williamson the origins of world war i

8/12/2019 Williamson the Origins of World War I

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j o ii i r ~ a i f l i ~ t c i . d i s r i p / i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~l i s fo iy, X V I I I : ~ (Spring 1 9 8 8 ) ~795-818

The rigins of World War World War I began ineastern Europe. The war started when Serbia, Austria-Hungary,Russia, and G e r ~n a n y ecided that wa r o r the risk of war was anacceptable policy option. In the aftermath of the Halkan wars of1912113, the decision-makers in eastern Europe acted mo re asser-tively and less cautiously. T he Serbian govern men t displayed littlewilli~lgness o nego tiate wi th Vienna; in fact, so me elements ofthe Belgrade regime worked to challenge, by viole~lt means if

necessary, Habsburg rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary, threatened anew by the Balkan problems, grew moreanxious about its declining position and became more enamoredof the recent successes of its n~ i l i t a ~ l t iplomacy. Having encour-aged the creation o f the Halkan League and benefited from Serbia'smilitary triumphs, Russian policyn~akers isplayed a new aggres-siveness towa rd their 13anubian neighbor . T he C;erman leader-ship, for its part, fretted more than ever about its relative positionin the Eu ro pea ~ l ystem and found the ne w Russian self-confi-dence troubling. Then came the Sarajevo assassi~lations on 28June 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrianthrone, and his wife Sophie. Within a rnonth of these deaths,Austria-Hungary and Serbia would bc at war, followed by therest of Europe shortly thereafter.

Although the war began in eastern Europe, the events therehave received only modest attention f rom historians. This neglectis no t entirely surpri sing, given the Versailles war guilt clauseagainst Germany and subsequent efforts to defend or denounce

Samue l R . W l ll i an l son , J r. , IS l rofcssor of His tory and Provo s t of T he U nivers ity ofN o r t h C a ro li na a t C h a p e l H l ll . H c is t he a ~ ~ t l l o r Or(qiiis o o Tra,qedy: ]rily 1914f TIZ(Aslingto11 He igh ts, Ill., 198 1).

T he au thor is inciebtcd to S cott Lackey, Jon atha n Rande l , and Russel Van W yk forresearch ass1stancc.

C 1988 by T h e Massachusetts Ins t l tu tc of Technolosy and t l lc ed l tors of Tile-Joiii.ria1 q f

Iilterdircil~iiriaiy His tory.

Tllc 111ost perceptive reccllt stu dy is Jarncs Joll. Ti le Ori,qiris qf ti le Fint IVorld H'ar ( N c wYork. 1 9 8 4 ) . Fur a survey of tllc Issues, see Williamson, Tiif ' Ori 'yins q j a ' rra 'qedy: Ju ly1914 (Arlirlgton Heights, Ill . , 1981). See also StevenE. Mil ler (cd . ) , A d21iiitary Strate,qy aildti if Or~


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D WA R I 9

the crisis of the summer of 1914 remains fu~ ld ai ne~l ta lo anunderstandiilg of the issues of peace and war.

Historians often talk about the long-term origins of World War I-those physical, intellectual, emotional , and political activitiesthat created parameters and left legacies that influenced the Julycrisis. Although these causes remain a central feature of all recenthistorical works, new research reveals an almost quantum alter-ation ill our perception of the character and nature of the causesof the war. Recent studies-based upon rigorous archival re-

search-make clear the dramatic changes that took place after191 I in the rela tio~l ships esulting fr om the allia~lces nd ententes,military planning, imperial attitudes, nationalism, and confidenceabout the fu ture of the governmental systems.

By 1912, the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance had beenconsolidated by the Bosnian crises of 1908-09 and the Moroccantensions of 191 I . Russia, Britain, and France formed, along withRussia's Serbian client, the Triple Eiltente; Austria-Hungary,Italy, and Germally comprised, with their secret ally King Carolof Rumania, the Tr iple Alliance. 111 the mo nths before July 1914,these two groupings collided with each other on f~~ndamentalissues, al though brief periods of cooperati011 and apparent dCte11teexisted.

From 1912 to the eve of the war, France and Russia workedto convert the Tr iple Entente int o an alliance. Paris pressed Lon-don to confer wit1 Russia about naval issues, while assiduouslyworking to define their own military and naval arrangements

with Britain. In the spring of 1914, Sir Edward Grey, the mostinsular of British foreign secretaries, and Winston Churchill, FirstLord of the Admiralty, agreed to start negotiations with St. Pe-tersburg. Almost immediately German intelligence learned of thisdevelopment . When asked about such conversations, Grey deniedthat any were underway. Berlin thus found itself unable to trustGrey's assurances about these talks and could only speculate thatBritain had also made military and naval arrangements withFrance.

Zara Steiner, I3ritaiti an d tiif' O r i ~ i n r ftii f' First I.'l/i~rldLt r (London, ~977); rancis HarryHlnslcy (ed.), British F or ei ~t i 'olicy iit7der Sir Edward Gr ey (Cambrl dgc, 1977); Keith M.Wllson, Tiif' Policy o f the Etitf'n tf'. Essays on the Ilf~tf~ rttritia tits?fl3ritis h 120re;gti Po licy, 190419 1 Cambridge, 1985); Willianlsoll, T h e Polit ics i?j Gratid Strate~qy. Britniti ntid Fratice

4


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98 S A M U E L R . W I L L I A M S O N , J R .

During I 9 I and I 9 I 3 , the Franco-Russian alliance withinthe Triple Entente assumed new meaning. The French wanted

immediate Russian pressure on Germany if war came and investedcapital in railway construction that could be used to facilitate themov ement of Russian troops. Raymon d PoincarC, first as premierand then as president of France, brought new vigor to Frenchdiplomacy and spared no effort to st re ~l gt he ~l Pe-he Paris-St.tersburg connection. llespite socialist opposition, he even man-aged to secure passage of a three-year ~n il it ar y ervice law thatincreased the number of French troops on active duty.'

Russo-Serbian relatio~ls had also grown closer in the yearsbefore Sarajevo. St. Petersburg had played mid-wife to the BalkanLeague, a pact signed in the spring of 1912 and directed againstboth the O tt om an Empi re and the Habsburg monarchy. VigorousRussian diplomatic support, along with shipme~lts of ~nili tarysupplies during the Balkan wars, buttressed the ties. 111 the springof 1914, Nikola PaSiL, the Serbian premier, depended upon Rus-sian support in his disputes with the Serbian military. Indeed,when PaSid resigned in June 1914, the Russians pressured KingPeter I to restore him to the premiership.

The leaders of the Triple Alliance were also active in themonths following the Agadir crisis over Morocco. In late 1911Berlin and Vienna backed Ro ~ l l e n its war with the Ottoma~lEmpire over Tripoli. At the end of 1912, the partners renewedthe alliance for a~ lo the r ive years and reinstituted military andnaval planning, though neither Berlin nor Vienna expected much

Prepare for Wa r, 1904-1914 Cambridge, Mas s . , 1969) ; Paul Halpe rn , T h e .IlediterizlneatiNavn i S i tua t ion , 1908-1914 (Ca rnb ridg c, Mass . , 19 71). Be rnt vo n Siebcrt , thlrdsecretaryof the Russ ian embassy in London, was the sourcc of Bcr l i r l ' s i r l forn la t ion ; sec F isc l~er,Krieg, 632-635,5 John F. V. Keiger, 12rance aird th e Ori cein s [ f t h e First Lt'orld Lt51r (London , r983 ) ; Gc r dKrunle ic l l ( t rans . Mar ion Bcrghahr l ) ,Armniile nts and Politics iti France on tile E v e [ f t h e FirstLV'c~rld [ t a r . T h e I t it rod~cction oj . Three-Year ( lo i i r r r i~~t iot i ,9 1j- 19 1j ( D o v e r, N . H . , ~ 9 8 4 ) ;Jack Snydcr, Tii c Idcolc~gyqf th e Of pn s i t ~c : \filitoiy D~ cr s~ o i i doking oiid tiip Dirorteilr (g.191 ( I t l~ac a , 984 ) ; Tho rnas Haycs Con ne r, Pa r l i a~ nen t nd the Mak ing o f Fo re ign Po l icy :France un der the 'Tll ird Repu blic , 1875-1gr4, un pu b. Ph.11, dlss . (Ch ape l Hil l , r983).6 Vlad imir Lledijer, T h e Ro o d t o S a r q c v o (N e w York , 1966 ) , 385 -388 ; Ba rba ra J c l av i c l~ ,History qf the Balkans ( C a m b r i d g e , r9S3) , 11, r o6 -r r z ; Hans ~ b c r sb e rg c r,~s te r re rc i iztv iich en R~t ssl ant i itid Serliicn (Ki i ln , rg58); Andrc \v Rossos , R~irr iaanti the I3olkanr: Int~r-I3alkori Rit~alrirsand Rusriair Forergti Pol~cy, 1908-1914 ( 'Tor onto , 19 81) . Pub lication of thcScrb ian d ip lomat ic docurncnts , now in progrcss , wi l l fac i l i t a te a s tudy of Serbo-Russ ianrelations before 1914


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D WA R I 799

support from their southern ally. Furthe rmore, the three partnersmaneuvered for position wi th each other over a potential division

of Turkish Asia Minor, and a new issue-Albania and its future-emerged after the Balkan wars as a point of friction betweenVienna and Rome.

Vienna's probleins were no t co~ lf ined o Italy. Th e Balkanwars had shaken Vienna's confidence about Gerinan support if acrisis arose. O n three occasions the Habsburgs had nearly goneto war; in each instance the Germans had counseled caution andprudence. To be sure, Kaiser Wilhelin I1 talked boisterously ofstrong action, but the German political leadership spoke aboutnegotiation. As a result, there was considerable apprehension inVienna over Berlin's possible behavior in a crisis involving eitherSerbia or Russia or bot11.~

The major problein confronting the Austro-German allieswas no t their o w n relationship, but evidence that Bucharest w oul dprobably defect from the alliance. If King Carol opted out, Aus-tria-Hungary faced a new and nearly intolerable strategic situa-tion. Furthermore, Rumailian nationalism, stirred by the successes

of the month-long second Balkan war, demanded changes in thestatus of the three million Rumanians living in Transylvania underMagyar domination. Budapest, however, offered virtually noconcessions. Th us the Ruinanian problem, like the Serbian issue,ellcompassed both a domestic and a diplo~natic dimension. ForVienna, distinctions between Aussenpolitik and Innenpolitik silnplydid not exist. Foreign policy provided much of the raison d'ttrefor the Habsburg state, but foreign affairs also f~trnished most of

the threats to its future.

7 Michael Behnen, Rust1oi~-l3irndriis-Sicl1erhcit: D r ~ i h u n d tid ir /ortneller Ittlpt~rialisttrits,1900-1908 (Tub ingen , 19x5); R ichard Bosw or th , I ta ly nrid the Approach o f t 1 1 ~-'iilrt IVovidIVar (N ew Y ork , 1983) and I ta ly, the Lcast of- th tz Great POIIICI~C a m b r i d ge , 1 9 79 ). O nHa bsb urg concerns , ibout Alb ' ini,~, see Lu dw ig B it tner , ind Ubersberg er (eds .) ,Ostevveich-L'rigarns ilu ss en po iit ik vorl der bosnisclierl Kvise 1908 bis zu tn Kviqgsarishr~tclihereafter Aussen)(V ienn ,~ , 93o) , VII, VIII ; Br idge , ossa': Austro-Hungar ianTa v d e ~ ~ f ' n i e n t ~ b u s Coloni'ilAspir 'itlons in Asia Minor, 1913-14,' ' Middle Eastern Studlr's, VI (197 o), 319-330,8 Fischer, K r i q , 289-323; Bridgc, Sndori~n,360-3611; E rw in H ol zc , Ilie Selbsteritttrach~tn,gEuropns (Frankfurt an1 M . , 1975), 269-278; H ug o Hantsc h, Leopo ld Gr~ l jRf~rch to ld :rand-sf'igrif'~ir nd Stantsmariri ( G r x , 1963 ), 11, 520-539.9 Kci th Hi tchins , Th e ationality Problem in Hung,iry: Is tvin Tisza , ind thc RumanianNational lJarty, 1906-1914, -[oui.nal of \lo dem His tor ),, L I I I ( I ~ X I ) ,19-651; GheorgheNicolae Cizan and Serban Kldulcscu-Zoncr, Rottra^riia si T rip la ill ia nt d, 18 78- lgi j (BLI-


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In a desperate effort to rescue the situation, Vienna sentOttokar Czernin, a confidant of Franz Ferdinand, as minister to

Bucharest in late I 91 3. Czernin achieved nothing. Then in Junethe czar and czarina visited Constantsa ill Rumania. lluring thetrip Serge Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, actually crossedinto Transylvania in a defiant s ho w of support for the liumailiansliving in Austria-Hungary. These events thoroughly alarmed Vi-enna. More than ever, Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtoldand his associates believed that Bucharest was lost to the allianceand that Russia was determined to cause problems at all costs.l0

Russia also antagonized Germany and Austria-Hungary mo redirectly. T h e Liman von Sanders affair, a Russo-German disputeover whether the German general would have actual cominarldover Turkish troops in Constantinople, embroiled St. Petersburgand Berlin for weeks in late 1913. The crisis created genuineconcern in Berlin and accelerated a series of studies by the Germangeneral staff of Russian mobilization plans. For the first time sinceMarch 1909, the t wo Baltic powers were in direct confrontation,and this time St. I1etersburg, not Berlin, was the protagonist.'l

Relations between St. E'etersburg and Vienna were morefragile still. The Austrians held the Russians partly responsiblefor the Balkan wars. Vienna had difficulty forgetting St. Peters-burg's tactic in the fall of 1912, when it kept an additional I . zmillioil troops on duty to check any Habsburg move againstSerbia. Vienila had responded by calling up 200,000 reservists,stationing many of them in Galicia. The border tensions led tobank runs and public unrest in the Habsburg provinces; the po-

tential conflict also prompted passage of emergency legislation inAustria and Hungary in Lkcember 1912 in the event that warshould come. Not until March 1913, after extensive negotiations,did the tw o powers begin to demobilize troops and tensions abate.But the residual perceptions of the incident were not so easily

10 C r e r n i n t o B e r c h t o l d , 2 J u n e 1914, Ailssen. VIII , no. 9902; a lso C zer t i in to Be rchto ld ,22 J n n e 1914, Berch to ld Arch iv, no . 9, Haus- , Hof- , und Staa tsarchiv, Vlenna; Ha ntsch ,Bevchtuid, 11, 545-557.I I F ~ s c i ~ e r , i n E rti es t Ma)- (ed . ) , K I I O I L . ~ J ~ < ~r i e f , 481-5 I ; Stone, "Austr ia-Hlingary."01 1e 's J:nemies: It ~t el ii ~q ~n ce Cl,;lus (i'riiicetoti,4ssessr?icrit iiefovc tiie T w o It'ovid 1984 ), 43-43;H o l g e r H e r w i g , Imperial G e r m a n y, " ihid. , 86-92; Will iam C Fuller, Jr. "The RussianEmpi re , " rbid. , I 15-123.


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D W R I 801

altered, certainly not among the military leaders in either St.Petersburg or Vienna. l

Despite the growing tensions, there were moments of co-operation and concession. Th e rhetoric of Anglo-German rela-tions was muted somewhat; the powers cooperated to keep theBalkan turmoil within bounds in the spring and sum mer of 191 3 .Austrians invested funds in a Russian armaments factory, androyal visits continued. Yet the clashes of 191 I and thereafter wereno t easily forgot ten. The future o f the Balkans and the Macedon-ian inheritance of the Ottoman Empire were significant issues.

The Eastern Question and the fate of Ottoman holdings in theBalkans, the bane of British foreign secretaries in the nineteenthcentury, had now become a problem for all foreign ministers.13

N o g roup o f decision-makers recognized this new dangermore quickly than the military commanders. Everywhere thedoctrine of offensive warfare and the short war illusion pre-vailed. The French revamped their war plans after 1911 to con-form to these doctrines. The Germans, British, and Austro-Hun-garians further refined their offensive schemes in the belief thatoffensive warfare alone offered the possibility of quick success.N o one probed the question of what wou ld happen if success didno t in fact come quickly at the start o f a war. Sufficient intelligenceinformation existed about the manpower pools and general inten-tions of the opposing powers; what remained ullcertain was thelocation and timing of the deployment. Few realized that stale-mate could also be the result of offensive operations. Nor weregeneral staffs cognizant o f their o w n differing conceptions of what

mobilization actually meant for the other governments; for someit meant actual war and for others, the mere possibility of war.Questionable assumptions had now become dogrna.14

1 2 Erns t Chr i s t i an He lmre i ch , Th e Diploi ii acy q f t he Ra lk i~ i lLthvs, 1912-1913 (Cambridge,Ma ss. , 1938), 157-164, 281-290; W ill iamson, Mil i taryDimensions o i H a b s b u r g - R o m a -nov Re la t i o t~s du r in g t he E ra o i t he Ba lkan W ars , it1 B6la K . K i r i l y and D imi t r i eI l j o rdev i c ( eds . ) , Enst Ceilfr al Et~r op ea n Society i ~ n d he Bnlkail 147iln ( N e w Yo r k , 1 y 8 7) ,318-337.I3 P a u l K e n t ~ e d y,T h e R i s e qf A i l g l o - G ~ n i i n nAil tqoi l isnz , 1860-1914 (London, 198o),Steiner, Bvitain, 42-78 Cf . Volker I


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802 SAMUEL, R . WIL2L21AMSON, J R

N o generals faced greater probletlls than did the Habsburgcomtllanders after 1912 To the south, Serbia, their tllost formid-

able foe, had fought well in the Balkan wars, had virtually dou-bled its territory and population base, and possessed seasonedmilitary leaders. Rumanla 's probable defection added another bor-der to defend, and Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan warreduced its ability to offset either Serbia or Rumania. Reportsfrom Berlin were even more disturbing; the Russians were short-ening their mobilization timetables by five to seven days. Eachday gained by the Russians endangered the Schlieffen-Moltkeplan, in turn putting a higher premiutll on a Habsburg assaultagainst Russia. In May 1914 General Franz Conrad von Hotzen-dorf, chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, nmt Helmuthvon Moltke, his Gertllan counterpart, to review the increasedRussian threat. Conrad asked for more German troops in the eastto protect Germany (and Austria-Hungary); Moltke pressed formore immediate Austro-Hungarian action against Russia withonly secondary action against Serbia. The two generals failed toreach agreement. Conrad had always wanted to defeat the trou-blesome Serbians, yet he could not ignore the Russian threat. Henever overcame this dilemma.'

After 1912 the European military and naval leaders grew lessconfident. Troop increases and the continuing naval race (thoughwith less rhetoric) fueled fears, as did the sudden shifts of militaryfortune in the Balkans. Everywhere the military leaders warnedtheir civilian superiors of the dangers of falling behind in the racefor military supremacy. The militarization of attitudes and ~

spoken assumptions, even in Britain, grew more noticeable andpervasive. Militarism, despite occasional signs of pacificism, re-mained a dynamic factor.

A n i i y, 1871-1914 (Cambridge, 1981); Arthnr J Marder, Fvoiii the Dreadiloiifht to ScilpaFlolv. I : T h e Rond to War, 1904-14 (London, 1961); Gunther E . Rothenberg, T h e .Army qFvilncis Jos eph (West Lafayette, Ind., 1976); Richard Ned Lebolv, Betw een P a c e ntid I.C;lv:T h e .Vatiive of Int evnatioi~ nl Cvisis (Baltimore, 1981); Kennedy (ed.), T h p IVav Plans 0-f theGreat Powevs, 1880-1914 (London, 1979); Williamson, I olitics15 Conrad's memoirs are valuable. See his Aus meiilev L)ienstzeir, 1906-1918 (Vienna,1921-25), 111 665-675; Rothenberg, Aviiiy, 172-176; Stone, Di e Mobilnlachuirg derosterreicl1isc11 u~rgariscl~e~rrmee 1914, .Vfilitirfeschichtliciip .2/litteihln~?eil,XVI (1974 ), 67-95. See also Kurt Peball's edition o f Conrad's private riotes, Pvivntp A u ~ f z ~ i c h n u t ~ ~ ~ n .Y S ~ PVevuffeieiltlichunfen nus dell P ap i~ ve ildes 1 1 k . Gei~evi l ls tabs-ChefVienna, 1977).16 Joll, 1914: Th e Un sp ok m Assumptions, in Hannesjoachirn Wilhelrn Koch (e d. ),T h e Orig iils 0- fth e First Ll orld Ll ar. W a r Aiiiis ( N e w Yo r k ,reat Pol iip i. Ri l~i l lvy uid G e v ~ ~ i t ~ i i


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D W A R I 8 3

Closely linked wi th militarism was another long-term causeof war: imperialism. I t was reinforced by ideas of Social Darwi n-

ism and racism as well. After the second Moroccan crisis in thesummer of 19 I I , imperialism became more a Balkan phenomenonand less an Asian or African one. As the Eastern Question flaredanew, the dangers for Europe, in the context of the rigidity ofboth the alliance and the entente, increased exponentially.

Th ree examples illustrate the dangerous changes. First, in t heautumll of 191 I , the Russians renewed their pressure on the Straitsissue. Second, the Italians were reluctant to return Ottoman ter-ritory in the Aegean which they seized in their war with Turkeyin 1912. Indeed, Rome and Berlin actually plotted to carve outpotential gains in Asia Minor. Third, Bosnia and Herzegovinarepresented a special part of the Ottoman legacy. Annexed byVienna in 1908 after thirty years of de facto Habsburg adminis-tration, the two provi~lces were Habsburg imperial gains at Ot-toman expense. Bosnia and Herzegovina now became the focusof South Slav agitation for greater Serbian andlor Yugoslavianunity. Franz Joseph had, however, n o int e~ lt ion f relinquishing

the two provinces which represented the only gains of his longreign. Viellna wo ul d protect its acquisitions just as the British,French, and Italians had protected their gains from the gradualbreakup of the Ott oma n Empire.

National ism as a long -term cause of World War I has receivedsustained historical attention. Nationalism and a nlixture of chau-vi~lisnl and racism were prevalent in both Europe and NorthAmerica. In Germany, Britain, Russia, and France, nationalism

often served as a centripetal factor.18By contrast, in the Habsburg monarchy nationalism had a

disruptive f~unction. 11 Rumania, the impact of nationalism wasgrowing, and St. Petersburg encouraged intensive campaigns

1 9 7 z ) , 3 0 7 - 3 2 8 O n the peace movem ent in Germany, see Roger Chic kering , ImpprialGe vm im y and a LL'ovld IVkr: T h p Peacp , do~ ~em eilt n Ge ni ia n Soc iety , 1892-1913i , i f / ~ o u t(Princeton, 1 9 7 5 ) .1 7 Llttle has been w ritten about the tw o provinces, but the iol owit~g books are helpiul:Peter F. Sugar, Industrialization ofBosnin-Hercegovii~a,1878-1918 (Seattle, 1 9 6 3 ) ; Robert J

Donia, Islnm lindev the Do~lbleE i ~ ~ f l ehe t411slimsqf Busnin and Hevcegoviilil, 1878-1914(New York, 1 9 8 1 ) .18 Keiger, Fvancp; Fischer, K r ~ q ;Hosworth, Italy (2nd the z4pproi~ch; teiner, Bvitairi, treatthe issue of nationalism. For Rnssian attitudes, see Dominic C. H. Lieven, Ru ssii ~ lild theO r ~ g in s f f h eF ~ r s tkl'ovld IVkr (New York , 1 9 8 3 ) .


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D W A R I 8 5

the 11a5id gover nment to control the Black Hand . Serbia s spon-sorship of South Slav agitation inside the Habsburg monarchyposed threats of an immediate and practical nature for the Habs-burg leadership. For Vienna, Serbia represented the twin issuesof state security and state survival.

The decay in the effectiveness of the political structures ofthe Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Romanov regimes is noted asa final long-term cause of the war. After 1911, demands forconstitutional change in I1russia increased, the growth of the so-cialist party frightened the established elites, and Kaiser Wilhelm 11 s

ineffectiveness were matters of public comment. Certainly Chan-cellor Theobald vo n Be thmann Hollweg and his associates fearedfor the future o f the existing political order. Mu ch the same couldbe said of Russia where theabortive revolt of 1905 had alreadyrevealed the weaknesses of the czar s regime.

Th e future o f Austria-Hungary after the death of Franz Jo-seph, an octogenarian, was already a matter of international spec-ulation. In Vienna and Budapest, linked by a common monarch,common army, and common foreign policy, the blows of theBalkan wars and the prospect of Franz Ferdinand as ruler worriedmany. Yet the archduke desperately wanted the dynasty to sur-vive, and he thought a pro-Russian foreign policy would helphit11 achieve that goal. A force for peace during the Balkan wars,Franz Ferdinand had suppor ted Berchtold s policy of militantdiplomacy, but not militant action, against Conrad, his own pro-tCgC. Th e archduke s death removed a force for peace and pro-vided the pretext for decisions in Vienna that launched the third

Balkan war. Within these parameters, the decisions during lateJune and early July 1914 are ~r i t i c a l . ~

O n in terna l pressnres and the causes o iwar, see A rn o J . Mayer, T h p Pevsistptice o f theO ld R q i m e : Eltrope to the Gvpilt IZ ilv (N e w Yo rk, 1981), 273-329. See also Joll , Ovi f ins ,y2-122. O n Germ any , see Fischer, Ki iey, 289-323, 663-738; David Kaiser, Ge rm an y andthe Origins o i t h e Fir st W or ld War, J o ~ l r n n l f , L f o d ~ n i i s to vy, LV (1y83), 442-474; Ko nr adJarausch, ~ n(qmntic Chi lnc~l luv: ~th1i iannHollweg iliid the Hubris o Iiiiperinl Geriiiiliiy(N ew Hav en, 1973) , 153-170. O n Russ ia , see Lieven, Rlissin, 139-151. O n Austr ia-Hungary, see the per iod p iece , Henry Wickham Steed , T h e H n p s b q .l~fonnvchy(London ,

1914 , 2nd ed . ) ; Ar thu r J . May, T h e H i ~ p s b ~ l yqlduiiilrchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.,1951);Joach im Remak , T h e Hea l thy Inval id : Ho w Do ome d Was the Habsburg E mpi re?Jouvnnl o LVlodern Histovy, XLI (1969), 127-143; idem, 1 y11: T h e O r i g in s o i th e T h i rdBalkan War Reconsidered, ib id . , XLII (1971) ; Robe r t A . Kann , Erzherzog Fvilnz FerdinilildSt~ldie t i(Vlenna, 197 6), 15-25; Will ianlson, Influence, Powe r, and the Policy Process:T h e C a s e o i F r a n r F e r di n an d , T h e Historical Jotrvnnl, XV II (1974). 417-434.


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Many historiails have devoted their attention to the Julycrisis, and any analysis here risks injustice to the complexity ofhistorical thought concerning the events of that suinmcr. To fa-cilitate a systeinatic examination of that period, this essay focusesupon a number of key decisions taken during July. Each decision,one can argue, led to the next, and in the absence of any one ofthem, the crisis might have been averted. One may quarrel withthe choices or the emphasis, but most will agree that the decisionsdiscussed here were important, possibly decisive, on the road towar.L5

The first steps toward war began in Vienna. The deaths ofFranz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie shocked Berchtold and theother civilian ministers who wanted action against Serbia.Strongly supporting this view were Conrad and General Alex-ander von Krobatin, the minister of war. They were joined fromSarajevo by General Oskar Potiorek, who exaggerated the post-Sarajevo unrest in Bosnia and Herzegovina to justify immediatemilitary action against Belgrade. Put simply, Potiorek demandedthat Vienna should go to war to protect the tw o provinces. Thus,in early July, well before Germany indicated strong support, Vi-enna planned retribution against Serbia. Only Istvin Tisza, theHungarian premier, disliked this pr~spect.~

With the conversion of Franz Joseph to a policy of retribu-tion, Berchtold had the crucial support he needed within theHabsburg government. The emperoriking's decision stemmed inpart from evidence of Belgrade's complicity in the murders, forpolice interrogations in Sarajevo had quickly established the con-

spiracy of Gavrilo Princip a i ~ d is associates and the possibleinvolveineilt of some menlbers of the Serbian government. ByJuly 3 Franz Joseph was talking of the need for action. For thenext ten days, Tisza was his only senior adviser who remainedunconvinced. But his reluctance to act should not obscure the fact

2 3 Joll, Origins , has the most currciit bibliogrdphy; Dwight Ci lll iaj Lee, G ~ I O ~ P AYears: Tile Dtplomatic Rfitk,grorrnd q ltf orld I4 ar I 1902-1914 (Hanover, N.1-I., 1974);Leonard Charles Frederick Turilcr, Ori~yiris q ilre First 1T~ orld 1T~kr (N ew York, 1970);

Stephan Verosta, Th cor rc u fi d Rral itiii vorl Uiirlilrgisscrt (Vienna, 1971).24 Coiirad, Smeiizrr Dicrlstzc~it,IV, 13-30; 11, 557-569;antsch, U ~ u c l ~ t o l d , Leon vonBiliilski, It7~puriziizicwiil di~krrmcriiy, 1846-1922 [12femoivs and Docrtmcrlfs, 1846-I~ZZ] War-saw. 1 ~ 2 4 ) ~ 274-278; Potiorck's reports fiom Sarajevo are found in part in Aussi,rz, VIII.See also Potiorek's separate reports t o the tiiilitary leadership in Nachlass I'otiorck, Kricgs-al-chiv, Vicnila.


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O R I G I N S OF W O R L D W A R 807

that the Habsburg civilian and military leadership wanted to pun-ish Belgrade for the deaths at Sarajevo. N o pressure from Berlin

was required for Vienna to reach that decisi~n.~The second step in the Ju ly crisis was Berlin s decision to

support Habsburg military action against Belgrade. Kaiser Wil-helm I1 genuinely grieved over the Sarajevo victims and wantedaction against Serbia, as did Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. T husboth men proved receptive to the Hoyos mission in which Viennaasked for assurances of German support and indicated its plan totake radical action against Serbia. O n July and 6 Berlin gaveVienna the backing it sought. In contrast to its earlier hesitationsduring the Balkan wars , this time Berlin supported Vienna s desireto act. Thus , by July 6 Berchtold had assurances fro m Berlin and,he hoped, a deterrent against possible Russian inter~ention.~~

Why did the German leaders endorse Austro-Hungarian ac-tion against Serbia? Alliance loyalties, personal feelings, and Beth-mann Hollweg s desire for an assertive German policy are amon gthe traditional explanations. To these reasons have been addedGermany s desire to intimidate the Triple Entente and to end

Serbian affronts against its Habsburg ally. The German decisionhad many fateful consequences.

Vienna probably would not have gone to war without Ber-lin s assurances of suppor t. However, the unilateral and provoc-ative measures taken by Vienna during the Balkan wars, oftenwith scant German knowledge, suggest that Berchtold and Con-rad might well have staged some kind of military action (forexample, a border incident or alleged bombardment of a Habs-burg town) without a firm German guarantee. In any event, in

25 1 1 the investigation in Sarajevo, see Wurthle, Sprrv, and idem, Dokumerlte rrrni Saua-jevopvozess: E in Quellenbeuicht(Vienna, 1 9 7 8 ) . For one indication o f Franz Joseph 's thinking ,see Meinrich v on Tschirschky to Be thm an i~ Hollweg, 2 July 1914 , in Max Montgelas andWalther Schiicking (eds.), Orrtbreak oj-t he World Wa r: Gevnian Doirrnients Collected by KarlKarrtsky ( N e w Yo r k, 1 9 2 4 ) (hereafter Kautsky Documents ) , no. 1 1 ; Kantl, Kilisev Fuanr

Joseph und der Ausbrucl~des Weltkrieges (Vienna, 1 9 7 1 ) . O n Tisza see Galintai, Weltkuieg,251-278; Gabor Vernles, Istvdrl T i s r i ~ : h e L i b e r i ~ l Vi si o n i ~ n dConse rva t ive S ta tec r i~ j f aMa gy i~ r Vationi~l is t ( N e w Yo r k, 1 ~ 8 5 ) ,nd Buriin's diary entries for 7-14 July 1 9 1 4 , inIstvit~ D16szeg1, Aus sen ~ni ili ste r tephen Gra f Burian: Biographie und Tagebuchstelle,Annale s: Universitatis Sci entianrm Budapestinesis, Sectio Histouica,VIII ( 1 9 6 6 ) ,2 0 5 - ~ 0 6 .26 Fischer, Krieg , 686-694 ; Fritz Fellner, Die 'Missi on Hoyos', ill Vasa cubril ovii'(ed . ) , Recrreil des tvarrvi~rrx arrx assises stien t fiqrres intevrzationales: L es gv ande s puis si~ nc es et laSeubie ii 1i1 veille de la PueniiPre Euevve inorzdiale (Belgrade, 1 9 7 6 ) , IV, 387-418; Albertitli,O v i ~ i n s ,11, 133-150


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808 S A M U E L K W I L L I A M S O N , J R .

July 9 4 Austria-Hungary wanted action against Serbia; the Ger-mans certainly did not discourage it; and they soon found thern-

selves pulled into the crisis.27Even though Vienna had obtained Berlin's pledge of support

against Serbia by July 6, more than two weeks elapsed before theultimatum was presented to Belgrade on July 23 . A major factorexplaining this delay lies in the organization of the Habsburgmilitary. Early in his tenure as chief of staff, Conrad instituted apolicy of harvest leaves to appease the monarchy 's agrarianinterests. This policy allowed soldiers to go holne to help in thefields and then retu rn to their du ty stations for the annual summermaneuvers. In the days after Sarajevo, sizable numbers of Habs-burg soldiers were scattered over the empire on harvest leave.~ a l ~ c e l l a t i o nf the leaves would have alerted Europe to the irn-pending military action, disrupted farm production, and riskedconfusion concerning the railway's mobilization plans. Conradtherefore decided to let the current leaves run their normal course,but to cancel any new harvest leaves. As a result, most of thoseleaves already granted would end by July 2 1 or 2 2 Conrad's

decision gave Berchtold the parameters for the timing of the Julycrisis.28

Another cause of delay involved convincing Tisza to permitmilitary action against Serbia. When the Common MinisterialCouncil met on July 7 the Magyar premier initially persisted inopposing military action but, by the end of the lengthy session,his resistance had weakened. Tisza then appealed to Franz Joseph,only to find that his sovereign was strongly committed to action.

In his efforts to sw ay Tisza, Berchtold stressed Germany's supportfor action and, possibly more important, warned of Rumania'sprobable defection from the alliance. The foreign minister appar-ently suggested that a failure to deal with Serbia would encourageBucharest to press the Transylvania issue ever more insistently.Whatever the arguments, Berchtold convinced Tisza that inter-vention was required. O n July 15, the Magyar leader met with

27 See Fr i tz S tern , Bethn lant l Hol lw eg and the War : T h e Lin li ts of Respons ib i l ity, inLeonard Kr ieger and Stern (eds . ) ,f i e Rexporlxibility oj Pou~er(Garden City, 1967), 271-307 Fay arg ued that Austr ia-I-Iungary pulled Berl in alon g(Or&irrs. 11 198-223).28 Gene ra l S t a ff men lo ran dun l , Vor be re ~ tend eM a s s n a l i n l e ~ ~ , . d , b u t se en b y C o n r a do n 6 Ju ly 1914, Genera ls tab . Opera t ions B uro , faszike l 43, Kr iegsa rch~v ,Vient la ; Conrad ,Aus m c i n ~ rDicnstrcit, IV 13-87.


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D WA R I 8 9

the Hungarian House of Deputies and openly hinted of the needfor action. His only requirements were that Vienna would present

an ultimatum to Belgrade and would pledge not to annex addi-tional Slavic t e r r i t ~ r y . ~

A further reason for Vienna's delay was more prosaic. Poin-ca rt and Re116 Viviani, the French premier, were scheduled to bein St. I'etersburg on a state visit from July 2 to July 2 3 . Under-standably, Berchtold wanted the ultimatum presented after theFrench had left St. Petersburg. As a result, it was finally delivereda t p ~ m . on Thursday, July 2 3 , when the French leaders were atsea.

Vienna used the hiatus of mid-July to mislead the otherEuropean government s about its intentions. After July 1 2 Berch-told restrained press com men t about Serbia, and the journals inVienna and Budapest recounted little about the adjoining state.Conrad went hiking in the mountains; Franz Joseph stayed at BadIschl; and the other Habsburg leaders carried out their customaryduties. The Danubian monarchy appeared to have returned tonormal.

Berchtold had another motive for his deception. In mid-July,he discovered that on July I I Berlin had informed Hans vonFlotow, its ambassador in Rome, about the possibility of Habs-burg action against Serbia. Shortly afterward, Flotow conveyedthis message to Antonio San Giuliano, the Italian foreign minister;not surprisingly, San Giuliano cabled the information to Vienna.When the telegram reached Vienna, the Austrian codebreakersduly deciphered it, thereby exposing the indiscretion of both

Germany and Italy. Berchtold could only assume that San Giuli-ano had also sent the same information to St. Petersburg andBelgrade. Henceforth, he gave Berlin no further details about hisplans, including the text of the ultimatum, until the very lastmoment. Later, this secrecy would be held against Berchtold asa sign of duplicity; at the time, it appeared to be the only way hecould maintain his option^.^

29 Gali i~tai , iWeltkrieg, 258-271. Stoile, Hu i~g ary nd thc Crisis ofee a l s o N o r ~ ~ ~ a i lJuly 1914,'' Journnl of Corrfem poror ~l is iory, (1966), I 53-170; Fremderlblntt, 16 July 1914.3 Berchtold used the Literary Bureau of the foreigil nlinistry to help with thc press; hisefforts were geilcrally successful, but the stock tnarket colitinued to show signs of uneas-111ess.

31 Gottlieb von Jag ow to Flotow, (tel.) July rgrq, K a u h k y D o t u m e n t ~ ,10. 33; Habs-


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81 S A M U E L K. W I L L I A M S O N J K .

Th e Com ln on Ministerial Council met secretly in Vienna onJuly 19 to review the ultima tum. Although none present believed

Belgrade could accept it, the ministers approved the ultinlatumand concurrently affirmed their acquiescence to Tisza's denlandthat there would be no territorial annexations, only modificationsof strategic boundaries in case of victory. Conrad reported ly said,when leaving the meeting, We will see; before the Balkan warthe powers also talked of the status quo-after the war no oneworried about it. is cynicism matched the Habsburg approachto war. Vienna wanted war with Serbia in the sunimer of 1914;

for that conflict the leaders were willing to risk a war with St.Petersburg but hoped (and believed) that Germany's supportwould deter the Russians.

With the ultimatum delivered, Belgrade became the focus ofactivity. Although the reactions of the I'as'id gove rnmen t havenever been chronicled in detail, recently published Serbian doc-uments for the pre-1914 years confirm that senior officials in theSerbian government were aware of Apis' corlspiratorial activityin May and June and sought to stop it. Yet Pas'id's weakenedpolitical base made a public confrontation with the Serbian mili-tary or w ith Apis impossible. Apis, behind a carefully constructedno~ i-answer o PaSid's queries about reports of agents being smug-gled across the border, essentially went his own way. After theassassinations, PaBiC could not, of course, offer Apis to Vienna ordo more than proceed as if he and the government had knownnothing.33

burg ambassador 111 Rom e, K a j e t r von Mercy to Berchtold, (tel.) IS July 1914, AussenVIII, no. 10364; Berchtold to Mir ey, (tel.) 2 July 1914, illid 110. 10418. Sari Giuliano toBerlin, St. l'etersburg, Belgrade Vienna, (tzls.) 16 July 1914, in Italian Foreign Mi~ ns tr y,I Docurncnti Diplotnatiri Italiuni (1908-1914), XII, 110. 272.

32 Conrad, Aus meiuer Dienst;eti IV, 92. Th e nleetlng o n July 19 took place at Berch-told's private residence, not at the Ballhausplatz. Conrad came it1 civilian clothes and in a

private car.

3 3 I an1 indebted to Dragan iivojinovid for help with the documents. Dedijer, whoedited the July v ol un ~e f docu n~ent s, re ~v pon then1 in Road to Sarujevo. The vo lun~eof docun~e~ l t s s Dedijer and ~ i v o t a A1116 (eds , Dotrrmcrrts srrr la pol~tiqrre extc ric ure duRoy aum c dc Scrbic [Dokrrnictlt i o spo ~t loj po lii ici raijcv~rreSrbijc 1903-19141 (Belgrade, 1980).For 14 May-4 August 1914, see VII, pt . 11. Th e general series Tvas under the editorialdirection of Vasa eubr ilo vi? . O n knowledge of some kind of activity, see Protid ( n~in lst er

of the interlor) to Pabid, 15 June 1914, ihid. 110. 206; report fron~ Sabac county onsmuggling of arms across the border, 16 June 1914, ib id . no. 209; Apis to Putnlk (chlef


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O R IG I NS O F W O R L D WA R I 8

O n one point, however, the Serbian documents are definite-Serbia had no intention of accepting any Habsburg ultimatum

that infringed in the slightest on Serbian sovereignty. O n July 18PaHiC, probably alerted to Vienna s intentions by the Italian mill-ister to Belgrade, prepared a mem or an du m stating unequivocallythat Serbia would tolerate no infringement of its sovereignity.This defiant tone persisted through the discussions in Belgradeon July 24 and 25. Thu s, contrary to earlier explanations whichargued that the Russians had acted to stiffen the Serbian will toresist, the Serbian documelits reveal a hard-line position in Bel-grade that predates the ultimatum. In taking this stance, PaSiC andhis colleagues were obviously confident of Russian help. In July1914, the Serbian government showed little willingness to com-promise; that stance also contributed to the escalation of thecrisis. 34

Given this new background on the Serbian attitude and themessages sent from Rome, the state visit of PoincarC and Vivianito St. Petersburg assumes new importance. Indeed, some histo-rians have long suspected that Poincar t s talks were more detailed

and more relevant to the Balkan situation than either his memoir sor the official memoranda of the visit indicate. Since the Russiansprobably had broken the Italian code, just as the Austrians had,St. Petersburg must have kno wn of Vienna s intentions.

This assumption in turn helps to explain a series of actionsby both French and Russian officials during the crisis, suggestinga coordinated Franco-Russian policy based upon advance knowl-edge. O n July 2 1 and 2 2 PoincarC deliberately and abruptly

warned Friedrich Szipiry, the Habsburg ambassador to Russia,against any action by Vienna, while indicating strong Frenchsupport for Serbia. T he content of PoincarC7s message alarmedthe ambassador, the president s tone even more . Given the almosttotal black-out of news fr om Vienna about its intentions, Poin-carC s warnings were probably prompted by the intercepted tel-egrams. Certainly, given the anti-Habsburg views of MiroslavSpalajkoviC, the Serbian minister to Russia, the merest hint of

of the Serbian general staff), 2 1 June 1914, ibld no. 230; Putnik to PaSiC, 23 June 1914,ibid. no, 234. O n Pabid s attemp ts t o curb the activity, see PabiC to Putni k, 24 June 1914,ibid no. 254.34 PaSlt to all Serbian tllissions abroad, (tels.) 18 July 1914, Ducrrmeiltr no. 462.


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8 2 S A M U E L I < W I L L I A M S O N J R .

action by Vienna would have prompted overtures to the Frenchand the Russians for strong declarations of support.

Similarly, th rough out the crisis, the French apparently nevercautioned St. Petersburg to urge Serbia to show restraint. TheRussian military preparations on July 25, and thereafter, werethose of a government supremely confident of French support;that confidence could have come only from Poincart and Viviaiiiin a series of discussions in St. ~ e t e r s b u r ~ . hus, the provocativeRussian diplomacy of 1912 would be repeated anew, this timewit h advance French approval.

In Belgrade o n July 2 3 , Wladimir Giesl von Gieslingen, theAustro-Hungarian minister, delivered the forty-eight hour ulti-ma tu m. PaSiC, campaigning for the general elections in the coun-tryside, returned ho me to draft a reply. His response stunned eventhe Habsburgs. H e accepted most of Vienna's demands, thuswinning European sympathy, while carefully evading the essentialdemands. Above all, PaSiC could not agree to a police investigationof the assassinations, for he kiiew where such an inquiry couldlead. Otherwise, PaSiC was so acquiescent that Serbia almost ap-

peared to be the injured party in the proceedings. In any event,the Austrians immediately rejected Belgrade's answer as insuffi-cient and issued orders on July 25 for partial mobilization to beginon July 28.37

The senior Russian ministers, meanwhile, met in St. Peters-burg on July 24 and 25 to consider their options. Their conclusioiiscan easily be coilstrued as belligerent, provocative, and ill-de-signed to keep the crisis in check. Furthermore, their decisions

were taken before St. Petersburg kiiew either the Serbian replyor the Austrian response to Serbia. With the czar's approval, theministers agreed to a series of pre-mobilization measures: military

35 S ee S z i p i r y t o B e r c h t o ld , t e l s .)2 J u ly and 2 2 Ju ly 191 4 , A u s s e i ~ ,VIII, nos . 10461,10497 . O n t h e Russ ian d ocu m e n t s f o r t h e P o incar e v is i t, se e O t t o Hoe t z sch ed . ) ,Dic.~ilte nra tioi? alei?Bezic .I~u i?~q eriiir Zeitn1tc.r des Ifnperinlisinlrs Berl in, 1y32-1934), V 110s. I , 2.O n the French records for the v i s i t , see Minis te re des Affa ires Et rangeres ,Docritiiei~tsdiplomatiqttes .fiangnis, 1871-1911 Par is, 1936), X no. 536 which re fe rs on ly to Anglo-I luss ian nava l t a lks ; the ed i tors o f the vo lumes ind ica te tha t they could f ind no o therr eco rds . O n t h i s i s s ue , s ee A lb e r t in i ,Or~~qri rs ,1 188-203.36 Lieven, Ov qli?s, tnakes no n len t io i l o f the French v is i t , 111 his generaleep ing ~ ~ i t l iv iew of the lack of Russ ian ac t iv i s in dur i i lg the c ri si s 140-141) ; c f. Keiger,O r i g i i ~ s ,150-152 .37 T h e ul t i nla tum and the Serbian reply 11a1.e been frequently rep rinted. See Geiss ,Jrily1911, 142-146, 201-204.


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O R I G I N S O F W O I I L I) W A R I 8 3

cadets were promoted early, protective measures were institutedalong the borders, and troops in the east were ordered to prepare

to m ove west. Fro m July 5 to July 30 Serbian officials in Russiasent detailed reports of Russian military measures and referred tothem as partial mobilization. Simply put , the Russians initiated aseries of military measures well in advance of the other greatpowers, although Austria-Hungary's partial ~nobi liza tion cameshortly after the Russian initiative. These measures, moreover,were the equivalent of a partial ~nobilization and accelerated thecrisis far more than recent historiography has usually conceded.

The Russian measures upset both Habsburg and German assump-tions about St. Petersburg's probable behavior in the crisis. Fur-thermore , the steps disrupted the timetables in Vienna and Berlin,thus reducing the options that were available and, of course, thetime to consider

The final stage of the third Balkan war began with Austria'sdeclaration of wa r on July 28 and the desultory shelling of Bel-

grade that same night. There was little further hostile action forseveral days. Neither Vienna nor Belgrade showed the slightestwillingness to negot iate or to consider half-way measures. Talkof a Halt in Belgrade as a Habsburg military objective gotnowhere with Con rad, who wanted a total reckoning with Serbia.The once reluctant Tisza no w zealously pressed Conrad for action,fearing possible Rumanian movement into Transylvania againstthe Magyars. Already at war with Serbia, Vienna had risked thewider war that would soon fol10w.~

At this poin t i n the July crisis the diplomatic activity shiftedabruptly from eastern to western Europe and to Anglo-Germanefforts to contain the escalating hostilities. Wilhelm remained asfickle as ever. Returning from his North Sea cruise, the kaiserpraised the Serbian response to Austria's ultimatum and suggested

38 Lieven descr ibes s om e of the measures ,Ori,qins, 141-151; Snyder, Idrolo,qy, 183-198;Stone , Eastern, 37-60; U l r i ch Tru mp ene r, "War P rem ed i t a t ed? Germ an In te ll igence O p-erat ions July 1914, '' Crniral Europc.an Hlsiory, X (1976), 58-85. C f. Fischer,K ~ I c , ~ ,04-

709. O n t he Serb ian repor t s , see , e .g . , Spa la jkovi? to PaSiC, ( te ls . ) 25 , 26 , 29 Ju ly 1914,Dedljer and AniC (eds.) , Docri~netrts, nos. 570, 584, 673. See also Kisto Kopponen,Dic.russische Gqfnhr (He l sink i, 1 9 7 6 )~ 80-206.39 Galintai , LVcltkriy~, 341-373; Hantsch, Rerchiold, 11, 618-647. PaSiC ind ica ted he wo u ldconcede noth ing; no te b y PaSiC, da ted 27 Ju ly 1914 on te legram f rom Ber l ln of the samedate (Dedijer and AniC [eds. Docu~nc.i?tr, o. 588).


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a resolution of the crisis. Chancellor Bet111nann Hollweg nowwavered too; at moments Berlin sought to restrain Vienna, butthe German leadership did not abandon Vienna or act responsiblyto avert the crisis.

Grey was not much Inore helpful. Whether a mor e assertiveBritish policy-action or inaction-would have decisively influ-enced the crisis has long fascinated historians. It can be arguedthat the rapidity o f the crisis played a major role in the outcome,perhaps a Inore decisive role than Jervis suggests elsewhere in thisv o l u n ~ e . ~ hroughou t the crisis, Grey failed to appreciate Vi-

enna's desire for war. Accustomed to treating Vienna as an ap-pendage of Berlin, Grey and his hard-line, anti-German associatesbelieved Berlin could control Vienna. But the third largest statein Europe, with a population of fifty million, with two proudgovernments, and a proud monarch, wanted a resouiidiiig defeatof the Serbians. Grey's failure to acknowledge the differencesbetween this crisis and earlier ones coiistitutes a major failure ofperceptiorl that severely reduced Britain's ability to manipulatethe crisis toward a peaceful solution. In fact, after August I theBritish leaders, like their counterparts on the Continent, soughtchiefly to make their actions appear defensive in nature. Just asthe Russians obliged the Germans to enter the war, so too theGermans would oblige the British by invading Belgium on theirway to France.41

In the final days of July, Russia's general mobilization madecontainment of the crisis an impossibility. Historians have devotedample attention to Russia's call for general ~nobilization on July

3 0 . A frequent theme has emerged: why, if the Russians hadpartially mobilized during the first Balkan war, could they nothave done so again? The Serbian documelits offer a new inter-pretation of this issue. A partial mobilization was i~npossiblebecause the steps St. Petersburg had ordered after July 5 wereeffectively already those of a partial mobilization. After the pre-paratory measures, only full mobilization remained. Czar Nich-olas agreed to this step o n July 29 but on receipt of a letter from

Kaiser W ilhel~n 1, the czar rescinded the order . With difficulty,40 Ro bert Jervis , "War alld Mispercep tion," j o r rr i ia l o -f I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y H i s t o r y,X V I I I(1988), 675-700.41 Steiner, B i i t a i i i , 220-241; also Al be rtin i, O i i ~ i n r ,111 521-525; Bridge, G w a t B r i ta in ,


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L D W A R I 815

Sazonov and the generals convinced the czar to reissue the orderon July 3 0 . The headquarters' troops allegedly then tore out the

telephones to prevent any further delays. With Russian mobili-zation, Berlin faced the dilemma of a two-front campaign. Wil-helm and his associates proceeded to set in motion their ownplans, plans that guaranteed a European ~onflict.~

In Vienna, meanwhile, the war plans unfolded. Conrad re-mained transfixed with plans for an attack on Serbia. In the nor th ,along the Russian frontier, he planned to leave only minimaldefensive forces. He persisted in his intentions despite mountingevidence that the Russians would not stand aside. His southwardgaze remains almost inexplicable. Only months before, in thespring, he had worried about the Russian threat and about thei~nplications f recent Russian behavior in the Balkan wars. Yet,he disregarded reports reaching Vienna of Russian preparations,perhaps because of his long-standing distrust of diplomats and hisown desire for war. The sooner the troops were engaged, theInore likely it was that C onrad would succeed in precipitating thewar that he had advocated since the Bosnian crisis of 1908. And

the fastest way to engage the troops was to send them south tofight against the Serbian forces. Later, when he could not ignorethe movement of Russian troops toward the Habsburg lands,Conrad had to order most of the Habsburg troops to return tofight in Galicia. Not surprisingly, the soldiers were fatigued bythe time that they faced the Russian units.31

Conrad 's desire for war set him apart fro m most o f the otheractors in the July crisis. Whereas many w ould accede to thedeveloping situation with regret or caution, he welcomed thecrisis. Anxious to settle scores with the Serbians, the Habsburgchief of staff made a difference in the decision-making process.O f all of the central actors in 1914, Conrad alone could have-by saying no to Berchtold or expressing hesitation to Franz Joseph

42 The Serbian docunle nts repo rt extensive rnilitary steps by the llusslans after July 25;e.g., SpalajkoviC to PabiC, (tel.) 26 July, 1914, Lled jer and AniC (eds .) , Dociiiilerifs no.585. Albertini summ arized the K~lssidll nobilization argumen ts well in Oriqins 11, 528-581. See also Fischer, K r i f g 704-725).43 Stone, "Llie Mobilmachung," 176-184; see also Willlamson, "Theories of Organiza-tional Process and Foreign Policy Outcomes," in Paul ;. Lauren cd . ) , Diplu~nacy :N r t oilpproaches it7 Hist ory Th eo ry arid Policy (Ne w York, 197i)), 151-154; Jack S. Levy, "Or-ganizational Routines and th e Causes of War," lrzternarionni Striliier Quarreriy X X X (1986),193-222.


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8 6 S A M U E L R . W I L L I A M S O N , J R .

or accepting some modified Halt in Belgraden-brought thecrisis to a more peaceful conclusion. Conrad, however, did not,

and that raises in stark relief the role of the individual in history.In this instance, Conrad's military ambitions were motivated,possibly, by his ow n desire to be a military hero and thus be ableto marry Gina von Keininghaus, the woman he loved but couldnot wed because she was already married (and the mother of sixchildren). Between 1907 and their nuptials in 1915, Conrad wro teliterally thousands of letters to Gina, many mailed, others not. Inseveral his theme is: if war comes and I am a hero, then I can

marry Gina. But first he had to have the war. In the summer of1914, he finally got his war and a year later his bride.44While Conrad delayed any shift of his forces from the south

to the north, Berlin attempted to cope with the Russian mobili-zation. Those decisions opened the final stages of the July crisis.Faced with the two-front war, the German leadership demandedthat the Russians and French cease their preparations. But neitheryielded to Germa n pressure. Th e German high command pointedto unambiguous evidence of extensive Russian military activity;the Schlieffen-Moltke plan demanded action. O n August 2 inscenes far distant from Sarajevo, Germany moved against Lux-embourg and, one day later, against Belgium. With Germany'sviolation o f Belgium neutrality, Grey pressed the British govern-ment t o intervene. Thus the third Balkan war became World War I.

Th e outbreak of World War I saw a f~is ion f long-term causes

with short-run tactical decisions. Although the momentum of thecrisis differed from capital to capital, the limited options availableto the policymakers are explicable only when the eastern Euro-pearl dynamics are considered. Alliance loyalties, the pressures ofthe military bureaucrats, and the juxtaposition of different per-ceptions with personal motivatioiis made the chances of peaceextremely remote in the last days of July and early August 1914.

What broader conclusions can be draw n f rom the July crisisabout the origins and prevention of major wars? A few deserveemphasis, even if they are familiar. Nationalism and ethnic arro-

4 1 F or a d isc us sio n o f C o n r ad ' s re la tio ns hip ~ ~ i t hina, see Will ldnlson, Vienna andJu ly 1914, 13-14, See a lso Gind Co nra d ' s ind iscree t ,iLlcii~ -fbcn nit Conrad v i l Hiitzetrdo~f(Lelpzig, 1935).


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O R I G I N S O F W O R L l I W A R I 8 7

gance should never be underestimated. The powerfill, emotiveforces of prestige and survival press statesmen to take chances

that ostensibly rational actors might not take, especially when thecivilian ministers fail to comprehend the ramifications of militaryplanning or its illusory nature. Even Berchtold and the othersenior Habsburg statesmen, well versed in crisis management afterthe Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, never fully probed the logicof Conrad' s plans. T he offensive ideology swept aside any doubtsharbored by the civilian leadership and left them no time toponder and reconsider.

Th e alliance and entente structures likewise placed a premiumupon action. To be sure, the arrangements seemingly offeredprotection to their members. The alliances, however, could alsocoerce a state in to taking action simply for the sake of the alliance.Strong, tight alliances may in fact be Inore dangerous to peacethan loose, ambiguous ones where the actors must negotiateamong themselves before taking action.

A number of conclusions can be drawn concerning the Julycrisis. First, satisficing as a decision-making process was evident

everywhere; the statesmen repeatedly took the first suitable op-t ion, not necessarily the best o p t i o i ~ . ~ A n conomist model ofdecision-making was seldom seen dur ing the weeks after Sarajevo;instead, a series of reactive decisions were taken by statesmen inVienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg. Cost-benefit analysis, such asoccurred during the Cuban missile crisis, Inay take place if thetime parameters of a crisis are known. But such a process isunlikely (and the Cuban missile crisis is not a good guide fordecision-making dur ing a crisis), because in most internationalcrises the dCnouement can be projected only at an unspecifiedfuture time, not at a specific future time. In most crises, this isnot possible, and, certainly in 1914, the statesmen had no timecarefully to consider their decisions, the Habsburg leadership ex-cepted, once the ultimatum was delivered in Belgrade on July 2 3

Second, the events ofJuly reaffirm the power of perceptionsand past experience in assessing current situations. In 1914 a groupof leaders, all experienced in statecraft, power, and crisis man-agement, deliberately made decisions that risked o r assumed war.

5 G r d i i a r n T . Allison T h e Ersc.iirc q f ~ ~ c . r i s i o i ~ :splair~rtrgt h e CitDai? .l~fissileCi i s i Boston ,

19711, 72.


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Statesmen and generals cast the die because of their fears andapprehensions about the f~iture. N o g roup had less confidence

than the Habsburg leaders, who had been battered during theBalkan wars, Serbian expansion, and the loss of Franz Ferdinand,their experienced heir apparent. The Habsburg policy~nakers es-perately desired to shape the f ~ ~ t u r e , ather than let events controlthem. The prospect of domestic disintegration, exacerbated byforeign intervention from the north and south, made war an acceptable policy option. Frustration and fear were a fatal andseductive combination for Vienna and Budapest. The Habsburg

decision, backed by the Germans for their own reasons, gave theJuly crisis mo men tum and a dynamic that rendered peace the firstcasualty.

But the willingness of the Habsburg leadership to rescue asagging dual monarchy by resort ing to force had echoes elsewherein Europe. In each capital, and despite the recent Balkan wars,the policymakers adopted a fatalistic, almost reckless, approachto the crisis. A convergence of offensive military strategies, fearsabout the future, and an unwillingness to consider other lessdangerous options formed the perceptual agenda for the govern-mental leaders; peace had little chance once Vienna decided warwas an acceptable option.

The war of 1914 began as a local quarrel with internationalties; those ties converted it into a major conflagration. Thereinlies possibly the mos t salient lesson o f the July crisis: a local quarreldoes not always remain a local issue. I eace is more easily main-tained if one avoids even the smallest incursion into war, for,

once the barrier of peace is broken, the process of diplomacy inrestoring peace or preventing a larger war is infinitely more dif-ficult. The ~naintenance f peace requires an aggressive commit-ment to imaginative diplomacy and to continual negotiation, notspasms of despair and the clash of military action in the hope fo rsomething better. Something better is almost always somethingworse, as all of the European governments discovered in WorldWar I.46

6 O n the pro blen l of n lain ta i il ing peace over lo ng decades , see Jo hn Lewis Gaddis ,Th e L ong Peace : Elements of S tab i li ty in the P os tw ar In te rna t iona l Sys te in , i l temational

Setrivity, X 1986), 99-142.