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Historiography and Postmodernism: ReconsiderationsAuthor(s): Perez ZagorinSource: History and Theory, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Oct., 1990), pp. 263-274Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2505051

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HISTORIOGRAPHY AND POSTMODERNISM:

RECONSIDERATIONS

PEREZ ZAGORIN

Historiography today has become so pluralisticand subject to the play of fashion

that it need come as no surprise to find F. R. Ankersmit recommending in a re-

cent essay in History and Theory that historians should now adopt the perspec-

tive of postmodernism as the new, superior form of understanding of their dis-

cipline.1 Such a move was only to be expected, considering the current influence

of postmodernism in some of the arts as well as in literary theory and other fields

through its affiliation with deconstructionism. Ankersmit may not even be the

first to have extended an embrace to postmodernism on behalf of historiography,

though he is perhaps the first to do so explicitly. The same tendency is evident

among the disciples of Foucault. Some of the essays collected in a lately pub-

lished volume arguing for the predominantly rhetorical character of history and

the human sciences may also be taken as implying a similar position.2

Until now Ankersmit has been best known to readers of History and Theory

as a contributor to a recent collection of essays dealing with current issues in

Anglo-American discussions of the philosophy of history.3In his own article in

this collection he appeared as an ardent advocate of the narrativist-rhetorical

conception of historiography which Hayden White put forwardin his Metahis-

tory (1973) and subsequent writings. He has stressed the revolutionary import

of White's ideas ascribing primacy in historical thinking to literary tropes and

verbalstructures, and has hailed his work as the wave of the future. It is therefore

noteworthythat in contrast to literarytheorists, who haveprovidedthe majority

of supporters of White's view, most philosophers and philosophically-inclined

historians have been decidedly critical of it, when they have not simply ignored

it. Many historians in particular seem as resistant to it as they were previously

to the Hempelian positivist covering-lawdoctrine of historical explanation. Just

as they opposed Hempel's scientismas a damaging misconception of the character

of historical knowledge, so they have likewise tended to rejectWhite's linguistic

1. F. R. Ankersmit, "Historiographyand Postmodernism," History and Theory 28 (1989), 137-153.

2. John S. Nelson, Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey, TheRhetoric of the Human Sciences

(Madison, Wisc., 1987).

3. F. R. Ankersmit, "The Dilemma of Contemporary Anglo-American Philosophy of History,"Knowing& TellingHistory: TheAnglo-SaxonDebate, History and Theory,Beiheft 25 (1986).



264 PEREZ ZAGORIN

turn and its rhetorical approach for its disregardand distortion of certain essen-

tial characteristics of historical inquiry and writing.4

Inhis espousal of postmodernism, Ankersmitacts as a philosophic trend-spotter

who has his eye out for the latest thing. No doubt some merit may be grantedto an author who strivesto discern the newest fashion in his discipline and bring

out its implications. Ankersmit, however,is not only intent on recognizing what

is new, but also identifies with it. He does not want to resist it as fallacious or

harmful. Rather, like other historicists (although I know he would reject this

designation, I believe it is justifiable in this context), he greets its novelty as an

inevitable development and makes its cause his own.

Ankersmit's postmodernism may be regarded as an extension of his earlier

commitment to White's narrativistprinciples. It represents a further step in theattempt to aestheticize history and sever it from its formerly accepted grounding

in conditions of truth and reality.Although he offers no definitionof postmodern-

ism, he relatesthe latter to certain new situations and necessities that he believes

leave us no choice but to accept it. In the following remarks I want to examine

the validityof some of the claimsand reasons he advances n behalf of his position.

At the outset, however, it is important for the sake of clarity to stress several

features generally associated with the theory or idea of postmodernism. First,

it must be recognized as an essentially historicistconception. Those who announcethe advent of postmodernism regardit as an inevitable stage of present-daycul-

ture and a break with the past that, owing to the conditions of contemporary

society, cannot be withstood. Thus, a strong sense of fatality and the irresistible

hovers over the notion.

Second, the basic impulseof postmodernismlies in its repudiationof the values

and assumptionsof the precedinghigh modernist movement which revolutionized

the arts of the twentieth century, along with an equal repudiation of the philos-

ophy it calls logocentrism -the belief in the referentialityof language, in the de-terminacyof textualmeaning, and in the presence of a meaningful world to which

language and knowledge are related. Yetit is striking that these postmodernist

themes are unsustained by any feeling of elan or conviction of advance or prog-

ress. On the contrary,postmodernism, as its name implies, carrieswith it strong

connotations of decline, exhaustion, and of being at the end ratherthan the com-

mencement of an era.

Finally, a central element in postmodernism is its hostility to humanism. Fore-

telling, as Foucault wishfully predicted, the end of man, it rejects humanism as

4. See some of the papers in Metahistory: Six Critiques, History and Theory, Beiheft 19 (1980),

particularlyMauriceMandelbaum'sThePresuppositionsf Metahistory,"swell as Frederick .Olafson's ommentsnhis"Hermeneutics:Analytical'nd Dialectical,' nKnowing& ellingHistory,40-41. See,too, the criticalobservations nd cautionsregardingWhite's iews nPaul Ricoeur,TheRealityof the HistoricalPast (Milwaukee,Wisc., 1984),33-34, and WilliamH. Dray,"Narrativeand HistoricalRealism,"n OnHistoryandPhilosophyof History(Leiden,1989),chap.7. I havealso observedromconversations ithhistorians nddiscussionswithdoctoral tudentsn seminars

on the philosophyof history hat theirresponse o White'sMetahistory nd Tropics f Discourseis generallyunfavorable.



RECONSIDERATIONS 265

an outmoded relic and illusion of bourgeois ideology: the illusion of individuals

creating their history through their free activity, which it sees as merely a cover

for bourgeois society's oppressionof women, the working class, non-whites,sexual

deviants, and colonizednatives. As a

corollary,it also criticizes as elitist and

oppressive the idea of a canon, which both modernism and humanism hold

strongly n common, with its necessarydiscriminationand hierarchizationamong

the creations of culture. The consequence is that postmodernism lends itself to

a marked relaxation of cultural standards and sanctions an extreme eclecticism

and heterogeneity without any critical or ordering principle. In the cultural do-

main as a whole it implies a total erasure of the distinction between high or elite

culture and mass popular culture largely shaped and dominated by advertising

and the commercial media, a distinction that both modernism and humanismaccepted as axiomatic.

Some of the features I have just noted are touched upon, albeit in a much

more favorable way,by Frederic Jameson, a Marxian literary theorist, in a wide-

ranging survey entitled "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capital-

ism."In considering the bearings of postmodernism upon historiography,it will

be useful to look briefly at his account in order to enlarge our understanding

of the concept of the postmodern.

Thefirstthing to observeabout his discussionis the typically historicistcharacter

it imputes to postmodernism as a periodizing category. Jameson asks himself

whether postmodernism is merely a passing fashion or only one of a number

of alternativestyles or trends, and concludes that it is neither. Whether our atti-

tude toward it is one of celebration or moral revulsion, we must recognize it,

he contends, as a fundamental mutation in the sphere of culture reflecting the

new multinational phase of world capitalism and its concomitant level of ad-

vancedtechnology which othershavedescribed n suchterms as the post-industrial

orconsumer society,

mediasociety,

electronicsociety. Moreover, despite

the fact

that capitalist society in its earliest appearance in the west is still less than two

hundred years old, and therefore much younger than other types of society that

have preceded or coexisted with it, Jameson simply takes it for granted that it

is in its late stage. But how does he know this? Needless to say, he does not.

Nevertheless, he believes it because his Marxist faith assures him of it, just as

it (falsely) assured Lenin before and after 1917 that imperialism was the final

stage of capitalism and that European socialist revolutions were imminent. Post-

modernismandlate capitalismarethus alike,subjectin Jameson'shistoricistlogic

to the same inevitability. This causes him to argue that Marxists and radicals

who seek the transformation of society must abandon their moralizing condem-

nation of postmodernismand accommodate their theorizing and political strategy

to its presence as the dominant cultural force in today's world.

The most striking part of Jameson's treatment, however, is its analysis of the

postmodern as exemplifiedin a varietyof contemporaryculturalproducts drawn

from a spectrum of the arts. The fact that he ascribes to some of these, like Andy

Warhol's paintings or the architecture of John Portman's Bonaventure Hotel in

downtown Los Angeles, not only a representativeand symptomatic importance,



266 PEREZ ZAGORIN

but also an artistic value which is highly debatable need not concern us. What

is significant, rather, is the constellation of generic traits his scrutiny of these

works leads him to identify as synonymous with postmodernism. They include

the following: a new depthlessness and superficiality;a culture fixated upon theimage; the waning of affect and disappearance of or liberation from emotion;

abandonment of the concept of truth as useless metaphysical baggage; disap-

pearance of the autonomous individual and the death of the subject; loss of

historicity and the past; disintegration of the time sense into a series of pure,

unrelatedpresents;the prevalenceof pastiche and imitation and cannibalization

of past styles. Such, according to Jameson's perceptive observation, are among

the leading characteristics nd thematicsof the postmodern as the inevitably ascen-

dant style of the culture of late capitalism.5Ankersmit would no doubt be unwilling to accept every one of these features

as indicative of what he advocates as postmodernism. Nevertheless, the affinity

between them and his own point of view is unmistakable. The historicist fatalism

implicit in the theory of the postmodern is reflected in his belief that "autumn

has come to Western historiography,"which no longer has a theme or metanar-

rative, now that Europe since the end of WorldWar II has ceased to be identical

with world history and declined to an appendage of the Eurasian continent (150).

The turning away from the past is apparent in his rejection of the importanceof historical origin and context and in his conviction that evidence has nothing

to do with a past realitybut points only to the interpretations given by historians

(145-146, 150). The similarity between the two is further manifest in the concep-

tion of historiographyAnkersmit proposes. According to his postmodernist phi-

losophy, the historian would renounce the task of explanation and principle of

causality, along with the idea of truth, all of which are dismissed as part of a

superseded"essentialism."Instead, he would recognize historiographyas an aes-

thetic pursuit in which style is all-important (141-142, 144, 148-149).What stands out in Ankersmit's postmodernist concept of historiography is

its superficiality and remoteness from historical practice and the way historians

usually think about their work. It trivializes history and renders it void of any

intellectual responsibility. The logic and factual judgments which bring him to

this conclusion, morever, are far from convincing.

His point of departure is the present overproduction of historical writings,

which he tells us is spreading like a cancer and fills him with intense despon-

dency. Perhaps it is not very important that he fails to mention the reasons forthis condition, which are largely sociological in nature. They lie, as we all know,

in the great postwar expansion of higher education and university faculties, plus

the necessity of publication imposed on academics as a prerequisite of career

advancement. In any case, however, taking the literature on the philosopher

5. Frederic ameson,"Postmodernism,r theCulturalLogicof LateCapitalism," ew Left Re-

view, no. 146 (1984),53-92. The literature n postmodernisms by now considerable;or further

discussion f what t stands or and ts relationshipo deconstructionism,eeTerryEagleton,LiteraryTheory Minneapolis, 983),andthe essaysnPostmodernism,d. LisaAppignanesiLondon,1986).




Hobbes as an example, he notes that it has become so voluminous that Hobbes's

text no longer possesses any authority and vanishes before its many interpreta-

tions. From this instance he infers that "we no longer have any texts, any past,

but just interpretations of them" (137-138).

Many things might be said about the troubling problem of the ever-growing

quantity of historical publication without succumbing to the pessimistic opinion

to which Ankersmit's spectacular illogic has led him. For one thing, the situation

as J. H. Hexter pictured it in 1967 is even more the case today:

1. Never n the pasthasthe writingof historybeenso fatuousas it is today;neverhasit yieldedso enormousandsuffocating massof stultifying rivia,theproductof small

mindsengaged nthecongenialoccupationof writingbadlyaboutinsignificantmatters

to whichtheyhavegivenlittle or no thoughtand for whichthey feel small concern.2. Nevernthe pasthavehistorianswritten istory o competently,igorously,ndthought-fullyas theydo today,penetratingnto domainshithertoneglectedor in an obscurantistwayshunned,bringing ffectivelyo bearon the recordof thepast disciplineswholly n-accessible o theirpredecessors,reating he problems heyconfrontwith both a catho-licityandarigorandsophistication f methodhithertowithoutprecedent mongpracti-tionersof the historicalcraft.6

I am sure most historians would agreewith this appraisal. What it means is that

despite the burden of an increasing amount of mediocre and ephemeral histor-ical work, there likewise exists in contrast a considerable body of work of excep-

tional originality, learning, and insight which has not only widened our intellec-

tual horizons but deepened and even transformed our knowledge of many areas

of the past.

For another thing, while the phenomenon of historical overproduction may

sometimes depress us and seem unmanageable, we may also take some comfort

from the fact that its effect is usually counteracted over time by a selective pro-

cess which relegates trivial publications to obscurity and insures that the moresignificant contributions will in due course become known to specialists and,

if they merit it, to a large part of the historical profession.

But how, in any event, can the condition of historical overproduction deprive

us both of the text and the past, leaving us only with interpretations?As it happens,

like Ankersmit, I too have had Hobbes as one of my special interests on which

I have occasionally written. In a recent essay I have attempted to survey the

literatureconcerning Hobbes which has appearedin the last several years.7Con-

trary to Ankersmit's assertion, even twenty years ago it would not have been

6. J. H. Hexter,"SomeAmericanObservations,"ournalof Contemporary istory2(1967),5-6,cited nPeterNovick,ThatNoble Dream:The "Objectivity uestion"nd theAmericanHistoricalProfession(Cambridge nd New York,1988),377.

7. PerezZagorin,A Historyof PoliticalThought n theEnglishRevolution London,1954), hap.13;"ThomasHobbes," nternational ncyclopedia f theSocialSciences; ClarendonndHobbes,"Journalof ModernHistory57 (1985),593-616;"Cudworth nd Hobbes on Is andOught,"orth-

coming n Philosophy,Religion,andScience n theLaterSeventeenthCentury, d. RichardAsh-craft,RichardKroll,andPerezZagorin,Cambridge niversity ress; Hobbes n OurMind," ournalof theHistory of Ideas 51 (1990),317-335.



268 PEREZ ZAGORIN

sufficient for someone desiring to orient himself in the discussion of Hobbes's

political philosophy to have read only Warrender and Watkins. At the least he

would also have had to know the classic work by Leo Strauss, Oakeshott's in-

troduction to his edition of Leviathan, and MacPhersons's The Political Theoryof Possessive Individualism. For any claim to expertise, he would have needed

to be familiar as well with other important contributions such as A. E. Taylor's

article on Hobbe's ethical doctrine, and David Gauthier's study of Leviathan,

not to mention still other works that would be pertinent.

By now, of course, the literature on Hobbes has indeed become very large.

Yet, as is almost too obvious to state, in both previous and more recent writings,

the relationship between the text of Hobbes's political theory and its interpreta-

tions remainsextremelyclose. Far from being displaced or lost, the text is alwaysscrutinized and discussed as the foundation for any proffered nterpretativecon-

clusion. Among the students of Hobbes, moreover, some, like Quentin Skinner,

in their aim of recovering Hobbes's meaning and intention, insist on a reading

fully grounded in the historical context, by which is meant an understanding of

the intellectual tradition, ideological and political situation, and conventions of

political language within which Hobbes wrote. For those in particular who see

the study of political philosophy as an essentially historical discipline, interpre-

tation does not eclipse the past; rather,the latter, comprehendedas history, servesas a crucial test of the former's validity.

It is also plain that interpretations may stand or fall on textual and historical

grounds. Two of the most widely discussed interpretations of Hobbes in the past

generation have been Warrender'sand Macpherson's. The firstsought to explain

Hobbes's theory of moral and political obligation as ultimately founded on the

command of God; the second arguedthat Hobbes's conception of both the state

of nature and the political order was a reflection of the nascent capitalist market

society of competitive possessive individualism. Neither of these interpretations,it is fair to say, has commended itself to the majority of Hobbes scholars, who

have judged them incompatible either with the meaning of Hobbes's text and

the character of his beliefs or with a proper understanding of his society.

What I have said about Hobbes is no less trueof the other areas of earlymodern

British and European history with which I am familiar as part of my principal

field of study. Wherever in any.of these a revisionary interpretation has been

offered, textual evidence (in which I include not only literary sources and

philosophical texts, but archival documents of all kinds) and contextual con-siderations are invariably central to the discussion. It would be superfluous to

emphasize this point were it not for Ankersmit's curious discovery that in our

postmodern age interpretation has abolished the text and the past.

Although the work of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and other thinkers has helped to

reinstate he problem of interpretationand hermeneuticunderstandingas a major

issue in the philosophy of history, Ankersmit's essay throws no light on this sub-

ject. Instead, he concentrates some of his remarks on the claim that interpreta-

tion has acquired a new status in postmodern historiography. Observing that incontemporary society information and interpretations continually increase as if




by a law of theirbeing, he stresseswhat he callsthe paradox hatpowerfulnew

interpretationso not putan end to writingbutonly generatemore of it. This

allegedlyparadoxicalactis supposed o beexplicableonlyfroma postmodern-

istperspective140-141).But whyshould t beconsidered paradox?Historicalinterpretationsresimilar n somerespects o scientific heoriesandhypotheses.

Likethem, anyoriginalnewinterpretationwillhaveboth adherents nd oppo-

nents.Theformerwillattempt o apply,strengthen, ndextend t so as to dem-

onstrate ts superiorityover its competitors.The latterwill seek out its weak-

nesses and try to refuteit. If an historical nterpretation omesto be widely

accepted, t mayevenceaseto be the subjectof debateandtakeits placeas an

establishedpart of ourunderstandingf the past.Of course, hismaynot last.

The subsequentemergenceof another nterpretationmay force it to undergorenewed hallengeswhichthrow t into questionandperhapsdisplace t. There

isnothingparadoxical,owever, runique o thepresent,nthe fact hatsignificantnewinterpretationstimulaterather han close off discussion.

The ackof substancenAnkersmit's osition s furtherllustratedn hiscom-

mentson postmodernist istoriography'sttitude o science,whichhedescribesasone of apartnessnddetachment utnotopposition,hence"ascientistic"ather

than"antiscientistic."his sscarcely onsistent,hough,withhisclaim hatpost-

modernismhas succeeded n destabilizing cience andhitting t where t hurtsmostbydeconstructingheconceptof causality,neof themainpillars f scientific

thought.Howdoes it accomplish hisremarkableeat?Theensuingdemonstra-

tion is the same as the one given in JonathanCuller'sOnDeconstructionand

derives rom he latter'snspirer,Nietzsche. trunsas follows.Whenweconsider

aneffect, t makesus look forthecause; he effect husprecedes rbecomes hecauseof the cause;hencethe effect s the originof the cause.Thisaccordingly

reverseshe traditionalhierarchy f cause and effectand proves ts artificiality

(141-142).This verbal ugglingis a transparent onfusion,as John Searlehas already

pointedout in his criticalreviewof Culler'sbook.8Whilean effectmaybe the

epistemicsourceof an inquiry nto its cause, this cannotmeanthat it is tem-

porallyprioror that it producesor originateshecause.If mycarstopsrunning

forwantof gas, I look forthecause.It is theemptytank,however,not mycuri-

osity aboutwhyit will not run, that causedit to stop. The effect,in short, is

theoriginof my nterest, utnotof the cause.There s noquestionhere,moreover,

of conceivingcause and effectas a hierarchy, point that is entirely rrelevant.The two aresimplycorrelatives, ach entailing he other.

In makingthese criticisms,I havenot committedmyselfto any particular

meaningwhichthehistorian houldattach o thenotion of causalityas he uses

it. Whether"cause"n thehistorian'sanguagealways ignifiesa reasonor mo-tiveon the part of historicalagents,or the subsumption f an event,action,or

8. SeeSearle's eviewof JonathanCuller,OnDeconstruction:Theory ndCriticism fterStruc-turalism Ithaca,N.Y., 1983), n New YorkReviewof Books 27 (October,1983),74-79.



270 PEREZ ZAGORIN

phenomenonundera generalcausal law, or perhapsneither,dependingon the

subjectunderconsideration, ontinues o be a disputedquestion n the philos-

ophy of history.9 t is an illusion, nevertheless, o assumethat historiography

can dispensewith the conceptof causality.As long as it includesexplanationas one of its objectives, ausalattributionwillremaina necessary ngredient f

historical hinking. 0Postmodernism'sevelation o the contrary s not only mis-

taken,but futile.

One of theprincipalaims of Ankersmit's iscussions to bringout "therevo-

lutionarynatureof postmodernism" hich enables t to perform ts subversive

function.As a manifestation f the latterhe adducesnot only its allegeddecon-

structionof theprincipleof causality,but itsviewthatall ourscientific ertain-

ties arelogically mplicated n the liar'sparadox.As a succinctversionof thisparadox,he instances he statement,"thisstatement s false."By means of this

logical weapon,he imagines,postmodernismpulls the carpet out from under

scienceand modernism.Historiographys supposed o providean illustration

of this operation n the intrinsicallyparadoxicalcharacterof interpretation

(142-143).The loosenessand absenceof clarity n these assertionsmake it hard o deal

withthemseriouslyas argument.One could say the following,however, bout

theirproposedconclusion.The liar'sparadoxposes a problemof reflexivitynwhich a statement s logically included n its own verdictof falsity on a class

of statements f which t is itself a member.But how does such reflexivity pply

to historiographyr the theoriesof science?Ankersmitpresentsno reasonfor

his contention hatthe interpretationsr factual tatements f historians repara-

doxical nthisway.Apart rom his failure,t is also doubtfulwhether he paradox

he has chosenas an example s reallya paradox.This is becausethe sentence

does not actuallystate anythingandis thus not a proposition.Tobe a proposi-

tion, it would need to entail a truth value or particular ruth conditions,andthis t isunable o do.Itcanhardly ield, herefore,hesubversiveesultAnkersmit

wouldlike to assign to it.

Themost important nsightAnkersmit redits o postmodernisms its recog-

nition of theaestheticnatureof historiography. e relates his insight o thenew

understandingn contemporaryhoughtthatthe distinctionbetween anguage

andrealityhas lost its raisond'etre.Withthedisappearancef thisdistinction,

he points out, aestheticismextends ts sway over all forms of representation.

Historiographys thereby inallyperceived o be a literaryproduct n whichthehistoriandoes not producea representation f reality(or we may also say, of

9. Seethe recentdiscussion n W. G. Runciman's Treatise n SocialTheoryCambridge, ng.,1983), , chaps.1, 3, inwhich he author ries o resolve heproblem y firstdistinguishingeportage,description, valuation,andexplanationrom one another,and thensuggesting hat historical rsociological xplanation onsistsof subsuming he explanandums a case of some general ausallaw or connection.

10. I agree,however,withthose critics, ncludingAnkersmit,who holdthat in itsvirtually xclu-

sivepreoccupation ith heproblem f explanation, nalytical hilosophy f historyneglected thersignificanteaturesof historical hinkingand practice.




the past), but a replacement or substitute for it. Style is seen as prior to content

and content as a derivative of style. Historical differences likewise prove to be

due to differences of style (143-145).

One of the characteristicmoves of postmodernist and deconstructionist theoryhas been to try to obliteratethe boundaries betweenliteratureand other disciplines

by reducingall modes of thought to the common condition of writing.So it main-

tains that philosophy, like historiography,is merely another kind of writing and

subject to its laws, rather than a separate species of reflection concerned with

distinctivelyphilosophical questions.IIPutting aside, however, the identification

of language and reality, a thesis construable in differentways (which in any case

is well beyond the subject of my discussion), I venture to say that few historians

would agree with Ankersmit's consignment of historiography to the category ofthe aesthetic. Nor would they be likely to approve a characterization that gives

preeminence to its literariness. As the Russian formalists and Roman Jakobson

have told us, the quality of literariness consists in the way it thrusts language

and expression into the foreground and grants them an independent value and

importance. Although Ankersmit holds that literary and historical works are

similar in this respect, this is surely not the case. In historiography, the attempt

by language to draw attention to itself would commonly be regarded as highly

inappropriate and an obtrusive breach of the rules of historical writing. In his-tory language is very largely subservient to the historian's effort to convey in the

fullest, clearest, and most sensitive wayan understanding or knowledge of some-

thing in the past.

To sustain the opinion that style is the predominant factor in historiography,

Ankersmit emphasizes the intensional character and context of the words and

statementsin historical works, which entail that they cannot be replacedby other

equivalent statements. This opinion seems to me to be equally mistaken. If it

weretrue, it would be impossible to paraphraseor summarize a work of historywithout altering its substance or meaning. But such summaries are possible; we

can very well give a description of something as distinctive in style as Gibbon's

narration of the origin and triumph of Christianity in the Roman Empirewhich

effectivelyconveys not only his understanding of how and why this development

occurred but also the irony that pervades his account of it.

Generally it must be said that Ankersmit fails to provide any explanation of

how style can determine or engender the content of historical works. Like the

notion that interpretation has eliminated the text and the past, this is anotherof those extreme claims which, despite its inherent implausibility, postmodern-

ists like to put forwardas proof of the revolutionary import of their ideas. Cer-

tainly it runscounter to some of the strongestconvictions and intuitions historians

feel about their discipline. Their comment on it would most likely be that con-

tent derives from the critical study of sources and evidence, from the criticalcon-

sideration of other writings dealing with their subject, and from their perception

11.Foradiscussion, eeChristopher orris,Deconstruction, heory ndPracticeLondon,1982),and The Deconstructive Turn:Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy (London, 1983).



272 PEREZ ZAGORIN

of the interrelationships that exist among the indefinite multiplicity of facts per-

taining to the object of their inquiry.

Ankersmit's postmodernist attempt to absorb historiography into the literary

and aesthetic domain ignores features that are central to the very concept of his-tory. One of these is the differencehistory presumes between fact or truth and

fictionality, for which the aesthetic perspective makes no provision. Unlike the

work of literature,the historical work does not contain an invented or imaginary

world. It presents itself as consisting, to a great degree, of facts and true or prob-

able statements about the past. Many of its sentences are propositions with truth-

conditions attached to them. If this werenot so, the reader would take no interest

in it. The distinctive significance that history asserts for itself, therefore, is en-

tirely dependent on its claim to veridicality. Even though historical writing maycontain many false or erroneous statements and propound debatable interpreta-

tions resting on very complex evidential considerations, veridicality in the widest

sense is generally taken to be among its basic regulatory principles.

Another feature, for which the aesthetic domain contains no place, is the role

occupied by evidence. Historians operate within definite constraints, of which

they are fully conscious, arisingfrom the nature and limitations of their evidence.

While it is for them to determine that something is evidence and what it is evi-

dence for, when they have done so the evidence exerts a continuous force uponthem. They are not free to ignore it or make of it whatever they please. Its pres-

sure acts as a major determinant in giving shape to the historical work.

Connected with the precedingis yet another intrinsic feature of historiography,

the necessity for justification of its specific knowledge-claims, a requirement it

shareswith other types of inquiry. Historians know that they may be called upon

to justify the veridicality, adequacy, and reliability of particular statements, in-

terpretations, and even of their entire account. Their form of writing is apt to

incorporate many justifications for the judgments they make, the opinions theyexpress, and the descriptions and analyses they present in their treatment of the

past. Even the purest narrative history is unable to dispense with the necessity

of justification if it is to be acceptable to critical readers and students.

The aestheticizing of historiography which Ankersmit conceives as a major

postmodernist insight inevitably results in the trivialization of history through

its failure to acknowledge features that both define history as a form of thought

and give it its significance. The same effect is apparent in the prescriptions for

historiography which form the conclusion of his article. One of them is thathistoriansshould concentrate, as psychoanalysis does, on the unconscious aspects

of the past that have been repressedand come to light only involuntarily through

"slipsof the tongue" (147-148). Although I do not deny that this aim may possess

a certain value, it is of much less consequence than the attempt to discover and

understand the values, beliefs, assumptions, conventions, rules, and social prac-

tices that constitute a large part of the conscious life of past societies. The study

of these is not only a task of extreme difficulty, requiring exceptional insight and

imagination, but one of fundamental importance of which the priorities of post-modernism take no account.




Another of Ankersmit's prescriptions tells historians that they can no longer

deal with big problems or seek to reconstruct or discover patterns in the past,

as modern scientific historiography once aspired and pretended to do. All that

now remains for them to be concerned with are micro-subjects and "historicalscraps,"as exemplified in the work of some contemporary social historians, de-

spite the fact that writingssuch as the latterproduce may seem to have little point.

In the postmodernist view, he states, "thegoal is no longer integration, synthesis,

and totality," and small topics now come to occupy the center of attention

(149-150).

Needless to say, few historians would look with favor on this formula for a

new antiquarianism which springs from a trivialized, tired, and defeatist con-

ception of historical inquiry. Contraryto Ankersmit's belief, the expansion andfragmentation of historiography in our time through the simultaneous growth

of specialization and extension of our historical horizons has made the need for

integration and synthesis greater and more important than ever before. It is a

need, moreover, that is widely recognized. The point is not whether it is possible

to attain a total conception of world history or the historical process, for it al-

most certainly is not. This does not preclude the feasibility, nevertheless, of

focusing on large-scale subjects at a quite general level and on questions that

transcend specialist and disciplinary boundaries in order to provide an under-standing of whole societies and civilizations and of broad areas and aspects of

the past. Not only does modern historical literature contain numerous examples

of works of this kind, but there will always be historians with the intellectual

ambition to tackle subjects of exceptional breadth and significance.

In the course of his article Ankersmit touches on the question of the useful-

ness of historiography, only to dismiss it as impertinent and a category mistake.

As historiographyis a part of culture, he explains, the question of its usefulness

cannot meaningfully arise any more than it can about culture itself (139).12Whilewe may concede this point, we can nevertheless ask what the function of history

is and what purpose it serves or should serve in culture and society. Although

Westernsociety is sometimes said to be fast losing its connection to its past, that

it still values history and believes it important is apparent from the considerable

resources it provides to support historical research and teaching. Why does it

or should it do so?

An indirect answer to this question was once given by Ankersmit's compatriot,

Huizinga, a scholar humanist of distinctive mind and sensibility, who definedhistory as "the intellectual form in which a civilization rendersaccount to itself

of its past." This definition also implies a description of history's function.

Huizinga went on to say that "our civilization is the first to have for its past the

12. It is typicalof the superficialityf Ankersmit's pproach hat he is willing o permit he ques-tion of theusefulnessof sciencebecauseunlikehistoriography,ciencedoes not belongto culture.Onemaywonderhowany reflection n modernwestern ivilization,n which, n contrast o othercivilizationspastandpresent, ciencehas beena uniquelypowerful orce andin which scientific

thoughthas exertedan incalculablenfluenceon philosophyand otherdisciplines, ould possiblyexcludesciencefrom the realmof culture.



274 PEREZ ZAGORIN

past of the world, our history is the firstto be world-history."Tothis observation

he added that

a historyadequate o our civilization an onlybe a scientifichistory.The instrument f

modernWesternivilizationorthe ntellectualnderstandingf theworlds critical cience.

We cannot sacrifice he demand or scientific ertaintywithout njury o theconscienceof our civilization.Mythicaland fictitious epresentationsf thepast mayhavea literaryvalue as formsof play, but for us they are not history."3

In this statement Huizinga was not speaking of science as a positivist. By

scientific history he understood precisely what Collingwood did by the term,

namely, the rigorous cognitive standards, exigent critical methods, and global

sense of the past that became characteristicof westernhistoriography n the course

of its development during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Of course, historiographyservesa numberof functions, including severalprac-

tical ones, but Huizinga was looking at the question from the general standpoint

of society as a whole. Whether we agree entirely with him or not, his vision of

historiography s probablynot far different rom the way many Westernhistorians

today would conceive their craft. Ankersmit disparagesthis vision as modernist,

but his alternativepostmodernist view seems woefully impoverishedby compar-

ison. If it were to prevail-though there is little likelihood of this happening -

history would no longer have a real function. It could no longer perform its prin-

cipal intellectual obligation in education and culture, which must be to give to

each living generation the broadest and best possible knowledge of the past of

its own society and civilization as well as of the larger human past of which it

is part. Postmodernism representsthe abnegation of this obligation which is the

ultimateculturalresponsibilityof historiographyand one that remains ndispens-

able as the rapidly changing world moves faster into the future than ever before.

The Universityof Rochester

13. J. Huizinga,"ADefinitionof the Conceptof History,"n Philosophyand History,ed. Ray-mond Klibansky nd H. J. Paton [1936] New York, 1963),8-9.

zagorin perez - historiography and postmodernism reconsiderations

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