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Zimbabwe: Myths and RealitiesVladimir ShubinPublished online: 13 Mar 2013.

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Zimbabwe: Myths and Realities

Vladimir Shubin

This analysis compares widespread myths about Zimbabwe with the realities of thatcountry. The first myth is related to the national liberation struggle. Moscow is beingaccused of supporting the ‘wrong movement’, the ‘minority’ Ndebele-based ZimbabweAfrican People’s Union (ZAPU) instead of the ‘majority’ Shona-based ZimbabweAfrican National Union (ZANU). In reality, however, the ethnic composition of theZimbabwean population, support for the liberation movements, as well as the Sovietpolicy towards them, were much more complicated. The second myth puts all respon-sibility for the deep political and economic crises in Zimbabwe at the door of oneperson (Robert Mugabe, a ‘crazy old man’, with apologies to WikiLeaks). This is toforget the effect of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-proposed (or, rather,imposed) Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), an unsustainable‘dichotomy’ in agriculture, and the historical experience and connections of the domi-nant ZANU-Patriotic Front (PF) party. The third myth is the allegation that changesin landownership resulted in the ‘collapse’ of the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe.However, recent studies show that the situation is much more complex than it isusually portrayed. The fourth myth is the claim that ‘the international community’fully supports the Zimbabwean opposition and wants to see the current ‘regime’replaced.

This article will attempt to juxtapose the realities with these four myths, and provethat the dominant viewpoints informed by, and prevalent in, the international media arefar removed from these realities. Articles on the crisis in Zimbabwe, both popular andacademic, can be found almost daily in the media, and dozens of books have been

Africa Review 4, 1, 2012: 65–81African Studies Association of India, New Delhi

Vladimir Shubin is a Principal Research Fellow at the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy ofSciences, and Professor at the Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russia.

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published on the topic. The reason for this article is that, more often than not, the causesfor the crisis in Zimbabwe are not adequately dealt with in these publications. Althoughthis article does not claim to be comprehensive, the author wants to air some thoughts inan attempt to draw the attention of readers to those issues which very often becomeobscured.

Zimbabwe: The Four Myths

There is no doubt that Zimbabwe in 2000, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,was confronted by a very serious crisis. The disruption of the economy, the staggeringrise in the level of inflation, and the decline in production can be compared only with thesituation in Angola and Mozambique in the 1980s. But these countries were afflicted bycivil wars and they suffered a lot as a result of South African armed intervention.Nothing similar is applicable to Zimbabwe today. It is surrounded by friendly states;in fact, South Africa under an African National Congress (ANC) government is extend-ing a helping hand, providing electricity and loan capital. Nevertheless, by July 2008inflation already reached 231mn per cent and the real gross domestic product (GDP)declined that year by 12.6 per cent (Kamete, 2009); it was estimated that 3.4mn Zimbab-weans, one-quarter of the entire population, had left the country (Meldrum, 2007), andthat 2.5mn people were receiving food aid (Whitaker, 2008).

The Myth of Supporting the ‘Wrong’ Liberation Movement

In order to understand the tragedy of Zimbabwe, one must go back in history and dispelseveral myths surrounding that country, also as far as its relations with the outside worldis concerned — and, in particular, with Russia. The first myth is related to the nationalliberation struggle. As indicated above, Moscow is being accused of supporting the‘wrong movement’, the minority Ndebele-based ZAPU instead of the majorityShona-based ZANU. In reality, however, the situation is much more complicated.ZAPU, as well as its predecessor the National Democratic Party, was formed as amulti-ethnic party and remained so for almost three decades, and the majority of itsleadership always consisted of Shona. Its undisputed leader, Joshua Nkomo, wasKalanga — the ethnic group which, if professional ethnologists permit, could becalled ‘Ndebele-ised Shona’. But in 1963, a group of its prominent members, includingRobert Mugabe, split off and established ZANU, its first president being NdabaningiSithole who was Ndau; their Nguni forefathers came to Zimbabwe from the currentSouth African province of Mpumalanga and Swaziland, but over time became‘Shona-ised’.

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In any case, it would be wrong to reduce the indigenous population of Zimbabwe toShona and Ndebele only. Although it is accepted that these two groups comprise wellover 80 per cent of the population, some researchers scale this figure down to lessthan two-thirds. Apart from the Kalanga and Ndau, there are also several minorities:Tonga, Venda, Shangaan, Sotho, and others. In some cases, origin is even disputed:for example, Dumiso Dabengwa, a prominent leader of ZAPU is usually regarded asNdebele, but a Zimbabwean scholar insists that he is Tonga. On the other hand, thelargest ethnic group, the Shona, is divided into several sub-groups— and their represen-tatives, including politicians, do not always see eye-to-eye. This is not to say that theethic factor should be disregarded, but it does not always play a decisive role. Whenserious political and economic crises confronted Zimbabwe in the early 2000s, opposi-tion supporters were elected mayor of the two largest cities in the country: the predomi-nantly Shona-populated Harare and the Ndebele-populated Bulawayo. Although ethnicfactors did affect the liberation struggle, perhaps geographical location was of moreimportance. Zambia to the north and, to a lesser extent, Botswana in the south-west sup-ported ZAPU, while Mozambique in the east and south-east supported ZANU. Thisfacilitated recruitment of fighters for the two liberation movements mostly in Ndebeleareas for ZAPU and in Shona areas for ZANU. Also, it should be mentioned thatMozambican support was more ‘physical’ in nature: Frente Libertação de Moçambique(Frelimo) fighters took part in combat operations in Zimbabwe and thus contributed toZANU’s successes.

As for Moscow’s support for the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, it began withthe establishment of bilateral relations in the early 1960s and continued in various forms(diplomatic, political, financial, and military) up to the country’s independence in 1980.However, one question cannot be avoided: why did the Soviet Union render practicalsupport to ZAPU only, after the hiving-off of ZANU in 1963? There are at least tworeasons for this: first, as a rule Moscow’s approach had always been characterised byconsistency. There is a word in Russian — odnolyub, a man who loves one and thesame woman all his life; so Moscow, as a rule, would not change its political partner.The second reason was, perhaps, more important: ZANU, from the very beginning,established close contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). And in the1960s and 1970s, with the growing divide between Moscow and Beijing, this factorplayed a significantly negative role. Moscow was especially sensitive to statementsby the leaders of ZANU, which regularly contained lengthy diatribes and constant accu-sations of ‘Soviet imperialism’.1 With hindsight it is clear that Moscow’s refusal toestablish proper channels of communication with ZANU, even when that partybecame rather influential, was a mistake and affected bilateral relations between theSoviet Union and Zimbabwe. As Professor Solodovnikov (2000, 137–138), SovietAmbassador to Zambia at the time, put it in his memoirs:

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The [Zimbabwean] government … was in a hurry to establish diplomaticrelations with those countries that in the period of the struggle for independence… of Zimbabwe were openly calling ZANU leaders and its rank-and-file fight-ers ‘terrorists’, who were allies of Ian Smith’s regime, and who were clandesti-nely supplying him with oil and weapons, used to shoot Zimbabwean refugeesin the camps in Mozambique and Zambia and fighters of the PFZ, includingthose from ZANU.

But, initially at least, there were no relations with Moscow! These difficulties were soonovercome and relations between the two countries developed slowly but steadily. Theirprogress was, however, interrupted by the political and economic crises in the SovietUnion on the threshold of the 1990s, followed by somewhat similar crises in Zimbabwea decade later.2

The Myth of Blaming Zimbabwe’s Problems on the Actions of a Single Person

The second myth blames the deep-seated political and economic crises in Zimbabwe onone person — Robert Mugabe. But can all the problems facing modern-day Zimbabwebe laid at the door of a single person, even more so, the person who obviously has been‘demonised’ by the foreign media and certain politicians? As indicated above, to do so isto forget the unsustainable ‘dichotomy’ of agriculture in Zimbabwe, the effect of anIMF-imposed ESAP, as well as the historical experience and links of the dominantZANU-PF party.

By the end of the 1970s, the long anti-colonial war — waged by both wings of thePF, which diplomatically (but, unfortunately, not militarily) united ZAPU and ZANU—

was beginning to bear fruit. It became clear that the old white, minority establishmentwas losing the war, while the attempt at a so-called ‘internal settlement’, with BishopAbel Muzorewa as the government figurehead, failed dismally. London, Washington,and Pretoria, their virtual ally, started to realise that a continuation of the ‘bush war’would result in a military victory for the forces of liberation. Thus the Rhodesian estab-lishment came under substantial pressure from its overt and covert supporters, especiallyfrom London (which was internationally, especially in Africa, held responsible for thefailure of decolonisation in Southern Rhodesia) and Pretoria (which was alarmed bythe ongoing war of liberation on its doorstep). So it was agreed to begin substantialtalks with the anti-colonial forces, which were convened towards the end of 1979 atLancaster House in London.

These talks were the first major foreign policy initiative of Margaret Thatcher, whobecame Prime Minister of the UK in May 1979. The tactics of ‘carrot and stick’ wasemployed in discussions with the leadership of the liberation movements. The prospect

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of independence in the near future was opened to them, though with a number of con-ditions; and they were warned by some of the frontline states, especially by MozambicanPresident Samora Machel, that if they failed to reach an agreement they would no longerbe allowed to operate from countries bordering Zimbabwe. Johnson (2006), an author ofseveral books on Zimbabwe, writes:

Mozambique played an active role in encouraging a settlement. PresidentSamora Machel did this because he knew that the Zimbabwe African NationalUnion (ZANU) would win the proposed transitional elections, and he believedthe British government would deliver on their commitment on the land issue, toprovide significant resources for purchase and resettlement. This belief is at theroot of the firm support of Mozambique and Tanzania for the Zimbabwe landissue. They were at Lancaster House, they were part of the decision to settle,and they believed that resources would be forthcoming.

These expectations were understandable, but the blunder of the settlement reached at theLancaster House Conference is evident: no written agreement on the land issue wasentered into, although the armed struggle in Zimbabwe was waged not only for politicalindependence, but also for the recovery of land seized by colonisers from indigenousAfricans. Apparently, Machel and other leaders from the frontline states were ‘capti-vated’ by the strange charisma of an aging British Prime Minister and took her promisesfor granted. Most likely they (and, perhaps, even the leadership of ZANU and ZAPU)believed that the intentions of their negotiating partners were genuine and that substan-tial funding for land acquisition would be forthcoming. Indeed, earlier in 1976, when aBritish-American plan for settlement on Rhodesia was advanced, the then US Secretaryof State Henry Kissinger was reported to have promised between US$1.5bn and US$2bn‘to subsidise Rhodesian whites for agreeing to black rule’ (Time, 13 September 1976)—that is, primarily for the buyout of white-owned land. And a Zimbabwean journalist haswritten that ‘Zimbabweans do not forget that the main reason … [the country’s] inde-pendence was finally won around the table at Lancaster House rather than in thestreets of Harare was because the British government promised to pay for landredistribution in Zimbabwe’ (Madawo, 2007). However, the post-independencereality in Zimbabwe is quite different from the picture which these vague promisestried to paint.3 It was clear that a ‘time bomb’ was planted, ready to explode at any time.

In the early 1990s, subsequent to the expiry of the Lancaster House constitution’sproperty clause4 which preserved property rights for 10 years, Robert Mugabe deferredland redistribution following appeals from former Commonwealth Secretary-GeneralEmeka Anyaoku (quoted in the Zimbabwe Independent, 3 February 2010):

I told [Robert] Mugabe that taking over white farms would scupper what [F W]de Klerk was trying to achieve. South Africa’s white community was very

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powerful. Taking over white property in Zimbabwe would alarm white SouthAfricans. Fearing for their material and financial assets, they would use theirinfluence to scupper the negotiations … .[Joshua] Nkomo was one of thosewho felt 10 years had been a long enough wait for land. Nkomo wanted allthe land returned to Africans. I urged them to be patient.

True, the British Conservative government did provide some money for land buyoutsunder the so-called ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ principle, but just about ₤44mn intotal (Madawo, 2007) — that is, between 30 and 40 times less than was promisedtwo decades earlier.

When the money allocated for land acquisition by the Thatcher government hadbeen exhausted, a mission sent by Prime Minister John Major to evaluate the situationrecommended that further funding be given to Zimbabwe to pursue the land reformprogramme (The Herald, 28 December 2009). Therefore, after the electoral defeatof the Tories in May 1997 the Zimbabwe government expected the new Labour gov-ernment to resume funding for land acquisition. Indeed, historically the Labour Partywas always regarded as more ‘progressive’ than the Conservatives, and supposedly‘better equipped’ to understand the position of landless peasants in Zimbabwe. Butwhen Mugabe met the young, new British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Common-wealth Conference in Edinburgh in October 1997, he came away utterly disappointed.When the Zimbabwean President reminded Blair about earlier promises, the latterrather arrogantly replied: ‘Was I there when you were given that promise? I was inschool and I do not honour promises I had nothing to do with’ (Madawo, 2007).Then, on 5 November 1997 newly appointed Secretary of State for InternationalDevelopment Clare Short sent a letter to Harare, which read in part (quoted in TheGuardian, 11 August 2003):

I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsi-bility to meet the costs of land purchase in Zimbabwe. We are a new governmentfrom diverse backgrounds without links to former colonial interests. My ownorigins are Irish and, as you know, we were colonised not colonisers.

As arrogant as this letter was, there was an element of truth in it. Although the LabourParty had a lot of ‘links to former colonial interests’, and it was a Labour governmentwho did not take any practical measures to stop Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration ofIndependence proclaimed by the white minority government in 1965, on a personallevel, the interests of Labourites differed from those of the Tories. The list of bigfarm-owners in Zimbabwe was pretty similar to the list of British ‘noblemen’, andone could possibly suggest that the previous Conservative government was paying com-pensation to themselves or to their own kith and kin. So, by the beginning of the newcentury whites (who constituted less than 1 per cent of the entire population) owned

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most of the arable land in Zimbabwe. Meanwhile the black population in Zimbabwe wasgrowing rapidly, and so did the demand for land.

But there was another reason for the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. Immedi-ately after independence, Mugabe and his government proclaimed socialism as theiraim, though not much had been done to advance it except for an improvement insocial services such as health care and education. However, on the threshold of the1990s, with the fall of communist governments in Eastern Europe, Zimbabwe (likesome other African countries) opted for a ‘free market’ economy and, in 1991, beganto implement ESAP, their version of IMF-imposed reforms (Bond & Manyana, 2002,30). Introducing it as a ‘Framework for Economic Reform’, then Finance MinisterBernard Chidzero, a prominent economist — who earlier, for 20 years, had beenworking in the United Nations (UN) system, and even had been nominated for thepost of UN Secretary-General — managed to convince his colleagues in cabinet thateven if similar programmes did not work in other African countries, in Zimbabwe theresults would be different because the economy of the country was so much biggerand stronger. Nevertheless, the ESAP failed dismally. The ineffectual internationaleconomic integration of Zimbabwe, a country which historically had an ‘inward-looking’ economy, resulted in the rise of social instability and political crisis.5

A major setback was suffered by the processing industry, and even more so by the deliv-ery of social services. In the first decade after independence, the country made good pro-gress in education by doubling primary school enrolment, reducing infant mortality from85 to 49 per 1000 births, and increasing life expectancy from 56 to 62 years, butimplementation of the ESAP resulted in reversals of these gains; and the averagetrade union member was 40 per cent poorer in 1996 than in 1990 (Bond & Manyana,2002, 35).

Under these circumstances, a new political force emerged in Zimbabwe which calledthemselves ‘war veterans’, though not all of them actually ‘saw action’ (participated inactual fighting) during the war of liberation. This group was headed by a rather maverickfigure, Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi,6 who was described by his former wife, Wieslawa, as a‘cruel and vile man… .And, as for the war, he never fired a shot. He saw no action at all’(Hill, 2003, 96). Nevertheless, Hunzvi became popular among war veterans, most prob-ably because as a medical doctor he could easily issue certificates of disability, withwhich thousands of war veterans could claim large payments from the government.This popularity resulted in his election in 1997 as chairman of the Zimbabwe LiberationWar Veterans Association (WVA), which he managed to rapidly convert into a formid-able political force (The Guardian, 5 June 2001). But the fact that the chairman of theWVA could assume the name of the most infamous Nazi leader was skilfully used by amedia hostile to the government. They alleged that it was Mugabe who organised, or atleast from the very beginning used war veterans to further his political agenda. At any

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rate initially, however, Hunzvi posed somewhat of a threat to Mugabe. In 1997, heorganised demonstrations by war veterans and openly criticised Mugabe for failure tofinancially assist them.7 President Mugabe, a patron of the WVA could not ignorethese demands and granted once-off payments of Z$50,000 (at the time some US$2500) to each of the organisation’s 50,000 members, as well as monthly pensions ofZ$2000 — around US$100 (BBC News, 4 June 2001). This was a heavy blow to thecountry’s budget, amounting to about ₤150mn, which ‘precipitated a run on the stockmarket and threatened the value of the [Zimbabwean] currency’ (Chan, 2003, 138).

Inflation began to soar, and Mugabe and his supporters saw a way out in the rapidredistribution of land. To be able to do this, they organised the 2000 referendum on anew constitution, which included a clause allowing the government to take possessionof white-owned land with compensation to be paid by the UK. Should London refuse topay, the draft constitution declared that the government of Zimbabwe had ‘no obligationto pay compensation’. However, by that time, another political force appeared inZimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai,former Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe Council of Trade Unions. This party,which called for a ‘no’ vote at the referendum, attracted people of different politicalbackgrounds and persuasions, who often had only one thing in common: oppositionto Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF party. The unexpected failure by the governingparty to garner a majority ‘yes’ vote in the referendum on the constitution became awatershed in Zimbabwean politics. On the one hand, there was a deepening concernamong the ZANU-PF leadership about a possible unfavourable result in parliamentaryelections scheduled for 2002; and, on the other hand, a growing belief that the country’slaws, informed by the settlement negotiations at Lancaster House, did not allow for theredistribution of land in a legal manner (Interview, 19 February 2006). So, ‘enter the warveterans’, this time as staunch supporters of Mugabe.

In February and March 2000, war veterans began to physically seize white-ownedfarms, forcibly evicting their occupants; at least 12 farmers were killed. The inter-national media reacted with rightful indignation, although the very same media hardlyhighlighted the fact that in South Africa 1118 farmers were killed in the periodbetween 1994 and 2001. Initially, Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwaordered the ‘squatters’ to leave the farms; in his words, there was no need for them totake action, as the government would confiscate farms and redistribute them —

Mugabe overruled him (Chan, 2003, 147). After land-seizures began, the governmentpassed through Parliament a new law in 2002, allowing the acquisition of farms to be‘fast-tracked’. By 2006, of a total number of 4500 white commercial farmers, only300 remained on the land. Most farms previously owned by whites, often by foreignabsentee landlords, changed hands. Taking these measures, the government wasrelying on the fact that, more often than not, these farms had already been managed

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by blacks. However, whatever skills these new owners had, modern agriculture cannotdevelop and be sustained without proper equipment, fertilisers, and seeds. But fundingof these necessities became extremely problematic with the aggravation of the economiccrisis; and a severe drought in 2006–2007 further worsened the situation.

There is one more cause of the crisis in Zimbabwe that is a ‘subjective factor’. His-torically, from the days of its inception ZANU8 was connected with China (the PRC).Many party activists went to Beijing, and Chinese instructors trained ZANU fightersin camps in Tanzania. All this happened when the PRC was far removed fromtoday’s China, in the days of the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’, and frequentrepressions and purges. Not surprisingly, the history of ZANU was also complicated: itsfirst President, Ndabaningi Sithole, was ‘deposed’ by his fellow inmates in prison;Chairman Herbert Chitepo was killed in a car-bomb attack in Lusaka, and Zambian auth-orities initially put the blame on his comrades in the party leadership; and top militarycommander Josiah Tongogara died under suspicious circumstances in a car crash on theeve of independence. Nevertheless, all this did not prevent the West from applaudingMugabe on the eve of independence and thereafter. A ‘cold war’ mentality continuedto prevail: let them use radical slogans, let them officially adhere to ‘Marxism-Lenin-ism-Mao Zedong thought’,9 but more important was that, as distinct from ZAPU,Mugabe and his party were politically far removed from Moscow and did not haveclose relations with the ANC — the latter constituting a clear threat to the minorityregime in Pretoria. After the independence of Zimbabwe, Western politicians and theinternational media virtually overlooked the tragedy in Matabeleland, where govern-ment troops in the mid-1980s ruthlessly suppressed a rebellion by former ZAPU fight-ers. Then, again, they applauded the implementation of an ESAP, despite the heavyburden it imposed on the Zimbabwean people.

However, on this occasion, the reaction of the West, especially of Britain, to theseizure of ‘sacred private property’ was immediate and distinctly negative: becausenow the possessions of their kith and kin were endangered. And in a matter of days,Mugabe (who, for many years, was regarded a ‘wise statesman’, receiving several hon-orary degrees and decorations) became a ‘monstrous dictator’. The controversial resultsof parliamentary elections in 2002, on which the opinion of foreign observers differed,were used to squeeze Zimbabwe out of the Commonwealth: the country was suspendedfrom membership in 2002 and decided to withdraw from the organisation in December2003.10 All assistance to the government of Zimbabwe from the USA and the EuropeanUnion (EU) was suspended and limited sanctions introduced.

It was not so difficult to detect a rise in authoritarian tendencies in Zimbabwe’sruling structures. However, although criticism was justified, the West committed a stra-tegic blunder: the ‘point man’ in its ‘crusade’ against Mugabe was none other than TonyBlair, prime minister of the country which for almost a century maintained colonial rule

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over Zimbabwe. Did they believe that Zimbabweans had forgotten that no democracywhatsoever existed during that period? Did they expect that Blair’s lectures on democ-racy would be applauded in Harare? Under these circumstances, it was not hard forMugabe to rally support by using anti-colonial slogans. Mugabe’s words, pronouncedat the Earth Summit in Johannesburg in 2002, ‘Blair, keep your England and let mekeep my Zimbabwe’, were applauded by many Africans. In fact, a London-based maga-zine voted him ‘the third greatest African of all time’ (BBC News, August–September2004).11 In March 2007, at a meeting in Dar es Salaam, leaders of member states ofthe Southern African Development Community (SADC) appealed to Britain tohonour its commitments to fund Zimbabwe’s land reforms and to abolish all sanctionsagainst that country (The Guardian, 30 March 2007). Apart from land redistribution,another issue caused Zimbabwe to come into conflict with some Western countries:its 1998–2000 intervention in the affairs of the Democratic Republic of Congo insupport of President Laurent Désiré Kabila. It would not be an exaggeration to saythat Zimbabwean armed forces, together with their allies from Angola and Namibia,saved Kabila from being toppled by rebels assisted by Rwanda and Uganda.12

Further criticism at home and abroad was provoked by ‘Operation Restore Order’(also known as ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ or ‘Operation Clean-Up’) in 2005, whenhundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans, primarily in the capital Harare, were renderedhomeless when their shacks were destroyed. The government declared that this oper-ation was meant to get rid of illegally build structures that had sprouted up aroundurban centres and were seen as a haven for illegal traders in foreign currency and thehoarding of scarce foodstuffs, as well as to reduce the risk of the spread of infectiousdiseases. However, quite probably this ‘operation’ had a political aim as well. Those‘informal settlements’ were inhabited by the down-trodden, by a ‘lumpen proletariat’who could easily become ‘foot-soldiers’ for the opposition. It is hardly accidental thatthe Zimbabwean government’s actions were taken soon after the ‘Orange Revolution’in the Ukraine, where the opposition managed to mobilise thousands of supportersand impose a new round of presidential elections.13

The Myth of a ‘Collapsing’ Agricultural Sector

The third myth alleges that changes in landownership resulted in the ‘collapse’ of the agri-cultural sector in Zimbabwe. True, rapid land redistribution created a lot of practical andother problems and, as it was stated above, contributed to a decline in production.However, studies show that the situation is muchmore complex than it is usually portrayed.

The parties to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) of 15 September 2008 clearlystated that ‘ … colonial [and] racist landownership patterns established during the colo-nial conquest of Zimbabwe, and largely maintained in the post-independence period,

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were not only unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity, and justice’. While‘differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution’ they accepted ‘the irre-versibility’ of land acquisitions and redistribution. They agreed to

conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit … [and]ensure that all Zimbabweans, who are eligible to be allocated land and whoapply for it, shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race,gender, religion, ethnicity, or political affiliation.

They, furthermore, called ‘upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primaryresponsibility to pay compensation for land acquired from former landowners for reset-tlement’, and pledged to work together ‘to secure international support and finance forthe land-reform programme in terms of compensation for … former landowners andsupport for new farmers, … [as well as] the restoration of full productivity on all agri-cultural land’ (GPA, 2008, 4).

However, after three years of research in theMasvingo Province, a specialist (Cousins,2010) came to the conclusion that the image, endlessly reproduced in the media, that com-mercial farming had completely collapsed, was ‘profoundly unhelpful’. Although:

… agriculture in Zimbabwe has indeed experienced significant problems in theyears following radical land reform, the notion of ‘total failure’ is inaccurate. Anew agrarian structure has come into being, with a much wider range of farmsizes and farming systems than in the past, replacing a highly unequal and dua-listic structure … .Novel commodity chains for crops and livestock are emer-ging, with new agri-businesses supplying inputs and buying produce, as inthe tobacco sector. Seed and fertilizer production capacity is being restored.

The research concludes that land redistribution in Zimbabwe has reduced flagrant racialand class inequalities in landownership and has brought into being a potentially pro-ductive agrarian structure (Cousins, 2010). Renowned scholars such as Hanlon andSmart (2011) share this opinion. Attitudes towards land are different in Zimbabwethan in neighbouring countries. In their opinion,

… although many Zimbabweans have rural links, the new generation of land-reform farmers is well educated and often with urban links, which gives themaccess to markets and finance. The result is that resettlement farmers havebeen able to invest and produce at levels approaching those of the formerwhite farmers, and they were able to survive the 2007–2008 hyperinflations.

The fate of white farmers is often quite different from that portrayed in theWestern media.Several hundreds of them ‘continue to operate, and have often built links with resettlementfarmers, providing services such as ploughing; others have left farming, but movedupstream, playing a key role in marketing beef and tobacco’ (Hanlon & Smart, 2011).

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In any case, whatever happened, one thing is clear: Robert Mugabe will remainetched in the memory of many Africans as a man who stood firm against the formercolonial power, and the return of land to its historical owners (which he ensured) isnow irreversible.

The Myth of Undivided International Support for the Opposition

The fourth myth claims that ‘the international community’ fully supports the oppositionin Zimbabwe and wants the current ‘regime’ replaced. This is a typical case where thereference to the ‘international community’ is used to cover up illegal action. Naturally,the destiny of the country has to be decided by Zimbabweans themselves; but a ratherclumsy set of pressures set in motion by London, Washington and the EU only aggra-vated the situation. If foreign involvement is needed to facilitate a solution, it shouldcome from fellow Africans and, indeed, a special role on behalf of the SADC and theAfrican Union (AU) was played by South Africa. Despite criticism for being ‘too softon Mugabe’, former President Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues in the ANC governmentwere quietly but steadily working for a political solution to the crisis in the neighbouringcountry. Mbeki more than once expressed his readiness to promote ‘compromisebetween rival factions in Zimbabwe’, but was not going to ‘push for regime change’;‘ … we have to get the Zimbabweans talking, so we do have elections that are freeand fair (BBC News, 3 April 2007).

The first step in resolving the political crisis was made when, in March 2008, pre-sidential and parliamentary elections took place under conditions agreed upon by theconflicting parties. The opposition won parliamentary elections, but victory was notdecisive because of the split in the MDC. ZANU-PF won only 100 seats of 220 inthe National Assembly, while the MDC-T (headed by Tsvangirai) and the MDC-M(headed by Professor Arthur Mutambara) won 99 seats and 10 seats, respectively.The results of the presidential election were even worse for the ruling ZANU-PFparty. In the first round, Mugabe got just 43.2 per cent of the vote, against 47.9 percent for Tsvangirai. The latter refused to take part in the second, run-off election, refer-ring to intimidation and persecution of his supporters, and Mugabe was elected Presidentwith 85.5 per cent of the vote.

But on15September 2008,with tensions in the country rising, SADCleaderswitnessedthe signingof theGPA inHarare by the leaders ofZANU-PF, theMDC-T, and theMDC-M.According to this agreement, a Government of National Unitywas to consist of a president,two vice presidents, a prime minister, two deputy prime ministers, and 31 ministers.Mugabe remained Presidentwith executive powers and Tsvangirai became PrimeMinister,while Mutambara was appointed one of the deputy prime ministers. It was agreed thatZANU-PF would nominate 15 ministers, while the MDC-T got 13 and the MDC-M was

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offered 3 (GPA, 2008, 16).However, it took anotherfivemonths towork out specific detailson the allocation of ministries, and the new government was eventually sworn in only inFebruary 2009. One of the most important clauses of the GPA was a joint demand ‘thatall…measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a sustainablesolution to the challenges that are… facing Zimbabwe’ (GPA, 2008, 4).While theWesternpowers insisted that sanctions— they preferred to call them ‘restrictive measures’ —were‘targeted’, the GPA (2008, 4) listed them as the:

(a) enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by theUnited States of America Congress, which outlaws Zimbabwe’s right toaccess credit from international financial institutions in which the UnitedStates government is represented, or has a stake;

(b) suspension of Zimbabwe’s voting and related rights, suspension of balance-of-payments support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund resources, andsuspension of technical assistance to Zimbabwe by the International MonetaryFund;

(c) suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to Zimbabwe bythe World Bank; and

(d) imposition of targeted travel bans against current government and somebusiness leaders [of Zimbabwe].

Perhaps, discouragement of tourism to Zimbabwe should be added to this list.

It should be noted that all three parties to the GPA, as well as the SADC and the AU,are officially committed to the lifting of sanctions. However, major Western powers,despite undisputed positive developments in Zimbabwe, do not want to lift sanctions.A group of the so-called ‘Friends of Zimbabwe’ asserts that it recognises ‘Zimbabweanownership of the constitutional and electoral processes and the role which countries inthe region have to play’, but refuses to ask for the lifting of sanctions, just promising tokeep them ‘under review’ (Friends of Zimbabwe Group, 2010).14 Indeed, the preser-vation of sanctions became a stumbling block in the further implementation of theGPA: for ZANU-PF it provided a reason (or, at least, an excuse) not to make additionalconcessions to the (former) opposition. And, under the threat of sanctions, Mugabe pro-claimed a ‘Look East’ policy in an attempt to develop closer relations with China (thePRC), India, Iran, and other Asian countries — Russia was also included in this cat-egory. Apart from some economic gains, this policy resulted in subverting Westernattempts to politically isolate Harare. This was vividly demonstrated when Russia andChina used their veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent the introductionof mandatory sanctions against Zimbabwe (Press Release, July 2008).

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Conclusion

When hyperinflation surpassed 1bn per cent, the Zimbabwean dollar became virtuallyworthless and was replaced by a multiple currency regime: mainly the US dollar, theSouth African rand, and the Botswana pula. However, that contributed to price stabilityand, according tofigures from theReserveBank ofZimbabwe, byNovember 2009 annual-ised monthly price increases had even dropped to −1.19 per cent. The last two years wit-nessed slowbut steady recovery of theZimbabwean national economy: in 2009,GDPgrewby 5.7 per cent and in 2010 was estimated at 8.1 per cent, while inflation declined to a low4.8 per cent. According to Tendai Biti, Minister of Finance (and MDC-T Secretary-General), growth in 2011 is expected to be around 9.3 per cent, with average inflationlevels at about 4.5–5.0 per cent. In his budget speech, he gave a realistic assessment of‘aid’ to Zimbabwe, reminding that of US$810mn pledged by donors in 2010 only US$360mn were disbursed, none of which came under the rubric of the budget framework.

However, some important political issues have not yet been resolved. It seems, onceagain, that relations between President and Prime Minister have become rather strained.Though Tsvangirai earlier spoke of ‘some chemistry’ (The Guardian, 18 August 2009)which was busy developing between them, more recently he flatly stated that they do notsee eye-to-eye. The deadline for drafting (and adopting by referendum) a new consti-tution has passed, and the date for fresh elections has not yet been set. Under these cir-cumstances, at the ZANU-PF conference in December 2010 Mugabe hinted at an end tothe coalition (in Zimbabwe they prefer to call it ‘inclusive’) government, and the holdingof elections even before the adoption of a new constitution. By mid-January 2011, heappeared to have backed down, and at a joint news conference with Tsvangirai andMutambara they announced that elections would be held only after the constitutionalprocess had been completed. But earlier the Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe,a national grouping of private business leaders, appealed to Mugabe, Tsvangirai andMutambara not to go ahead with elections in 2011 because it could reverse the economicgains achieved after formation of the inclusive government. They even suggested a five-year moratorium on holding elections to consolidate the economic recovery and main-tain stability in the country (Mpofu, 2010).

The political situation in Zimbabwe is being complicated by divisions within themajor political parties. There are regular media reports about the succession strugglesin ZAPU-PF (Mugabe is 89) and tensions between the MDC-T’s Tsvangirai and Biti;while the MDC-M replaced Arthur Mutambara with Welshman Ncube, renamingtheir faction MDC-N. Besides, ZAPU (as a single party) was ‘resurrected’ last yearwith Dumiso Dabengwa, one of the leaders of the liberation struggle, as its president.Under these circumstances, South Africa does its best to consolidate progress in resol-ving the Zimbabwean issue. President Jacob Zuma succeeded Thabo Mbeki as the

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mediator for Zimbabwe and, moreover, appointed Mac Maharaj15 as his special envoy;both Zuma and Maharaj regularly visit Zimbabwe for mediation talks. True, one cannotexclude the possibility that during any forthcoming election campaign political tensionsmight rise again, but hardly to previous levels. Not many in Zimbabwe want to relive theacute political and economic crises of the recent past. Besides, in terms of the GPA,greatly improved rules and structures had to be established to ensure the peacefulfuture development of Zimbabwe. Indeed, the most remarkable impression one comesaway with after a visit to Zimbabwe is that the people of that country want peace andstability — and, clearly, their wishes should prevail.

Notes1 But this does not mean that Moscow did not have any contact whatsoever with ZANU. In particular,the author had an opportunity to have a lengthy discussion with the chairman of ZANU, HerbertChitepo, during a UN-Organisation of African Unity Conference on Southern Africa in Oslo inApril 1973. The interaction was quite friendly, though Chitepo did not share the author’s enthusiasmfor the establishment of a ZANU–ZAPU joint military command. Even after the formation of the PFin 1976, a similar situation obtained in practice. Although it was welcomed in Moscow, the fact wasdeplored that in reality both organisations continued to operate separately, be it in their official rep-resentation abroad or their military units in the field.

2 This is not the place to discuss the nature and causes of these crises, but external factors played a nega-tive role in both cases.

3 The author was present at a Witness Seminar on ‘Britain and Rhodesia: Road to Settlement’, organ-ised by the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics in collaboration with theCentre for Contemporary British History, in London in July 2005. When a British academic askedLord Carrington, who had been Foreign Secretary at the time of the Lancaster House Conference— and later Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation— what monies were prom-ised as compensation for land acquisition in Zimbabwe, surprisingly enough the experienced diplomatcould not recall the fact. Other ‘witnesses’, all prominent former British diplomats, could not remem-ber either. Moreover, all of them remained silent even when the author asked an ‘easier’ question,whether any calculations had been made of how much money would be needed for land buyouts.

Yet, later one of them expressed a very interesting viewpoint: since the situation was relativelycalm after Zimbabwean independence, the issue of funding a buyout was not regarded as essential.

4 According to the Lancaster House Constitution, during the first 10 years of independence, the newZimbabwean government was barred from nationalisation of private property, including land.

5 For the author, this closely resembles the fate of similar ‘reforms’ in Russia during the same period.6 Hitler was a rather strange nickname or nom de guerre for a physician who had graduated in Polandand was, at some stage, married to a Polish woman. But later he insisted that Hitler was, indeed, hismiddle name since birth (The Independent (London), 5 June 2001).

7 Hunzvi suddenly died in 2001, of what seemed to be natural causes at the relatively young age of 51,after having been voted out as chairman of the WVA.

8 Although the PF was originally formed in 1976 (during the liberation struggle) as a political and mili-tary alliance between ZAPU and ZANU, upon independence in 1980 the two parties separated to form

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PF-ZAPU and ZANU-PF. Only in December 1987 did the two parties finally merge to formZANU-PF, and Robert Mugabe became the leader of the united party.

9 Only in 1984 was ‘Mao Zedong thought’ dropped from ZANU documents.10 It has to be said, however, that some Western criticism of Mugabe appeared earlier, after his confron-

tation with Tony Blair in Edinburgh. But the first ‘salvo’ in this battle sounded before, in July 1995,when Mugabe shut down a book exhibit organised by an organisation of gays and lesbians at theprestigious Harare International Book Fair, declaring that homosexuals were ‘worse than dogs andpigs’. For the ‘liberal’ Western media such a statement was simply unforgivable.

11 The author witnessed how, on 21 March 2010, at a rally in Windhoek to celebrate the 20th anniversaryof Namibia’s independence, Mugabe received the biggest applause.

12 It must be added, however, that Mugabe’s government began supporting Laurent Kabila much earlier,when he was still fighting the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.

13 Events in the Ukraine are, of course, beyond the scope of this article, but it is worth mentioning that theparty of Victor Yanukovych was soon returned to power and he was again elected President in 2010.

14 In October 2010, the author was invited to Paris to make a presentation at the Annual Conference ofthe European Union Institute for Security Studies on the topic of ‘Humanitarian Crises and Inter-national Responsibility’; after reflection, he resolved to ‘rename’ his talk ‘Humanitarian Crises andInternational Irresponsibility’.

15 Maharaj is a former cabinet minister, well-known as a political prisoner under apartheid and head of‘Operation Vula’, the armed underground structure in South Africa until 1991.

References

BBC News. 2001 ‘Obituary: War Veterans leader “Hitler” Hunzvi’, 4 June (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1369182.stm/)

BBC News, 2002 ‘Excerpts from Mugabe’s address’, 2 September (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2232156.stm)

BBC News. 2007 ‘Mbeki Hoping for Zimbabwe Talks’, 3 April (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6520553.stm)

Bond, Patrick and Masimba Manyana. 2002 Zimbabwe Plunge, Exhausted Nationalism, Neo-Liberalism,and the Search for Social Justice, Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Chan, Stephen. 2003 Robert Mugabe: A Life of Power and Violence, London and New York: I B Tauris.

Cousins, Ben. 2010 ‘Time to Ditch the Disaster Scenarios’, Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 21 May(http://www.mg.co.za/article/2010-05-20-time-to-ditch-the-disaster-scenarios — accessed on 10February 2011).

Friends of Zimbabwe Group. 2010 Declaration by the Friends of Zimbabwe Group on the Situation inZimbabwe, Harare, 12 June (http://www.zimbabwesituation.org/?p=14606url).

GPA (Global Political Agreement). 2008 Ministry of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs,Government of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 September.

Hanlon, Joseph and Teresa Smart. 2011 Zimbabwe’s Land Reform (Abstract submitted to the 12thConference of Africanists in Moscow, Russia).

Hill, Geoff. 2003 The Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown, Cape Town: Zebra Press.

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Interview, 19 February 2006 — author’s discussion with a prominent member of ZANU-PF in Harare,Zimbabwe.

Johnson, Phyllis. 2006 Samora Machel: 20 Years since 19 October 1986, South African News Featuresno 90, 6 October (http://www.sardc.net/Editorial/Newsfeature/06901006.htm — accessed on 10February 2011).

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Meldrum, Andrew. 2007 ‘Refugees Flood from Zimbabwe: Flow of Desperate Migrants into SouthAfrica Intensifies as Inflation and Shortages Worsen’, The Guardian (London), 1 July.

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Solodovnikov, Vassily. 2000 K istorii Ustanovleniya Diplomaticheskih Otnoshenii Mezhdu SSSR iZimbabwe [On the History of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the USSR andZimbabwe], in Afrika v Vospominaniyah Veteranov Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhby [Africa inReminiscences of the Veterans of Diplomatic Service], Moscow: Sovet Veteranov MID i InstitutAfriki RAN, pp 137–138.

The Guardian. 2001 ‘Obituary Chenjerai Hunzvi’, 5 June (http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/jun/05/guardianobituaries.zimbabwe)

The Guardian. 2003 ‘Short Denied Responsibility to Zimbabwe’, 11 August (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/aug/11/freedomofinformation.zimbabwe)

The Guardian. 2007 ‘Diplomacy Allows Mugabe to Escape Censure at Summi’, 30 March (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/30/zimbabwe.chrismcgreal)

The Guardian (London), 18 August 2009.

The Herald (Harare), 28 December 2009 (http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2010/05/20/mugabe-may-be-tired-of-war/ — accessed on 13 February 2013).

The Independent (London), 2001 ‘Obituary. Genjerai Hunzvi’, 5 June (http://www.questia.com/library/1P2-5160945/obituary-chenjerai-hunzvi — accessed on 13 February 2013).

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Whitaker, Raymond. 2008 ‘Five Million People Face Starvation in Troubled Zimbabwe: Power-SharingTalks Deadlocked While UN Warns of Humanitarian Emergency Caused by Failed Harvest’, TheIndependent (London), 19 October.

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