. As such, the predicted participation rate declines as population increases.
This decrease is not insignificant, with the smallest metropolitan units noticeably more likely to
have higher levels of voter turnout than the most populous units (Oliver, 2000). This finding
carries over into other aspects of city life. More dense and concentrated cities, rather than
increasing community identification, voter registration, and voter turnout, instead are likely to
decrease voter registration and civic involvement (Kelleher & Lowery, 2008). Contrary to these
findings, there is evidence that contingent factors are more important than city size and density,
and that larges municipal populations do not, in fact, have a depressing effect on political
participation and voter turnout. Instead, when controlled for other factors like population density,
county concentration, and total metropolitan population, they have virtually no effect whatsoever
(Carr & Tavares, 2014).
Political Culture
Intangible political culture is an important aspect to examine when looking at voter
turnout and the circumstances that impact it. Unfortunately, it is ill-defined and exceedingly
Patison 18
difficult to measure. Efforts have been made to identify some of the political culture-related
elements, with some success, while attempts to measure these factors has been less successful.
Political culture is a particularly amorphous concept to try to distill into a distinct set of
powerful and measurable variables. A city’s level of political engagement has wide variance on a
city-by-city basis, both on an activism level and on a voting level. Additionally, a single city can
have differing levels of political engagement and voter turnout from one local election to the
next, depending on the prevailing political winds. For instance, the personality of the mayor, on
occasion, can have an impact on turnout, and a particularly important and/or polarizing local
issue may lead to quite a boost in turnout (Alford & Lee, 1968). The aspects of a given place’s
political environment, however, are not always quite so easy to see, and are not always as
induced by the current climate as they are by longstanding political will within the community.
This idea plays a role in multiple different formulations of political participation as a civic
concept. The “civic voluntarism” model, for instance, argues that political participation is a
function of an individual’s resources, interest in the process and outside interests, and level of
political mobilization (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Oliver, 2000). These three concepts
also interact with other, more tangible issues that have been discussed above. For example,
demographics, such as education, race, and home ownership, play important roles, as do contact
with local political organizations and campaigns (Oliver, Ha, & Callen, 2012). Barriers to voting,
including voter registration regulations and off-peak elections, matter too, as they increase the
relevance of a voter’s individual knowledge and how readily available the information is to them
(Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).
Outside of these concepts, concrete, but largely uncontrollable, factors have been posited
as playing important roles in political culture. For decades, the South has seen lower turnout than
Patison 19
other parts of the country. Previously these depressed turnout levels were largely attributed to
anti-African American voting laws during the Jim Crow era (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).
These laws, however, no longer exist, and there is still some evidence, however limited, that the
South still experiences slightly depressed voter turnout, relative to other regions of the country.
Candidate incumbency is also seen as a hindrance to voter turnout, largely because an
incumbent candidate reduces the likelihood of other candidates entering a race and reduces the
competitiveness of the election (Hajnal, Lewis, & Louch, 2002). Competitiveness, though
important to political and electoral vibrancy, has suffered from a lack of exploration, due largely
to issues measuring it.
Another important part of political culture and political environment to consider is the
extent to which group interests and conditional decision-making factor into decisions to vote.
There is some logic in the assertion that more potent group interests brought out by either the
issues at play or the candidates addressing them, or both, would increase voter turnout. Despite
this logical presumption, there is also evidence that these group interests, and, more specifically,
the groups that share them, are considerably more fluid than might otherwise be apparent. The
small-issue nature of local politics engenders an ability to move between interest groups more
easily and diminishes the existence and importance of the high-level group interests that help
dictate voting patterns at the state and national levels. A proposed city park, for instance, might
create groups of allied individuals who share little else in common (Kaufmann, 2004). This
group interest also relies on the existence of a social aspect to political engagement and
participation. This social aspect largely centers on the social importance of voting. If someone
votes and tells others close to them that they have voted or to vote, those others are more likely
to vote simply because it seems like the thing to do. This socialization of voting makes it both a
Patison 20
public and private good to be utilized both for society as a whole and for an individual’s place in
said society (Rolfe, 2012).
Finally, the cost versus benefit aspects of voting should be taken into account. In an
election with thousands and millions of voters, an individual’s vote really does not matter. As
such, the costs it takes to carry out one’s civic duties must not outweigh the satisfaction the voter
gains from voting.
Despite the rationale and logic behind many of these theories, there is little way to
accurately measure the effects discussed in them quantitatively. As such, observation becomes
the more important thing to do.
Literature Reviews: Main Takeaways
There seem to be three main takeaways from the presented literature. First, the impact of
low voter turnout, both on the election outcome and the running of the city as well as on the
representativeness of the result, are largely disputed. Second, of the institutional factors under
examination, election scheduling is easily the most important factor. Nevertheless, other factors,
such as mayor-council versus council-manager government forms and statutory nonpartisanship,
are also important. Third and finally, demographic factors have become increasingly
unimportant, particularly where race is concerned. Home ownership and education seem to be
the most important of the demographic factors.
Patison 21
Chapter 3: Data Methodology, Presentation, and Analysis
Methodology
The data set used to conduct the analysis consists of data from every incorporated city or
town in the United States with a population of more than 200,000 as of the 2010 Census, for a
total of 107 cities. Inspired by the low turnout in Dallas’s mayoral elections, this population
demarcation was chosen, as opposed to a random sampling of incorporated places of all sizes, in
order to get both a picture of this most populous sector of American cities, as well as a
statistically complete picture of the factors influencing turnout in these cities. This group of 107
cities accounts for nearly 20% of the nation’s entire population.
The Cities
The list of the cities and their populations can be found in Appendix A, sorted under the
state in which they are located. 36 different states have at least one city with over 200,000
people. This group of 107 cities contains exactly one incorporated town, Gilbert, AZ, a large
Phoenix suburb. Gilbert has been included both because it fulfills the population criterion, and
because its town government functions more or less like any other city on the list. This stands in
contrast to the large towns on Long Island in New York that might otherwise have populations
large enough to qualify: Hempstead, Brookhaven, Islip, Oyster Bay, North Hempstead, Babylon,
and Huntington. These 7 towns are ineligible for a couple of reasons. First, rather than being
incorporated places, they are classified as minor civil divisions by the Census Bureau, within
which smaller incorporated villages and numerous unincorporated census-designated places are
located. Second, while each town elects its own town supervisor and town council, it cedes much
of its legislative power to the county level. As such, including these large places in the study
presents a sizeable precedential hurdle that cannot be overcome. Thus, they have been excluded.
Patison 22
Additionally, cities with largely developed, but unincorporated surroundings, such as Columbia
and Charleston in South Carolina, are not included, as their incorporated areas do not exceed
200,000. Finally, two cities on the list, Honolulu (which also only functions as a city at the
county level since Honolulu is itself unincorporated) and Baton Rouge, do not elect city mayors,
but rather elect mayors of the county in which they are by far the largest population center. As
such, the figures used for Honolulu and Baton Rouge correspond to those of Honolulu County,
HI and East Baton Rouge Parish, LA, respectively. Other county mayors, namely that of Miami-
Dade County, FL, are excluded as both Miami and Hialeah, FL elect their own city mayors.
Studied Variables
The variables gathered from all 107 cities encompass the three most recent contested
mayoral elections, as of the end of 2019. There were 23 variables gathered for each city using the
Census data closest in date to the corresponding mayoral election. Turnout percentage, which
acts as the sole independent variable through the analysis, was created by dividing the raw
turnout numbers by the Census estimates for the citizens of voting age population (CVAP). The
remaining 22 variables can be split into three separate types: institutional, demographic, and
competition.
Variables: Institutional
There are nine institutional variables, of which seven are tied to election and electoral
procedure, one is tied to the government itself, and one is tied to both. The eight purely electoral
variables are 1) whether the incumbent is running, 2) whether the election is nonpartisan, 3) the
electoral method used in the election (i.e. first-past-the-post versus ranked-choice voting), 4)
whether same-day voter registration was available, 5) the month during which the decisive
election occurred, 6) how many potential stages there are in the election, 7) which stage of the
Patison 23
election was decisive, and 8) what the highest office being elected concurrently was. The
decisive stage refers to the specific election in which the final result of the mayoral election was
rendered. If, for example, the election is partisan, with a partisan primary followed by a general
election, then that would be two stages. If there is a runoff in the partisan primary, that would be
an extra round, for a total of three. Most nonpartisan cities have a two-round system similar to
that used in French elections. First, a blanket primary is held in which all candidates are present.
Then, unless a candidate receives over 50%, a runoff is held between the two highest vote-getters
in the primary contest. This variable was included as there may be a noticeable turnout difference
present because of not having the decisive election being held on the same day as the election for
every other elected office. The total potential number of elections, referred to as the total number
of election stages, was also included, as turnout in earlier, but decisive, rounds may suffer
because people were intending to simply vote on the last round. The highest office being elected
is included in order to try to discern whether higher elected office being on the ballot actually
causes more people to vote for the mayor down-ballot. The high-yield specificity of the
categorization, however, may make this approach moot.
Government type is the only variable solely within the governmental sphere. This splits
the city governments into two types: mayor-council, in which the mayor is a position outside the
city council, and council-manager, in which a mayor is elected, but they simply act as any other
city council member and as a public face for the city.
Term length stands on its own straddling both the electoral and governmental camps.
This is because of the definition used in this study. Most cities elect their mayor either every two
years or every four years. This makes term length a governmental issue. This study, however,
includes special elections, which makes term length shorter than normal, sometimes as little as
Patison 24
one year long. The logical conclusion would be that these special elections would have lower
turnout as they are for lesser lengths.
Of these institutional variables, the literature would seem to indicate that the greatest
impact will be seen from the month in which the election takes place, the government type, and
the partisanship of the election.
Variables: Demographic
The 12 demographic variables can be divided into three basic categories: race,
socioeconomics, and geography. There are five racial variables, five socioeconomic variables,
and two geographic variables.
The five racial variables are simple enough. The first four, white percentage, African
American percentage, Hispanic percentage, and Asian percentage, measure the concentration of
these different racial population segments, alone, in a given city’s population. This means that
the only people in these counts are those who identify solely as white, black, or Asian, with no
Hispanic identification or people of mixed race. As the Census only identifies Hispanics who
identify as white, black, and Asian, rather than the extent to which this Hispanic identification
outweighs the other, any person who identifies as Hispanic is counted as such. The fifth racial
variable is the percentage of people identifying as other. This category typically means a person
is of Native American or mixed racial ancestry. Pure population size was not included as the
already large size of the cities being studied would not be useful in assessing research into city
size.
The five socioeconomic variables, median household income, high school or GED
attainment percentage, bachelor’s degree attainment percentage, the percentage of people
married with children under 18, and the percentage of people over 65, are rather straightforward.
Patison 25
Based on the literature, higher values for each of these variables would be expected to yield a
higher voter turnout in every circumstance. More economically well-off people have been shown
to have higher rates of voter participation. Those with higher levels of education have also been
shown to be more politically active. People who are married with younger children also would be
expected to vote more as they have a vested interest in electing those officials they think most
likely to create the world they want for their own children. Those of retirement age have been
shown to have the highest relative voter turnout levels of any age demographic. Of these
variables, only those who are married with children under 18 would seem to provide a reasonable
explanation against believing them more likely to vote. This is for one simple reason: juggling a
job and children living at home may make voting more difficult.
These demographic variables should be seen more as a way to differentiate between
cities, rather than as a means to explain lower turnout in municipal elections versus state or
national ones. The demographics of a city do not randomly shift based upon the perceived
importance of the office being election. There are inherent racial and socioeconomic differences
between cities that these demographic variables are meant to show.
The ecological inference problem must also be dealt with, at least insofar as it relates to
demographics and demographic variables. This problem arises when characteristics of the
individual are inferred from those of the larger group. In other words, a city’s average
demographic composition is used to refer to an individual of that city, despite the fact that the
individuals in the city do not exactly fit that makeup. While not ideal, this essentialization is a
necessary step in the analysis.
The two geographic variables are easily understood, but more speculative. First,
population density has been shown to have an effect on political engagement in a municipal
Patison 26
setting, though this effect has often been contradictory in outcome. Its relation to actual voter
turnout, however, has not been conclusively studied. There also seems to be little reason to
suspect it will impact turnout much in either direction. Those living in more dense cities are
often close enough to walk to a polling station. Any other potential geographic reason for an
inner-city dweller not to vote is probably better explained by one of the racial or socioeconomic
variables already mentioned. On the other hand, individuals living in suburban settings are much
more likely to own a car, making larger voting precincts and other geographic barriers to entry
less important.
The other geographic variable is region. The Census Bureau divides the country into four
separate geographic regions: 1) the Northeast, 2) the South, 3) the Midwest, and 4) the West. The
Northeast region consists of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The South, the largest region, consists of
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
and West Virginia. The Midwest consists of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
The West consists of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. The literature suggests that the South
has the lowest voter turnout, while the Northeast has the highest.
Variables: Competition
In order to try to measure an election’s competitiveness, a scalar variable called the
competition index was formulated. The competitiveness of elections is often measured by how
close an election was, or was expected to be beforehand, and how many candidates are running
Patison 27
for the position. A closer election theoretically brings more voters to the polls, as their vote
becomes more powerful the closer the election is. Likewise, a larger number of candidates
running for the same office theoretically increases the number of voters with whom the message
of one of the competing candidates resonates. This, in turn, should increase voter turnout. In this
vein, the competition index combines these two elements, election closeness and number of
candidates, in an attempt to distill this sense of competition and greater potential voter reach into
a quantitative measurement of competitiveness. The equation for the competitive index is:
c=(m/(√nc))/t1. This formula is admittedly imperfect. It is not particularly intuitive, either in
formulation or in the reading of the results. It also favors elections with very many candidates or
very few. That said, when examining the relationship between margin of victory, candidates, and
the resulting index, margin of victory is almost always the most powerful variables. The index
itself is also a reasonably effective way to provide a candidate-informed assessment of
competition, in light of margin of victory, while attempting to control for candidates who stand
little chance of winning but still must be counted as official, non-write-in candidates.
Data Construction
All population, CVAP, demographic, and geographic variables were constructed using
data from the Census Bureau. All values were taken from the 2010 Census and the 2015
American Community Survey, whichever count took place nearer the date of the election in
question. Institutional data such as government type, term length, and partisanship statutes came
from individual municipal websites, as well as the United States Conference of Mayors.
Information on which cities use ranked-choice voting, rather than a mixed first-past-the-post-
two-round system was provided by FairVote. Data on which states provide for same-day voter
1 c: competition index; m: margin of victory; nc: number of candidates; t: raw turnout
Patison 28
registration came from the National Conference of State Legislatures. Official vote numbers
were accessed from multiple types of websites, namely those of city, county, and state registrars
and secretaries of state. A complete, categorized list of election source type for each city can be
found in Appendix B.
Presentation and Analysis
The 107 cities in the data set have an average population of 600,349, and an average
voter turnout in mayoral elections of 24.6%. The population will not be looked at further, as the
high-end outliers, specifically New York City, render any descriptive statistical representation of
specific population meaningless. The average racial composition of a city is 44.1% white, 20.6%
African American, 24.1% Hispanic, 7.5% Asian, and 3.7% other. The average median household
income is $50,222.41, while 84.5% have a high school degree or GED. 10.5% of the average
city’s population is over 65 years of age, while the average percentage of people who are married
with children under 18 is 17.7%. The average population density is 4,619.5 people per square
mile. Also, on a scale where 0 is most competitive and 1 is least competitive, the average
competition index is 0.2095, which, while seemingly quite a good score, actually reflects a rather
middling level of competition because the index is calculated in an inverse-exponential way that
condenses the values for all elections that have any sort of competition.
The highest turnout is found in Louisville, KY, which holds its mayoral elections
concurrently with congressional midterms rather than presidential elections, and yet, in its last
three mayoral elections, has seen turnouts of 63.9%, 56.4%, and 59.4%. Madison, WI, also has
somewhat high turnout, which is especially notable given it holds its mayoral elections in April.
There is a sizeable level of variance in Madison’s turnouts, however. 2011 and 2019 saw
turnouts of 40.6% and 49.5%, respectively, but 2015 saw a noticeably lower turnout, at 28.4%.
Patison 29
Other than Madison, the only other city that does not hold elections in November to have voter
turnouts over 40% is Portland, OR.
On the other end of the spectrum, Garland, TX has the most consistently low turnout of
any city in the nation with more than 200,000 residents. With a high turnout of 4.3% and a low
turnout of 3.5%, its mayoral election turnouts are consistent and dismal. Of the 38 mayoral
elections that saw turnout under 10%, Texas cities accounted for 20 of them, with all turnout in
Dallas and Fort Worth mayoral elections falling below 10%. Des Moines, IA also experiences
very low turnout. Nevertheless, after two straight elections with turnouts under 6%, its most
recent election saw a voter turnout of nearly 15%, a sizeable increase in participation
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
__________________________________________________________________
Statistic Mean Std.
Dev. Max Min Range
Turnout 24.6% 13.9% 63.9% 3.3% 60.6%
White %
44.1%
18.5%
84.8%
2.6%
82.2%
African American %
20.6%
18.0%
82.2%
0.2%
82.0%
Hispanic %
24.1%
20.7%
96.4%
2.4%
94.0%
Asian %
7.5%
8.8%
53.6%
0.2%
53.4%
Other %
3.7%
3.0%
27.9%
0.1%
27.8%
Median Household
Income
50222.4
13788.0
103591
26095
77496
High School
Attainment %
84.5%
6.9%
96.2%
54.1%
42.1%
Bachelor's
Attainment %
31.7%
10.7%
65.6%
11.7%
53.9%
Married w/ Children
%
17.7%
6.3%
35.0%
7.9%
27.1%
Table continued.
Patison 30
Over 65 % 10.5% 2.1% 20.0% 6.1% 13.9%
Population Density
4619.5
4040.8
28084.2
174.9
27909.3
Competition Index
0.2095
0.226
1.000
0.0016
0.9984
__________________________________________________________________
Frequencies
A near majority of the 321 elections analyzed were held in November (n=160, 49.8%),
with May, June, April, and August each comprising more than 5.0% (n=17) of the elections held.
January and July are the only months during which not a single election took place.
Table 2: Frequency of Elections Held by Month
______________________________
Month Number Percent
January 0 0
February
8
2.5
March
11
3.4
April
26
8.1
May
47
14.6
June
29
9.0
July
0
0
August
17
5.3
September
5
1.6
October
9
2.8
November
160
49.9
December
9
2.8
______________________________
Patison 31
Despite a near majority of elections take place in November, the overwhelming majority
of decisive mayoral elections take place when the highest elected office appearing on the ballot
is the mayor (n=224, 69.8%). The only other highest office even approaching statistical
significance is the President (n=27, 8.4%).
Table 3: Frequency of Highest Elected Office on the Ballot
____________________________________
Month Number Percent
Congress 5 1.6
Congress &
Governor 14 4.4
Congress &
Governor primary 3 0.9
Congress primary 3 0.9
municipal 224 69.8
municipal & state
judicial 9 2.8
municipal & State
Senate 3 0.9
municipal & State
Senate primary 1 0.3
President 27 8.4
Presidential
primary 9 2.8
Senate 6 1.9
Table continued.
Patison 32
Senate &
Governor 5 1.6
Senate &
Governor primary
4 1.2
Senate primary 8 2.5
____________________________________
As far as government and regulation-related institutional variables, roughly an equal
number of city governments were mayor-council cities (n=168, 52.3%) and council-manager
cities (n=153, 47.7%). The vast majority of elections held were nonpartisan (n=263, 81.9%). A
four-year term also composed the vast majority of terms for which elections were being held
(n=261, 81.3%). A combined 11 elections were held for terms of either one or three years, all
due to special elections. A single election was held for a five-year term, in order to synchronize
future elections with elections for higher offices. Finally, same-day voter registration, while an
expanding practice, still lags behind.
Table 4: Frequency of Governmental and Regulatory Institutional Variables
__________________________________________
Variable Number Percent
Government Type
mayor-council 168 52.3
council-manager 153 47.7
Partisanship
partisan 58 18.1
nonpartisan 263 81.9
Term Length
1 year 2 0.6
2 years 48 15.0
3 years 9 2.8
4 years 261 81.3
5 years 1 0.3
Table continued.
Patison 33
Same-Day Voter Registration
Yes 90 28.0
No 231 72.0
__________________________________________
The election-related institutional variables and other election variables involved whether
the incumbent ran, the total number of candidates running in the decisive election, the method
used to vote in the election, the total number of possible stages in an election cycle, and the
decisive stage. Nearly two-thirds of elections saw an incumbent running for reelection (n=203,
63.2%). Over half of decisive elections had just two candidates running (n=167, 52.0%). While
an increasing number of cities have adopted ranked-choice voting (n=11, 3.4%), nearly every
election was nevertheless held using a first-past-the post system (n=310, 96.6%). As far as
election stages are concerned, the vast majority of elections had a potential of two stages (n=265,
82.5%), a blanket or partisan primary, followed by a runoff between the top two vote-getters. A
not insignificant number of elections were held on a true winner-take-all, one-round basis (n=50,
15.6%), with the plurality vote-getter winning the election despite not having to receive a
majority of the votes cast. A small number of partisan cities (n=6, 1.9%) require a runoff in their
partisan primaries if no candidate receives a majority in the first round, for a total of three
election stages. The decisive stage provides greater parity, with roughly half of elections being
decided in the first round of voting (n=155, 48.3%) and roughly half being decided in the second
round of voting (n=165, 51.4%). A single election required a third round of voting.
Table 5: Frequency of Election Variables
____________________________________
Variable Number Percent
Incumbent Running
yes 203 63.2
no 118 36.8
Table continued.
Patison 34
Number of Candidates
1 candidate 19 5.9
2 candidates 167 52.0
3 candidates 38 11.8
4 candidates 41 12.8
5 candidates 12 3.8
6 or more
candidates 44 13.7
Voting Method
first-past-the-post 310 96.6
ranked-choice
voting 11 3.4
Number of Potential Election Stages
1 stage 50 15.6
2 stages 265 82.5
3 stages 6 1.9
Decisive Stage
1st round 155 48.3
2nd round 165 51.4
3rd round 1 0.3
____________________________________
Each census region was represented by at least 5% of the sampling, though the Northeast
(n=27, 8.4%) was ostensibly hurt by its states’ incorporation policy that requires all land to be
incorporated, limiting city growth by annexation, while also making cities harder to come by, as
seen on Long Island. The extreme population concentration within some Midwest states and
dispersion within others may have also slightly hindered their inclusion (n=54, 16.8%).
Table 6: Regional Frequencies
____________________________________
Region Number Percent
Northeast 24 7.5
South 126 39.3
Midwest 54 16.8
West 117 36.4
Patison 35
____________________________________
The white population was a majority in nearly two-thirds of the elections studied (n=116,
36.1%). Roughly the same amount of elections had African American populations under 10%
(n=123, 38.3%) and less than 10% of elections had African American majorities (n=25, 7.8%).
Exactly 10% of elections had Hispanic majorities (n=32, 10.0%), but one-third also had Hispanic
populations under 10% (n=108, 33.6%).
Table 7: Frequency of Racial Compositions
____________________________________
Race Number Percent
White
0-9.9% 12 3.7
10-19.9% 16 5.0
20-29.9% 50 15.6
30-39.9% 59 18.4
40-49.9% 68 21.2
Over 50% 116 36.1
African American
0-9.9% 123 38.3
10-19.9% 65 20.3
20-29.9% 56 17.4
30-39.9% 23 7.2
40-49.9% 29 9.0
Over 50% 25 7.8
Hispanic
0-9.9% 108 33.6
10-19.9% 75 23.4
20-29.9% 37 11.5
30-39.9% 33 10.3
40-49.9% 36 11.2
Over 50% 32 10.0
Asian
Table continued.
Patison 36
0-9.9% 255 79.4
10-19.9% 45 14.0
20-29.9% 6 1.9
30-39.9% 6 1.9
40-49.9% 7 2.2
Over 50% 2 0.6
Other
0-9.9% 313 97.5
10-19.9% 5 1.6
20-29.9% 3 0.9
30-39.9% 0 0.0
40-49.9% 0 0.0
Over 50% 0 0.0
____________________________________
Regional Averages
In an effort to understand regional differences, calculations of the average turnouts and
competition indices were taken for each region. At least in large cities, the West has the highest
average turnout, at nearly 30%, while the South lags behind at 21.1%. Despite having the
second-lowest average turnout at 21.6%, the Northeast has the smallest range, indicating a
relatively uniform political culture across the region. As far as competition is concerned, all
regions have indexes hovering around 0.2. Nevertheless, assessments about the more robust
political culture in the Northeast continue to ring true, with no city having an index over 0.45.
This is in contrast to each of the other three regions, where at least one election had virtually no
competition whatsoever.
Table 7: Regional Averages
______________________________________________________
Variable Mean Max Min Range
Voter Turnout
Northeast 21.6% 30.9% 16.4% 14.5%
South 21.1% 63.9% 3.5% 60.4%
Table continued.
Patison 37
Midwest 23.9% 49.5% 3.3% 46.2%
West 29.2% 61.6% 6.3% 55.3%
Competition Index
Northeast 0.2010 0.4266 0.0155 0.4111
South 0.2165 1.0000 0.0060 0.994
Midwest 0.1936 0.9210 0.0056 0.9154
West 0.2109 1.0000 0.0016 0.9984
______________________________________________________
Regional frequencies identify several fissures in regional institutional political culture as
well. While each region has more elections held in November than any other month, the South
and the West each hold less than half of their mayoral elections during the month. Each region
also shows differing secondary preferences as far as months are concerned. The South shows a
sizeable secondary preference for May elections (n=27, 21.4%), while the West holds nearly the
same proportion of its elections in June and August (nt=25, 24.8%). The Midwest holds roughly
the same proportion in April instead (n=13, 24.0%), and the Northeast holds nearly the entire
remainder of its non-November elections in May (n=6, 25.0%).
Outside of special election exceptions, term limits are rather uniformly of the four-year
variety, though the South shows a penchant for two-year terms (n=34, 27.0%). The Midwest
(n=18, 33.3%) and West (n=69, 58.0%) are the only two regions with any significant presence
for same-day voter registration. As is to be expected over 90% of elections in every region were
held using the first-past-the-post voting method, while a two-round system was used in over 75%
of elections in each region.
The South and the West each had clear preferences for the council-manager government
structure, but not as clear as the preference held by the Northeast and the West. Every region but
the North displayed strong preference for nonpartisan elections.
Patison 38
Table 8: Regional Frequencies
______________________________________________________________________________
Variable Northeast South Midwest West Total
Month
February 0 (0.0%) 3 (2.4%) 1 (1.9%) 4 (3.4 %) 8 (2.5%)
March 1 (4.2%) 6 (4.8%) 1 (1.9%) 3 (2.6%) 11 (3.4%)
April 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.6%) 13 (24.0%) 11 (9.4%) 26 (8.1%)
May 6 (25.0%) 27 (21.4%) 6 (11.1%) 8 (6.8%) 47 (14.6%)
June 0 (0.0%) 10 (7.9%) 2 (3.7%) 17 (14.5%) 29 (9.0%)
August 0 (0.0%) 5 (4.0%) 0 (0.0%) 12 (10.3%) 17 (5.3%)
September 1 (4.2%) 2 (1.6%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.7%) 5 (1.6%)
October 0 (0.0%) 7 (5.6%) 0 (0.0%) 2 (1.7%) 9 (2.8%)
November 16 (66.7%) 57 (45.2%) 30 (55.5%) 57 (48.7%) 160 (49.9%)
December 0 (0.0%) 7 (5.6%) 1 (1.9%) 1 (0.9%) 9 (2.8%)
Term Length
1 year 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.9%) 2 (0.6%)
2 years 1 (4.2%) 34 (27.0%) 3 (5.6%) 10 (8.5%) 48 (15.0%)
3 years 0 (0.0%) 5 (4.0%) 0 (0.0%) 4 (3.4%) 9 (2.8%)
4 years 23 (95.8%) 85 (67.4%) 51 (94.4%) 102 (87.2%) 261 (81.3%)
5 years 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.8%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.3%)
Same-Day Voter Registration
yes 0 (0.0%) 3 (2.4%) 18 (33.3%) 69 (58.0%) 90 (28.0%)
no 24
(100.0%) 123 (97.6%) 36 (66.7%) 48 (41.0%) 231 (72.0%)
Government Type
mayor-council 24
(100.0%) 57 (45.2%) 42 (77.8%) 45 (38.5%) 168 (52.3%)
council-
manager 0 (0.0%) 69 (54.8%) 12 (22.2%) 72 (61.5%) 153 (47.7%)
Partisanship
partisan 14 (58.3%) 25 (19.8%) 10 (18.5%) 9 (7.7%) 58 (18.1%)
nonpartisan 10 (41.7%) 101 (80.2%) 44 (81.5%) 108 (92.3%) 263 (81.9%)
Voting Method
Table continued.
Patison 39
first-past-the-
post
24
(100.0%) 126 (100.0%) 49 (90.7%) 111 (94.9%) 310 (96.6%)
ranked-choice
voting
0 (0.0%)
0 (0.0%)
5 (9.3%)
6 (5.1%)
11 (3.4%)
Number of Potential Election Stages
1 stage 0 (0.0%) 19 (15.1%) 4 (7.4%) 27 (23.1%) 50 (15.6%)
2 stages 24
(100.0%) 104 (82.5%) 47 (87.0%) 90 (76.9%) 265 (82.5%)
3 stages 0 (0.0%) 3 (2.4%) 3 (5.6%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (1.9%)
______________________________________________________________________________
Correlations
A multiple regression of turnout against the 22 variables gathered identified two strong
variables: election month and competition index. These correlations seem to confirm that the
election month has a high level of influence on voter turnout in mayoral elections. They also
indicate that more competitive elections correlate with higher turnouts. There are another eight
variables with weaker, but still statistically significant, correlation to voter turnout. Mayor-
council governments correlate to higher voter turnout, as does same-day voter registration. More
than one potential election stage correlates negatively, while higher offices at the top of the ballot
correlate with higher turnout. Higher Asian populations correlate with higher turnout, and
movement west across the country correlates with higher turnout. There is also a predictable
correlation between higher median household income and bachelor’s degree attainment and voter
turnout. There is absolutely no correlation between municipal population density and voter
turnout.
Table 9: Correlations
______________________________
Variable Correlation
Month 0.346
Incumbent running -.126
Table continued.
Patison 40
Term length 0.182
Government type -0.284
Partisanship -0.106
Same-day voter
registration 0.275
Number of potential
stages -0.226
Decisive stage 0.117
Voting method 0.112
Highest office
elected 0.284
Competition index -0.326
White % 0.122
African American
% -0.064
Hispanic % -0.198
Asian % 0.281
Other % 0.164
Median household
income 0.235
High school/GED
attainment 0.146
Bachelor's degree
attainment 0.262
Married w/ children
under 18 -0.032
Over 65 0.155
Region 0.248
Population density 0.008
______________________________
Multiple Regression Model
The multiple regression model created using the data has an r2 (predictive power) value
of 0.505, and an adjusted r2 value of 0.469, with a standard error of 10.1%. The highest variable
Patison 41
contributions to the model were the competition index, the month, and the highest office being
elected. The number of potential election stages, the type of government, same-day voter
registration, the partisanship of the election, and the region were also important, but lesser,
contributors to the model.
Eight variables made significant unique contributions to the prediction of voter turnout:
month, government type, same-day voter registration, partisanship, number of potential election
stages, highest office elected, competition index, and region. The competition index, the month,
and the highest office elected were the largest partial contributors to the model.
Table 10: Multiple Regression Model
____________________________________________________________
Variable B Std.
Error Sig
Month 1.129 0.214 0.000
Incumbent
running -0.777 1.255 0.536
Term length 1.647 0.844 0.052
Government type -4.736 1.738 0.007
Partisanship -4.483 1.754 0.011
Same-day voter
registration 4.258 1.897 0.026
Number of
potential stages -6.288 1.973 0.002
Decisive stage 1.675 1.553 0.282
Voting method -6.544 3.866 0.092
Table continued.
Patison 42
Highest office
elected 1.302 0.249 0.000
Competition index -16.114 2.818 0.000
White % 0.112 0.070 0.112
African American
% 0.066 0.063 0.295
Asian % 0.032 0.126 0.798
Other % 0.183 0.259 0.480
Median household
income 0.000 0.000 0.273
High school/GED
attainment -0.397 0.227 0.081
Bachelor's degree
attainment 0.204 0.129 0.115
Married w/
children under 18 -0.104 0.268 0.699
Over 65 0.143 0.371 0.701
Region 1.743 0.884 0.050
Population density 0.000 0.000 0.193
Excluded variable: Hispanic %
Patison 43
Chapter 4: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussion
The objective of the study was to come to a conclusion about what matters most when
discussing voter turnout in mayoral elections in large, U.S. cities. This larger “What matters?”
question boiled down into three smaller questions:
1. Why is voter turnout so low in mayoral elections?
2. What factors account for this low turnout?
3. How might these factors account for the discrepancies in turnout between cities with
major differences in it?
A complete sample of all cities in the United States with populations over 200,000 was chosen to
study, a total of 107 cities. Data for the voter turnout in the last three mayoral elections in each
city was gathered, as was data on institutional and demographic factors. The institutional
variables gathered were term length, government type, statutory nonpartisanship, same-day voter
registration, number of potential election stages, the decisive election stage, and voting method.
The demographic factors were racial population percentages, median household income, high
school graduate percentage, bachelor’s degree attainment percentage, the percentage of people
married with children under 18, the percentage of people over age 65, the Census region in
which the city is located, and the population density of each city. Additionally, a competition
index was created using the raw turnout, the citizen of voting age population, and the number of
candidates running in the ultimately decisive stage of the election.
Month of election, as espoused by Hajnal and Lewis (2003), emerges as a primary factor
in predicting voter turnout in mayoral elections. The real story, however, is the emergence of the
competition index as one of the strongest and most significant variables. The power of the index
Patison 44
seems to be a confirmation of the hypothesis put forward by Alford and Lee (1968) about issues,
candidates, and political culture playing an important role in voter turnout. The other results of
the study indicate a mixed bag when it comes to confirmation or refutation of other theories and
findings. Most authoritatively, the importance of population density with respect to voter turnout,
as espoused by Oliver (2000), Kelleher and Lowery (2008), and Carr and Tavares (2014), has
been pretty much refuted. Wood’s (2002) assessments of the importance of partisan, political
cities as opposed to nonpartisan, administrative ones, as a means to higher voter turnout, receives
a qualified confirmation. Every correlation obtained points to this fact, but they are of limited
correlative and predictive power. In a partial confirmation of social status as an important
predictor, median household income and bachelor’s degree attainment proved to have moderate
correlations, but neither ultimately played an important role in the creation of the model.
Results and Conclusions
The largest finding of the study and analysis is the greater predictive power of
institutional variables than those of demographic variables. The beta values of the month of the
decisive election, the number of potential election sequences, and the highest office being elected
were all more powerful variables than any demographic factor. Outside of month, the most
potent variable was the competition index, indicating a potential connection between the
importance of competition and robust political dialogue around local issues and increased voter
turnout.
Previously relied upon variables, such as government type and partisanship, as well as
median household income and educational attainment, proved to be of only moderate predictive
power. Additionally, regional differences, while pronounced on many of the institutional factors,
did not play as significant a role in dictating voter participation levels, as was perhaps expected.
Patison 45
Recommendations
The following five recommendations stem from the findings of this study:
1. A further study should be conducted that focuses more specifically in a more
President-focused sense on the decisive election month and the highest office up for
election. While the study did not combine the two into a complete variable or address
the issue of presidentially concurrent elections outside of these two variables, there is
ample reason to expect that local elections held concurrently with Presidential
elections would have significantly higher turnouts than any other local election. A
study with this data set, however, is necessary to determine just how large this
difference would be.
2. While the racial variables failed to provide much in the way of predictive
significance, a study examining the impact of minority and female candidates on
minority and female voter turnout in local elections, as well as on voter turnout in
local elections more broadly, should be undertaken.
3. A wider study of local voter turnout using this set of variables, or something similar,
should be undertaken with a more random sampling not limited to cities over 200,000
in population. This will provide a test of the validity of this study’s findings in a
wider context and provide a basis for wider application of the findings.
4. A study should be completed to assess and analyze the competition index in light of
both qualitative and quantitative variables. The highly potent nature of the variable
requires a more in-depth look at how the competition index works, as well as whether
something might make for a significant positive addition to it.
Patison 46
5. The institutional variables, even those with less predictive mettle, show a distinct
trend for higher turnout. As such, is seems prescient to propose the following as a
policy proposal. Elections should be held in November, regardless of the year. To
improve turnout even further, they should be scheduled to coincide with Presidential
elections. A single election would better serve voters, presumably by decreasing the
costs associated with voting in local elections. Finally, cities should work to move
toward a political, rather than an administrative, form of government, where the
mayor has clearly delineated and important political powers and is elected on a
partisan basis.
Patison 47
Appendix A: United States Cities with Populations of 200,000 or More
City
Population
(2010
Census)
Alabama
Birmingham 212,237
Montgomery 205,764
Alaska
Anchorage 291,826
Arizona
Phoenix 1,445,632
Tucson 520,116
Mesa 439,041
Chandler 236,123
Glendale 226,721
Scottsdale 217,385
Gilbert 208,453
Arkansas
none -
California
Los Angeles 3,792,621
San Diego 1,307,402
San Jose 945,942
San Francisco 805,235
Fresno 494,665
Sacramento 466,488
Long Beach 462,257
Oakland 390,724
Bakersfield 347,483
Anaheim 336,265
Santa Ana 324,528
Riverside 303,871
Stockton 291,707
Chula Vista 243,916
Fremont 214,089
Irvine 212,375
Patison 48
San Bernardino 209,924
Modesto 201,165
Colorado
Denver 600,158
Colorado Springs 416,427
Aurora 325,078
Connecticut
none -
Delaware
none -
District of Columbia
Washington 601,723
Florida
Jacksonville 821,784
Miami 399,457
Tampa 335,709
St. Petersburg 244,769
Orlando 238,300
Hialeah 224,669
Georgia
Atlanta 420,003
Hawaii
Honolulu 337,256
Idaho
Boise 205,671
Illinois
Chicago 2,695,598
Indiana
Indianapolis 820,445
Fort Wayne 253,691
Patison 49
Iowa
Des Moines 203,433
Kansas
Wichita 382,368
Kentucky
Louisville 597,377
Lexington 295,803
Louisiana
New Orleans 343,829
Baton Rouge 229,493
Maine
none -
Maryland
Baltimore 620,961
Massachusetts
Boston 617,594
Michigan
Detroit 713,777
Minnesota
Minneapolis 382,578
St. Paul 285,068
Mississippi
none -
Missouri
Kansas City 459,787
St. Louis 319,294
Montana
none -
Patison 50
Nebraska
Omaha 408,958
Lincoln 258,379
Nevada
Las Vegas 583,756
Henderson 257,729
Reno 225,221
North Las Vegas 216,961
New Hampshire
none -
New Jersey
Newark 277,140
Jersey City 247,597
New Mexico
Albuquerque 545,852
New York
New York City 8,175,133
Buffalo 261,310
Rochester 210,656
North Carolina
Charlotte 731,424
Raleigh 403,892
Greensboro 269,666
Winston-Salem 229,617
Durham 228,330
Fayetteville 200,564
North Dakota
none -
Ohio
Columbus 787,033
Cleveland 396,815
Patison 51
Cincinnati 296,943
Toledo 287,208
Oklahoma
Oklahoma City 579,999
Tulsa 391,906
Oregon
Portland 583,776
Pennsylvania
Philadelphia 1,526,006
Pittsburgh 305,704
Rhode Island
none -
South Carolina
none -
South Dakota
none -
Tennessee
Memphis 646,889
Nashville 601,222
Texas
Houston 2,100,263
San Antonio 1,327,407
Dallas 1,197,816
Austin 790,390
Fort Worth 741,206
El Paso 649,121
Arlington 365,438
Corpus Christi 305,215
Plano 259,841
Laredo 236,091
Lubbock 229,573
Garland 226,876
Patison 52
Irving 216,290
Utah
none -
Vermont
none -
Virginia
Virginia Beach 437,994
Norfolk 242,803
Chesapeake 222,209
Richmond 204,214
Washington
Seattle 608,660
Spokane 208,916
West Virginia
none -
Wisconsin
Milwaukee 594,833
Madison 233,209
Wyoming
none -
Patison 53
Appendix B: Election Sources
City Source Type
Alabama
Birmingham city
Montgomery city & county
Alaska
Anchorage city
Arizona
Phoenix city
Tucson city
Mesa city & county
Chandler county
Glendale county
Scottsdale county
Gilbert county
Arkansas
none -
California
Los Angeles city
San Diego city
San Jose county
San Francisco city
Fresno county
Sacramento county
Long Beach city
Oakland county
Bakersfield county
Anaheim county
Santa Ana county
Riverside city & county
Stockton county
Chula Vista city & county
Fremont county
Patison 54
Irvine county
San Bernardino county
Modesto county
Colorado
Denver city
Colorado Springs city
Aurora city & state
Connecticut
none -
Delaware
none -
District of Columbia
Washington city
Florida
Jacksonville city & county
Miami county
Tampa county
St. Petersburg county
Orlando city & county
Hialeah county
Georgia
Atlanta county
Hawaii
Honolulu county
Idaho
Boise county
Illinois
Chicago city
Indiana
Patison 55
Indianapolis city
Fort Wayne county
Iowa
Des Moines county
Kansas
Wichita county
Kentucky
Louisville county
Lexington county
Louisiana
New Orleans state
Baton Rouge state
Maine
none -
Maryland
Baltimore state
Massachusetts
Boston city
Michigan
Detroit city & county
Minnesota
Minneapolis city
St. Paul county
Mississippi
none -
Missouri
Kansas City city
St. Louis city
Patison 56
Montana
none -
Nebraska
Omaha county
Lincoln city & county
Nevada
Las Vegas county
Henderson county
Reno county & state
North Las Vegas county
New Hampshire
none -
New Jersey
Newark county
Jersey City county
New Mexico
Albuquerque city & county
New York
New York City city
Buffalo county
Rochester county
North Carolina
Charlotte state
Raleigh state
Greensboro state
Winston-Salem state
Durham state
Fayetteville state
North Dakota
none -
Patison 57
Ohio
Columbus county
Cleveland county
Cincinnati county
Toledo county
Oklahoma
Oklahoma City state
Tulsa state
Oregon
Portland city & county
Pennsylvania
Philadelphia city
Pittsburgh county
Rhode Island
none -
South Carolina
none -
South Dakota
none -
Tennessee
Memphis county
Nashville city
Texas
Houston city & county
San Antonio city & county
Dallas county
Austin city & county
Fort Worth city & county
El Paso county
Arlington city & county
Patison 58
Corpus Christi county
Plano county
Laredo city
Lubbock county
Garland county
Irving city & county
Utah
none -
Vermont
none -
Virginia
Virginia Beach city & state
Norfolk city
Chesapeake city & state
Richmond state
Washington
Seattle city & county
Spokane county
West Virginia
none -
Wisconsin
Milwaukee city
Madison county
Wyoming
none -
Patison 59
Works Cited
Adams, J. (1776). Thoughts on Government. Thoughts on Government. Philadelphia, PA: John
Dunlap.
Alford, R. R., & Lee, E. C. (1968). Voting Turnout in American Cities. American Political
Science Review, 62(3), 796-813.
Alford, R. R., & Scoble, H. M. (1965). Political and Socioeconomic Characteristics of American
Cities. In Municipal Year Book. Chicago, IL: International City Managers’ Association.
Bullock, C. S. (1990). Turnout in Municipal Elections. Review of Policy Research, 9(3), 539-49.
Carr, J. B., & Tavares, A. F. (2014). City Size and Political Participation in Local Government:
Reassessing the Contingent Factors of Residential Location Decisions Within Urban
Regions. Urban Affairs Review, 50(2), 269-302.
Goodnow, F. J. (1908). City Government in the United States. New York, NY: The Century Co.
Hajnal, Z. L. (2010). America's Uneven Democracy: Race, Turnout, and Representation in City
Politics. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Hajnal, Z. L., & Lewis, P.G. (2003). Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local
Elections. Urban Affairs Review, 38(5), 645-68.
Hajnal, Z. L., Lewis, P.G., & Louch, H. (2002). Municipal Elections in California: Turnout,
Timing, and Competition. San Francisco, CA: Public Policy Institute of California.
Hajnal, Z. L., & Trounstine, J. (2005). Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven
Turnout in City Politics. Journal of Politics, 67(2), 515-35.
Kaufmann, K. M. (2004). The Urban Voter: Group Conflict and Mayoral Voting Behavior in
Major Cities. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Kelleher, C. A., & Lowery, D. (2009). Central City Size, Metropolitan Institutions and Political
Participation. British Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 59-92. Kessel, J. H. (1962). Governmental Structure and Political Environment: A Statistical Note about
American Cities. American Political Science Review, 56(3), 615-20.
Mcdaniel, J. A. (2016). Writing the Rules to Rank the Candidates: Examining the Impact of
Instant-Runoff Voting on Racial Group Turnout in San Francisco Mayoral Elections.
Journal of Urban Affairs, 38(3), 387-408.
Patison 60
Morlan, R. L. (1984). Municipal vs. National Election Voter Turnout: Europe and the United
States. Political Science Quarterly, 99(3), 457-70.
Oliver, J. E. (2000). City Size and Civic Involvement in Metropolitan America. American
Political Science Review, 94(2), 361-73.
Oliver, E. J., Ha, S. E., & Callen, Z. (2012). Local Elections and the Politics of Small-Scale
Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Rolfe, M. (2012). Voter Turnout: A Social Theory of Political Participation. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Schnore, L. F., & Alford, R. R. (1963). Forms of Government and Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Suburbs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 8(1), 1-17.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. (1995). Voice and Equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Wolfinger, R. E., & Rosenstone, S. J. (1980). Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Wood, C. (2002). Voter Turnout in City Elections. Urban Affairs Review, 38(2), 209-31.