wind energy in france - an analysis of specific developments and constraints

Wind Energy in France

An Analysis of Specific Developments and Constraints

Diploma Thesis

by Fabia Schäufele

Technical University Berlin

Sociology and Technology Studies

May 2010

Wind Energy in France - Diploma Thesis - Fabia Schäufele - Institute of Sociology, TU Berlin - 2010

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Technische Universität Berlin

Institut für Soziologie

FG Techniksoziologie

Supervisor:

Prof. Dr. Werner Rammert

Co-advisor:

Martin Meister, M.A.


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Table of Contents

Wind Energy in France – An Analysis of Specific Developments and Constraints ........................ 0

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 4

2 Theories of Technological and Sectoral Change ............................................................................. 7

2.1 Wind Power as an Innovation ..................................................................................................... 7

2.2 Innovations in Socio-Technical Constellations ......................................................................... 9

2.3 Socio-Technical Constellations in a Wider Context ............................................................... 14

2.3.1 The Evolution of Large Technological Systems .............................................................................................. 15

2.3.2 Technological Transitions in a Multi-Level-Framework ............................................................................... 16

2.3.3 Technology-Based Sectoral Change .................................................................................................................. 20

2.4 Pattern, Phases and Paths .......................................................................................................... 23

3 Case Studies in other National Contexts ........................................................................................ 27

3.1 The Development of Wind Power Stations in Denmark and in the USA ........................... 27

3.2 The Innovation Biography of Wind Energy in Germany ...................................................... 29

4 The Development of the French Wind Energy Sector .................................................................. 33

4.1 Technology Development and Technological Profile of the Sector ..................................... 38

4.2 Development of Institutional Structures – the French Energy Policy ................................ 55

4.3 Changes in Actor Constellations and in the Socio-Economic Framework ......................... 69

4.4 Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 88

5 Constricting and Enabling Factors of the Niche-Sector-Transformation .................................. 90

5.1 Geographical Preconditions ....................................................................................................... 90

5.2 Events at the Landscape Level .................................................................................................. 91

5.3 Niche Factors ................................................................................................................................ 96

5.4 Impact of the Regime Level ..................................................................................................... 102

5.5 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 119

6 Transformation of the French Energy System ............................................................................ 122

References, Indexes, and Appendix ..................................................................................................... 127


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Abstract

Wind energy is currently one of the most mature technologies in the renewable energy sec-

tor and Europe is taking a leading role in its development. However, within Europe, there are

significant differences in the advancement of wind energy: While it has come to play a signifi-

cant, non-negligible role in the German energy system, the same technology could not yet

establish itself in France. The niche has not succeeded in transforming the French energy

system, although the surrounding conditions in France have changed significantly over the

past years. To shed some light on the reasons for this particular development, this case study

tracks back the development of the French wind energy sector from its beginnings up to the

present. Special attention is given to the following three processes: technological change,

changes in energy policy, and changes in actor constellations and the socio-economic context.

Based on this extensive analysis, it is possible to work out enabling and constricting factors in

this development, which have caused it to take its special “French” course. For the theoretical

analysis of “the French development” the ‘Multi-Level-Perspective’ (Rip & Kemp 1998) was

then applied to the empirically compiled data. This perspective gives a contextualized view of

the role niches play in a technological transition process. It makes it possible to assign the

enabling and constricting factors to different socio-technological constellations on three analyt-

ical levels: the wind energy niche, the established and dominant constellation in the French

energy sector (the regime), and the overall macro level of society (the landscape). The perspec-

tive further helps to observe interactions between processes at all the analytical levels and to

analyze the effects of the respective ‘change mechanisms’ on the socio-technical transition

process. The study finally assesses whether a regime shift is actually possible in the French

context.

Keywords:

STS, sociology of technology, multi-level-perspective, socio-technical change, regime shift,

niche, wind energy, renewable energies, France


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1 Introduction

Until the end of the 18th century our energy sources have all been renewable (Cochet 2000).

It was only with the first industrial revolution1 that wood, wind, water, and solar energy were

quickly and efficiently replaced by coal and steam as main energy sources. The industrial

revolution profoundly changed social and economical conditions of our society and modified

power production in such a way that it became location- and time-independent. The increasing

industrial relevance of oil and the comprehensive application of electric power then marked the

beginning of a second industrial revolution. Of late, the idea of a third industrial revolution

frequently comes up in discussions on climate change and a possible turnaround in the energy

sector. Supporters of this idea emphasize the importance of an efficient handling of our energy

resources and overcoming our dependence upon fossil fuels to guarantee sustainable growth in

our society. (BMU 2008)

“I believe we are now standing on the brink of a Third Industrial Revolution: the Low Carbon Age […] Like the previous industrial revolutions, this will be driven by technolo-gy and new forms of energy. It will also transform our societies.” (José Manual Barroso, President of the European Commission, in a speech on October 1, 2007; BMU 2008: 11)

Present power supply systems are already about to change. The share of renewables is rising in

many countries. The German Federal Environment Agency assumes that in 2020, 40% of the

national energy sources could be renewable (Tagesschau.de). In recent years, French politi-

cians became interested in those topics, too. During the European Wind Energy Conference of

2009, the Secretary of State for Ecology Chantal Jouanno said for example that the world had no

alternative other than to pass a new energetic threshold and that the French energetic revolu-

tion had already begun but that it had to accelerate from now on (SER/FEE press release 2009).

Wind energy, as a quite mature technological innovation, plays an important part in that en-

ergetic transformation process. In the EU in 2008 and 2009 “more new wind power capacity

1 Ever since the first industrial revolution, historians have repeatedly tried to classify the subsequent development into phases. The classification I refer to defines the first, second, and third industrial revolution with respect to important raw materials and energy resources that mark the respective phase. (BMU 2008)


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was installed [...] than any other electricity-generating technology” (EWEA 2010). With a total

of 25,777 MW, Germany today is the absolute market leader regarding cumulative installed

wind energy capacity and only second to the USA relative to annually installed capacity in

2009. Proportionately, the French wind energy sector is fairly undeveloped. EU-directives2 on

renewable energies admittedly provide a common basis for their development the actual im-

plementation and promotion of the potential of renewables in the respective countries can

however differ strongly. France’s wind energy sector for example started to develop compara-

tively late, its cumulative installed capacity of wind energy was only 4,574 MW in 2009, and its

energy sector seems to develop into a different direction than for example that of Germany.

Motivated by personal experience with the French culture and society, I decided to research

and explore the matter and to attempt to discover where those differences come from. For my

diploma thesis, I want to answer the question: why the wind energy development in France

proceeded in this particular way and how the development of the sector was and still is con-

stricted?3

The case study is loosely based on two sociological studies on wind energy in different na-

tional contexts; owing to the research question, I chose a different theoretical framework,

though. The period of time I selected also resulted from the subject: I studied the French wind

energy development from the first relevant activities in the 1940s until 2009. As the different

actors in the field are very numerous and heterogeneous, I decided against conducting inter-

views and instead concentrated on the analysis of secondary literature and on various docu-

ments like: studies on technological issues and tariff models, surveys on acceptance of wind

energy, press releases, brochures and reports of enterprises, organizations, or associations,

articles in professional journals and newspapers, and legal texts. Regarding the theoretical

approaches I am going to use in my study I will use them as a set of tools to get my research

question answered; it is not my priority objective to discuss pros and cons of those theories.

2 All European Directives are accessible on the website EUR-Lex (see respective Official Journals of the European Communities): http://eur-lex.europa.eu 3 My analysis may appear biased towards wind energy. This impression could be caused by the fact that in my analysis I adopt the perspective of the wind energy sector. I am in fact a supporter of renewable energy sources; I however tried not to let these personal preferences skew my results. A normative evaluation of different energy sources was not my intention.


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The study is structured as follows. First of all, I am going to present the theoretical concepts

(chapter 2) and the two case studies on wind energy already mentioned above (chapter 3),

which I will later use and refer to in my analysis of the development of wind energy in France

(chapter 5). Before this analysis, I will describe in detail how exactly the French wind energy

sector is structured and how the development process took place over the years (chapter 4). In

chapter 6, I will finally discuss the question to what extent this development resulted in a

transformation of the French energy supply system and whether a regime shift is actually

possible in the French context.

I limited the analysis almost exclusively to on-shore development, as it would have gone be-

yond the scope of my diploma thesis to cover all the current development paths of wind energy.

The offshore development is still in its early stages – not only in France – which means that it

is characterized by various divergent activities. It can be seen as a new path that was born from

overall wind energy development, which was previously confined to expansion on land. Fur-

thermore, I will not include some of the financial aspects of the French wind energy develop-

ment – financing models and business taxes – due to insufficient data.


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2 Theories of Technological and Sectoral Change

Before analyzing innovations like wind power generators it is necessary to theoretically

define the subject and introduce appropriate theories to approach them. First, I am going to

focus on what innovations actually are and on several distinctions that exist between them.

Secondly, I will describe the innovations as elements of so-called socio-technical constellations.

I will further place those socio-technical constellations in a wider context. It will thus become

possible to analyze changes in or between different constellations and at different levels. In the

last section, I will touch on the subject of a temporal order and recurring patterns of technolog-

ical change.

2.1 Wind Power as an Innovation

Commonly, innovations have a very positive connotation, but literally, an innovation simply

describes something new – be it positive or negative. It is, however, not the actual newness of

an idea or an invention that is decisive but the newness perceived.

“The idea may be a recombination of old ideas, a scheme that challenges the present or-der, a formula or a unique approach […] as long as the idea is perceived as new by the individuals involved, it is an ‘innovative idea’” (Van de Ven et al. 2008: 9).

So, in the case of the wind energy, it is not important that mankind has been using wind energy

for a very long time now (in navigation or agriculture for instance), but that someone had the

idea to combine the windmill with a generator, thus creating a new technology for new kinds

of applications.

There are however not only technical innovations. In the Oslo Manual (OECD.org) for exam-

ple – a report from the OECD and Eurostat, that was published to provide guidelines for collect-

ing and interpreting innovation data – a differentiation was made between ‘technological prod-

uct and process innovations’ (‘TPP’) and ‘organizational innovations’:

“TPP innovation must be distinguished from organizational innovation. Organizational innovation in the firm includes: the introduction of significantly changed organizational structures, of advanced management techniques, and of new or substantially changed corporate strategic orientations”. (ibid.)


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Thus, the definition of innovations was somewhat extended (beyond concrete products, pro-

cesses and technologies), but was still limited to an exclusively economic field. In a broader

definition, social and institutional innovations are included as well (innovations in the legal

framework or in behavior patterns, for example). Such a broad definition of innovations can be

found in the work of S. Schön, D. Ohlhorst, J. Köppel and E. Bruns about wind energy in Ger-

many (Schön et al. 2008). They assume that innovations can comprise technical, economical,

social, organizational, political and institutional aspects (ibid.: 22f). A wind power turbine can

be regarded as a technical innovation; but seen in a wider context, the use of wind power in-

cludes other aspects too: such as new laws4 in country planning and construction activity,

changes in energy policies, development of new branches of industry, and maybe even a new

aesthetical perception and ecological awareness of the population.

Most of the time, and especially in economic science, innovations are distinguished from in-

ventions. This differentiation emphasizes the importance of markets and efficiency.

“(TPP) innovations comprise implemented technologically new products and processes and significant technological improvements in products and processes. A TPP innova-tion has been implemented if it has been introduced on the market (product innovation) or used within a production process (process innovation).” (OECD.org: 31)

Put like that, an invention only becomes an innovation if it is successfully commercialized or

used by a widespread community. Today’s wind power stations are certainly widespread and

they have a proper market, but it has not always been like that. Contrary to early definitions,

which stress the merits of an ingenious inventor with a groundbreaking idea, it is now as-

sumed that innovation processes, from invention to innovation, are too complex to be conduct-

ed by a single person and that those processes take place in a network of heterogeneous actors

(e.g. Van de Ven et al. 2008).

A last differentiation is made between incremental and radical innovations. Minor improve-

ments, continuous adaption, and variations are contrasted with fundamental transitions. Schön

and her colleagues additionally use the term of “additive innovations”, which stands for a larger

and more expansive exploration of already existing possibilities (Schön et al. 2008: 23). Tech-

nical innovations to improve the performance of existing wind power stations are incremental

4 All French laws and regulations are accessible on the website Legifrance.Gouv.fr, Le service public de la diffusion du droit: www.legifrance.gouv.fr


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innovations; the extension of wind energy exploitation to offshore areas can be seen as an

additive innovation; but the utilization of wind energy stations as such can be defined as radi-

cal innovation. “This assumption has to be substantiated, as biomass, water power and wind

energy already constituted the energy basis of the pre-modern ages” (Mautz 2007: 115). This

may be so, but the innovative quality of modern wind power is not the usage of wind as an

energy source, but “the rediscovering and further development of the above-mentioned tech-

nologies, embedded in new social contexts and linked to societal and environmental objectives

of a wider range” (ibid.).

So, a technical innovation such as a wind power station is much more than simply new tech-

nology and cannot be analyzed independently from the context in which it arose and in which

it was developed. In the next chapter I am going to elaborate on the theoretical concept of the

socio-technical constellations or systems in which technical innovations are embedded.

2.2 Innovations in Socio-Technical Constellations

Sociological theories of technological change generally concentrate on two main aspects of

technology: their genesis – How do they evolve as a result of and are shaped by social action? –

and their consequences – How do they structure social action and what are their effects on

society? In recent years, attention was turned increasingly to the interplay of both processes

(Schulz-Schaeffer 2008, Rammert 2008). Very popular are approaches of the Sciences and

Technology Studies, which are, in respect of their interdisciplinary orientation, multifaceted

and not always uniform. Rating among them are for instance the concepts of the Social Con-

struction of Technology (SCOT; Pinch & Bijker 1989) and the Actor-Network-Theory (ANT;

Latour 1991). Their common starting point is the assumption that technology interacts closely

with its social context and that it is shaped by it. Technical artifacts are considered as compo-

nents of socio-technical systems or constellations. In the conception of those systems, two

theoretical concepts are very important5: Firstly, the concept of ‘technical systems’ from the

historian Thomas P. Hughes (that also worked together with Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker,

5 The notion of socio-technical systems has in fact been coined by a group of scientists at the London Travistock Institute, but they had rather an additive than a systemic idea of those systems. Hughes showed that the components also interact and influence each other. He thinks of those systems as a seamless web (Schulz-Schaeffer 2000: 91ff).


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two leading adherents of the SCOT approach) and secondly, the already mentioned theory of

‘actor-networks’, which can be seen as a more radical version of the former.

Hughes’ study about Edison and the history of electric light and power is dealing with the

question of how heterogeneous components of such processes are fused together and how the

emerging systems mange to remain stable over time (Hughes 1989, Schulz-Schaeffer 2000:

91ff). In his analysis, he stresses the strong interdependency of scientific, technical, socio-

economic, political, legal, institutional, and cognitive factors and of different interests in the

process of technology development. In fact, Hughes never uses the term ‘socio-technical sys-

tems’ himself, but admits later that it was a more appropriate designation for the systems

described by him as ‘technological systems’ (Schulz-Schaeffer 2000: 92f), which he defined

as follows:

“Technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components. They are both socially constructed and society shaping. Among the components in technological systems are physical artifacts […] Technological systems also include organizations […] and they incorporate components usually labeled scientific […] Legislative artifacts, such as regulatory laws, can also be part of technological systems […] natural resources also qualify as system artifacts.” (Hughes 1989: 51)

As these components interact, the removal or alteration of one of them changes the characteris-

tics of the whole network. Not all components are equal though. Hughes distinguishes between

artifacts and human beings. The latter can be inventors, industrial scientists, managers, finan-

ciers, engineers, or workers; all of them have certain degrees of freedom that other components

of the system do not posses. The most important group is that of the system builders6. Their

task is it to invent, design, and develop coherent technological systems by bringing more and

more factors and components under their control.

“One of the primary characteristics of a system builder is the ability to construct or to force unity from diversity, centralization in the face of pluralism, and coherence from chaos.” (ibid.: 52)

The boundaries of technological systems are defined by the limits of control that system build-

ers, and their associates, are able to exercise. All intractable factors not under the control of the 6 When applying Hughes’ findings to present-day technology development one has to bear in mind that he was studying American inventors at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Nowadays, the predominant figure of the system builder (a pivotal individual or collective actor) should be replace by the concept of system building as a result of interaction of a plurality of actors with potentially different and competitive interests.


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system operators can be called the environment, which consist of further technological sys-

tems. Hughes explicitly says that “the convention of designating social factors as the environ-

ment, or context, of a technological system should be avoided” (ibid.) as individuals, groups,

and organizational components – conventionally labeled as social – can either be part of the

system or of the environment.

The Actor-Network-Theory – conceptualized and developed mainly by Bruno Latour and

Michel Callon – even goes a step further in defining those heterogeneous networks. The theory

is also based on a social-constructivist approach of Science and Technology Studies but criti-

cizes that the importance of technologies and objects in the analysis of social processes was not

respected in most approaches and that, in relation to social factors, they seemingly played only

a marginal role. Therefore, the ANT demands to abolish all theoretical distinctions between

different network components (be it natural, institutional, social, or technical) and to give all of

them equal status as so called ‘actants’ in the development and maintenance of heterogeneous

systems called ‘actor-networks’. Technology development is thus seen as the result of a process

in which several different actants are linked together to a successfully working association or

network around the technology in question. They all influence the development process in a

certain way. The strong point of the ANT lies in this non-dualistic perspective on society

through the revaluation and equal treatment of technology as explaining factor in social pro-

cesses. At the same time, the generalized principle of symmetry, which does not only concern

the definition of actants but other aspects of the theory as well, poses theoretical and practical

problems: the symmetry results in a leveling of all analytical conceptions (Schulz-Schaeffer

2008: 19, Schulz-Schaeffer 2000: 125ff), which makes it difficult to empirically work with this

theory. Whilst, on the theoretical level, having to face the problem of an ‘infinite regress’, those

leveled analytical concepts cannot satisfyingly describe all the different facets of empirical

reality. This is why, further on in my analysis, I will not work with the Actor-Network-Theory

anymore.

Even so, the theoretical concept of socio-technical constellations forms the basis of my analy-

sis. Describing the emerging and changing socio-technical wind energy constellation in France

in detail and with regard to the particular technological innovation, I will later draw mainly on

Ulrich Dolata’s analytical approach on ‘sectoral change’ (see chapter 4). His ‘sectoral systems’


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are specified as “socio-technical events” (Dolata 2007: 12) or “socio-technical entities” (Dolata

2008a: 7) with socio-technical profiles or structures (Dolata 2007: 30, 34f). They are essentially

constituted by specific technologies, which are developed, produced, and used in those (and

sometimes in other) sectoral systems. At the same time, they are socially embedded entities

with special industrial and institutional structures.

„They are sociotechnical entities. Characteristic of the constitution of sectoral systems are not just distinct socioeconomic structures and institutions, typical constellations of actors, and patterns of actor-based interaction, but also the specific technologies being developed, produced, or used. (ibid.)

All the components together – the technological profile, a special socio-economic and insti-

tutional context, and specific types of actors and patterns of interaction – form a “socio-

technical match” (ibid.: 8).

The technological profile of such a match plays an important role in shaping the sector’s ac-

tor configurations, its dominating types of interaction, the regulation patterns, and its institu-

tions. Just as institutions, it opens up possible courses of action and restricts them at the same

time. It can be defined in more detail by the following classification categories: (Dolata 2005,

2007, 2008b, Dolata & Werle 2007)

1) Type of technology that characterizes the sector: Nowadays ‘technology’ can be many things –

for example individually useable consumer technology, large-scale and capital-intensive tech-

nology, cross-sectional technology, infrastructural systems, methods, or even programs. Tech-

nical characteristics differ mainly in size, complexity and coupling of their elements.

2) Degree of the technology’s activity: Is it a passive, active, reactive, interactive or transactive

technology (Rammert 2003: 8)? How is action divided between humans and non-humans?

3) Patterns and conditions of use: How is the technology utilized? Can it be used individually as

part of the everyday life, is it an industrial good, or is it a large-scale and capital-intensive tech-

nology that cannot be used individually at all?

4) Knowledge base and access to it: Is the development of the technology based on fundamental

academic research or rather on practice- and application-oriented knowledge from engineers? Is

this knowledge open to numerous people or just to a small distinct community?

5) Homogeneity versus heterogeneity of a technology: Is there a clear function associated with the

technology or is it used in different contexts and different ways? Has it clear or unclear origins?


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6) Endogenous versus exogenous technologies: Is the development and use of an (for the sector)

important technology essentially a sector-immanent phenomenon or has the technology been

developed outside the sector?

7) Potential effects of the technology on a sector: Will there be radical, and far-reaching, changes

in the sector through the emergence of a new technology or will this technology only have lim-

ited effects, so that there will only be incremental change?

Secondly, sectoral systems are marked through special, historically grown and stabilized so-

cio-economic and institutional contexts. Those constitute the sector’s socio-economic ‘topogra-

phy’, whose rules are formed by institutional arrangements. These institutions make it possible

for actors in the sector to interact and limit at the same time possible courses of action. Actors

do not have simply to submit to existing structures though. Institutional structures are shaped

reciprocally through processes of structuration and institutionalization. The following factors

have to be considered:

1) Industrial and corporate structures of the sector: like e.g. the concentration and size of

organizations, the degree of the sector’s internationalization, or the form and dynamics

of competition

2) Market, production, and research structures of the sector: like e.g. the organization and

intensity of research and development activities, the types of production and markets, or

patterns of demand

3) Socio-economic embedding of the sector: like e.g. the importance of other sectors, the quali-

ty of inter-relations with other sectors, regulatory influences of state institutions, or the role

of non-governmental and non-profit organizations

Finally, there are the sector’s specific types of actors and patterns of interaction. Numerous

social actors take part in the development or reinterpretation of a sector and interact with each

other – like for example manufacturers, suppliers, commercial enterprises, service providers,

research facilities, stakeholders, lobbies, governmental institutions, non-profit organizations,

citizens, or consumers. They can be individual, corporate, or non-organized collective actors.

Their interactions can be characterized as competitive, cooperative, negotiation-oriented,

or societal.


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In this illustration the linkages between analytical categories are summarized:

figure 1: Sectoral systems - analytical categories (Dolata 2007: 25)7

In summary, technological innovations are part of socio-technical systems, or constellations,

of heterogeneous, more or less equal, components that can be categorized as either: social,

technical, natural, institutional, scientific, political, or legal. Those components interact and

shape each other, thus influencing the characteristics of the whole system and impacting their

environment; their interdependency gives those networks stability.

2.3 Socio-Technical Constellations in a Wider Context

The socio-technical constellations, of which technical innovations are a part, are again em-

bedded in a larger context. This socio-economic embedding of a sector is an important factor in

Dolata’s definition; the section on Dolata’s sectoral systems in chapter 2.2 already partially

covered the issue. In this chapter, I am going to enlarge upon interactions between different

constellations. I will further introduce concepts, which will allow me to analyze mechanisms of

change that can be found on different levels of society (see chapter 5). Additionally, I will dis-

cuss the concept of ‘sectoral impact and adoptability’ by Ulrich Dolata, which I am going to

apply in my last chapter (see chapter 6).

7 translation by the author


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2.3.1 The Evolution of Large Technological Systems

In Hughes’ concept of the evolution of large technological systems8, those systems exist in an

environment of all the components, which are not part of the system, in other words, an envi-

ronment of other technological systems. There is, for example, the technological system of wind

power, solar energy, the well-established technological system of energy production through oil

and carbon, and many others. Those technological systems can again be divided into subsys-

tems, which depend on the choice of the level of analysis (Hughes 1989: 55). The technological

system of wind power is, for example, a subsystem of the technological system of renewable

energies. So, technological systems have defined boundaries, they are however never complete-

ly autonomous from their environment. As system builders (see above) try to get more and

more components under the control of the system, they give it stability, make it durable, and

minimize uncertainties. Little by little, through “organizations and people committed by vari-

ous interests” (ibid.: 76) a system can acquire momentum and become seemingly independent

of its environment. Technological systems are however open systems that depend on other

systems and are influenced by them:

“Two kinds of environment relate to open technological systems: ones on which they are dependent and ones dependent on them. In neither case is there interaction between the system and the environment; there is simply a one-way influence. Because they are not under the control, environmental factors affecting the system should not be mistaken for components of the system.” (ibid.: 53).

With growing size and complexity of a system problems are likely to increase, as well.

Hughes calls them ‘reverse salients’.

“Reverse salients are components in the system that have fallen behind or are out of phase with the others. […] Until the lagging components can be altered, often by inven-tion, they are reverse salients.” (ibid.: 73)

Being out of phase, reverse salients restrain development. If a reverse salient has no big impact

on the system’s growth, yet, it can be balance or removed by new, but usually conservative or

incremental inventions. When a reverse salient cannot be corrected within the context of an

8 Hughes developed a non-linear, complex phase model (see also chapter 2.4) of “the history of technological systems” (Hughes 1989). In this model, he showed that “large, modern technological systems seem[ed] to evolve in accordance with a loosely defined pattern [of evolution: …] invention, development, innovation, transfer, and growth, competition and consolidation” (ibid.: 56). For my study, I only selected certain aspects of this approach; I will not discuss it in detail.


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existing system anymore, it becomes a radical problem and its solution may bring a new and

competing system with it. The concept of the reverse salient is very similar to that of mis-

matches (see chapter 2.3.3), or that of tensions in the regime structure (see chapter 2.3.2),

which I will use in chapter 5.

Hughes assumes that radical innovations neither become components in existing technologi-

cal systems (this is where incremental change takes place) nor do they contribute to their

development and growth. They more likely challenge the systems and force them to change. So,

if successfully developed, radical inventions will culminate in new technological systems. In

the case of wind power, it has to be discussed how well the new technological system around

the innovation could establish itself in France (see chapter 6).

2.3.2 Technological Transitions in a Multi-Level-Framework

The ‘multi-level-perspective’, first formulated by Arie Rip and René Kemp (1998), is a further

concept that applies the idea of socio-technical constellations. Next to some of the aspects of

Hughes’ theory on the development of technological systems (see above) the concepts and

mechanisms of change of this theoretical approach will later serve me to find enabling and

constricting factors of the wind energy development in France (see chapter 5). Technological

transitions (‘TT’) are conceptualized as something more than just technological changes:

“TT do not only involve technological changes, but also changes in elements such as user practices, regulation, industrial networks, infrastructure, and symbolic meaning. […] TT consist of a change from one sociotechnical configuration to another, involving substitution of technology, as well as changes in other elements.” (Geels 2002: 1257f)

So, in the course of technological transitions, entire socio-technical configurations composed of

heterogeneous elements have to be modified. Such a modification of established configurations

is however no easy task.

“Such reconfiguration processes do not occur easily, because the elements in a sociotech-nical configuration are linked and aligned to each other. Radically new technologies have a hard time to break through, because regulations, infrastructure, user practices, maintenance networks are aligned to the existing technology.” (Geels 2002: 1258)

New radical innovations – or so-called “hopeful monstrosities” (ibid.: 1261) – emerge in small

niches where they do not have to compete with established socio-institutional constellations at

first. Market selection is deliberately kept out to provide a protected space with special selec-


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tion criteria for newly emerging, radical innovations. This is necessary because “they have

relatively low technical performance, [and] are often cumbersome and expensive” (ibid.).

The multi-level-perspective gives a contextualized view of the role such niches play in the

process of technological transitions. Rip and Kemp describe and analyze the connections and

interactions between different levels of society in which those transition processes take place.

They distinguish three analytical levels (see also Weyer 2008):

1) The micro-level of the niche – a protected space for innovations, which will eventually develop

into a new regime

2) The meso-level of socio-technical regimes – a system of formal, normative, and cognitive rules,

which enables and constrains possible courses of action and

3) The macro-level of socio-technical landscapes – the material and cultural framework for the

niche and the regime

Their conception of socio-technical regimes is an extended version of the ‘technological regime’

from evolutionary economics. Rip and Kemp specifically refer to the “Nelson-Winter-Dosi-

model” (Van den Belt & Rip 1989) of technological development. In this model, a technological

regime is formed by shared cognitive routines of an engineer community, which are embedded

in the minds and practices of those engineers and which guide innovative activity in one direc-

tion, along ‘technological trajectories’, towards incremental change (Geels 2002: 1259). As do

technological regimes, socio-technical regimes are guiding activities of relevant actors, are

giving orientation, and accounting for stability of established configurations. Socio-technical

regimes comprise however a much larger set of social groups (like for example: users, policy

makers, suppliers, scientists, or banks) and they do not only refer to “cognitive routines and

belief systems, but also to regulative rules and normative roles” (Geels & Schot 2008: 545).

‘Socio-technical landscapes’ are conceptualized as an external structure or context in which

regimes and niches are embedded. Like regimes, they also can function as selection mecha-

nisms for transitions, but are much harder to change. Deep structural trends and patterns like

macro-political developments, changes in cultural patterns, or macro-economical trends are

beyond the direct influence of niche and regime actors. They are susceptible to change, more

slowly than regimes however, as developmental shifts occur across decades.


18

figure 2: Multi-level-perspective on transitions (Geels & Schot 2008: 546; Geels 2002: 1263)

The connections between the three levels are never unilateral:

“The core notion of the multi-level perspective (MLP) is that transitions come about through interactions between processes at different levels [...] The MLP thus corrects the suggestion of the early SNM [Strategic Niche Management] literature that regime shifts would come about through bottom-up processes of niche expansion.” (Geels & Schot 2008: 546)


19

Radical innovations may build up internal momentum, gradually stabilize into a new domi-

nant design, and break out of the niche to form a new regime9, but to cause a shift in existing

structures and frameworks, changes at all three levels have to occur. It would be an oversimpli-

fication to assume that niches are just “waiting out there” (Geels 2002: 1271) and that they can

break out just by themselves. Niche-intern mechanisms to accelerate technological transitions

are important, but they need the support of favorable processes at the regime and landscape

level. As interconnections between levels are not uni-lateral, transformation processes can

work in the opposite manner as well. Successfully established, new regimes may contribute to

changes on the landscape level. Important is the alignment of developments and processes at

multiple levels (Geels & Schot 2008: 545; Geels 2002: 1262) and in both directions (bottom-up

and top-down).

At the niche level, transition processes can be supported by the cumulative effect of “niche-

piling” (Rip & Schot 2002: 165) or “niche-cumulation” (Geels 2002: 1271): innovations branch

out into further varieties, transfer their specific mode of application to other domains or mar-

kets, and “add up to something more than their simple sum” (Rip and Schot 2002: 165). Anoth-

er niche-mechanism is that of technological add-on or hybridization (Geels 2002): an innovation

physically links up with established technology, often in its early phase, to form some kind of

symbiosis; thus, there is no immediate competition. Furthermore, new technology can break

out of its niche by riding along with growth in particular markets and profit from the increased

demand (ibid.).

At the landscape level, favorable processes for transition can be shifts such as cultural

changes, demographic trends, or broad political changes and revolutions. Changes at the land-

scape level take place very slowly, but have the power to put pressure on socio-technical re-

9 Recent works revealed some new types of co-evolution between niches and regimes and more differentiated views of their interactions (Geels & Schot 2008: 547). They show that niche-regime interactions need not always be about competition (this is contrary to what Hughes said) and that niches can play very different roles in those interactions: they can become a new regime and eventually replaces the old one, but they can also incorporated into existing regimes. The adoption or incorporation of innovations into existing regimes usually happens to solve certain problems. Thus, they may transform the regime from within. Another alternative to substitution that has been discovered was the translation from niche experiences to the regime; niche practices are picked up and applied by actors of the dominant regime, thus triggering regime changes. It is however arguable if a radical regime shift can be achieved in these ways.


20

gimes and destabilize them. Thus, ‘windows of opportunity10’ for niche innovations are likely

open up.

Processes and events at the regime level can also create such windows of opportunity. They

may be caused by tensions in the regime. Geels distinguishes seven dimensions of socio-

technical regimes: “technology, user practices and application domains (markets), symbolic

meaning of technology, infrastructure, industry structure, policy and techno-scientific

knowledge” (ibid.). Those dimensions are interconnected and co-evolve, but they also have their

own internal dynamics. Like in Hughes’ concept of reverse salients (see chapter 2.3.1), this

may lead to tensions, which could create openings for innovations by weakening the linkages

between the components of the regime.

I will work with those concepts in chapter 5 when analyzing constricting and enabling fac-

tors of the French wind energy development.

2.3.3 Technology-Based Sectoral Change

Ulrich Dolata developed an analytic framework for studying and explaining technology-

driven sectoral change (Dolata 2008a: 6). It is based on two theoretical concepts: that of socio-

technical constellations (see above) and that of matches and mismatches by Freeman and Perez

(ibid.: 7f). Interrelationships in socio-technical constellations are conceptualized as matches.

Components of constellations have to be aligned to a working match otherwise those heteroge-

neous systems do not work properly (see also chapter 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, reverse salient’s and

tensions on the regime level). Impulses for change and modification in matches can be quite

different. Some economical, political, and societal examples are: modulation of the legal frame-

work, reorientation in corporate strategies, acquisition or take-over of organizations, new com-

petitors, changes in consumer preferences, or changes in public perception of problems and

risks. Existing constellations can also be influenced by both new radical and incremental tech-

nologies. Major challenges for and modifications of established constellations often derive from

fundamentally new or substantially enhanced technologies – also called system innovations11 –

that cannot be integrated into established matches anymore because frameworks and structures 10 This expression will be used as in Geels 2002: 1262. 11 System innovations are innovations that have a significant effect on established social, economical, and institutional structures and that entail fundamental changes (Ohlhorst 2008: 213f).


21

no longer corresponds to the potential of the new technology. Those phases of searching, exper-

imenting, struggling, and adjusting are called “periods of mismatch” that, over time, result in a

new equilibrium.

Thus far, Dolata’s observations are not very different from the approaches I have introduced.

From his point of view, Freeman’s and other scholar’s concepts of technological change are not

fully satisfying, though, as they remain vague in the analysis of concrete patterns, dynamics,

and variants of technology-driven socio-economic and institutional transformation. New tech-

nologies can affect sectors in very different ways and they can also be perceived and treated

quite differently depending on the respective structure and constellation of the sector.

“The match/mismatch approach conceptualizes the influence of new technologies on so-cioeconomic and institutional change as pressure on existing structures, institutions, and actors to change and adjust. However, when we focus on the meso-level, it becomes obvious that, at times, the pressure of the same set of technologies on various economic sectors differs significantly.” (ibid.: 9).

To identify and analyze technology-driven sectoral change, Dolata formulated the concepts of

‘sectoral impact’ (also called ‘transformative capacity’) and of ‘sectoral adaptability’. I will come

back to those considerations in chapter 6 when discussing the transformation process of the

French wind energy sector.

The transformative capacity of a technology can by defined along two dimensions. The first

dimension is that of a technology’s origin: technologies developed outside a sector using them

(exogenous) and technologies that come from within a certain sector (endogenous) must be

distinguished. In sectors with a high degree of innovative activity, technology-driven change

processes may derive from endogenous innovations and from exogenous innovations tailored to

the demands of the sector. Economic sectors that are not characterized as innovative mainly

use externally developed technologies and adapt them to their needs through a processes of co-

invention. The second dimension of transformative capacity is that of a low versus a high im-

pact of a technology on the sector. A technology may have only a feeble transformative capacity

and fail to challenge the established structures of a sector. The higher the relevance of the

technology for the sector, the lower the possibility to modify and adapt it to the sector’s needs,

and the higher the need for a restructuring of the sector, the higher is the pressure and the

effect of the innovation on the existing match of constellations in the sector.


22

That still leaves open the question of how exactly a new, challenging technology is handled

within the sector, which then determines the specific course of sectoral transformation. All of

this depends on the adaptability and openness towards path-deviant developments of the exist-

ing sectoral structures and institutions, and on the actors’ capability to anticipate and to react

adequately:

“Existing sectoral systems and their actors may be characterized by structural, institu-tional, and cognitive openness and adaptability, which encourages the early perception and adoption of new technological opportunities. At the other end of the scale, we find sectors that are characterized by persistence and structural conservatism on both the system and actor levels, which impedes early and directed sectoral change and causes crisis-ridden adjustment processes instead.” (ibid.: 13)

The spectrum of adaptability stretches from structural, institutional, and cognitive openness to

persistence and conservatism. Low adaptability is typical for sectoral systems with structures

and institutions that have been very stable, successful, and therefore change-resistant over a

long time. In those sectors, new technologies are often treated with suspicion and their effects

and potentials are often noticed very late. Together with a high transformative capacity of a

new technology such persistence usually leads to crisis-like reactions and transformations; the

process is then undirected and not under the control of focal actors. Dolata calls it “transfor-

mation-resistant sectoral path dependency” (Dolata 2007: 37). High transformative capacity

and high adaptability and anticipation skills however lead to a transformation-supportive sec-

toral path dependency. Some sectors have institutionalized mechanisms of transformation,

which facilitate sectoral change that deviates from established paths (Dolata 2008a: 7). Those

mechanisms are not the same in all sectoral systems and may also vary in different nations, but

some relevant mechanisms are: strong dynamics of technological innovation and economic

competition, “transformation-supporting industry structures [, …] horizontally structured and

collaboratively embedded focal actors [, …] institutionalized mechanisms of transfer between

academia and industry [, … and] technology, innovation, and competition policy” (ibid.: 18f).

Anticipative and adaptive sectors are much more likely to actively steer and control sectoral

change. In this case, change is more like an “open-minded use and advancement of new techno-

logical alternatives [... and] matching structural and institutional arrangements” (ibid.: 19) than

a crisis-ridden, and late, reaction to endogenous shocks and the pressure to adapt. This does

not mean, of course, that it is a harmonious process; competition, power struggles, and read-


23

justments in constellations of actors and power structures are defining characteristics of all

sectoral change processes.

Together, the two concepts create specific modes of sectoral transformation. To further ana-

lyze and explain them Dolata draws on the concept of “gradual institutional transformations”

by Streeck and Thelen (Dolata 2007: 43).

“by means of the concept of gradual transformations we can analyze technology-driven sectoral change, beyond the dichotomy of continuity and sharp breaks, as a multitude of more or less consistent organizational, structural, and institutional readjustments, thereby highlighting the numerous tentative, erratic, and highly competitive sectoral re-structurings that span a longer period of time and are typical even of sectors confronted with serious pressure to change.” (Dolata 2008a: 24)

With this last aspect of his concept Dolata criticizes certain phase models of technology devel-

opment that assume that transformations processes are characterized by stable paths that are

only occasionally interrupted (cf. chapter 2.4 – path dependence) or that they are characterized

by long convergent and short divergent periods (cf. chapter 2.4 – innovation journey). He sug-

gests instead that transformation processes are gradual, consist of rather long phases of discon-

tinuity, and remain susceptible to change all throughout the development process (Dolata 2007;

Dolata 2008b; Dolata & Werle 2007).

2.4 Pattern, Phases and Paths

When analyzing innovations, dynamic aspects of society, concepts of change, and transitions

are very important. Through innovations, there arise new social constellations or pre-existing

constellations are changed. In my study on the development of wind power in France, change is

conceptualized as a process that has an established socio-technical constellation as a starting

point and that results in a new and modified socio-technical constellation (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer

2008). To this point, I have left out all aspects that refer to a temporal order of technological

change, to the partitioning of change processes into specified phases or periods, and to their

generalization into typical patterns and courses. I justify this choice with respect to my object

of study, for, in the French case, I have to deal with a rather short development process that did

not even “really take-off” yet. The analyzable evolution is therefore too short to show a distinct

and generalizable pattern. I will nonetheless devote a brief section to phases, paths, and pat-

tern, as two important sociological studies about wind power development (see chapter 3) are


24

based on, on the one hand, a ‘complex phase model’ (as in: Schön et al. 2008, Ohlhorst 2008)

and, on the other hand, a ‘path model’ (as in: Garud & Karnoe 2003). In chapter 4, I will loosely

base the description of the French development on the phases presented in the German case study.

Non-Linear Phases and Recurrent Cycles

There exist several quite similar approaches for analyzing technology and innovation devel-

opment that assume that those processes do not have linear, but complex sequences. Classical

complex phase models distinguish generally between three ideal-typical phases: genesis, stabi-

lization and diffusion, like for example Johannes Weyer’s concept of “networked innovations”12

(Weyer 2008: 186f, Schulz-Schaeffer 2008: 15f). The innovation’s development is described as a

multistage process of social construction of technology. Another concept that assumes that

innovation processes can be subdivided into three big phases or periods – that are in fact not

unlike the three phases of the basic complex phase models – is the so called ‘Innovation Jour-

ney’. The authors of this approach focus however on a cyclical model of innovation processes

(Van de Ven et al. 2008). They describe an ‘innovation journey’ as “a nonlinear cycle of diver-

gent and convergent activities that may repeat over time and at different organizational levels

if resources are obtained to renew the cycle” (ibid.: 184). These loops are basically composed of

one shorter, divergent period (characterized by complexity, expansion, and dissemination

activities) and one longer, convergent period (characterized by constraining factors, focusing,

and reduction of complexity) and are typical in particular organizational innovation processes.

Complex phase models are one important theoretical basis for Ohlhorst’s concept of phase

modules in the development of wind energy in Germany (see chapter 3.2). In her study she

describes the discontinuous and non-linear development of wind energy as a sequence of ideal-

typical phases, some longer and some shorter, which are combined in varying ways.

Path Dependence and Path Creation

First formulated by Paul David and Brian Arthur (David 1985; Arthur 1994; Meyer & Schu-

bert 2005), the concept of ‘Path Dependence’ tries to explain why suboptimal and proportional-

12 translation by the author: ‘vernetzte Innovationen’


25

ly inefficient technologies can prevail over seemingly superior ones. The path concept13 ex-

plains why decisions made in the past, even though circumstances may have changed, still

influence the present course of events, or, in other words, why technological standards persist

even though new and “better” technologies have been invented that could replace them. It says

that the course of all social processes can be reduced to path dependencies and historical condi-

tionality. The phenomenon is explained by three mechanisms that create, stabilize, and help to

pursue paths: “increasing returns”, “momentum”, and “lock-ins” (ibid.). The increasing margin-

al utility one can derive from continuously using the same kind of technology (increasing

returns) contributes to the emergence of a path, which stabilizes and increases in strength over

time and develops some kind of internal dynamics (momentum). The force of habit (known

technologies are easier to use and to anticipate in their further development) and invested time,

money, and knowledge into a certain technology also play an important role for a technological

path to acquire momentum. The steadiness and assumed irreversibility of a hardened structure

of rules and routines – or a path – is called lock-in. For some time, development happens quite

predictably along those paths then, which can only be interrupted and changed through exter-

nal shocks. Shocks cause disruptions in paths, creating a short-time period in which processes

are open to development in new directions before the described process starts anew. Innovation

processes are thus seen as a succession of long stable and short unstable periods.

The concept of path creation, mainly formulated by Raghu Garud and Peter Karnoe (Garud &

Karnoe 2003, see also Meyer & Schubert 2005), carries on the main aspects of path dependence

with one major modification: Garud and Karnoe emphasize the active role actors can play in

changing existent and creating new paths. Apart from external shocks, actors (with sufficient

resources) can deliberately alter paths. Garud and Karnoe therefore speak of technology entre-

preneurship as a process of ‘mindful deviation’. They also assume that success or failure of

technology entrepreneurship is not attributed to a single individual. In innovative projects,

agency is distributed across different kind of actors that become involved with the technology

13 Some of the other concepts I introduced sometimes refer to the notion of paths, as well: Socio-technical regimes, for example, consist of hardened rules, routines, and structures that account for stability and guide development along technological trajectories – or in other words along established paths (see chapter 2.3.2) – and Dolata mentions ‘path deviant development’ and ‘sectoral path dependency’ when explaining sectoral impact and transformative capacity (see chapter 2.3.3).


26

in question and thus influence the development of an emerging technological path. Through the

steady accumulation of inputs from various actors that try to shape it, the path gains momen-

tum and begins, on his part, to influence (to constrain but also to enable) the activities of the

actors involved. One of their studies is about the development of wind power stations in Den-

mark and in the United States of America (see chapter 3.1).


27

3 Case Studies in other National Contexts

To be able to contextualize the development of the French wind energy sector, it is helpful to

be familiar with the development of the sector in other countries and their special characteris-

tics. In the context of my work, I cannot offer a full comparison of several or even of two coun-

tries; I will instead briefly present two important sociological studies on wind energy develop-

ment in other countries that I am going to refer to in my work. One of them asserts that there

are two opposite approaches to technology entrepreneurship (see above): a breakthrough ap-

proach and a bricolage approach (Garud & Karnoe 2003). Both of them could be detected in the

German wind energy development, but I could only find aspects of the findings of this case

study in the French wind energy development, which seems to follow a special path. In my

description of this special ‘French way’, I will later use the theoretical concept of phases of the

second case study, an analysis of the ‘innovation biography’ of wind energy in Germany (Ohl-

horst 2008).

3.1 The Development of Wind Power Stations in Denmark

and in the USA

In their comparative study about different paths of wind turbine technology development in

Denmark and in the USA (Garud & Karnoe 2003), Garud and Karnoe analyze why one path

eventually prevailed over the other. Their question “How is it possible for one group of actors

deploying modest resources to prevail over another deploying far superior resources?” (ibid.:

278) finally led to the discovery of two contrasting approaches to technology entrepreneurship

that actors in the US and in Denmark pursued: bricolage and breakthrough. The Danish ap-

proach to wind turbine development, called ‘bricolage’, was characterized by the deployment of

modest resources, a steady build up and improvement process, and a low-tech design. Through

resourcefulness and improvisation, involved actors progressively and collectively built up a

functional wind turbine path. Actors of the US path followed a different logic, labeled ‘break-

through’. With sophisticated high-tech designs, large development leaps, and a science-based


28

technology-push model, they tried to overtake the Danes. The path finally failed though, despite

of a deployment of significant financial and intellectual resources. Why?

The group of designers and producers in Denmark consisted of groups of mostly practical

engineers and technicians that were skilled workers but lacked theoretical knowledge on tur-

bine aerodynamics. So, they started low and took much smaller steps in designing, redesigning,

and improving their turbines, which allowed them to initiate learning processes. In addition,

there was considerable interaction among those early designers and producers that formed into

collaborative networks. Such networks could not be found between actors in the US. Besides,

designers started on a much higher level and did not take the time to engage in product devel-

opment in-between the large scale-up stages. The American actors therefore deprived them-

selves of precious learning processes that are vital for the emergence of a viable technology

path. Developers in the US could not profit from interaction with wind turbine users either like

the Danish could, because ownership structure was very different. In Denmark small turbines

were sold to individual users and cooperatives, keen on improving the turbine design and on

sharing their knowledge about operating them, thus offering continual feedback, whereas in

the US, many wind parks were sold to actors that did not depend on the performance of a wind

turbine bur rather were interested in generating profits by exploiting subsidies and tax credits.

The knowledge base in the Danish case was also broadened by results of evaluation and test

centers that systematically tested wind turbines, thus contributing to the development of indus-

try-wide standards and a research agenda. This kind of extensive and trusting relationship was

not to be found between the US-American wind turbine industry and the National Renewable

Energy Laboratory. The laboratory did not insure systematic testing of commercial turbines,

but focused instead on research and testing of a high-tech turbine design, generating abstract

models that were too theoretical to be useful to the commercial turbine designers. A last signif-

icant difference of the two paths can be found in regulatory involvement. Danish policy makers,

“a fragile yet persistent political coalition around wind energy” (ibid.: 293), strategically

steered or modulated activities in the emerging wind turbine industry. With rather flexible and

adaptable policies, they kept the path alive in times of crisis or prevented the market from

growing too fast. The US government also played an active role in shaping the wind turbine

path in offering huge incentives, like market subsidies and tax credits to users and producers.


29

It’s interventions had an episodic quality, though: first “jump-starting” (ibid.: 284) the wind

turbine markets and then, after a government change, abruptly removing subsidies and thus

putting the wind turbine industry in a difficult position.

These findings show that “micro-processes can have the potential to overcome advantages

conferred by a sophisticated high-tech approach backed by large-scale resources (ibid.: 281).”

3.2 The Innovation Biography of Wind Energy in Germany

Dörte Ohlhorst’s dissertation about ‘the development of wind energy in Germany’ (Ohlhorst

2008) originated in the context of an interdisciplinary research project at the Center for Tech-

nology and Society Berlin with the title ‘Wind Energy – An Innovation Biography’ (Schön et al.

2008). Constellations, phases, and patterns of innovation and technology development process-

es are described as follows: It is presumed that innovation processes neither follow the same

sequence of phases every time nor that they proceed without any discernible regularity. They

rather consist of certain typical and recurrent situations and phases – the modules (Ohlhorst

2008: 185) – which are combined in varying ways. Thus, the respective sequence and length of

phases in innovation processes can deviate significantly. Besides, phases do not succeed each

other in a linear way but overlap, repeat themselves, or feed back so that they cannot always be

distinguished clearly from one another. The typology of those phases is based on the idea of

‘ideal types’. Figure 3 shows the German development curve and its composition of different

modules.

In the pioneer or departure phase, new technology is born (or an old model is rediscovered).

The technology initially manifests a large technical diversity and is usually not profitable yet.

The phase’s function is to give the new technology a possibility to arise and grow. The socio-

technical constellation can be characterized as a “sensible niche” (ibid.: 186) that is completely

isolated from the dominant system or constellation and that has not found a stable internal

equilibrium, yet. The niche assumes the function of a protective space for the still unstable,

new technology that cannot develop on its own and that is dependent on the commitment of

pioneers and on stimulating context events. In Germany, that phase lasted about 15 years, from

the middle of the 1970s until 1986 and was characterized by two different socio-technical

constellations grouped around two different technologies. The path that resulted in a dead end


30

describes the failed attempt to realize a large-scale wind energy project initiated by the gov-

ernment, the GROWIAN (in German short for large-scale wind energy facility). Like in the USA,

the underlying principles of the breakthrough approach did not lead to success. The develop-

ment along the other path progressed similarly to the development in Denmark and on a low-

tech design and steadily building up (see above).

figure 3: Phases of the innovation process of wind energy in Germany (Ohlhorst 2008: 185)14

In the phase of progression, the niche-constellation and the technology itself stabilize more

and more. It is characterized by a stepwise and purposeful improvement of the technology’s

performance and efficiency, the stabilization of the development process, the gradual emer-

gence of a dominant design, and the diffusion of the technology. In other words, the technologi-

cal evolution develops into some kind of path or trajectory that becomes narrower and more

distinct over time and that guides the continuing development. Thus, the niche becomes more

and more self-supporting but is still strongly dependent on governmental and entrepreneurial



31

protection for the dominant paradigm still exerts a strong influence on the niche-constellation.

At the same time however, the niche begins to compete with the established paradigm.

Through the innovation’s success, the established system is faced with arising doubts but it

still remains strong and closed, which makes it difficult for the niche-technology to break

through. In Germany, that phase lasted from 1986 until 1990 and was largely triggered by the

Chernobyl disaster. This ‘external shock’ caused massive changes in the awareness of risks

regarding nuclear energy production, which put pressure on the established technological

paradigm and and destabilized it. The wind energy niche took advantage of those events

and expanded.

In the phase of the dynamic expansion, the niche eventually develops into an established el-

ement of the overall system. By acquiring momentum, it becomes stable and self-supporting.

Technological development then becomes predominantly incremental. The constellation in this

phase is usually characterized by the addition of new elements (like new companies, investors,

legal arrangements, or the enhancement of the infrastructure) and by the development of a

strong bond between of the relevant actors. Ideally, the constellation in this phase would be

consistent and not marked by conflicts. So far in Germany, two such phases of dynamic expan-

sion could be observed: one from 1991 until 1995 (the breakthrough phase) and the wind-

energy boost from 1998 until 2002. During the breakthrough phase, the wind energy constella-

tion was still a large niche whereas in the boost phase, wind energy finally developed into

a self-contained part of the German energy supply system.

In the German case, the two phases of the dynamic expansion have been interrupted by a

short phase called ‘development slump’; it can arise through the occurrence of several unfavor-

able niche-external or niche-internal developments – like, for example, the massive resistance

from the traditional energy industry, a hesitant attitude of actors in the finance sector, and

changes in the legal framework with a negative effect. Such a crisis-like situation can be just a

temporal lean period but it can also become very critical for a niche-technology and even

threaten its existence; that depends on how fast obstacles can be overcome. The phase’s charac-

teristics are the rearrangement and at best the re-stabilization of the unbalanced and disturbed

constellation.


32

The last phase of the German development curve (the consolidation phase from 2002 until

2007) includes another split-up into two different paths: that of the on-shore constellation and

that of the offshore constellation. It can be called ‘bifurcation’ or ‘forking’. Technology devel-

opment branches out and new fields of application can thus be opened up. The German on-

shore development is characterized through decreasing installation rates and a focus on export

trade and repowering. The offshore development is still in the early stages and is mainly sup-

ported by a new constellation of actors consisting of the German government and large enter-

prises of the still dominant energy supply industry. Both paths have to deal with the problem of

the integration of ever increasing amounts of RES-E into a limited grid. Whether both of them

will be successful or whether one (or even both) will eventually turn out to be unsuccessful,

and thus leading to a dead end, cannot be determined.

This analysis of wind energy development in Germany showed that the process was discon-

tinuous and non-linear and was composed of a sequence of different phases or modules. Ohl-

horst also observed that some phases with stable and consistent constellations were longer and

some phases marked by unstable constellations and bold changes were shorter. These findings

would confirm the assumption of the theoretical approaches discussed in chapter 2.4 (the

Innovation Journey and Path Dependence) that such innovation processes consist of long con-

vergent and short divergent periods.


33

4 The Development of the French Wind Energy Sector

France’s wind energy sector started to develop much later and relatively slower than the

German wind energy sector, but due to very favorable wind conditions and the adoption of a

feed-in tariff system in 2001 (which had already been successfully applied in several coun-

tries), a dynamic development in the French sector has been predicted ever since the abolition

of a first tender scheme in 2000. The promised innovations took time to get off the ground,

though. The rate at which technology was installed and implemented was much slower than

expected, or hoped for, and would have to increase dramatically if the RES-E (electricity produc-

tion from renewable energy sources) capacity targets for 2010 were to be reached. The newly

installed capacity did, however, not increase much until the year 2005. (Jobert et al. 2007,

Persem 2008, Dena 2006, EWEA 2005)

figure 4: Annual and cumulated wind development in MW (RTE 2009a: 68)


34

2005 was the year when France joined, for the first time, the ‘top ten wind power markets’

regarding delivered wind turbines (Chabot 2006) and it seemed as if the sector finally reached

a “tipping point”. Since 2006, France displayed one of the most dynamic development rates in

Europe with 950 MW in 2008 (see figure 5); however, it still lagged far behind the two Europe-

an market leaders Germany (1,665 MW) and Spain (1,609 MW) or the international newcomers

China (6,300 MW), the US (8,358 MW), and India (1,800 MW) (GTAI.de, GWEC 2008, RTE

2009a).

figure 5: Installed wind power by country on December 31, 2008 (SER/FEE kit éolien 2009: 2)

The following table (see table 1) substantiates the above-mentioned development curve (see

figure 4) of the French wind energy sector over the last twelve years. In this table view of the

data, it becomes clear that apart from two very small setbacks in the early development stages


35

(1998 and 2001, in red15), the development is marked by a continuous capacity increase. From

2005 on, rates of installation are comparatively high. When comparing the years 1998 and

2006, the amount of MW that was built annually increased one hundred times. At the end of

2005, the first TWh of wind energy was produced, which more than double production figures

from 2004. And 2006 growth rates, both in MW (810 MW) and in GWh (1,206 GWh) indicate a

possible take-off in the French wind energy sector, as well.

Year Over-all

number of

WPS

Annual

installation

rate of WPS

Cumulative

installed

capacity in

MW

Annual

installation

rate in MW

Produced

energy in

GWh

Annual

increase in

GWh

1996 33 25 3 1

1997 59 26 (78.8%) 5 2 (66.7%)

1998 70 11 (18.6%) 13 8 (160%)

1999 154 84 (120%) 21 8 (61.5%)

2000 242 88 (57.1%) 61 40 (190.5%) 70

2001 302 60 (24.8%) 92 31 (50.8%) 131 61 (87%)

2002 374 72 (23.8%) 144 52 (56.5%) 245 114 (87%)

2003 500 126 (33.7%) 244 100 (69.4%) 363 118 (48%)

2004 649 149 (29.8%) 390 146 (59.8%) 577 214 (59%)

2005 956 307 (47.3%) 757 367 (94.1%) 963

first TWh

386 (67%)

2006 1344 388 (40.6%) 1567 810 (107%) 2169 1206 (125%)

2007 1868 524 (39%) 2455 888 (56.7%) 4140 1971 (91%)

2008 2488 620 (33.2%) 3404 949 (38.7%)

first GW

5653 1513 (35%)

table 1: Table view of the French wind energy development from 1996 to 2008 (the figures I used for my calculations can be looked up in: SER/FEE kit éolien 2009 + état parc 2009)

15 Where do those setbacks come from? The “2001-setback” may result from possible hesitant behavior of park developers that wanted to await the new legal framework before deciding to further or henceforth investing in wind energy.


36

The annual installation rate in MW now seems to stabilize around 1,000 MW per year (RTE

2009a) although Charles Dugué, the President of the French Wind Organization, claims that “in

terms of projects we have the pipeline there to reach 2,000 MW per year” (EWEA 2009a) – a

rate of installation that will be absolutely necessary to meet France’s RES-E capacity target of

25 GW in 2020. This 2020 target is still attainable, but despite recent developments in the

sector, France’s 2010 target (13.5 GW) is not likely to be reached. It also remains unclear

whether the recent capacity increase is the beginning of a “real” breakthrough of wind power

in the French energy sector or whether it will remain a niche in a nuclear dominated energy

system. Although the French wind energy lobby seems optimistic to be able to increase instal-

lation rates and to help on the sector (see above), an international wind market trend analysis

(Husum WindEnergy 2008) assumes that the importance of the French market share will de-

crease rather than increase in the years to come. So, the future development remains ambiguous.

A rather interesting discovery was the fact that the development of the French and the Ger-

man wind curve is quite similar when theoretically shifting the German curve at about 10 years

(see figure 6). In most articles about wind energy development in France, it is mentioned that

France was lagging far behind other countries and that development was much slower than in

the pioneer countries. However, when comparing the French development with that of Germa-

ny ten years earlier, the similarities are striking – admittedly, always provided that France

sticks to its RES-E capacity targets, as from the 2009-mark on, I worked with hypothetical

figures16. These findings are rather encouraging for the French wind energy sector and given

the time, perhaps it will be able to catch up; however, one has to ask the question: why was the

rate at which the technology was installed and implemented not quicker? With state-of-the-art

on-shore wind generators producing ever-increasing amounts of electricity and with the foun-

dation that other countries had already laid in the domain of policy framework, France should

have been able to achieve much higher installation rates than Germany did 10 years ago.

16 To meet the target of 25 GW in 2020 an annual installation rate of at least 1,800 MW is necessary.


37

figure 6: Wind power development in France and Germany (graphic rendered by author)


38

I will later argue that France’s development curve of wind energy production is very likely to

be capped at a certain point (see chapter 6). Before going into detail though about why and how

the French wind energy sector was and still is constricted, I am going to describe the develop-

ment of the sector on the basis of Dolata’s analytical categories of sectoral systems (cf. chapter

2.2, its technological profile, institutional arrangements, socio-economic context, and actor

constellations and networks) and on Ohlhorst’s classification on different phases or modules of

innovation processes (cf. chapter 3.2). The fact that the analyzable development period is still

very short and the fact that the sector’s development is marked by a constant capacity increase

make it difficult to group events into distinct development phases. My attempt to subdivide the

development into different periods on the basis Ohlhorst’s classification is as follows: a “pre-

phase” lasted from the 1940s until the 1990s, followed by a first period inspired by the pioneer

or departure phase (1991 - 2000), then a learning period that is loosely based on the phase of

progression (2000 - 2005), and finally the possible beginning of a take-off (from 2005 on).

Those phases can be found in each of the following subchapters.

4.1 Technology Development and Technological Profile

of the Sector

Technical Details of the Core Technology17

The wind power station (‘WPS’) is the core technology of the wind energy niche. There exist

several, technically different types but all of them transform wind into electricity and are uni-

formly used for this purpose – the most commonly used design I will shortly describe in detail.

The here-introduced WPS should not be confused with the windmill. At first glance they seem

quite similar: they both have a wind turbine that converts the kinetic energy in the wind into

mechanical power. However, windmills do not convert this mechanical energy into electricity;

they use it directly for various machinery (e.g. for grinding grain or pumping water). WPSs

additionally have generators that convert the mechanical energy into electricity. (VDE.com)

This electricity can be produced for home requirements only, it can be fed in the overall power

17 This chapter is very technical and serves above all a better understanding of the core technology of the sector that I am going to describe and analyze.


39

supply system, or it can be stored elsewhere for future use. Small, individually usable consum-

er technologies, used for home requirements (between 0.1 and 20 kW; see ADEME guide: 22ff),

are not prevalent in France (only about 1,000 small wind systems as compared to over 10,000

in the UK; see LaTribune.fr, BWEA 2009) and do not presently exert influence on the develop-

ment of the wind energy sector in France. I will therefore limit myself to the analysis of modu-

lar technologies consisting of several autonomous and complex technologies (like generators,

gears, or transformers) and producing electricity, which is then sold to power consumers (the

electricity being the merchandise and the WPS the industrial good). Purchasers of WPSs are

mostly industrial costumers, but also individuals or associations of such. Several wind power

stations together are called a wind park or farm.

The existence of wind is dependent on the sun. Wind is therefore a form of solar energy.

Masses of air are set into motion due to an inhomogeneous surface of the earth, uneven heating

of the atmosphere, and rotation of the earth. (WindSonne.de) The kinetic energy in the wind

impacts on the rotor blades of the WPS, which are set into motion through the airstream that

circulates around the blades. The rotor then spins a shaft that connects to a generator that, in

turn, transforms the mechanical energy into electricity. In this way (and at the present state of

technology), a maximum of 59% of the wind’s kinetic energy can be extracted. However, be-

cause of losses during the transformation, modern WPS have an efficiency of only 45 to 50%.

The amount of energy produced depends on several parameters: firstly, on the design of the

rotor blades, their length, and their positioning in the airstream, and secondly, on wind speed

and on the density of the air. If the length of the blades doubles, the WPS can produce four

times as much electricity, and if the wind speeds doubles, the possible outcome is even multi-

plied by eight. Another 3% of increased performance can be added by a temperature drop of ten

degrees. (BWE A-Z, SER/FEE kit éolien 2009)

The rotor does not always run on maximum speed, though. The yearly operation time of a

WPS is at an average of 7,500h – 85% of the 8,760h in a year. Full load hours (when the rotor

runs on maximum speed) of on-shore WPSs however average only 2,000h per year. They

achieve their maximum or nominal capacity (mostly identifiable through the WPS’s name, like

for example Jeumont’s 750 kW machine J48/750) at a specific wind speed that generally lies

between 40 and 54 km/h. Modern WPS are designed for a life expectancy of 20 years. The


40

energy they produce during this period is 40 to 70-fold the energy that is used for the WPS’s

fabrication, utilization, and disposal together. An on-shore WPS can therefore “offset” the con-

sumed energy costs of construction after three months to one year. (BWE A-Z)

There exist several different designs for WPSs. They vary most prominently in three areas:

positioning of the rotation axis, number of rotor blades, and wind exposition. Over the years,

WPSs with horizontal rotation axes prevailed, but designs with vertical axes – also called the

eggbeater-style – still exist18. Depending on site conditions, they sometimes constitute the

superior alternative (e.g. in an urban environment), even though their efficiency is compara-

tively low. Their technical advantages are their small size, easy manageability and mainte-

nance (the generator and the gearbox being installed at the bottom), and independence of the

wind direction. The best-known vertical rotor model is the Darrieus rotor that has been invent-

ed by George Darrieus, a French engineer, in 1930. In the 1980s, his concept was applied on a

large scale in Canada at the wind park Éole; the prototype was 110m high and had a nominal

capacity of 4 MW. Before it was destroyed in a storm, it was the largest WPS with a vertical axis

ever built and at the time also the largest WPS on the planet. (EcoSource.info, LeMoniteur.fr)

WPSs with a horizontal axis can have a varying number of rotor blades – in the 70s and 80s

WPSs were built with a range of one to four and more rotor blades – today’s prevailing design

however has three. The choice for an uneven number of blades has special technical reasons19.

The third difference in design – whether the rotor is facing into the wind (upwind) or facing

away from it (downwind) – depends on whether a yaw gear is installed or not. Downwind fac-

ing WPSs can do without a yaw gear for the wind turns the rotor automatically in the right

direction. This passive adjustment of the rotor works, however, only for small WPSs because of

turbulences on the downwind side of the tower. Windward facing WPSs are dependent on the

right wind direction. They need a tracking device that adjusts the rotor, a so-called yaw gear

that is hinged to the top of the WPS’s tower. The wind vane measures the wind direction and

communicates it to the yaw drive that will then orient the turbine properly. (BWE Technik)

18 The question of why wind generators with vertical axes were not successful will not be answered in this study. It could however be quite interesting to approach this issue as vertical axes do recently reemerge in the domain of urban wind power. (see later in this chapter: technology development) 19 To know why, please read the chapter “Pourquoi la plupart des éoliennes ont-elles trois pales ?” of the “kit éolien” (SER/FEE 2009 kit éolien) or the article “Anzahl von Blättern” on the number of rotor blades on the BWE-website (BWE Technik).


41

figure 7: Schematic representations of nacelles, with and without gears (Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien)


42

“Wind turbines are complex mechanical systems” (Molly 2009: 15) and “comprise many in-

teractive parts that work together to convert kinetic wind energy to electromagnetic energy”

(Garud & Karnoe 2003: 282) like a rotor with a hub and blades, a nacelle, a gearbox, electrical

equipment, a tower, a foundation, a monitoring, control, and regulating system, and a connec-

tion to the grid. (BWE A-Z, SER/FEE kit éolien 2009)

The most distinctive component of a WPS is the rotor, a hub with blades, which work roughly

like the wings of an airplane (on the principle of aerodynamics). The rotor converts the kinetic

energy in the wind into mechanical power. Two shafts and a gearbox (or just one shaft if the

WPS does not have a gearbox) transfer the rotation energy to the generator. For the case of an

emergency, a WPS has to have a break that can stop the rotor and the gears. The gears connect

the main shaft to the high-speed shaft and thus increase the rotational speed to one required by

the generator to produce electricity (for the rotor turns with a relatively low rotation speed and

the generator with one much higher). There are constant-speed generators and variable-speed

generators. A constant-speed generator can be connected directly to the grid. This allows WPSs

to be built with a simpler design but has the drawback that the rotation speed of the rotor

cannot be adapted to changing wind speeds, which leads to a lower energy production. Fre-

quency and amount of the electricity produced by variable speed generators fluctuate perma-

nently. Therefore, the energy output has to be transformed into continuous current by a rectifi-

er, filtered, and than retransformed by an inverter into alternating current. In the end, the

voltage has to be, in both cases, the same as that of the grid.

Most of the equipment is situated in the nacelle, which is mounted on the top of the tower

and can weigh several hundred tons. The tower has not only to bear the nacelle’s weight, but

also to withstand mechanical forces that are exerted by the swinging of the nacelle under dif-

ferent operating conditions and other strains caused by the wind. They are usually made from

concrete, steel, or steel lattice. Their height is decisive for the WPS’s power output. In higher

air layers, turbulences are reduced, the wind stream is more continuous, and its speed increas-

es. Thus, taller towers enable turbines to capture more energy and generate more electricity.

The whole construction has to be fixed securely to a ground foundation. Foundation designs are

primarily selected depending on geotechnical conditions and range from spread footings, and


43

pile and cap foundations, to rock anchors. Offshore foundations have various designs like their

on-shore siblings, but remain to have a codified building standard as of yet.

Another part of the electric equipment (apart from the generator and the mechanisms for

grid connection) is the monitoring, regulating, and control system. First of all, these measures

serve as preventive maintenance, because changes and wear-out can be detected early on and

can be remotely monitored (through modern information and communication technology).

What is more, these systems automatically regulate the WPS’s power production. At promising

wind speeds (9 - 32 km/h) the controller starts up the machines and the WPS is connected to

the grid. Wind speeds can be measured by an anemometer, which transmits the data to the

controller, or can be calculated by the rotation speed of the rotor and the generators power

output. The WPS is again disconnected when the wind speed drops to low or rises to high (90 -

122 km/h) to protect it from capacity overload and from physical damage through high winds.

This disconnection does not occur abruptly, but slowly and in harmony with the power grid to

guarantee a steady feed-in. The WPS is not just shut down but the output is reduced gradually.

Currently, there exist two different ways of power control on modern WPSs: active or passive

stall control and pitch control.

WPSs with stall-controlled turbines have their rotor blades bolted onto the hub at a fixed an-

gle. With increasing wind speed, the angle of attack of the rotor blade will increase until, at

some point (the moment the wind speed becomes too high), it begins to stall. Stalling means

that air turbulences occur on the downwind side of the rotor, limiting the rotation speed of the

rotor and with it the engine’s performance. Thus, the WPS can be limited to its nominal capaci-

ty even with high winds. This simple solution avoids using a complex control system and in-

stalling moving parts in the rotor itself, but it also has some drawbacks. Owing to its special

blade profile, the WPS cannot start running independently when wind speeds are low. They

then need to use the generator as a motor to activate the rotor. In addition, stall-induced vibra-

tions of the blades generate noise emissions that are disrupting the surrounding residents.

Furthermore, the power output of a WPS with a passive stall control – being usually equipped

with generators that can be connected directly to the grid – is difficult to synchronize with the

power supply network, for a constant rotation speed of the rotor and the generator can only

be maintained in a rather limited range. WPSs with an active stall control can additionally


44

regulate the stall point through stepwise modification of the rotor blade angle. Thus, variations

in wind speed can be more accurately balanced and higher wind speeds can be better exploited.

A pitch control system resembles the active stall control in one point: they both use adjustable

rotor blades. In the case of active stall control, however, the angle of attack of the blades is

increased in order to make the blades go into a deeper stall. Thus, the excess energy in the

wind is wasted. Pitch controlled WPSs turn, or pitch, their blades out of the wind to control the

rotor speed. By choosing a suboptimal blade angle the aerodynamic efficiency of the blades is

deliberately worsened. Pitch-controlled WPSs generally use a variable speed generator – that is,

generator and grid connection are decoupled. Thus, gust of winds do not backlash on the WPS’s

power output. A pitch-controlled WPS is additionally equipped with electronic controllers that

constantly check the power output and that send orders to the blade pitch mechanism when the

power output becomes to high or drops to low. The pitch mechanism then immediately turns

the rotor blades either in or out of the wind. This can be performed continuously (unlike the

stepwise adaption of the active stall control) and separately for every blade. Pitch-controlled

blades can also be used as aerodynamic breaks; most of the pitch-controlled WPSs do not fea-

ture mechanical breaks.

The nature of the monitoring, regulating, and control system defines a WPS’s ‘degree of ac-

tivity’. All WPSs are at least ‘automobile’ for they can independently transfer kinetic energy

into electricity. They can also automatically launch their engines if wind speeds are promising

and will yield a return, which means that they are ‘reactive’, as well. Today’s modern pitch-

controlled WPS can even guarantee a steady power output that does not disturb the grid’s

stability. Together with the latest grid control systems, modern WPSs may even be called ‘in-

teractive’ since they adapt, in “cooperation” with grid control systems and human grid adminis-

trators, to the requirements of the grid. This “jointly” action has been demonstrated in the

power failure on November 4, 2006 that affected nearly all Europe (Bundesnetzagentur 2006)

-------------------------------------------------------------------- SIDE NOTE: POWER FAILURE

The power outage of November 4, 2006 originated in Northwest Germany where E.ON (a

German electricity provider) switched off a high voltage power line across a river to allow

a cruise ship to pass underneath. After the line had been switched off the load flows were


45

redirected to other power lines. Due to overloading, an interconnection line in the area finally

tripped, entailing a cascade of line trippings within the next few seconds from North to South

Germany and all throughout Europe. The result of the failure of individual lines was the dis-

connection of approximately 15 million people throughout Europe from power supply and the

separation of the interconnected European power supply system into three zones with different

frequencies.

figure 8: Diagram of the grid after the power outage (Bundesnetzagentur 2006: 10)

Shortly after the incident, the first line tripping was blamed in several articles (see e.g. Land-

tag Nordrhein-Westfahlen Drucksache) on a high feed-in of wind power stations in the area, but

extraordinarily high wind feed-in can be ruled out as the initial cause, for the network’s load on

that evening was not unusual and feed-in forecasts of wind energy had been taken into account.

So, although wind power feed-in was indeed not the cause of the power outage it admittedly

aggravated the situation by the automatic reconnection of some of the units while system oper-

ators were trying to stabilize the grid. One could say that the cause of the outage and the diffi-

culties experienced after the first line tripping was a mixture of human misjudgment, inade-

quate load management, lack of cooperation and communication, and the automatic “behavior”

of technical elements.

System operators of the two neighboring grids had been previously informed about the

upcoming disconnection of a high voltage power line, but E.ON failed to notify them when

deciding to advance the disconnection. The changed load flows therefore took the other two


46

operators by surprise. Due to a lack of coordination and cooperation, many phone calls between

the different operators and a last minute crisis management became necessary – which natu-

rally provoked mistakes and hasty decisions. An important part was also the transmission

grid’s ‘tripping value’ and ‘voltage collapse boundary’. The first limit activates grid protection

equipment; the second one is a security limit value that must not be exceeded to prevent a

power line from being automatically disconnected. Due to the fact that the limits of those pro-

tection concepts differ from operator to operator, the situation became still more confusing. A

third factor was the insufficient cooperation between transmission system operators and distri-

bution network operators. A large number of decentral generation units, which are connected

at distribution network level, as are for example wind power stations, automatically discon-

nected from the grid as a result of the unexpected frequency change (about 60% of the connect-

ed wind generation units disconnected). The automatic tripping of wind generation occurs if the

network frequency drops under or rises over a certain limit20. In the western area this further

aggravated the frequency drop and the shortage in power generation. In the northeastern area,

wind generation units also disconnected from the grid due to its over-frequency. They then

automatically reconnected when the network frequency was just stabilizing, interfering nega-

tively with the stabilization process and making it crash once again. The main problem there-

fore was, that it happened without being monitored by the transmission or the distribution

system operators and without any information being exchanged between them.

The interaction and coordination between these different actors of today’s network manage-

ment – system operators from all distribution levels and from different operators, but also

technical network elements with automatic control systems – has to be intensified and

strengthened to guarantee a smoothly running power supply system.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- END SIDE NOTE

20 “All the generating equipment in an electric system is designed to operate within very strict frequency margins. Grid codes specify that all generating plants should be able to operate continuously between a frequency range around the nominal frequency of the grid, usually between 49.5 and 50.5 Hz in Europe, and to operate for different periods of time when lower/higher frequencies down/up to a minimum/maximum limit, usually 47 - 47.5 and 52 Hz. Operation outside these limits would damage the generating plants, so even very short duration deviations from the nominal frequency values would trip load shedding relays and generation capacity would be lost. The lost of generation leads to further frequency deviation and a black-out may occur.” (de Alegria et al. 2007)


47

Exogenous Technologies

Alongside the core technology there are some niche-extern technologies that should be men-

tioned due to their influence on the wind energy sector. Two of them that, so far, had a restrict-

ing effect on the wind energy sector are mechanisms for energy storage and the power supply

system. Storage mechanisms do exist (e.g. technologies that work with hydrogen; Zeit.de b)

although they are not able to store large quantities of energy and, above all, not for a long

period of time because storage of electricity usually leads to significant energy losses. However,

with the growing size and growing production output of today’s wind parks, their importance

will probably rise and could give the whole development in the sector another boost because

non-storability of electricity produced by wind energy is so far seen as a bottleneck. Another

restricting technology is the grid. Wind parks and electrical infrastructure have to reciprocally

adapt to solve supply-demand problems based on geographical, seasonal, and daily patterns of

demand. Its enhancement can have a similar effect as the theoretical solution of the storage

problem. Wind forecasts have been highly improved in their accuracy and help to calculate the

amount of electricity that will be produced at a certain time by means of wind energy and then

fed into the grid. To make sure that the interplay of several different forms of energy produc-

tion on one grid runs smoothly, it makes sense to interconnect the power supply systems of

several European countries to a larger extent so that surplus electricity can be used where it is

needed.

New information and communication technologies, that have completely revolutionized other

sectors, do have an impact on the wind energy sector, as well – although it is rather small.

Changes mainly occur in the area of monitoring, regulating, and control systems. The fact that

the maintenance of WPSs can now be conducted and sometimes even executed from afar

changes the working structure of the maintenance industry. A WPS in Brittany for example,

built by a German company, can be controlled almost entirely by a controller in Germany.

Thus, new information and communication technologies may counteract the possible decentral-

ization effect of new flexible energy production technologies, fostering centralized management

approaches of energy systems.


48

Technology Development

In the early stages of technology development, sectoral dynamics were characterized by par-

adigmatically new technologies and radical innovations. The first “French” technological inno-

vation has probably been the Darrieus rotor, a rotor with a vertical axis named after its inventor

(see above). Such wind generators had not been rediscovered in France until very recently

though. In 2008 for example, a small French enterprise named Apple-Wind presented a small-

scale wind generator prototype based on the Darrieus rotor. The “micro-generator” was de-

signed to be placed on rooftops of enterprises, townhouses, or farms. (LeMoniteur.fr, Apple-

Wind.fr) Another innovative French wind energy project that uses a vertical rotor is called

Wind-it and was designed by Elioth, a firm of engineering consultants. Their wind generators,

which can be integrated into power poles, won a first prize at the ‘Metropolis Next Generation

Design Competition’ in 2009. The generators, ranging from 1 kW to 1 MW, can in most in-

stances be inserted in already existing infrastructure and can above all be connected directly to

the power supply system. (WindIt.fr + IosisGroup.fr, Actu-Environnement.fr p)

The first French large-scale research projects in the domain of wind generators with a hori-

zontal axis took place in a period from the late 1940s to the beginning of the 1960s. (Bonnefille

1974, Cahiers d’Eole, Site Cavey) The research activities, which resulted in three prototypes,

have been undertaken under survey of EDF. In collaboration with the enterprise Neyrpic, EDF

built two three-winged large-scale wind generators in St-Rémy-des-Landes (Manche region), one

with a 132 kW capacity and another with 1,000 kW. Those prototypes do not figure in current

registers, like TheWindPower.net or suivi-eolien.fr – those websites list those wind generators

that have been connected to the French power supply system – contrary to the third experi-

mental large-scale wind generator that has been built during this period in Nogent-le-Roi (Cen-

tre region). The wind generator of the type ‘800 KVA BEST-Romani’ had a nominal capacity of

either 650 kW or 800 kW, a synchronous generator, three airfoil rotor blades, a rotor diameter

of 30m, was 58m high, and was mounted on a tripod lattice tower. It resulted from a co-

operation of EDF and the research center BEST (Bureau d'Etude Scientifique et Technique,

established by Lucien Romani; dissolved and replace by Aérowatt in 1966) and was commis-

sioned in 1958. At that time, BEST – together with Aeronautical Institute of Saint-Cyr School at

Yvelines (l'Institut Aérotechnique de Saint-Cyr l'Ecole) – had already experimented for almost


49

two decades with several small-scale wind generators fixed on pylons. The ‘800 KVA BEST-

Romani’ has been designed with the objective to test large-scale wind generators in France.

When in 1963, during a test run, a blade of the BEST-Romani generator broke, EDF discontin-

ued its wind energy research activities and finally suspended all payments. Possible reasons

for this were technical problems and also the decrease in the cost of gasoline (Bonnefille 1974).

The generators were eventually dismantled in 1966. Thus ended the first experiments on large-

scale wind generators in France.

The first experimental French wind park by the name of Château de Lastours (municipality

of Portel des Corbières, Languedoc-Roussillon/Aude region) was put into operation about twen-

ty years later, in 1983. The installed wind generators were, however, much less powerful than

the three large-scale wind generators from the 1960s; the park was equipped with ten small-

scale 10kW generators from Aérowatt/Vergnet (see below). (Feuille sur le Vent, Cahiers d’Eole)

With EDF discontinuing all research activities in the domain of wind energy and the failure

of the Darrieus rotor to establish itself, those first “French” initiatives to develop large-scale

wind generators have not been pursued further. Other renewable energy projects, like for

example EDF’s research project on tidal power (EDF commissioned a tidal power plant in 1966

at La Rance that was the biggest in the world), met the same fate. In the 1970s, EDF finally

stopped all research on tidal power in favor of nuclear energy – all this at a time when it was

absolutely not sure yet that nuclear power plants were a competitive alternative. (Cahiers

d’Eole, EDF press release) Since the 1970s, France’s government steadily reinforces its com-

mitment to nuclear energy, its chosen solution to energy sourcing challenges. (Dena 2006,

Szarka 2007a; see also chapter 4.2)

At the same time, Denmark settled for a different path, that of wind energy. The so-called

‘Danish concept’ of wind generators grew out of a social movement that strongly rejected nu-

clear energy and was very skeptical about conventional energy sources. It could finally get the

upper hand due to a broad opposition to nuclear energy in the Danish population. Thus, Den-

mark became the cradle of the entire contemporary wind power industry – but not with large-

scale generator projects and a ‘top-down’ strategy devised by the government, but through

incremental enhancements of small machines, and a ‘bottom-up’ movement that was undertak-

en by green hobbyists, technical experts, engineers and agriculturists (Szarka 2007a: 25, 31).


50

At this stage of technology development, technical basics were not based on fundamental aca-

demic research and research activities from large-scale industry, but on practice- and applica-

tion-oriented knowledge from engineers.

„Modern wind turbines are not based on any new dramatic inventions or recent scien-tific discoveries. Rather, modern wind turbines embody the steady accretion of inputs from many actors. [... In Denmark,] instead of pursuing a design intensive R&D ap-proach, these firms [Vestas, and nine other Danish wind turbine firms] deployed proto-types designed with simple engineering heuristics to engender a process of trial-and-error learning. (Garud & Karnoe 2003: 282)

Garud and Karnoe also point out the importance of feedback between all groups involved in the

technology development: theorists, users, and engineers of different expertise like mechanics,

electrotechnology, hydraulics, aerodynamics, advanced materials, and welding. The result of

this approach was the ‘Danish concept’ of wind generators for which the foundation had al-

ready been laid in the late 19th century, with the experiments of the wind pioneer Paul la Cour,

and in the 1950s, with the designing of the Gedser turbine by Johannes Juul. The ‘Danish mod-

el’ was a simple, robust, upwind machine with a horizontal rotation axis, three blades, a con-

stant speed rotor, a stall control, a gearbox, an asynchronous generator, and a direct grid con-

nection. During the 1980s and early 1990s, it constituted the vast majority of wind generators

sold worldwide. The first wind generator of this type was installed in 1956/57 and had a nomi-

nal capacity of 200 kW. The ‘Danish model’ was for a long time the ‘state of the art’ of the wind

energy sector all over the world. Only over the years did its capacity increase (up to a nominal

capacity of 500 kW). They had many advantages like a simple configuration, robustness, low

maintenance costs, cheap engine parts, and direct grid coupling. The asynchronous generator

and the direct coupling to the grid also posed some problems, though: because of the direct

connection to the grid no other generator than an asynchronous constant speed generator could

be used. That meant that the rotor speed had to be constant, too. So, there was only one ideal

wind speed at which the wind generator could perform best and it could not adapt to different

wind speeds – leading to a suboptimal performance. What is more, asynchronous generators

required idle power (electricity that some machines need to be able to start operating). And

finally, mechanical forces, like strong gusts of wind, considerably strained the rotor blades and

the gear train. (BWE Technik)


51

At the beginning of the 1990s, France made a new attempt to get involved in the wind ener-

gy development. In 1991, at a time when a first standardization of technology had already been

taking place, the first non-experimental wind power station had been connected to the grid.

There are two French wind park developers that claim to have been the first21: ‘La Compagnie

du Vent’ and ‘Espace Eolien Developpement’. ‘La Compagnie du Vent’ (at that time still being

called Cabinet Germa) installed one 200kW machine (V25/200) from the Danish manufacturer

Vestas at Port-la-Nouvelle (Languedoc-Roussillon/Aude region). ‘Espace Eolien Developpement’

chose a Dutch model from the manufacturer Windmaster (which in the meantime ceased to

exist) with a capacity of 300kW and the same rotor diameter of 25m, which was installed at

Dunkerque (Nord-Pas-De-Calais region). (CdV press release, Energie-Cités.org, Suivi-Eolien.com

+ TheWindPower.net) In the ten years that followed, about thirty projects were started, half of

them due to the calls of tender of the so-called EOLE-2005 project (see chapter 4.2), and several

of them have already been dismantled again. Their average nominal capacity was 350 kW

(from 15 kW to 750 kW; one single park even had 1,300 kW machines); the average capacity of

the parks was 2,300 kW (from 15 to 7,800 kW) and they were equipped with 1 - 40 wind gen-

erators. The parks with the highest number of wind generators (usually small machines with

little capacity) were often situated on the islands of the overseas departments and territories

(DOM-TOM) and Corsica – about half of the projects have been situated there. The cumulated

output of all the wind power stations in France has, at that time, not been significant, yet (until

1997, the output was in the single-digit MW range). (see table 3 in the appendix)

In 1993 and 1996, two new wind generator models affected the international wind energy

markets and their market shares have increased ever since. To solve the Danish model’s draw-

backs, a new WPS generation, which operates with variable rotor and generator speed, has

been developed. This could be achieved through the replacement of the asynchronous through

a synchronous generator that can operate with variable speeds and can be combined with a

pitch control. Thus it became possible to cover a whole range of different wind speeds and to

increase the WPS’s efficiency. An additional benefit was that the strain on the blades and the

21 Apparently, there has been installed a third WPS in 1991 at Malo-les-Bains (Nord-Pas-de-Calais region); it was however no industrial wind generator but an experimental one with a capacity of 300 kW (ADEME.fr letter).


52

gear train was diminished. The produced electricity of such WPS varies in frequency however,

and thus these new models cannot be directly connected to the grid. A converter is needed that

adapts the energy to the supply frequency. With a higher performance, the capital cost of vari-

able speed WPSs increased, too, because of the utilization of more electronics. Capital costs

further increase when the gearbox is left out although this increases energy efficiency (through

lesser losses) and reduces complexity, the number of component parts, and maintenance re-

quirements of a WPS. The size, weight, and the rather high price of the new generators used

(e.g. ring generators) are however still disadvantageous. (BWE Technik) At the same time, a

special kind of asynchronous two-pole generator was developed that can also be used with

variable speed rotors. It has the advantage of being smaller, less heavy, and cheaper than syn-

chronous generators and at the same time, able to compensate for the drawbacks of the “ordi-

nary” asynchronous generator. Those generators can switch between different (usually two)

poles and can consequently adapt to two (or in some cases more) different wind speeds. In

comparison to synchronous generators, only 40% of the produced electricity has to be converted

to the supply frequency.

These developments allowed wind generator manufactures to increase nominal capacity

much more rapidly than before their implementation. In the middle of the 1990s first ‘MW-

machines’ penetrated the markets. A hard competition between manufactures was going on to

increase wind generators in height, rotor diameter and nominal capacity. At the beginning of

the 1980s, a WPS’s rotor diameter was less than 18m wide, today’s rotor diameters count up to

112m and even 126m – and the trend is to create even lager rotors in the years to come. The

same trend of expansion can also be seen with regards to the height of the towers. The highest

WPS in the world – the Fuhrländer FL2500 at Laasow/Brandenburg (Germany) – has a tower of

160m and an overall height of 205m. (Molly 2009, BWE A-Z, MEDAD d, VDE.com) The WPSs’

nominal capacity increased proportionally, as it is dependent on its height and its rotor diame-

ter (see above). The average capacity of wind generators at the beginning of the 1980s was

about 100 kW, 500 kW in the late 90s, has increased to several MW today (see figure 9 on the

left). With 6 MW, the Enercon EN112 is currently the strongest WPS in the world, it is however

not an on-shore but an offshore wind generator. (MEDAD d, VDE.com, SER/FEE kit éolien 2009

+ état parc 2009) In France, the increase in installation of machines with two ore more MW


53

occurred from 2005 on; installation of WPSs with more than 3 MW is not planned prior to 2010

(or maybe even later). (see table 3 in the appendix) Naturally, the average capacity of wind

parks became bigger, too – from a couple of MW in the year 2000 to nearly 13 MW in 2008,

with a tendency to still bigger parks in the years to come (SER/FEE état parc 2009). Until 2007,

there are almost no wind parks in France bigger than 12 MW because of the 12-MW-limit in the

purchase obligation (see figure 9 on the right, see also chapter 4.2)22.

figure 9: Development of the average potential of single wind power stations (on the left) and of whole wind parks (on the right) in MW (SER/FEE état parc 2009: 10, 11)

The downside of this fast size development is the fact that the quality of the wind turbines

could not always keep pace because of a very competitive environment that left no time for

manufactures to improve the design. Dealing with failures and lifetime problems that led to

additional costs became part of a wind park operator’s activities. In recent years, when the size

development of wind generators slowed down, quality gained more importance in the manufac-

turers’ competition. (Molly 2009) Further technological innovations, apart from size and capaci-

ty, have been added to the design, like for example ice sensors and navigation lights at the

rotor blades (Enertrag.com). Naturally, there exist a great many different wind generator de-

signs, often influenced by the manufacturer’s historical background and based on the technical

options described in this chapter (see above).

22 Before 2007, large parks presumably originated from occasional calls of tender, which had been carried on simultaneously to the feed-in obligation regulation, to support parks larger than 12 MW (see chapter 4.2).


54

France did not play a decisive role in the described technology development. Only two

French enterprises, which I will introduce in more detail in chapter 4.3, were involved in the

development of whole wind power stations – with varied success. Intending to directly join the

market of large-scale WPSs, Jeumont Industries designed the J48/750 direct drive wind genera-

tor with a nominal capacity of 750 kW. The model was equipped with an innovative synchro-

nous generator (a permanent magnet type ring generator), a variable speed rotor with stall

control, an aerodynamic efficiency control, an electronic converter technology, and no gearbox.

The J48/750 was launched in 2001 but production ceased after just a few years after encounter-

ing numerous technical problems. (LesEchos.fr, Gosset & Ranchin 2006, Suivi-Eolien.com)

Another French, and very successful, WPS manufacturer is Vergnet SA. Together with BEST-

Romani, this enterprise had already been involved in the first large-scale wind generator re-

search projects in France. Today, it is world leader in the domain of small and medium-sized

machines with a special cyclone protection.23

figure 10: Butoni Wind Farm on the Fiji Islands (Vergnet.fr, © Vergnet SA)

These WPSs are predominantly sold in so-called FARWIND-zones, isolated areas like archipela-

gos, mountainsides, and semi-deserts with underdeveloped infrastructure and extreme climate

conditions. Vergnet’s newest (2008), award-winning invention on the market is the ‘GEV HP

1MW’. Its specific characteristics are: a retractable tower that permits to lower the nacelle to

23 It would probably be very interesting to study the career of Vergnet in detail and to analyze why the enterprise had so much success. I will however not further elaborate on this at this point.


55

the ground (in case of storm warnings or to facilitate maintenance work); a guy-wire fixture

that allows to install high towers (to access higher wind speeds); a two-winged, pitch controlled

rotor with an oscillating hub (derived from the technology used for helicopters); an asynchro-

nous, three-phase generator with variable speed (that necessitates a gear train); and a special

converter technology that allows the WPS to integrate even in weak, local power supply sys-

tems. (Vergnet.fr)

Over the years, Vergnet had a great success in selling theses machines, but due to its special-

ization the enterprise could only achieve a share of 1% in the French market of manufacturers

in 2008 (SER/FEE état parc 2009) and it could never compete with manufacturers of large-scale

wind generators like for example REpower. Today, on-shore wind generators are regarded as a

mature and stable technology that only adapts incrementally; further, on-shore development

will focus on upscaling and repowering the existing technology24. That is why some say that

France ‘has missed the boat for good’ – however, there may be a chance for them to compete

with the technology development in the offshore sector (Gosset & Ranchin 2006). In contrast to

the discoveries of on-shore development, the offshore development is still rather unexplored.

This new “territory” is quite attractive, as it promises many advantages like: more space, high-

er wind speeds and higher electricity production (BWE A-Z). The most pressing problems – for

the on-shore as well as for the offshore development – will be storage technologies and the

smooth integration of wind power (and other renewables) into the grid (cf. chapter 4.1). New

impulses in the on-shore development could come from the domain of small and urban wind

generators (Gosset & Ranchin 2006; see above) but it seems like, for the big players of the wind

energy industry, the future lies at sea.

4.2 Development of Institutional Structures

– the French Energy Policy

Starting at the beginning of the 1970s – at the same time as two oil-crises shook the world –

the French government (like many other countries) invested increasingly in nuclear energy, an

24 Repowering means the replacement of wind generators of the first generation through more powerful machines with the objective of a better exploitation of available sites, an increase in installed capacity, and a simultaneous reduction of the number of installed WPSs. (BWE Technik)


56

industry launched in 1946. The government announced that it intended to render the country

independent from fossil resources through intensified nuclear power production. This decision

laid out the path for today’s energy policy. France’s first nuclear power programs did not have

any legislative foundation and they were never voted on in parliament. The first law concerning

nuclear matters, from 1991, was limited to research and development questions on radioactive

waste. Only in 2006, the ‘law relative to transparency and security in nuclear matters’ specified

legislation. (Schneider 2008)

For several years, there were no special laws concerning wind power stations, either. Wind

park developers therefore had to resort to the general French Environmental Code (Le Code de

l’Environnement), that of Urbanism (Le Code de l’Urbanisme), and the Code of Public Health

(Le Code de la Santé Publique).

The Urbanistic Code is a set of laws that determines spatial planning and land utilization.

Emerging in the postwar period after World War II, its present-day form was established in

1973 and from 1983 on, it has been continuously expanding. An important amendment for the

wind energy sector was the ‘Urbanisme and Habitat Act’ (no. 2003-590 of July 2, 2003; see

below). Not being considered as urban buildings but as ‘installations required for public facili-

ties’ – because the produced energy is usually not self-consumed – wind power generators can

be built far away from urbanized areas and are not subject to the obligation of article L.146-4 of

the Urbanistic Code, which prescribes that buildings have to be built near other buildings. In

2007, proceedings for building licenses were profoundly modified. (Gralon.net, Droit-

Finances.net, DDE Drôme) The reform became effective on October 1, 2007 and set new stand-

ardized and simplified rules for obtaining a building license. Instead of eighteen forms of li-

censes and declarations there afterwards remained only three types of planning applications

(planning permit, development permit, demolition permit) and a single works declaration.

(IWRPressedienst.de, MEDAD g)

The Environmental Code with its three distinct principles (that of precaution, of prevention,

and the polluter-pays-principle) aims at the protection and conservation of the environment.

The ‘law of May 2, 1930 about the protection of natural monuments and artistic, historical,

scientific, legendary, and picturesque sites’ proclaimed for the first time, with its actual name,

the intention of protecting nature. There was another law that confirmed this governmental


57

commitment, the ‘law about the protection of nature’, however, it was not passed until July 10,

1976. Together with the ‘Mountain act’ (la loi Montagne, 1985), the ‘Littoral act’ (la loi Littoral,

1986), and the ‘Landscape act’ (la loi Paysage, 1993), they constitute the basis of the Environ-

mental Code. It tries to prevent an aggravation of the environmental situation and wants to

protect and preserve fauna, flora, the landscape, air, water and soil. Although dating back to

1930, the legislative part of the Code, consisting currently of seven different books, is quite

recent. It was approved by the regulation no. 2000-914 of September 18, 2000 (l’ordonnance

relative à la partie législative du code de l’environnement) and ratified by the law no. 2003-591

of July 2, 2003 (la loi habilitant le gouvernement à simplifier le droit). (Droit-Finances.net,

DroitNature.free.fr)

Rules and laws concerning the handling and control of noise can be found in the Urbanistic

Code and in the Code of Public Health. The ‘circular letter of February 27, 1996 about neigh-

borhood noise’ and the ‘decree no. 2006-1099 of August 31, 2006 concerning the abatement of

neighborhood noise’ (le décret relatif à la lutte contre les bruits de voisinage), which abrogates

the ‘ministerial order of May 10, 1995 concerning the measurement of neighborhood noise'

(l'arrêté relatif aux modalités de mesure des bruits de voisinage), are to be applied to noise

made by wind generators (being classified as neighborhood noise). (Afsset.fr, Ministère en

charge de la santé)

In 1996, the French Ministry for industry launched the first wind power program, a tender

scheme named EOLE-2005, which aimed at an increase in installed capacity from 5 MW at the

time to 250 - 500 MW in 2005. It was the first noticeable regulatory move of the French gov-

ernment concerning promotion of wind power and assistance in competitiveness for the French

wind power sector. The four rounds of calls for tender, inspired by the UK non fossil fuel obli-

gation (NFFO)25, produced very low bid prices (with 5 EURct/kWh they were the lowest in

Europe), but had rather disappointing outcomes in installed capacity (only 53 - 70 MW in

2000). Therefore, the program has been discontinued and was replaced by the 2000 Electricity

act. (Dena 2006, Jobert et al. 2007, Nadai 2007, Szarka 2007b, Cochet 2000, DGEMP a)

25 Established in the 1990s, the NFFO consisted “of a series of rounds of calls to tender [… but its key aim was rather] to prop up nuclear power […] whilst offering limited support to renewables.” (Szarka 2007a: 82f)


58

This Electricity act, the ‘law no. 2008-108 of February 10, 2000 about the modernization and

development of the public electricity sector’ (la loi relative à la modernisation et au développe-

ment du service public de l'électricité), was a milestone of French energy policy. It put the ‘EU

directive 96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity’ and the ‘EU

directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources

in the internal electricity market’ into national legislation, which resulted in two, for the wind

energy sector interesting aspects: the liberalization of the electricity market and the elaboration

of a legal framework for wind power generation. (Dena 2006, Fröding 2009)

The law obligated EDF and local electricity providers to buy electricity produced from wind

energy, and from other renewable energy sources in general, at a fixed price. The preferential

renewable energy feed-in tariff had to be paid to all independent producers that operated wind

generators or parks with a maximum of 12 MW. It was legally substantiated in the ‘decree no.

2001-410 of May 10, 2001 about terms of purchase of electricity produced by operators that

benefit from the purchase obligation’ (le décret relatif aux conditions d'achat de l'électricité

produite par des producteurs bénéficiant de l'obligation d'achat), that comprised regulations on

the precise form of the power purchase agreement between EDF and the producers, and in the

‘ministerial order of June 8, 2001 defining terms of purchase of electricity produced by installa-

tions using mechanical wind power’ (l’arrêté fixant les conditions d’achat de l’électricité

produite par les installations utilisant l’énergie mécanique du vent), that defined fixed tariffs

for new wind power installations. During the first five years of operation, entitled wind energy

producers received 8.38 EURct/kWh and then, during a period of 10 years, between 3.05 and

8.38 EURct/kWh depending on on-site wind speeds. Initially, those tariffs were only valid until

the completion of a total of 1,500 MW in France – then some lower tariffs would be valid, but it

never came to that26. (Fröding 2006, Dena 2006)

With the introduction of feed-in tariffs for installations below 12 MW, the 2000 Electricity

Act created a dual wind power support system, as calls for tender had not been abolished and

were still used to stimulate projects above 12 MW, like for example in 2004 when 500 MW on-

shore and 500 MW offshore have been tendered (Szarka 2007b).

26 The French energy policy had been changed again before the attainment of 1,500 MW of installed wind energy capacity.


59

Emphasizing on monetary aspects of promotion for renewables the 2000 Electricity Act did

not give much thought to landscape issues and spatial planning. Those aspects have been

treated later in subsequent legal acts when a lack of coordination in the development became

obvious. This ongoing legislative process generated among others the ‘Urbanism and Habitat

act’ (la loi n°2003-590 du 2 juillet 2003 urbanisme et habitat; q.v. circular letter of September

10, 2003 on promotion of terrestrial wind energy development), and the ‘law no. 2003-8 of

January 3, 2003 relating to gas and electricity markets and to the public energy service’ (la loi

relative aux marches du gaz et de l’électricité et au service public de l’énergie). This 2003

Electricity and Gas Act was a kind of complement to the 2000 Electricity act. It implemented

the ‘EU directive 2003/55/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas’

and increased legal certainty for wind power operators: installations above 12m now needed a

construction permit whose instruction procedure is specified in the Urbanistic Code; a public

enquiry and a study of impact were required for installations with a capacity of 2.5 MW27 or

higher, as defined in article 59 of the 2003 Electricity and Gas act, in article 98 of the Urbanism

and Habitat act, and in article L.122-1 of the Environmental Code; moreover, a minimum dis-

tance between wind generators had been introduced (1,500m), for being able to consider them

belonging to the same or to different wind parks; the act also included the obligation for opera-

tors to restore the site to its original condition after the dismantling of a wind generator (q.v.

article L.553-3 of the Urbanistic Code); and finally, regional wind schemes (des schémas re-

gional éolien), a tool for local planning relative to wind power, have been created (q.v. article

L.553-4 of the Urbanistic Code). Regional wind schemes are tools used at regional or depart-

mental level to indicate the best-adapted geographical zones or sectors for wind power installa-

tions28, taking into account a number of criteria including landscape, birds and noise emis-

sions. This is also stipulated in the ‘Urbanism and Habitat act’, which tries to promote a har-

monic wind power development through the introduction of wind power schemes and other

tools like good practices and wind power charters. At that time, these measures were however

27 It changed to a limit defined by the height of the tower (50m) in 2005 with the adoption of the 2005 Energy Act (see article L.553-2 of the Environmental Code; see also below). 28 First ‘wind atlases’ have already been devised in France in 1991, but only in few departments (like the Finistère, Aude, or Languedoc-Roussilon). (ADEME letter 1999, Lajartre 2007)


60

still voluntary and had no authoritative value on future wind power installations. (Dena 2006,

Nadai 2007, Senat.fr c)

Despite of this new, legislative framework for renewables and especially wind power, heavy

promotion of nuclear energy by the government (with a right-wing majority since 2002) still

continued (cf. chapter 4.3). In 2003 and 2004, national energy debates were organized

throughout France where issues like the future of France’s nuclear energy sector and France’s

energy mix were expected to be discussed, but the debates were accused of being dishonest

and its outcome being predefined: namely the evaluation of nuclear power as a local, climate

friendly, and competitive energy source. The outcome of the debates should officially have been

integrated in a new Energy Act (see below) but in practice the debates did not influence gov-

ernmental decision-making in any way. Even some time before a parliamentary debate on the

topic took place, the government had already decided to invest further into nuclear power and

it had approved the construction of a first ‘third-generation European Pressurized water Reac-

tor’ (‘EPR’) at Flamanville. Regarding security supply issues, this was absolutely not necessary,

for France possesses significant surplus capacities in base-load power generation and “it is

quite commonly agreed that the nuclear share has gone too high in France if compared with an

ideal generating mix” (Schneider 2008: 35). The most obvious reason why the French govern-

ment wanted this EPR to be constructed is the fear of a widening competence problem and a

generational gap in the nuclear sector. In order to remain being a world leader in nuclear ener-

gy, France constantly has to enlarge and update the knowledge and skills needed to build and

design nuclear plants. (Dena 2006, Nadai 2007, Schneider 2008)

This promotion of nuclear power by the French government was also reflected in the 2005

Energy Act, the ‘law no. 2005-781 of July 13, 2005 defining the orientation of energy policy’ (la

loi de programme fixant les orientations de la politique énergétique). The legislative debate

over the law started in April 2004 in a context still marked by the legislative election in 2002,

which led to a right-wing majority favorable of nuclear energy in the Government, the Senate,

and the National Assembly. The four main aims of the Energy Act were: further energy inde-

pendence, competitiveness of the French Republic, protection of climate and environment, and

equitable access to energy services in France. To attain them, the Energy Act clearly expressed

the French government’s trust in technological choices made in the past and the will to more-


61

or-less maintain the status quo in the French energy sector in which nuclear power holds the

most important place:

“The [French] State takes care of maintaining an important part of electricity produced by nuclear energy in its electricity production, which looks to security of supply, energy independence, competitiveness, the fight against the greenhouse effect, and the influ-ence of an industrial branch’s excellence although, in the future, it will rely on, along side the nuclear, the increasing production of renewable energies, and, to respond to peak demands, on the sustainment of the potential of production of hydropower and thermal power stations.” (Loi n°2005-781 du 13 juillet 2005)29

However, the 2005 Energy Act also encouraged the development of renewable energy sources.

It transposed targets on renewables and reinforced measures to support them. Concerning

wind power, these measures consisted mainly in: the conservation of the tariff system and the

subsequent increase in the level of support, in the abolition of the 12-MW-limit for installations

to benefit from the preferential feed-in tariff (and thus also abandoning additional calls for

tender), and in the introduction of so-called ‘wind power development zones’ (zones de dé-

veloppement de l’éolien, ZDE). (Dena 2006, Nadai 2007, Szarka 2007b)

In parts, ZDEs resemble the already discussed wind power schemes (see above), for they take

into account similar criteria, like the conservation and protection of nature, landscape, and

historical monuments. They impose, however, on existing wind power schemes, because such

schemes, being urbanistic documents with no authoritative value, have no legal impact on the

installation of wind power stations. By defining certain zones with special characteristics (the

area’s wind potential, the possibilities of connection to the power supply network, the zone’s

maximum and minimum capacity for electricity produced by wind power stations, and the

protection of nature, landscape, and historical monuments), conditions are set that have to be

followed in order to benefit from preferential feed-in tariff (the former condition of operating an

installation under 12 MW having been abolished). A building permit cannot be denied, howev-

er, on the grounds that a future installation may not be situated in a ZDE and permits will not

automatically be granted for projects situated in a ZDE because wind power development zones

are officially an energy policy decision, introduced to modify conditions of the purchase obliga-

tion for wind power stations, and no urbanistic document. In practice, however, ZDEs were

perceived as part of local planning law, a tool or an instrument to protect the local environment 29 translation by the author


62

and to regulate the diffusion of wind power stations. A request for the creation of a ZDE can

only be made by a ‘public institution for inter-municipal cooperation’ (‘établissement public de

coopération intercommunale’, Fröding 2009: 69) and is then decided on by the Prefect of the

department. Third parties, like local associations and residents are to be included in the pro-

cess in order to intensify the understanding and participation of those groups; they cannot

request the creation of a wind power development zone, though. (Fröding 2006 + 2009, ADEME

colloque 2006, Senat.fr c, DRIRE Pays de la Loire)30

Based on the 2005 Energy act, the ‘ministerial order of July 10, 2006 defining terms of pur-

chase of electricity produced by installations using mechanical wind power’ (l’arrêté fixant les

conditions d’achat de l’électricité produite par les installations utilisant l’énergie mécanique du

vent) fixed new tariffs for wind energy. While maintaining the general principle of the tariffs

system, they brought some important changes. For on-shore installations, the initial high tariff

was slightly diminished (from 8.38 to 8.2 EURct/kWh), but it is now paid during at least a ten

year period (not five) and for another five years if the wind generator’s full load lies under

2,400h per year (6.8 EURct/kWh if it lies under 2,800h and 2.8 EURct/kWh if it lies under

3,600h). Furthermore, tariffs are now adapted to inflation and the 1,500 MW limit for the expi-

ration of the tariffs’ validity has been abolished. (Dena 2006, Fröding 2006, SER/FEE contre-

vérités 2008) Those tariffs are effective until at least 2012 – even though they have been legally

challenged in August 2008. Due to a formal error, the ministerial order had been revoked by

the State Council but the tariff as stands has not been questioned. Therefore, a new ministerial

order was released in November 2008 (l’arrêté du 17 novembre 2008 fixant les conditions

d'achat de l'électricité produite par les installations utilisant l'énergie mécanique du vent) that

accorded in almost every point with the order revoked in August. (Actu-Environnement.fr k +

m, Enviro2b.com b, DeveloppementDurable.com a, MEEDDAT f)

30 q.v. official documents of the government: Instruction ‘installation de parcs éoliens’ of January 1, 2006, Circulaire ‘dispositions relatives à la creation des zones de développement de l'éolien terrestre’ of June 19, 2006, and Instruction ‘des demandes de certificat ouvrant droit a l'obligation d'achat d'électricite produite par des installations éoliennes implantés hors ZDE’ of June 18, 2007


63

------------------------------------------------------------------------ SIDE NOTE: PROCEDURE

The development of a wind park, form designing to operating it, is a long process during

which several obstacles have to be overcome and various licenses have to be obtained. In addi-

tion to feasibility studies, the conceptual design of the park, and negotiations with landowners

a rather complex administrative procedure has to be run through. It can be divided into two

thematically different blocks concerning energy law and building law.

Regulations concerning energy issues prescribe that every wind park project has to apply for

an operating license. It is issued by the Ministry in charge of energy issues and is impre-

scriptible. After that, the request for the power purchase obligation certificate can be made

(Certificat ouvrant droit à l’obligation d’achat) at the local office for industry, research, and

environment (Direction régionale de l’industrie de la recherché et de l’environnement). It is the

basis for a contract of sale (valid for 15 years after the start of operation) between the future

electricity producer and EDF or another local network operator. After those 15 years, the pro-

duced electricity has to be sold on a free market. Finally, the agreement about grid access

(Convention de raccordement) has to be obtained by the wind park operator. It is usually issued

by the high-voltage network operator (the RTE or ‘Réseau de Transport de l’Electricité’) after

the wind park operator has undertaken an estimate of costs and preliminary technical calcula-

tions. Charges for the grid connection are at the expense of the wind park operator.

Concerning building law, the most important document to obtain is the building license. It has to

be issued by the Prefect of the department for all wind generators with a tower of 12m or higher. It

is initially valid for a period of two years – if after the lapse of this period no con-struction works

have been undertaken, the license expires. For installations with a height of 50m or higher, devel-

opers additionally have to perform a study of impact (including environmental, landscape, and

sanitary aspects) and a public inquiry among the residents. This procedure aims at an appropriate

protection of the local landscape, of the environment, of flora and fauna, and the residential neigh-

borhood. Furthermore, communication with and participation of residents, local associations, and

regional industry and trade are to be improved in this way. (Fröding 2006, Senat.fr c, Droit-

Finaces.net, Gosset & Ranchin 2006, SER/FEE kit éolien 2009 + SER/FEE future 2009)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- END SIDE NOTE


64

Of particular importance for French energy and environment policy over the last years was

the so-called ‘Grenelle of Environment’ and its outcomes – a convention on sustainable devel-

opment organized in France in October 2007 and followed by a great many political meetings

and discussions (see chapter 4.3). Legally, it is composed of two draft laws, the Grenelle I and

II. The Grenelle I was initiated on July 6, 2007 and was finally adopted with quasi-unanimity in

summer 2009 (loi n°2009-967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre

du Grenelle de l’environnement). The Grenelle II (projet de loi n°155 portant engagement

national pour l'environnement) can be seen as some kind of judicial toolbox for the implemen-

tation of the Grenelle I. On January 7, 2009 it has been presented in the council of ministers

and on October 8, 2009 is has been adopted by the French Senate. Next, the Grenelle II Act has

to pass the National Assembly, where it will be discussed in Mai 2010. (MEEDDAT d, LeGrenelle-

Environnement.gouv.fr, Actu-Environnement.fr n, MEEDDM b, Senat.fr d, Vie-publique.fr)

Concerning wind power, some important issues have been codified with regards to planning

conditions and procedures. Future offshore wind parks will be exempt from the ZDE regulation,

and legal conditions are to be simplified through the creation of a planning instrument espe-

cially adapted to offshore conditions31. Concerning on-shore wind parks, an amendment of the

ZDE regulations was decided. Every region in France will have to devise a regional scheme for

renewable energies (des schémas régionaux d'énergies renouvelables). These schemes are

geographical zones defined through special characteristics: in addition to those defining a ZDE

(the renewable energy potential in the area, the conservation and protection of nature, land-

scape, and historical monuments, the possibilities of connection to the power supply network),

regional wind energy schemes will be defined through concerns of the neighborhood, security

issues, farming interests and aspects of health protection – thus specifying an area in which

energy production should preferably take place. Simultaneously, regional schemes for climate,

air, and energy (des schémas régionaux du climat, de l’air et de l’énergie) will have to be estab-

lished, which will define quantitative and qualitative targets that should be achieved in each

31 In order to improve planning procedures for offshore installations, the environment minister launched another ‘Grenelle’ in February 2009, the Grenelle of the Sea. Following the Grenelle of Environment, new and especially adapted planning instruments and developments zones shall be devised in a collective discussion of concerned ministries, communities, representatives of the local economy, and residents. (Actu-Environnement.fr o, LeGrenelle-Mer.gouv.fr, MEEDDAT h)


65

case. Unlike the “old” regional schemes (see above), the new schemes are no longer voluntary;

they will have to be established in compliance with ZDEs, making it impossible to create a ZDE

outside such a regional scheme (the existence of a ZDE is however not required for the creation

of a regional scheme). In a circular letter from February 26, 2009 (la circulaire relatif à la pla-

nification du developpement de l’energie eolienne terrestre), a note from April 14, 2009 (la note

‘permettre un développement soutenu et maîtrisé de l'énergie éolienne par une amélioration de

la planification territoriale, de la concertation et de l'encadrement réglementaire’), and another

circular letter from May 19, 2009 (la circulaire relatif à la planification du developpement de

l’energie eolienne terrestre) the environment minister Jean-Louis Borloo requested the regional

and departmental Prefects to develop such schemes relative to wind power in cooperation with

all relevant local parties concerned and to complete them before the end of the year. Through

this amelioration of planning conditions and the legal framework in the wind energy sector and

through integration of all the parties involved, an efficient, orderly, and controlled development

of wind power in France is expected – or hoped for. In the mentioned official documents it is

also specified that the French government favors a ‘high quality development’ (meaning the

avoidance of urban sprawl and of adverse effects on the country side, the patrimony, and resi-

dents) – therefore, large wind parks that pool wind power stations are to be encouraged. (Frö-

ding 2009, Espace-ENR.com, Actu-Environnement.fr l, Energie2007.fr, MEEDDAT d)

Since 2008, there is also a discussion going on whether wind generators should be catego-

rized as so-called ICPEs, that is ‘classified installations for environmental protection’ (installa-

tions classées pour la protection de l’environnement), or not. An ICPE is defined in the 5th book

of the Environmental Code (article L.511-1) as a fixed installation, whose operation represents a

risk for the environment, public health or security, like for example a factory or a stone pit.

Until recently, two different proceedings existed: the regime of declaration (régime de declara-

tion) for installations that have only a minor impact, and the regime of authorization (régime

d’autorisation), a more binding procedure for installations with a heavy impact. The law no.

2009-179 of February 17, 2009 (la loi pour l’accélération des programmes de construction et

d’investissement publics et privés) allowed for the modification of the ICPE procedure and

made it possible to establish a third regime, that of registration (régime d’enregistrement),

which is stipulated in the regulation no. 2009-663 of June 11, 2009 relative to the registration


66

of certain classified installations for the sake of environmental protection (l’ordonnance relative

à l’enregistrement de certaines installations classées pour la protection de l’environnement).

This intermediate procedure that will apply to simple and standardized installations positioned

outside of environmentally sensitive zones shall officially lead to a reduction of delays in the

issuing of permits, a decrease in administrative expenses, a simplification of the application

procedure, and a better protection of the environment through the concentration on preventive

measures and on primary risk problems (when comparing it with the regime of authorization).

(Koordinierungsstelle Windenergie, Actu-Environnement.fr r + s, Envirolex.fr) The wind sector,

however, is trying to prevent the application of the new regime to wind power stations that had

already been rejected by the ‘Comité Opérationnel’ n°10 of the Grenelle. In a press release of

July 2008, the wind energy lobby criticized, among other things, that a single 2 MW wind

generator would then be subject to the same conditions and financial penalties as a thermal

power plant of 500 or 1,000 MW. They further observed that no country in the world had ever

implemented a wind power framework as rigid and remarked that wind power development is

already sufficiently restricted in France with the regulation of ZDEs, studies of impact, public

inquiries, building permits, operating licenses, and the obligation for operators to restore the

site to its original condition after the dismantling of the wind generator. The planned applica-

tion of the third ICPE regime to wind generators is also denunciated because it is assumed not

to bring any advantages – it is rather expected to further complicate the already complex ad-

ministrative framework and to put into question the objectives of the Grenelle and the Europe-

an energy climate agreements (see next paragraph). Some, like Arnaud Gossement, lawyer and

spokesman of the SER, even raise concerns about the lawfulness of the regulation with refer-

ence to the EU Directive 2009/28/EC, which demands a reduction of administrative barriers in

the EU that could hamper the development of renewables. So far, wind generators are not yet

mentioned in regulation no. 2009-663 of June 11, 2009, but in the context of negotiations on

the Grenelle II Act (see above), the French Senate adopted several articles on the controversial

ICPE regulation for wind generators. If the act passes, wind generators will be subject to the

ICPE regime starting in 2011. (Koordinierungsstelle Windenergie, SER/FEE press release 2008

a, Blog Gossement, Actu-Environnement.fr u, GreenUnivers.com, Bureau Lefebvre)


67

Apart from the institutional framework, binding objective targets are important, too. Europe’s

first collective climate target can be associated with the Rio Summit of 1992 (cf. chapter 5.2)

and has been fixed in the EU-White Paper of 1997 (cf. chapter 4.3) that also provided a support

program for renewables: in 2010, Europe’s gross energy consumption should comprise 12% of

renewable energy sources. (Nadai 2007, EU White Paper KOM97, EU Paper 2006) Four years

later, the target was confirmed in the European Directive 2001/77/EC – an initiative that,

referring to commitments accepted by the signing of the Kyoto protocol in 1997 (UNFCCC.int),

wanted to provide a basis for significant growth of electricity production from renewable ener-

gy sources. It proposed measures to facilitate grid access for renewables, to simplify adminis-

trative procedures, to achieve green electricity certification, and it split up the 12% target of

gross energy consumption produced from renewable energy sources (or in other words, 22.1%

of the European gross electricity consumption) into well-defined, but non-binding national

targets. For France the 2010 target was 21%32 of its gross electricity consumption produced by

renewables (compared to 15% in 1997). (Cochet 2000)

In France, those targets were transposed in the 2000 Electricity Act and the 2005 Energy

Act. In the ‘law no. 2005-781 of July 13, 2005 defining the orientation of energy policy’ it was

fixed that 10% of the annual energy demand should be provided by renewable energy sources

in 2010 and that wind would play an important role in achieving this target. Furthermore, the

French government published a multi-annual roadmap on investments – la programmation

pluriannuelle des investissements (‘PPI’) – to be made in the electricity sector, in the thermal

energy sector, and in that of gas; this roadmap is published every three years. In the PPI of

2003 a 6,000 MW target for wind power had been fixed for 2007. This target has been expand-

ed to 13,500 MW (for 2010) and 17,000 MW (for 2015) in the PPI of 2006. With that, wind

power had to take over the main part of the overall 14,430 MW to be produced by renewables

in 2010 (20,000 MW in 2015). It soon became evident that the French targets were out of

range. (Dena 2006, EWEA 2003)

According to a report of the European Commission in April 2009, the EU Member states will

not reach the targets set for 2010. While Germany had already reached its targets in 2006,

32 The percentage can be calculated by dividing the national production of RES-E by the gross national electricity consumption.


68

many other countries are still far away from it. (EU Paper 2009) In the case of France, 2010

wind energy targets (13,500 MW) are unrealistic. Furthermore, the 10% of renewable energy

sources of France’s gross energy consumption in 2010 will presumably not be reached either.33

This likely failure to reach the targets can be demonstrated by the following calculations (Dena

2006, Directive 2001/77/CE, MEEDDAT a + d, RTE 2009b):

Year Gross Electricity

Production RES

Gross Electricity

Consumption

Percentage

1997 66 TWh

(Directive 2001)

440 TWh - 15%

(Directive 2001)

2007 68 TWh

(MEDDAT d)

/ 480 TWh

(MEDDAT d)

- 14.2%

2008 77.6 TWh

(RTE 2009b)

/ 490 TWh

(Dena 200634)

- 15.8%

2010

(MEEDDAT d,

three scenarios)

x TWh / 506 or

525 or

534 TWh

- 21%

(Directive 2001)

x - 106.3 or

110.3 or

112.1 TWh

2010 x TWh / 510 TWh

(Dena 2006)

- 21%

(Directive 2001)

x - 107.1 TWh

table 2: Calculations on the share of renewable energy sources in the french gross electricity consumption

Depending on the scenario (MEEDDAT d), France would have to produce, in the next two

years, about 110 TWh of the gross national electricity production by means of renewables to

meet the 2010 target, which is an extra of about 30 TWh. Even though production rates are

increasing, this is simply impossible. The new 2020 targets, however, are still within reach.

New targets for the year 2020 are linked to the adoption of a new European Directive on re-

newable energy in April 2009. The EU-Directive 2009/28/EC of April 29, 2009 on the promo-

tion of the use of energy from renewable sources (amending and repealing the Directives

33 In 2006 the percentage was only 6.2. It was not possible though to obtain data from after 2006 about the percentage of renewables in the gross national energy consumption, but as the percentage in the final energy consumption did not change between 1990 and 2008 – always oscillating around 12 % – I assumed that the other percentage did not change much either. (MEEDDAT e + j, and my own calculations on the basis of Schneider 2008 and MEEDDAT a) 34 Calculated with an average growth rate of 2 % (Dena 2006)


69

2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC) contains legally binding targets for the first time. Until 2020,

20% of the European gross energy consumption will have to be produced by renewables. The

Directive guarantees, among other things, the further use of feed-in tariffs, demands the expan-

sion of the European power supply network, defines specifications for electricity transfer, asks

for a reduction of administrative barriers that could hamper the development of renewables,

and has to be transposed into national law before the end of 2010. (BWE Europe 2009)

In the PPI of 2009, a new and ambitious French target was published, fixing the percentage

of renewables in the gross national energy consumption in 2020 at 23%. This target is also

referred to in the Grenelle I act. The PPI of 2009 further defines a 25,000 MW wind power

capacity target for 2020 (19,000 MW on-shore and 6,000 MW offshore). The SER observes that

to achieve this target, an annual increase in capacity of about 2,000 MW would be necessary.

(MEEDDAT d, SER/FEE future 2009) The increase does not seem to be very much at first

glance, however, the realizability of the target should be approached very critically as histori-

cally targets for renewables and for wind energy in France have not been reached in time.

Theoretically, the annual increase in capacity to achieve this target needed “only” to be 1,800

MW (calculated from the beginning of 2009 on). This is not impossible, but on December 31,

2009, an additional capacity of only 1,036 MW had been installed (MEEDDM c) – 764 MW less

than needed. So even though the French wind energy industry seems to be prepared to increase

installation rates (see above, statement of Charles Dugué of the SER), the annual installation

rate seems to stabilize around 1,000 MW. The main question is therefore: Is there a maximal

amount of renewable energy sources, and especially wind energy, in the French context?

(see chapter 6)

4.3 Changes in Actor Constellations and in the

Socio-Economic Framework

The “Pre-Phase”

The most important actor through all the constellations was, and still is, the French govern-

ment. The development in the wind energy niche was already strongly structured by the consti-

tution of the French Republic and by decisions of the government long before it actually took an


70

active part in it. The French Republic is a democratic, unitary, centralized state. Its centralism

has been embodied in the French Constitution since the Revolution of 1789. Today, France

consists of 26 regions (thereof four overseas), 100 departments, and about 36,700 municipali-

ties (communes). In the period after the Second World War, attempts were made to soften this

rather rigid structure, for it proved to be an obstacle for modernization, but the reforms only

resulted in some kind of deconcentration35. Since the change of government in 1981, President

Mitterand declared decentralization to be of great importance; one year later a first comprehen-

sive law on that subject (la loi Defferre) came into effect: regions were declared to be independ-

ent territorial and financial authorities with a directly elected regional council and some execu-

tive and judicial power. Their autonomy was admittedly still quite limited, but in some domains

(e.g. road, culture, or social services) the former power of the Prefect (state representatives at

the departmental level) was handed over to regional, departmental, and municipal authorities –

in the context of wind power development it is interesting to know that the responsibilities of

land allocation, urban development, landscape planning, and preservation of historical monu-

ments were given over to municipal authorities – none of the local authorities received legisla-

tive or enacting power, though. The role of the Prefect changed to that of a middleman and

coordinator for affairs between the local and the state level. The result of the development of

decentralization – activated in 1982 – was a multilayered administrative organization that was

embodied in the Constitution in 2003. (Nadai 2007, Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet & Moreau 2000,

Diplomatie.gouv.fr a) Competences in energy policy at a local level were practically non-

existent or very small. Production, transport, distribution, import, and export of electricity were

nationalized by the government in 1946 with the creation of the two national companies ‘Elec-

tricité de France’ (‘EDF’) and ‘Gaz de France’ (‘GDF’) (see also law no. 46-628 of April 8, 1946).

Before this state monopoly was transferred to EDF and GDF, local collectives assured the power

supply in their respective area. Afterward, they admittedly still had a choice whether to trans-

fer control over this public service to the state companies or not36, but only very few municipal-

35 Competences of the government are only transferred to another sublayer of the centralized ‘state apparatus’, like for example to Prefects, but they are not passed on to independent local authorities. 36 See article L.2221-1 of the ‘code général des collectivités territoriales’


71

ities (e.g. Strasbourg or Grenoble37) dared to compete with the two national players and to

become a non-nationalized distributer (distributeur non nationalisé, ‘DNN’). (Nadai 2007,

Schneider 2008, Senat.fr a)

As described in more detail in chapter 4.1, there have been a few early research activities in

the domain of wind power development in France, which even involved EDF and thus also the

French state. In the 1950s and 1960s, EDF participated and financed research activities that

resulted in large-scale wind generator prototypes. One of EDF’s partners was Neyrpic and the

other one was the research office BEST (Bureau d'Etude Scientifique et Technique), established

by Lucien Romani and commissioned in 1958, that had already been experimenting since the

1940s, together with Aeronautical Institute of Saint-Cyr School at Yvelines (l'Institut Aérotech-

nique de Saint-Cyr l'Ecole), with several small-scale wind generators. Those early initiatives

failed however – EDF ceased its support for wind generators in 1963 when technical problems

occurred – and did not have much impact on the future course of French wind power develop-

ment. It is interesting to see, though, that Vergnet (through BEST/Aérowatt) was already then

involved in this early wind power development. Aérowatt, today an independent and integrated

wind and solar energy producer in French overseas territories and mainland France, was offi-

cially established in 1966, when it replaced BEST (s.o.; Site Cavey, Bonnefille 1974). In 1988 or

shortly after, Vergnet bought up the manufacturer of small wind generators and developed

them further (ADEME Moci 2008). Aérowatt was transformed into a subdivision for wind power

project development and was resold in 2002. Marc Vergnet founded Vergent S.A., another

French manufacturer for small-scale wind generators, in 1988. After acquiring Aérowatt, he

gave up small-scale wind generators pursued wind generator models with an increased capaci-

ty. In 1983, the first experimental wind farm in France was equipped with wind generators

from Vergnet. Today, the company is world leader in small and medium-sized machines with a

special cyclone protection. (Vergnet.fr, Aerowatt.com, ADEME Moci 2008, Site Cavey) Quite

contrary to EDF, Vergnet and Aérowatt maintained their focus on wind energy through all

theses years.

37 Gaz Electricité de Grenoble and Electricité de Strasbourg are two historical gas and power suppliers (Selectra.info)


72

Since the beginning of the 1970s, the state monopolist EDF devoted itself to nuclear energy

instead. The decision for nuclear power generation had been made by the government to ensure

security of supply (see also chapter 4.2) and had since been defended against all competition.

With EDF being a state-owned enterprise, the government had great influence on the question

of how electricity in France was to be produced (today about 90% of the electricity produced in

France is assured by EDF; and 85% of the electricity produced by EDF is generated by nuclear

power; MEDAD e). Nuclear energy in France is supported beyond that however. Development,

design and implementation of nuclear policy in France is mainly under the control of the so

called ‘Corps des Mines’38. In France, a ‘Grands Corps d’Etat’ is a body of civil servants in posi-

tions of power that are historically recruited from graduates of a few French elite schools like

the Ecole Polytechnique, the Ecole Nationale d’Adminstration, or the Ecole Normale Supérieure.

Members of a corps usually occupy executive positions in the civil service or in general man-

agement. Being one of those corps, the Corps des Mines has been accused of consisting of only

a few elite technocrats (their cumulated number of living participants is about 700 and their

annual admission is about twenty or less) that created, over decades, a well-functioning net-

work of lobbyists. Formally, the Ministry of Industry presides over the Corps des Mines and its

General Council, however, the composition of ministries changes every five years (the French

government has a five year mandate), whereas the members of the Corps des Mines remain –

leaving the most powerful position to the vice-president of the General Mining Council. Over

the years, the Corps des Mines has managed to occupy a great many key positions linked with

the nuclear sector, like “the nuclear advisors to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minis-

ter, the Ministers for Economy, Industry, Environment and Research, the CEOs of the CEA39,

AREVA, Framatome and the safety authorities” (Schneider 2008: 6). Thus, the nuclear lobby

was able to push through a long-term nuclear policy without having to deal with parliamentary

issues. (Schneider 2008, AITEC)

A good part of today’s wind energy lobby in Europe originated in the anti-nuclear movement

of the 1970s that triggered an upcoming environmental awareness. Many international non-

38 This is not a legal appellation, but an expression based on habitual language use. 39 Created in 1945, the ‘Commission for atomic energy’ is a French public research establishment related to industrial and commercial activities in the domain of nuclear power. (CEA.fr)


73

profit organizations, like Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth, grew out of this movement and

play today an important role in mobilizing the public (Szarka 2007a: 48, Szarka 2007b). It also

brought forth the formation of the party ‘Les Verts’ established in 1984 (Paris.LesVerts.fr,

Szarka 2007b). The upcoming environmental awareness manifested, as well, in the creation of

a French Ministry of Environment in 1971 (see below). Although the majority of French citi-

zens’ opinions regarding nuclear issues are in-line with the rest of Europe40, the anti-nuclear

movement could never make real progress in France: “Brittany [...] is the only region in France

where the antinuclear movement of the 1970s succeeded in stopping the construction of a

nuclear reactor” (Szarka 2007b: 328). (For more information, see chapter 5.2)

At the end of the described pre-phase in wind power development in France, there was a

clear turning away from wind power by the most important and powerful actors in the sector

(the government and EDF), but a first industrial foundation had been created (Vergnet and

Aérowatt).

The “Pioneer Phase”

Since the beginning of the 1990s, the development of wind energy in France became a new

dimension: new, mainly industrial actors joined the constellation, re-activating the develop-

ment in the wind energy niche (see also chapter 4.1). The next decade can be described as

some kind of pioneer or departure phase (see Ohlhorst 2008).

In the early 90s, the newly forming industry of a future wind energy sector did not have

much help, least of all from the French government. Most of the early industrial French wind

power projects were developed due to support from the European Commission (Nadai 2007:

2717, Energie-Cités.org) as public research grants were mainly allocated to activities on nuclear

issues. In 1997, less than 1% of the public funds were spent on energy efficiency and all renew-

able energies combined (Schneider 2008) and an initial governmental program to promote

40 “The French public’s attitude towards nuclear energy is similar to the average in the EU. In a 2005 study commissioned by the IAEA only 25% of the French people polled expressed support for additional nuclear power plants [...], while 50% were in favor of operating current units but not building new ones and 16% were in favor of shutting down all operating plants. The result is remarkably close to responses from Germany, with respectively 24% for new built, 50% for operating what’s there but against new built and 26% in favor of closure of existing plants. A 2007 poll carried out on behalf of the European Commission confirmed the trend.” (Schneider 2008: 36)


74

wind energy did not exist until 1996 (see below). That meant that pioneers in the French wind

energy niche had to rely, in some extent, on knowledge from their European and American

neighbors – most notably concerning technological issues were concerned. Many of the genera-

tors installed in this pioneer phase were small Vergnet-machines, but park developers also

used “foreign technology” with more capacity (among them machines from Nordex, Vestas,

Gamsea, Lagerwey, Neg Micon, Siemens, Bonus Energy, Turbowinds and Windmaster; see table

3 in the appendix). It is interesting to know that the first wind park developers and operators in

France were almost exclusively French enterprises: there are for example La Compagnie du

Vent (wind park developer and operator, and studies and measurements agency), Eole technol-

ogies (studies and measurements agency), Cégelec (engineering and technical services), JMB

Energie (green electricity producer), SINERG (specialized in third-party funds in the energy

sector; part of the IDEX-group), SIIF Energies (project developer in the domain of renewables;

later EDF-EN), Innovent (wind park developer and operator), or Poweo (power supplier). In the

beginning of the development of the French wind sector, there were still quite a few small wind

park developers and operators, too (see table 3 in the appendix), like for example so-called

‘sociétés en nom collectif’ (‘SNC’), municipalities, regional associations, or even individuals –

this changed, however, with the introduction of a tender scheme (see below).

The French governmental Environment Agency ADEME (l’Agence de l'Environnement et de

la Maîtrise de l'Energie; ADEME.fr) was founded at the same time as the wind energy develop-

ment was reactivated in France. The ADEME did not noticeably attend to wind energy issues

from the onset, however. The first initiative from the French government for the development of

wind energy in France (apart from EDF’s financial support in the 1950s) was a tender scheme

named EOLE-2005 initiated by the Ministry for Industry in 1996 (see circular letter no. 68 of

February 22, 1999) – the Ministry of the Environment not being in authority for energy deci-

sions, yet (see below). Based on this wind energy promotion program, EDF concluded first

purchase agreements for electricity produced by wind energy. About half of the projects built

before 2000 (17 out of 30; see table 3 in the appendix) arose within the framework of the EOLE-

2005 program. They were predominantly developed and realized by larger companies and

consortia due to a rather strict, complex, and demanding application procedure (Szarka 2007b).

The government claimed (see DGEMP a) that Vergnet could establish itself in the market niche


75

‘small retractable wind generators’ thanks to its wind power promotion program. The govern-

ment also claimed that the program favored the appearance of the first French large-scale wind

generator manufacturer, thus having contributed to the creation of a new trade and having

strengthened the emerging French wind power industry.

Vergnet developed very well during this first period of wind energy development in France.

In 1993, it started to broadly commercialize the first Vergnet wind generator – and that not

only in France but also all over the world (Vergnet.fr, Gosset & Ranchin 2006). The new manu-

facturer on the French market was Jeumont, affiliate to a major player in the French nuclear

industry, the Framatome Group (now Areva)41. With a long history in fabrication and installa-

tion of industrial goods (such as pumps, motors, and electrical equipment) and with the help of

the ADEME that contributed a considerable amount of money, Jeumont Industries built its first

prototype wind generator in 1999 and started commercialization in 2001 (see also chapter 4.1).

(ArchivesNationales.Culture.gouv.fr, FED, Gosset & Ranchin 2006) The first park equipped with

one of the Jeumont-machines was Widehem (commissioned in September 2001). Others fol-

lowed, but not many: Escales 1, Plougras, Montjoyer, and Rochfort in France, Le Renard in

Canada, and Klipheuwel and Peyongchang in South Africa (TheWindPower.net).

It was also in 1996 when the emerging French wind power industry began to organize itself.

The association France Energie Eolienne (FEE) was founded, bringing together professionals of

the French wind energy branch and giving them a voice (Fee.Asso.fr, Szarka 2007a: 47). There

was no apparent cooperation between the FEE professionals and the government and between

the FEE professionals and public research establishments, though.

The “Progression Phase”

From 2000 on, several changes can be observed in the constellation. 2000 is the year of the

abolishment of the EOLE-2005 program, the amplification of the pro-wind lobby, the emergence

of the anti-wind-movement, the drop out of an important industrial player, and the creation of a

new institutional framework (see chapter 4.2). This has been favored by changes in the French 41 This shows that actors supporting the wind power development do not have to be against nuclear power. “Wind industry representatives are neither unanimous nor categoric in rejecting nuclear. Electricity majors such as [...] Areva and EdF deal with both nuclear and wind power. Likewise component manufactures sell into a range of markets, whilst the careers of electrical engineers typically embrace different conversion technologies, including nuclear.” (Szarka 2007a: 55)


76

government and by the EU through the 2001/77/CE directive on renewables. Another EU-

directive (Directive 96/92/EC on the Internal Market in Electricity, coming into effect in 1999)

ordered the liberalization of the European electricity market, thus helping many new (mainly

industrial) domestic and foreign actors to come on the market and into the constellation. On the

whole, this second period (2000 - 2005) “can be regarded as one over which actors “trained” in

developing real-size wind power projects and experienced institutional learning as regards to

local wind power development.” (Nadai 2007: 2719)

The second constellation was strongly characterized by the effects of different governmental

situations. After fourteen years of socialist presidency (François Mitterand, Partie Socialiste)

and a change of government in 1995 (Jacques Chirac, Rassemblement pour la République) the

Green party was finally brought into government in 1997 when early parliamentary elections

took place. This gave the wind energy development in France a new pulse. The “Gauche

Plurielle”, a coalition of Socialistes, Communistes, and Greens under Prime Minister Lionel

Jospin, in which the Green party obtained the position of minister of the environment (first

Dominique Voynet, then Yves Cochet), brought forward the 2000 Electricity Act and achieved,

among other things, the implementation of the feed-in tariff policy (see chapter 4.2). (Nadai

2007, Szarka 2007b, MEEDDM a, LaDocumentationFrancaise.fr, Liternaute.com) From 2002 on,

having won both the presidential and parliamentary elections, Chirac and his conservative

party (now called Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, UMP) could govern France all by

themselves (Archives.Premier-Ministre.gouv.fr). This new government amended and diluted

several of the environmental initiatives taken by the former government – like for example, a

comprehensive concept to reduce CO2 emissions (Dena 2006) – and was accused of “not mak-

ing a real effort to abolish the numerous obstacles preventing a breakthrough of renewables in

electricity generation, in particular wind” (Brand 2004, s.a. Alternatives-Economiques.fr). The

political and intellectual atmosphere during this period was well reflected in two public reports.

Yves Cochet, deputy and member of the Green Party, wrote the first report in 2000. It support-

ed a significant development of renewable energy technologies and the adoption of feed-in

tariffs. In France however, the Green party was (and presumably still is) the only party that

promoted a nuclear phase-out. All the other parties, except for the liberal wing of the UMP that

opposed wind power development completely for aesthetic and economical reasons, were basically


77

in favor of renewable energies, but only as long as the hegemony of the nuclear was not ques-

tioned. This situation made it extremely difficult for the pro-wind lobby to find influential advo-

cates for their cause in ministries or in the policy network in general. A report by the French

Commission for the assessment of scientific and technological choices (Office parlementaire

des choix scientifiques et technologiques, OPECST) expressed this position that was also more

or less shared by the majority of the National Assembly:

“While open to the development of renewable energies, it considered that renewable electricity should not be considered the sole room for manoeuvre as regards to CO2 re-duction [...] Nuclear technology should keep on securing energy provision and providing France with “clean electricity” [...] Wind power being the most mature RES-E technology but considered as raising landscape and grid management issues […] should only be given a temporary role in fulfilling the Kyoto commitments.” (Nadai 2007: 2718)

The second constellation of the wind energy development was also characterized by the ef-

fects of the EU-directives 96/92/EC and 2003/54/EC, which specified general conditions for the

liberalization of the European electricity and gas market. This implicated the privatization of

the state-owned company EDF, thus dissolving the quasi-monopoly that EDF held over the

‘power generation’ and ‘network operation’ divisions, and the creation of an independent regu-

latory authority, the CRE (‘Commission de Regulation de l'Energie’). In July 2000, EDF was

transformed into an anonymous society (whose main shareholder is even today the French

state, though) and it disassociated from the transport network and entrusted it to the RTE

(‘Réseau de transport de l’électricté’), a quasi-independent administrator of the transport net-

work with a separate balance sheet to guarantee financial transparency. The regulation of the

distribution network remained with the municipalities, which assign the right of utilization to

EDF or a DNN. The CRE was supposed to guarantee equal access to the grid and to prevent EDF

from abusing its market power. (Dena 2006, Gosset & Ranchin 2006, MEDAD e, SortirDuNucle-

aire.org) The liberalization of the markets should have enabled alternative, non-governmental

power producers and providers to enter. In France, this process of market liberalization was

performed stepwise. Initially, only business clients could freely choose their suppliers; for

private customers the market opened in 2007. (Dena 2006, MEDAD f) Prior to the liberalization

of the electricity market the main power producers were EDF, the CNR (Compagnie nationale

du Rhône, second largest electricity producer in France due to its hydroelectric power produc-

tion, founded in 1933), the SNET (Société nationale d'électricité et de thermique, created in 1995),


78

and the SHEM (Société hydroélectrique du Midi) (see DGEMP c). In 2003, the SNET was taken

over by Endesa, ‘number one’ on the Spanish electricity market and became Endesa France.

The major stockholder changed again in 2008 when E.ON, a German electricity provider, ac-

quired 65% of the shares. (Snet-Electricite.fr, Fusacq.com, Actu-Environnement.fr h, Envi-

ronnement.CCIP.fr) It was also in 2003 that CNR and SHEM became affiliates of Electrable, a

historical Belgian power supplier – shortly before Suez became main shareholder of Electrable.

With the merger of Suez and GDF (an anonymous society since 2004 with the French state as

main shareholder until the merger) in July 2008 they were finally all combined under one label:

GDF-Suez. (Environnement.CCIP.fr, CNR.tm.fr, RFI.fr a, LesEchos.fr b, Shem.fr, Actu-

Environnement.fr i, GdfSuez.com) In 2007, the three leading power producers on the French

market were still EDF, CNR (GDF-Suez), and SNET (Endesa France) with more than 95% market

share (90% of them were assured by EDF; MEDAD e). Aside from these power producers, there

are several domestic and international power suppliers active on the French electricity market

today, such as: E.ON (Germany), RWE (Germany), Verbund (Austria), Electrabel (Belgium),

Iberdrola Generacion (Spain), Union Fenosa Generacion (Spain), Norsk Hydro (Norway),

Dynegy (United Kingdom), and TXU EET (United Kingdom) (MEDAD a). The first new domestic

power suppliers were Poweo and Direct Energie, created in 2002 and 2003. They both have a

low cost profile and provide the possibility to buy electricity entirely obtained by renewables,

giving themselves a green image. In addition to contracts with big power producers like EDF,

Verbund, Total, or Vattenfall they both possess some production units themselves (Direct Ener-

gie in the domain of hydroelectricity, wind and solar energy; Poweo additionally invests in

biomass and in traditional thermal power plants). Alterna, Enercoop, and Planet Oui appeared

some years later and offered only 100% ‘green electricity’. Alterna, created by Gaz Electricité de

Grenobles and Sorgégies, unites more than twenty local electricity providers – thus having the

advantage of possessing an already established clientele. Enercoop chose the form of a social

enterprise (Société Coopérative d’Intérêt Collectif) including actors like Greenpeace42 or La

Compagnie du Vent. The electricity they sell is entirely provided by their members. (Ener-

zine.com a, Selectra.info, Fournisseurs-Electricite.com)

42 A Greenpeace Energy branch did not seem to work in France because of an incomplete liberalization of the electricity market. (Heise.de)


79

Not only foreign power suppliers streamed on the French market however – the power pur-

chase obligation and the new legal framework (see chapter 4.2) gave sufficient planning relia-

bility and economic incentives to attract wind park developers and operators from other coun-

tries, too (Szarka 2007b). While the first park developers in France were almost exclusively

French, there are now numerous examples for foreign park developers: Enertrag (German

power supplier), Boralex (Canadian Power Income Fund), Natenco (German power supplier;

since 2006 consolidation with the French Theolia SA), WSB Neue Energien (German wind and

solar farms developer), ABO-Wind (German wind park developer), Juwi-Gruppe (German wind

park developer), Nordex (German manufacturer of wind generators), Volkswind (German wind

park developer), Ostwind (German wind park developer), Iberdrola (Spanish power supplier), or

Neo Renovaveis (Spanish wind farm developer) (see table 3 in the appendix). The wind genera-

tors for those farms are mainly fabricated by German manufactures like Nordex, REpower, and

Enercon, but the Danish with Vestas and Neg Micon, the Americans with GE Wind, and the

Spanish with Gamsea are well represented, too. (see table 3 in the appendix) The French wind

generator industry consisted, at that time, of two enterprises: Vergnet, that was a world leader

in its line of business but that did not produce large-scale generators, and Jeumont Industries

that could never successfully penetrate the market43. After just four years, Jeumont finally

ceased production in 2005 – leaving the French wind energy industry with only one single

national manufacturer (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, FED, Chabot 2006). It does not look quite as

“bad” in the domain of French component suppliers and equipment manufacturers. Some of

them are even internationally known in the wind generator industry, like for example Rollix-

Defontaine, that designs special bearings and slewings, and Leroy-Somer that produces and

commercializes motors, alternators, and gear mechanisms. Those companies have experienced

some difficulties, though, to establish themselves on the “inexistent” French market forcing

them to go into the export trade. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006) Apart from suppliers, park develop-

ers also work together with research and development companies. Some French examples are:

Abies, Airele, Alternative Technologie, Cabinet Germa (now La Compagnie du Vent), Eiden,

43 The superiority of Vergnet can be explained with the findings of Garud and Karnoe (2003): Vergnet that followed a bricolage approach could slowly but surely establish itself in the sector whereas Jeumont failed when it tried to penetrate the market with a breakthrough approach.


80

Elsam France (with a Danish parent company), EDF-EN (formerly SIIF Energies), Eole-Res,

Espace Éolien Développement, Oser, P&T Technologie SAS (with a German parent company),

Sofiva Energie, and Valorem. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, see also table 3 in the appendix) Park

operators, eventually, are those actors that operate and exploit a wind power station or park. In

order to benefit from preferential feed-in tariffs, a 12-MW-capacity-limit for wind parks had to

be observed (see chapter 4.2).

With the growth of the wind power industry and the increasing number and size of wind

power stations in France, an anti-movement began to develop, as well. Visibility of the ma-

chines and fear of a wind rush in windy regions were the main cause for opposition, but “for-

eign” ownership of many of the wind parks was relevant, too (Szarka 2007a). In 2001, the

national federation ‘Vent de Colère’ was founded with the aim to unite all local associations

campaigning against industrial wind energy development in France. Their central arguments

against wind energy are: its intermittency, its supposed harmfulness for humans and animals,

its impairment of landscape and historical monuments, its assumed economical inefficiency

and unjustified enrichment by park developers and operators at the expense of the general

public, and an opacity of politics and the media coverage (VentDeColere.org, Brand 2004,

Gosset & Ranchin 2006). In practice however, there was no common front in this battle against

wind energy development. Actors of the anti-movement involved in the opposition of a project

seldom worked together because they were not motivated by the same cause: “[An] overlap

between their aims tend[ed] to be coincidental rather than strategic.” (Szarka 2007a: 174)

Several public opinion polls supported the pro-wind-lobby in its course, though, and consist-

ently confirmed that the wind energy development in France – in spite of the growing anti-

movement – was, and still is, well accepted in the population. An opinion survey realized in

January 2003 by the leading market research and market information group SOFRES (Société

française d'enquêtes par sondages) showed that those who lived nearest to the wind power

projects in question were in general the most favorable ones. This survey – requested by SIIF

Energies– was undertaken at Bouin in the department Vendée. The percentage of approval in

general was 89%, that of the inhabitants of Bouin was even 94%. This confirms results of anoth-

er opinion survey carried out for the ADEME in department Aude one year earlier. (SER/FEE

press release 2003) Another opinion survey realized in 2003 by the global market research


81

company Synovate proved that, even at a national level, 92 % of the population approved the

development and that residents of the departments Aude and Finistère that lived next to wind

energy generators were still more favorable than the national average. Being unaesthetic was

the most cited reason for opposition to the development. (ADEME Sondage 2003)

In 2005, the FEE was integrated in the ‘Renewable Energies Syndicate’ (Syndicat des Ener-

gies Renouvelables, SER). Established in 1993, the SER acts as advocate for the interests of its

members (in July 2009 they had more than 400). It is a national organization of industrialists

and professionals whose activities are connected to the domains of biomass, wood, bio-fuels,

tidal energy, geothermal energy, hydro-electricity, photovoltaics and solar energy (that is to say

also enterprises being simultaneously active in the fossil fuel or the nuclear electricity domain

like EDF Energie Nouvelle or Total) – contrary to the ‘Committee for the Linkage of Renewable

Energies’ (Comité de liaison des énergies renouvelables, CLER) that accepts only smaller re-

newables supporters. The CLER was created in 1984. It was however not possible to find out

when its involvement in the wind energy sector began. (Brand 2004, Enr.fr, Cler.fr, Fee.Asso.fr)

The Tipping Point

About the year 2005, the development of wind energy in France attained a turning point,

which was marked by a significant increase in installed capacity and in the number and size of

French enterprises and organizations in the wind energy sector – in spite of the lack of a

French large-scale manufacturer44. To some extent, those new entrants were enterprises active

in traditional branches of industry that capitalized on the emerging wind energy market but

there could also be observed another trend in the French wind energy sector. Some French

enterprises tried to enter the market and join the competition via acquisition of important

foreign manufacturers or via partnerships with such. This showed that the French industry was

indeed interested in investing in the wind energy sector. Even major players of the (in-

ter)national energy sector like Areva and EDF participate increasingly in the development.

44 The only remaining established French manufacturer Vergnet continued to expand distribution of its specialized small- and medium-scale generators. In 2008 it had a 1 % share in the French market of manufacturers (SER/FEE état parc). That is admittedly not much but in his specialized niche Vergnet carried on an excellent export trade with countries in the Pacific, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, and in Africa (Vergnet.fr).


82

“The interest of the national power company [EDF] in renewable energy investments and the fact that the main international groups are now opening up factories and offices in France reflect increased belief in the French market.” (EWEA 2009b)

After the Jeumont failure for example, Areva became the major shareholder of the German

manufacturer REpower in 200545 and in 2007 it acquired 51% of the German manufacturer

Multibrid, specialized in large-scale offshore generators (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, Areva.com,

Actu-Environnement.fr c + g). Other examples are the take-over of the Spanish manufacturer

Ecotecnia by Alstom in 2007 (SER/FEE kit éolien 2009, Actu-Environnement.fr b) as well as the

association of the French wind park developer Valorem and the Canadian manufacturer AAER.

The emerging society AAER SAS shall be located in the region of Bordeaux and take care of the

fabrication and commercialization of large-scale AAER wind generators in France (GTAI.de,

Enviro2b.com a). Those takeovers and associations are accompanied by a general corporate

concentration in the European Energy Sector as well as an internationalization of companies

that were previously nationally based (EPSU.org). This is also reflected in the development of

wind energy in France. Since 2007, GDF (later GDF-Suez) became a major shareholder of the

French wind park developers and operators: La Compagnie du Vent, Nass&Wind Technologie,

Maia Eolis (only 49%), Erelia, Eoliennes de la Haute-Lys, and the Canadian Ventus Energy

(GTAI.de, Actu-Environnement.fr d). EDF on the other hand holds 50% of the shares of its affili-

ate EDF Energies Nouvelles, which is now managed by Henri Proglio, who is at the same time

CEO of Veolia Environnement (a French multinational company in the domain of environmen-

tal services). (Veolia.com, Liberation.fr b) EDF is also a fine example for the increasing interna-

tionalization of national players in the energy sector. With its American wind energy branch for

example, EDF-EN is developing large wind parks in the US. At the end of 2008, EDF owned

wind parks with a total capacity of 263 MW in France, 1,001 MW in the rest of Europe, 49 MW

in Turkey, and 713 MW in the United States. (Actu-Environnement.fr f, LeFigaro.fr b, Capital.fr,

EDF projects)

45 In 2008, Areva ceded its shares to Suzlon.


83

------------------------------------------------------------------- SIDE NOTE: GREENWASHING

Although being part of the wind energy constellation and contributing to the sector’s devel-

opment in France, big enterprises like EDF and Areva are often accused of practicing ‘Green-

washing’. Greenwashing is a term used for certain practices of companies that want to give

themselves a ‘green image’ and that are more intent on cultivating that image than actually

doing something to earn it. The environmental non-profit organization Friends of Earth France

has created the ‘Prix Pinocchio’ to call attention to negative behavior of some French enterpris-

es in the domains human rights, environment, and greenwashing. In 2009, the first prize in the

category Greenwashing went to EDF for its campaign “Changer d’énergie ensemble”. This

campaign was aiming at showing the public how committed EDF was to renewable energy

sources and to the combat against global warming. In its environmental report of 2008, howev-

er, the budget for renewables amounted only to 8.9 million EUR, 2.1% of the overall budget (421

million EUR) and it was one million EUR less than the expenses for the whole campaign (about

10 million EUR). (Prix-pinocchio.org) In 2008, it was Areva that won the first place for its slo-

gan “Nos energies ont de l’avenir, un avenir sans CO2”. The eco-balance of its production fleet

lagged far behind of the performance of renewable energy sources, though. (AmisDeLaTerre.org)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- END SIDE NOTE

In spite of the lack of a French large-scale manufacturer, as well as the concentration and

internationalization on the European energy market, the overall number of French enterprises

and organizations in the wind energy sector increased and existing enterprises were able to

expand. This development was most notable in the domain of component suppliers and equip-

ment manufacturers (examples are: Aérocomposite occitane, Alstom Power, Areva T&D, Eiffel,

SBS Forge, Schneider Electrics, SIAG, SPIE, Stromag France, etc.), which pushed the develop-

ment of numerous engineering and consulting companies, civil and electrical engineering, and

transport and installation works companies. All in all, including park developers, operators,

and maintenance works companies, there are now about 380 French enterprises, in 20 differ-

ent lines of business, on the wind energy market in France – some of whom are even world

leader in their domain. Most of the enterprises are relatively young. For instance, in only two


84

years, about five factories for the manufacturing of towers and foundations have been built in

France. To some extent, new entrants on the market come from traditional industrial domains

like metallurgy and metal fabrication, mechanical engineering, the aeronautical sector, and

naval architecture. (SER/FEE press release 2009 + kit éolien 2009 + annuaire 2009) All in all,

about 2000 full time jobs were created in the wind energy sector in 2007 (with a total of 5,000

jobs in 2006 and 7,000 in 2007). In 2012, the ADEME predicted that on the basis of the planned

Grenelle measures there will even be up to 16,000 new jobs (ADEME & Vous 2008, SER/FEE

Panorama 2007, EWEA 2009b). The impact that the present financial crisis will have upon this

development still remains to be seen (see chapter 5.2).

In May 2007, a new French president was elected: Nicolas Sarkozy46. This man, although be-

ing from the same party as Jacques Chirac and although continuing to heavily promote nuclear

energy, had considerable influence on developments in the renewables sector. A feature of

Sarkozy’s energy policy, as he announced it during his run for presidency in 2006, and as he at

least partly realized it over the last years, was that he was very favorable of nuclear energy and

of renewable energy sources at the same time. It was during his mandate that the construction

of a first EPR in France started in 2007 and that that of a second one was decided on in 2009,

with the prospect of a third one in the years to come. (DGEMP d, MEEDDAT g, TF1.LCI.fr a); but

it was also he that wanted to make France a leader in all ‘clean technologies’ and not only in

nuclear energy:

“France, a leader in nuclear energies, thought it did not require renewable energy sources. That is a mistake. Today, we are going to take decisions, for renewable ener-gies, that are just as important as have been those taken by General Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s regarding nuclear energy. [...] We have to become tomorrow's leaders of energies that do not emit carbon dioxide without losing anything of our advance in the domain of nuclear energy.” (TF1.LCI.fr b)47

This support manifested in several initiatives like the Grenelle of Environment (see chapter

4.2), the reorganization of the Ministry of the Environment, and in a rise in public research

expenditures for renewables (TF1.LCI.fr b, Ecolo.fr, Actu-Environnement.fr q, Actualites-News-

Environnement.com, LeDauphine.com a).

46 His Prime Minister is François Fillon; Sarkozy’s party, the UMP, also won the Parliamentary election in June 2007. (Interieur.gouv.fr, France-Politique.fr) 47 translation by the author


85

The Ministry of the Environment was created in January 1971 and has, since then, changed

names several times and to some extent also its field of activity. In 1997, the Ministry became

Ministry of Regional Planning and of the Environment (le ministère de l’Aménagement du

territoire et de l’environnement) and in 2001 it changed to Ministry of Ecology and of Sustaina-

ble Development (le ministère de l’écologie et du développement durable). In 2007 it was again

restructured, by the decree of May 18, 2007 relative to the composition of the government, to

become the Ministry of Ecology and of Sustainable Development and Planning (ministère de

l’écologie, du développement et de l’aménagement durables, MEDAD). The first minister of this

new Ministry was Alain Juppé, but he resigned after the parliamentary election in June, ceding

the post to Jean-Louis Borloo that occupies it since. (MEDAD b + c, Actu-Environnement.fr a)

President Sarkozy had bigger plans for the Ministry however. In 2006, he announced his plans

to create a comprehensive ‘Super Ministry’ (DeveloppementDurableLeJournal.com) with a

much larger field of responsibility than before:

“I wish for a policy in which the [French] State has a strategic vision based on long-term considerations on its structuring investments. That is why we have suggested the crea-tion of a big ministry that incorporates the Managements in charge of the environment, of water, of transport, and of energy. You have to appreciate that this is a revolution in our administrative landscape.” (BourseReflex.com)48

This meant that the two fields of activity, environment and energy, which have been historical-

ly separate, should be brought together under one ministry. After the local elections in March

2008, the new Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Local Planning (le

ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du Développement durable et de l’Aménagement du terri-

toire, MEEDDAT) was created, including then also responsibilities on energy issues49. Its pre-

sent name is Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development, and of the Sea (Ministère

de l’Écologie, de l’Énergie, du Développement durable et de la Mer, MEEDDM), having been

reorganized once again in June 2009, adding responsibilities for oceanic development, “green

technologies”, and negotiations on climate issues. (MEEDDAT c, DeveloppementDurable.com b,

Caradisiac.com, Actu-Environnement.fr e) 48 translation by the author 49 Analogy with the German case: “In Germany the Ministry of Economy and Labour was responsible for energy politics in general until 2002. This brought up several conflicts with the Ministry of Environment which was responsible for climate change politics [...] The success of the Green party helped the minister of the environment to acquire the responsibility for renewable energy.” (Brand 2004)


86

The Grenelle of Environment (see chapter 4.2) was a national convention on sustainable de-

velopment organized by Nicolas Sarkozy that took place in October 2007 and was followed by a

great many political meetings and discussions. The name of the convention refers to the “Ac-

cord of Grenelle in May 1968” (LaDepeche.fr) and symbolizes the will of the government to

integrate representatives of concerned non-profit organizations and of professional associations

in its decision making process on renewable energies and environmental issues. This kind of

cooperation is still quite unusual in France. It remains to be seen whether the newly found

basis for cooperation between the government, the economy, and associations will be a perma-

nent one. (BourseReflex.com, Alternatives-Economiques.fr b, Assemble-Nationale.fr, DGAP)

In addition to those measures, Nicolas Sarkozy has recently declared that he intended to

raise public investment in renewable energy resources to the same level as those the govern-

ment spends on nuclear energy. (LeDauphine.com a + b)

“I thought to myself that we will put the same amount of money which we invest in new third generation European Pressurized water Reactors in renewable energy sources, this is an objective of parity and I reconfirm it, not within 2015 or 2020 but right away, right now.” (Liberation.fr a)50

Until now, the French research landscape on renewables has been hardly supported by public

money. Between 1985 and 2001 up to 93% of public funds went into nuclear fission and nucle-

ar fusion (OECD-IEA figures based on data transmitted by the French government). In 1997,

less than 1% of these funds were allocated to energy efficiency and renewable energies. In

recent years however, the situation has changed only marginally. In 2006 about 800 million

EUR were provided for research on energy issues. Thereof, 477 million (about 60%) went into

nuclear energy, 106 million into fossil fuels (13%), and only 52 million (6.5%) into all renewa-

bles combined (Senat.fr b). Those investments seem even more disproportionate when consid-

ering the fact that nuclear energy does not provide more than 16 % of the final energy consump-

tion in France. (Schneider 2008, Wissenschaft-Frankreich.de, UsineNouvelle.com a, Senat.fr b) The

French research landscape on renewables is not only poorly provided with public funds, it is

badly organized and insufficiently linked, as well. In 2006, Jérôme Gosset and Thierry Ranchin

published a report on the condition and prospects of the French wind energy sector (Gosset &

Ranchin 2006). Among the weak points of the French research landscape on wind energy they 50 translation by the author


87

described was, on one hand, the limited number of public and private laboratories and organi-

zations that actually participate in the development of the sector and, on the other hand, the

lack of interconnectedness as well as a lack of organization and structuring among them. This

goes along with the lack of a common research program or even a common goal. They further

pointed out that France, contrary to other European countries like Denmark, Germany, or

Spain, had no national institution responsible for scientific and technological research on and

development of wind energy. They finally remarked that in other countries, research activities

have largely been supported by the wind energy industry. In the absence of a significant indus-

try, this cooperation between the private sector and academic research institutes turned out to

be very weak in France. This lack of structuring and organization has been reconfirmed in

2007 by the government in a short article on the national strategy on wind energy research on

the website of the Ministry of Environment (MEDAD d) and it is again criticized in a report of

the OPECST of 2009 (Senat.fr b). Sarkozy now promises to raise public investment in renewa-

bles – for him, it is a question of parity that has to be approached now and not in ten years.

These developments are quite positive for the French wind energy – not everything is run-

ning smoothly, though (Actu-Environnement.fr j). In 2008, the ‘Institut Montaigne’ published a

very unfavorable report on wind energy development in France. Moreover, the anti-wind-

movement seems to be becoming stronger and, most notably, better organized.

The Institut Montaigne is a think-tank that was created in 2000 by Claude Bébéar, president

of the board of directors at AXA. It emphasizes ideological, political, and financial independ-

ence; other sources (Arte.tv, NonFiction.fr) classify it as liberal and point out that large and

influential consortia support it. In July 2008, it published a report (see InstitutMontaigne.org)

named “Wind Generators: A Fresh Breath or Hot Air?”51, an evaluation on wind energy as it is

intended in the Grenelle roadmap. The report mainly criticizes the supposed economical ineffi-

ciency of wind energy and the associated additional cost for society.

The Federation Environnement Durable (FED) was created in January 2007 on the initiative

of Jean-Louis Butré and is another organization (alongside the federation ‘Vent de Colère’; see

above) that unites associations that are opposed to the development of industrial wind energy

in France. In addition to this new organization, the anti-wind-movement has a new hero: the 51 translation by the author: “Eoliennes : nouveau souffle ou vent de folie ?”


88

former president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Since 2007, he has been presiding over the strategic

orientation committee (Comité d’orientation stratégique) of the FED. When asked in an inter-

view with Libération, why this committee was created, d’Estaing answered:

“When I was President, I was highly involved in the protection of the French landscape. And, in the last six months, whilst I was crossing France in a TGV, I saw appearing wind power stations in La Beauce [a region south of Paris]. The French landscape is however, along with its language and its cultural heritage, one of the most precious things that we have. The second reason is the financial opacity in this matter. Nobody ever wants to put a figure on it, nobody knows who is paying for it, and psychological arguments are used without explaining the consequences to the citizens. Why do we produce electricity that is more costly when we have a surplus due to nuclear energy production?” (Adeva-Villebeon.org)52

Renewables in general are not criticized by the movement, but exclusively wind energy and

that because of its assumed unjustified hegemony in politics compared to other renewables and

because of landscape protection issues. (Actu-Environnement.fr t, LeMonde.fr b)

Public opinion polls on wind energy in France continue to provide positive numbers, though.

In a press release of November 2006 (ADEME Sondage 2006) the ADEME declared that 93%

of the interviewed people gave a favorable opinion on wind energy. And in April 2009, the

French Ministry of the Environment published a poll on social acceptability of wind energy in

France (MEEDDAT i) that ascertained that only 5% of local residents perceive wind generators

as disturbing.

4.4 Summary

On the whole, five interwoven core transformation processes can be identified in the devel-

opment: a technological innovation process, changes in energy policy and legal conditions,

a transformation of the economical context, alteration of social relationships, as well as a modi-

fication of the normative basis. Together they make the emergence of the wind energy sector in

France possible.

In France, just as in other countries (cf. wind parks in California in the 1980s or the

GROWIAN in Germany), early large-scale wind generator projects did not lead to success.

Instead, installation rates showed a steady shift from small and simple wind generators to



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large-scale wind power stations with ever increasing size and capacity, which, from 1991 on,

followed approximately the same development curve as in neighboring countries because most

of the installed machines (except for Vergent) came from abroad and had not been developed in

France. The result of this technological transformation is most evident in the current offshore

development (with prototype machines of 5 MW or higher), which is, in contrast to the on-shore

development, still in a premature state. According to Ulrich Dolata (Dolata 2007, 2008a,

2008b), technological changes entail transformations in other areas, too. The growing size of

today’s wind generators and parks is accompanied by the need for capital-intensive investors

that can bear the risks and requirements of such projects. Simultaneously, park developers,

operators, and the supplier industry also increased in size. The industrial French wind energy

sector that, in the beginning, was almost none existent, could establish itself more and more,

trying to defy its foreign competitors. Furthermore, major international players are becoming

interested in the wind energy sector, for it now promises to yield profits. Thus, the sector be-

came more and more organized by a market-based rationality. The increasingly international-

ized and outcome-oriented development demanded a change in actor constellations, too. Small

organizations and individuals were never well represented in the wind energy development in

France but recently it has become even more difficult for them to participate. With the trans-

formation of the actor constellations in the sector, motives for support of the development

changed as well. In the beginning, the development of the French wind energy sector was

mainly being pushed by European and international agreements on climate protection and

promotion of renewables. Today however, economical issues have become an additional incen-

tive to participate in the development. Those transformations reciprocally influenced and in-

tensified each other. The most important transformation for the development of the wind ener-

gy sector in France was, however, the steady alteration of the political and legal framework.

Beginning fairly indifferent of wind energy with mediocre support for wind energy only coming

through international pressure, today the French government shows ambitions to assume

a leading role in all ‘clean’ energy sources, including wind. The development in France demon-

strated that governmental support and an adequate regulation are very important for the

sector’s evolution.


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5 Constricting and Enabling Factors of the

Niche-Sector-Transformation

After the detailed description of several aspects of the development in the wind energy niche

in France it is time to deal with the question of why the development proceeded in this particu-

lar way. To answer it, one has to look for enabling and constraining factors at all the theoretical

levels: niche, regime, and landscape. Where and when arose the so-called ‘windows of oppor-

tunity’ for the niche constellation and which structures and constellations limited the develop-

ment of the niche? These positive and negative factors can be of natural, economical, political,

social, and technological quality and can be explained by either niche-intern mechanisms that

enable it to expand or by developments and structural tensions at the regime and the landscape

level that open up windows of opportunity for niche expansion (discussed in chapter 2.3).

5.1 Geographical Preconditions

Having enough wind and enough land are two natural conditions that must be ensured first

when looking for adequate sites to built wind generators upon. France has the advantage of

featuring the second best wind potential in Europe after Great Britain. With its three different,

complementary wind regions – the English Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean re-

gime (see figure 11) – the problem of intermittence53 is much less important than for example

in Germany. (EWEA 2009a, ADEME colloque + guide)

In contrast to Germany and other European countries, France’s regions are also rather

sparsely populated. With a surface of 551,000 km2, France’s population density (residents per

square kilometer) was only 105.7 in 1999 and 111 in 200554. In theory, this low population

density should leave more space for a harmonic wind energy development that does not clash

with landscape, housing, and economic interests. Landscape protection and the (un-)aesthetic

53 An energy source is intermittent when it is unintentionally unavailable from time to time (that is when the wind does not blow) and when the amount of electricity produced consequently shows undesired changes in output. An intermittent energy source can be highly predictable, though. 54 For comparison: the EU-average in 1999 was 121.6 and Germany’s population density in 2007 was 230 (with a surface of 357,000 km2). (Diplomatie.gouv.fr b, UN Population Division, Statistik-Portal.de)


91

aspect of wind generators are, however, a central argument in the French discussion about

wind energy development (Brand 2004, Gosset & Ranchin 2006, Jobert et al. 2007, EWEA

2009a; see chapter 5.4).

figure 11: French wind regimes (ADEME guide: 7)

5.2 Events at the Landscape Level

Events at the landscape level are deep structural trends or shifts of, for example, cultural pat-

terns, demographical developments, the macro-economical context, or the macro-political

framework. They take place very slowly and have the power to destabilize socio-technical

regimes, thus, opening up ‘windows of opportunity’ for niche expansion. Beyond direct influ-

ence of niche and regime actors, they can eventually be altered through the successful estab-

lishment of a new regime (like for example a new aesthetical perception; see chapter 5.4).

One such transformation was the gradual emergence of a public environmental awareness

from the 1960s and 70s on. This change of awareness went hand in hand with an anti-nuclear


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movement in the Western society. The movement was pushed by the nuclear reactor accident

in Chernobyl in 1986, the most disastrous nuclear power plant accident in history. A good part

of today’s wind energy lobby in Europe originated in this movement but those events did not

have the same impact in France. Nuclear opponents could not prevail in their battle even

though the movement was at least as big as in other countries (Kitschelt 1986) and even

though the majority of French citizens have and had an opinion on nuclear issues that is in line

with the rest of Europe (Schneider 2008). This failure was due to several political reasons. The

French state led a determined and heavy police action against demonstrations and civil disobe-

dience so that anti-nuclear activities have been effectively discouraged. Another reason was the

closed political system with a strong executive branch, which limited participation in decision-

making processes to a very small group of actors. Thus, the anti-nuclear movement could not

make its voice heard through a national referendum, nor were there possibilities for accessing

political licensing procedures and applications. The fact that no general legislative act on nu-

clear energy issues existed until 1991 made it, above all, impossible to challenge licensing

procedures in court. A last reason was the partisan organization of the French party system.

Both of the two major parties were reluctant to represent the anti-nuclear movement, con-

cerned about losing voters and giving up power. (Kitschelt 1986)

Further international events that resulted from the shift in public awareness – like the UN

Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, pointing out the importance of a

turnaround in international energy policy – had a very limited impact on the French develop-

ment of wind energy, too. The climate argument was much less predominant in the discussion

on the French electricity mix than in other countries because its electricity was and still is

mainly produced by nuclear energy and partly by hydropower. In comparison to CO2 emissions

of coal or oil, France’s electricity production park is therefore almost free of greenhouse gases

(at the point of electricity generation). Thus, one of the major mobilizing discourses55, which

had been successfully used by other wind energy movements in Europe (that of CO2 economiza-

tion), could not be used in France because it was already occupied by the nuclear lobby. (Brand

55 “[...] mobilizing discourses serve to rally actors and aggregate resources. [... ‘story lines’ are] ‘the medium through which actors try to impose their view of reality on others, suggest certain social positions and practices, and criticize alternative social arrangements’” (Szarka 2007b: 327f)


93

2004, Szarka 2007b) The French government made its first regulatory move in the domain of

wind power in 1996 and introduced a tender scheme for the promotion of wind energy projects.

It arose in the context of the elaboration of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (an additional protocol to

the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) that aimed at combating global

warming and defined international targets for the limitation of greenhouse gases and in the

context of the EU-White Paper of 1997 that defined the first, but non-binding collective climate

targets of the EU. It was not until the new environmental orientation in international and Euro-

pean climate policy finally resulted in a collective EU-directive on the promotion of electricity

produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market (see chapter 4.2)

that France was ready to introduce development targets for renewable energy sources and to

provide the industry with instruments to realize those targets. Over the last few years, climate

protection has become more and more important in national and international policy. Even the

USA no longer disputes that climate change is underway and that it is a man-made phenome-

non: “Humans cause global warming, US admits” (News.BBC.co.uk). The actions recently taken

by the Sarkozy-Fillon-government, which increasingly support the deployment of renewable

energy sources (see below), have to be seen in this context.

In parallel to the emerging environmental awareness, oil supply shortages occurred from

time to time. The oil crises did not always have the same effect in France as they did have in

other countries however. In Germany for example, the oil crisis of 1970 activated an increasing

interest in wind energy (Schön et al. 2008: 29). In France however, the story line of energy

independence was at that time already occupied by the nuclear lobby that was massively sup-

ported by the government from the 1970s on to render France independent from fossil fuels.

Today, France’s energy independence is stabilized ostensibly around 50% – officially. In his

report ‘Nuclear Power in France, Beyond the Myth’, Schneider (2008) demonstrated that the

adjusted level of France’s energy independence in 2007 was only 8.5% because the calculations

did not take into account some important criteria and were highly biased:

“It is remarkable to what extent the myth of “energy independence” through nuclear power has survived the last 35 years. One of the reasons is the artistic manipulation of basic data by the State administration and the energy industry.” (ibid.: 25)

So, even in France, renewable energy sources can still make a significant contribution to energy

independence. It will however be very difficult for the French wind lobby to seize the argument


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from the control of the nuclear lobby – that publicly holds on to the story line – because in the

short term the impact of wind energy is rather small (Szarka 2007b).

In recent years, during the course of the overall shortage of many natural resources, the oil

price (and with it, gas prices) rose again. The big difference to former oil price increases was

that this time, prices were not assumed to go down again – due to the shortage of resources –

but to settle down at a high level. (Zeit.de a, Sueddeutsche.de) The still very high dependency of

all countries on natural resources shows itself in armed conflicts and heated political debates

as seen in the repeating gas supply problems between Russia and the Ukraine56, a trade dis-

pute that also affected Europe because of disruptions in its gas supply. Those developments can

turn out to be a window of opportunity for renewable energy sources for they can help to be-

come more independent from gas and oil supplies. In the French case, there was no obvious

proof though that wind energy in particular would benefit from it.

The current financial crisis temporarily interrupted the trend of constant price increases for

raw materials in general. Price levels dropped significantly, but are expected to go up again to

their former level when the crisis finishes (Focus.de, Spiegel.de). The crisis had a massive

impact on global economics, but the wind energy sector was apparently hit much less than

other sectors. Certainly, banking institutions will be cautious regarding credit in the near

future, but the slowdown in financing does not appear to be very dramatic in France (RTE

2009a, EWEA 2009a). There has been a slowdown in production rates, too, but international

wind energy markets are intact and employment figures in France indicate a positive trend in

the sector (Enerzine.com b, Liberation.fr c, BWE press release 2009). Some wind park develop-

ers even hope “that the lack of wind turbines in the market thus will have an end and that they

will get the wind turbines they need for the realization of their projects much earlier than

expected.” (Molly 2009, see also RTE 2009a) A potential negative effect of the financial crisis

on the French wind energy sector – that will however only be as durable as the crisis itself – is

that there could be a decrease in power consumption by the French industry (RTE 2009a). As

the annual increase in the French power consumption can be seen as a window of opportunity

for the French wind energy sector (see below) this can constitute an obstacle. The potential

56 For more details see e.g. Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Center of Security Studies, www.res.ethz.ch


95

window of opportunity should not be a reason to maintain a constant rise in power consump-

tion, though, for power savings are also an important element in the battle against climate change.

The price level of raw materials can influence wind power development in two different

ways. A drop in prices for building materials, as observed during the recent crisis, can impact

manufacturing cost of wind power stations (RTE 2009a) making them cheaper. As costs for a

wind park operator mainly consist in expenditures for the wind generators (and not for fuel)

this can raise ‘competitiveness’57. The ‘competitiveness’ of electricity generation by wind ener-

gy also increases with rising prices for fossil fuels because there is no price on renewable

energy sources like wind and sun. In October 2009 the Ministry of the Environment published

a study on bench-line costs for electricity generation (MEEDDAT b). In this comparison of

different energy sources it becomes apparent that electricity generated by wind energy is more-

or-less competitive these days: Estimated production costs for electricity generated by wind

energy in 2012 (for a machine with 2,200 full load hours, which is the French average) are 79.4

EUR/MWh. In October 2009, prices on the French electricity market Powernext were much

higher than that: the average price for electricity was 90 EUR/MWh and 84 EUR/MWh were

payed for wind energy (SER/FEE press release 2008b). Those prices are however highly fluctu-

ating. On December 12, 2009 the spot price for electricity was only 41.75 EUR/MWh but on

December 15, 2009 it had again risen to 70.51 EUR/MWh (see Powernext.com). So, ‘competi-

tiveness’ of wind energy depends on the one hand on electricity stock markets but it is also

dependent on the various factors that are included in the calculation of costs (or not). External

or social costs like impairment of physical health and degradation of the environment are often

disregarded and falsify comparisons of different energy sources (Gosset & Ranchin 2006).

Nuclear energy is generally said to be the most competitive energy source. When amortized,

nuclear energy plants can indeed produce electricity at very low prices (28.4 EUR/MWh for

nuclear electricity produced in France in 2015; DGEMP b). The low price can, however, only be

maintained when producing base load power. With a huge overcapacity in base load power,

France has a highly uneconomic load curve, because it has to import high-priced peak load

57 It is important to distinguish ‘competitiveness’ and profitability. Due to the feed-in tariffs for renewables wind parks can be profitable for operators even though wind energy may not be entirely competitive on the electricity market, yet. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006)


96

power (Schneider 2008). In comparison to fossil fuels, CO2 emissions58 of nuclear energy pro-

duction are low but the harm to humans of nuclear energy is many times worse. The inclusion

of health risks through possible accidents, security gaps, and the unsolved problem of waste

disposal into the calculation would increase costs considerably. French nuclear operators are

obligated to reserve sufficient funding for nuclear decommissioning and waste management,

but calculations for those reserves are non-transparent, data is not publicly accessible, and

“risk insurance levels have never reflected any realistic assessment of the potential conse-

quences of a major accident. France has persistently practiced the lowest maximum liability

limits in Europe.” (Schneider 2008: 39) The competitive advantage of nuclear energy over

renewable energy sources must therefore be questioned.

5.3 Niche Factors

Possible causes for change in the French energy sector can also come from the niche level.

Radical innovations may build up internal momentum and break out of their niche to form a

new or at least change the constellation of the old regime. According to Hughes, system build-

ers try to stabilize new technological systems and minimize uncertainties by getting more and

more components under the control of the system. An important factor in this process is the

commitment of groups or individuals to the new system. Other mechanisms can be: ‘technolog-

ical add-on’ or ‘hybridization’, a physical link-up of an innovation with established technologies

to form some kind of symbiosis; ‘free-riding’, which can be found when a niche technology is

benefiting from an increased demand in an established market and is riding along with this

growth; and ‘niche-piling’ or ‘niche-cumulation’, the branching out of an innovation into further

varieties and the transfer of their specific mode of application to other domains or markets like

the exploitation of economies of scale and scope of wind power generators in a variety of differ-

ent landscapes and the development from small and decentralized wind power generation to

profit-oriented parks and industrial applications. Those niche-mechanisms did not play a major

role in the growth and the stabilization of the French wind energy sector, though. ‘Hybridization’

58 The new French ‘carbon tax’, an environmental tax on emissions of CO2, should have come into effect in the summer of 2010; however, the project was abandoned in March 2010. Even so, it would probably have had no impact on the competitiveness of wind energy, for electricity would not have been assessed by the tax. (NouvelObs.com; see also footnote 83)


97

for example cannot be found in the French wind energy context at all59 and ‘niche-piling’ is

rather something that can be found in the overall wind energy development but does not dis-

tinguish the French wind power sector in particular because the sector’s industry was, for a

long time, dominated by foreign technology and foreign enterprises. Only ‘free-riding’ played

an important part in the stabilization of the French niche, this will however be discussed in the

next chapter (see chapter 5.4) as it is strongly dependent on developments on the regime level.

So, in other words, the French wind energy niche was initially not able to break out by itself.

Explanations for this failure are: unavailability of important story lines (see above), lack of

committed actors and inefficient networking, missing experience and knowledge, insufficient

funds, and an inadequate legal framework.

As already described in the chapter 5.2 on landscape factors, wind lobbyists in different

countries have brought forward a number of mobilizing discourses or ‘story lines’. Each of the

story lines could indeed be found in the French context, too, but as their power was diminished

by contextual factors they only exerted a limited influence on reforms in France (Szarka

2007b): when the wind energy sector developed in France, the story lines of greenhouse emis-

sions and that of energy independence were already monopolized by the nuclear lobby (see

above), and the story line of an energy gap and that of job creation (see below) only existed in

a scaled-down form.

Next to motivating discourses, the emerging sector was also in need of motivated and com-

mitted actors that possessed sufficient knowledge and experience on the subject: The anti-

nuclear movement for example had been suppressed very early (see chapter 5.2) and could

therefore not contribute much to the development of the wind energy sector. The French gov-

ernment was for a long time quite indifferent towards wind energy and even its first supporting

program in 1996 seemed a half-hearted initiative. This limited political support was also re-

flected in the share renewable energy source had in public research funds (see also chapter

5.4). Not only were public research activities on wind energy marginal, but private research

institutes of the French industry were underrepresented as well. What is more, the population

as a whole and residents in particular were not significantly involved in the emerging sector.

59 A technology in the domain of renewable energies that could profit from the diffusion of nuclear energy in France was hydropower; hydropower provides peak load power, which nuclear power plants cannot produce.


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This was, first of all, due to marginal financial participation of individuals in wind energy

parks. “[...] in France apart from a few examples individual persons cannot yet invest in renew-

able funds in their particular region as this is done in Germany and still more in Northern

Europe” (Brand 2004: 11) – it is an approach more developed in Germany than in France

(Jobert et al. 2007) – nor have there been realized wind energy projects solely by cooperatives

of individual citizens60, so-called “citizen wind parks” (Mairesse 2009). Secondly, the lack of

involvement of the population was due to a small, specialized, and undeveloped industry that

could initially only provide a small amount of domestic jobs (Szarka 2007b, Gosset & Ranchin

2006). In recent years, the situation has changed, in the beginning however the sector could

not benefit from the story line of job creation (Szarka 2007b).

Principal initiators in the French wind energy niche were industrial actors. At the beginning

of the 1990s, the French wind energy industry was very small and specialized, as were wind

generators and parks, developers, and operators. The size of developers and operators began to

grow, when the EOLE-2005 program was implemented, which had a rather strict, complex, and

demanding application procedure (see chapter 5.4). Vergnet was then the only producer of

wind generators in the French sector and was one of the only actors that had experience in the

field (see chapter 4.1). Why interest in wind power technologies reappeared at that time in

France remains ambiguous. Maybe initiatives were stimulated by financial support of the EU,

which was not very high, though – most of the early industrial French wind power projects

were developed due to support from the European Commission (Nadai 2007: 2717, Energie-

Cités.org) as public research grants were mainly allocated to activities on nuclear issues – or

maybe some of the actors were interested in keeping up with technology development in other

countries. Ranchin and Gosset assumed, however, that this interest was mainly due to climate

and environmental concerns: “Unlike other countries, France has never been pushed to com-

plete the fleet of its production facilities. This wish appeared later and has mainly been moti-

vated by environmental challenges” (Ranchin & Gosset 2006: 46)61. This was also the official

reason given by the government when launching its EOLE-2005 program (see chapter 5.4). At

the outset, the French market was still unattractive for foreign park developers, which must be

60 A reason for this is, among others, the absence of adequate financial instruments (Mairesse 2009). 61 translation by the author


99

the reason why first wind park developers and operators in France were almost exclusively

French. In 2000 however, when the government implemented the first legal framework and

introduced financial incentives, their interest was aroused as well. The legal framework (see

chapter 4.2) imposed a 12-MW-capacity-limit for operators who wanted to benefit from the

power purchase obligation. It was imposed to restrict the development of wind energy to small

wind farms. Thus, it became feasible for small enterprises, organizations, and individuals –

which had been the main promotors of early wind energy development in Denmark and Ger-

many – to become wind park operators. Due to the fact that France’s industry lacked a kind of

middle class, small and medium-sized French enterprises were however underrepresented

(Dena 2006: 24). Consequently, foreign enterprises tried to take over this place. Another reason

why small operators could not gain ground in France was fact that large developers and opera-

tors that wanted to build bigger parks and that did not want to renounce the special tariffs have

often dodged the 12-MW-regulation. Many of the installed wind parks have thus been chopped

up into smaller branches to avoid limitations and were actually much bigger than the pre-

scribed 12 MW. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, Szarka 2007b, see also table 3 in the appendix) On

the whole, the French wind energy sector was for a long time very reliant (around 90%) on

imported know-how, work force, and technology (Szarka 2007b) and French enterprises initial-

ly could not, or would not, benefit from the emergence of the sector in France – irrespective of

their size. In Spain, the development of the sector was massively supported from the beginning

by major national players of the energy sector (Szarka 2007a). The national French power

company EDF, however, was not very pleased about the emergence of a wind energy sector in

France. The company had indeed been involved in early research projects in the 1950/60s but

suspended all sponsorship in 1963. EDF had to return into the wind-power-constellation in

2001 when the power purchase obligation became effective, but did not do so enthusiastically

(LeMonde.fr a)62. It actively joined the development of wind energy in 2004 when taking over

62 Today, EDF-EN is developing large wind parks in several European countries (Europe 1,264 MW, thereof France 263 MW) and in the US (713 MW). This development seems similar to the case of the German power utilities that primarily, in the beginning of the 1990s, opposed the implementation of a feed-in law in court; after having lost the case they tried to shape the situation according to their preferences instead and started to build up wind portfolios – initially not in Germany though, but in the UK. Contrary to the German feed-in law the UK Renewables Obligation (a form of trade with “green certificates”) reinforced the established structure of the electricity supply industry and privileged large enterprises. Thus the supply industry was in


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SIIF Energies that then became EDF Energies Nouvelles (EDF-EN). Framatome (later Areva),

another important player in the traditional French energy sector, tried to enter the wind energy

market in 2001 with a large-scale wind generator fabricated by its affiliate Jeumont Industries,

but after just four years they already ceased production. The reason was probably underestima-

tion of the complexity and problems it can cause when trying to fabricate a new, large-scale,

direct-drive wind power station without experience to build on (see also Garud & Karnoe 2003).

In any case, this happened ten years after the first industrial wind power station had been built

in France, that is to say, much delayed. All in all, it can be resumed that the French wind ener-

gy development has been advanced, to a large extent, by non-domestic enterprises. The power

purchase obligation and the new legal framework (see chapter 4.2) gave sufficient planning

reliability and economic incentives to attract wind park developers and operators from other

countries (Szarka 2007b).

Another shortcoming of the French wind sector was that the few actors of the constellation

were not sufficiently connected among each other. A first attempt was made in 1996 when the

FEE was founded, but that was a very uniform network of actors from the same domain. Con-

nections between the wind energy industry and scientific research organizations and between

the industry and the governmental institutions did not seem to exist during the first periods of

wind energy development in France.

A further brake for the already hesitant dynamic of renewables in France is established by the fact that the supporters of renewable electricity are not very often received by the governmental institutions like ministries, in particular the influential ministries like the ministry of Economy, Industry and Finance […] the network supporting the transfor-mation of the highly centralized French electricity system has difficulties in exerting its influence in the policy network. (Brand 2004: 10)

It was in 2007, due to the Grenelle of Environment, that a basis for cooperation and networking

between the government, the economy, and associations was finally created, but it remains to

be seen whether this newly found basis will be a permanent one.

When looking at technological issues and problems of the niche, it is at first somewhat sur-

prising that they do not seem to excessively restrain the sector’s deployment; it is logical

favor of the Renewables Obligation. Due to a wave of takeovers most of the wind park developers and operators in the UK are now in possession of foreign enterprises such as the German power utilities RWE and E.ON. (Szarka 2007a: 33, 36, 93)


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though when considering the fact that, at the time when France joined the wind energy devel-

opment, technological formation had already passed through a standardization process (see

Danish model) and improved designs had been developed to adjust major drawbacks such as

noise emissions, security issues, and feed-in problems. Due to France’s tardiness and its reli-

ance on imported know-how, the emerging French wind energy niche could benefit from the

preliminary work of other countries but could not take credit for this technological develop-

ment itself. The problem of light reflection on rotor blades for example does not exist any more

as non-reflecting paint has been used for a long time now (BWE A-Z). Modern wind generators

are also acoustically optimized so that mechanically and physically induced noises can hardly

be heard any more from a short distance away. Aerodynamically induced noises are still audi-

ble by residents that live nearby, but have also been significantly reduced and are subject of

comprehensive regulations on noise emissions (BWE A-Z, SER/FEE kit éolien 2009). Studies

showed that noise emissions by wind generators are significantly lower than that of road traffic

and that there is no significant impairment on the health of humans and animals (ADEME

colloque 2006, Gosset & Ranchin 2006). The same goes for infrasound. No frequencies that

could be classified as harmful have been measured near wind generators (BWE A-Z, SER/FEE

kit éolien 2009). Accident risks of wind generators cannot categorically be excluded, but seri-

ous risks like the collapse of the whole structure, or the breaking off of components, are, statis-

tically speaking, very rare and only affect the immediate surroundings. Besides, modern wind

generators are equipped with lightning conductors that prevent them from being seriously

damaged by lightning strokes. They are also equipped with ice sensors and heated rotor blades

that impede the icing of important machine parts and prevent snow from accumulating and

dropping off the blades (BWE A-Z). A subject of controversy has been the impact of wind gener-

ators on birds and bats. The problem of bird and bat strikes can apparently been considered as

marginal (about 10 thousand in comparison to 5 to 10 million dead birds through high-voltage

lines and road traffic). The impact on different species of birds and on migration and breeding

breading behavior has however not been sufficiently studied, yet. The protection of animals

should be taken into account when looking for building sites. It is safe to say though that no

basic antagonism can be found between wind energy and birds. (BWE Vogelschutz 2005,


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Gosset & Ranchin 2006) Problems concerning aeronautical and military radar installations can

be mainly ascribed to administrative barriers (BWE News 2008, ADEME colloque 2006).

So, technological problems of the core technology do not constitute a ‘reverse salient’ of the

wind energy sector in France – although they are persistently brought forward in argumenta-

tions of anti-wind movements. It was a mixture of all the other weaknesses that have been

identified, which contributed to the fact that the French wind energy sector could not establish

itself by its own means. The sector was instead highly reliant on processes and events that oc-

curred on the regime and the landscape level and on windows of opportunity that thusly appeared.

5.4 Impact of the Regime Level

The dominant constellation of the French energy sector played an important role in the de-

velopment of the wind energy niche. Several structural lock-ins and special characteristics of

the French political and its energy supply system limit possible courses of action for the niche.

So, the established system must either be challenged by the niche via exploitation of weak-

nesses in its structure (see chapter 2.3 on reverse salients, tensions in the regime, and mis-

matches) or, its actors must change the regime’s structure through intentional modifications.

The wind energy sector would most likely not be where it is today without the willingness of

actors of the regime to modify the energy sector. The definition of climate targets and targets

for renewables, the introduction of incentives to realize those targets, the elaboration of a legal

framework and adequate planning tools, and a real support from governmental institutions

were, and are, fundamental factors for the deployment and competitiveness of wind energy.

Additionally, the degree of local acceptance and opposition of wind energy has to be considered.

The nuclear sector is well established in the French energy sector, a constellation carried by

different social groups that are dominated by nuclear power production. The decision for the

creation of such an energy sector was undertaken in the early 1970s and it “has been embed-

ded in French culture for more than 30 years” now (EWEA 2009a). This lock-in is well reflected

in special political and industrial structures.

The centralized political culture in France contributed significantly to the present-day struc-

turing of the French energy sector. As local authorities had no legislative or enacting power and

as their competences in energy policy had nearly all been taken away with the creation of the


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two national and state-run power companies EDF and GDF, the power of decision on energy

matters lay in the hands of the government. Their decision for and commitment to nuclear

power in the 1970s was additionally facilitated through the absence of legislation on nuclear

matters and by the fact that “the elected representatives [members of parliament] always had

and have a very minor influence on the development, orientation, design and implementation

of energy and nuclear policy in France” (Schneider 2008: 6). Ever since its emergence, the

constellation supporting this technological choice expanded and solidified into an institutional

lock-in. Nuclear policy in France is supported by a large number of enterprises, associations,

political parties, and also individuals, it is however mainly controlled by the ‘Corps des Mines’

(see above). Over the years, the Corps has managed to occupy a great many key positions

linked with the nuclear sector. Formally, the Corps des Mines and its General Council is pre-

sided over by the Ministry of Industry. As the composition of the ministry changes ever few

years though, the most powerful position of the Corps des Mines is the vice-president of the

General Mining Council. Thus, “this state organized elite clan has made it possible to push

through long-term policy orientations like the nuclear program, entirely outside election con-

cerns” (Schneider 2008: 7). The “problem” is that thus, democratic decision-making is com-

pletely undermined and policy adaption or reorientation is seriously hampered (Schneider

2008, AITEC). All the members are historically recruited from graduates of a few French elite

schools, restricting access to the Corps to a very limited and exclusive group of people. This

group constitutes a very powerful lobby for nuclear energy that the emerging wind energy

sector has to cope with.

Another lock-in can be found on the French electricity market; it is closely linked to the im-

pact of political structures I described above. For a long time, EDF and GDF virtually monopo-

lized the French electricity and gas market. In consequence of pressure exerted by the EU (in

form of directives) electricity and gas markets were slowly deregulated in France from 2000 on.

EDF was transformed from a national power company into an anonymous society, whose main

shareholder is however still the French state, and it disassociated from its transport network,

entrusting it to the quasi-independent network administrator RTE. An independent regulatory

authority, the CRE, was created to guarantee equitable access to the grid and to prevent EDF

from abusing its market power. Thus, the liberalization of the markets should have enabled


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alternative, non-governmental power producers and providers to enter. This proved very diffi-

cult, though. EDF, although formally not a state-run company anymore, is still the exclusive

operator of the 58 operative (and amortized) French nuclear reactors (see IAEA), it produces

about 90% of France’s electricity demand (MEDAD e), and it is the only power provider in

France that can offer the so-called ‘tarif réglementé’63. This tariff is fixed by the Minister in

charge of Energy and Economy. It is usually lower than the market price and should have been

abolished with the liberalization of the European energy markets for individual consumers in

2007 it is however still in operation (Euractiv.fr, LeFigaro.fr a).64 This institutional lock-in has

limited, still to this day, the possibility for the renewables sector to profit from the liberalization

of the electricity market and to use it as a window to break out of the niche. (q.v. Nadai 2007)

The technological lock-in in French industry structures is still more apparent. In summary,

there are five important structural factors that reduce the scope for wind power expansion:

competitive advantage of amortized nuclear power stations, a scaled-down energy gap, struc-

tural over-capacity, the inflexibility of nuclear base-load, and an insufficiently upgraded power

supply network (Szarka 2007b, Brand 2004). An advantage of this technological lock-in is the

rather low electricity price that can be achieved due to economies of scale in amortized nuclear

reactors. Another advantage of the present industry structures in the energy sector is the quite

small energy gap France is facing in comparison to other countries.

“Whilst France is encountering similar sourcing problems, their scale and timing are different. The French are less reliant on ensuring adequate gas and coal supplies, and they have not taken a political decision to phase out nuclear. On the contrary, they will extend the lifetimes of the current fleet and replace it with more nuclear in the next decade” (Szarka 2007b: 328)

This competitive advantage of nuclear energy and the absence of a “real” energy gap constitute

a disadvantage for the French wind energy sector. As nuclear energy is seen as the solution to

energy problems among French policy makers, the ‘energy gap’ discourse does not meet with

the same response in France as it does in other countries, although it exists even in France, but

only in a scaled-down form. Rising electricity demands and the lengthy period needed to build 63 Except for Electricité de Strasbourg (see Fournisseurs-Electricite.com) 64 In summer 2010, this situation may change. The French government is about to devise a new regulation that would give EDF’s competitors access to its nuclear base load power. This measure should encourage more competition, reduce EDF’s hegemony, and satisfy the European Commission that already criticized the situation on the French electricity market. (UsineNouvelle.com b)


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the new European Pressurized Reactors created a small window of opportunity for wind energy.

(Szarka 2007b) One could say that the wind energy sector rode along with a growth in electrici-

ty demand that could not be satisfied by the existing market participants – it is a combination

of a window of opportunity produced by developments on the regime level and of one of the

niche-mechanisms described above (see chapter 5.3).

A fundamental weakness of the French electricity supply system is its structural over-

capacity (Szarka 2007b, Schneider 2008). France has a very large nuclear reactor park with

fifty-eight plants that have a lifespan of forty years (Brand 2004). Those existing nuclear reac-

tors produce far more electricity than actually needed to satisfy domestic consumption. As

nuclear power reactors produce only base load power an important part in the domestic elec-

tricity demand can however not be met by the power they produce; their output has to be regu-

lated and balanced with additional peak load power. In France, nuclear base load power has

usually been balanced with hydropower. Due to its significant surplus in capacity in base load

power, France has however to resort to additional mechanisms to stabilize the system. The

main solutions have been: export of electricity to neighboring countries and encouragement of

domestic usage of electricity by lowering electricity tariffs and thus substituting electricity for

other energy sources, especially in the domain of space heating. As a consequence of large-

scale introduction of electric space heating65 – once even called a “French folly” by the Secre-

tary of State for Ecology, Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet (Schneider 2008: 23) – seasonal peak load

demands increased significantly from the 1980s on; instead of downsizing its nuclear park

though, EDF maintained its strategy even when the problem became so urgent that it had to

restart old, inoperative oil fired power plants to meet seasonally fluctuating electricity de-

mands. This kind of load curve, with high cost for peak load imports and additional oil fired

plants, is very uneconomic66 –

“Without power exports and electric space heating an economically optimized French nuclear program would have been limited to less than 30 GW, the equivalent of the 34 x 900 MW reactors, the last of which was connected to the grid in 1987” (ibid.: 24).

65 Today, over one quarter of French apartments are equipped with electric heating systems (Schneider 2008). 66 The encouragement of electric space heating is not only uneconomic, it is also highly polluting because approximately three quarters of the primary energy, like e.g. natural gas, oil, or biomass, is lost when burning it to generate electricity instead of using it directly. (Schneider 2008)


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– but structural characteristics of the French energy system seem to self-perpetuate and did

create a ‘path dependence’ that influences decisions not only for this but also for the next

generation (Szarka 2007b: 329).

It is evident that the French power supply system is organized to fit demands of nuclear

power plants and that it forces other energy sources to adapt to the system. “The nuclear sector

is set to dominate the French ESI [electricity supply industry] in a way that is not the case in

the leading wind power countries” (ibid.: 331). Wind power does not fit very well in the existing

structure. Its integration is considered problematic because wind power usually substitutes

load-following power plants that run on coal or gas67. As it would not make much sense, in a

comprehensive view of the French energy system and in relation to climate issues, to substitute

capacities of hydropower for wind power – hydropower being a renewable energy source, as

well – and as the replacement of nuclear power by wind power seems out of question in the

French context, the wind energy sector was not given much room to expand. (Szarka 2007b)

Another fundamental, technological weakness of the French electricity supply system is its

degree of saturation. The network’s absorption capacity of electricity generated by wind energy

is very limited. In their report on the French wind energy sector, published in 2006, Gosset and

Ranchin (2006) assumed it to be smaller than 7,000 MW (taking into account only those capac-

ities situated in adequate regions for wind power generation). This is clearly not enough to

connect the 10,000 MW of wind energy projects needed to meet 2010 climate targets (Szarka

2007b). Besides, those 7,000 MW, or less, are diminishing yearly and are not exclusively allo-

cated to wind energy68 but also to other power generation plants. Particularly problematic for

wind energy is the network’s regional saturation69 (Szarka 2007b, Gosset & Ranchin 2006,

Enerzine.com c, RTE 2008a + 2009c). This is so because, first of all, wind energy generators

cannot be erected everywhere on French terrain but only in regions with enough wind and in

67 Base load power plants generate electricity continuously and at maximum output. Peak load power plants operate only during certain times of peak demand. Load-following power plants are a kind of power plant situated in between the other two. Its time of operation depends on several factors, but mainly on their efficiency of electricity production at a certain time. 68 Unlike in Germany, wind energy projects in France do not have priority access to the power supply system (Nadai 2007). 69 There are regions in France that have very weak power supply networks, irrespective of the recent wind power development.


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regions that are not protected or used otherwise (for example nature protection or military

areas). It is also problematic that wind parks have been built predominantly in regions with low

power consumption (far from populated areas and on wind-disposed sites). Until 2007, wind

parks were rarely bigger than 12 MW (see chapter 4.1) but with increasing size and capacity

(as the 12-MW-limitation does not exist anymore) the situation will still be aggravated. To

better anticipate the situation and to make it manageable, ZDEs have been implemented but the

impeding bottleneck can only be overcome by grid reinforcements. Reinforcements or exten-

sions of the transmission network go at the expense of the grid operator RTE and require about

seven or eight years. With such long delays, grid operators have to think far ahead, the RTE

refused to spend money on the extension of its grid for a long time, though70 (Gosset & Ranchin

2006, Szarka 2007b). This strategy complicated the procedure for obtaining a grid connection

immensely. The procedure is very strict, complex, and tedious and can take several years (due

to lacking capacities). The delay for the extension of the transmission network by far exceeds

the time needed to build a wind park though and is also longer than the validity period of sev-

eral of the authorizations needed for the construction. Thus, park developers usually have to

abandon their project when the waiting time for a grid connection is too long. If, on the other

hand, a planning permit for a project has not been obtained within four months after the appli-

cation for a grid connection, developers lose their place in the queue and start again (Szarka

2007b). This incompatibility of delays is one of the obstacles for the expansion of the wind

energy sector.

“On an industrial level, it is this incompatibility that blocks, nowadays, the deployment of this branch in France that is on the whole ready to takeoff [...] The question on the in-tegration of renewable energies and in particular wind energy into the grid is therefor a central question in regards to the development of this branch in France.” (Gosset & Ranchin 2006: 47)71

To better integrate electricity generated by wind energy into the grid not only the French power

supply system should be extended and upgraded but also international transmission lines.

70 The situation improved from 2007 on, when the RTE changed its investment strategy and increased expenses significantly: from a relatively low level of 500 - 600 EUR during several years to 792 EUR in 2007, 840 EUR in 2008, and 1030 EUR in 2009, and from 100km of new or renewed lines in 2006 to 785km in 2008 (RTE 2008b + 2009b). 71 translation by the author


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Thus, balancing power for the integration of wind power and other intermittent energy sources

will decrease.

Wind energy is an intermittent energy resource, that is to say, wind does not blow all the

time and it does not do so on demand (see above). Calms and lulls in the wind stream have to

be balanced by energy produced in other power plants. The problem of its integration into the

grid is solved much easier though than generally suggested by wind energy opponents. Fluctu-

ation in power output is not a problem specific to wind energy (even traditional power plants

can fail unexpectedly) and just because an energy source is intermittent, it is not automatically

unpredictable. Solar energy, for example, is highly predictable and also wind can be forecasted

very reliably. In a time frame of 48h to 72h, wind speeds can be predicted with an average

deviation of only 7%, that is to say, balancing energy has to be kept ready merely for those 7%,

the not predictable part of the wind energy that will be fed into the grid (BWE A-Z). In the years

to come, the amount of balancing power will still decrease due to further development of fore-

casting methods. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, BWE A-Z + Mythen, Environnement-Magazine.fr) So,

instead of endangering the grid stability, wind energy contributes today to the compensation of

differences in demand and supply (RTE 2009a: 69) even though the available capacities do not

always match consumer demands. To further improve the stability of the power supply network

it is important to establish a mix of different energy sources that can compensate their respec-

tive weaknesses. Balancing power does not need to come solely from traditional energy plants;

renewable energy sources can balances each other just as well (BWE Mythen). Another possi-

bility to minimize the need for additional balancing power, and to reinforce stability, is to

integrate different national grids. A European power supply network with numerous intercon-

nections between the different countries would have a much higher performance in distributing

unused electricity to where it is needed, reducing the need for balancing power and storage

capacities72 to a minimum. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, RTE 2009a)

In summary: special structural characteristics in the French industry and politics gave hard

limits for the development of wind energy with only minor weaknesses that could have been

72 Storage mechanisms do exist, they are however not able to store large quantities of energy and above all not for a long time because storage of electricity usually leads to a significant losses of energy (see chapter 4.1).


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exploited by the newly emerging sector. Tensions, mismatches, and deliberately created open-

ings in the established system, like the (incomplete) liberalization of the European electricity

and gas markets, the rising demand for electricity and a small energy gap, led only to a small

expansion of the wind energy niche in France.

French policy design and governmental support

As weaknesses in the French energy supply system did not contribute to a large extent to the

deployment of the wind energy niche, let us take a closer look at the development and the

influence of the French policy design on wind energy and on the governmental support of the

newly emerging sector.

“Expansion in capacity is causally linked to policy design: in general, the more support-ive the policy, the bigger the expansion, and the more predictable and continuous the scheme is, the stronger the rate of expansion.” (Szarka 2007b: 322)

The first supporting program for wind energy, a tender scheme named EOLE-2005, turned

out to be a poor choice. The program was implemented by the government in 1996 to meet

obligations it had incurred in the context of the Kyoto protocol and the EU-White Paper of 1997.

“According to the recent commitments taken during the Tokyo and Buenos Aires con-ferences regarding the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the European Commis-sion has suggested to the member states in its White Paper on Energy Policy to increase the share of renewable energies in the gross national energy consumption of the [Euro-pean] Union from 6 to 12%, from now on until 2010. In that context, France [...] wished to promote and develop the recourse of power production by wind energy.” (Ineris.fr)73

The program was, however, aborted five years before its completion because of its ineffective-

ness. Major problems were: a ‘stop and go’ process in the calls for tender, a complex adminis-

trative procedure, intransparent application conditions, a strong competitive aspect that caused

financing problems because of cost understatements, limited attention to other, mainly social

and environmental aspects, and unequal distribution of risks due to high rejection rates, mean-

ing that only large companies could get involved. Some of those problems could have been

anticipated given what was known from the poor performance of the ‘Non-Fossil Fuel Obliga-

tion’ in the UK, which was based on the same principle. The success of feed-in tariffs in other



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countries made it additionally clear that the EOLE-2005 program was a comparatively bad

choice to promote wind energy development in France. (Nadai 2007, Szarka 2007b, Chabot 2001)

A change in the composition of the National Assembly laid the foundation for a new legal

framework. As a result of snap elections in 1997, the constellation of actors in the energy

sector became penetrable and opened up to let in pro-wind actors. In coalition with Socialistes

and Communists, the French Greens were brought into the government for the first time and

achieved, in the position of minister of the environment, the implementation of guaranteed

feed-in tariffs for wind energy in the 2000 Electricity Act. This comprehensive law was the

national implementation of the 2001 EU-directive on ‘the promotion of electricity produced

from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market’ initiated by changes on the

landscape level, namely the diffusion of a new environmental orientation in international and

European climate and energy policy. It was not until then that the French government was

willing to introduce fixed development targets for renewable energy sources and to provide the

industry, by and by, with appropriate instruments to realize them. Over the years, the legal

framework concerning wind energy became more and more comprehensive and explicit.

One of the first measures was the implementation of feed-in tariffs. Due to remarkable re-

sults in other countries, the feed-in support mechanism was expected to cause a significant

expansion in installed wind power.

“French policy makers have sought to learn from renewables policy making elsewhere – notably Germany – and adapt the lessons to a different national context, using a policy instrument reputed for its effectiveness in the expansion of capacity, namely the feed-in tariff.” (Szarka 2007b: 322)

Monetary incentives were indeed a very important factor in the emergence of a wind energy

sector and for its expansion but they were not sufficient to trigger a “real” takeoff74. Their main

achievement was the increasing profitability of wind energy projects. (Nadai 2007, Szarka

2007b, Chabot 2001, Fröding 2006) Although said to be basically fair, they were particularly

criticized for being still too low and decreasing too rapidly though (Szarka 2007b), thus again

affecting the projects’ rentability. Moreover, the tariffs did not give any planning security to

74 In Germany, an important factor for the breakthrough of the niche-technology was the fact that during a limited period of time two different financial support mechanisms could be combined and accessed at the same time, making wind energy more profitable than before (Schön et al 2008: 38).


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park developers because once an installed capacity of 1,500 MW would have been reached in

France an overall reduction of the tariffs of 10% would have come into effect. A further obstruc-

tive element for the French wind energy development was the 12-MW-limitation of the tariffs

that impeded economies of scale, raised transaction costs, and increased complexity in applica-

tion procedures. (EWEA 2005, Gosset & Ranchin 2006) So, while being definitively a step in the

right direction, the tariffs were still in need of improvement and adjustment.

When the capacity for potential wind energy projects rose first after the implementation of

the tariffs in 2001, it became clear that monetary incentives had to be completed with control

mechanisms. Fear of uncontrolled growth triggered local opposition and it became necessary to

introduce planning tools to counter this development and to give security to the concerned

population and to park developers. (Nadai 2007, Jobert et al. 2007) First regulations on land-

scape issues and spatial planning have been introduced with the Urbanism and Habitat Act and

the Electricity and Gas Act of 2003. Among them were regional schemes for wind power, which

were however still voluntary at the time.

The 2005 Energy Act further improved the regulation on wind energy. One of the measures

to promote wind energy was the basic increase of the level in support in the tariff system and

its adjustment to inflation. The new tariffs will be effective until at least 2012 (MEEDDAT d)

and give higher planning reliability to project developers and higher profitability to wind park

operators because the 1,500-MW-regulation had been abolished. At the same time, the 12-MW-

limit had been abolished, too. This measure permitted big wind farms and large-scale industrial

projects to profit from the power purchase obligation and to become profitable in France, as

well75 (Fröding 2006, Nadai 2007). Thus, the ‘dual regime’ of tariffs and calls for tender was

finally abandoned. New decisive conditions that had to be met in order to benefit from the

power purchase obligation were defined by the newly introduced ZDE regulation. In order to be

75 It remains to be seen whether this development was beneficial for the French wind energy sector because it stimulated the growth of the size of wind parks (to be observed most notably in the offshore sector), which further encouraged a general corporate concentration in the European Energy Sector as well as an internationalization of companies that were previously nationally based (see chapter 4.3). The development towards ever-bigger parks impedes the participation of small- and medium-sized organizations and companies in the development because of difficulties to find investors and because of increasing costs for research and development activities. It thus limits the entry to the market and raises the question whether the future development of wind energy will be more about money and profit than about the environment and climate issues.


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entitled, a new wind park had to be situated inside such a ‘wind power development zone’. The

problem with this energy policy instrument was that it was perceived, in practice, as part of

local planning law although it had nothing to do with obtaining a building permission or the

like. This kind of usage demonstrated the need for a “real” and mandatory planning instru-

ment; the concept of new regional wind power schemes has however not been introduced

before the end of 2009. Those are additionally defined through concerns of the neighborhood,

security issues, farming interests and aspects of health protection. New planning instruments

for offshore installation are currently elaborated as well.

New regulations did not only specify application and planning procedures and give more le-

gal security, the alteration process in the legal framework also made it possible for the French

population to participate more actively in the development. A first measure had been intro-

duced in 2003, when public inquiries among the residents became compulsory for wind power

installations with a capacity of 2.5 MW or more. In 2005 the communication with and partici-

pation of residents and local associations was further improved when those groups were to be

included in the process of developing ZDEs in order to intensify understanding. It was also the

new ZDE regulation that gave more autonomy in the area of energy policy to local authorities

(that are also in charge of land allocation, urban development, landscape planning, and preser-

vation of historical monuments) for the initiative for devising such zones was given to them.

Central government still controls the process though because it is the Prefect of the concerned

department that eventually assigns the permission for a ZDE, or not (Nadai 2007). The new and

demanding regional wind power schemes will have to be established in compliance with the

ZDEs (it will become impossible to create a ZDE outside such a regional scheme). This will

probably lead to a better integration of ZDEs at the regional level for neighborhood issues,

security issues, farming interests, and aspects of health protection will have to be considers as

well. The environment minister Jean-Louis Borloo also requested to develop the schemes in

cooperation with all relevant local parties concerned: communities, representatives of the local

economy, associations, and residents. These developments made it possible for them to become

more involved in the development of wind energy in France.76

76 The trend to increasingly integrate non-governmental associations, non-profit associations, and the general public into political decision making processes was also reflected in the Grenelle of Environment. Until then,


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All those regulations contributed to the constant improvement of the rentability of wind pro-

jects in France, to a refinement of planning conditions, to an enhancement of legal security for

park developers, operators, and other interest groups like the French population, and to the

integration of new actors into the ‘wind-constellation’. Sometimes, the application and planning

procedures are made very complex and cumbersome though. (Gosset & Ranchin 2006, ADEME

colloque 2006). The multitude of applications and preliminary studies, the consultation of a

plurality of agencies, the lack of coordination between authorities, and partly also their igno-

rance of certain operations and procedures, make the obtaining of a building permit and other

associated authorizations a very tedious undertaking (Brand 2004, Gosset & Ranchin 2006,

Szarka 2007b). Application procedures for wind power projects in France are said to be the

most rigid and severe in the world (SER/FEE press release 2008a). An examination of adminis-

trative procedures for renewable energy projects in France in the context of the implementation

of the EU-directive 2001/77/CE showed however that there were no specific obstacles for wind

energy from public authorities (Gosset & Ranchin 2006: 36). The abolition of the 12-MW-limit

in 2005 brought a simplification of procedures, as applications did not need to be requested for

several small projects anymore. Some relief also resulted from the reformed procedure for

building licenses77 that was profoundly modified in October 2007 reducing the multitude of

different forms of licenses there were to three applications and one single works declaration.

The ZDE regulation complicated procedures again however. It is also possible that the new

regional wind power schemes shall lead to a lengthening of the planning and establishing of

new ZDEs for they will have to be established in compliance with each other. Besides, proce-

dures will be “enriched” even further when the altered ICPE regulation will be applied on wind

power installations, as will probably happen in 2011. Professionals of the wind energy sector

fear that this will have an adverse effect on the development of wind power in France and that

the prospering, but still fragile, sector will suffer a severe setback. (Actu-Environnement.fr u)

Some even raise concerns about the lawfulness of the regulation with reference to the EU

this integration was quite unusual in France and it remains to be seen whether this newly found basis for cooperation between the government, the economy, and associations will be a permanent one. 77 This reform did not only concern wind energy projects, though.


114

Directive 2009/28/EC, which demands a reduction of administrative barriers in the EU that

could hamper the development of renewables78. (see above)

Nevertheless, most of the discussed tools and regulations helped the wind energy niche to

expand. In order to take a real effect, though, an additional condition had to be met: namely,

genuine support from the established political regime.

During early development, the government only half-heartedly supported wind energy (see

also chapter 5.3) and the initial choice for a tender program to support wind energy revealed a

“long lasting ambiguity of the French authorities as regards to the development of RES-E tech-

nologies” (Nadai 2007: 2717). This changed somewhat with the emergence of the Greens in

Parliament, but after five years of “Green influence” the conservative party UMP was back in

power in all the main French institutions and with it came amendments of several of the envi-

ronmental initiatives taken by the former government (Dena 2006). None of the parties actually

argued against the importance of climate protection and promotion of renewables, but the

‘nuclear option’ was definitely favored as a cheap, safe, and eco-friendly energy source to pre-

vent climate change. Wind energy was apparently regarded as an auxiliary and temporary

instruments to cope with increasing power consumption and to fulfill commitments resulting

from the EU White Paper, the Kyoto protocol, and the 2001-EU-Directive79 (see above; Nadai

2007). The government was hence being accused of “not making a real effort to abolish the

numerous obstacles preventing a real breakthrough of renewables in electricity generation, in

particular wind” (Brand 2004: 13). Renewable supporters requested more practical support

from the government instead of rhetorical promises and criticized that “Official rhetoric [was]

simply not supported by action on the ground” (EWEA 2005: 24). The governmental focus on

nuclear energy was also based on fear of a widening competence problem and a generational

gap in the nuclear sector. In order to remain world leader in the domain of nuclear energy,

France constantly had to enlarge and update the knowledge and skills needed to built and

design nuclear plants. 78 Together with other unfavorable events (like the strengthening of the anti-movement; see below) this can lead to a phase called ‘development slump’, which can be just a temporal lean period but can also become very critical for the niche-technology and even threaten its existence. How fast obstacles can be overcome depends mainly on the constellation’s ability to rearrange and re-stabilize itself. (see chapter 3.2) 79 During the devising of this EU-Directive in 2000 France held the presidency of the EU Commission, thus being able to influence targets and the choice of instruments to achieve them. (Nadai 2007, Brand 2004)


115

The situation began to change somewhat in the year 2007 when Nicolas Sarkozy became

President. Although continuing to heavily promote nuclear energy Sarkozy publicly admitted

that it was a mistake to rely only upon nuclear power and announced that he wanted to make

France a leader in all ‘clean technologies’ and not only in nuclear energy. This support mani-

fested in several initiatives like the Grenelle, the reorganization of the Ministry of the Envi-

ronment, or the promise to raise public research expenditures for renewables to the same level

as for nuclear energy. In practice, this equal treatment has however not been realized. Besides,

Sarkozy was quite unspecific when speaking about the equal treatment in public funding for

nuclear energy and for renewables, …

“«If he wants to spend the same amount of money for renewables as he is going to spend for the two new French EPRs [10 thousand millions, editor's note], we will have to hold on tight», states Areva amused.” (Liberation.fr a)80

… nor did he apparently explain his intentions to his ministers:

“On the 10th of June, on the TV-channel Canal+, Jean-Louis Borloo affirmed that the objec-tive of parity had been widely exceeded: «today, we are far beyond a one-to-one allocation. The figures in the field of renewable energies have got nothing to do with those of nuclear energy. For nuclear energy, mere replacements are carried out, something comparatively marginal.» Two days later, on the TV-channel LCI, the undersecretary of state in charge of environmental issues Chantal Jouanno asserted exactly the contrary: «The President said, “As soon as we put one euro in nuclear energy we will also put one euro in renewable ener-gies.” We are presently still very far from that.»” (Liberation.fr a)81

Chantal Jouanno eventually specified that the parity was to be reached on research investments

and that today the ratio was two to one with a budget of 400 million EUR for research on nucle-

ar issues and 200 million EUR on renewables. When verifying those numbers, Libération (a

well-known French daily newspaper) discovered that in 2009, 440 million EUR were provided

for research on nuclear energy. On the side of renewables public support was mainly taking

place through the National Agency of Research (Agence nationale de la recherché, ‘ANR’) and

the ADEME: the ANR annually obtains 70 - 80 million EUR and the ADEME a total of 450 mil-

lion EUR every four years – but, these sums are not only dedicated to research on renewables

but also on energy storage, energy efficiency, or fuel cells. So, parity is still far-off and even the

amount of 200 million EUR for renewables is not reached, yet. (Liberation.fr a) Maybe, however,

80 translation by the author 81 translation by the author


116

patience will provide the answers. In a press release by the Ministry of the Environment on

June 3, 2009 concerning the direction of France’s energetic infrastructure originating from the

Grenelle (MEEDDAT j), it was confirmed that an unprecedented effort will be undertaken in the

domain of renewables by means of an additional one billion EUR research budget, and by the

creation of a fund for renewables endowed with an annual budget of 100 million EUR.

The potential of a positive image as a possible leader in renewable energy technologies, and

the prestige and the economical advantages that would come with it, seemed to play an im-

portant role in the governmental decision to increase support for renewables in France. The

question remains however: is there actually a rethinking process happening among politicians

or did some of them merely discover that the ‘green’ subject is popular today and will way

voters? Nicolas Sarkozy’s emerging interest in ecological matters is a prime example for this

discussion. It cannot be denied that he really has managed to implement some important

measures in the domain of climate and environment protection (see chapter 4.2 and 4.3) but

many of his opponents still doubt that he has a genuine interest in ecology and that he will

realize all his announcements. They bring up his preconceived and partisan attitude in nuclear

matters, his desire to be the center of general attention instead of pleading a case for renewa-

bles (like at the Copenhagen Climate Conference 2009), inconsistently elaborated measures in

environmental protection (like for example the French carbon tax82), or some rather pedantic

regulations on wind energy (like the ICPE). It does not help that it is widely known that Nicolas

Sarkozy did not show any interest in ecological topics during his political career until Nicolas

Hulot – a journalist, writer, and lobbyist for environmental matters – showed up in the cam-

paign for the 2007 presidential elections with rather flattering results in public-opinion polls.

It was rumored that he would run for office, which he denied, but he could successfully direct

the attention of the public, the media, and of politics to ecological topics and make a lot of

the candidates sign an ‘Ecological Pact’ (Pacte-Ecologique.org), amongst them Nicolas Sarkozy.

82 The new French tax on consumption of fossil fuels (carbon tax) should have come into effect on January 1, 2010 but had been declared non-compliant with the principle of equality of the Human Rights Declaration and with the French 'Charte de l'Environnement' by the Constitutional Court. The Court further criticized numerous exceptions that had been negotiated with several industrial and agricultural sectors. Therefore, the tax had to be revised and should have been applied from July 2010 on. (Actu-Environnement.fr v + w) On March 23, 2009 however, Prime Minister Francois Fillon announced that the tax would be suspended ‘sine die’. (LeFigaro.fr c)


117

So, his sincerity is indeed debatable, but some say that it does not really matter if his motive is

political calculation or personal conviction – what matters are results. At the third round table

of the DGAP (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.) Laure Kälble, director of the

French-German coordination body for wind energy, confirmed that there really are new tenden-

cies relative to renewable energies in France. Those tendencies are still far away from being a

“green revolution” but “a stronger focus on new energy forms, especially in the domain of

Offshore-wind, can clearly be identified” (DGAP). (FranceSoir.fr, RFI.fr b, ParisMatch.com,

Liberation.fr d)

All in all, institutional learning83 and increasing political support for wind energy brought

about a rearrangement of the regime as well as of the niche constellation and removed some of

the obstacles discussed above that had prevented the French wind energy industry from be-

coming an important player in wind energy. It also led to the integration of the French govern-

ment into the niche constellation.

Local acceptance and opposition of wind energy

From the hesitant and sometimes inconsistent behavior of the government concerning wind

energy, one could conclude that this technology may be rather unpopular among its voters, too.

The opposite is the case however. The acceptance of wind energy among actors of the regime

that are not part of the government is much higher. Public opinion polls on wind energy persis-

tently provide very positive results among the French population. The general perception of

wind generators among residents is actually even better the closer one gets to the installations

(Gosset & Ranchin 2006) and that even though the possibility to directly benefit of wind parks

via public access to shares is not very prevalent in France84. The much-discussed NIMBY (‘Not

In My Backyard’) syndrome can therefore be ruled out as a limiting factor for wind energy

development (Jobert et al. 2007). Even with this favorable public opinion however, “social

acceptance at the local level represents an important challenge for the developers of wind-

83 It is not always easy for governments to find the right way to support new technologies. The question of how such innovation processes can best be controlled and directed in the desired direction is not part of my study. To pursue the matter see e.g.: Dolata 2005, 2008b, Rip & Schot 2002, Kemp, Schot & Hoogma 1998 84 In this context, the influence of business taxes that are raised by the communities should be additionally studied.


118

energy parks” (ibid.: 2751)85. Several case studies of Arthur Jobert and his colleagues on local

acceptance of wind energy (ibid.) showed that conflict resolution and networking at the local

level should still be worked on. Decisive factors for a successful development of wind energy

are: the former use and perception of the territory, the integration of the wind park into the

local tourism concept and the local economy, the origins and local integration of the park de-

velopers, the creation of networks and of trust between the developers and the local population,

information of the public and the quality of communication, public participation in the plan-

ning process, and ownership of the wind energy project or the rented territory (Jobert et al.

2007, Gosset & Ranchin 2006).

Despite this fundamental acceptance of wind energy amongst the population, the anti-wind

movement in France has become stronger and better organized in recent years. The protection

and preservation of French heritage sites and its landscape is, one of the main concerns of this

movement. Its new hero is the former president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing that is now presiding

the strategic orientation committee of the FED. In their study on ‘Wind power planning in

France (Aveyron)’, Alain Nadai and Oliver Labussière (2009) observed however that, on a

regular basis, local opposition only occurred “in some tourist and secondary residence areas or

in places where landscape is particularly valued (e.g., Provence Alpes Côtes d’Azur, Basse

Normandie, Rhône Alpes)” (Nadai & Labussière 2009: 4). The engineer Jean-Louis Gaby, whose

business in the renewables sector has been accredited by the ADEME, also observed a seasonal

aspect in this opposition to wind energy:

“Those weekend-vacationists that wish to benefit fully from their country house don’t want their landscape destroyed by the setting up of wind power stations, they however do not care about their way of living and the harm they inflict upon the environment throughout the whole year.”86 (SOLAIRE2000)87

85 This is even more the case, as the French policy framework makes developers much more dependent on local acceptance than for example the German policy framework does. “The major difference is that local authorities in Germany can be forced to accept wind turbines on their territory (§ 35 of the building code)” (Jobert et al. 2007: 2753). In France, with the creation of new regional wind energy schemes, the situation is probably about to change as well. 86 Seen thusly, the visibility problem of wind power stations becomes a “luxury problem” that is subordinate to other more pressing climate and environment problems. 87 translation by the author


119

as did Soazig Quemener in the article ‘Wind power stations: Why so much hatred’88 in the web

newspaper ‘Le Journal du Dimanche’:

“The supporters of wind energy stations see it as seasonal phenomenon. An estival 'wind of hatred' that arises once a year at the arrival of the summer visitors in their va-cation homes.” (LeJDD.fr)89

Alain Nadai and Oliver Labussière (2009) further discovered that the hesitant development of

wind energy in France is not notably caused by anti-wind movements, but is partly a result of

“a diffuse pattern of administrative landscape protection” (ibid.: 2). Due to their far-reaching

visual impact, industrial wind generators are seldom compatible with currently established

representation of landscape in Europe. However, “if new energy landscapes are to become

“sustainable”, new landscape representations have to emerge with the development of these

[sustainable] energies” (ibid.: 22). Such a change in the perception of appropriate and aesthet-

ical landscape representation, that has to be assigned to the landscape level of deep structural

trends or shifts, seems to be a generational issue for children generally like the sight of wind

generators (ADEME colloque 2006). – And besides, are there not other man-made structures,

such as cathedrals and even the Eiffel Tower, that have initially been perceived as unappeal-

ing? (ADEME colloque 2006, Energie.LesVerts.fr)

5.5 Summary

Enabling and constraining factors for niche expansion can be of natural, technological, eco-

nomical, political, and social quality. To explain the development of a niche it is important to

look at mechanisms on all levels, the niche, the regime, and the landscape.

Due to a variety of reasons, the wind energy niche in France was not able – or only to a small

extent – to utilize niche-intern mechanisms. One of the reasons was the unavailability of im-

portant story lines, which strongly hampered the recruitment of supporters for the niche. The

lack of committed supporters increased through the fact that it was difficult and very uncom-

mon in France for individuals to get involved in the development, that the French government

was rather uninterested in wind energy, and that the anti-nuclear movement had been sup-

pressed very early in France. So at first, the French wind energy industry was very small and

88 translation by the author 89 translation by the author


120

specialized, was insufficiently networked, was missing experience and knowledge on the sub-

ject, and was thus highly reliant on imported know-how, technology and work force. Insuffi-

cient funds and an inadequate legal framework did nothing to improve the situation either. The

reliance on imported technology and know-how had one major advantage, though: when France

joined the wind energy development, technological formation had already passed through a

standardization process so that technological issues did not excessively restrain the sector’s

deployment anymore.

So, as niche-mechanisms were very weak, developments and conditions at the regime and

the landscape level became all the more important. The gradual emergence of a public envi-

ronmental awareness in the 1960s and 70s and international events that resulted from that

shift, like the Kyoto Protocol, had only a limited impact on the development of wind energy in

France, as did have recurrent price increases and bottlenecks in the global oil supply. The main

reason for it is the fact that the climate and the security of supply argument have always been

less predominant in the discussion on the French electricity mix because the French govern-

ment had decided in the 1970s to secure their energy independence with nuclear energy whose

production generates far less greenhouse gases than coal or oil. Thus, developments at the

landscape level have surely brought forward the general awareness for “clean” energies but did

not promote the French wind energy sector in particular.

In order to explain the development of the French wind energy niche, the regime level is es-

sential because several lock-ins and solidified paths in the established energy sector – like the

centralized French government, a very strong nuclear lobby, the quasi monopoly of EDF and a

just partly liberalized electricity market, a very large fleet of mostly amortized nuclear power

plants, and the high inflexibility of the French grid due its predisposition towards a nuclear

base-load – strongly constrained the niche’s expansion. These established structures are surely

not flawless, but weaknesses and tensions in the system could not be capitalized by the wind

energy niche, for it could neither solve the problem of structural over-capacity of electricity

production nor could it supply peak load power to minimize the grid’s inflexibility. The insuffi-

cient upgrading and regional saturation of the grid was, and still is, another bottleneck for wind

energy development in France. Only the small (but all the same existing) energy gap in the

French energy supply, which originated from a constant increase in demand, seems to have


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positively influenced the niche’s expansion. So, as actors of the wind energy niche could not

alter the established regime through exploiting the weaknesses in its structure, the niche’s

expansion depended largely on the goodwill of actors of the dominant regime. Some of them

intentionally and willingly created an institutional and legal framework, helping the niche to

develop, and thus becoming themselves a part of the wind energy constellation. The institu-

tional learning process – from the implementation of monetary incentives, over the elaboration

of planning tools and landscape regulations, and the inclusion of the public into decision mak-

ing, to the creation of responsible authorities – contributed to: a constant improvement of the

rentability of wind projects in France, a refinement of planning conditions, an enhancement of

legal security, and to the integration of new actors into the wind energy constellation, but it

also made application and planning procedures very complex and cumbersome. In order to take

a real effect though, increasing support from the established political regime was very im-

portant, which had been quite indifferent to wind energy development for a long time. This

situation has changed quite recently; it has to be seen whether the promised governmental

support will be maintained. A last important factor of the regime level is that of local ac-

ceptance. Although landscape protection is a much discussed issue among the opponents of

wind energy, public opinion polls on wind energy persistently provide very positive results

among the French population. The general perception of wind generators among residents

actually improves with physical proximity to the installations. Nevertheless, the hesitant devel-

opment of wind energy in France is apparently caused to some extent by the result of certain

patterns in administrative landscape protection.

This summary makes it clear that although conditions in France for the development of wind

energy clearly improved, the niche has been given a very hard time and its expansion still is

constricted. So, the question where the development will lead in future remains. In chapter 6 I

will now discuss the question of what effect wind energy development has had until now on the

established French energy system and to what extent both sectors have been transformed and

adapted; and I will then try to find an answer to the question whether a regime shift is actually

possible in the French context.


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6 Transformation of the French Energy System

For a long time, modern energy systems like the one of Germany or France have been char-

acterized by a heavy use of carbon-rich fossil fuels, a “centralised generation and distribution of

electricity within an interlocking technical system” (Mautz 2007) and a demand-oriented de-

sign (Rohracher 2007: 134). In the light of impeding environmental risks like the climate

change process, many supporters of renewable energies demand a restructuring regarding

energy issues and a rebuilding of the energy sector (see also chapter 1). Early advocates of

wind energy in Germany were mainly driven by the idea of a radical paradigm shift that was

defined by three principles: a decentralization of energy production, an extension and plurali-

zation of relevant actors in the energy sector, and environment and climate protection as the

guiding theme in energy policy. The emergence and expansion of protected niches for renewa-

bles was and is – next to more developed solutions for energy storage and an improvement of

energy efficiency – very important for the realization of this potential energetic revolution.

(Ohlhorst 2008, Mautz 2007) The development of the wind energy niche in France however

does not seem to be driven to the same extent by the above-mentioned principles and is seek-

ing peaceful co-existence with, rather than challenging the nuclear regime. As it is clear that a

nuclear phase-out is currently still unthinkable in France, due to the fact that all political par-

ties, except for the Greens, are in favor of a strong nuclear sector, a turnover of the strongly

locked-in French energy system would be extremely ambitious and chances of success would

be very unlikely.

“Thus, the French wind industry sees itself as complementary to nuclear, rather than as a replacement for it. It seeks peaceful coexistence, whereas greens militate for the elim-ination of nuclear.” (Szarka 2007b: 327)

So, a radical transformation of the French energy sector is apparently not the ambition of the

wind energy niche in France. As Raven showed in a study on biomass, niche-regime interac-

tions need not always be about competition though (Raven 2006, Geels & Schot 2008). Niches

can instead be incorporated into existing regimes and may thus transform the regime from

within. I will now approach the question of what effect wind energy has had until now on the


123

established French energy system by drawing upon Dolata’s concept of technology driven

sectoral change. I will further look into the question of how, and to what extent, the niche itself

had to adapt to the existing regime to achieve a certain success.

According to Dolata, new technologies can affect sectors in very different ways (see chapter

2.3.3). To identify and analyze technology-driven sectoral change, several factors have to be

considered: where the technology originates from (endogenous vs. exogenous technologies),

whether it has a low or a high transformative capacity, and how open and adaptable towards

path-deviant development the sector and its actors are. The current transformation of the mod-

ern energy systems is based on “the system-internal development of new decentralized and

flexible energy production technologies”90 like wind energy and on “the implementation of new

system-external founded information and communication technologies” (Dolata 2008a: 10).

Information and communication technologies open up new possibilities in the management of

the grid and may increasingly include energy consumers in a comprehensive energy manage-

ment but they do not necessarily require the energy system to change very much; they can be

integrated and adapted without transforming the basic structure of the system. The diffusion of

new decentralized and flexible energy production technologies, like wind energy, puts pressure

on established energy systems to change. The decentralized electricity production and distribu-

tion of wind energy stations, their supply-oriented mode of production, and their intermittency

are not compatible with existing structures in modern energy systems. Combined with the idea

of a radical paradigm shift towards a sustainable energy system such potential system innova-

tions can entail a radical transformation of the energy sector at large.

The French wind energy niche began to develop rather late but managed to attain a respect-

able size today that cannot simply be ignored by the actors of the established energy system

anymore. Even if the niche is not challenging the established energy system (see above), the

wind generators and the electricity they produce still have to be integrated in the French ener-

gy system, somehow. This system is not very transformation-supportive: it has no strong dy-

namics of economic competition, mechanisms of transfer between academia and industry are

very weak, focal actors are not horizontally structured and collaboratively embedded, and the

sector’s institutions have been very stable and change resistant over a long time (see chapter 90 In other words: the core technology of the respective niche


124

4.2 and 4.3). The French energy system is in no case a well-balanced and unstrained constella-

tion, though. Even without the feeding-in of new, renewable energy sources it has to cope with

large surplus capacities of base-load electricity, a significant lack of peak load energy, and

regionally underdeveloped power networks (see chapter 4.2). Dolata now claims that “The more

a new technology affects the existing patterns of economic activity in a given sectoral system

and the less it is able to be implemented, used, and efficiently exploited within its existing

institutional framework, the greater the pressure is on the sector to undergo significant

change” (Dolata 2008a: 13). So far, resistance from the dominant constellation in the French

energy sector has however been very strong and successful despite of the high transformative

capacity of wind energy, despite the limited openness and adaptability of the established sys-

tem, and despite of its structural problems. So, from an empirical point of view, no support can

be provided for this claim (cf. Meister & Ohlhorst 2008). One of the reasons for this successful

resistance is the fact that the structural problems of the sector cannot be solved by wind energy

and therefore, cannot be exploited by it either. Other reasons are the strong political support for

the nuclear regime, the “non-existence” of a real energy-gap, the occupancy of important story

lines by the nuclear regime, and the unsuccessfully implemented liberalization of the electrici-

ty market in France91 (see chapter 5). Thus, only one of the three principles of the new para-

digm (see above) can be found to some extent in France: the importance of environmental and

climate issues in the French energy policy increased perceptibly. The centralized energy sup-

ply system and the quasi monopoly of EDF in the French electricity market have not been

affected very much. The question is then: Can we actually speak of a transition process towards

another regime in the French energy sector or, are new renewable energy production technolo-

gies, like wind energy, simply integrated in a system that did not basically change?

To be able to break out of the niche and to eventually stabilize into a new and replace the old

regime, wind energy development has to offer a strong expansion and a wide implementation of

the technology. The French wind energy sector has grown markedly over the last few years. In

order for this expansion to occur, the integration and adoptability of the niche-technology into

91 In the course of the liberalization process of the European electricity and gas markets, the structure of the French electricity market had been formally changed (see creation of RTE and CRE, and privatization of EDF). This did however lead neither to a “real” opening of the market for alternative providers nor to competitive market structures.


125

existing patterns was crucial: the better and more predictable the regulation of the electricity

output of wind generators, the easier the feed-in into the grid (cf. Meister & Ohlhorst 2008; see

also chapter 4.1). To achieve the needed integration, not only the niche-technology was adapted

though, the existing energy supply system was modified as well – however changes were

marginal (e.g. a modified load management and a general improvement of the grid). In addition,

these technological developments were accompanied by an adaption of the niche’s institutional

and socio-economic structures to the established regime, which was mainly encouraged by the

general growth of the size of technical units and wind parks and their concentration into large

parks. The upscaling process was justified by efficiency criteria and by the avoidance of urban

sprawl and adverse effects on the countryside, the patrimony, and on residents through a

concentration of negative impacts92. Basically leading to an increase in installed capacity in

France, increasingly centralized and capitalized market and operator structures of the niche

impeded the participation of small- and medium-sized organizations and companies, which

have so far been the main forces in the German movement for a paradigm shift in the energy

sector93. Actors of the dominant regime seem to “take over” more and more control of the wind

energy development, most notably in the offshore sector, but also on-shore through buy-outs

and acquisitions.

These developments – transfer of “traditional” structures to the wind energy niche and a

gradual adaptation of the potential system innovation ‘wind energy’, which could have been the

basis for a new and sustainable energy system, to the established system – suggest that the

chances for a regime shift in the near future are quite low. In the French context other circum-

stances, like the categorical ‘no’ to a nuclear phase-out and the scheduled expansion of the

92 Such a “high quality development” of wind energy was encouraged by the French government in official documents (see chapter 4.2; see also: ‘Circulaire relatif à la planification du developpement de l’energie eolienne terrestre du 26 février 2009’, ‚Note permettre un développement soutenu et maîtrisé de l'énergie éolienne par une amélioration de la planification territoriale, de la concertation et de l'encadrement réglementaire du 14 avril 2009’, and ‚Circulaire relatif à la planification du developpement de l’energie eolienne terrestre du 19 mai 2009’). 93 A structural revolution in energy production had been a central objective of many wind energy pioneers in Germany (Ohlhorst 2008). “The former clear-cut profile of the new socio-technical paradigm meanwhile has become more or less diffuse” though (Mautz 2007: 127). The German protagonists of renewable energies (just as protagonists in France) are confronted with new challenges, like the tendency towards ever increasing technical units and centralization. So, in the course of the transformation process of the German electricity sector, “the principles of the alternative paradigm have been modified significantly” (Mautz 2007: 128).


126

already oversized nuclear power production fleet, additionally complicate matters. So, how does

the future of the French wind energy niche look like? Is a regime shift actually possible? Will

the French wind energy niche continue to grow or will there perhaps never be a “real” break-

through? And are the French wind energy targets for 2020 achievable or not?

As the power consumption of the population and the industry cannot, and must not, increase

without limit (which would give wind energy a small window of opportunity to further expand,

however, without basically changing the French energy system), two scenarios as highly possi-

ble: either France will fulfill its obligations, produce more and more electricity (renewable and

nonrenewable) without changing the basic structure of the energy sector, and will have to

somehow find a way to cope with the energy surpluses – this will prove difficult because of the

structural problems of the French grid mentioned above – or the development of renewables in

France will abate and stagnate, thus leading to targets not being reached once again because

the wind energy niche could not find a place to expand in the established energy system.

For all the reasons given in this study, I predict that the probability of France reaching their

targets is rather low and assume that, at the current state of affaires, the French development

curve of installed wind energy capacity is capped at a certain point, which again limits the

possibility of the niche to breakthrough. To truly cause a shift in the established French energy

sector there probably have to occur more favorable events at the regime and the landscape

level, like a rethinking on nuclear matters in French politics, a further shortage of fossil fuels, a

genuine liberalization of the French electricity market, or a fundamental change in the aesthet-

ical perception of wind generators in the population.


127

References, Indexes, and Appendix

Index: Figures and Images

figure 1: Sectoral systems - analytical categories ...................................................................................... 14

figure 2: Multi-level-perspective on transitions ......................................................................................... 18

figure 3: Phases of the innovation process of wind energy in Germany ................................................ 30

figure 4: Annual and cumulated wind development in MW .................................................................... 33

figure 5: Installed wind power by country on December 31, 2008 ......................................................... 34

figure 6: Wind power development in France and Germany ................................................................... 37

figure 7: Schematic representations of nacelles, with and without gears ............................................. 41

figure 8: Diagram of the grid after the power outage ................................................................................ 45

figure 9: Development of the average potential of single wind power stations (on the left)

and of whole wind parks (on the right) in MW ................................................................................. 53

figure 10: Butoni Wind Farm on the Fiji Islands (Vergnet) ....................................................................... 54

figure 11: French wind regimes .................................................................................................................... 91

Index: Tables

table 1: Table view of the French wind energy development from 1996 to 2008 ................................ 35

table 2: Calculations on the share of renewable energy sources in the french gross electricity

consumption ............................................................................................................................................. 68

table 3: French wind farm database, March 2009 . .................................................................................. 153


128

List of Abbreviations94

kW – kilowatt MW – megawatt GW – gigawatt MWh – megawatt hour GWh – gigawatt hour TWh – terawatt hour ANT – Actor-network-theory CEO – Chief executive officer DNN – Distributeur non nationalisé (non-nationalized distributer) DOM-TOM – Départements et territoires d'outre-mer (overseas departments and territories) EPR – European pressurized water reactor ICPE – Installation classée pour la protection de l’environnement (classified installation for environ-mental protection) MLP – Multi-level perspective NFFO – Non fossil fuel obligation NIMBY – Not-in-my-backyard PPI – Programmation pluriannuelle des investissements (multi-annual roadmap on investments) RES-E – Electricity production from renewable energy sources TPP – Technological product and process innovation TT – Technological transition SCOT – Social construction of technology SNC – ‘Société en nom collectif' SNM – Strategic niche management WPS – Wind power station ZDE – Zone de développement de l’éolien (wind power development zones)

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153

Appendix table 3: French wind farm database, March 2009 (combination of several sources: Suivi-Eolien.com, TheWind-Power.net, SER/FEE liste parcs 2009, Eolinfo.com, + information from the websites of several wind generator manufacturers and park developers; graphic rendered by author)

12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031

A B C D

wind park park section regiondepartm

ent

Nogent-le-Roi (à 70 km à l'ouest de Paris) . Centre 28Portel des Corbières - Plan des Aladers (Château de Lastours?) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Site de particulier - Schweyen . Lorraine 57Malo (les Bains) . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Dunkerque . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Corbières-Maritimes - Port-La-Nouvelle (1) 1de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Corbières-Maritimes - Port-La-Nouvelle (2) 2de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Toufflers . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Bondues . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Le Souffleur (1de2) Désirade 1 DOM - Guadeloupe 971Le Souffleur (2de2) Désirade 2 DOM - Guadeloupe 971Dunkerque (Windpark) . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Petite Place . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Wormhout . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Sallèles-Limousis . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Aire de Baie de Somme . Picardie 80Petit Canal (1de3) 1de3 DOM - Guadeloupe 971Miquelon . TOM - Polynesie fr/St Pierre et Miquelon 975Morne Constant . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Le Moule . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Mont Négandi . TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Rurutu . TOM - Polynesie fr / Iles Australes 987Ile des Pins . TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Widehem . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Donzère . Rhône-Alpes 26Plateau de la Montagne Désirade 3 DOM - Guadeloupe 971Goulien . Bretagne 29Plouarzel 1de2 Bretagne 29Corbières-Maritimes - Sigean 3de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Cap Corse - Pietraggine Rogliano 1de2 Corse 2B

323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364

A B C DCap Corse - Toricella Ersa 2de2 Corse 2BSouleilla-Corbières 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Bondues II ? . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Portel des Corbières - Plan du Pal 1de2 = Lastours? Languedoc-Roussillon 11Ile de Lifou . TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Roquetaillade . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Souleilla-Corbières 2de2 - extension Languedoc-Roussillon 11Tuchan II 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Portel des Corbières - Plan du Pal 2de2 = Lastours? Languedoc-Roussillon 11Prony (1de3) 1de3 TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Petit Canal (2de3) 2de3 DOM - Guadeloupe 971Avignonet - Lauragais 1de2 Midi-Pyrénées 31Fontanelles . Midi-Pyrénées 12Merdélou . Midi-Pyrénées 12Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhône 3de3 Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 13Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhône 1de3 Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 13Port-Saint-Louis-du-Rhône 2de3 Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 13Côte de l’Epinette . Champagne-Ardenne 51Le Portel . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Fitou I 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Dineault . Bretagne 29Plouyé . Bretagne 29Tuchan 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Saran . Centre 45Petit François (Petit Canal) . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Fonds Caraïbes (St François) . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Prony (2de3) 2de3 TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Chépy . Picardie 80Guitrancourt (Issou) . Ile-de-France 78Plougras . Bretagne 22Névian 1de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Névian 2de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Punta Aja . Corse 2B

656667686970717273747576777879808182838485868788899091929394959697

A B C DBouin - La Côte de Jade 1de2 Pays de la Loire 85Rivesaltes 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 66Rivesaltes 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 66Escales 1 (Conilhac?) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Sainte-Marie-de-Redon . Bretagne 35Freyssenet - Serre-des- Fourches . Rhône-Alpes 7Bouin - Les Polders du Dain 2de2 Pays de la Loire 85Opoul-Perillos (Salses) . Languedoc-Roussillon 66Mardyck 1de3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Mardyck 3de3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Mardyck 2de3 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 59Morne Carriere . DOM - Martinique 972Petit Canal (3de3) 3de3 DOM - Guadeloupe 971Beuzec-Cap-Sizun . Bretagne 29Nibas 1de2 Picardie 80Névian 3de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Dirinon . Bretagne 29Oupia . Languedoc-Roussillon 34Saint-Simon - La clé des champs . Picardie 2Coat-Piquet (Magoar) . Bretagne 22Riols (= La Roque ?) . Languedoc-Roussillon 34Plateau Ardéchois . Rhône-Alpes 7Cotentin (Sortosville-en-Beaumont) . Basse-Normandie 50Montjoyer et Rochefort 2de2 Rhône-Alpes 26Montjoyer et Rochefort 1de2 Rhône-Alpes 26Kerherhal extension - Plouguin 2de2 Bretagne 29Téterchen . Lorraine 57Fitou I - extension 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Langoëlan . Bretagne 56Haute-Lys - Fauquembergues 3de4 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Haute-Lys - Fauquembergues 1de4 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 2Haute-Lys - Fauquembergues 2de4 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Haute-Lys - Fauquembergues 4de4 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62

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A B C DSaint-Crépin . Poitou-Charentes 17Saint Thégonnec (in Pleyber-Christ) . Bretagne 29Ploumoguer . Bretagne 29Montfranc . Midi-Pyrénées 12Saintes (Terre de Bas) . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Kafeate (2de2) 2de2 TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Kafeate (1de2) 1de2 TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Ally - Mercoeur 4de4 Auvergne 43La Montagne ardéchoise - Cham Longe 2de2 Rhône-Alpes 7La Montagne ardéchoise - Cham Longe 1de2 Rhône-Alpes 7Ally - Mercoeur (Moulins de Verseilles?) 1de4 Auvergne 43Ally - Mercoeur (Moulins de Monteil?) 2de4 Auvergne 43Ally - Mercoeur (Moulins de Bessadous?) 3de4 Auvergne 43Plourin . Bretagne 29Aumelas - Quatre Bornes 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 34Aumelas - Conques 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 34Clitourps . Basse-Normandie 50Guerlédan . Bretagne 22Sainte-Rose . DOM - Réunion 974Ploudalmezeau (Plourin) . Bretagne 29Janville - Voie Blériot Est 1de3 Centre 28Bougainville . Picardie 80Chaudeyrac . Languedoc-Roussillon 58Gavray . Basse-Normandie 50Le Haut des Ailes - Haut des Grues 3de4 Lorraine 54Le Haut des Ailes - La Tournelle 2de4 Lorraine 54Le Haut des Ailes - Le Haut des Masures 1de4 Lorraine 54Janville - Bois Clergeons 2de3 Centre 28Bouillancourt-en-Séry . Picardie 80Le Quarnon - Mont Faverget . Champagne-Ardenne 51Kergrist 1de5 Bretagne 56Kergrist 2de5 Bretagne 56Kergrist 3de5 Bretagne 56

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A B C DValhuon - Tranche : First 2de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Valhuon - Tranche : Innovent 1de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Les Malandaux . Champagne-Ardenne 51Plouguin 2 . Bretagne 29Kerherhal 1de2 Bretagne 29Peyrelevade . Limousin 19Champfleury . Champagne-Ardenne 10Haut-de-Vausse - Reffroy . Lorraine 55Le Boutonnier (Reffroy) . Lorraine 55Saint-Clément . Rhône-Alpes 7Louville la Chenard 1de3 Centre 28Louville la Chenard 2de3 Centre 28Louville la Chenard 3de3 Centre 28Gueltas Noyal Pontivy . Bretagne 56Site de particulier 2 (Dordogne) . Aquitaine 24Auvers-Méautis . Basse-Normandie 50Nibas - Saucourt 2de2 Picardie 80Epense-Argonne 2de2 Champagne-Ardenne 51Epense-Argonne 1de2 Champagne-Ardenne 51Côtes de Champagne . Champagne-Ardenne 51Carré Sénart (Lieusaint) . Ile-de-France 77Méligny le Grand . Lorraine 55Prony (3de3) 3de3 TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Sainte Suzanne - La Perrière (3de3) 3de3 DOM - Réunion 974Sainte Suzanne - La Perrière (2de3) 2de3 DOM - Réunion 974Sainte Suzanne - La Perrière (1de3) 1de3 DOM - Réunion 974Aupiac . Midi-Pyrénées 12Iffendic . Bretagne 35Saint-Agrève la Citadelle . Rhône-Alpes 7Dio et Valquières . Languedoc-Roussillon 34Chapelle Vallon - Chapelle d’Eole 2de2 Champagne-Ardenne 10La Nisandière (Brem sur Mer) . Pays de la Loire 85L’Espinassière . Pays de la Loire 85

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A B C DPort autonome de Marseille (Fos-sur-Mer) . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 13Beaucaire . Languedoc-Roussillon 30Momerstroff . Lorraine 57Vauvilliers . Picardie 80Lou Paou PV5 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 48Fécamp . Haute-Normandie 76Escales 2 . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Saint-Martin-des-Besaces . Basse-Normandie 14Lou Paou 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 48Longue Epine . Picardie 80Freyssenet . Rhône-Alpes 7Assigny . Haute-Normandie 76Maisnières - Tilloy-Floriville 1de2 Picardie 80Bois Bigot . Centre 28Bois de l’Arche . Centre 28Les Trois Muids (Treminiers) . Centre 28Le Cornouiller (Thieux, Noyers-Saint-Martin) . Picardie 60Roinville . Centre 28Chemin de Tuleras . Centre 28Haut-de-Bane . Lorraine 55Haut Languedoc - Valbonne 2de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 34Haut Cabardès - Cabrespine 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Haut Cabardès - Pradelles 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Haut Languedoc - Mourel 1de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 34Roussas - Claves 1de2 Rhône-Alpes 26Roussas - Gravières 2de2 Rhône-Alpes 26Haut Languedoc - Amaysse 3de3 Languedoc-Roussillon 34Cuxac-Cabardès . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Quatre-Communes (Faux-Vésigneul) . Champagne-Ardenne 51Les Monts Bergerons 1de2 Picardie 80Cormainville (Guillonville) 1de5 Centre 28Cormainville (Guillonville) 2de5 Centre 28Cormainville (Guillonville) 3de5 Centre 28

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A B C DCormainville (Guillonville) 4de5 Centre 28Cormainville (Guillonville) 5de5 Centre 28Héstomesnil . Picardie 60Les Mardeaux . Centre 41Viertiville . Centre 41Le Carreau (Treminiers) . Centre 28Le Moulin Démoli (Lihus) . Picardie 60La Branche Morte . Picardie 60Mont Huet . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Bois Louis . Centre 45Kergrist 4de5 Bretagne 56Kergrist 5de5 Bretagne 56La Butte des Fraus (Ménéac, Mohon) . Bretagne 56Janville - Voie Blériot Ouest 3de3 - PELEIA I Centre 28Lascombe . Midi-Pyrénées 12Chicheboville (Conteville) . Basse-Normandie 14Les Pénages PELEIA II Centre 41Quatre-Chemins (Saint Jean Coupéville) . Champagne-Ardenne 51Beauregard . Lorraine 55Fitou II 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Silfiac - Bodervedan . Bretagne 56Pluzunet . Bretagne 22Trébry . Bretagne 22Lanfains . Bretagne 22Le Haut Corlay . Bretagne 22Fonds de Fresnes . Picardie 80Séglien Trescoët (Séglien Ar Tri Milin) . Bretagne 56Chapelle Vallon - Val d’Eole 1de2 Champagne-Ardenne 10Centernach (Saint-Arnac) . Languedoc-Roussillon 66Gommerville . Centre 28Beausemblant 1de2 Rhône-Alpes 26Bonneval . Centre 28La Champ du Pin (St Front ) . Auvergne 43

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A B C DLa Champ du Pin (St. Front, Montusclat, Champclause) . Auvergne 43Pont-de-Salars - Ségur + Jos . Midi-Pyrénées 12Kemenez / Quéménès (Le Conquet) . Bretagne 29Ménil la Horgne . Lorraine 55Mont Mau (Mont Dore) . TOM - Nouvelle Caledonie 988Grand Maison . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Trois Sources . Lorraine 55Plouarzel - extension 2de2 Bretagne 29Campagnes et Tambours 1de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Campagnes et Tambours 2de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Longs Champs (Longchamps) . Picardie 80Kerigaret + Pennengoat . Bretagne 29Patrimonio . Corse 2BLes Barthes 1de2 Auvergne 43Luc-sur-Orbieu . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Pleyber-Christ (Coat Conval) . Bretagne 29Portes - Soudan 2de2 Pays de la Loire 44Freigné . Pays de la Loire 49Portes - Erbray 1de2 Pays de la Loire 44Beaufou . Pays de la Loire 85Maisnières - Frettemeule 2de2 Picardie 80St Flour (Col Fageole + Rageade) . Auvergne 15Omissy 2 . Picardie 2Butte Saint-Liphard . Centre 28Sainbois . Centre 45Les Chandelles (Breteuil, Paillart) . Picardie 60Brachy . Haute-Normandie 76Cast 1de2 Bretagne 29Murat sur Vebre . Midi-Pyrénées 81Derval et Lusanger 1de2 Pays de la Loire 44Derval et Lusanger 2de2 Pays de la Loire 44Mont de Bézard - La Grande Côte 1de3 Champagne-Ardenne 10Mont de Bézard - Le Haut du moulin 3de3 Champagne-Ardenne 10

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A B C DMont de Bézard - Les Renardières 2de3 Champagne-Ardenne 10Saint-Léger 2de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Saint-Léger 1de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Bornes de Cerqueux . Centre 45Saint-Servais . Bretagne 22Coren . Auvergne 15Boulay-Moselle - Buchfeld 2de3 Lorraine 57Laneuville-au-Rupt . Lorraine 55Rampont (Nixéville-Blercourt, Les Souhesmes-Rampont) 1de2 Lorraine 55La Nourais . Bretagne 35Courcelles sur Aire . Lorraine 55Saulzet . Auvergne 3Grand Fougeray . Bretagne 35Guéhenno . Bretagne 56Bignan . Bretagne 56Cast - Chateaulin 2de2 Bretagne 29Champ-Besnard PELEIA IV Centre 28Hauts de Melleray PELEIA III Centre 28Lanrivoaré (I ?) . Bretagne 29Le Champ Vert . Picardie 60Plestan . Bretagne 22Pont-Melvez II - Keranfouler 2de2 Bretagne 22Pont-Melvez 1 - Le Gollot 1de2 Bretagne 22Ségur - Viarouge . Midi-Pyrénées 12Saint-Barnabé . Bretagne 22Patay (Vallee des Gommiers) . Centre 45Plouvien . Bretagne 29Fruges (Tranche 2008) 2de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Fruges (Tranche 2007) 1de2 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Site de particulier - Avignonet . Midi-Pyrénées 31Saint-Aubin-sur-Aire 1de2 Lorraine 55Fond de Plaine (Luc-sur-Orbieu) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Boulay-Moselle - Les moulins de Boulay 3de3 Lorraine 57

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A B C DLa Renardière . Champagne-Ardenne 51Mulinière (Vairé) . Pays de la Loire 85Les Métairies (Maitairies) . Pays de la Loire 85Princay (Benet) . Pays de la Loire 85Harpen Hauts Traits . Haute-Normandie 76Harpen Petits Caux . Haute-Normandie 76Kerlan . Bretagne 22Bois Lislet . Picardie 2La Mahaudière . DOM - Guadeloupe 971Quatre-Vents (Vanault-le-Châtel) . Champagne-Ardenne 51Bambesch . Lorraine 57Bernay-Saint-Martin . Poitou-Charentes 17Voie Sacrée Sud 2de2 Lorraine 55Voie Sacrée Nord 1de2 Lorraine 55Léhaucourt . Picardie 2Castelnau - Pegayrols . Midi-Pyrénées 12Les Sablons . Basse-Normandie 14Moulin de Froidure (Cocquerel) . Picardie 80Barre - Cap Redounde 2de2 Midi-Pyrénées 81Barre - Puech Cambert 1de2 Midi-Pyrénées 81Les Champs Blancs - Benet . Pays de la Loire 85Beausemblant - extension 2de2 Rhône-Alpes 26Cambernon . Basse-Normandie 50Les Pérails (Marquein) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Piolenc . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 84Plélan-le-Petit . Bretagne 22Conteville . Basse-Normandie 14Gâtinais, Sceaux-du-Gâtinais . Centre 42Fierville-Bray . Basse-Normandie 14Les Quatre Vents . Champagne-Ardenne 10Corlay . Bretagne 22Janaillat - Saint-Dizier-Leyrenne . Limousin 23Pont-de-Salars - Flavin (= Les Potences ?) . Midi-Pyrénées 12

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A B C DScaër - Leuhan . Bretagne 29Hombleux . Picardie 80Sainte-Honorine-la-Chardonne . Basse-Normandie 61La Belle Epine (Pléchâtel) . Bretagne 35Argentan . Basse-Normandie 61Hermin . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Valhuon II . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Garcelles-Secqueville . Basse-Normandie 14Hénansal . Bretagne 22Saint Jacques de Nehou . Basse-Normandie 50Beurey-Bauguay . Bourgogne 21Grosbois Saint-Anthot . Bourgogne 21Le Truc de l'Homme (La Fage-Montivernoux) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Sallen . Basse-Normandie 14Villemur . Poitou-Charentes 16La Grallière (Saint-Amand-sur-Sèvre) . Poitou-Charentes 79Jaladeaux . Poitou-Charentes 16Combusins . Poitou-Charentes 16Xambes . Poitou-Charentes 16Roudouallec . Bretagne 56Donzère - extension . Rhône-Alpes 26La Montagne Ardéchoise - extension (St-Étienne-de-Lugdarès) . Rhône-Alpes 7Hargicourt . Picardie 80Avignonet - Lauragais - extension 2de2 Midi-Pyrénées 31Boulay-Moselle - Welling 1de3 Lorraine 57Plélan le Grand . Bretagne 35Petit Terroir . Picardie 80Cruas . Rhône-Alpes 7Villesèque des Corbières 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Castanet - La Tourelle 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 34Les Barthes 2de2 Auvergne 43Veulettes-sur-Mer . Haute-Normandie 76Castanet - Le Haut 1de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 34

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A B C DFraïsse sur Agoût . Languedoc-Roussillon 34Chemin d’Ablis . Centre 28Levézou - Salles-Curan . Midi-Pyrénées 12Bourbriac . Bretagne 22Pays de Bray - Clos Bataille 1de3 Haute-Normandie 76Pays de Bray - Les Vatines 2de3 Haute-Normandie 76Pays de Bray - Varimpré 3de3 Haute-Normandie 76Leign Ar Gasprenn (Collorec) . Bretagne 29Les Eparmonts . Champagne-Ardenne 52Plaines du Porcien (Château Porcien) . Champagne-Ardenne 8La Gaillarde . Haute-Normandie 76Gueures . Haute-Normandie 76La Marette (Saint-André-Farivillers) . Picardie 60Chemin Blanc - Francastel . Picardie 60Demi-Lieue (Crèvecœur-le-Grand) . Picardie 60Oresmaux . Picardie 80Les Trois Fermes . Centre 45La Brière . Centre 45Le Colombier (Saint-Germain-de-Longue-Chaume) . Poitou-Charentes 79Le Soulié . Languedoc-Roussillon 34Lomont Est 1de2 Franche-Comté 25Marsanne . Rhône-Alpes 26Lomont Ouest 2de2 Franche-Comté 25Carrière Martin . Picardie 2La Grelière (Mauléon) . Poitou-Charentes 79Longuyon . Lorraine 54Saint Hilaire-La-Croix . Auvergne 63Ardes-sur-Couze . Auvergne 63Les Monts Bergerons 2 2de2 Picardie 80Falaise II / Pays de Falaise . Basse-Normandie 14Bonneuil-les-Eaux . Picardie 60Le Haut des Ailes II (=Le Haut de Blâmont?) 4de4 - extension Lorraine 57Lislet 1de2 ? Picardie 2

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A B C DLehaucourt-Gricourt . Picardie 2Lislet 2de2 ? Picardie 2Saint-Sauveur-de-Ginestoux . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Les Prés Hauts . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Bel Air . Pays de la Loire 85La Haie au Vent - Stenay . Lorraine 55Fitou II - extension 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Amélécourt . Lorraine 57Trayes . Poitou-Charentes 79Erize Saint Dizier + Gery . Lorraine 55Saint-Aubin II 2de2 Lorraine 55Hamel Au Brun (Guilberville) . Basse-Normandie 50Talizat-Rézentières 1de2 Auvergne 15Hescamps . Picardie 80Coajou-Baslan (Plouisy) . Bretagne 22Villesèque-Portel 2de2 Languedoc-Roussillon 11Vaux-lès-Mouzon . Champagne-Ardenne 8Lestrade-et-Thouels . Midi-Pyrénées 12Sole du Moulin Vieux - Ablaincourt-Pressoir 2de2 Picardie 80Le Mont de Ponche . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Anoux Saint Saumont . Lorraine 54Vaudeville-le-Haut . Lorraine 55Le Haut des Épinettes (Perles) . Picardie 2Le Vieux Moulin (Hautevesnes) . Picardie 2Vouthon-Haut . Lorraine 55Montcornet . Picardie 2Cernon - Centrale éolienne de Cernon 1de3 Champagne-Ardenne 51Cernon - Eole cernon 2de3 Champagne-Ardenne 51Cernon - Les vents de Cernon 3de3 Champagne-Ardenne 51Prouville . Picardie 80Montloué . Picardie 2Fresnes-en-Saulnois . Lorraine 57Plomodiern . Bretagne 29

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A B C DSite de particulier 3 . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 84Chantereine (Chanteraine) . Lorraine 55Nançois (le grand) . Lorraine 55Is-en-Bassigny . Champagne-Ardenne 52Nalliers . Pays de la Loire 85Péré . Poitou-Charentes 17Mouzeuil St Martin, Le Langon 1de2 Pays de la Loire 85Mouzeuil St Martin, Le Langon 2de2 Pays de la Loire 85Pont-de-Salars - Canet-de-Salars (Carelets) . Midi-Pyrénées 12Mounes - Parc du Pays Belmontais . Midi-Pyrénées 12Clamanges-Villeseneux . Champagne-Ardenne 51Niedervisse . Lorraine 57Rochereau . Poitou-Charentes 86Mas de Leuze (Mas Laurent) . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 13Ambon (=Gambon?) . Bretagne 56Muzillac . Bretagne 56Saint-Jean-Lachalm (1de2) 1de2 Auvergne 43Puech Cornet . Midi-Pyrénées 81Saint-Jean-Lachalm (2de2) 2de2 Auvergne 43Forières II (Criel-sur-Mer) 2de2 ? Haute-Normandie 76Guern . Bretagne 56Greneville-en-Beauce . Centre 45Hauteville . Picardie 2Parc du Lauragais (Saint-Felix - La Lande) 2de2 Midi-Pyrénées 31Parc du Lauragais (Montégut - Le Bois) 1de2 Midi-Pyrénées 31Trémeheuc . Bretagne 35Seraumont - La Saurupt . Lorraine 88La Salle et Rocharvez Lanrivain . Bretagne 22Réguiny - Crédin . Bretagne 56Beausoleil (Taupont, Saint-Malo-des-Trois-Fontaines) . Bretagne 56Saint-Cirgues-en-Montagne . Rhône-Alpes 7Plaine Auboise (Nozay,Premierfait,Grandes Chapelles/Banlées) . Champagne-Ardenne 10Chouy - Billy-sur-Ourcq . Picardie 2

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A B C DMonts d'Arcis (Allibaudières, Dosnon, Le Chêne) . Champagne-Ardenne 10Lavallée - Levoncourt . Lorraine 55Saint-Georges-de-Noisné . Poitou-Charentes 79Aussac-Vadalle . Poitou-Charentes 16Saint-Coulitz . Bretagne 29Pleugriffet - Crédin . Bretagne 56Gâprée - Trémont . Basse-Normandie 61Agenville . Picardie 80Boisbergues . Picardie 80Moyencourt-lès-Poix . Picardie 80Fiefs . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Audrieu . Basse-Normandie 14Frénouville . Basse-Normandie 14Croixrault . Picardie 80Massiac . Auvergne 15Chaussée César Nord Civray 2de2 Centre 18Chaussée César Sud Civray 1de2 Centre 18Sainte-Thorette - Les Coudrays 2de2 Centre 18Sainte-Thorette - Les Mistandines 1de2 Centre 18Dehlingen . Alsace 67Les Croquettes Quincy . Centre 18La Benâte . Poitou-Charentes 17Binas- Ouzouer-le Marché . Centre 41Sachin . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Haucourt-Moulaine . Lorraine 54Plateau de Ronchois (Lannoy-Cuillère) . Picardie 60Le Grand Camp (Barmainville, Oinville-Saint-Liphard, Rouvray-Saint-Denis). Centre 28Chasse-Marée (Fressenneville, Aigneville, Embreville) . Picardie 80Plateau de Ronchois (Conteville, Criquiers, Ronchois) . Haute-Normandie 76Arfons - Sor . Midi-Pyrénées 81Viviers-sur-Chiers - Revémont 2de2 Lorraine 54Viviers-sur-Chiers - Braumont 1de2 Lorraine 54Oisseau . Pays de la Loire 53

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A B C DPlogastel-Saint-Germain . Bretagne 29La Lande du Vieux Pavé (Calanhel, Lohuec) . Bretagne 22Grand-Bois (Lacombe, Cuxac-Cabardès, Caudebronde) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Sambrès (Roquefere,Labastide-Esparbairenque,Mas Cabardès) . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Pays de Saint-Seine . Bourgogne 21Bollène . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 84Lanrivoaré (II ?) . Bretagne 29Locmélar . Bretagne 29La Limouzinière . Pays de la Loire 44Saint-Hilaire de Chaleons . Pays de la Loire 44Mont Cauvel (Notre-Dame-de-Bondeville) . Haute-Normandie 76Frossay . Pays de la Loire 44Echalot . Bourgogne 21Miroir (Domart-en-Ponthieu, Saint Léger-lès-Domart) . Picardie 80La Picoterie (Charly-sur-Marne) . Picardie 2Chemin des Haguenets . Picardie 60Bretelle, Étalante, Poiseul-la-Grange . Bourgogne 21Soveria . Corse 2BLe Mont d’Aunay (Fiennes) . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Sauveterre . Midi-Pyrénées 82Lévigny . Champagne-Ardenne 10Tigné . Pays de la Loire 49Hauteurs de Falbe . Lorraine 57Le Horps - Lassay . Pays de la Loire 53Saint Pierre Bénouville . Haute-Normandie 76Saint Pierre Le Viger - La Gaillarde . Haute-Normandie 76Les Ternois . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Côte d'Albatre (Veulettes-sur-Mer) . Haute-Normandie 76Lamontélarié . Midi-Pyrénées 81Vix . Pays de la Loire 85Les Joyeuses - Saint-Georges-sur-Arnon 2de2 ? Centre 36Les Barbes d'Or (Saint-Georges-sur-Arnon, Migny) 2de2 ? Centre 36Les Tilleuls - Saint-Georges-sur-Arnon 1de2 ? Centre 36

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A B C DLes Vignes (Saint-Georges-sur-Arnon) 1de2 ? Centre 36Autremencourt . Picardie 2Plein Champ - Chanteraine-Ménaucourt . Lorraine 55Orme - Champagne . Champagne-Ardenne 51Leffincourt . Champagne-Ardenne 8Nurlu . Picardie 80Mauron . Bretagne 56Talizat-Rézentières 2de2 Auvergne 15Mont de l'Arbre . Champagne-Ardenne 51Saint Cyr en Pail (Les Près Barons) . Pays de la Loire 53Raucourt-et-Flaba . Champagne-Ardenne 8Solerie - Moulin Vieux Pertain, Potte 1de2 Picardie 80Beaurevoir . Picardie 2Le Truel - Ayssènes . Midi-Pyrénées 12Fouy Saint-Georges-des-Gardes . Pays de la Loire 49Les Crêtes . Pays de la Loire 49Breteuil - Esquennoy . Picardie 60Campbon . Pays de la Loire 44Antoigné . Pays de la Loire 49Plateau de Langres . Champagne-Ardenne 52Chemay - L'lie d'Olonne . Pays de la Loire 85Forières 1 (Criel-sur-Mer) 1de2 ? Haute-Normandie 76Rampont 2 - Osches 2de2 Lorraine 55Saint-Alban (Cinq chemins ?) . Bretagne 22Éolienne du Singladou Le Margnès . Midi-Pyrénées 81Fontanille II (St-Jean-de-Pourcharesse, St-Pierre-St-Jean) 2de2 ? Rhône-Alpes 7Fontanille 1 (Sablières) 1de2 ? Rhône-Alpes 7Trelans . Languedoc-Roussillon 11Murato . Corse 2BVentiseri . Corse 2BBeuvraignes . Picardie 80Laucourt . Picardie 80Champs des Sœurettes (Gamaches, Beauchamps) . Picardie 80

560561562563564565566567568569570571572573574575576577578579580581582583584585586587588589590591592

A B C DCrennes-sur-Fraubée . Pays de la Loire 53Rully . Basse-Normandie 14La Haie (Traversaine) . Pays de la Loire 53Laprugne, Ferrières-sur-Sichon, Saint-Clément . Auvergne 3Saint-Riquier . Picardie 80Familly . Basse-Normandie 14Portes de la Côte-d'Or . Bourgogne 21Manneville-ès-Plains . Haute-Normandie 76Rouessé-Vassé . Pays de la Loire 72Cap Redounde . Midi-Pyrénées 81Châteauneuf - Val-Saint-Donat . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 4Villars-Neuvy . Centre 28La Vallée du Moulin (Guigneville, Charmont-en-Beauce) . Centre 42Sainte Sève . Bretagne 29Sery les Mézières 1de3 Picardie 2Sery les Mézières 2de3 Picardie 2Sery les Mézières 3de3 Picardie 2Villers le Sec . Picardie 2Sonneville . Poitou-Charentes 16Fontaine-Chalendray . Poitou-Charentes 17Saint Mard . Poitou-Charentes 17Trois Évêques (Albine,Cassagnoles,Lespinassière,St Amans-Soult ?) . Midi-Pyrénées 81Thicourt . Lorraine 57Houtteville . Basse-Normandie 50Mesnil-au-Val . Basse-Normandie 50Puceul . Pays de la Loire 44La Vallière (Pannece, Riaillé O.WKN) . Pays de la Loire 44Artigues - Ollières . Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur 83Baronville - Destry . Lorraine 57Rezentières-Vieillespesse . Auvergne 15Blain . Pays de la Loire 44Omissy . Picardie 2Vauvilliers II (Lihons, Herleville) . Picardie 80

593594595596597598599600601602603604605606607608609610611612613614615616617618619620621622623624625

A B C DRoman Blandey . Haute-Normandie 27Marsanne - La Teissonnière . Rhône-Alpes 26Orvilliers-Saint-Julien . Champagne-Ardenne 10Mont de Bezard - extension . Champagne-Ardenne 10Plougonven . Bretagne 29Saint-Germain-de-Marencennes . Poitou-Charentes 17Moréac . Bretagne 56Heugnes - Villegouin . Centre 36Germainville . Centre 28Prudemanche (Dampierre-sur-Avre, Prudemanche) . Centre 28Ménétréols-sous-Vatan . Centre 36Pellafol . Rhône-Alpes 38Avant-les-Marcilly (Avant-lès-Marcilly, Charmoy, Trancault ) . Champagne-Ardenne 10Achiet-le-Grand . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Ablainzevelle . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Gomiécourt . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Mouriez-Tortefontaine . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Roye . Picardie 80Langonnet . Bretagne 56Longueville-sur-Aube . Champagne-Ardenne 10Kergrist-Moëlou . Bretagne 22Germinon - Vélye . Champagne-Ardenne 51Baudignécourt . Lorraine 55Delouze-Rosières . Lorraine 55Les Landes du Tertre (La Prénessaye, Saint-Barnabé) . Bretagne 22Saint-Michel-Chef . Pays de la Loire 44Chauvé . Pays de la Loire 44Marigny-le-Châtel . Champagne-Ardenne 10Corroy (Corroy, Euvy, Fère-Champenoise) . Champagne-Ardenne 51Saint - Pierre-de-Maillé . Poitou-Charentes 86La Motte-de-Galaure . Rhône-Alpes 26Plourin-lès-Morlaix . Bretagne 29La Désirade IV Désirade IV DOM - Guadeloupe 971

626627628629630631632633634635636637638639640641642643644645646647648649650651

A B C DLa Montagne Ardéchoise II (Saint-Étienne de Lugdarès) . Rhône-Alpes 7Bonneval (Neuvy-en-Dunois) . Centre 28Rambures . Picardie 80La Motte (Linghem, Rely) . Nord-Pas-de-Calais 62Mont-de-Gerson (Arniwurt, Barby, Sorbo) . Champagne-Ardenne 8Saint-Servant - Lizio . Bretagne 56Ambrugeat (Ambrugeat, Péret-Bel-Air, Davignac) . Limousin 19Téterchen - extension . Lorraine 57Pièces de Vignes Liniez . Centre 36Cermelles, Luçay-le-Libre . Centre 36Vatan . Centre 36Le Vieux Moulin (Charmont-en-Beauce) . Centre 42Beauséjour . Pays de la Loire 44Site de particulier 1 . Picardie 60Ambleny . Picardie 2Le Moulin à Cheval (Montdidier) . Picardie 80Lusignan . Poitou-Charentes 86Montigné (Celles-sur-Belle, Saint-Roman-lès-Melle) . Poitou-Charentes 79Les Alleuds (Les Alleuds, Goumay-Loizé) . Poitou-Charentes 79Lusseray (Lusseray, Paisay-le-Tort) . Poitou-Charentes 79Saulces- Champenoises . Champagne-Ardenne 8Noyales (Perles) . Picardie 2Thory (Chirmont, Louvrechy, Sourdon, Thory) . Picardie 80Quesnoy-sur-Airaines . Picardie 80

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E F G H I J K L M N

.startup

year

capacity(park) in

MW

numberof

WPSsWPS model .

capacity(WPS) in kW

rotordiameter

in m

hubheightin m

stall / pitch

. 1958 650 1 ? 650 ? 58 ? .

. 1983 100 10 Vergnet (?) 10 ? . .2002? 1989 400 1 ? 400 ? . .

. 1991 300 1 ? 300 ? . .

. 1991 300 1 Windmaster (?) 300 25 . .

. 1991 200 1 Vestas V25/200 200 25 . .

. 1993 2000 4 Vestas V39/500 500 39 . .

. 1993 300 2 Siemens B23/150 150 23 . .1995 1993 80 1 Lagerwey LW80-18 80 18 . .1992 1995 300 12 Vergnet GEV 10/15 15? 25 10 . .1998 1996 240 4 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . .

. 1996 2700 9 ? 300 ? . .

. 1997 1500 25 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . inertial regulation1999 1997 400 1 Turbowinds T400-34 400 34 . .

. 1998 7500 10 Windmaster WM43/750 750 43 43 PITCH

. 1998 250 1 Nordex N29/250 250 29 . STALL1998 1999 2400 40 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . inertial regulation1997 1999 600 10 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . .2000 1999 1380 23 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . inertial regulation

. 1999 15 1 Vergnet GEV 10/15 15 10 . .

. 1999 4500 20 Vestas V27/225 225 27 . PITCH

. 1999 80 2 Vergnet GEV 15/40 40 15 . inertial regulation

. 1999 180 3 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . .2001 1999 4500 6 Jeumont J48/750 750 48 . .

. 1999 3000 5 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL


. 2000 6000 8 Neg Micon NM48/750 750 48 . STALL

. 2000 3300 5 Gamesa G47/660 660 47 . PITCH+

. 2000 6600 10 Vestas V47/660 (Gamsea?) 660 47 . .

. 2000 4200 7 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL

323334353637383940414243444546474849505152535455565758596061626364

E F G H I J K L M N. 2000 7800 13 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL. 2000 7800 6 Bonus Energy B62/1300 1300 62 . STALL. 2000 750 1 Lagerwey LW750-52 750 52 . .. 2000 1800 3 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL. 2001 540 9 Vergnet GEV 15/60 60 15 . .. 2001 5280 8 Gamesa G47/660 660 47 . PITCH+. 2001 13000 10 Bonus Energy B62/1300 1300 62 . STALL. 2001 3000 5 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL. 2001 1540 7 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . .

2003 2002 2200 10 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . STALL2001 2002 3300 15 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . STALL

. 2002 8000 10 Nordex N50/800 800 50 . STALL

. 2002 7800 6 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL

. 2002 7800 6 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL2003 2002 850 1 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . PITCH2003 2002 10200 12 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . PITCH2003 2002 10200 12 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . PITCH

. 2002 1500 1 Repower MD77 1500 77 . PITCH+

. 2002 3000 4 Lagerwey LW750-52 750 52 . .

. 2002 9100 7 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL

. 2002 1200 4 Windmaster WM28/300 300 28 . .


. 2002 6000 10 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL

. 2003 20 1 Vergnet GEV 10/20 20 10 . .2002 2003 2200 10 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . STALL

. 2003 4400 20 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . STALL

. 2003 4620 21 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . STALL

. 2003 4000 2 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+


. 2003 6000 8 Jeumont J48/750 750 48 . STALL+

. 2003 5950 7 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . PITCH+

. 2003 9350 11 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . PITCH+

. 2003 6000 10 Enercon E40 600 40 . .

656667686970717273747576777879808182838485868788899091929394959697

E F G H I J K L M N. 2003 12000 5 Nordex N80/2400 2400 80 . PITCH+. 2003 2400 4 Nordex N43/600 600 43 . STALL. 2003 5200 4 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL. 2003 7500 10 Jeumont J48/750 750 48 . STALL+

2005 2003 1250 1 Dewind D6 1250 64 . .. 2003 600 1 Enercon E40 600 40 . .. 2003 7500 3 Nordex N80/2500 2500 80 . PITCH+. 2003 10500 6 Vestas V66/1750 1750 66 . PITCH+. 2003 3000 1 GE 3000 3000 104 . .. 2003 4000 2 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH. 2003 5000 2 Nordex N80/2500 2500 80 . PITCH+

2005 2004 1100 4 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH 2003 2004 1540 7 Vergnet GEV 26/220 220 26 . STALL

. 2004 1500 1 Neg Micon NM64 (Vestas?) 1500 64 . STALL

. 2004 12000 6 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+

. 2004 2550 3 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . PITCH+

. 2004 1700 2 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . PITCH

. 2004 8100 9 Neg Micon (?) 900 ? . STALL

. 2004 11000 4 Neg Micon ? (Vestas?) 2750 92 ? . .? 2004 5600 7 ? 800 ? . .. 2004 3600 4 Neg Micon (?) 900 ? . STALL. 2004 6800 8 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . PITCH. 2004 7500 5 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2004 7500 10 Jeumont J48/750 750 48 . STALL+. 2004 9750 13 Jeumont J48/750 750 48 . STALL+. 2004 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 70 . STALL+

2005 2004 9000 6 Repower MD77 1500 77 . .. 2004 1300 1 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL. 2004 1800 2 Neg Micon (?) 900 ? . STALL. 2004 7500 5 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2004 9000 6 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2004 9000 6 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2004 12000 8 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+

9899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130

E F G H I J K L M N. 2004 9000 6 Repower MD77 1500 77 . PITCH+. 2004 1500 5 Windmaster WM28/300 300 28 . .. 2004 5250 7 Neg Micon NM48/750 750 48 . STALL. 2005 ? 1 ? ? ? . .

2006 2005 1925 7 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH . 2005 5500 20 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH. 2005 6050 22 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH. 2005 7500 5 GE 1.5sl 1500 77 . PITCH+. 2005 9000 6 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2005 9000 6 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2005 10500 7 GE 1.5sl 1500 77 . PITCH+. 2005 10500 7 GE 1.5sl 1500 77 . PITCH+. 2005 10500 7 GE 1.5sl 1500 77 . PITCH+. 2005 3400 4 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . PITCH+. 2005 10000 5 Repower MM70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2005 12000 6 Repower MM70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2005 3300 5 Vestas V47/660 660 47 . PITCH. 2005 4250 5 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . .. 2005 6325 23 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH . 2005 9100 7 Siemens B62/1300 1300 62 . STALL. 2005 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2005 12000 6 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2005 1700 2 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . PITCH+. 2005 2000 1 Repower MM70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2005 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2005 9000 6 Acciona (?) 1500 ? . .. 2005 4000 2 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 850 1 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . .. 2005 3600 2 Vestas V80/1800 1800 80 . .. 2005 7200 4 Vestas V80/1800 1800 80 . .

131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163

E F G H I J K L M N. 2005 2000 1 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2005 2000 1 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2005 4000 2 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 8000 4 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2005 4000 2 Enercon (?) 2000 70 . .. 2005 9000 6 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+

2007 2005 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2005 1200 2 Enercon E40 600 40 . .

2006 2005 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH2006 2005 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH2006 2005 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH

. 2005 9000 6 Repower MD77 1500 77 . PITCH+

. 2005 1,5 1 African Wind Power AWP 3.6 900? 1,5 3,6 . .

. 2005 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2005 12000 6 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+

. 2005 4250 5 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . PITCH+

. 2005 11900 14 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . PITCH+

. 2005 19550 23 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . PITCH+

. 2006 132 1 ? 132? ? ? . .

. 2006 8000 4 Repower MM82 2000 82 66 PITCH+2007 2006 5500 20 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH2008 2006 3025 11 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH 2007 2006 3300 12 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH 2005 2006 3850 14 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH

. 2006 500 2 Vergnet (?) 250 ? . .

. 2006 2000 1 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+2007 2006 13800 6 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+

. 2006 11690 7 Ecotecnia 74 1670 74 . .

. 2006 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

. 2006 4250 5 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . .

. 2006 18000 9 Gamesa G80/2000 2000 80 . .

164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196

E F G H I J K L M N. 2006 10000 4 Nordex N80/2500 2500 80 . PITCH+

2007 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . .. 2006 2000 1 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2006 4500 5 Neg Micon (?) 900 ? . STALL. 2006 5950 7 ? 850 ? . .. 2006 6000 2 Vestas V90/3000 3000 90 . .. 2006 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2006 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2006 10000 5 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . PITCH. 2006 12000 6 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2006 12000 6 Enercon E70 2000 70 . .. 2006 9200 4 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 8000 4 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2006 12000 6 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2006 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2006 7800 6 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .. 2006 10400 8 Bonus Energy B62/1300 1300 62 . STALL. 2006 10400 8 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .. 2006 10400 8 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .. 2006 10500 6 Vestas V66/1750 1750 66 . PITCH+. 2006 10500 6 Vestas V66/1750 1750 66 . PITCH+. 2006 11700 9 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 122 .. 2006 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2006 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH

197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229

E F G H I J K L M N. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH . 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 9200 4 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 9000 6 GE 1.5s 1500 70,5 . PITCH+. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 850 1 Vestas V52/850 850 52 . .. 2006 5400 3 Vestas V80/1800 1800 80 . .. 2006 12000 6 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2006 1700 2 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . PITCH+. 2006 12000 8 GE 1.5sl 1500 77 . PITCH+

2007 2006 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .2007 2006 9000 6 Repower MD77 1500 77 . PITCH+

. 2006 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

. 2006 10400 8 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL

. 2006 3200 4 Enercon E48 800 48 . .

. 2006 6000 3 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH2005 2006 9000 6 Neg Micon NM64/1500 1500 64 . .

. 2006 7500 5 Neg Micon NM64 (Vestas?) 1500 64 . .


. 2006 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

. 2006 9000 6 Repower MD77 1500 77 . PITCH+

. 2006 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+2005 2006 1670 1 Ecotecnia 74 1670 74 . .

. 2006 275 1 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . .

. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 5x2000 2000 90 . .

. 2006 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . .? 2007 12000 8 ? 1500 ? . .

230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262

E F G H I J K L M N? 2007 12000 8 ? 1500 ? . .. 2007 24000 12 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . .. 2007 2500 1 Proven WT2500 2500 3,5 ? . .. 2007 10500 7 Repower MD77 1500 77 57 .. 2007 4125 15 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH

2006 2007 2475 9 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH Oktober (Juni) 2007 36000 18 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 . .

. 2007 3400 4 Gamesa (?) 850 ? . .

. 2007 8350 5 Ecotecnia 80 1.6 1670 80 . .

. 2007 8350 5 Ecotecnia 80 1.6 1670 80 . .

. 2007 8350 5 Ecotecnia 80 1.6 1670 80 . .

. 2007 12000 8 Acciona AW-77/1500 1500 77 . .

. 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .2009 2007 12000 6 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+

Dezember 2007 12000 6 Repower MM70 8x2000 2000 70 . PITCH+2008 2007 8100 9 Enercon (?) 900 ? . .

. 2007 6900 3 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+

. 2007 9200 4 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+

. 2007 11500 5 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+2008 2007 12000 6 Enercon E70/E4 2000 71 . PITCH+

. 2007 12000 6 Enercon E70 2000 70 . .März ? 2007 15000 5 Vestas V90/3000 3000 90 . .

. 2007 10000 5 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .

. 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .2006 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .

. 2007 12000 5 Nordex N80/2400 2400 80 . .

. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N80/2500 2500 80 . PITCH+

. 2007 11700 9 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .

. 2007 8000 4 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

. 2007 8000 4 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

. 2007 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 80 PITCH+

. 2007 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 80 PITCH+

263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295

E F G H I J K L M N. 2007 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 80 PITCH+. 2007 3400 4 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . PITCH+. 2007 6000 3 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . PITCH+. 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2007 5600 7 Enercon (?) 800 ? . .

Januar ? 2007 15000 5 Vestas V90/3000 3000 90 . .. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2007 10000 5 Repower MM92 2000 92 . PITCH+

2008 2007 12000 6 Gamesa G90/2000 2000 90 78 .. 2007 10000 5 Gamesa G80/2000 2000 80 . .. 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2007 1200 1 Winwind WWD-1-64 1200 64 . .. 2007 2400 2 Winwind WWD-1-64 1200 64 . .. 2007 3600 3 Winwind WWD-1-64 1200 64 . .

2008 2007 4000 2 Enercon ? / WinWind ? 2300 2000 71 . .. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N80/2500 2500 80 . PITCH+. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2007 3900 3 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL

2008 2007 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+Januar 2007 13800 6 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 80 .

. 2007 9100 7 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .

. 2007 10400 8 Siemens (?) 1300 ? . .

. 2007 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 . .

. 2007 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 . .

. 2007 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH

. 2007 10400 8 Siemens Bonus SWT-1.3-62 1300 62 . .2008 2007 28000 14 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+Juni 2007 112000 56 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+

? 2007 ? 1 ? ...éolienne à pales souples ? 32 .. 2007 9200 4 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2007 4000 2 Repower MM70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .

296297298299300301302303304305306307308309310311312313314315316317318319320321322323324325326327328

E F G H I J K L M N2009? 2007 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

2007 4000 5 Enercon E48 800 48 65 .März 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2500 2300 90 . .

Januar 2007 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2500 2300 90 . .. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2007 6300 7 Enercon (?) 900? 900 ? 65 .. 2007 5000 2 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2007 3025 11 Vergnet GEV MP 275 275 32 . PITCH . 2007 8500 10 Gamesa G58/850 850 58 . PITCH+. 2007 12000 6 Gamesa G80/2000 2000 80 . .. 2007 12000 8 Repower MD77 1500 77 . PITCH+

Juli 2007 22000 11 Gamesa G90/2000 2000 90 78 .Juli 2007 32000 16 Gamesa G90/2000 2000 90 78 .

. 2007 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .Januar 2007 29900 13 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+

. 2007 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

. 2007 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . .

. 2007 3900 3 Ecotecnia 62 (Repower?) 1300 62 . .

. 2007 11700 9 Ecotecnia 62 1300 62 . .

. 2007 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH2005 2007 4000 2 Vestas V80/2000 1x2000 2000 80 . .2009 2007 9200 4 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2008 20 2 Aircon 10S 10 7,4 . .

. 2008 5400 3 ? 1800 ? . .

. 2008 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2008 4000 2 Enercon E70/E4 2000 ? . .

. 2008 8000 4 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .2009 2008 28000 14 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2008 35000 14 ? 2500 ? . .

. 2008 4250 5 Gamesa (?) 850 ? . .

. 2008 7650 9 Gamsea (?) 850 ? . .

. 2008 20000 10 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .

329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347348349350351352353354355356357358359360361

E F G H I J K L M N. 2008 7500 5 ? 1500 ? . .. 2008 18000 9 ? 2000 ? . .. 2008 2400 2 Winwind (?) 1200 ? . .. 2008 4800 4 Winwind WWD-1-64 1200 64 . .. 2008 7200 6 Winwind (?) 1200 ? . .. 2008 11500 5 Siemens (?) 2300 ? . .. 2008 23000 10 Siemens (?) 2300 ? . .. 2008 16000 8 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 10000 5 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. 2008 11690 7 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .. 2008 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 2300 1 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2008 8000 4 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 9200 4 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2008 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2008 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .. 2008 5600 7 Enercon E53 800 53 . .. 2008 7500 3 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2008 4600 2 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .. 2008 16000 8 Enercon E82 7x2000 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2008 4600 2 Enercon E70 2000 2300 70 . PITCH+. 2008 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2008 12000 6 Enercon E82 2000 82 . .. 2008 4250 5 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . PITCH+. 2008 6000 2 Vestas V90/3000 3000 90 . .. 2008 50600 22 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+

2009 2008 2000 1 Enercon E70 2300 2000 71 . PITCH+. 2008 4000 2 Enercon E70 2000 70 . PITCH+. 2008 8000 4 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 10000 5 Enercon E70 2300 2000 71 . PITCH+

362363364365366367368369370371372373374375376377378379380381382383384385386387388389390391392393394

E F G H I J K L M N. 2008 23000 10 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .. 2008 52000 26 Repower MM92 2000 92 . PITCH+. 2008 87000 29 Vestas V90/3000 3000 90 . .. 2008 10000 5 Vestas ? / Gamsea ? 2000 90 ? . .. 2008 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2008 12500 5 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .. 2008 12500 5 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .

2009 2008 8000 4 Enercon E70 2000 70 . .. 2008 12000 8 Repower MD77 1500 77 . .. 2008 23000 10 Enercon E82 2000 2300 82 . .. 2008 12500 5 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2008 7500 3 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2008 11500 5 Enercon (?) 2300 70 . PITCH+. 2008 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2008 10000 5 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH . 2008 12000 6 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 10000 5 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 6000 3 ? 2000 ? . .. 2008 10000 5 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 . .. 2008 12000 6 Vestas V80/2000 2000 80 . PITCH. 2008 20000 10 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 80 .. 2008 30000 15 ? 2000 ? . .. 2008 8000 4 Repower MM92 2000 92 . PITCH+. 2008 25300 11 Siemens (?) 2300 ? . .. 2008 1200 1 Winwind WWD-1-64 1200 64 . .. 2008 20800 26 Enercon E48 800 48 56 .. 2008 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+

2007 2008 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 . PITCH+. 2008 12500 5 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 92 . PITCH+. 2008 12000 ? Gamsea (?) ? ? . .

395396397398399400401402403404405406407408409410411412413414415416417418419420421422423424425426427

E F G H I J K L M N. 2008 22000 11 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 1980 3 Gamsea (?) 660 ? . .. 2008 6680 4 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .

2007 2008 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 . .. 2008 8000 4 Gamesa G90/2000 2000 90 . .

2007 2008 10000 5 Gamesa G90/2000 2000 90 . .2006 2008 1300 1 Nordex N60/1300 1300 60 . STALL

. 2008 11500 5 Nordex (?) 2300 90 . .

. 2008 10000 5 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .2006 2008 11500 5 Nordex ? / Gamsea ? 2300 ? . .2007 2008 11500 5 Nordex N90/2300 2300 90 . .

. 2008 8000 4 Gamesa G87/2000 2000 87 . .

. 2008 12000 6 Gamesa G87/2000 2000 87 67 .

. 2008 6000 5 Winwind WWD-1-64 1200 64 . .

. 2008 6900 3 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2008 4600 2 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . .

. 2008 6900 3 Enercon E70/2300 2300 70 . .

. 2008 11500 5 Enercon E70/2300 2300 70 . PITCH+

. 2008 10000 5 Repower MM82 2000 82 80 .

. 2008 8000 4 Repower MM82 2000 82 . .

. 2008 10000 5 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .2009? 2008 11000 4 Repower (?) 2750 ? . .

. 2008 12000 6 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2008 12000 6 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .2009? 2008 12000 5 Repower (?) 2400 ? . .

. 2008 24000 12 Vestas (?) 11x2000 2000 ? . .

. 2008 7500 3 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 80 .

. 2008 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 80 .

. 2008 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 80 .

. 2008 12000 6 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2008 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2008 11500 5 Nordex N90/2500 2300 90 . .

. 2008 12000 5 Nordex N80/2400 2400 80 . .

428429430431432433434435436437438439440441442443444445446447448449450451452453454455456457458459460

E F G H I J K L M N? 2008 10 1 ? ... France Eolienne 10kW 10 ? . PITCH. 2008 2300 1 ? 2300 2000 ? . .. 2008 4600 2 ? 2000 2300 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 80 .

2009 2008 4800 6 Enercon E53 800 53 . .. 2008 8000 4 Enercon E66 2000 66 . PITCH+. 2008 5600 7 Enercon E48 800 53 . .. 2008 8100 10 Enercon E48 800 53 . .

2007 2008 12000 6 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 90000 30 ? 3000 70-80 . .. 2008 10020 6 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .. 2008 12000 6 Gamesa G80/2000 2000 80 . .. 2008 6680 4 Ecotecnia 80 1.6 1670 80 . .. 2008 7200 9 Enercon E48 800 48 50 .. 2008 10020 6 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .. 2008 10020 6 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .. 2008 6000 3 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

2007 2008 11500 5 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . PITCH+. 2008 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 4000 2 AAER 2000 ? . .. 2008 8000 4 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2008 1000 1 Vergnet GEV HP 1000 62 . .. 2008 22000 11 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .

2009 2008 8350 5 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .2009 2008 10020 6 Ecotecnia (?) 1670 ? . .

. 2008 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 . .

. 2009 10000 5 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 8000 10 Enercon (?) 800 ? . .

. 2009 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 18000 9 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 41400 18 Siemens Bonus SWT-2.3-93 2300 82? . .

. 2009 18000 9 ? 2000 ? . .

461462463464465466467468469470471472473474475476477478479480481482483484485486487488489490491492493

E F G H I J K L M N. 2009 35000 14 ? 2500 ? . .. 2009 8000 4 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 9350 11 Gamsea (?) 850 ? . .. 2009 8000 4 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 22000 11 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 2400 2 Winwind (?) 1200 ? . .. 2009 2400 2 Winwind (?) 1200 ? . .. 2009 2400 2 Winwind (?) 1200 ? . .. 2009 6900 3 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .. 2009 8000 4 Winwind (?) 2300 2000 ? . .. 2009 13800 6 Enercon (?) 4x2300 2300 ? . .. 2009 13800 6 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

2008 2009 13800 6 Enercon E82 3x2300 2300 ? . .. 2009 27000 9 Winwind (?) 3000 ? . .. 2009 10000 4 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2009 10000 4 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2009 10000 4 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2009 10000 4 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2009 11500 5 Nordex (?) . 2300 ? . .. 2009 12000 5 Nordex (?) 2400 ? . .. 2009 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 9200 4 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .. 2009 2300 1 Siemens ? 2300 ? . .. 2009 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 20000 10 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 20000 8 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2009 22000 11 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 22000 11 AAER 2000 ? . .. 2009 9200 4 Siemens (?) 2300 ? . .. 2009 13800 6 Siemens (?) 2300 ? . .. 2009 6000 3 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .

494495496497498499500501502503504505506507508509510511512513514515516517518519520521522523524525526

E F G H I J K L M N. 2009 9200 4 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .. 2009 9350 11 Gamesa G58/850 11800? 850 58 60 .

2008 2009 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .2008 2009 59800 26 ? 2300 ? . .

. 2009 50000 25 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 6900 3 Nordex (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2009 2550 3 Gamesa G52/850 850 52 . .

. 2009 5950 7 ? 850 ? . .

. 2009 6000 3 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 6000 3 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 16000 16 ? 1000 ? . .

. 2009 16000 8 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 22000 11 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 28000 14 Repower MM92 2000 92 . .

. 2009 30000 30 ? 1000 ? . .

. 2009 1700 2 Enercon (?) 850 ? . .2008 2009 11500 5 Enercon E70/2300 2300 71 . .

. 2009 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 5 Repower MM92 2000 92 80 .

. 2009 12000 6 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 13800 6 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2009 13800 6 Enercon E70/E4 9x2300 2300 71 . .

. 2009 12500 5 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .2008 2009 12500 5 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .

. 2009 22000 11 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 105000 21 Multibrid 5000 ? . .2007 2009 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 5 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 4 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .

. 2009 12000 5 Nordex (?) 2400 ? . .

. 2009 12000 5 Nordex (?) 2400 ? . .

527528529530531532533534535536537538539540541542543544545546547548549550551552553554555556557558559

E F G H I J K L M N. 2009 12000 5 Nordex (?) 2400 ? . .. 2009 27500 11 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. 2009 12000 6 Gamesa G90/2000 8x2000 2000 90 . .. 2009 24000 12 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 32000 16 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 4000 4 ? 2000 ? . .

2008 2009 10000 5 Gamesa G90/2000 2000 90 . .2008 2009 6000 3 Gamesa G87/2000 2000 87 67 .

. 2009 34000 17 ? 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 5 Enercon E82 2000 82 . .

. 2009 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 2000 90 105 .

. 2009 12000 6 Repower MM82 2000 82 80 .

. 2009 10000 5 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .2008 2009 12000 8 Acciona AW-77/1500 1500 77 . .

. 2009 10000 4 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .2008 2009 10000 4 Nordex N90/2500 2500 90 . .

. 2009 12000 5 Nordex (?) 2400 ? . .

. 2009 12000 5 Nordex (?) 2400 ? . .

. 2009 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 12000 6 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 8000 10 Enercon (?) 800 ? . .

. 2009 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .2008 2009 26000 13 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 5 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 2300 1 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2009 8000 4 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 10000 5 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .

. 2009 12000 8 GE (?) 1500 ? . .

. 2009 18400 8 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2009 18400 8 Enercon (?) 2300 ? . .

. 2009 10000 4 GE (?) 2500 ? . .

. 2009 10000 4 GE (?) 2500 ? . .

. 2009 14000 7 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

560561562563564565566567568569570571572573574575576577578579580581582583584585586587588589590591592

E F G H I J K L M N. 2009 10000 5 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 12000 6 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. 2009 12000 6 Vestas V90/2000 3x2000 2000 90 . .. 2010 16000 8 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2010 22000 11 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. 2010 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .

2009 2010 54000 27 ? 2000 ? . .. 2010 10500 6 ? 1750 ? . .. 2010 7500 3 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .. ? 12000 6 Repower (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 5 ? 2400 ? . .. ? 24000 8 Vestas V90/3000 3000 90 . .. ? 30000 10 Ecotecnia (?) 3000 ? . .. ? ? 9 ? ? ? . .. ? ? 3 ? ? ? . .. ? ? 4 ? ? ? . .. ? ? 8 ? ? ? . .. ? ? ? ? ? ? . .. ? ? 6 ? ? ? . .. ? ? 9 ? ? ? . .. ? ? 8 ? ? ? . .. ? 150000 ? ? 60x2500 ? ? . .. ? 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 ? ? ? ? . .. ? 18000 ? ? ? ? . .. ? 800 1 ? 800 ? . .. ? 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 63000 21 ? 3000 ? . .. ? 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .

2007 ? ? 6 ? ? ? . .. ? 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .

2008 ? 12000 6 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .

593594595596597598599600601602603604605606607608609610611612613614615616617618619620621622623624625

E F G H I J K L M N. ? 12500 5 Nordex (?) 2500 ? . .

2009 ? 4000 2 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 24000 24 Repower (?) 1000 ? . .. ? 9000 6 ? 1500 ? . .. ? 7500 5 Repower (?) 1500 ? . .. ? 16000 8 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 16000 8 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 24000 12 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 28000 14 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 34000 17 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 3000 2 ? 1500 ? . .. ? 16000 8 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 8000 4 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 10500 6 Vestas (?) 1750 ? . .. ? 34000 17 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 28000 14 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 90000 30 ? 3000 ? . .. ? 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 24000 12 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 10 ? 1000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 24000 8 ? 3000 ? . .. ? 45000 18 ? 2500 ? . .. ? 24000 10 Vestas (?) 2400 ? . .. ? 4000 2 Vestas (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 1375 5 Vergnet (?) 275 ? . .

626627628629630631632633634635636637638639640641642643644645646647648649650651

E F G H I J K L M N. ? 39000 26 GE (?) 1500 ? . .. ? 16000 8 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 6 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 8000 4 Enercon (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 20000 8 ? 2500 ? . .. ? 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 10500 7 ? 1500 ? . .. ? 3000 2 Repower (?) 1500 ? . .. ? 15000 5 Ecotecnia (?) 3000 ? . .. ? 18000 6 Ecotecnia (?) 3000 ? . .. ? 18000 6 Ecotecnia (?) 3000 ? . .. ? 18000 6 Ecotecnia (?) 3000 ? . .. ? 10000 5 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 1 1 ? ... Eolienne FD 3.2-1000 1 ? . .. ? 6900 ? ? ? ? . .. ? 8000 4 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 6000 3 Gamsea (?) 2000 ? . .. ? 10000 4 ? 2500 ? . .. ? 12000 6 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 5 ? 2400 ? . .. ? 16000 8 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 12000 ? ? ? ? . .. ? 24000 12 ? 2000 ? . .. ? 36000 12 Vestas (?) 3000 ? . .

PITCH+ = PITCH & adaptable speedSTALL+ = STALL & adaptable speed

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O P

park developer park operator

Institut Aérotechnique de Saint-Cyr L'Ecole ? ?Vergnet ? ?? Particulier? ?Espace Éolien Développement ?Compagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du Vent? Les 3 SuissesInnovent Natural Teck/InnoventAerowatt Aerowatt/VergnetAerowatt Aerowatt/Vergnet? Eoliennes Nord-Pas-de-CalaisAerowatt Aerowatt / SNC Marie- Galante ? Dhollandia (belgisches Logistik-Unternehmen)Poweo EDF-EN / EDEV/EDF/Cegelec ?Poweo Poweo / Conseil général de la SommeVergnet/SIIF (EDF-EN) AerowattAerowatt Aerowatt / SNC Eole MiquelonAerowatt Aerowatt / SNC Eole Morne Constanttelball Commune du Moule? EEC (Eau et Electricité de Nouvelle-Calédonie)? Electricité de Tahiti? Enercal (fournisseur d'électricité en Nouvelle-Calédonie)Poweo SFE Française d’EoliennesPoweo Sinerg-EOC / PoweoAerowatt Aerowatt / SNC Eole Plateau de La MontagnePoweo Centrale éolienne du Goulien (SA) / CegelecCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentSIIF (EDF-EN) EDF-EN

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O PSIIF (EDF-EN) EDF-ENEole-Res Eole-Res / CEP Souleilla ? InnoventJMB Energie JMB Energie / Centrale éolienne de Lastours/Énergies du Midi ?Aerowatt AerowattCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentEole-Res Eole-Res / CEP Souleilla Solldev Valeco EoleVergnet VergnetAerowatt AerowattVergnet/SIIF (EDF-EN) AerowattPoweo BoralexValorem EnertragValorem EnertragMistral Energie GIE Mistral EnergieMistral Energie GIE Mistral EnergieMistral Energie GIE Mistral EnergieParticulier/Private owner Hervé HuetPoweo InnoventPoweo Moulins à vent de FitouNerzh An Avel Nerzh An AvelPoweo Sinerg-EOC France / Cegelec / Adelis ?Solldev Valeco EoleVergnet ? ?Aerowatt AerowattAerowatt AerowattAerowatt AerowattInnovent BoralexCommunauté d'agglomération Mantes en Yvelines Communauté d'agglomération Mantes en YvelinesPoweo Compagnie Armoricaine D’Energie Verte CADEV (SAS)Compagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCorséol (SA) Corséol (SA)

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O PSIIF (EDF-EN) EDF-EN/SydecHydelec HydelecHydelec HydelecPoweo JSPM / Jeumont/Amec Spic/Espace Éolien Développement ?DBS-Wind System Lecoq SA/DBS Wind SystemParticulier/Private owner M. Ladreyt / SARL PTPLMSIIF (EDF-EN) REVe ? / EDF-EN/SydecEole-Res STMicroelectronicsPoweo TotalPoweo TotalPoweo TotalAerowatt AerowattVergnet/SIIF (EDF-EN) AerowattAvel Braz ("kleines Unternehmen") Avel Braz ("kleines Unternehmen")Innovent BoralexCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du Vent / Moulin de Services EDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN / Poweo EDF-ENSIIF Energies EDF-EN ?EDF-EN EDF-EN / SNC parc éolien St Simon, RiolsEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResPoweo EscofiPoweo EscofiVSB Energies Nouvelles ? JuwiABO-Wind Macquarie Bank/ABO WindPoweo / Perfect Wind Moulins à vent de Fitou / IberdrolaNass & Wind NatencoPoweo Séchilienne-SidecPoweo Séchilienne-SidecPoweo Séchilienne-SidecPoweo Séchilienne-Sidec

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O PSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’Eoliennes? SPEE de St Sève/DBSPoweo VS Energie (SNC) / Cegelec? ?Aerowatt AerowattAerowatt Aerowatt / VergnetAerowatt Aerowatt / VergnetSofiva BoralexSofiva BoralexSofiva BoralexSofiva BoralexSofiva BoralexSofiva BoralexCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du Vent? EDF-EN? EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN / Vergnet EDF-ENBreiz-Avel (?) / Ecovent ? ElsamNordex Enersis/NordexEnertrag EnertragEole 48 Eole 48Particulier/Private owner Eolfi / Patrick Neel / S3E Erelia EreliaErelia EreliaErelia EreliaNordex EurowattFrançaise d'Éoliennes Française d'ÉoliennesParticulier/Private owner Hervé HuetP&T Technologie IberdrolaP&T Technologie IberdrolaP&T Technologie Iberdrola

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O PInnovent/Verhaegue Industrie Innovent/Verhaegue IndustrieInnovent/Verhaegue Industrie Innovent/Verhaegue IndustrieJMB Energie J.M. Bouchet / JMB EnergieVSB Energies Nouvelles Juwi / BoralexJuwi Juwi / Plougin SAS ?Poweo M. Canard / CegelecPoweo M. ChatelainMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierOstwind OstwindVolkswind Poweo - Sorgenia (CIR) - SFE Française d'ÉoliennesVolkswind Poweo - Sorgenia (CIR) - SFE Française d'ÉoliennesVolkswind Poweo - Sorgenia (CIR) - SFE Française d'ÉoliennesNeo RDE (Neo?)? Robert LaurentVentis Samfi InvestEurowatt Samfi/Ventis/InnoventSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’EoliennesSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’EoliennesSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’Eoliennes? ?Energie 21 ABO-Wind/Energie 21Aerowatt AerowattAerowatt / Vergnet Aerowatt / SNC Eole La PerrièreAerowatt / Vergnet Aerowatt / SNC Eole La PerrièreAerowatt / Vergnet Aerowatt / SNC Eole La PerrièreAupiac Diversification (SARL) Aupiac Diversification (SARL)Avel-If (SARL) Avel-If (SARL)VSB Energies Nouvelles BoralexValorem Cantos Holding (SAS)? Chapelle d’Eole (SARL)Compagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du Vent

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O PCompagnie Nationale du Rhône CNR Compagnie Nationale du Rhône CNRCompagnie Nationale du Rhône CNR Compagnie Nationale du Rhône CNREolec EcojouleEurowatt Ecoterra / Infinivent ?EDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENVentura EDF-ENEcovent EDF-EN / EcoventEnergieteam Energieteam / Nouvergie (SAS)Energieteam Energieteam / Samfi InvestNordex Energy Power Resources / Macquarie Bank et Norde ?Nordex Energy Power Resources / Macquarie Bank et Norde ?Nordex EnersisNordex EnersisEnertrag EnertragEnertrag EnertragMaïa Sonnier Eole 79 SASEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResPoweo EolfiValorem EolfiVolkswind EoliaVolkswind EoliaVolkswind Eolia

197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229

O PVolkswind EoliaVolkswind Eolia? ERGNordex ERG / VSB Energies Nouvelles? / Theta?Nordex ERG / VSB Energies Nouvelles? / Theta?Nordex / Eole 76 ERG / VSB Energies Nouvelles? / Theta?Nordex ERG/VSB Energies Nouvelles / Eole Service ?Nordex ERG/VSB Energies Nouvelles / Theta ?Poweo EscofiNordex EurowattP&T Technologie IberdrolaP&T Technologie IberdrolaP&T Technologie IberdrolaNordex JPEE / Financière du Cèdre ?Particulier/Private owner LascoventValorem M. Charmy / SNC Saint Laurent energieNordex M. Châtelain ? / JPEEPoweo M. Guilllaume / SAS les 4 chemins / PoweoMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierPerfect Wind Moulins à vent de Fitou / IberdrolaNass & Wind Natenco - GDFDifko Ouest Energies nouvelles / Energies Eoliennes France ?Poweo Sinerg / Adelis / Ouest Energies Nouvelles ?Poweo Sinerg / Adelis/Eneria ?Poweo Sinerg / Adelis/Eneria? / Ouest Energies nouvelles?Ventura Théolia - VenturaNass & Wind Théolia/Ventura? Val d'Eole (SARL)Valeco Eole Valeco EoleVergnet VergnetVSB Energies nouvelles VSB Energies nouvellesZéphyr Zéphyr / loceaux / ADEME ?? ?

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O P? ?? ?Krugwind ?Energie 21 ABO-Wind/Energie 21Aerowatt AerowattAerowatt / Vergnet AerowattEole-Res CEPE des Trois Sources et de St FlorentinCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEnel Erelis (SAS) / Wind System Enel Erelis (SAS)Energieteam EnergieteamEnergieteam EnergieteamEnergieteam EnergieteamEnergieteam EnergieteamEnergieteam Energieteam / CNREneria Eneria / NED Nouvelles Energies DynamiquesEurowatt / Infinivent EnersisNordex EnersisNordex EnersisNordex EnersisEnersis/Shell Enersis/ShellCegelec Eole Energies SASEole-Res Eole-ResABO-Wind EpuronABO-Wind EpuronErelia EreliaErelia Erelia

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O PErelia EreliaInfinivent EurowattInfinivent EurowattNordex EurowattNass & Wind GDFDirkshof GHF Windpark Herzberg GmbH & Co. KGBoreas IberdrolaForcéole / Perfect Wind ? IberdrolaGamesa IberdrolaP&T Technologie IberdrolaPerfect Wind IberdrolaInnovent InnoventInnovent InnoventInnovent InnoventInnovent InnoventCegelec JMA Energies SARLNordex JPEE / Financière du Cèdre ?Nordex JPEE / Financière du Cèdre ?Juwi JuwiMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierNass & Wind Natenco / Théolia/Ventura?Adeol NeoAdeol NeoRDE NeoRDE (Recherche et Développement Eolien) / Nii ? NeoRDE / Tencia ? NeoAdeol (Ecovent?) Neo / Le Duigou ?Ostwind Ostwind/Babcock and Brown/EnersisOstwind Ostwind/Babcock and Brown/Enersis? ParticulierLes Vents Meuse Sud Pedersoli? PoweoBoreas / Perfect Wind Poweo

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O PZéphyr PoweoREE REEREVe REVeREVe REVeValorem RWEValorem RWEAdeol SARL Le DuigouEoles Futur / Eole 76 ? Scan Energy / Eurocap ?SEC SECPoweo Séchilienne-SidecPoweo Séchilienne-SidecSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’EoliennesSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’EoliennesSFE Française d’Eoliennes SFE Française d’EoliennesPoweo SNETVentura Théolia - Ventura? Theolia/VenturaVentura Théolia/VenturaValeco Eole Valeco EoleValeco Eole Valeco EoleVolkswind VolkswindVSB Energies nouvelles VSB Energies nouvellesVSB Energies nouvelles VSB Energies nouvelles? ?? ?? ?ABO-Wind ?Adelis ?EDF-EN ?Espace Éolien Développement ?Gamesa / Innovent ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamesa Énergie France ? ?

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O PGdF ?Infinivent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Intervent ?Neo ?Ostwind International ?Poweo ?Poweo ?Tencia ?Ventura ?ABO-Wind ABO-WindABO-Wind ABO-WindABO-Wind ABO-WindABO-Wind ABO-WindABO-Wind ABO-WindABO-Wind ABO-Wind / Juwi ?Adelis Amec Spie / Espace Éolien Développement? BoralexInnovent BoralexSeris Eole (SAS) BoralexBoreas Boreas / Iberdrola? Brocéliande Energies Locales (SAS)Compagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentEDF (nicht -EN !) EDF (nicht -EN !)? EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-EN

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O PEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEDF-EN EDF-ENEneria / Neo ? EDP RenovaveisEole 76 développement EDP Renovaveis / Oget et Shulz (particulier?)Eole 76 développement EDP Renovaveis / Oget et Shulz (particulier?)Eole 76 développement EDP Renovaveis / Oget et Shulz (particulier?)Enel Erelis (SAS) / Wind System Enel Erelis (SAS)Enel Erelis (SAS) / Wind System Enel Erelis (SAS)Energie 21 Energie 21Enersis / Shell Enersis / ShellEnersis/Shell Enersis/ShellEnertrag EnertragEnertrag EnertragEnertrag EnertragEnertrag EnertragAdelis Eole 45 (SICAP) / Eneria ?Adelis Eole 45 / Eneria ?? Eole 79? Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-ResEole-Res Eole-Res? Eolfi? EolfiInnovent EolfiInnovent EolfiValorem EolfiVentura Eolfi / Energies Pays de Falaise ?Epuron EpuronErelia EreliaInfinivent Eurowatt

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O PInfinivent / Eurowatt ? EurowattInfinivent Eurowatt / EnersisLes Éoliennes du Gévaudan Forces éoliennes du Gévaudan ? GDFAlternative Technologie IberdrolaForcéole / Perfect Wind ? IberdrolaPerfect Wind IberdrolaPerfect Wind / Eolor/Vigneron/Nath/Schlernitzauer IberdrolaWindstrom IberdrolaIberdrola / Perfect Wind Iberdrola / Perfect Wind La rose des vents lorrains Iberdrola / Poweo/Perfect Wind ?Gamesa Iberdrola / Samfi Invest ?Energie France ? Iberdrola, GamesaInnovent InnoventGamsea Energie France ? Innovent ?JMB Energie JMB EnergieJuwi JuwiJuwi JuwiMaïa Eolis Maïa EolisMaïa Sonnier Maïa Eolis? Maïa SonnierMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierMaïa Sonnier Maïa SonnierEurowatt Maïa Sonnier / Eurowatt ?Nass & Wind Nass & Wind/SNET/Habitants (invest. loceaux)Nass & Wind Nass & Wind/SNET/Habitants (invest. loceaux)Nass & Wind Nass & Wind/SNET/Habitants (invest. loceaux)? NeoEole 76 développement NeoNordex NordexDBS-Wind System Nordex/SBEA/DBS-Wind System

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O P? Particulier? Pedersoli? PedersoliPoweo PoweoREE REEREE REE? REVe? REVeNeo / RDE ? SAS Centrale éolienne Canet-de-Salars - Pont-de-Salars? SAS Eoliennes de Mounes / Total et Harpen (Groupe RWE)Espace Éolien Développement ? Séchilienne-SidecPoweo Séchilienne-SidecTencia Sergies SEMLAdelis SNC Energie du Delta / Samfi Invest / Enercon ?Valorem SNETValorem SNETValeco Eole Valeco EoleValeco Eole Valeco EoleValeco Eole Valeco EoleValorem ValoremOser Ventotec et ZJNVergnet VergnetVolkswind Volkswind3V Développement Voltalia3V Développement VoltaliaVSB Energies Nouvelles VSB Energies Nouvelles / Nouvergies ?? ?Adeol ?Adeol ?Adeol ?Enel Erelis ?Eolfi / Cegelec ? ?Espace Éolien Développement ?

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O PEspace Éolien Développement ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamsea Energie France ? ?GdF ?Iberdrola / VSB Énergies Nouvelles ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Innovent ?Nordex ?Nordex ?Nordex ?Nordex ?Nordex ?Nordex ?Renerco ?SEPE Bois d'Anchat, Intervent ?SEPE Sachin / Intervent ?SPEHM ? ?Theolia / Ventura ?Theolia / Ventura ?Theolia / Ventura ?Theolia / Ventura ?Valorem ?Vivéole ? ?Vivéole ? ?VSB Energies nouvelles ?

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O PVSB Energies nouvelles ?Neo (Spanischer Investor?)Eole-Res CEPE de GrandboisEole-Res CEPE de Sambres, de Lafage, de la Ferrière et de VaumercyEole-Res CEPE du Pays de St Seine et des EpinoirsCNR CNRCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentEDF-EN EDF-ENEspace Éolien Développement ? EDF-ENEneri /Noréole / EDF-EN ? EDF-EN ?Eolfi EDF-EN ?Energie 21 Energie 21Énergiequelle Au Vent Énergiequelle Au VentEnergieteam EnergieteamEnersis/Shell Enersis/ShellEnersis/Shell Enersis/ShellEnertrag EnertragEnertrag Enertrag? Eole-ResEolfi EolfiNordex EurowattNordex EurowattNordex Eurowatt

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O PNordex EurowattEole Futur EurowindFrançaise d'Éoliennes Française d'ÉoliennesFrançaise d'Éoliennes Française d'ÉoliennesFrançaise d'Éoliennes Française d'ÉoliennesEole-Res IberdrolaVSB Energies Nouvelles IberdrolaEnergie France ? Iberdrola, GamesaJMB Énergie JMB Énergie / Nass et Wind TechnologieJuwi JuwiJuwi JuwiMaïa Eolis Maïa EolisNeo NeoNeo NeoNordex NordexNordex NordexNordex NordexWindsystem NordexAmicus Salus Parc éolien d'Antoigné SAS et Énergie z rPoweo PoweoREVE REVEValorem RWEGamesa SAS du MulsonnierNeo Energia SCE Saint-Alban? Valeco Eole? Valeco Eole? Valeco Eole? Valeco Eole? Valeco Eole? Valeco EoleValorem ValoremValorem ValoremValorem Valorem

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O PVSB Energies nouvelles VSB Energies nouvellesVSB Energies Nouvelles VSB Energies NouvellesVSB Energies nouvelles VSB Energies nouvelles / DIF(?)Enel Erelis / JP Énergie environnement ?Intervent ?JP Énergie Environnement ?Eole-Res CEPE des Portes de la Côte d'OR et des Hautes CôtesCompagnie du Vent Compagnie du VentWindsystem Nordex? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?(Valorem?) ?Aerodis Énergies Renouvelables ?Aerodis Énergies Renouvelables ?Aerodis Énergies Renouvelables ?Astoul ?Astoul ?Eco Delta Développement ?Eiden ?ENEOL ? ?Énergie Éolienne France ?Eneria ?Eneria / Infinivent ?

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O PEole 76 développement ?Eole-Res ? ?Eolec ?Erelia ?Espace Éolien Développement ?Française d'Éoliennes ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Gamesa Énergie France ?Hostache Earl ?Iberdrola / Perfect Wind ?Infinivent ?Infinivent ?Infinivent ?Infinivent ?Infinivent ?Juwi ?Les Ailes d'Argensol ?Nass et Wind Technologie ?Nass et Wind Technologie ?Natenco ?Natenco ?P&T Technologie ?Valorem ?Valorem ?Valorem ?Valorem ?Volkswind ?VSB Energies nouvelles ?VSB Energies nouvelles ?Aerowatt Aerowatt

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O PSofiva-Energie BoralexEDF-EN EDF-ENEnergieteam EnergieteamEnertrag EnertragAerowatt Éole de Mont de GersonNass et Wind Technologie Gaz de France / Theolia ?Iberdrola / Perfect Wind Iberdrola / Perfect Wind ABO-Wind Macquarie BankTencia NeoTencia NeoTencia NeoTencia NeoPannece, Bonnœuvre WKN ? Pannece, Bonnœuvre WKN ?? ParticulierPfeiffer Énergies renouvelables Pfeiffer Énergies renouvelablesOser Régie communale d'électricitéGamesa Énergie France Sergies? Sieds? Sieds? Sieds? VensorRVolkswind VolkswindVolkswind VolkswindVolkswind Volkswind

PITCH+ = PITCH & adaptable speedSTALL+ = STALL & adaptable speed

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Q R

comments .

démantelé en 1966 .premier parc experimental en France .. .démantelé en 2004 .erste Anlage Frankreichs ? - démantelé en 2004 à la suite d’un accident .erste Anlage Frankreichs ? .. .. .(auf thewindpower.com + suivi-eolien + FEE France Energie Eolienne ) .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005 .démantelé en 2004 à la suite d’un accident .EOLE 2005 .. .démantelé en 2003 ? .. .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005; SNC = Société en nom collectif (= GbR; Betreibergesellschaft?) .. .. .. .. .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005; Poweo = Espace Éolien Développement ??? .EOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005; Fournisseur des éoliennes: Vestas Gamsea Eolica ? .EOLE 2005 .

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Q REOLE 2005 .EOLE 2005 .(auf der Innovent-Seite + thewindpower.com + eolinfo.com) .EOLE 2005 .. .. .. .. .EOLE 2005. - Aerowatt réalise 1ere centrale éolienne française couplée au réseau EDF. Construite à Lastours elle produit 10 x 10 kW. .. .. .. .. .EOLE 2005 .. .. .. .. .EOLE 2005 .. .. .. .. .démantelé .. .. .. .. .Comm Agglo = établissement public de coopération intercommunale .. .. .. .. .

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Q R"Ce parc a bénéficié d'un accueil très favorable des riverains" .. .. .EOLE 2005; Le parc éolien du CERS .. .. .Eigentümer des ganzen Parks: SIIF Energies France & REVe (Régie d’Eletricité de Vendée) --> nordex-online.com .. .. .. .. .. .. .démantelé en 2004 ??? .. .. .cédé ? (nicht auf edf-website) .. .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .en construction ? .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .. .. .. .. .. ."für seine Qualität und Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung anerkannt" .. .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .GE = GE Wind .. .. .. .dont 10 MW (des 22 MW) cédés (Centrale cédée dans le cadre de l'activité de Développement-Vente d'Actifs Structurés ) .dont 10 MW (des 22 MW) cédés (Centrale cédée dans le cadre de l'activité de Développement-Vente d'Actifs Structurés ) .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .cédé ? (nicht auf edf-website) .. .. .. .. .. .. .Regroupés au sein de la société Le Haut des Ailes, 99 souscripteurs privés, résidant autour du parc, ont acquis des actions .Regroupés au sein de la société Le Haut des Ailes, 99 souscripteurs privés, résidant autour du parc, ont acquis des actions .Regroupés au sein de la société Le Haut des Ailes, 99 souscripteurs privés, résidant autour du parc, ont acquis des actions .. .. .. .(auf suivi-eolien: Kergrist - Maisnières II (12000 - 6x2000) + Le Roduel (6000 - 4x1500), Enercon, PITCH+, CNR / Iberdorla) .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .www.e-eolienne.info .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .auf www.vergnet.fr - insg. Nur 7,2 MW .auf www.vergnet.fr - insg. Nur 7,2 MW .auf www.vergnet.fr - insg. Nur 7,2 MW .. .. .(Link auf VSB-Seite funtioniert nicht) .. .. .. ."Il s'agit du parc qui compte le plus grand nombre de machines, et les plus hautes, de toute la région." (Sept 2006) .

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Q RCNR = Compagnie Nationale du Rhône .. .. .. .dont 12 MW cédés (Centrale cédée dans le cadre de l'activité de Développement-Vente d'Actifs Structurés ) .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .cédé ? (nicht auf edf-website) .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .dont 12 MW cédés (Centrale cédée dans le cadre de l'activité de Développement-Vente d'Actifs Structurés ) .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .Parc cédé dans le cadre de l'activité de développement-vente d'actifs structurés. Programme "Plein Vent" .. .. .. .. .. .(nicht auf Nordex-Seite) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .5 projets juridiquement indépendants ont été mis en place par 4 sociétés .5 projets juridiquement indépendants ont été mis en place par 4 sociétés .5 projets juridiquement indépendants ont été mis en place par 4 sociétés .

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Q R5 projets juridiquement indépendants ont été mis en place par 4 sociétés .5 projets juridiquement indépendants ont été mis en place par 4 sociétés .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .l'annulation des permis de construire? .

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Q Rl'annulation des permis de construire? .(nur auf thewindpower.com) ."Kemenez, l'île autonome en énergie" .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .cédé ? (nicht auf edf-website) .en construction ? .dont 4 MW cédés (Centrale cédée dans le cadre de l'activité de Développement-Vente d'Actifs Structurés ) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .(nicht auf Nordex-Seite) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

.die einzelnen Parks sind hier gelistet: http://www.ostwind.de/index.php?id=33 .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .REVe = Régie électricité de Vendée .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .Venture = filiale de Theolia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .en construction ? .en construction ? .. .en construction ? .

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Q Ren construction ? .en construction ? .en construction ? .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .Brissy-Hamégicourt (3 machines), Séry-les-Mézières (4 machines), Ribemont (5 machines), Villers-le-Sec (3 machines) .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .permis de construire pour 8 éoliennes accordé, travaux engagés .. .permis de construire pour 8 éoliennes accordé, travaux engagés .. .. .Parc expérimental de Vergnet .. .. .. .Parc Chanteloup ??? / Parc Combourg ??? .. .. .. .. .. .Pour le compte de la société Eolfi, Cegelec a livré sur le site 'Plaine Auboise', les infrastructures relatives à 3 parcs (6 turbines de 2,3 MW) .. .

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Q R. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .en construction .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .en construction .en construction .en construction; (nicht auf www.thewindpower.net) .. .en construction; (nicht auf www.thewindpower.net) .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .Offshore .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .en construction .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .en construction; (nicht auf www.thewindpower.net) .en construction .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .en construction .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q Ren construction .en construction .en construction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .en construction .. .gehört vielleicht zu Saint Thégonnec (siehe exploiteurs) ??? .. .. .. .en construction .. .. .. .(Vgl. Vent de Colere) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

.. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

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Q R. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .