wills suc digest #6

8/11/2019 Wills Suc Digest #6

1/11

V. PROBATE OF WILLS

4. JIMENEZ v IAC

184 SCRA 367

Facts:

Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez married Consolacion Ungson with whom he begot four (4) children,namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During such marriage, Lino acquiredfive (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. When Consolacion died, Linocontracted a second marriage with Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the sevenpetitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginial, allsurnamed Jimenez. After Lino and Genovevas death, Virginia filed a petition before CFI prayingto be appointed as administratix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva

upon which Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. filed a motion for exclusion of his fathers name and those ofhis uncle and aunts contending that they have already received their inheritance consisting offive (f) parcels of land. However, the petition of Virginia wherein she included the said five (5)parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of spouses Lino and Genoveva. Consequently,Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventorycontending that such parcels of land were already adjudicated to his father and to his uncle andaunts. The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land and denied themotion for reconsideration filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a petition for certiorari andprohibition seeking the annulment of the orders of the probate court, of which the CA dismissed.Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complained before the RTC to recoverpossession/ownership of the five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva.Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action

was barred by prior judgments and by prescription and laches. Thereafter, the trial courtdismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. A motion for reconsideration was deniedas well as the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before the appellate court. Hence, thispetition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not in a probate proceeding the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions ofownership.

Held:

Petitioners present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filedbecause as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions oftitle or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, canonly be settled in a separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the probateof a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannotresolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestateproceedings as in the case at bar.


2/11

5. OZAETA vs. CUARTERO9 phil 1041

Facts:

Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos Palanca

Taguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been dulyestablished by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presentedwas the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married Rosa Gonzales inwhich marriage they had eight children.

Issue:

Whether or not the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted asconclusive evidence of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator.

Held:

Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of anexistence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator of the said Will. Palanca executed his willand he made the solemn declaration in said document that since 1923 and for some yearsthereafter he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by her six naturalchildren whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said nothing abouthaving married Maria; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded herunworthy of being the guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and soappointed Felisa Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of theirpersons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriageto Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him werelegitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will may not betaken lightly, as a statement of little significance. When he made said statement he was about

76 years old and must have felt that he had not many years left to live.


3/11

6. Coso v Fernandez-Deza42 phil 596

Facts:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations

with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio delibre disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundredSpanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her intalking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will wasset aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of thetestator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over thetestator.

Issue:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

Held:

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to havethat effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence hasbeen variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient toavoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mindof the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another ratherthan his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution ofthe will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be stilloperative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the

making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupyingan improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercisedby a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that theinfluence destroys the testators free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at thetime of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for RosarioLopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as todestroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mereaffection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition orfraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjustdisposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministeredto his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.


4/11

VI. INSTITUTION, PRETERITION AND SUBSTITUTION

1. Austria v. Reyes31 SCRA 754

Facts:

Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alllhave been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basiliafiled a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephewsand nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In 1954, the petitionersfiled a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia andthat the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that thevalidity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator waspossessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud,trickery or undue influence.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

held:

Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution doesnot affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity willset aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will beannulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in thewill, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the

testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy isfavored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention onthe part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.


5/11


6/11

IX. RESERVA TRONCAL

5. Larcerna v. vda de corcino1 SCRA 1226

Facts:

Valentine Marbebe begot a daughter, Jacoba Marbebe, before his marriage with BonifaciaLacerna. Valentine and Bonificia had an only son, Juan.

Valentine and Bonifacia died leaving three parcels of land to their only son Juan. Juan, then,executed a power of attorney authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona Vda. deCorcino take care of the disputed land. Eventually, Juan died intestate and without any issue.The Court of First Instance declared that the land is property of Jacoba being the half sister ofJuan. Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews and nieces of Bonifacia questioned thedecision of the court. According to them, the case should be based upon Article 891 of the CivilCode of the Philippines which establishes what is known as "reserva troncal." According to

them, under this principle, the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceasedwithin the third degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came. Thus, sinceJuan Marbebe inherited the land from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative withinthe third degree on the maternal line or to his aunt and cousins and not to Jacoba Marbebe forshe belongs to the paternal line. This, however, was protested by Jacoba Marbebe. Shecontends that pursuant to Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, brothersand sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that, asJuan Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit hisproperties.

Issue:

Whether or not there is reserva troncal?

Held:

The provision on reserve troncal cannot be applied in this case. In reserve troncal, theascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired bygratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such propertyas he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the thirddegree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied.) Thisarticle applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by anascendant from a descendant, and this is not the scenario in the given case, for the lands indispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not applicable in this case.

Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land to Jacoba Marbebe. The saiddecision is in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludesall other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from whichthe property of the deceased came.

Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to succeed Juan.


7/11

6. Chua v. Court of First Instance

78 SCRA 406

Facts:

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he

sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua

contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the

name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel died without leaving any issue.

Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of the

second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage. In the Intestate

Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, among others, the one-half portion of

Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of

Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio.

By virtue of said adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of

Consolacion and Juanito.

On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother

Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time, Consolacion

executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son

Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Then on

March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or

ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the first

marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the

deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint before the respondent CFI

of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged

to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable

property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article

981 of the NCC.

Issue:

Whether or not the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father

Jose Frias Chua gratuitously or not. (In relation to the first requisite of reserva troncal)

Held:

YES.in Cabardo v. Villanueva, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the

recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or

be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made

gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any

obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does

nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that

the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from

the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property

in question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of

a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.

The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed

upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in his last will and

testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding. As long as the transmission of

the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the

property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court


8/11

orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito, to pay the Standard Oil Co. This does not change

the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in

question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891.


9/11

7. FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO40 PHIL 480

Facts:

Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, during his lifetime, married twice. The 1

st

time, with Antonia Fazde Leon, with whom he begot 9 children: Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita,Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena.

On becoming a widower, he married the 2ndtime with Severina Faz de Leon, with whom he had2 children: Mercedes and Apolonio III.

On January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio II executed a will instituting as his universalheirs his 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz; he declared thatall his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.

Apolonio III died in 1891; his mother, Severina Faz, succeeded to all his property.

Severina Faz died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress heronly living daughter, Mercedes Florentino. As such heir, said daughter took possession of allthe property left at the death of her mother, among those is that property inherited from ApolonioII.

Issue:

Whether or not the property in question is reservable property

Held;

At the death of Apolonio II, under a will, his 11 children succeeded to the inheritance he left. In1891, Apolonio III died; he was succeeded by his mother Severina Faz (included in theinheritance is the property in question).

That Apolonio III acquired the property in question by a lucrative title or by inheritance from hisfather is without any doubt. Thus, when, on the death of Apolonio III, without issue, the samepassed by operation of law into the hands of his mother, it became reservable property, with theobject that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than thosecomprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the source ofsaid property.

When Severina Faz died in 1908, she left in her will said property, together with her own, to heronly daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes. However, the reservable nature of such propertywas not lost.

The law so provides that ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but only itsenjoyment, use or trust. The law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve the same forcertain designated persons who, upon the death of the said ascendants-reservists, (taking intoconsideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership ofsaid property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs.

These designated persons (reservatarios) are the relatives, within the third degree, of thedescendant from whom the reservable property came.


10/11

8. Gonzales v Court of First Instance104 SCRA 481

Facts:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived by his

widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena,Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equalportions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarday De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races.Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inheritedfrom her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceaseddaughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other sixchildren.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of theproperties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,

Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving childrenpartitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda yTuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De laPaz.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probatewas affirmed by the CA.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motionto exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her

deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable propertieswhich should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by thechildren of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F.Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against herbrothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing adeclaration that the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed the actionof Beatriz.

Issue:

whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.

Held:

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from anascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant oris acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendantshould reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree fromthe deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said propertycame.

The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.

She was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death thereservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living orthey survived Mrs. Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren thereservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because thereservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a


11/11

disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived thereservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearestrelatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given

and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservableproperties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore thereservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentarydisposition cannot be allowed.

wills suc digest #6

Documents