william whewell

7/21/2019 William Whewell

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William WhewellFirst published Sat Dec 23, 2000; substantive revision Mon Nov 12, 2012

William Whewell (17941866) was one of the most important and influentialfigures in nineteenth-century ritain! Whewell" a polymath" wrote e#tensi$ely

on numerous su%&ects" including mechanics" mineralogy" geology" astronomy"

political economy" theology" educational reform" international law" and

architecture" as well as the wor's that remain the most well-'nown today in

philosophy of science" history of science" and moral philosophy! e was one

of the founding mem%ers and a president of the ritish ssociation for the

d$ancement of *cience" a fellow of the +oyal *ociety" president of the

,eological *ociety" and longtime aster of .rinity /ollege" /am%ridge! 0n his

own time his influence was ac'nowledged %y the ma&or scientists of the day"such as ohn erschel" /harles 2arwin" /harles 3yell and ichael araday"

who fre5uently turned to Whewell for philosophical and scientific ad$ice" and"

interestingly" for terminological assistance! Whewell in$ented the terms

anode" cathode" and ion for araday! 0n response to a challenge %y the

poet *!.! /oleridge in 18" Whewell in$ented the nglish word scientist:

%efore this time the only terms in use were natural philosopher and man of

science! Whewell was greatly influenced %y his association with three of his

fellow students at /am%ridge; /harles a%%age" ohn erschel" and +ichard

ones!


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or scholarships were set aside for the children of wor'ing class parents" to

allow for some social mo%ility! Whewell studied at a$ersham ,rammar for

two years" and recei$ed pri$ate coaching in mathematics! lthough he did win

the e#hi%ition it did not pro$ide full resources for a %oy of his familyAs means

to attend /am%ridge: so money had to %e raised in a pu%lic su%scription tosupplement the scholarship money!

e thus came up to .rinity in 181= as a su%-siDar (scholarship student)! 0n

1814 he won the /hancellorAs priDe for his epic poem oadicea" in this way

following in the footsteps of his mother" who had pu%lished poems in the local

papers! Eet he did not neglect the mathematical side of his training: in 1816 he

pro$ed his mathematical prowess %y placing as %oth second Wrangler and

second *mithAs ?riDe man! .he following year he won a college fellowship! e

was elected to the +oyal *ociety in 18=@" and ordained a priest (as re5uiredfor .rinity ellows) in 18=C! e too' up the /hair in ineralogy in 18=8" and

resigned it in 18=! 0n 188 Whewell %ecame ?rofessor of oral ?hilosophy!

lmost immediately after his marriage to /ordelia arshall on 1=


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sensations! .hese ideas" which he called undamental 0deas" are supplied

%y the mind itselfJthey are not (as ill and erschel protested) merely

recei$ed from our o%ser$ations of the world! Whewell e#plained that the

undamental 0deas are not a conse5uence of e#perience" %ut a result of the

particular constitution and acti$ity of the mind" which is independent of alle#perience in its origin" though constantly com%ined with e#perience in its

e#ercise (18C8a" 0" 91)! /onse5uently" the mind is an acti$e participant in our

attempts to gain 'nowledge of the world" not merely a passi$e recipient of

sense data! 0deas such as *pace" .ime" /ause" and +esem%lance pro$ide a

structure or form for the multitude of sensations we e#perience! .he 0deas

pro$ide a structure %y e#pressing the general relations that e#ist %etween our

sensations (1847" 0" =C)! .hus" the 0dea of *pace allows us to apprehend

o%&ects as ha$ing form" magnitude" and position! Whewell held" then" that

o%ser$ation is idea-laden: all o%ser$ation" he noted" in$ol$es unconscious

inference using the undamental 0deas (see 18C8a" 0" 46)! ach science has a

?articular undamental idea which is needed to organiDe the facts with which

that science is concerned: thus" *pace is the undamental 0dea of geometry"

/ause the undamental 0dea of mechanics" and *u%stance the undamental

0dea of chemistry! oreo$er" Whewell e#plained that each undamental 0dea

has certain conceptions included within it: these conceptions are special

modifications of the 0dea applied to particular types of circumstances (18C8%"

187)! or e#ample" the conception of force is a modification of the 0dea of

/ause" applied to the particular case of motion (see 18C8a" 0" 184C and =6)!

.hus far" this discussion of the undamental 0deas may suggest that they are

similar to IantAs forms of intuition" and indeed there are some similarities!

ecause of this" some commentators argue that WhewellAs epistemology is a

type of Iantianism (see" e!g!" utts 197" and uchdahl 1991)! owe$er" this

interpretation ignores se$eral crucial differences %etween the two $iews!

Whewell did not follow Iant in drawing a distinction %etween precepts" or

forms of intuition" such as *pace and .ime" and the categories" or forms of

thought" in which Iant included the concepts of /ause and *u%stance!

oreo$er" Whewell included as undamental 0deas many ideas which

function not as conditions of e#perience %ut as conditions for ha$ing

'nowledge within their respecti$e sciences; although it is certainly possi%le to

ha$e e#perience of the world without ha$ing a distinct idea of" say" /hemical

ffinity" we could not ha$e any 'nowledge of certain chemical processes


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without it! Gnli'e Iant" Whewell did not attempt to gi$e an e#hausti$e list of

these undamental 0deas: indeed" he %elie$ed that there are others which will

emerge in the course of the de$elopment of science! oreo$er" and perhaps

most importantly for his philosophy of science" Whewell re&ected IantAs claim

that we can only ha$e 'nowledge of our categoriDed e#perience! .heundamental 0deas" on WhewellAs $iew" accurately represent o%&ecti$e features

of the world" independent of the processes of the mind" and we can use these

0deas in order to ha$e 'nowledge of these o%&ecti$e features! 0ndeed" Whewell

criticiDed Iant for $iewing e#ternal reality as a dim and un'nown region

(see 186@a" 1=)! urther" WhewellAs &ustification for the presence of these

concepts in our minds ta'es a $ery different form than IantAs transcendental

argument! or Iant" the categories are &ustified %ecause they ma'e e#perience

possi%le! or Whewell" though the categories doma'e e#perience (of certain

'inds) possi%le" the 0deas are &ustified %y their origin in the mind of a di$ine

creator (see especially his discussion of this in his 186@a)! nd finally" the

type of necessity which Whewell claimed is deri$ed from the 0deas is $ery

different from IantAs notion of the synthetic a priori(We return to these last

two points in the section on Becessary .ruth %elow)!

We turn now to a discussion of the theory of induction Whewell de$eloped

with his antithetical epistemology! rom his earliest thoughts a%out scientific

method" Whewell was interested in de$eloping an inducti$e theory! t their

philosophical %rea'fasts at /am%ridge" Whewell" a%%age" erschel andones discussed how science had stagnated since the heady days of the

*cientific +e$olution in the 17th century! 0t was time for a new re$olution"

which they pledged to %ring a%out! .he cornerstone of this new re$olution was

to %e the promotion of a aconian-type of induction" and all four men %egan

their careers endorsing an inducti$e scientific method against the deducti$e

method %eing ad$anced %y 2a$id +icardo and his followers (see *nyder

=@11)! (lthough the four agreed a%out the importance of an inducti$e

scientific method" WhewellAs $ersion was one that erschel and ones would

later ta'e issue with" primarily %ecause of his antithetical epistemology!)

WhewellAs first e#plicit" lengthy discussion of induction is found in

his"hilosophy of the #nductive Sciences, founded upon their $istory" which

was originally pu%lished in 184@ (a second" enlarged edition appeared in 1847"

and the third edition appeared as three separate wor's pu%lished %etween 18C8

and 186@)! e called his induction 2isco$erersA 0nduction and e#plained that


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it is used to disco$er %oth phenomenal and causal laws! Whewell considered

himself to %e a follower of acon" and claimed to %e reno$ating aconAs

inducti$e method: thus one $olume of the third edition of the"hilosophyis

entitledNovum %r!anon &enovatum! Whewell followed acon in re&ecting

the standard" o$erly-narrow notion of induction that holds induction to %emerely simple enumeration of instances! +ather" Whewell e#plained that" in

induction" there is a Bew lement added to the com%ination Kof instancesL %y

the $ery act of thought %y which they were com%ined (1847" 00" 48)! .his act

of thought is a process Whewell called colligation! /olligation" according

to Whewell" is the mental operation of %ringing together a num%er of

empirical facts %y superinducing upon them a conception which unites the

facts and renders them capa%le of %eing e#pressed %y a general law! .he

conception thus pro$ides the true %ond of Gnity %y which the phenomena are

held together (1847" 00" 46)" %y pro$iding a property shared %y the 'nown

mem%ers of a class (in the case of causal laws" the colligating property is that

of sharing the same cause)!

.hus the 'nown points of the artian or%it were colligated %y Iepler using

the conception of an elliptical cur$e!


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history of science is the history of scientific ideas" that is" the history of their

e#plication and su%se5uent use as colligating concepts! .hus" in the case of

IeplerAs use of the ellipse conception" Whewell noted that to supply this

conception" re5uired a special preparation" and a special acti$ity in the mind of

the disco$erer! H .o disco$er such a connection" the mind must %e con$ersantwith certain relations of space" and with certain 'inds of figures (1849" =8

9)!


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We mentioned earlier that Whewell thought of himself as reno$ating aconAs

inducti$e philosophy! is inducti$ism does share numerous features with

aconAs method of interpreting nature; for instance the claims that induction

must in$ol$e more than merely simple enumeration of instances" that science

must %e proceed %y successi$e steps of generaliDation" that inducti$e sciencecan reach uno%ser$a%les (for acon" the forms" for Whewell" uno%ser$a%le

entities such as light wa$es or properties such as elliptical or%its or

gra$itational forces)! (or more on the relation %etween Whewell and acon

see *nyder =@@6)! Eet" surprisingly" the recei$ed $iew of WhewellAs

methodology in the =@th century has tended to descri%e Whewell as an anti-

inducti$ist in the ?opperian mold (see" for e#ample" utts 1987" uchdahl

1991" 3audan 198@" Biiniluoto 1977" and +use 197C)! .hat is" it is claimed

that Whewell endorses a con&ectures and refutations $iew of scientific

disco$ery! owe$er" it is clear from the a%o$e discussion that his $iew of

disco$erersA induction does not resem%le the $iew asserting that hypotheses

can %e and are typically arri$ed at %y mere guesswor'! oreo$er" Whewell

e#plicitly re&ects the hypothetico-deducti$e claim that hypotheses disco$ered

%y non-rational guesswor' can %e confirmed %y conse5uentialist testing! or

e#ample" in his re$iew of his friend erschelAs"reliminary Discourse on the

Study of Natural "hilosophy" Whewell argued" against erschel" that

$erification is not possi%le when a hypothesis has %een formed non-

inducti$ely (181" 4@@1)! Bearly thirty years later" in the last edition of

the"hilosophy" Whewell referred to the %elief that the disco$ery of laws and

causes of phenomena is a loose hap-haDard sort of guessing" and claimed that

this type of $iew appears to me to %e a misapprehension of the whole nature

of science (186@a" =74)! 0n other mature wor's he noted that disco$eries are

made not %y any capricious con&ecture of ar%itrary selection (18C8a" 0" =9)

and e#plained that new hypotheses are properly collected from the facts

(1849" 17)! 0n fact" Whewell was criticiDed %y 2a$id rewster for notagreeing

that disco$eries" including BewtonAs disco$ery of the uni$ersal gra$itation

law" were typically made %y accident!

Why has Whewell %een misinterpreted %y so many modern commentatorsM


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instance" of the happy guesses made %y scientists (18C8%" 64) and claimed

that ad$ances in 'nowledge often follow the pre$ious e#ercise of some

%oldness and license in guessing (1847" 00" CC)! ut Whewell often used these

terms in a way which connotes a conclusion which is simply not conclusi$ely

confirmed! .he %(ford )n!lish Dictionarytells us that prior to the =@thcentury the term con&ecture was used to connote not a hypothesis reached %y

non-rational means" %ut rather one which is un$erified" or which is a

conclusion as to what is li'ely or pro%a%le (as opposed to the results of

demonstration)! .he term was used this way %y acon" Iepler" Bewton" and

2ugald *tewart" writers whose wor' was well-'nown to Whewell! 0n other

places where Whewell used the term con&ecture he suggests that what

appears to %e the result of guesswor' is actually what we might call an

educated guess" i!e!" a conclusion drawn %y (wea') inference! Whewell

descri%ed IeplerAs disco$ery" which seems so capricious and fanciful as

actually %eing regulated %y his clear scientific ideas (18C7N187" 0" =91

=)! inally WhewellAs use of the terminology of guessing sometimes occurs in

the conte#t of a distinction he draws %etween the generation of a num%er of

possi%le conceptions" and the selection of one to superinduce upon the facts!

efore the appropriate conception is found" the scientist must %e a%le to call

up in his mind a num%er of possi%le ones (see 18C8%" 79)! Whewell noted that

this calling up of many possi%ilities is" in some measure" a process of

con&ecture! owe$er" selecting the appropriate conception with which to

colligate the data is not con&ectural (18C8%" 78)! .hus Whewell claimed that

the selection of the conception is often preluded%y guesses (18C8%" #i#): he

does not" that is" claim that the selection consistsin guesswor'! When

inference is not used to select the appropriate conception" the resulting theory

is not an induction" %ut rather a hasty and imperfect hypothesis! e drew

such a distinction %etween /opernicusA heliocentric theory" which he called an

induction" and the heliocentric system proposed %y ristarchus in the third

century %!c!" to which he referred as a hasty and imperfect hypothesis

(18C7N187" 0" =C8)!

.hus WhewellAs philosophy of science cannot %e descri%ed as the hypothetico-

deducti$e $iew! 0t is an inducti$e method: yet it clearly differs from the more

narrow inducti$ism of ill! WhewellAs $iew of induction has the ad$antage

o$er illAs of allowing the inference to uno%ser$a%le properties and entities!


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(or more detailed arguments against reading Whewell as a hypothetico-

deducti$ist" see *nyder =@@6 and =@@8)!

3. Philosophy of Science:

Conrmation


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n e$en more $alua%le confirmation criterion" according to Whewell" is that

of consilience! Whewell e#plained that the e$idence in fa$our of our

induction is of a much higher and more forci%le character when it ena%les us

to e#plain and determine Ki!e!" predictL cases of a *ind differentfrom those

which were contemplated in the formation of our hypothesis! .he instances inwhich this ha$e occurred" indeed" impress us with a con$iction that the truth

of our hypothesis is certain (18C8%" 878)! Whewell called this type of

e$idence a &umping together or consilience of inductions! n induction"

which results from the colligation of one class of facts" is found also to

colligate successfully facts %elonging to another class! WhewellAs notion of

consilience is thus related to his $iew of natural classes of o%&ects or e$ents!

.o understand this confirmation criterion" it may %e helpful to schematiDe the

&umping together that occurred in the case of BewtonAs law of uni$ersalgra$itation" WhewellAs e#emplary case of consilience!


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which is in$erse as the s5uares of the distances! y seeing that an in$erse-

s5uare attracti$e force pro$ided a cause for different classes of e$entsJfor

satellite motion" planetary motion" and falling %odiesJBewton was a%le to

perform a more general induction" to his uni$ersal law!

What Bewton found was that these different 'inds of phenomenaJincluding

circum&o$ial or%its" planetary or%its" as well as falling %odiesJshare an

essential property" namely the same cause! What Bewton did" in effect" was to

su%sume these indi$idual e$ent 'inds into a more general natural 'ind

comprised of su%-'inds sharing a 'ind essence" namely %eing caused %y an

in$erse-s5uare attracti$e force! /onsilience of e$ent 'inds therefore results

in causal unification! ore specifically" it results in unification of natural 'ind

categories %ased on a shared cause! ?henomena that constitute different e$ent

'inds" such as planetary motion" tidal acti$ity" and falling %odies" werefound %y Bewton to %e mem%ers of a unified" more general 'ind" phenomena

caused to occur %y an in$erse-s5uare attracti$e force of gra$ity (or"

gra$itational phenomena)! 0n such cases" according to Whewell" we learn

that we ha$e found a $era causa" or a true cause" i!e!" a cause that really

e#ists in nature" and whose effects are mem%ers of the same natural 'ind (see

186@a" p! 191)! oreo$er" %y finding a cause shared %y phenomena in

different su%-'inds" we are a%le to colligate all the facts a%out these 'inds into

a more general causal law! Whewell claimed that when the theory" %y the

concurrences of two indications H has included a new range of phenomena"we ha$e" in fact" a new induction of a more general 'ind" to which the

inductions formerly o%tained are su%ordinate" as particular cases to a general

population (18C8%" 96)! e noted that consilience is the means %y which we

effect the successi$e generaliDation that constitutes the ad$ancement of

science (1847" 00" 74)! (or more on consilience" and its relation to realism" see

*nyder =@@C and =@@6!)

Whewell discussed a further" related test of a theoryAs truth; namely"

coherence! 0n the case of true theories" Whewell claimed" the system%ecomes more coherent as it is further e#tended! .he elements which we

re5uire for e#plaining a new class of facts are already contained in our

systemH!0n false theories" the contrary is the case (18C8%" 91)! /oherence

occurs when we are a%le to e#tend our hypothesis to colligate a new class of

phenomena without ad hoc modification of the hypothesis! When Bewton

e#tended his theory regarding an in$erse-s5uare attracti$e force" which


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colligated facts of planetary motion and lunar motion" to the class of tidal

acti$ity" he did not need to add any new suppositions to the theory in order to

colligate correctly the facts a%out particular tides!


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necessary truths; %ecause" as we saw a%o$e" empirical science is needed in

order to e#plicate the 0deas! .hus Whewell also claimed that" in the course of

science" truths which at first re5uired e#periment to %e 'nown are seen to %e

capa%le of %eing 'nown independently of e#periment! .hat is" once the

rele$ant 0dea is clarified" the necessary connection %etween the 0dea and anempirical truth %ecomes apparent! Whewell e#plained that though the

disco$ery of the irst 3aw of otion was made" historically spea'ing" %y

means of e#periment" we ha$e now attained a point of $iew in which we see

that it might ha$e %een certainly 'nown to %e true independently of

e#perience (1847" 0" ==1)! *cience" then" consists in the idealiDation of

facts" the transferring of truths from the empirical to the ideal side of the

fundamental antithesis! e descri%ed this process as the progressi$e intuition

of necessary truths!

lthough they follow analytically from the meanings of ideas our minds

supply" necessary truths are ne$ertheless informati$e statements a%out the

physical world outside us: they ha$e empirical content! WhewellAs &ustification

for this claim is a theological one! Whewell noted that ,od created the

uni$erse in accordance with certain 2i$ine 0deas! .hat is" all o%&ects and

e$ents in the world were created %y ,od to conform to certain of his ideas! or

e#ample" ,od made the world such that it corresponds to the idea of /ause

partially e#pressed %y the a#iom e$ery e$ent has a cause! ence in the

uni$erse e$ery e$ent conforms to this idea" not only %y ha$ing a cause %ut %y%eing such that it could not occur without a cause!


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n interesting conse5uence of this interpretation of WhewellAs $iew of

necessity is that e$ery law of nature is a necessary truth" in $irtue of following

analytically from some idea used %y ,od in creating the world! Whewell drew

no distinction %etween truths which can %e idealiDed and those which cannot:

thus" potentially" any empirical truth can %e seen to %e a necessary truth" oncethe ideas and conceptions are e#plicated sufficiently! or e#ample" Whewell

suggests that e#periential truths such as salt is solu%le may %e necessary

truths" e$en if we do not recogniDe this necessity (i!e!" e$en if it is not yet

'nowa%le a priori) (186@%" 48)! WhewellAs $iew thus destroys the line

traditionally drawn %etween laws of nature and the a#iomatic propositions of

the pure sciences of mathematics: mathematical truth is granted no special

status!

0n this way Whewell suggested a $iew of scientific understanding which is"perhaps not surprisingly" grounded in his conception of natural theology! *ince

our ideas are shadows of the 2i$ine 0deas" to see a law as a necessary

conse5uence of our ideas is to see it as a conse5uence of the 2i$ine 0deas

e#emplified in the world! Gnderstanding in$ol$es seeing a law as %eing not an

ar%itrary accident on the cosmic scale" %ut as a necessary conse5uence of

the ideas ,od used in creating the uni$erse! ence the more we idealiDe the

facts" the more difficult it will %e to deny ,odAs e#istence! We will come to see

more and more truths as the intelligi%le result of intentional design! .his $iew

is related to the claim Whewell had earlier made in his ridgewater .reatise(18)" that the more we study the laws of nature the more con$inced we will

%e in the e#istence of a 2i$ine 3aw-gi$er! (or more on WhewellAs notion of

necessity" see *nyder 1994 and =@@6" chapter one!)

$. #he %elation Between ScienticPractice& 'istory of Science& and

Philosophy of Sciencen issue of interest to philosophers of science today is the relation %etween'nowledge of the actual practice and history of science and writing a

philosophy of science! Whewell is interesting to e#amine in relation to this

issue %ecause he claimed to %e inferring his philosophy of science from his

study of the history and practice of science! is large-scale$istory of the


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#nductive Sciences(first edition pu%lished 187) was a sur$ey of science from

ancient to modern times! e insisted upon completing this wor' %efore writing

his"hilosophy of the #nductive Sciences, founded upon their history!

oreo$er" Whewell sent proof-sheets of the$istoryto his many scientist-

friends to ensure the accuracy of his accounts! esides 'nowing a%out thehistory of science" Whewell had first-hand 'nowledge of scientific practice; he

was acti$ely in$ol$ed in science in se$eral important ways! 0n 18=C he

tra$eled to erlin and Fienna to study mineralogy and crystallography with

ohs and other ac'nowledged masters of the field! e pu%lished numerous

papers in the field" as well as a monograph" and is still credited with ma'ing

important contri%utions to gi$ing a mathematical foundation to

crystallography! e also made contri%utions to the science of tidal research"

pushing for a large-scale world-wide pro&ect of tidal o%ser$ations: he won a

+oyal *ociety gold medal for this accomplishment! (or more on WhewellAs

contri%utions to science" see *nyder =@11" 2ucheyne =@1@a" +use 1991" and

echer 1986)! Whewell acted as a terminological consultant for araday and

other scientists" who wrote to him as'ing for new words! Whewell only

pro$ided terminology when he %elie$ed he was fully 'nowledgea%le a%out the

science in$ol$ed! 0n his section on the 3anguage of *cience in

the"hilosophy" Whewell ma'es this position clear (see 18C8%" p! =9)!

nother interesting aspect of his intercourse with scientists %ecomes clear in

reading his correspondence with them; namely" that Whewell constantly

pushed araday" or%es" 3u%%oc' and others to perform certain e#periments"

ma'e specific o%ser$ations" and to try to connect their findings in ways of

interest to Whewell! 0n all these ways" Whewell indicated that he had a deep

understanding of the acti$ity of science!

*o how is this important for his wor' on the philosophy of scienceM *ome

commentators ha$e claimed that Whewell de$eloped an a prioriphilosophy of

science and then shaped his$istoryto conform to his own $iew (see *toll

19=9 and *trong 19CC)! 0t is true that he started out" from his undergraduate

days" with the pro&ect of reforming the inducti$e philosophy of acon: indeed

this early inducti$ism led him to the $iew that learning a%out scientific method

must %e inducti$e (i!e!" that it re5uires the study of the history of science)! Eet

it is clear that he %elie$ed his study of the history of science and his own wor'

in science were needed in order to flesh out the details of his inducti$e

position! .hus" as in his epistemology" %oth a prioriand empirical elements


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com%ined in the de$elopment of his scientific methodology! Gltimately"

Whewell criticiDed illAs $iew of induction de$eloped in the System of

o!icnot %ecause ill had not inferred it from a study of the history of

science" %ut rather on the grounds that ill had not %een a%le to find a large

num%er of appropriate e#amples illustrating the use of his ethods of#perimental 0n5uiry! s Whewell noted" acon too had %een una%le to show

that his inducti$e method had %een e#emplified throughout the history of

science! .hus it appears that what was important to Whewell was not whether

a philosophy of science had %een" in fact" inferred from a study of the history

of science" %ut rather" whether a philosophy of science was inferable fromit!

.hat is" regardless of how a philosopher came to in$ent her theory" she must

%e a%le to show it to %e e#emplified in the actual scientific practice used

throughout history! Whewell %elie$ed that he was a%le to do this for his

disco$erersA induction!

(. )oral PhilosophyWhewellAs moral philosophy was criticiDed %y ill as %eing intuitionist (see

ill 18C=)! WhewellAs morality is intuitionist in the sense of claiming that

humans possess a faculty (conscience) which ena%les them to discern

directly what is morally right or wrong! is $iew differs from that of earlier

philosophers such as *haftes%ury and utcheson" who claimed that this

faculty is a'in to our sense organs and thus spo'e of conscience as a moralsense! WhewellAs position is more similar to that of intuitionists such as

/udworth and /lar'e" who claimed that our moral faculty is reason! Whewell

maintained that there is noseparatemoral faculty" %ut rather that conscience is

&ust reason e#ercised on moral su%&ects! or this reason" Whewell referred to

moral rules as principles of reason and descri%ed the disco$ery of these

rules as an acti$ity of reason (see 1864" =4)! .hese moral rules are primary

principles" and are esta%lished in our minds simply %y a contemplation of our

moral nature and condition: or" what e#presses the same thing" %y intuition

(1846" 11)! Eet" what he meant %y intuition was not a non-rational mental

process" as ill suggested!


18/25

re5uires rules %ecause reason is our distincti$e property" and +eason directs

us to +ules (1864" 4C)! WhewellAs morality" then" does not ha$e one pro%lem

associated with the moral sense intuitionists! or the moral sense intuitionist"

the process of decision-ma'ing is non-rational: &ust as we feel the rain on our

s'in %y a non-rational process" we &ust feel what the right action is! .his isoften considered the ma&or difficulty with the intuitionist $iew; if the decision

is merely a matter of intuition" it seems that there can %e no way to settle

disputes o$er how we ought to act! owe$er" Whewell ne$er suggested that

decision-ma'ing in morality is a non-rational process!


19/25

%elie$e that we can loo' to the dictates of positi$e law of the most morally

ad$anced societies as a starting point in our e#plication of the moral ideas! ut

he was not therefore suggesting that these laws are the standard of morality!

ust as we e#amine the phenomena of the physical world in order to e#plicate

our scientific conceptions" we can e#amine the facts of positi$e law and thehistory of moral philosophy in order to e#plicate our moral conceptions!


20/25

(184@) -he "hilosophy of the #nductive Sciences, Founded 5pon -heir

$istory" in two $olumes" 3ondon; ohn W! ?ar'er!

(1844)


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(18C8%)Novum %r!anon &enovatum" 3ondon; ohn W! ?ar'er!

(186@a) %n the "hilosophy of Discovery9 .hapters $istorical and

.ritical" 3ondon; ohn W! ?ar'er!

(186@%) +emar's on a +e$iew of the ?hilosophy of the 0nducti$e

*ciences" letter to ohn erschel" 11 pril 1844: pu%lished as essay in

186@a!

(1861) (ed! and trans!) -he "latonic Dialo!ues for )n!lish &eaders"

3ondon; acmillan!

(186=) Si( ectures on "olitical )conomy" /am%ridge; .he Gni$ersity

?ress!

(1864) -he )lements of Morality, #ncludin! "olity" 4th edition" with

*upplement" /am%ridge; .he Gni$ersity ?ress!

(1866) /omte and ?ositi$ism"Macmillan8s Ma!a:ine" 1; C6=!

Secondary +iterature

echer" ! (1981) William Whewell and /am%ridge

athematics"$istorical Studies in the "hysical Sciences" 11; 148!

(1986)" Foluntary *cience in Bineteenth-/entury /am%ridge

Gni$ersity to the 18C@s"ritish 7ournal for the $istory of Science" 19; C7

87!

(1991)" WhewellAs


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roo'e" !! (1977)" Batural .heology and the ?lurality of Worlds;


23/25

isch" ! and *! *chaffer (eds!) (1991)" +illiam +heell9 ' .omposite

"ortrait"


24/25

orrison" ! (199@)" Gnification" +ealism and 0nference"ritish

7ournal for the "hilosophy of Science" 41; @C=!

(1997)" Whewell on the Gltimate ?ro%lem of ?hilosophy" Studies

in $istory and "hilosophy of Science" =8; 41747!

Biiniluoto" 0! (1977)" Botes on ?opper as a ollower of Whewell and

?eirce"'


25/25

(1997a)" 2isco$erersA 0nduction""hilosophy of Science" 64; C8@

6@4!

(1997%)" .he ill-Whewell 2e%ate; uch do %out

0nduction""erspectives on Science" C; 1C9198!

(1999)" +eno$ating theNovum %r!anum; acon" Whewell and

0nduction" Studies in $istory and "hilosophy of Science" @; C1CC7!

(=@@C)" /onfirmation for a odest +ealism""hilosophy of

Science" 7=; 8949!

(=@@6)"&eformin! "hilosophy9 ' =ictorian Debate on Science and

Society" /hicago; Gni$ersity of /hicago ?ress!

(=@@8)" .he Whole o# of .ools; William Whewell and the 3ogic

of 0nduction" in ohn Woods and 2o$ ,a%%ay (eds!)" -he $andboo* of the

$istory of o!ic(Folume F000)" 2ordrecht; Iluwer" pp! 16C=@!

(=@11)" -he "hilosophical rea*fast .lub9 Four &emar*able Men

ho -ransformed Science and .han!ed the +orld" Bew Eor'; roadway

oo's!

*trong" !W! (19CC)" William Whewell and ohn *tuart ill; .heir/ontro$ersy o$er *cientific Inowledge"7ournal of the $istory of #deas" 16;

=@91!

Wilson" 2!! (1974)" erschel and WhewellAs Fersions of

Bewtonianism"7ournal of the $istory of #deas" C; 7997!

Eeo" +! (199)"Definin! Science9 +illiam +heell, Natural

>noled!e, and "ublic Debate in )arly =ictorian ritain" /am%ridge;

/am%ridge Gni$ersity ?ress!

william whewell

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