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    JOHNS HOPKINS A PL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997) 501

    MOUNTAIN TOP: BEYOND-THE-HORIZON CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

    T

    Mountain Top: Beyond-the-Horizon Cruise MissileDefense

    William H. Zinger and Jerry A . Krill

    he Cruise Missile Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration,

    known as Mountain Top, was successfully completed at Kauai, Hawaii, during Januaryand February 1996. The demonstration featured a new type of cooperative engagementknown as forward pass, made possible by the Cooperative Engagement Capability, inwhich low-flying drones were engaged beyond the horizon of an Aegis ship for greatlyincreased engagement range. Although the Navy performed the forward passcooperative engagements alone, the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army participatedin other major joint-services exercises. Most significantly, the concept of a surface-launched, air-supported engagement of cruise missiles was validated and has providedthe impetus for follow-on joint-services pursuit of an extended, beyond-the-horizonengagement capability for defense of land sites from land-, air-, and sea-based missiledefense systems. This article describes the background, objectives, conduct, and resultsof the Mountain Top test operations. Also detailed are the systems engineeringconcepts, system configurations, and the test and evaluation process that went into theplanning, conduct, and analysis of the many complex experiments of the AdvancedConcept Technology Demonstration.(Keywords: Beyond the horizon, Cooperative engagement, Forward pass, Joint services,Mountain Top, Overland cruise missile defense.)

    BACKGROUND

    The concept of intercepting low-flying targets byship-launched missiles beyond the ships horizon withthe aid of an airborne platform was considered over twodecades ago. By removing the limitation of the shipsradar horizon, such a concept envisioned the intercep-tion of targets much farther from the defended andengaging units, allowing time for additional engage-ments if necessary.Figure 1 illustrates the evolution ofthe forward pass concept.

    The earliest version of the concept, examined atAPL in the mid-1970s as part of the Battle Group Anti-Air Warfare Coordination Program, embodied prima-rily the element of beyond-the-horizon guidance. In

    this case, a Standard Missile (SM) would be directedvia the ships missile midcourse control link to thevicinity of an F-14 fighter. The fighters fire controlradar, modified for this role, would illuminate the tar-get, allowing the missile to home on the reflected il-lumination from the target.

    A modified form of forward pass emerged in the late1970s to early 1980s during a series of outer air battlestudies, which addressed next-generation Navy battlegroup air defense requirements against Soviet bombersarmed with long-range antiship cruise missiles. If thebombers could be intercepted before they approachedto within range of launching their missiles at U.S.

    TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION

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    W. H. ZINGER AND J. A. KRILL

    502 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997)

    ships, a critical new layer of defense would be provided.This variant of forward pass featured a conceptual, long-range ramjet missile that could be launched from anAegis cruiser and flown toward a carrier-based surveil-lance and fire control aircraft. The aircraft would carryadvanced, long-range sensors to detect bombers and totake over midcourse missile control from the ship via

    an onboard aircraft-to-missile link. The missile wasenvisioned to have a multisensor homing seeker capableof locking onto a target from long distances. This formof the concept (Fig. 1, center) was known as midcoursehandover in contrast to the remote illuminationapproach of the F-14 concept. From these outer airbattle studies, in which APL was a prominent partic-ipant, a requirement for a long-range form of SM (nowknown as SM-2 Block IV) emerged along with the needfor a cooperative engagement link.

    The Laboratory participated in yet another series ofrelated studies in the mid- to late 1980s, centeredaround the use of an airship to carry weapon system

    elements comparable in function to the phased arrayradar and illuminators of an Aegis cruiser, but withreduced weight and new features for missile control.Key among those features was the use of a multifunc-tion phased array system as both the fire control radarand illuminator. This feature provided multiplexed il-lumination of targets, thus allowing simultaneous hom-ing of several SM-2 missiles. Analysis showed that,given sufficient equipment weight reduction and powercapacity, an airship so equipped and operating at analtitude of over 10,000 ft could greatly extend theeffective surveillance and engagement range againstlow-altitude cruise missiles.

    This last example of forward pass can be seen as ahybrid between a remote-illumination forward pass anda form of cooperative engagement then being designedfor the Cooperative Engagement Capability1(CEC; seethe boxed insert) known as engagement on remote data(EOR). An EOR capability allows a ship to fire an SM-2 missile and direct the missile midcourse and terminalhoming illumination using data from remote rather than

    own-ship sensors. For this concept, the airship wouldserve as both the remote data source for EOR and as theremote homing illuminator in the forward pass mode.This became the form of cooperative engagement con-sidered for the eventual Mountain Top tests.

    With the end of the Cold War and the advent oflittoral environment scenarios, the low-altitude cruise

    missile threat became even more important, so that abeyond-the-horizon intercept capability remained veryattractive. A variety of air platform candidates emergedincluding large tethered aerostats, wide-body aircraft,and a network of sensors from multiple smaller(manned or unmanned) aircraft linked via the CEC.An example of a concept using ship-launched aircraftnetworked with CEC is shown inFig. 2.

    MOUNTAIN TOP

    Demonstration

    The potential operational advantages of a forwardpass capability led senior Navy and DoD officials toconclude in 1993 that the likely payoff of an airborneunit to extend surface-launched missile engagementrange was sufficiently compelling to explore as theinitial stage of an Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstration (ACTD). This ACTD stage eventuallyfeatured two sets of test operations, which are describedin detail later in this article.

    Set 1 comprised beyond-the-horizon Navy tests (Phase1) and Army tests (Phase 2).

    Set 2, known as Enhanced Scenarios, involved par-

    ticipation of the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and AirForce in joint exercises: arrival on the scene (Phase1), defense against shore-based attacks (Phase 2), andjoint littoral operations (Phase 3).

    The organizations and participants in the ACTD arepresented inTable 1. (The boxed insert, APL Moun-tain Top Team, lists the Laboratory personnel whoparticipated in the formal testing.)

    Mid-1970s Mid- to late 1980sLate 1970s to early 1980s

    Figure 1. Evolution of the forward pass concept, i.e., the concept of intercepting missiles attacking from beyond a ships horizon with the

    aid of airborne radars: in the mid-1970s, aircraft illumination of the target for missile semiactive homing; from the late 1970s to early 1980s,aircraft detection of the target and guided missile midcourse to multimode homing; by the mid- to late 1980s, aircraft detection of the targetand guided missile midcourse, and illumination of the target for pulsed semiactive missile homing.

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    W. H. ZINGER AND J. A. KRILL

    504 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997)

    THE COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAPABILITY

    The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) hasbeen developed to network sensors and weapon systems ina manner that allows a set of geographically diverse airdefense systems of various types to operate as if they werea single entity, but with performance advantages that accruefrom the exploitation of their intrinsic diversities (i.e.,locations and sensor characteristics). A full description ofCEC is available in a previous issue of theTechnical D igest.1

    For the convenience of the reader, the primary CEC char-acteristics are briefly summarized here.

    The CEC system consists of two subsystems: the Coop-erative Engagement Processor (CEP) and a data transferelement known as the Data Distribution System (DDS). InFig. A , the CEC is shown connected to the Aegis combatsystem, for example. The CEP provides its combatantsweapon system with a composite track picture as well asrecommended target identity. This is accomplished by usinglocal and remote sensor measurements and informationfriend or foe (IFF) responses, which are exchanged via theDDS, to create a common air picture that is more completeand more accurate than one obtained from the best con-tributing sensor. With this quality information, a unit mayengage using only remote data, even if the target is fast and

    maneuvering. The DDS performs the networking functionsof automatically establishing and maintaining a secure net-work for rapid exchange of target position measurements

    and associated data messages among all cooperating com-batants.

    The CEP on a given combatant is interfaced to its prin-cipal sensors, from which it receives radar or IFF targetreports and to which it provides data for special acquisitionor gating to acquire targets not locally held. All sensor orIFF reports associated with each assigned track are ex-changed via the DDS with other cooperating units. The

    exchanged data include, as appropriate, target range, bear-ing, elevation, Doppler (if available), sensor type, and as-sociated track number. Unit position data obtained frominertial navigation data, DDS-to-DDS measurements, andother pertinent sources are also exchanged. The CEP grid-lock function computes the precise relative positions ofcooperating units and calibrates sensor angular and rangealignments by correlating reported positions of common,multiply tracked targets.

    Using these data, the CEP develops an optimized com-posite track of each target by applying a quality-weightedcombination of all data sources via a Kalman filter. Con-tinual tests for target splits and merges are made at themeasurement input level. These track data are provided tothe combatants weapon system for fire control use and to

    its command/control element. The exchange and process-ing of unprocessed target measurement datarather thanthe exchange of track data (with its inevitable lags andcorruption by fades), as is common to tactical link net-worksis a key feature of the CEC concept and is respon-sible for its ability to generate fire controlquality data forsensor/weapon acquisition and missile guidance.

    The CEP also exchanges engagement status data amongcooperating weapon systems. In the future, it will computethe relative engageability of undesignated targets by thevarious weapon systems for recommendation of weaponsengagement assignments among networked units.

    DDS elements, using their directive phased array an-tennas, automatically establish and maintain a communi-cation network among all cooperating units by synchro-nously switching their transmit and receive beams amongpairs of units in parallel (Fig. B). Because each DDS pos-sesses a phased array with a single beam for either trans-mission or reception, each unit can only point its beam toconnect (transmit or receive) to one other DDS at a time.Each connection event involves one unit transmittingthrough its beam to another unit and the other unit point-ing its beam at the transmitting unit to receive from it. Thistransmit/receive beam connectivity is generally performedin parallel among pairs in the network at precise times viathe DDS cesium clocks using a common, adaptive algo-rithm. Different pairings occur every frame, a small sub-second block of time. If a connectivity path or a unit is lost

    CEC

    Weaponcontrolsystem

    SPY-1Bradar

    IFF CEP

    DDS

    Command/decision

    Displays

    Command/control links

    SPS-49radar

    Figure A. CEC interfaces to the Aegis combat system.

    Objectives

    The Mountain Top ACTD management plan2iden-tified the Navy, Army, and the Advanced ResearchProjects Agency (ARPA) as the primary participantsand was approved by senior Army, Navy, DoD, andBallistic Missile Defense Organization officials.

    The objective of . . . (Mountain Top) is to demon-strate the potential for significant enhancements to air

    defense capabilities by integrating Navy/Army/ARPAtechnology developments and existing air defense sys-tems. The goal is to detect, track, and successfully engagecruise missiles at ranges beyond the radar line of sightof surface-based air defense units, and provide an oppor-tunity to assess joint doctrine and concepts of air defenseoperation.2

    Toward this objective the plan required an explora-tion of three new capabilities2:

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    JOHNS HOPKINS A PL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997) 505

    MOUNTAIN TOP: BEYOND-THE-HORIZON CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

    (e.g., because of equipment failure, excess jamming, orpropagation fade), the loss of connectivity is communicat-

    ed throughout the network, and the common algorithmsadjust the schedules and any relay sequences identicallyand automatically at each DDS.

    Antenna directivity and relatively high transmitter pow-er provide the required countermeasures immunity andmargin against propagation fading, while maintaining a highdata rate and a low error rate. The phased array designpermits the near-instantaneous beam pointing necessary tomeet stringent subsecond timing requirements associatedwith sensor measurements. The utilization of a narrowbeam-directed phased array antenna for both transmission andreception is unprecedented for a mobile communicationsystem, as is the unique scheduling and control process usedby the DDS.

    Transmit

    Transmit

    Receive

    Receive

    Time frame N+ 1

    Transmit

    Transmit

    Receive

    Receive

    Time frame N+ 3

    Transmit

    Receive

    Receive Transmit

    Time frame N+ 2

    Time frame N

    Transmit

    Receive

    Transmit

    Receive

    Because of these characteristics, the CEC provides theweapon system on every cooperating combatant with a

    composite track picture that is more precise and containsmore rapidly updated target data than any individual con-tributing sensor. This is accomplished by the use of a sophis-ticated Kalman filter and the data flow logic of multiplesensor data, which exploit the more accurate range-versus-bearing data (for radars), eliminate target fades due to mul-tipath and refraction fades (especially over land), circum-vent main-beam jamming and local clutter, and utilize fa-vorable target aspect. In the case of elevated sensors, as inthe Mountain Top tests, the composite track also overcomesthe horizon limitations of own-ship radar for the firing unit.In addition, CEC obtains a force-wide assessment of targetidentity and engageability, greatly enhancing the cumula-tive effectiveness of the force.

    Figure B. DDS directive pair-wise operation.

    1. Increased target acquisition and tracking ranges (be-yond radar horizons) and extended target terminalillumination ranges through elevated sensor suites

    2. Sensor networking along with a high data rate andfire controlquality data

    3. Increased target engagement ranges

    Measures of effectiveness for the Navy includedtarget detection and firm track ranges, fire controlconnectivity between an elevated site and the ship,missile intercept range beyond the ships horizonfrom the ship, inbound and crossing target trajectoriesrelative to the ship, and low target altitude above the

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    W. H. ZINGER AND J. A. KRILL

    506 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997)

    sea surface at sub-Mach speed. A key purpose of theACTD, then, would be to validate the physics embed-ded in the forward pass concept and the performancecharacteristics of the equipment so that the results

    could be confidently applied to tactically orientedsystem development.

    Installations

    Many considerations went into the planning, con-duct, and evaluation of the Mountain Top ACTD. Insupport of the demonstration, APL, in collaborationwith Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln

    Labs, proposed the following: Since available fire con-trol radar and illuminator elements were too heavy tobe carried by air vehicles, a mountaintop could be usedas a surrogate aircraft. This would allow existing ship

    and prototype aircraft equipment to be installed on anelevated site to emulate future airborne elements andfunctions.

    A mountain site on the island of Kauai, Hawaii(Kokee Park), near the Pacific Missile Range Facility(PMRF) at Barking Sands, met all the foreseen require-ments. This site had three advantage: steepness, exist-ing government installations near the coast, and deepwater in which ships could operate safely near shore.

    APL MOUNTAIN TOP TEAM

    The following APL staff and resident subcontractors (listed alphabetically) participated in the formal Mountain Top testingduring January and February 1996. The list illustrates the breadth and depth of the Laboratorys involvement in those events.

    CEC design, int egrati on (l and/ships/

    aircraft), test data evaluati on

    G. P. AllynA. D. Bernard

    J. M. DavisG. P. GafkeR. W. GarretS. F. HaaseH. H. HamiltonL. M. HubbsS. A. KunclS. KuoG. K. LeeD. J. LevineR. E. MartinaitisT. A. McCartyR. C. McKenzieC. L. MyersJ. R. PenceR. W. ProueC. P. RichardsD. B. ScheplengM. Y. ShenL. W. ShroyerV. I. StetserJ. W. StevensO. M. StewartD. M. SundayP. H. TemkinD. I. TewellT. T. TranG. C. UeckerC. VandervestL. A . VentimigliaJ. Wong

    C. A . Wright

    Cri ti cal experiments, data coll ection,

    special instr umentati on

    (some experiments were performed prior to

    January/February 1996)

    R. A . BesekeA. J. BricM. H. ChenS. J. CrosbyG. J. DobekG. D. DockeryW. P. GannonW. R. GellerJ. GoldhirshJ. M. HansonA. S. HughesR. Z. JonesB. E. KlugaF. J. MarcotteJ. H. MeyerJ. J. MillerC. P. MrazekP. D. NacciJ. R. RowlandR. C. SchulzeR. M. WaterworthL. H. White

    Documentation/photography

    G. A. BoltzJ. G. FiskeR. L. GoldbergR. E. HallJ. E. OBrien

    Program management /li aison

    C. J. GrantR. T. LundyM. MontoyaS. M. ParkerJ. E. Whitely

    Senior management

    R. W. ConstantineM. E. OliverG. L. Smith

    W. H. Zinger

    Sit e design/i nstall ati on support

    L. J. AdamsR. BarryD. J. BuscherC. A. DalyH. F. DirksP. N. GarnerD. E. JohnsonM. H. LuesseL. E. McKenzieM. L. Miller

    Systems engineer in g

    W. I. CitrinJ. A. KrillP. E. LakomyJ. R. MooreJ. F. RediskeD. D. RichardsR. E. Thurber

    Test preparati on, coordinat ion,

    conduct

    C. R. CookA. F. JeyesG. LongM. R. SandsR. D. TimmN. E. White

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    JOHNS HOPKINS A PL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997) 507

    MOUNTAIN TOP: BEYOND-THE-HORIZON CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

    The Kokee Park Site A, situated 3800 ft above sealevel, was an abandoned NASA installation. The Navyhad to establish appropriate electrical services, repairand upgrade the laboratory facilities, and erect specialtowers to support the radars and CEC (Fig. 3), whilemeeting the environmental standards of this famousstate park. Kokee also served APL and E-Systems as theprimary engineering data analysis site for the CEC

    network and as the base of operation for the radaragents, MIT, and the Naval Sea Systems Command.Aegis and SM-2 data analyses were performed by Lock-heed Martin and the Navy at Barking Sands. APL, incollaboration with the Navy, established data lines tothe primary test conduct and control site at BarkingSands to make the composite CEC track data outputavailable for test control.

    The 1700-ft-elevation Makaha Ridge site, equippedwith the AN/SPS-48E (hereafter, SPS-48E) surveil-lance radar and IFF (information friend or foe), wasintegrated into the Kokee CEC system via fiber-opticlines. This enabled the elevated sites to more accurate-

    ly resemble the full avionics suite of the elevated firecontrol/surveillance aircraft concept, which would beexpected to provide a multiple-target tracking and IFFcapability. The integration scheme complemented thesingle-target tracking radar and fire control radar ele-ments at Kokee and provided for multiple mutual tar-gets with the SPY-1B radar of an Aegis cruiser for CECprecision gridlock (these and other defense units aredescribed in the next section).

    To provide a ready surrogate link between CECand the Army Patriot unit, Joint Tactical InformationDistribution System (JTIDS) terminals were installed atboth the Kokee and Barking Sands sites, i.e., at Kokeethe JTIDS was indirectly connected to the CEC displayinterface via a device developed by the Naval Space andAir Warfare Command, and at Barking Sands the ter-minal was connected to an existing Patriot interface.

    The airport at Barking Sands supported a commercialhelicopter equipped with APL-developed atmosphericsensors,3,4 the Captive Seeker Lear aircraft (discussedbelow), and the P-3 aircraft used in the EnhancedScenarios. Both the Makaha Ridge site and an aerostattethered at Barking Sands were equipped with specialinfrared sensors to provide insight into potential coop-erative, networked infrared systems for longer-range de-tection of low-flying targets.

    Before describing the actual test operations, thetechnical foundation upon which the Mountain Topresults were based is described in the following section.

    TECHNICAL FOUNDATION

    System Elements

    The weapon system elements participating in theMountain Top beyond-the-horizon ACTD (Set 1) arepresented inTable 2; Table 3 lists additional elementsparticipating in the Enhanced Scenarios (Set 2). Thefollowing paragraphs briefly describe the characteristics

    of the CEC-networked weaponsystem elements.

    CEC: Sensor and Fir e Contr ol

    Network

    As noted in the boxed insert, theCEC was developed to allow a net-work of air defense units to inte-grate their collective sensor mea-surement and weapons control dataso as to operate as a single, distrib-uted air defense system. For theACTD, two specially adapted CECequipment sets were built, one forthe Kokee surrogate aircraft site

    and the other for the USSLake Erie(A egis CG 70). The CEC electron-ics differed somewhat from thepermanent ship sets installed onthe USSAnzioandCape St. George(Aegis CG 68 and 71, respectively)to reduce weight and facilitatehousing in a shelter. A follow-oncruise missile defense (CMD) phase

    Figure 3. Kokee Park surrogate aircraft site A, at a 3800-ft elevation. In addition toproviding the surrogate forward pass aircraft functions, test data evaluation of the siteelements and the CEC was conducted here. The system elements are described in the text.

    RSTERroto-dome array

    CEC array antenna

    MK 74 fire control radarand illuminator area

    Kokee site Aengineering test evaluation and

    surrogate avionics facility

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    W. H. ZINGER AND J. A. KRILL

    508 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997)

    Table 2. Major beyond-the-horizon test elements (Set 1).

    Element Type Function

    Radar surveillance Pulsed Doppler array Stationed at elevated sight to perform target

    technology experimental radar surveillanceradar (RSTER)

    Mark 74 (MK 74) Tartar fire control radar Stationed at elevated site to provide precision

    target data and target illumination

    SPS-48E Terrier New-Threat-Upgrade Stationed at elevated site to providethree-dimensional radar surveillance and gridlock data

    CEC Cooperative engagement/ Networked radars and illumination to weapon

    sensor network control for composite track picture and

    cooperative engagement

    USS Lake Erie Aegis, CG 70 Provided engagement control and missile

    launch/guidance

    SM-2 Block IIIA Guided missile Responded in-flight to midcourse(instrumented) commands and performed semi-active

    homing and warhead fusing

    BQM-74 Drone Controlled from elevated sight; flown withcharacteristics of a low-altitude attacker

    Table 3. Major additional elements used in the Enhanced Scenarios (Set 2).

    Element Type Function

    USSAnzioandCape St. George Aegis, CG 68 and 71 Varied depending on scenario, including(with CEC) data collection and cooperative

    SM-2 engagements

    Hawk Marine Corps anti-air Provided engagement control and missile

    weapon system launch/guidance for Hawk missile firings

    TPS-59 Hawk radar Provided elevated surveillance

    Aerostat Tethered, unmanned airship Supplied elevated digital communicationrelay for Hawk firings and infraredsensor test vehicle

    AWACS Air Force airborne warning Collected surveillace radar data and

    and control system reported tracks over JTIDS

    P-3 U.S. Customs Service surveil- Served as part of the CEC net withlance aircraft (with CEC) surveillance radar

    Patriot Army surface-to-air Collected radar data; reportedmissile system tracks over JTIDS

    BQM-74/-37 Target drones Served as SM-2 and Hawk firingscenario targets

    JTIDS Link 16 Tactical data link Provided command/control link

    F-15/F-16 A ir Force and A ir Served as scenario red and blue forcesReserve fighters

    Big Crow andQ-Lear Electronic warfare test aircraft Served as electronic warfare threats(jammers)

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    JOHNS HOPKINS A PL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997) 509

    MOUNTAIN TOP: BEYOND-THE-HORIZON CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

    is being planned, which will feature a next-generationpreproduction E-2C version of the CEC equipmentcalled the common equipment set. This set has iden-tical electronics for surface and air units, yet conformsto the more constrained airborne payload. Reference 1discusses the differences between these versions.

    Functionally, the CEC for this demonstration was aderivative of the version used during 1994 develop-

    ment testing2

    with the addition of hardware and soft-ware for interfacing with radar surveillance technologyexperimental radar (RSTER) and the Mark (MK) 74tracking illuminator.

    RSTER: A dvanced Ai rborne Surveil lance Radar

    RSTER was developed for ARPA by MIT LincolnLabs to evaluate experimental Doppler radar technol-ogies. For this demonstration, RSTER was installed atthe Kokee site to provide the required horizon detec-tion range performance and was fitted with a prototypeadvanced E-2C phased array antenna in a roto-domeconfiguration. The system search and track softwarewas also modified by MIT for the ACTD to significant-ly increase the update rate, so as to minimize track filterlag errors due to target maneuvers and to ensure earlierdetection through shorter search frame times.

    Aegis: A ir Defense and Combat System

    Aegis ships were the primary air defense forces inmost Mountain Top scenarios. The Aegis air defenseweapon system uses the multifunctional SPY-1B phasedarray radar to perform the search, track, and fire controlfunctions. The CEC-integrated version of the Aegisweapon system that was a derivative of the Baseline 4

    computer programs1was used with minor modificationsto meet ACTD requirements. This version had beendemonstrated to enable the Aegis system to perform anSM-2 engagement on a target, even when the firingships SPY-1B radar did not track the target, by usingfire control radar data from another ship via CEC. Thistype of cooperative engagement, i.e., EOR, was de-scribed earlier in this article.

    T artar M K 74: Surrogate A ir borne Fire Contr ol

    T racking Radar and Il luminator

    The Aegis system with CEC had already been

    modified to accept remote fire control radar data fromeither another Aegis radar or from a fire control radaron Tartar New-Threat-Upgrade (NTU) ships that sup-port a different version of SM-2.1For testing in 1994,the Tartar system had also been integrated with CECand was able to meet the engagement range objectivesof the management plan with remote data, serving as

    either a source or a firing unit.1For this ACTD, theTartar MK 74 missile fire control system installed at theKokee site served as both the fire control radar sourceand the terminal homing illuminator for the Aegis SM-2, in the same manner as it serves as both radar andilluminator on a Tartar ship for a Tartar configurationof SM-2. Modeling indicated that the MK 74 met therequired fire control radar detection range and had

    sufficient illumination power for a modified SM-2missile to achieve the intercept range well beyond theship horizon, even if the ship was 25 nmi forward ofthe illuminator. Relatively minor changes were madeto this element, mainly to make it compatible withRSTER cueing accuracy and with negative, look-downtarget elevation angles (owing to its mountain altituderelative to the horizon).Figure 3 shows the MK 74system, RSTER, and CEC antenna as part of the Kokeesite installation.

    SM -2 Block I I I A with Experimental M odifications

    The latest-generation SM-2 in the Fleet is the BlockIIIA, which, like Block III, has exhibited a very highintercept success rate. As will be noted in the nextsection, a beyond-the-horizon geometry and an elevat-ed illuminator produce much greater sea reflectionthan seen in normal low-altitude engagements. There-fore, to reduce clutter interference, Hughes Aircraftmodified the IIIA seeker by incorporating the Plate 1receiver upgrade under development for the next-generation Block IV. The missiles were also furnishedwith a telemetry package to transmit terminal homingsignals to determine intercept performance.

    Systems Engineering Approach

    The systems engineering process used to develop thedistributed Navy forward pass weapon control network(consisting of Aegis/SM-2, CEC, and the mountaintopradars and illuminator) entailed all participating orga-nizations in extensive analysis, experimentation, andplanning extending over a 30-month period. Figure 4shows this process as it applied to Mountain Top. Be-cause of the diversity of program offices involved, eachwith their respective engineering teams, a systems en-gineering working group was formed under the coordi-nation of the CEC program to ensure that design and

    interface issues were identified and resolved as the prin-cipals proceeded to design, review, and document thenetworked system. Issues included the ship and missilelaunch safety zone requirements for the PMRF range,types of drones, availability of systems (such as theversions of SM, Aegis ship combat system, and moun-taintop illuminator), and the local geological features.

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    W. H. ZINGER AND J. A. KRILL

    510 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997)

    The primary system models and simulations thathave been used through the years by the variousprograms were adapted to this effort. Because themodels had been previously validated with test dataand broadly used, the systems engineering team hadmuch confidence in them. As will be discussed later inthis article, test results were very close to the modelpredictions.

    Since CEC provided the means to effect theACTDs distributed weapon system, the role of APLsTechnical Direction Agent (TDA) extended to tech-nical coordination in carrying forward the netted sys-tems engineering process. Since the Laboratory is alsothe TDA for the SM-2 and Tartar NTU programs, andserves as technical advisor to the Aegis program as well,it was involved on both sides of the CEC interfaces.

    Analysis

    Analysis prior to the Mountain Top demonstrationshowed that

    Sensors and fire control could provide adequate rangeperformance against the spectrum of atmospheric andsea conditions experienced around Kauai.

    CEC network and missile error budgets would permitmidcourse guidance with acceptable errors for a suc-cessful terminal homing phase.

    Missile seeker pointing errors at the start of terminalacquisition were sufficiently small to support targetacquisition.

    The Block IIIA version of SM-2 possessed sufficientkinematics to support stable flight and terminal con-trol at the ranges and altitudes of interest.

    The Block IIIA would be able to acquire and track adrone-sized target in the expected sea clutter back-ground if modified with the Plate 1 upgrade to sup-press clutter interference.

    M issil e Capti ve Seeker Cr it ical Experiments

    In the course of the SM development program, APLhad performed critical Captive Seeker5experiments for

    ACTD management plantop-level requirements

    Interface specificationsFunctional/performance

    allocations

    Critical experiments and modeling

    Fabrication/modificationIntegration tests

    Site andpreparatory tests

    Formal ACTD tests

    Figure 4. The systems engineering process as applied to the Mountain Top ACTD, beginning with the concept and requirementsdefinition, proceeding through requirements allocation to the elemental level, and finally to testing from the smallest elements up to thefully networked composite system. APL provided leadership in modeling, requirements definition and allocation, interface specifications,critical experiments, site risk reduction scenarios, site subsystem checkout and verification, and test conduct. Shown in the formal ACTDtest inset, from right to left, are APLs Test Conductor, Art Jeyes, sitting beside the CEC and Mountain Top Program Manager, MichaelODriscoll, and RADM Timothy Hood, the Program Executive Officer for Theater Air Defense.

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    a variety of sea- and land-clutter conditions to deter-mine the effects on seeker performance against low-flying targets. These experiments showed that, basedon Mountain Top geometry, steeper illumination inci-dence angle to the sea, longer range, higher surfacereflection, and different Doppler characteristics, themissile receiver would require special filtering com-pared with a conventional engagement. The Plate 1

    upgrade had already been developed for the longer-range Block IV missile, and performance modelingindicated that it would also suffice to allow the BlockIIIA seeker to distinguish the illumination reflectionfrom the target relative to that from the sea surface forthe Mountain Top geometry. However, only limitedexperimental data existed to support this conclusion.

    To capture the seasonal sea and atmospheric char-acteristics to be encountered, the Captive Seekerexperiment was conducted about a year before theACTD. Another Captive Seeker test series was alsoperformed for the actual engagement geometries andtargets several months before the firing events. Both

    sets of test results confirmed that Block IIIA, modifiedwith the Plate 1 clutter filter, would be effective underMountain Top conditions.

    Radar Experiments

    The foregoing analysis and systems engineering ef-forts were augmented by risk reduction assessments andother critical experiments for key aspects of the dem-onstration, e.g.,

    The acquisition, track, and illuminator power densityof the MK 74 system were examined for the geometry

    of each of the planned beyond-the-horizon en-gagement scenarios using the Captive Seeker systemagainst drones.

    The acquisition and track performance of the RSTERradar was tested for the geometry of each plannedengagement.

    The modifications required to the Aegis combatsystem were analyzed, defined, and then tested at theAegis combat system engineering development site.

    Test and Evaluation Process

    T est Engineeri ng

    As a complement to the systems engineering pro-cess, a test and evaluation working group was formedearly in the Mountain Top preparation effort. Thegroup worked out such issues as

    Impact on engagement range due to range safetyrequirements

    Selection of the Kauai mountain ridge with sufficientheight to achieve required range to the target horizon

    Hawaiian state park environmental requirements forvisual, electromagnetic, and acoustic noise effects

    PMRF requirements to provide drone control out tothe required ranges (resulting in the developmentof a new long-range drone control system for thispurpose)

    Selection and preparations of the BQM-74 droneswith the requisite characteristics

    Scenarios were defined in terms of inbound trajec-tories and engagement geometries in accordance withthe systems engineering design, and were embodied ina series of test and evaluation planning documents(e.g., Mountain Top installation plan and installationdocuments, PMRF plan, requests for test assets, testplan and procedures, and data evaluation plan). TheNavy Program Office directed APL to conduct the testseries.

    T est Planning

    The next level of detailed preparations included

    scheduling site preparations, ship installations, testsupport assets, and test range services as well as assess-ing ship availability requirements for checkout, re-hearsal, and test. Testing began at the subsystem level,for example, starting with the SPY-1B computer pro-gram and the CEC processor modules, proceedingthrough interface tests, and finally testing the entireCEC network of systems (Fig. 4). These tests wereperformed at the sites of the design agents (see Table1). Interface tests were generally performed betweenCEC and weapon system elements at the combat sys-tem test sites using APL-supplied wrap-around simula-tors. Finally, network-level tests were performed atPMRF. Key decision points for the higher-level eventswere formal test readiness and control panel reviews,missile firing scenario certification review, and a weap-on safety review. The final reviews were chaired bysenior Navy officers.

    BEYOND-THE-HORIZON TESTS

    Phase 1: Navy Firing Tests

    The Navy tests consisted of a series of firing exer-cises by an Aegis ship (USS Lake Erie) against a low-flying drone (BQM-74 representing a simulated enemy

    target). Remote target radar data were used along withillumination by radars mounted on the Kokee site radarsurrogate aircraft. The integration of the target datafrom the elevated site into composite fire controlquality tracks was accomplished by CEC. The test con-figuration is illustrated inFig. 5, which represents theCMD concept shown inFig. 2.Not shown is the SPS-48E three-dimensional surveillance radar at the lowerMakaha Ridge site that provides target identification

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    and data to enable CEC to precisely gridlock the systemelements relative to one another.

    T est Sequence

    The sequence for each of the beyond-the-horizonfiring events was as follows (also see Fig. 6):

    1. The CEC established gridlock (precise relative sensoralignment and position of scenario elements) fromarea targets seen by both the land site and ship. CEC

    units at the land site and ship performed (independentbut identical) composite tracking and identificationfrom distributed radar and IFF data.

    2. The BQM-74 drone was launched from the BarkingSands site, flown outbound for 80 nmi, turned in-bound, and descended to low altitude.

    Kokee site

    Aegis CGmissile initialization

    and midcourse

    Aegis/SM-2midcourse

    uplink/downlink

    StandardMissile

    MK 74

    CEC

    Track/illuminate

    Search/cue

    Composite trackdevelopment

    BarkingSands

    BQM-74

    Patriotradar

    SPY-1Bradarhorizon

    Joint TacticalInformatiomDistribution

    System

    RSTER

    Figure 5. Conceptual representation of Mountain Top tests configured to represent the cruise missile defense concept depicted in Fig. 2.

    Figure 6. Representation of the sequence of the initial beyond-the-horizon engagement. The plan view indicates a low-elevationinbound drone approaching the Kokee site with a crossing targetintercept by the ship-launched SM-2 (not drawn to scale).

    Niihau Kauai

    Pacific MissileRange Facility

    USS Lake Erie

    Kokee Park

    Barking Sands

    Plannedintercept point

    North/southrangerelativetoKokee

    East/west range relative to Kokee

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    3. RSTER detected the drone and passed measurementdata to its land-site CEC. The CEC passed measure-ments to the ship. Both CEC units (land andship) independently derived the track of the dronetarget.

    4. Aegis commanded the drone to be engaged. From theengagement command, CEC cued MK 74 to acquirethe target. Both CEC units performed composite

    tracking of the drone using RSTER and the moreaccurate MK 74 data. CEC provided target measure-ment data from the MK 74 to the ship.

    5. The ship launched an SM-2 missile at the target, thenguided SM-2 via its midcourse link to within terminalhoming range using CEC target data for fire control.

    6. The CEC commanded MK 74 to illuminate thetarget. The ship commanded the missile to beginhoming. The missile intercepted the target.

    T est Result s

    For the initial scenario event, the drone approached

    a fictitious target on the beach, where it was intercept-ed by the SM-2 well beyond the ships horizon and wellprior to the target area. The missile not only passedwithin lethal range of the drone but scored a direct hit.Figure 7 shows the composite track picture created byan automated data reduction system based on CEC datacollected at the Kokee site. This was the first-everengagement of a low-altitude target beyond the firingships horizon.

    The distributed missile control between the ship andmountain site had been comparable in intercept per-formance to the best that could be expected of conven-tional, ship-only engagements, yet at a range many

    times that possible by the cruiser against such a targetwithout the elevated elements. Furthermore, thepredicted SM-2 seeker characteristics, the detailedmodels of detection and track performance of the

    mountain sensors, and the simulated missile fly-outpredictions were very close to actual event results.

    Another scenario event (Fig. 8) featured the droneflying toward the ship and crossing relative to the is-land mountaintop sensors. The missile made a success-ful intercept and damaged the target. Again, the inter-cept range was well beyond the firing ships horizon andvery close to model predictions.

    The final forward pass scenario of this set of eventsentailed aligning the drone approach path with theship and the mountain. A lthough the geometry wassimpler (i.e., the drone was inbound and not crossingwith regard to the ship and mountain site), detectionand engagement presented a greater challenge becauseof predicted multipath propagation fading. However,the missile again successfully intercepted the target.The engagement range was close to the maximum thatmodeling indicated to be achievable for the test con-ditions and system elements used.

    This final test highlighted an important feature ofthe CEC design: When the ship first ordered an engage-

    ment, causing the CEC to cue the MK 74 fire controlradar from RSTER data, the MK 74 could not acquirethe target because of a (predicted) multipath fade atthat range. The CEC unit on the mountain reported tothe ship CEC that the required remote data could notbe provided at that time. The ship operator, so alerted,ordered the engagement again, by which time the dronehad flown out of the fade region, thereby enabling theMK 74 to acquire and support the successful intercept.

    These tests met and exceeded all objectives. A llthree low-flying targets were successfully intercepted atranges well beyond those possible with a single ship.The tests demonstrated the technical feasibility of

    providing a Fleet-wide ability to defend inland targetsagainst low-flying cruise missiles using special aircraft(or aerostat) systems to greatly extend each ships en-gagement horizon.

    SM-2

    Intercept

    Kokee site A

    RSTER

    MK 74

    Figure 7. Data reduction plot of tracks from the first beyond-the-horizon firing. The track histories of the drone and the interceptingmissile are shown. The histories terminate at the intercept pointwhere the missile impacts the drone. As the engagement isordered by the ship, the MK 74 automatically is cued from theRSTER data and acquires the target. MK 74 data are used formissile guidance via the ship.

    RSTER

    MK 74

    SM-2

    Kokee site A

    Intercept

    Figure 8. Data reduction plot of tracks from the second beyond-the-horizon firing (see Fig. 7 caption).

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    Phase 2: Army Experiments

    The Army was unprepared as of 1996 to conductfiring tests comparable to those of the Navy. Their plan,therefore, called for simulated engagements and captiveseeker experiments to test the potential of forward passintercepts by a Patriot weapon system. Elements ofthe simulations and experiments were the PatriotPAC-3 weapon system located at Barking Sands(Fig. 5),

    a computer simulation of the missile, and the aircraft-mounted advanced Patriot Extended-Range InterceptTechnology Missile (ERINT) captive seeker carriedaboard a C-130 aircraft to simulate target engagementsagainst low- to mid-altitude drones.

    For this phase, the CEC composite track data weretransmitted from the Kokee site to the Patriot via aJTIDS communications link using a link all-purposeworkstation interface unit to translate CEC messagesto JTIDS format. From Patriot, the composite data weresupplied to the simulation and linked to the captiveERINT seeker.

    These Army simulations were successful, demonstrat-

    ing that the target would have been intercepted in a highpercentage of cases.6For each ERINT seeker test, thePatriot unit was able to cue the captive seeker to acquirethe target on the basis of CEC composite track data.

    ENHANCED SCENARIOS

    For Set 2 of the Mountain Top ACTD operations,Enhanced Scenarios, two additional CEC-equippedcruisers from the Atlantic Fleet and a CEC-equippedU.S. Customs Service P-3 aircraft were brought in toprovide greater opportunities for joint, extended air

    defense experimentation. With participation by an A irForce AWACS test aircraft, a total of three Aegis shipsequipped with CEC, a Marine Corps Hawk system(modified to accept fire control cues via CEC fromAegis and mountain sensors), the P-3, and an ArmyPatriot site, a truly all-service experiment under care-fully controlled test conditions was made possible.During this stage of Mountain Top tests, the Navy andAPL worked closely to establish the test objectives anddesign and certify the scenarios, which were subse-quently agreed to by the other services. Those objec-tives aimed

    To provide further risk reduction opportunities forthe upcoming CEC initial operational capability(IOC), i.e., formal Fleet deployment, later that year

    To provide an opportunity for further CEC datacollection in support of new tactics development andnew concepts

    To afford an opportunity for joint-services participa-tion in a littoral setting with exploration of sensor andweapons networking (via CEC) and command/control networking (via JTIDS)

    Sequence of Operational Scenarios

    Again, the Enhanced Scenarios comprised three phases:

    1. Arrival on the scene: Aegis shipsthe Cape St.George, Lake Erie, and Anzioand the CustomsService P-3 equipped with CEC arrived on the scene(Fig. 9a). The CEC network established a compositearea picture.

    2. Defense against shore-based attack: the Armys Pa-triot battery and the Air Forces AWACS joinedoperations (Fig. 9b). Simulated air attacks werelaunched against forces.

    3. Joint littoral operations: Joint-service operations withparticipation of the Navy ships, P-3, Patriot, Hawk,AWACS, and fighters (Fig. 9c). Enemy jammersattacked nearly all radars.

    Phase 1: Arr ival on the Scene

    This initial phase featured two experiments that weredesigned to provide data to support the development of

    Figure 9. Enhanced scenarios: (a) Phase 1, arrival on the scene;(b) phase 2, defense against shore-based attack; (c) phase 3, jointlittoral operations.

    P-3

    USS Lake Erie

    USS Anzio

    SPS-48E

    F-16s F-16s

    Radarsectors

    (a)

    Patriot

    Drones

    P-3

    AWACS

    Jammer

    Silent shootertarget

    (b)

    AWACS

    Patriot

    F-16s/15s

    F-15s or C-12s

    F-16s/15s

    F-16s

    P-3

    Jammers

    USS Lake Erie

    USS Anzio

    HawkTSP-59/

    firecontrol

    (c)

    USS CapeSt. George

    USS CapeSt. George

    Kokee

    Kokee

    Kokee

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    advanced CEC functions. The first experiment involvedthe three Aegis cruisers, the Kokee site, and the P-3aircraft in the CEC network. Its objective was to collectdata relevant to the ability of CEC to allow radar cov-erage coordination. In severe clutter or jamming oragainst difficult targets (e.g., future tactical ballisticmissiles), units equipped with CEC may each elect tocover only certain sectors with their radars to cooper-

    atively manage available transmitter energy and retainappropriately short search frame times. These sectorsmay be coordinated via CEC. In that case, if a unitdetects a target in its sector, the other ships radars maycue off the data, or one of the other ships may evenengage the target using the detecting units data (i.e., anEOR). The data collected in these tests indicated thatthe units were effectively positioned to uncover regionsblocked by terrain. Thus, although several tracks wereonly held by certain units at a time (because of blockage,sectoring, etc.), CEC allowed all networked componentsto process the collection of radar measurement data fromall other CEC units with accuracy comparable to or

    better than the sensors themselves. As tracks transi-tioned between sensors, composite track continuity (interms of position, velocity, identification, and compositetrack number) was maintained.

    The second set of experiments in Phase 1 was per-formed to collect data for laboratory testing of a newcapability that was introduced in CEC for its IOC thatoccurred later in 1996. This capability integrates radarpassive angle (PAT) data from targets emitting radia-tion in the radar band into the CEC composite trackingprocess. The new algorithms associate PAT measure-ments with CEC track data and associate PAT datafrom two or more units to derive range and bearing as

    well as elevation angles as outputs of the CEC filter(analogous to passive range triangulation). A deghost-ing algorithm also acts to resolve multiple jammers toobtain a unique aircraft location of each or an indica-tion that insufficient data are available to do so. Con-firming previous analyses, the radar passive range com-posite track was of sufficient quality that it couldsupport missile engagements over a wide range ofemitting target positions relative to the tracking ships.This capability for missile engagements from passivecomposite track data is planned for future incorpora-tion into CEC and Aegis.

    Despite test curtailment due to extremely severeweather, some very useful data were collected, allowinglaboratory evaluation of the real-time passive trackingprocess. The data supported both PAT-to-active trackassociation and passive ranging, as shown in Fig. 10. TheIOC package did, in fact, successfully field the new CECpassive range tracking capability. In addition, data col-lections from all units were obtained to support furtherCEC and JTIDS network architecture assessment.

    Passiveonly track

    Radiating aircraft 1

    Passive/activetrack

    Radiating aircraft 2

    Active track

    Figure 10. Passive ranging scenario. Shown are the track historiesfrom two separate aircraft emitting radiation in the radar band forwhich the cruisers each obtain a passive angle track (without therange dimension). The data collected from the passive rangingscenario were replayed through the next-generation Cooperative

    Engagement Processor tracker several weeks after the event toconfirm the process for the subsequent CEC initial operationalcapability (IOC). The CEC IOC track filter used active (three-dimensional) and passive (two-dimensional) track measurementdata to generate highly accurate three-dimensional composite tracks.

    Phase 2: Defense Against Shore-Based A tt ack

    These scenarios consisted of several simulated andactual missile engagements. The first event demonstrat-ed the ability of CEC to provide high-quality compositetracks in the presence of various forms of electroniccountermeasures against the networked sensors.

    The second scenario demonstrated CECs ability to

    support the Navys silent shooter tactic. In this tac-tic, one or more ships are stationed at positions thatgive them good engagement coverage of regionswhere hostile missiles or aircraft might attempt topenetrate. These ships operate in an emissions con-trol state with radiating systems off (at least in theexpected penetration sector). They are linked by theCEC network to ships with active radar located wherethey could only be reached by hostile forces if theyflew through the area guarded by the silent units. Asilent ship, knowing the enemys precise location viathe CEC network, could launch an SM-2 missile toengage the target, without ever enabling radar search,using remote data from the network to directmidcourse guidance and target illumination. If theengagement could be completed before the firingship could be detected, a very effective silentshooter capability would result. The simulated en-gagements by the silent ship in this scenario provid-ed valuable data for future system design and tacticsdevelopment.

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    Two missile firing scenarios were also executedduring this phase. To increase range safety margins forthe multiple ships participating, drone targets operatedat altitudes above those used in the beyond-the-hori-zon tests. Instrumented SM-2 Block III missiles wereused. In one scenario, BQM-34 drones were flownsimultaneously at two cruisers, with a third cruiser offto the side. The objectives of this scenario were two-

    fold: (1) to provide two simultaneous engagements onremote data with the same remote data source (for thefirst time), and (2) to collect data for a risk reductionevaluation of a new coordinated engagement algo-rithm known as first launch (invented by the Aegisprime contractor, Lockheed Martin, while under APLsubcontract in the mid-1980s).

    The first launch process was incorporated in theCEC IOC package in 1996. When enabled by anoperator, this feature allows the first ship to order an

    engagement to report over CEC, so that the other shipremoves the target from its immediate engagementqueue, thereby minimizing unwanted, redundant en-gagements. The test event culminated with successfullaunches and engagements by theAnzioandCape St.Georgeusing remote data from the Lake Erie.Theengagementswere so well coordinated by the firingships that the intercepts occurred nearly simulta-

    neously. Figure 11 is a snapshot of the CEC displayof the event during the midcourse phase of theengagement.

    In a similar firing scenario, the Anzio engagedand successfully intercepted a pair of targets using re-mote data from theLake Erie. This was the first occur-rence of multiple engagements by a firing ship usingremote data and was scored as a success (Fig. 12).In all, there were five successful SM-2 Block IIIEOR firings.

    Figure 11. CEC snapshot of dual cooperative engagement events by two firing shipsthe USS Anzio(CG 68) and Cape St. George(CG71)engaging drones using the USS Lake Erie(CG 70) SPY-1B remote data. The triangles are the drone targets. The CEC-equippedunits are circles. The upper-half squares near the drones are SMs in flight.The dotted lines between CG 70 and the targets indicate thatCG 70 is the source of fire control data. The solid lines between CG 68 and 71 and the drones indicate the target/ship engagement pairings.The thin solid lines indicate direct CEC connectivity among CEC units.

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    Figure 12. CEC data reduction plot of dual drone cooperative engagements by a singleship. The track histories of the drones were obtained by the USS Lake Erie(CG 70), whichwas the source for dual engagements on remote data by the Anzio(CG 68).

    Phase 3: Joint Li tt oral Operati ons

    This final phase of the Enhanced Scenarios providedan opportunity for the CEC-equipped ships, P-3 air-craft, and the Kokee site to operate with joint elements

    in a common scenario. The Navy units were intercon-nected by the CEC and to the Army and Air Force bythe JTIDS. The first all-services operations using atactical Model 4 JTIDS network were conducted.AWACS radar data were collected in these operation-ally representative situations simultaneously with CECnetwork data as a basis for beginning development ofrequirements and a design concept for integration ofAWACS into the CEC network. TPS-59 radar datawere collected for the same purpose. Development workusing these data has begun. The CEC network tracksof several two-on-two F-15/ 16 air combat operationswere conducted. These composite tracks were formedby the radar and IFF equipment on the three Aegiscruisers and the P-3, with no loss of track identity orcontinuity, even though significant main-beam radarjamming was present.

    The primary scenario consisted of 12 fighters, halfdesignated blue force and half red force, to conductoperations in concert with airborne electronic counter-measures against participating radars. It was first run withthe CEC operating using a specially defined composite

    identification doctrine and CECtracks reported over JTIDS onlyfrom the Kokee site JTIDS unit(others were in a receive-only con-dition) to represent the near-futureCEC/JTIDS interoperability archi-tecture. This architecture will fea-ture CEC sensor-networked identi-

    fication doctrine in accordancewith JTIDS-promulgated com-mand/control doctrine as well asJTIDS reporting of CEC compositetracks for greater track life andmore consistent track number andidentification correlation. Figure13 is a data reduction plot of theevent midway through the scenar-io. A second without CEC run ofthis same scenario allowed theunits to operate the first truly jointJTIDS Link 16 protocols with the

    three cruisers, AWACS, and Patri-ot in the network.

    Also as part of this phase, theHawk battery conducted live firingsagainst drones. The scenario con-sisted of a BQM-74 drone withtowed targets inbound toward thebattery. For one firing, the compos-ite track data were supplied by CEC

    and relayed through the aerostat, mentioned earlier,using a single-channel ground-to-air military radio as asurrogate CEC Data Distribution System (see the boxedinsert). The composite track consisted of sensor data

    from the three Aegis cruisers and the Kokee site. Figure14 illustrates the configuration. A ll five Hawk engage-ments were successfully executed with either fire controlradar cues from CEC or from the TPS-59 radar onMakaha Ridge (representing an elevated sensor).

    As part of the follow-on evaluation, collected TPS-59data have since been processed through a CEC processorat APL and integrated into the composite track picture.Figure 15 is a CEC display snapshot of the compositetrack history for data collected during one of the Hawkmissile firings. The resulting composite track picture,although not fully optimized to specification at that time,revealed the potential contribution of such a land-basedradar to the Navy CEC network. From its elevated van-tage point, the TPS-59 provided radar data of a target notdetected by the other CEC units as well as early detectionof the drone launch from Barking Sands. The latter wouldhave provided for automatic special acquisition of thetarget by one of the Aegis radars if the TPS-59 hadactually been in the CEC network. These results were aninitial step toward the integration of the TPS-59 radarand CEC, which was achieved in 1997.

    Jammeraircraft

    Outbounddrones

    Inbound drones

    Missile track

    Kokee site ACG 68

    CG 70

    CG 71

    AWACS track

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    Figure 13. CEC data reduction plot of a complex joint operationsscenario. The composite track histories of the scenario are shown.Tracking and identification continuity were maintained throughout,and the CEC composite tracks were reported over JTIDS from theKokee site. The colors in the track histories correspond to thecolors of the CEC units indicating the portions of the track contrib-uted by each unit.

    Figure 14. Illustrated configuration of Aegis, CEC, aerostat, and Hawk. The Hawk high-powered illuminator/tracking radar was cued forsuccessful engagements from the TPS-59 radar at the elevated Makaha site, as well as from the Aegis cruisers via CEC composite track.Three data paths are shown: blue, Aegis SPY composite CEC track via aerostat relay to cue Hawk fire control; yellow, cue of TPS radarand radar cue of Hawk fire control; red, direct cue of Hawk fire control.

    Results

    This portion of Mountain Top also met, and inseveral cases exceeded, its primary objectives. For ex-ample, it demonstrated the capability of CEC to sup-port the Navys silent shooter concept. In addition, twosimultaneous ship engagements with SM-2 using re-mote data were successfully accomplished for the firsttime. The exercise provided an unprecedented oppor-

    tunity for concept exploration and data collection withfive CEC-equipped units (three of which were Navycruisers) operating with the participation of the Army,Marine Corps, and Air Force elements in a series oflittoral scenarios. It supplied invaluable data for eval-uation of the potential integration of AWACS andthe Marine Corps TPS-59 Hawk radar into the CECnetwork.

    SUMMARY

    Significance of Test Results

    The Mountain Top ACTD successfully demonstrat-ed the feasibility of the forward pass mode of targetengagement, an approach conceived over 20 years agoto extend air defense capability beyond a ships horizon

    USAFAWACS and

    KC-135tanker

    CG 68

    CG 71

    CG 70Kokeesite A

    F-16s (2)

    F-15s (4)

    Jammer

    Jammer

    Jammer

    Jammer

    P-3

    CG 71

    CG 68

    Target

    TPS-59

    CEC

    Kokee site

    CECline

    Hawk launchersand fire control/

    illuminators

    Aerostat relayof CEC data

    TPS-59 datafiber-optic line

    Makaha Ridge

    Hawk/CEC experimentalfire control interface

    CEC network

    Aegis firm trackof target

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    Makaha

    Composite trackwith TPS-59 and Aegis

    SPY-1 contribution

    Composite trackfrom TPS-59 data only

    CG 71

    CG 68

    TPS-59

    Figure 15. CEC display with TPS-59 radar. A replay of collected TPS-59 radar measure-ments, conditioned to appear in the format of an SPS-48E radar, was run through aCooperative Engagement Processor along with data collected simultaneously from CECunits. The lower track indicates that the TPS-59 had detected a target not detected by thecruisers. The track emerging and then turning toward the island is a target drone. The TPS-59 was in a position to detect the outbound target before theCape St. George(CG 71) coulddo so. Had it been networked with the CEC, CG 71 could have provided data for thecruisers SPY-1B to acquire the drone prior to its own autonomous detection.

    with the aid of surveillance and target illumination airvehicles.7In his message of congratulations, the lateChief of Naval Operations ADM Mike Boorda wrote

    Outstanding is the only word to describe the re-

    sounding success you all achieved in both the advancedconcept technology demonstration (ACTD) and en-hanced phases of the recently completed Mountain Topdemonstrations. In discussing emerging technologiesand warfighting capabilities, revolutionary may be oneof the most overused words in Washington. In this case,however, there is no question that you have set the stagefor a revolutionary new way of fighting in the air defensearena. Because of your dedication and hard work, ourtask of quickly deploying this unprecedented warfightingcapability has been made much easier. You were on time,on target, and on the money. Congratulations on a majorsuccess. All the best.8

    The evolution of the concept and the ability of ex-

    isting Navy systems to be modified for such a demonstra-tion were the result of convergent mutual developmentof these systems, with APL as a key player. The fact thatCEC, conceived by APL, was designed to enable suchforms of cooperative engagement is due to the Labora-torys capability to preserve the technical vision overmultiple generations. It may also be attributed to APLscomplementary roles in development of Navy air defensesystems that enable it, in partnership with the Navy, to

    ensure that key synergistic featuresare present in these systems to facil-itate their technical advance in abalanced, focused, and mutually sup-porting manner.

    The potential of the land-attackCMD concept to protect U.S. andcoalition forces in future conflicts is

    a compelling reason for further de-velopment of such capabilities bythe joint services. The success ofthe Mountain Top exercises pro-vided a critical step toward this ob-

    jective by proving the integrationconcept and the potential perfor-mance amplification over individ-ual systems. These tests also furtherexplored the foundations of weap-on and sensor networking (viaCEC) and command/control net-working (via JTIDS) for joint-ser-

    vices CMD operations.

    The Future

    Since the Mountain Top be-yond-the-horizon firing eventswere successfully completed, dis-cussions of a follow-on have been

    intense. The definition of the follow-on CMD phaseis being vigorously pursued by DoD, with all servicesrecommending roles and next-phase approaches. As ofthis writing, a substantial test operation, even exceed-ing Set 1 in scale, is being discussed, with the intentto lead to a deployable prototype national resource.

    The various airborne platform options under consid-eration include a very large Army aerostat, a large AirForce aircraft, and a Navy carrier aircraft, possibly withunmanned aerial vehicles in a CEC subnet for en-hanced performance. Advanced Army, Navy, and AirForce missile variants are also being considered, andCEC and JTIDS are expected to be integrated as thesensor/weapons network and command/control net-work, respectively.

    The Enhanced Scenarios also have made an impact.First, they contributed to CEC meeting its congression-

    ally directed IOC schedule, with significant risk reduc-tion having been part of those scenarios. Second, theMarine Corps has begun integrating CEC into its Hawksystem, and the Air Force and Army are consideringprototype integrations of CEC into the AWACS testaircraft and missile batteries, respectively. A ll the ser-vices are further examining the use of CEC and JTIDSfor CMD as well as tactical ballistic missile defense rolesin a joint networking study.

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    W. H. ZINGER AND J. A. KRILL

    520 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 18, NUMBER 4 (1997)

    THE AUTHORS

    JERRY A. KRILL received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from Michigan StateUniversity in 1973 and 1974, respectively, and a Ph.D. from the University ofMaryland in 1978, all in electrical engineering. In 1973 he joined theLaboratory, where he is presently Supervisor of the Sensor and Weapon ControlEngineering Branch of the Air Defense Systems Department. He is also alecturer for The Johns Hopkins University Part-T ime Graduate Program.Originally specializing in electromagnetic theory, Dr. Krill has published articles

    on electromagnetic scattering and guided wave technology and holds a numberof U.S. patents. He has led systems engineering and critical experiments for theNavys Aegis and Battle Group Anti-A ir Warfare Coordination programs. For 10years he served as the APL System Engineer for the Cooperative EngagementCapability. Dr. Krill was recently named APLs lead System Concept Engineerfor the Navy Program Executive Office for Theater Air Defense. His e-mailaddress is [email protected].

    WILLIAM H. ZINGER is a member of APLs Principal Professional Staff andAssociate Head of the Air Defense Systems Department. He obtained a B.S.E.E.from the University of Pennsylvania in 1961. Since joining APL in 1962, Mr.Zinger has worked on the design and testing of Fleet radars and relatedelectronics. He has been associated with Aegis and its AN/SPY-1 radar sinceprogram inception. More recently, he served as the Technical Director of APLs

    Cooperative Engagement Capability effort and led the Ship Self-Defense Systemeffort within his organization. His e-mail address is [email protected].

    REFERENCES

    1The Cooperative Engagement Capabil ity, Johns Hopkins APL T ech. D ig.16(4), 377396 (1995).

    2Cruise Missile Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrat ion Phase I,Office of Naval Research (Mountain Top) ACTD Management Plan (A ug1994).

    3Dockery, G. D., and Konstanzer, G. C., Recent Advances in Prediction ofTropospheric Propagation Using the Parabolic Equation, Johns Hopkins APLTech. D ig.8(4), 404412 (1987).

    4Rowland, J. R., and Babin, S. M., Fine-Scale Measurements of MicrowaveRefractivity Profiles with Helicopter and Low-Cost Rocket Probes, JohnsHopkins APL Tech. D ig.8(4), 413417 (1987).

    5Marcotte, F. J ., and Hanson, J. M., An A irborne Captive Seeker with Real-Time Analysis Capability, Johns Hopkins APL T ech. D ig.18(3), 422431(1997).

    6Moore, D.,1996 National Fire Control Symposium, Eglin A ir Force Base (JulAug 1996).

    7Blazar, E., Firing Blind, Not Blindly, Navy T imes(29 Jan 1996).8Boorda, M., SUBJ/BRA VO ZULU// Navy Message from CNO, N03210,MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO(N86)//Washington, DC (23 Mar 1996).

    ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: The authors wish to thank A lexander Kossiakoff,APL Director Emeritus, for his valued editorial guidance in preparing this manu-script. We also gratefully acknowledge the leadership provided by the Mountain

    Top ACTD and CEC program manager, Michael J. ODriscoll, whose insight,team-building, issues resolution capabil ities, and adherence to the systems engi-neering process were critical in making Mountain Top an unquali fied success.