Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 26178

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(PPFI-P9720; IDA-28280)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$13.4 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF MALI

FOR A

VOCATIONAL EDUCATION & TRAINING CONSOLIDATION PROJECT

June 30, 2003

Human Development IIAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective March 1, 2003)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF) CFAF 1 Million = US$ 1,639

US$ 1 = CFAF 610

FISCAL YEARJuly 1 June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACDI Agence canadienne pour le développment international(Canadian International Development Agency-CIDA)

AGETIPE Agence d'exécution des travaux d'intérêt public pour l'emploi (Agency for Implementation of Public Works for Employment)

ANPE Agence nationale pour l'emploi (National Agency for Employment)BIT Bureau international du travailBT Brevet de technicien (Technician Diploma)CAP Certificat d'aptitude professionelle (Certificate of Professional Training)CAS Country Assistance StrategyCFAF Communauté financière africaine franc (African Financial Community Franc)CFP Centre de formation professionelle (Vocational Training Center)CG Consultative GroupCr. CreditCV Curriculum VitaeDCA Development Credit AgreementDEF Diplôme d'etudes fondamentales (High School Entrance Diploma)DNETP Direction nationale de l'enseignment technique et de la formation professionnelle

(National Department of Technical Education and Vocational Training)ECICA Ecole centrale pour l'industrie, le commerce et l'administration

(School for industry, commerce and administration)ETO Employment and Training Observatory

(Observatoire de l'emploi et de la formation-OEF)FAC Fonds d'aide et de coopération (French Development Cooperation)FCFA Franc de la communauté financière africaineFNAM Fédération nationale des artisans du Mali (National Federation of Malian Craftsmen)FNEM Fédération nationale des employeurs du Mali (National Federation of Malian Employers)FPI Formation professionelle initiale (Pre-service VET)GoM Government of MaliICR Implementation Completion ReportIDA International Development AssociationIFPs Instituts de formation professionelle (Institutes for Vocational Training)Logframe Logical FrameworkMESSRS Ministère des enseignements secondaire, supérieur et de la recherche scientifiqueMOE Ministry of EducationNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationONMOE Office national de l'emploi et de la main d'oeuvre (National Employment and Manpower Office)PAFPE Project d'appui à la formation professionelle et à l'emploi (Vocational Training and Employment

Support Project)PCFP Projet de coordination de formation professionelle (Vocational Education and Training

Consolidation Project)

PHRD Poverty and Human Resource DevelopmentPISE Programme d'investissement du secteur de l'education (Education Sector Investment Program)PPF Project Preparatory FacilityPPTE Pays pauvres très endettés (Highly Indebted Poor Countries-HIPC)PSR Project Status ReportSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSDR Special Drawing RightSSA Sub-Saharan AfricaUFAE Unités de formation et d'appui aux entreprises (Enterprise Training and Support Unit)VET Vocational Education and TrainingVTSF Vocational Training Support Fund (Fonds d'appui à la formation professionelle et à

l'apprentissage-FAFPA)VTT Vocational Training Tax (Taxe de formation professionelle-TFP)WB World Bank

Vice President: Callisto E. MadavoCountry Director: A. David CraigSector Manager: Alexandre V. Abrantes

Task Manager: Eunice Yaa Brimfah Dapaah

MALIVOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING CONSOLIDATION

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 55. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 126. Sustainability 147. Bank and Borrower Performance 168. Lessons Learned 189. Partner Comments 2010. Additional Information 21Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 23Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 25Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 27Annex 4. Bank Inputs 31Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 33Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 34Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 35Annex 8.Partner Contribution to ICR 36

Project ID: P001746 Project Name: VOCAT. EDUC. & TRG CONSOLID.

Team Leader: Eunice Yaa Brimfah Dapaah TL Unit: AFTH2ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 30, 2003

1. Project Data

Name: VOCAT. EDUC. & TRG CONSOLID. L/C/TF Number: PPFI-P9720; IDA-28280Country/Department: MALI Region: Africa Regional Office

Sector/subsector: Vocational training (78%); Central government administration (12%); Tertiary education (10%)

Theme: Social risk reduction (P); Access to urban services for the poor (P)

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 06/30/1994 Effective: 04/01/1996 03/26/1997Appraisal: 07/28/1995 MTR: 11/01/1999 05/01/2000Approval: 03/14/1996 Closing: 12/31/2001 12/31/2002

Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOVERNMENT OF MALI/MIN OF EDUCOther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Callisto E. Madavo Edward V.K. JaycoxCountry Director: A. David Craig Jean-Louis SarbibSector Manager: Alexandre V. Abrantes Ok PannenborgTeam Leader at ICR: Abdoulaye Ky Samuel C. CarlsonICR Primary Author: Eunice Yaa Brimfah Dapaah

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: UN

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The project development objective as stated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) was to contribute to economic growth and human resources development, targeting in particular the skill requirements of relatively poor urban groups in the informal sector. Related objectives were to improve local capacity to allocate training resources as a function of labor market demand, and to increase the involvement of the private sector in the management, provision and financing of Vocational Education and Training (VET).

As regards particular skill requirements of relatively poor urban groups in the informal sector, the project’s development objective was clearly stated, realistic and important to the country and the education sector. There was however, less clarity in the project's development objective with respect to contributing to economic growth. It is important to mention that the project development objective targeted skill requirements, involved specific areas and sectors, and had reasonable and workable related objectives. It also ensured increased coherence between training and employment which was a key factor for achieving Mali’s goal of growth, poverty reduction, and human development, all important elements of IDA’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of December 1, 1994. At the time of appraisal, Mali had one of the least skilled labor forces in the world with an estimated literacy rate of 20 percent and the need for basic professional and technical skills was important for the growth of the economy.

3.2 Revised Objective:The project development objective was not revised at any point in the project implementation. In all the Project Status Reports (PSRs), the implementation objective stated in the SAR is indicated as the project’s development objective. The project's development objective as it was stated, promised too much and did not have as much operational power as the stated implementation objective. The SAR implementation objective outlines specific outputs of the project, namely to develop labor force skills through improved quality, supply and responsiveness of vocational education and training services adapted to labor market demand. Over the implementation period of the project, approximately 40,000 workers and apprentices would benefit from in-service skills upgrading, while another 6,000 youth would benefit from pre-service vocational training. It was expected that at least 75 percent of project trainees would be employed within three years of training, with incomes sufficient to generate at least a 16 percent social rate of return to project investments. The implementation objective was also set out in the Memorandum of the President, Credit and Project Summary as the project’s objective. For clarification, any reference to development objective for this ICR will be based on the development objective as stated in the project's SAR.

3.3 Original Components:Three components supported the project’s development objective.

Component 1 – Pre-Service VET Services (US$9.2 million)Improve Quality and Relevance of Pre-service Vocational Education and Training: The component’s objective was to improve the quality, supply, efficiency and relevance of pre-service VET service, in order to provide young trainees with knowledge and skills demanded by the labor market through: (i) upgrading selected training facilities, supporting selected training streams and phasing out obsolete training streams, (ii) improving quality of instruction through curriculum reform, training, and creation of training and enterprise support units, and (iii) developing management capacity at the central and school levels.

Component 2 – Vocational Training Support Fund (VTSF) for Skills Upgrading (US$12.0 million)Develop Sustainable In-service Vocational and Technical Training Capacity: The component’s objective was to improve the quality and capacity of skills upgrading service, in order to enhance labor force skills

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and productivity among formal and informal sector workers by: (i) undertaking skills upgrading and retraining with financing from a VTSF, and (ii) supporting the development of a national system of apprenticeship certification.

Component 3 – Employment and Training Observatory (US$1.6 million)Improve Labor Market Information: The objective was to increase employment and earnings through improved functioning of the labor market and enhanced effectiveness of vocational training by: (i) establishing an Employment and Training Observatory (ETO), (ii) training ETO staff, and (iii) disseminating labor market information.

The three project components were related to achieving the development objective of the project for the following reasons: (i) the first component to improve the quality and relevance of pre-service VET is directly linked to the development objective to improve local capacity and allocate training resources as a function of labor market demand because the selection of training streams was based on labor market demand, (ii) the second component to develop sustainable in-service vocational and technical training capacity is directly associated with the development objective to increase the involvement of the private sector in the management, provision and financing of VET, and (iii) the third component to improve labor market information with the objective of increasing employment and earnings, is directly connected to the development objective to contribute to economic growth and human resource development.

Project design took into account most of the lessons learned in five previously financed education projects in Mali, namely, (i) Cr. No. 420-MLI, for US$5 million (Jul. 1973 - Aug. 1980); (ii) Cr. No. 733-MLI, for US$10 million (Sep. 1977 - Jun. 1983); (iii) Cr. No. 1442-MLI, for US$9.5 million (Jul. 1984 - Sep. 1990); (iv) Cr. No. -MLI, for US$5 million (Jul. 1973 - Aug. 1980); The fifth project, CR No. 2673 – MLI for US$50 million (Jan., 1995 - Dec., 1996), to correct sector resource allocation distortions was ongoing at the time of project design. A key lesson which the project took into account was to ensure that employers contributed more to the design of practical training programs, and that adequate public funds to be provided for operational cost of training institutions. Components of the project were aligned to three key implementing institutions designed to benefit from technical assistance, vehicles, and office equipment through the project. The project was also designed to incorporate enterprise and skills training centers closely linked to industry. A World Bank policy paper prepared in April 1994, Vocational Education and Training, The Role of the Public Sector in a Market Economy, advocated that enterprise and skills training centers had proven more cost-effective compared with school-based vocational education and training. In the same document, the relevance of public sector provision of vocational education and training is promoted because of potential market failure. The project design took these views into consideration in having components that addressed both the public and private sector provision of vocational and technical training. On the whole, the project was designed to ensure the development of necessary institutional capacity in order to meet the project objective. The design of the project was appropriate. Although the project design was not based on the logical framework concept, and performance indicators were not separated by outcome and output, the indicators were measurable and to a large extent, attributable. For example, under Component 2, a high percentage of trainees employed within six months of training would indicate an improved quality of and capacity in skills upgrading.

3.4 Revised Components:

N/A

3.5 Quality at Entry:Quality at Entry is rated satisfactory in spite of the institutional demands made by the project and the

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complexity of coordinating the various components which led to implementation challenges. The reasons for the rating are: (i) consistency with country priorities and CAS objectives, (ii) consistency with sector and country projects while incorporating lessons learned from previous projects, (iii) ensuring ownership through expanded beneficiary participation, (iv) ensuring a strong analytical basis for pursuing policy reforms, and (v) consistency with the Bank’s safeguard policies.

Consistency with Country Priorities and CAS: The project objectives were consistent with the CAS goals at the time of project preparation. The project objectives both enhanced and built on the objective of the CAS of December 1, 1994, which was to alleviate poverty through a three-pronged approach of sustained broad-based economic growth; human resources development; and a special focus on the needs of the most vulnerable. These objectives were also compatible with a key objective of the GoM which was to increase the coherence between training and employment.

Consistency with Sector and Country Projects: The project design took into consideration the sector priorities of the country to meet the requirements for dealing with a weak primary education subsector, with low quality secondary and higher education, and an unstructured, low technology skills training mainly in the informal sector, which had very little or no link with training in the formal sector (Please refer to section 3.3, Original Components: Component 3 - Employment and Training Observatory (US$ 1.6 million), para. 3). The project was designed to provide basic professional and technical skills demanded by the labor market and required for Mali’s economic development.

Two lessons learned from past education projects considered in the design of the project are: (i) public and private training and skills upgrading institutions must be responsive to demand and supply, and enrollments and curricula should be sensitive to employment opportunities for trainees, and (ii) diversity in financing is important for both sustainability, benefit and cost sharing. During project preparation, employers were involved in both research and project design. Other considerations were the application of a flexible, labor market based criteria for financing of skills upgrading activities, managed by private sector employers and artisans. The introduction of the Vocational Training Tax (VTT) contributed to diversification of financing and annual graduate tracer studies were incorporated for mandatory evaluation of skills upgrading.

Government Ownership and Expansion of Beneficiary Participation: The project design took into account government ownership and expanded beneficiary participation. This was important for increasing accountability of GoM among other VET stakeholders. A review for the project in July 1994 stressed the need to expand beneficiary participation and the consultative process. To this end, a VET Consultative Group (CG) including employers, unions, public and private institutions, NGOs and students leaders, was established in October 1994. The VET CG met monthly to discuss project preparation issues focusing on the setting up of the Vocational Training Fund. Although this process was assessed to be time-consuming at the time, it proved important for building wider ownership and facilitated implementation.

Institutional Capacity: In the institutional analysis outlined in the SAR, institutional capacity was assessed as a high risk to the project. To mitigate this risk the project was designed to build the institutional capacity of key implementing structures like the National Department of Technical and Vocational Training (Direction nationale de l'enseignment technique et de la formation professionelle - DNETP). In cases where there was no institutional capacity, new structures were set up as in the case of the VTSF and the ETO. The setting up of new structures was in some instances, delayed as was the case of the VTSF.

Analytical Basis for Pursuing Policy Reforms: The project had a strong analytical basis for pursuing policy reforms. A series of seven studies was undertaken, namely, a tracer study of recent VET graduates,

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a study of private sector training needs in Bamako, an analysis of the apprenticeship/production system in the informal sector, a survey of economic growth and employment trends in the regions, an analysis of data from the Annual Manpower Survey, 1988-1993, a reverse tracer study of VET graduates, and a study on women’s needs and constraints to training. The studies, funded with a Japanese PHRD grant, aimed at first ascertaining labor market demand in formal and informal sectors, in and outside Bamako. Second, the studies helped to identify vocational training streams most likely to lead to employment. Although there were initial difficulties in working with the National Manpower and Employment Office and the weak survey methodology of some studies made it difficult to generalize the results, the studies provided sound background documentation to support policy reforms in vocational education and training and pointed out the focus for project benefits and needs.

Bank’s Safeguard Policies: The project was to finance rehabilitation and limited new constructions. Regarding this focus, it was not expected to pose any environmental risks or have any significant environmental impact and was rated as C category.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:Overall, the achievement of project outcome is rated satisfactory. Outcome objectives for all three components according to the performance indicators, were at best only partially met, however, much was achieved with respect to creating an improved environment to provide vocational and technical education and training. The setting up of new institutions like the VTSF and the ETO and of initially nonexistent structures like the VTT provide good examples. Not only were structures put in place to support an improved vocational education and training system, but also the private sector which previously had not had much of a role in vocational training, became involved in the creation of a "new vocational training culture" in the sector. Generally, the achievement of project outcome objectives is determined to the extent to which data is available regarding project performance indicators and targets. The component objectives and performance indicators as outlined in the SAR and the actual/latest estimates on achievement are indicated in Annex 1: Key Performance Indicators/Logframe Matrix.

The achievement of outcomes for Component 1 was unsatisfactory. The outcome was to have at least 70 percent of trainees in reinforced streams employed within one year after graduation. The percentage of trainees employed is not known because the first cycle of enrollment from 2000-2002 did not provide adequate time to follow up on students when the project ended in December 2002. Whether or not knowledge and skills of pre-service VET graduates are required by the labor market was also not determined because the indicator of average monthly earnings of VET trainees one year after graduation could not be ascertained for the same reasons. The late start of training was due to the time it took for the curriculum development, training of instructors, installation of equipment, etc. which all had to be completed before actual VET training could start. The performance indicator of public VET expenditure per student on equipment and material targeted to increase from 50,000 to 60,000 CFAF by project completion was also not achieved. (Please refer to Appendix 1: Summary of Project Outcomes based on Performance Ratings by Component).

Component 2 was however, rated satisfactory on the achievement of outcomes. The objective was to improve the quality and capacity of skills upgrading service, in order to enhance labor force skills and productivity. Although the targeted performance indicators relating to the percentage of trainees employed within six months after training was not determined, the percentage of women trainees which was targeted to reach 40 percent by the completion was observed to have increased from 26 percent to 30.5 percent at the time of project completion. Monthly earnings of graduates and the percentage of trainees who passed

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apprenticeship certification examinations had not been determined at the time of completion. This component cannot be rated unsatisfactory on the basis of data unavailability. The ICR team recommends an impact study to ascertain monthly earnings of graduates after the appropriate time lapse.

The achievement of project outcomes for Component 3 was satisfactory. The component achieved much with respect to setting up structures, training staff and undertaking surveys. It is also not certain whether the component objective of increasing employment earnings through improved functioning and enhanced effectiveness of the labor market was achieved because no survey was carried out. Here again, the ICR team proposes that the relevant survey be undertaken as soon as practicable to ascertain whether the target has been met.

4.2 Outputs by components:The achievement of outputs has been assessed separately from the achievement of outcomes. Overall, the achievement of outputs for all three components of the project is rated satisfactory. Specific output achievement ratings for the three components are based on operational achievement of the components and sub-components outlined as well as on indicators provided in Annex 1: Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix. The reason is that quite a remarkable achievement was made during project implementation which resulted in an operational vocational education and training system with greater participation by the private sector. It could be argued that the project has largely achieved the outputs it was meant to achieve. This achievement is considerable and must be weighed against performance indicators some of which were not achieved, while others could not be determined because of lack of data. The decision of the ICR team to weigh the operational achievements of the various components against the performance indicators, was not an easy one, but it is believed that this would provide a more balanced rating of achievement. Considering this, ratings according to components and sub-components are as follows:

Component 1: Pre-Service VET Services - satisfactorySub-Component 1.1: Upgrade Selected Training Facilities - satisfactorySub-Component 1.2: Improve Quality of Instruction - unsatisfactorySub-Component 1.3: Develop Management Capacity at Central and School Levels - satisfactory

Component 2: Vocational Training Support Fund (VTSF) for Skills Upgrading - satisfactorySub-Component 2.1: Upgrade Skills and Retrain - satisfactorySub-Component 2.2: Apprenticeship Certification - satisfactory

Component 3: Employment and Training Observatory - satisfactorySub-Component 3.1: Establish Employment and Training Observatory - satisfactorySub-Component 3.2: Train ETO staff - satisfactorySub-Component 3.3: Conduct Labor Market Surveys and Train - satisfactorySub-Component 3.4: Disseminate Labor Market Information - satisfactory

Component 1: Pre-Service VET Services (US$9.2 Million)Project funds allocated for this component supported (i) upgrading of training facilities, (ii) improving the quality of skills of instructors and revising the curricula, and (iii) developing management capacity at the central and school levels.

Sub-component 1.1 - Upgrade Selected Training Facilities (US$5.4 million): In all, five training facilities were selected for upgrading comprising the Vocational Training Center (CFP), the School for Commerce, Industry and Administration (ECICA), and three Institutes for Vocational Training (IFPs) in Sikasso,

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Kayes and San. Upgrading and equipment installation have been completed and are functioning satisfactorily. There are however, concerns about maintenance and recurrent supplies for the running of the machines. The number of CAP training streams selected for support by the project exceeded those originally selected during project preparation. Following a labor market analysis workshop organized by the DNETP in February 1999, ten training specialties were reinforced as indicated in Table 1: Number of Streams Target and Supported by Project.

Table 1: Number of Streams Targeted and Supported by Project

Seven Streams Targeted Ten Streams Actually Supported by Project

Mechanics, general and vehicle (CAP)Construction (CAP)Metalwork (CAP)Electrical Contracting (CAP)Woodworking (CAP)Electro-mechanics (BT)Accounting (BT)

Auto Mechanics (CAP)General Mechanics (maintenance)MasonryMetalworkElectrical ContractingCarpentry, Woodwork and JoineryElectro-mechanicsAccountingPlumbing (CAP)Office Work , secretarial and office skills (CAP)

Sub-component 1.2 - Improve Quality of Instruction (US$ 3.3 million): Curriculum reform was undertaken to reinforce selected training streams. Revisions were made to adopt a modular, competency-based approach which emphasized transferable practical and entrepreneurial skills. The reform was based on the legal framework for revising the training streams (Article 5 and 6 of the 97-718/MESSRS-SG decree) and was supported by labor market analysis which provided the technical basis for the developing programs and established the list of tasks, demand for employment and level of qualification required for each training specialty.

In addition to reinforcing selected streams, obsolete and non- relevant streams identified by the project were phased out e.g., customs, budget, treasury, and justice. However, none of the output targets for student numbers in the reinforced training streams was met as indicated in Appendix 2: Summary of Project Outputs-Based on Performance Ratings by Component. While most instructors agreed that the introduction of modular, competency-based curricula was an improvement on the old system, they also expressed some concerns. The first was that students’ background was inadequate at the BT and CAP levels. It was observed that students’ academic background with respect to reading, writing and measurement of units was very weak. This made communication and teaching very challenging. Second, the comprehensive nature of the competency-based approach, rendered instructors helpless when faced with certain completely new teaching situations such as ‘bodyworks’ in Auto Mechanics or ‘formworks and stairways’ in Woodwork. Some modules could not be undertaken in certain courses for the simple reason that instructors did not have the specific training to teach them.

The competency-based curricula is strongly linked to the supply of material resources and as a result, any interruption in supplies posed a threat to the running of programs and the learning process. An inadequate

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recurrent budget for purchasing supplies and insufficient resources for repairing and maintaining equipment, further aggravated the situation. This state of affairs frequently led to interruptions and lengthy module delivery periods. For instance, students using the computer for the first time, could not acquire the target competency for typing speed in the time allotted. Instructors maintained that the time for this module was just not adequate given the interruptions to the learning process.

The Training and Enterprise Support Units were set up to improve the quality and relevance of VET instructions and to ensure that instructors knew and understood the labor market and private sector enterprises for which their students were being trained. The French Cooperation Agency supported three enterprise support units which contributed to the setting up of a national system of training for apprentices.

Sub-component 1.3 - Develop Management Capacity at Central and School Levels (US$ 0.5 million): The Department of Technical and Vocational Training (DNETP) was strengthened under the project. Institutional capacity was reinforced through capacity-building and technical assistance. For example, 45 hours of training in school administration was organized for 66 personnel of the DNETP and training institutions. Training in strategic planning and management methods was also organized for staff. Technical assistance was provided to develop a system to link the DNETP with its institutions. For monitoring and evaluation, an enrollment and teaching staff database was developed. A new Department of Technical and Vocational Training was also constructed, equipped and furnished under the project.

Component 2: Vocational Training Support Fund (VTSF) for Skills Upgrading (US$12.0 Million)The project supported (i) skills upgrading and retraining with financing from a VTSF, and (ii) developing a national system of apprenticeship certification under this component.

Sub-Component 2.1 – Skills Upgrading and Training (US$11.6 million): In order to provide sustainable financing for skills upgrading and retraining in the informal sector, the project undertook a number of activities. These included setting up and managing the VTSF and instituting the VTT to increase the annual output of in-service trainees from 3,000 in 1997 to 10,000 in 2001.

The VTSF was set up in 1998 to mobilize resources for financing the training needs of companies, and became fully effective in 2002. The sources of financing for the VTSF were (i) receipts from the professional training tax, (ii) contributions from sponsors and/or beneficiaries, (iii) credits or loans, (iv) gift donations and subsidies, and (v) other receipts. The types of sponsors included individual enterprises and groups of workers from private, parastatal or other organizations such as NGOs.

To ensure a sustainable source of employer financing even after the project ends, the Vocational Training Tax was instituted under the legal framework of law No. 97-024 of April 14, 1997. The objectives of introducing the VTT were to (i) allow employers to participate in the financing of training of their employees while introducing the principle of cost recovery, and (ii) ensure financial sustainability of VTSF by guaranteeing a regular and sustained mobilization of financial resources. Of the 75 percent VTSF financing, the Vocational Training Tax (0.5 percent of payroll) provided one-third while IDA and the French Development Cooperation (Fonds d'aide et de coopération - FAC) provided the other two-thirds. In other words, financing of training was broken down as follows: 25 percent by beneficiaries and sponsors; 25 percent by employers and the GoM; 50 percent by IDA and FAC.

Private professional training was expanded both in diversity and coverage. The project upgraded facilities, provided training support for continuing training and apprenticeship, and targeted identified geographic centers and relevant skill areas for training linked to economic growth. The VTSF supported private and semi-private centers with equipment to enable them improve their capacity to respond to demands of the

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labor market for training and services. With a grant of 845,600,000 CFAF, (US$1,208,000) over the five-year intervention period, VTSF equipped 13 private training centers.

Selection for support was based on criteria agreed with the World Bank. The criteria for VTSF support was mostly consistent with criteria set out in the SAR. Changes were, however, made to simplify criteria in order to attract more requests for training. Criteria for support was in two parts, namely, (i) accreditation agreement delivered by VTSF, and (ii) providing the documentation requested for financing. To benefit from VTSF support, the sponsor or beneficiary organization provided a request for financing accompanied by the following:

- an accreditation letter provided by VTSF;- a feasibility study on the equipment to be funded;- a tax clearance certificate or letter showing that the organization is tax exempt;- references of instructors including CVs, copies of certificates and diplomas;- other administration documents including authorization of the Ministry of Education, contract of investment code.

Following the selection of companies, the VTSF helped to translate identified training needs into viable training programs and then helped finance the training. At the end of each training year, training centers were evaluated and based on this evaluation, centers sustained accreditation to offer training for the next level. If a center failed the evaluation, the training was given to another center from the list of accredited centers. With respect to the development cost of training activities, initially the VTSF was to finance up to 50 percent of the cost of new equipment and materials through a 50 percent combined grant-loan arrangement (25 percent grant and 25 percent loan with 2.5 percent interest rate), while the training centers contributed the remaining 50 percent When certain categories of sponsors and/or beneficiaries experienced difficulties in mobilizing their contribution of 25 percent, a new approach was introduced which consisted of beneficiaries financing a minimum of 25 percent of the investment in equipment of training centers. According to sponsors and beneficiaries, this new approach was more acceptable and satisfactory. One problem identified related to the procurement of equipment. Some equipment procured with the wrong specifications could not be installed. This weakness was identified and rectified speedily and efforts were instituted to guard against the recurrence.

Professional apprenticeship training was expanded in agreement with the professional artisan organizations of Mali (FNAM) to include auto mechanics, woodwork, metalwork, air conditioning/refrigeration, auto electronics, and sewing/fashion. While the objective of the VTSF was to finance up to 90 percent of training expenses for apprentices under 21 years, there was no indication that this arrangement was implemented. Another problem emerged while implementing this component. Prior to the institution of the VTSF, apprentices followed 3 or 4 levels and all their training was usually in one center. With the institution of VTSF, apprentices would change training centers when their original centers failed to meet evaluation criteria for competitiveness. Some apprentices were not able to meet the transport expenses of moving from one center to another and thus dropped out.

Training targeted geographic centers which had the potential to ensure employment and economic growth including Bamako and the regional capitals of Sikasso, Segou and Kayes. Not only did training take place in urban areas, there were also examples of rural-based training, notably, training which took place in 1999 and 2001 when 5,000 villagers of the Zone Office of Niger were trained in modern techniques of rice farming by irrigation. Another example of rural based training was organized for 650 villagers from the OHVN zone in market gardening. Professional training involving about 1,000 apprentices currently takes place annually in towns such as Bamako, Diola, Sikasso, Koutiala, Segou and Mopti with Bamako having

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the largest number of apprentices, in response to preparatory survey results which identified Bamako as having the most apprentices participating in vocational training (45,000 out of a total of 65,000 apprentices).

The project, through the VTSF, involved employers in the financing and management of training for their workers as part of the effort to ensure a sustainable system of professional training. Informal sector training benefited artisans, Technician Diploma (Brevet de technicien - BT) professions, rural areas, tourism, commerce and services. The percentage financed by employers and/or beneficiaries in the informal sector was 23 percent of total training financed (1,432,246,902 CFAF) while the VTSF contributed 1,096,592,187 CFAF. This contribution by employers and/or beneficiaries was a little lower that the minimum of 25 percent to be financed by beneficiaries and/or sponsors.

To respond to the particularly restricted access that women had to skills upgrading opportunities, women represented one of the targeted groups to benefit from VTSF training. The participation of women in the training programs however, was a little less that expected. One reason was the predominance of men in certain skill areas.

Sub-component 2.2 – Apprenticeship Certification (US$0.4 million): By supporting the development of a national system of apprenticeship certification, the project through the VTSF, has contributed to the delivery of certification at the end of apprenticeship training. In 2001, a study on Certification of Professional Training through Apprenticeship and Validation of Professional Skills in Trades was jointly financed by SwissContact and the VTSF. This collaboration led to the setting up of a system of certification of apprenticeship and validation of professional skills in the artisan sector. Following the study, a National Communication Forum was organized by the Ministry of Employment and Professional Training in November 2001 in Bamako. The recommendation of the forum contributed to the present system of certification and validation. The Ministry of Employment and Professional Training directed the work on certification by creating a Working Group which defined adequate legislative, regulatory and institutional framework relating to a national system of certification and validation. The VTSF maintained the secretariat of the Working Group composed of 14 representatives from relevant apprenticeship training structures.

As part of project preparation, the process of analyzing and translating trades to be mastered into modules with competency standards and training programs was extensively tested and validated for one trade in collaboration with SwissContact. By the completion of the project, the VTSF had succeeded in providing eight professions out of 13 targeted, with national certification standards of training by apprenticeship.

Component 3: Employment and Training ObservatoryComponent 3 aimed at increasing employment and earnings through improved functioning of the labor market and enhanced effectiveness of vocational training (i.e., increased coherence and complementarily between training, employment and physical capital investments)

To achieve this objective, the project supported the following sub-components: (i) establishing an Employment and Training Observatory (ETO); (ii) training ETO staff; (iii) disseminating labor market information.

Sub-Component 3.1 – Establishment of Employment and Training Observatory (US$0.44 million): Created by a resolution of the Board of the National Office of Employment, the ETO was established in 1996, and was the first component to become operational. The ETO was made up of two organs, namely, the steering committee which was to evaluate the activities of the ETO, and the technical committee which

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evaluated the activities of the ETO. In addition to these two organs, coordination was defined by the project steering committee. The project rehabilitated and equipped the offices of the ETO. Although the ETO was set up in practice to be autonomous, up to the end of the project, no regulation was outlined to formalize its autonomy. The ETO was set up under the National Employment and Manpower Office (ONMOE) which was subsequently restructured to become the National Agency for Employment (ANPE), as one of several departments under the ANPE. Staffing was a perennial issue during the implementation of the project and at no time did the ETO function with its full complement of staff. The ETO started with seven staff compared with the eight staff initially planned and at one point, it had only three key staff. In addition, the confirmation of the Acting Director was delayed for most of the implementation period. In spite of the perennial issue of staffing and its status, the ETO carried out its tasks satisfactorily and met most of the requests. Set against the ETO's challenges, the ability of the ETO to deliver becomes very important. Sub-component 3.2 – Training of ETO Staff (US$0.40 million): To enhance the capacity of staff to produce and handle statistical information, several training modules were developed. Initially, the aim was to develop seven training modules but the changing labor market led to a need to develop 35 training modules. In addition, arrangements for technical exchange were made with the Observatories of Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and Benin and with employment services of Cameroon, Guinea, Niger, Senegal and France (ANPE). There were also exchanges and information sharing with the universities and research centers in Mali.

Sub-component 3.3 – Conduct Labor Market Surveys and Training (US$0.42 million): The project financed a series of labor market and training surveys as indicated in Appendix 2: Summary of Project Outputs-Based on Performance Ratings by Component. At mid-term review, it was noted that a number of important studies and surveys had been carried out and several seminars had been organized to disseminate information produced. Some uncertainty was, however, expressed about the quality of the documents produced mainly because of the scarcity of accurate data and the lack of basic tools such as an updated list of industries, professions and trades.

Sub-component 3.4 – Disseminate Labor Market Information (US$0.44 million): Through the activities of the ETO, the project promoted the dissemination of labor market information through the setting up and strengthening of a documentation center. Opened at the beginning of 2002, the documentation center has expanded its area of coverage from ETO documents to other external documents. Registers of visits and consultations have been opened to provide information on actual users' needs. An analysis of one hundred visits/consultations during 2002 revealed great diversity in users including state organizations, NGOs, research institutions, the print media and students. Feedback from users indicates that the center offered an important source of employment and training data as well as information on the economy, demography and poverty among others.

Throughout project implementation, the ETO was reported to have made good progress in undertaking studies and surveys and in making information and publications accessible to policy makers and other relevant users. For example, in the fifth Project Status Report (PSR), it was mentioned that publications of the ETO’s labor market surveys were on schedule and the ETO had developed a new approach for providing executive summaries of studies for managers. In addition, external studies undertaken had utilized documents developed by the ETO. In PSR 06, it was reported that the work of the ETO was ongoing and many publications had been produced and disseminated. Delays in planned workshops were also mentioned in the documentation reviewed but it should be noted that these delays were quickly resolved. While target output planned for the dissemination of labor market information did not meet actual output (43 labor market awareness seminars for students and other VET trainees were planned but

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only 23 seminars were organized partly due to school disturbances which prevailed at the time, and only half of the planned seminars for policy makers were undertaken out of the 30 seminars planned), a case could still be made that the ETO operational achievement was quite high. The ETO was operational even in the face of severe staffing constraints.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:Of three proposed components, pre-service VET training, vocational training support fund (VTSF) and employment and training observatory, rates of return were only estimated for a sub-component of the first component. The issue for the remaining components is more of sustainability, if proposed objectives have been achieved, rather than rates of return. At time of appraisal, the rates of return estimates could help justify financing education, but at the time of the ICR, due to a lack of data and the lagged timing on the return to the investment, the analysis of the allocative efficiency of the project by components was more appropriate (see Annex 3). The analysis can only be indicative. The general observation made from the analysis was that the efficiency of the investment was less than expected, based on the achieved and proposed performance indicators.

4.4 Financial rate of return:No financial rate of return was calculated. Please see Annex 3 for discussion on financial analysis.

4.5 Institutional development impact:The project made a modest institutional development impact with the setting up of the VTSF and the ETO neither of which existed before the project. Considerable training was organized for staff of the DNETP and the ETO. The strongest evidence of the ETO’s institutional development impact is the staff’s ability to respond to information needs of users and to undertake studies and surveys to meet these needs. The ETO has become an important reference for publication. The modular approach for training which previously did not exist and the upgrading of equipment in vocational education and training has impacted current training in a positive way. The ability of the VTSF to conduct and support training for both the formal and informal sector also reflects the institutional development impact which implementing the project provided. Added to this, the VTSF involved employers in the training of their employees leading to the development of a significant informal sector training culture which previously did not exist. The concern is how long these institutional gains can be sustained especially in view of the risk of staff turn-over, characteristic of the ETO and VTSF.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:One factor that indirectly affected the implementation of the project was the changes in government during project implementation in 1997 and 2002. The changes by themselves did not have a negative impact on the project, however, the red-tape within various ministerial departments increased due to change in ministers and the situation affected procurement, for example, from 1997 to 1999. These changes also indirectly affected measures to increase the employment levy for the VTSF from the present 0.5 percent to 2 percent of the payroll and impacted in a significant way to the potential financial sustainability of the VTSF.

Collaboration with development partners involved in relevant aspects of vocational training was almost nonexistent. Collaboration is facilitated when two parties demonstrate a willingness to work together. In as much as the GoM could have led the process, without the agreement of development partners, it becomes very challenging to ensure effective collaboration. The Bank and other development partners should have taken a greater responsibility in ensuring this. Although FAC was working closely with the Enterprise Training and Support Units (Unités de formation et d'appui aux entreprises - UFAEs) which were involved in project activities, there was very little collaboration between the activities of FAC and the project. This

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led to a lack of integration between complementary inputs and processes.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:Delays in setting up of key institutions e.g., VTSF and VTT, which led to the late start-up of certain activities affected the achievement of objectives. Instituting the VTT was a condition for negotiation and although it was set out in the SAR during project preparation, this condition was not met before negotiations in January 1996. It was not until 1998 that the VTT became really effective. The delay in setting up the VTSF contributed to delays in implementing activities for the VTSF component. Similarly, delays in developing certain reinforced training streams, installing equipment and developing curricula, affected the achievement of project outputs for the Pre-service VET component. For example, curricula for building electricity, accounting, and office work were not completed until December 2001, five years after the project began and it was not possible to enroll students before the training streams had been reviewed, curriculum and teaching guides prepared, equipment put in place and instructors trained. As a result of these delays, it was impossible to meet targets for component outputs and component outcomes could not be met, especially when the first cohort of students was enrolled in 2000 and graduated with the completion of the project in 2002. It was within the control of the government to ensure that key project activities were closely monitored, especially when setbacks in the implementation of these activities had the ability to greatly affect the achievement of outcomes.

The implementation of civil engineering works exclusively by AGETIPE-MALI, also caused serious delays thus constraining the delivery and storage of procured equipment. AGETIPE-MALI constructed workshop facilities for vocational education and training under the project.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:Cumbersome processes for accessing funds of the VTSF also had a negative impact on the achievement of project outputs and outcomes. During project implementation, beneficiaries of the VTSF expressed concern regarding the complexity and length of the request process compared with another World Bank project the Private Sector Support Project (Project d’appui au secteur privé) which had much simpler procedures. Although the procedure for accessing funds was simplified after the mid-term review of the project, the modification took more time than expected and this affected implementation of training in the formal and informal sectors. Institutional reshuffling and a change in oversight responsibility for components also had consequences on smooth implementation. At the beginning of the project the VTSF was administered by the Ministry of Industry, Arts and Tourism and the ETO was administered by the Ministry of Employment, Manpower and Labor. Toward the end of the project, the VTSF and the ETO components were both linked with the Ministry of Employment and Professional Education. Though it may be argued that reshuffling was beneficial in that it brought the VTSF and ETO where they belonged i.e., with employment, the changes also meant that new relationships and processes had to be established and learned and this took some time.

Collaboration with other partners was weak. Although FAC and Swiss Contact were both undertaking activities in vocational and technical education, efforts at collaboration can best be described as accidental rather than deliberate and the advantage that greater integration of similar activities could have brought was lost.

5.4 Costs and financing:In view of the fact that there were significant disbursement lags at various points during project implementation, the credit disbursement of 98.9 percent out of total credit of 9 million SDR at project completion was quite an achievement. Considerable progress was made in disbursement between May 2000 and December 2001. The variation in total project allocation between projected and actual

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disbursement at project completion was not substantial. Actual disbursement for most categories was very close to projections except for the Operating Costs category in which actual disbursement exceeded original allocation by nine times as indicated in Table 2: Original and Actual Allocation of the IDA Credit by Category. It was learned that the original estimate for the coordination of the project as set out in Schedule 1 of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) did not include an operation budget for Components 1: Pre-service VET and 3: Employment and Training Observatory because of the anticipated two-pronged coordination approach. This situation was later rectified and thus the increased actual operating costs outlined in Table 2. There were no unallocated funds at the end of the project compared with about 10 percent of funding projected as unallocated at Appraisal.

Table 2: Original and Actual Allocation of the IDA Credit by Category

Category Amount of Credit Projected (SDR)*

Actual at Project Completion**

1) Civil Works 700,000.00 814,655.62

2) Goods, Consultants’ Services and Training 2,400,000.00 1,754,544.55

3) Equipment, Vehicles, furniture, Materials

Part A of Project

Part B and C of Project

150,000.00

1,600,000.00

315,916.55

1,713,454.66

4) Technical Assistance, Training, Consultants

Part A of Project

Part B and C of Project

1,600,000.00

1,300,000.00

1,548,569.98

1,681,477.39

5) Operating Costs 100,000.00 918,684.03

6) PPF Advance refund 250,000.00 91,522.53

7) Unallocated 900,000.00 0.00

8) Special Account 57,731.15

Total 9,000,000.00 8,896,556.46

*Source: Development Credit Agreement between Republic of Mali and IDA, March 26, 1996**Source: World Bank Disbursement data, May 26, 2003

Projected sources of funding for the project at Appraisal in US$ million were:

IDA - 13.4Government and Employers - 5.8French Agency for Cooperation (FAC) - 3.7

On average, FAC contributed 25 million CFAF annually, SwissContact, 60 million CFAF annually and the GoM, 200 million CFAF annually. (Please refer to Table 3: Annual Receipts on the Vocational Training Tax, 1997 to 2002).

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:As at the end of the project, sustainability of overall project achievement was unlikely. The project had made some contribution to the vocational and technical education system, however, there were issues of institutional and financial sustainability for all the three components. Financial viability of the VTSF component with respect to maintaining output achievement is not very certain. Following the institution of the professional training tax law in April 1997, actual collection of the professional training tax started in

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earnest in January 1998. (Please see annual receipts in Table 3).

Table 3: Annual Receipts on the Vocational Training Tax, 1997 to 2002

Vocational Training Tax

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Expected VTT 12,950,244 278,983,833 467,663,915 636,134,374 460,000,842VTT collected 73,447,996 142,206,946 184,500,000 320,367,798 410,358,272 448,716,365Recovery Rate % 1098.10 66.13 68.50 64.51 97.55

The execution rate of VTT increased from 66.13 percent in 1999 to 97.55 percent in 2002. In 1998, actual VTT collected exceeded expected VTT almost eleven times due to an underestimation of the amount which was projected to correspond to the budgetary contribution received in 1997. In line with the financial sustainability objective of setting up the VTT, the GoM undertook a study on the sustainability of VTSF which estimated the financial needs of VTSF as follows:

2003 - CFAF 1,450 billion2004 - CFAF 1,600 billion2005 - CFAF 1,660 billion2006 - CFAF 1,700 billion2007 - CFAF 1,800 billion

The study proposed that for the VTSF to be financially sustainable, its share of the lump sum tax should increase from 0.5 percent to 2 percent. Upon obtaining initial agreement with the GoM, the board of VTSF and IDA, a formal brief for increasing the training levy to 2 percent was submitted by the relevant ministries to the Council of Ministers. At the time of project completion, however, the increase had not been approved. While an increase of the training levy to 2 percent is very important, the VTSF will also have to correct the inefficiencies in the collection of the tax if financial sustainability is to be achieved. In contrast to financial sustainability, institutional sustainability is more likely. The active involvement of the private sector resulting in the development of a new vocational education and technical training culture has contributed significantly to institutional sustainability. Examples are provided by the artisanal sector of the informal sector and enterprises and businesses such as FNAM and FNEM. The VTSF board is chaired by a private sector representative, a situation which supports VTSF sustainability.

Institutional effectiveness of the ETO component is uncertain. Added to the staffing issue, which until the end of the project had not been resolved, there is the issue of the autonomy of the ETO. Although it was agreed that the ETO will be financially autonomous for purposes of implementing the project, the formal regulation/degree to ensure the autonomy was drafted but never adopted. The ETO was set up under the auspices of the National Employment and Manpower Office (ONMOE). When the ONMOE was restructured to become the National Agency for Employment (ANPE), the extra ETO became one of several departments under the ANPE with no separate budget or program of activities which situation means that ETO activities may cease entirely.

To ensure the maintenance of equipment and to guard against disruptions in the teaching of modules and the learning process, four agents were trained locally in the industrial maintenance by the UFAE/MB under the first component on Pre-service Vocational Education. The training in maintenance methods was in the area of Mechanic Manufacturing where three instructors were trained and in General Mechanics and Automation where one instructor was trained. The DNETP was, however, not satisfied with the training provided maintaining that the training did not meet expected outcomes. There is therefore not much evidence of sustainability especially with regard to ensuring an uninterrupted learning process in vocational and technical training institutions.

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The recommendation of the ICR team is for sectoral and macro dialogue with the GoM to vigorously pursue the issues that need to be addressed for the likelihood of sustainability to be increased.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:Some of the Pre-service VET component activities will continue with the current Education Sector Expenditure Project, 2001-2004. The new 10-year project took into consideration the Pre-service VET component and activities will cover certain salient areas. It is expected that the Education Sector Expenditure Project will further prepare the ground work for more sustainable achievement. If the VTSF continues to be financed by the GoM and the private sector it will continue its activities. It is unlikely that the transitional arrangements under the new ANPE will translate into the ETO activities being taken over fully by the GoM. The technical arrangements made for future operation are not adequate for the ETO and will not ensure timely provision of all necessary inputs for the delivery of outputs.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:The Bank’s overall performance in project identification, assistance in preparation and appraisal was satisfactory. As described in section 3.5, the project was consistent with country and sector priorities which was to address the provide basic professional and technical skills demanded by the labor market and required for Mali’s economic development. The project was also consistent with CAS objectives to alleviate poverty through economic growth, human resources development and focusing on the needs of the most vulnerable groups. The Bank worked consistently with the Borrower during the course of the project identification and preparation and expanded beneficiary participation to ensure ownership.

The project design took into consideration institutional requirements and built into the project mechanisms for setting up new institutions, where relevant, as in the case of the VTSF. The analytical basis for project preparation was a series of seven labor market and training surveys to ascertain labor market demand and to help identify vocational training streams which lead to employment. In the setting up of the VTSF, the Bank fielded experienced staff who had designed similar funds in other countries. Staff worked closely with Malian consultants and during project preparation, the preparatory team visited Côte d’Ivoire to observe the structure and processes of their training fund. The quantity and quality of Bank staff/consultants skill mix during project preparation was satisfactory and the preparatory team included the relevant mix of staff.

7.2 Supervision:Overall supervision of the project was also satisfactory but more marginally so. There were 13 supervision missions led by three out of four team leaders for the project. Supervision mission teams consisted largely of the relevant mix of skills namely education, procurement, financial management, economists and consultants. There was no mention of WID, labor market or informal sector specialists during implementation although these skill requirements were proposed during the design of the project and are outlined in SAR Table 1: IDA Supervision Plan. Teams consisted of between one and seven members comprised of Country Office and Washington-based staff. Missions lasted an average of nine days prior to mid-term review which lasted four days. A 4-day mid-term review seemed a short period of time in view of the issues at stake. After mid-term review, missions were, on average, a little shorter. A total of 18 PSRs were opened for the project, however, reporting was not always adequate. For example, issues identified at the beginning of the project were never reviewed until the end of the project. In addition, updates on key performance indicators was not always done.

Regarding the rating of "satisfactory" for all the PSRs until the very last PSR which was rated

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"unsatisfactory", the ICR team concluded that the project team must have rated the project too severely and given the opportunity, there would have been a change in the rating if the PSR had not been archived before a change could be made. This assessment is based on discussions with the project team and written comments by the Bank's management advising a review of the ratings to "marginally satisfactory" as indicated under Manager's Comments in PSR# 18. To a large extent, a monitoring and evaluation mechanism was in place to ensure that data was available and where data was unavailable for monitoring. Plans to undertake surveys and studies, in most cases, could not be carried out. Please refer to Appendix 1: Summary of Project Outcomes based on Performance Ratings by Component. Although performance indicators selected were not categorized by outcome and output in the SAR, they were adequate and measurable. During the mid-term review, it was noted that performance indicators had not been reviewed to take into account delays in achieving outputs and outcomes. In response to this, the mid-term review outlined a new plan to mitigate this weakness. The plan was however not translated into subsequent PSRs and a restructuring was not undertaken. The Aide-Memoires however, indicated that there was pro-activity on the part of the project team and sufficient attention provided for early detection and resolution of implementation problems. An example is the simplification of processes for beneficiary access to the VTSF undertaken during the mid-term review of the project which took place May 29 to June 2, 2000.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:The Bank’s overall performance was rated satisfactory

Borrower7.4 Preparation:The GoM involvement in the preparation of the project was satisfactory. During project preparation, account was taken of most of the lessons learned in five previously financed education projects in Mali. Employers were encouraged to contribute to the design of practical training programs, and some effort was made to ensure adequate public funds for operational cost of training institutions. Particularly relevant to the project preparation was the consideration given to ensure adequate capacity of the three key implementing institutions. Key institutions aligned to the three components of the project were strengthened to facilitate implementation although this alignment sometimes led to challenges in coordinating the entire project. The monitoring structure of the Steering Committee and its work with the DNTEP, the VTSF and the ETO was reviewed. Most of the conditions for negotiation were met except for the allocation of offices to the VTSF and the naming of personnel which incidentally also delayed project effectiveness.

7.5 Government implementation performance:The government’s overall implementation performance was satisfactory but only marginally. While sector policies supported the objectives of the project, the government's commitment with respect to the appointment of key staff and the provision of counterpart funding was sometimes delayed or not carried out. For example, recruitment of additional staff for the ETO was never carried through, although it was reported consistently as an issue in all the PSRs and several times in official communications between the Bank and the Borrower. An example is the Memorandum of the Supervision Mission of the PCFP to the Borrower dated July 1, 2002 in which the GoM's attention is drawn to the fact that action had not been taken on an agreement reached during the December 2001 mission to fill vacant positions in the ETO. The ETO never had the full complement of staff even at project completion and the Acting Director was not confirmed until the end of March 2000. The situation, in addition to funding issues, led to delays in holding dissemination workshops, for example.

Progress on the implementation of the VTSF component was hindered due to a lack of counterpart funding. Initially, the employment taxes, levied and collected on salaries were not transferred to the VTSF. This

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situation led to a much slower pace of training and contributed to trainee numbers not meeting set targets. In addition, the proposed increase in the VTT from 0.5 percent to 2 percent was never carried through. With respect to the Pre-service VET, the expected increase from 50,000 CFAF to 60,000 CFAF in public VET expenditure per student (on equipment and materials) was never realized. There was also the situation in 1999 when equipment that had been procured for the Pre-service VET component was blocked by customs for two months mostly due to bureaucratic bottlenecks. The equipment was finally cleared and installed in the selected institutions as intended but the delay affected the overall achievement of project outputs and outcomes.

7.6 Implementing Agency:The performance of implementing agencies was satisfactory. Shortly after effectiveness, project coordination was identified as a key factor affecting project implementation and outcome. The initial weak project management resulted in delays in addressing issues such as the need for an auditor’s opinion of the implementation manual and the opening of a special account at the start of the project. After project coordination was streamlined and key implementing agencies were incorporated, the management of the project improved significantly. Steering Committee meetings were held regularly and minutes of meetings and updated project activity reports were regularly submitted to IDA. Financial management and financial reporting were satisfactory. Implementation delays related to procurement issues were usually resolved. For example, during the first two years of implementation, the procurement process for the Pre-service VET component had to be redone because of initial poor quality. This led to a delay in the procurement of key goods and services required for project implementation. With the resolution of these procurement issues, the implementation of the Pre-service VET proceeded more smoothly however, the built-in delays impacted on the successful achievement of project outputs and outcomes leading to failure in meeting certain targets. Beneficiary participation was modest in the VTSF component. In 2002, financial contributions from sponsors and/or beneficiaries for the equipping of private and semi-private training centers was 52 percent of contributions. Financial contributions from the formal sector were weaker in comparison to the informal sector in the VTSF component.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:The Borrower’s overall performance on preparation of the project was satisfactory based on the satisfactory performance of implementing agencies and the GoM’s performance during project preparation and implementation. Most project sub-component output objectives were satisfactory, leading to overall satisfactory outcomes. Prerequisite activities such as the setting up of institutions for project implementation or the setting up of the VTT for example although delayed, were successfully instituted.

8. Lessons Learned

General lessons:Lessons learned fit into the larger context of global lessons drawn from a World Bank document, Vocational Education and Training Reform:Matching Skills to Markets and Budgets, published in March 2000. One important lesson drawn from this wider context is that institutional change is an important requirement for expanding VET. This lesson is very relevant in the case of the project and core institutional requirements/activities for the implementation of the project should have been in place before the start of the project. The recommendation here is that project approval dates could be extended where necessary, to ensure that institutional requirements are in place. Effectiveness delays and late start-up of key activities e.g. the setting up the VTSF and the VTT, could have been avoided.

From the broader context of lessons learned, maintaining relationships among various partners and employer groups and the vocational education and training system is critical. The project should have done

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a better job of maintaining closer and effective links with stakeholders, by bringing together all components and key players right from the beginning. Multiple implementing agencies overseeing various components of the project made coordination challenging and led to difficulties in maintaining the integration of project components. Where multiple agencies are involved, an understanding should be reached on coordination arrangements within existing institutional structures before the project starts. In cases in which capacity for project coordination is weak, arrangements should be made for skills transfer during project implementation. The lesson here is that possible barriers to ensuring effective relationships should be identified very early in the project and addressed in order to mitigate implementation problems.

Key partners should be involved in the project beginning with project preparation. For example, in the case of the PCFP, although agencies such as French Cooperation and SwissContact supported vocational and technical training, these agencies were not coordinated, leading to each establishment working on its own. A global lesson drawn from recommendations made in a recent publication on vocational education and technical training, Skills Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2003, expands the idea. The assertion is that governments should realize they cannot do all that is needed to provide vocational education and training. Governments should be more strategic by fostering partnerships with other providers, promoting social equity and filling critical skills gaps.

Project planning should build in flexibility to absorb changes as a result of elections, institutional reshuffling and shifting of key staff during project implementation. Projects should anticipate the possible impact of changes in government mid-stream of project implementation to ensure steady project implementation.

Project specific lessons :Component 1 – Pre-service VET ServicesWorld Bank studies on VET have demonstrated that investing in new or substantially upgraded facilities, equipment, training materials, curriculum reform and teacher training in anticipation of growing demand for skills, very frequently, does not yield the expected results. An example in this context is the estimated number of students in reinforced streams for the Pre-service VET component. Estimates of expected demand for skills did not match the actual number of students in 2001 as outlined in Annex 1: Key Performance Indicators/Logframe Matrix. The total number of students in reinforced streams constituted only 19 percent of total estimated students or estimated demand for skills. It is important to consider this in project design and implementation and to ensure that expectations are more realistic.

The timing of key activities which influence other activities, should be carefully monitored to avoid delays. An example is the review of curriculum which, in turn, affected the procurement of equipment, which then impacted on the training of instructors and also affected the enrollment of students. Delays in key activities could have a very substantial negative impact on project implementation and achievement of outcomes.

Engaging with the borrower on planning for maintenance is critical for sustaining project activities after project completion. This should start at the very beginning of the project and not mid-way or when the project is about to end. In projects in which specific skills are required to procure, install and maintain equipment, the relevant technical skills required should be obtained through consultancies or skills transfer to ensure that specifications are adhered to, equipment are rightly installed and a maintenance plan is followed. The specifications, installation and maintenance problems encountered with the Pre-service VET component could have been mitigated.

Close attention must be paid to the collection of monitoring information to avoid a situation in which data/information is not available for determining achievement of outcomes. Where it was not possible to

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obtain such critical monitoring data, adequate proxies should be obtained to ensure that an assessment of project achievements can be made. Follow-up on students and apprentices was important for the Pre-service and VTSF components, respectively, and a database of names and addresses of students and apprentices, should have been created as soon as trainees registered for training. The existence of a database could have allowed for a quick survey of students' expectations regarding future employment for example, and would have allowed for a determination of outcomes to have been made.

Component 2 – Vocational Training Support Fund (VTSF) for Skills UpgradingEnsuring a steady source of funding for training is key for maintaining the training culture that has been created in the formal and informal sector. Sustaining this aspect of the project is imperative if the gains made during the project are to be maintained. Competitiveness in training needs should be maintained in order to keep costs at manageable levels.

Obtaining and acting on feedback from beneficiaries during project implementation is important as was the case when the VTSF procedures presented obstacles to accessing training funds and were simplified during project implementation.

Ensuring that the Borrower adequately plans for counterpart funding during project implementation is important if project delays are to be prevented. The engagement on counterpart funding should actively involve the Ministry of Finance which budgets for and releases this funding. Progress of the VTSF component was hindered as a result of delays in the release of counterpart funds.

Component 3 – Employment and Training ObservatoryAgreeing with the Borrower on the minimum number of years staff should be at post after training is critical. For example, the GoM transferred ETO staff during project implementation leaving the institution with barely enough staff to implement the activities of the ETO component. The situation could have been mitigated if agreement had been reached prior to project effectiveness.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:A letter dated June 25, 2003, received from the GoM indicated that the government shared the views presented in the ICR. The government's contribution to the ICR is attached as Annex 8.

(b) Cofinanciers:Discussions held by the ICR team with the French Development Cooperation in Mali was very revealing. The agency acknowledged the weakness in collaboration with IDA during the implementation of the project. There was some cooperation on pedagogic training between the French Development Cooperation and Swiss Contact, another NGO working on VET, but not much between the two agencies and IDA although they were all working in the area of VET. The French Development Cooperation supported the UFAE which directly received funding from the agency without passing through the coordination unit. The project was prepared and implemented alongside the PCFP. The lack of coordination and collaboration made implementation quite challenging.

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

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10. Additional Information

Appendix 1: Summary of Project Outcomes based on Performance Ratings by Component

P r o j e c t O u t c o m e s C o m p o n e n t s Object ives Per formance Ind ica tors T a r g e t e d A c t u a l 2 0 0 1

C o m m e n t s / R a t i n g s

Publ ic VET expendi tu re pe r s tuden t on equ ipment and mate r ia l s ( in C F A F )

60 ,000 C F A F

50 ,000 C F A F

Less than 25% f r o m reaching ta rge t

S

Percentage of t ra inees in re inforced s t r eams employed wi th in 1 yea r a f te r g rad .

70% No t de te rmined

No t enough t ime to de te rmine (no t r a ted)

1 Im p r o v e Qual i ty and Re levance o f Pre- service V E T

Im p r o v e q u a li ty, supply, e f f ic iency and re levance of pre -se rv ice VET, in o rde r to p rov ide young t ra inees wi th knowledge and sk i l l s demanded by labor market .

Ave rage mon th ly ea rn ings o f VET t ra inees , 1 year af ter graduat ion ( in C F A F )

68 ,000 C F A F

No t de te rmined

No t enough t ime to de te rmine (no t r a ted)

Pe rcen tage o f t r a inees employed wi th in s ix months of t ra in ing

95% No t de te rmined

No t enough t ime to de te rmine (no t ra ted)

Percen tage increase in month ly earn ings s ix months a f te r t ra in ing

10% No t de te rmined

N o t e n o u gh t ime to de te rmine (no t ra ted)

Percen tage o f t ra inees who pass apprent iceship cer t i f ica t ion exam

80% No t de te rmined

Not de te rmined a t I C R (not ra ted)

2 D e v e l o p Susta inable In -service Voca t iona l a n d Technica l Tra in ing Capaci ty

Improve the qua l i ty and capaci ty of ski l ls upgrading serv ice , in order to enhance labor force ski l ls and product iv i ty a m o n g formal and in formal workers .

Percen tage of female t ra inees 40% 30.5% Less tha t 25% f rom reaching ta rge t

S

Employment and t r a in ing semina r s fo r po l icy makers

3 0 15 Marg ina l ly sat isfactory

M S 3 Im p r o v e Labor Marke t In fo rmat ion .

Inc rease employmen t and ea rn ings th rough improved func t ion ing o f the labor marke t and enhanced ef fec t iveness o f the l abor marke t

Labor marke t awareness seminars fo r s tuden ts and o ther VET t ra inees

4 3 23 Marg ina l ly sat isfactory

M S

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Appendix 2: Summary of Project Outputs based on Performance Ratings by Component

Project Outputs Components Objectives Performance Indicators Targeted Actual

2001

Comments/Ratings

1 Improve Quality and Relevance of Pre-Service VET

Improve quality, supply, efficiency and relevance of pre-service VET, in order to provide young trainees with knowledge and skills demanded by labor market.

Auto mechanics Electrical Mechanics General Mechanics (Maintenance) Accounting Secretarial and Office Skills Electrical Contracting Metalwork Carpentry and Woodwork Plumbing Masonry Total VET Trainees in reinforced streams

160 80 160 160 240 80 80 160 80 80 1,280*

70 40 37 0 0 0 28 23 18 24 240

Market was not fully responsive (not rated)

2 Develop Sustainable In-Service Vocational and Technical Training Capacity

Improve the quality and capacity of skills upgrading service, in order to enhance labor force skills and productivity among formal and informal workers.

Person-months of training financed Formal sector training proposals approved (#) Informal sector training proposals approved (#) Formal sector financial contrib. (CFAF m.) Informal sector financial contrib.(CFAFm.) Training centers benefiting from VTSF inv. (#) Professions with nat. apprenticeship cert. (#)

40,300 175 275 1,515 220 25 13

24,915 478 526 518.9 335.7 13 9

Did not meet target Exceeded target about 4 times Exceeded target almost twice Did not meet target Exceeded target Marginally satisfactory Marginally satisfactory

U HS HS U HS MS MS

3 Improve Labor Market Information.

Increase employment and earnings through improved functioning and enhanced effectiveness of the labor market

Training modules for ETO personnel (#) Employer and labor market surveys (#) Household employment and earnings surv. (#) Pre-service trainee tracer study (#) Publications (#)

7 5 5 5 15

35 7 5 2 44

Exceeded target 5 times! Exceeded target Right on target Did not meet target Exceeded target 3 times over!

HS S S U HS

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

This project was developed prior to the new log frame indicator format.

Outcome Indicators Projected in SAR/ PAD End of Project

Actual/Latest Estimate

Component 1: Improve Quality and Relevance of Pre-service Vocational Education and Training

Public VET expenditure per student on equipment and materials (in CFAF)Percentage of trainees in reinforced streams employed within 1 year after graduationAverage monthly earnings of VET trainees, 1 year after graduation (in CFAF)

60,000 CFAF70%68,000 CFAF

50,000 CFAFNot determinedNot determined

Component 2: Develop Sustainable In-Service Vocational and Technical Training Capacity

Percentage of trainees employed within six months of trainingPercentage increase in monthly earnings six months after trainingPercentage of trainees who pass apprenticeship certification examPercentage of female trainees

95%10%80%40%

Not determinedNot determinedNot determined30.5

Component 3: Improve Labor Market Information

Employment and training seminars for policy makersLabor market awareness seminars for students and other VET trainees.

3043

1523

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Output Indicators Projected in SAR/ PAD End of Project

Actual/Latest Estimate

Component 1: Improve Quality and Relevance of Pre-service Vocational Education and Training

Auto mechanicsElectrical MechanicsGeneral Mechanics (Maintenance)AccountingSecretarial and Office SkillsElectrical ContractingMetalworkCarpentry and WoodworkPlumbingMasonryTotal VET Trainee Project Beneficiaries in reinforced streams

160 80160160240808016080801,280*

70403700028231824240

Component 2: Develop Sustainable In-Service Vocational and Technical Training Capacity

Number of person-months of training financedNumber of formal sector training proposals approvedNumber of informal sector training proposals approvedFormal sector financial contributions (CFAF million)Informal sector financial contributions (CFAF million)Number of training centers benefiting from VTSF equipt. invest.Number of professions with national apprenticeship cert. stand.

40,300 175 275 1,515 CFAF m. 220 CFAF m. 25 13

24,078 476 491 515.6 CFAF m. 370.3 CFAF m. 13 8

Component 3: Improve Labor Market Information

Number of training modules for ETO personnelEmployer and labor market surveys (carried out, processed, analyzed, disseminated)Household employment and earnings survey (carried out, processed, analyzed, diss.)Pre-service trainee tracer study (carried out, processed, analyzed, disseminated)Publications (at least 20 pgs designed for policy makers, reflect labor mkt trends)

7 5 5 515

35 7 5 244

* Annual Enrollment targeted for 2001 according to Project Performance Indicators in SAR.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)AppraisalEstimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Component US$ million US$ millionQuality and Relevance of Pre-service VET 7.90 8.13 102.91Vocational Training Support Fund 10.20 12.44 121.96Employment and Training Observatory 1.50 1.61 107.33

Total Baseline Cost 19.60 22.18 Physical Contingencies 1.30 Price Contingencies 2.00 0.72 36

Total Project Costs 22.90 22.90Total Financing Required 22.90 22.90

Source of Exchange Rate information: Integrated Controller's System (ICS), June 12, 2003 - US$1 to CFA 559.66

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 1353.00 190.00 0.00 1543.00(0.00) (1150.00) (69.00) (0.00) (1219.00)

2. Goods 4010.00 223.00 269.00 101.00 4603.00(4010.00) (223.00) (229.00) (0.00) (4462.00)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 9045.00 2711.00 11756.00Training & Consultancies (0.00) (0.00) (5588.00) (0.00) (5588.00)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 1991.00 456.00 2447.00Contractual Services (0.00) (0.00) (1991.00) (0.00) (1991.00)5. MiscellaneousIncremental Recurrent Costs

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

145.00(145.00)

2368.00(0.00)

2513.00(145.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

Total 4010.00 1576.00 11640.00 5636.00 22862.00(4010.00) (1373.00) (8022.00) (0.00) (13405.00)

- 25 -

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.90(0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77)

2. Goods 2.04 0.62 0.00 0.00 2.66(0.73) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.86)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.28Training & Consultancies (0.00) (0.00) (0.93) (0.00) (0.93)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Contractual Services (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)5. MiscellaneousIncremental Recurrent Costs

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

Total 2.04 1.53 1.28 0.00 4.84(0.73) (0.89) (0.93) (0.00) (2.56)

1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest EstimatePercentage of Appraisal

IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF.Quality and Relevance of Pre-service VET

9.20 2.30 6.30 1.84 0.00 68.5 80.0

Vocational Training Support Fund

12.00 3.70 7.74 4.49 0.20 64.5 121.4

Employment and Training Observatory

1.70 0.80 0.48 1.13 0.00 28.2 141.3

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

In the SAR, the only calculation of rates of returns was proposed for the VET trainees. The private and social rates of return were estimated at 30 percent and 11 percent, respectively for 2-year CAP trainees. For the 4-year BT trainees, the corresponding rates of returns were 33 and 17 percent, respectively. These rates of returns were based on the assumption that the average salaries would be that of the modern sector salary and that 75 percent trainees would be employed within three years of graduation. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis found that in order to achieve 10 percent minimum social returns among CAP, at least 60 percent of trainees needed to find a job which paid a monthly salary of at least 60,000 CFAF (in 1996 value), within three years of graduation. For BT trainees overall, at least 75 percent needed to be employed within three years of graduation, and earning at least 90,000 CFAF per month (in 1996 value). At the time of the ICR, none of the above data were available for calculating the rates of returns to the investment.

It has been well established that rates of returns to education investment's extend well beyond the augmented salaries earned by the trainees. The social returns and many long-term economic benefits are not rewarded by the market. This is why the education sector requires long-term and significant public investments. This project had an objective of building an in-country financial and training capacity to effectively link education with the labor market’s needs, thus providing the economy with much needed skilled labor. It also had an objective to link the Malian labor market with the neighboring Sub-Saharan African (SSA) country labor markets. At the close of the project, it was more useful to analyze the effectiveness of the investment in terms of achieving the project objectives, and the sustainability of the financial and training capacity built by the project.

Effectiveness and Sustainability of the Project Investment

This section will analyze the effectiveness of the financial investment by component. It will also investigate the capacity sustainability by project component. The total project cost was US$22.9 million, and IDA was to finance US$13.4 out of total US$14.8 million foreign exchange part of the project. The total actual foreign exchange spending at the closing of the project was US$14.5 million. Overall, the project spent 98 percent of total anticipated investment in foreign exchange. Tables 1 to 3 below show the anticipated and actual outcomes, and proposed and actual investments (based on foreign exchange spending) by project sub-component. Overall, the components with specific numerical targets and with regard to personal trainings are under-achieved. Achieved objectives mostly concern facility and equipment building/upgrading and research/analysis, etc.

The total anticipated investment in foreign exchange for Component 1 was US$5.9 million, and the actual spending was US$6.3. Table 1 gives an overview of Component 1 outcomes and investments. For Component 1.1, although the actual spending was almost 3 percent higher than planned, the objectives were underachieved. Despite the investment in the five training facilities, only 240 trainees were trained compared with the 1,280 planned. Please refer to Appendix 2: Summary of Project Outputs based on Performance Ratings by Component. For Component 1.2, the actual spending was much lower than the planned budget, but teaching the new curriculum was sometimes impeded by insufficient teaching material supplies required for teaching and learning and the component cannot be evaluated as a complete success. For Component 1.3, the physical structure of the ETO was built, with new furnishing, equipment, etc. However, the office had a high staff turn-over and had difficulty retaining qualified staff. At the close of the project, three staff out of seven planned by the project were at work in the ETO. Overall, Component 1 over spent US$0.4 million. Capacity was, however, built in the DNETP and ETO to continue project activities.

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Table 1 Project Objectives and Investment, Component 1

Project components

Expected outcomes Actual 2001 outcomes Proposed IDA ($m)

Actual IDA ($m)

1. Pre-service VET services 5.9 6.31.1--Upgrade training facilities

Upgrading five training facilities, support of training for seven streams of 1,280 trainees

Upgrading satisfactory,10 streams were supported, trained 240 trainees

3.5 3.6

1.2--Improve quality of instruction

Curriculum reform, training instructors, linking training to labor market

Reform carried out, insufficient supply of teaching materials in reformed curricula, which requires more teaching materials than the old curricula.

2.1 1.6

1.3--Development management capacity at central and school levels

At the central level, building new offices, training school directors, twinning DNETP with MOE of Quebec

New Department of Technical and Vocational training was established with new offices, equipment and staff, the other two outcomes are unclear

0.3 1.1

The total anticipated investment in foreign exchange for Component 2 was US$7.8 million, but the actual spending was US$7.7 million. Table 2 gives an overview of outcomes and investments of Component 2. For Sub-component 2.1, at the time of closing, the VTSF fund was deemed to be unsustainable due to inadequate VTT. The trainees supported by this fund constituted 60 percent of what had been planned. A special target for the recruitment of 40 percent female trainees was not achieved, although female's share of the trainees did increase moderately from 26 percent to 31 percent. The sub-component underspent by 16 percent of anticipated budget, and its achievements was at least 40 percent below the targets. The sub-component itself was a moderate success, although the financial efficiency was low. Sub-component 2.2 overspent the budget of US$0.3 million with an actual spending of US$1.4 million. To date, no explanation has been provided for the overspending. In spite of overspending, the objective was partially achieved with about 60 percent of targets being reached. Overall, Component 2 significantly reallocated the resources between the two sub-components. The overall objective was partially achieved.

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Table 2 Project Objectives and Investment, Component 2

Project components

Expected outcomes Actual 2001 outcomes Proposed IDA ($m)

Actual IDA ($m)

2. Develop sustainable in-service vocational and technical 7.8 7.72.1--Skills upgrading and retraining

Establishment of a revolving VTSF, increase annual in-service trainees from 3,000 to 10,000, increase women trainees from current 26 to 40 %.

VTSF is unlikely to be sustainable at the current stage, about 60 % of targeted person-months training was achieved, 30% of women trainees

7.5 6.3

2.2--Apprentice-ship certification Developing a national system

of apprenticeship certification for 13 priority occupations.

National standards were established for 9 professions

0.3 1.4

The total anticipated investment in foreign exchange for Component 3 was US$1.1 million, but the actual spending was only US$0.49 million. Table 3 gives an overview of the outcomes and investments of Component 3. The objective of Sub-component 3.1 was partially achieved with some serious sustainability problems due to the under staffing of the ETO. Sub-component 3.2 underspent half of the anticipated budget, yet staff were trained on 35 instead of 7 modules. However, trained staff apparently did not stay with the ETO, because only three key staff remained with the ETO at the time of project completion. Component 3.3 spent only US$60,000, as reported, but produced 14 surveys/studies and 44 publications. Given the quantity of output, it is likely that there was additional Government funding. Without actually reviewing the contents of each of the surveys and publications, it is hard to assess the quality of the research done. For Component 3.4, only US$30,000 was spent, compared to US$300,000 planned. The documentation center was opened as planned, and at least 50 percent of planned training seminars were undertaken. Component 3 was a small component in terms of project budget, and underspent significantly. Some objectives were achieved, mostly training, physical infrastructures and supplies. The sustainability at the end of the project was an issue.

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Table 3 Project outcomes and investments, component 3

Project components

Expected outcomes Actual 2001 outcomes Proposed IDA ($m)

Actual IDA ($m)

3. Improve labor market information 1.1 0.493.1--Employment and training observatory

Establish an employment and training observatory

ETO was established and functions satisfactorily, although with recurring under staffing problems

0.2 0.22

3.2--Training of ETO staff ETO staff will be

trained based on a 7-module program

ETO staff were trained based on a 35 module program, exchange programs established with other countries

0.3 0.18

3.3--Surveys of labor market and training

Support three labor market surveys each year and the analysis of the data

Fourteen surveys were conducted, and 44 publications produced, compared to 15 targeted. The quality of analysis, however, questionable due to lack of basic data

0.3 0.06

3.4--Dissemination of labor market information

Support ETO Documentation Center with equipment, publication fees, and job counseling for secondary and higher education students

Documentation center opened in early 2002. Twenty-three labor market awareness seminars and 15 training seminars for policy makers were conducted, about half of what had been planned.

0.3 0.03

In conclusion, the project only partially achieved its objectives mostly related to training, physical infrastructure, equipment and supplies. On the number of trainees, the target was partially met. Some capacity was however built up but it is not certain whether this will be enough to continue the project objective of providing the economy with trained professionals of relevant skills. In order to strengthen sustainability, the ICR team recommends that macro and sector policy dialogue relating to these issues should be pursued with the GoM.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation11/07/94 3 TASK TEAM LEADER (1);

CONSULTANTS (2)

Appraisal/Negotiation01/29/96 4 TASK TEAM LEADER (1);

LEGAL COUNSEL (2); RESIDENT REP. (1)

Supervision

03/16/1997 3 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (2);

S S

06/27/1997 2 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1)

S S

01/27/1998 1 EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1) S S05/20/1998 1 EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1) S S12/12/1998 3 TASK TEAM LEADER (1);

PROCUREMENT SPEC (1); FINANCIAL MGMT ASST (1)

S S

06/12/1999 3 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC (1); FINANCIAL MGMT SPEC (1)

S S

02/19/2000 4 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC (1); FINANCIAL MGMT SPECIALIST (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1)

S S

05/29/2000 7 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); ECONOMIST (1);FINANCIAL ANALYST (2); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC (1); CONSULTANT (1)

S S

11/17/2000 5 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (1); ECONOMIST (1)

S S

09/04/2001 5 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FIN. MGMT SPECIALIST (1); ECONOMIST (1)

S S

12/08/2001 3 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); FIN. MGMT SPECIALIST (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1)

S S

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06/15/2002 4 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); FIN. MGMT SPECIALIST (1); CONSULTANT (1); PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1)

S S

ICR12/20/2002 4 TASK TEAM LEADER (1);

PROCUREMENT SPEC. (1); CONSULTANT (1); FIN. MGMT SPECIALIST (1)

U U

02/12/2003 2 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); EDUCATION SPECIALIST (1)

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 21.20 39,000.30Appraisal/Negotiation 46.00 118,001.00Supervision 122.40 261,092.63ICR 23.18 14,015.37Total 212.78 432,109.30

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Republic of Mali, December 1, 1994

Staff Appraisal Report, February 15, 1996

Memorandum and Recommendation of the President of the IDA, February 15, 1996

Letter of Development Policy, February 26, 1996

Development Credit Agreement, March 26, 1996

Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for the Republic of Mali, April 24, 1998

Aide-Memoire, Mid-Term Review Mission, May 29, 2000

Commentaire sur La Note Technique Portant sur la Restructuration de l'Office National de la Main d'Oeuvre et de l'Emploi, January 8, 2001

Various Preparation, Negotiation and Supervision Aide-Memoires, December 16, 1994 to December 20, 2002

ICR Aide-Memoire, Final Supervision Mission, December 20, 2002

Project Status Reports (18), April 19, 1996 to February 4, 2003

Report on the End of Activities Seminar of the PCFP, February 17-18, 2003

Rapport d'Achèvement du Project de Consolidation de la Formation Professionnelle (PCFP), 1996-2002

Vocational Education and Training: The Role of the Public Sector in a Market Economy, HROWP April 1994

Vocational Education and Training Reform:matching skills to markets and budgets, WB Publication, March 2000

Skills Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Richard K. Johanson and Arvil V. Adams, June 2003

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Additional Annex 8. Partner Contribution to ICR

1. Introduction La signature de l’Accord de crédit 2828/MLI relatif au Projet de Consolidation de la Formation Professionnelle (PCFP) le 26 mars 1996 à Washington traduit la volonté du gouvernement du Mali de procéder d’une part, à une réforme en profondeur de son système de formation technique et professionnelle et d’autre part, à améliorer la productivité des entreprises et des artisans ainsi que la collecte des informations relatives à l’emploi.

Le PCFP qui a couvert une période d’exécution de six (6) ans, a comme toute œuvre humaine enregistré des points forts et des points faibles dans la réalisation des activités devant concourir à l’atteinte des objectifs de développement assignés au projet.

2. Rappel des objectifs et de la description du projetLe projet vise à :

a) Augmenter la productivité de la main-d’œuvre à travers l’amélioration de la qualité et la pertinence de la formation professionnelle ;b) Renforcer la capacité institutionnelle à gérer les ressources financières, humaines et matérielles allouées à la formation professionnelle publique et privée, avec la participation active du secteur privé ;

c) Améliorer l’adéquation formation-emploi.

3. Principaux résultats atteints et évaluation des résultas globaux du projetAu regard des indicateurs de performance contenus dans le « Plan d’exécution du projet » de décembre 1995, il ressort que les objectifs de réalisation du projet ont été atteints. L’essentiel des activités prévues a été réalisé.

4. Principaux facteurs ayant affecté la mise en œuvre du projetLes principaux facteurs ayant affecté l’exécution des activités du PCFP se résument comme suit :

4.1 Le retard accusé dans l’entrée en vigueur du projetL’Accord de crédit 2828/MLI signé le 26 mars 1996 entre le Gouvernement du Mali et l’Association Internationale de Développement ( IDA) n’est entré en vigueur qu’un an plus tard soit le 26 mars 1997. Cette situation a de ce fait retardé d’un an le démarrage des activités des composantes FPI et FAFPA, d’où la prorogation d’un an de la date de clôture du projet initialement fixée au 31 décembre 2001.

4.2 Le taux élevé de la participation des bénéficiaires dans l’exécution des activités du FAFPALes documents du projet prévoyaient une contribution des bénéficiaires à la réalisation des activités du FAFPA.Il est ressorti de l’exécution des activités du FAFPA que la contribution demandée n’était pas facilement mobilisable par les bénéficiaires. N’eût été l’apport de certains partenaires dont l’ONG Swisscontact dans la mobilisation de la contrepartie des bénéficiaires, la formation dans le secteur informel aurait connu un taux d’exécution faible semblable à celui du secteur moderne (34 %). De même seulement 13 sur 25 centres privés ont pu être équipés.

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5. Evaluation de la pérennité du projetLe projet a bien exécuté les activités de réalisation prévues en vue d’atteindre les objectifs de développement. Cependant, il convient de noter que les efforts entrepris par le gouvernement n’ont pas permis à ce jour d’assurer la pérennisation financière des acquis du FAFPA . Les mesures prises pour assurer l’atteinte des objectifs de développement du projet seront examinées dans le point 8 ci-dessous.

6. Evaluation du comportement et de la performance du gouvernement, de l’AGETIPE-Mali et des unités de gestion du projet d’exécution

6.1 Du gouvernementLe gouvernement du Mali n’a ménagé aucun effort pour faciliter l’exécution des activités prévues par le PCFP. Les difficultés rencontrées dans la mobilisation de la contrepartie nationale au démarrage du projet en 1997 étaient dues à l’absence d’une inscription au Budget Spécial d’Investissement par les agences d’exécution courant juin-juillet 1996. Face à l’épuisement du crédit IDA, le gouvernement du Mali a équipé les ateliers de quatre filières de formation rénovés par l’IDA. Le montant total de l’appui exceptionnel consenti par le gouvernement sur les ressources PPTE s’élève à environ 525 millions de francs CFA.

Cependant, des lenteurs préjudiciables à la bonne exécution du projet ont été constatées dans l’approbation des dossiers de passation de marché courant 1998 et 1999 par le ministère de tutelle de la Cellule de Coordination des composante FPI & OEF.

6.2 De l’AGETIPE-MALIL’exécution exclusive des travaux de maîtrise d’ouvrage délégué par l’AGETIPE-Mali n’a pas permis l’exécution satisfaisante dans les délais requis des travaux de construction/ réhabilitation des centres de formation et des locaux administratifs de l’enseignement technique et professionnel. Dans l’avenir, il serait souhaitable d’offrir à l’emprunteur la possibilité de choisir parmi plusieurs prestataires pour faire exécuter les travaux. La recherche de l’efficacité qui avait prévalu en 1996 n’a pas été atteinte .

6.3 De la Cellule de Coordination des Composantes FPI & OEFL’insuffisance numérique du personnel cadre et d’exécution de la Cellule n’a pas facilité l’exécution correcte des activités du projet. Malgré la demande de renforcement de l’effectif de cette unité suggérée par les missions d’audit des comptes du projet pour éviter les incompatibilités de fonctions , l’IDA n’a pas autorisé le recrutement d’un aide comptable. Pendant toute la durée du projet, le personnel de la Cellule a croulé sous le poids du travail et a dû faire face aux incompatibilités de fonctions dans la saisie des écritures comptables maintes fois relevées par les auditeurs.

Malgré les conditions de travail assez difficile, l’équipe de la cellule de Coordination des Composantes FPI & OEF s’est bien acquitté de sa mission en matière de passation de marchés, de mobilisation et de décaissement de fonds.. Le personnel de la Cellule de Coordination du PCFP a acquis au terme de l’exécution du projet une expérience solide en matière de gestion de projet qu’il conviendrait de capitaliser.

6. 4 Du FAFPAL’équipe du FAFPA s’est également acquittée avec satisfaction de ses missions malgré la forte mobilité des cadres du FAFPA due entre autres au manque de motivations financières. Les procédures de passation des marchés prescrites initialement n’ont pas permis à cette unité une exécution rapide des activités de formation.

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7. Evaluation du comportement et de la performance de la Banque Mondiale et du co-financier

7.1 De la Banque MondialeGlobalement le comportement et la bonne compréhension des cadres de la Banque chargés des missions de supervision du projet, de l’approbation des dossiers soumis à revue préalable et des décaissements de fonds auront permis de surmonter les difficultés rencontrées et d’éviter même une suspension du crédit IDA N° 2828/MLI. L’appui financier constant de la Banque pendant toute la durée du projet a été fort appréciable.Le changement fréquent du responsable du projet au niveau de la Banque et la lenteur dans l’approbation de certains dossiers d’appels d’offres internationaux soumis à l’avis préalable de la l’IDA ont également contribué à la mauvaise performance enregistrée du projet en 1997 et 1998.

7.2 De la Coopération française En l’absence d’une coordination effective des activités du projet, l’appréciation du comportement et de la performance du co-financier FAC s’avère difficile. Cependant les activités essentielles soutenues par le FAC ont concerné le FAFPA et les Unités de Formation et d’Appui aux Entreprises (UFAE). La Coopération Française a donc facilité la mise en place des activités principales du FAFPA, en direction des secteurs moderne et surtout de l’artisanat.

7.3 De la coopération suisseLa Coopération suisse bien que ne figurant pas dans les documents du projet comme co-financier a joué un rôle prépondérant dans l’exécution des activités de formation du secteur de l’artisanat à travers l’ONG Swisscontact. En effet, depuis 1998, à travers le Programme d’Appui à la formation professionnelle par Apprentissage dans le secteur de l’Artisanat (PAA) financé par la Coopération suisse, Swisscontact a mis à la disposition du FAFPA un fonds pour le financement de la formation par apprentissage dans les nouveaux métiers développés.

8. Description des mesures proposées pour le fonctionnement futur des activités soutenues par le projetLes activités du PCFP ont été exécutées par des structures pérennes qui sont :

- la Direction Nationale de l’Enseignement Technique et Professionnel pour la composante FPI,- Le Fonds d’Appui à la Formation Professionnelle et à l’Apprentissage pour la composante FAFPA, - L’Observatoire de l’Emploi et de la Formation pour la composante OEF

Seule la Cellule de coordination du projet dont le personnel est en majorité fonctionnaire est appelée à disparaître.Bien avant la date de clôture du projet, les ministères en charge du PCFP ont entrepris des séances de travail avec d’autres départements ministériels en vue de pérenniser le financement des activités du FAFPA et de l’OEF. Les démarches entamées sont porteuses d’espoir dans la mesure où les activités à financer s’inscrivent dans les priorités du gouvernement en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté.

En attendant de procéder sous peu à la relecture des textes portant création du FAFPA en vue de lui permettre de mieux accomplir sa mission, le gouvernement vient d’octroyer à cet Etablissement une subvention de 400 000 000 F.CFA.

La pérennisation des acquis de la composante FPI a été prévue dans les activités du Programme d’Investissement du Secteur de l’Education.

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9. Leçons à tirer du projet et de son exécution Selon l’équipe du projet les leçons préliminaires tirées de l’exécution du projet se résument comme suit

9.1 Pour la FPI Au regard des résultats satisfaisants atteints, le renforcement des dispositifs de formation professionnelle initiale réalisé par la composante FPI du PCFP devrait être étendu aux autres établissements publics d'enseignement technique et professionnel pour une question d'équité entre tous les enfants évoluant dans le système public.

9.2 Pour le FAFPA Eu égard à l’insuffisance notoire de capacité de formation, une plus grande importance doit être accordée au renforcement des capacités physiques de formation et au développement des compétences des formateurs dans le cadre d’un nouveau Projet.

9.3 Pour l’OEF Il aurait été préférable que l’OEF fût une agence indépendante afin de pouvoir mener à bien sa mission sans les contraintes qui ont été les siennes au cours de l’exécution de ce projet.

9.4 Pour la Coordination du projet · Encourager le Gouvernement du Mali à alléger le circuit d’approbation des marchés publics en vue de renforcer les capacités d'absorption des fonds mis à sa disposition du Mali;· S’assurer que les véritables acteurs de la mise en œuvre des activités des composantes du projet ont pris une part active aux phases de préparation , d’évaluation et de négociation du projet ;· Eviter de confier l’exclusivité de l’exécution des travaux de génie civil à une seule agence.

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