1 philosophy of science ii from positivists to thomas kuhn
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Philosophy of science II
From positivists to Thomas Kuhn
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Key concepts in the philosophy of science
• Positivism
• Logical positivism
• Falsificationism
• Paradigms
• Anarchy
• Social constructions
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Positivism Auguste Comte (1798-1857)
• Facts• Facts• More facts• Generalize from those
facts• = induction
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Comtes evolutionary stages
Law of three phases of civilisation’s evolution
• Theological• Metaphysical• Scientific
The final positive stage
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Logical positivism• Vienna circle 1920’s- 1930’s
– Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, A. J. Ayer
• Metaphysics ( = not science):– All propositions that are neither verifiable by
empirical observation nor demonstrable as analytic.
– Ex.: religious and ethical statements....
• Scientific method– Induction and verifiability
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Alfred Ayer (1910-89) in his Language, Truth and Logic first published in 1936.
The first claim of logical positivists is that a statement can only be true only if either
• it is a self-evident analytic, deductive truth of the kind found in mathematics and formal logic (e.g. ‘2+2=4’) or because
• the statement matches reality precisely. A consequence of this was that statements had to be verifiable to be meaningful.
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Vienna circle project
• Develop an exact and unbiased language for science.– logic, mathematics.
• Demarcation problem – make a clear distinction between science and
metaphysics (not science)
• Reductionism:– Physics, the queen of science.
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Falsificationism
• Karl R. Popper 1902-1994
• Criticized inductivism and verifiability:– No number of cases of
“A being B” can establish that “all A being B”. All such statements remain disprovable.
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Principle of falsifiabillity
• Scientific theory can never be accorded more than a provisional acceptance.
• A theory holds until it is disproved.
• Falsification, not verification is the appropriate object of the observational and experimental procedures of science.
• Falsifiability is a necessary part of a scientific theory.
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Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method
• Enlargements of our temporary knowledge begins with the conversions of hunches or imaginative insights into hypotheses.
• Then, once the conditions for falsification have been established by the application of deductive logic, such hypotheses must be tested through sustained search for negative instances.
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Assignment• Try to give an examples of theories which are
falsifiable and not falsifiable.• What would Popper say about a theory which is
not falsifiable?• Are popperianism or/and logical positivism
descriptive or normative theories of science? Argue for your answer.
• What does this have to do with the problem of demarcation?
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Post-Popperian theories
• Both The logical positivists and popperians did not describe reality, they were creating norms about how they thought science should be practiced for the best ( most effective ) results.
• Critics by– Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Paul
Feyerabend…
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Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–96)
• “Structure of the scientific revolution” (1962)
• Paradigm theory– Prescience - normal science
- crisis - revolution - new normal science - new crisis- revolution…
• A theory based on study of history of science
• Attempts to describe how science develops in reality
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Kuhn's normal science • Grand theory as a paradigm
• Praxis– community of scientists
• social power-relations and structures in the scientific community
– methodological school, exemplars– puzzling reality in terms of the grand theory by
deduction– increasing anomalies lead to crisis
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Paradigm shift
• In crisis there will be ‘extraordinary science’ where there will be several competing theories
• One theory will win because it will get the greatest number of supporters in the scientific community
• ‘Paradigm shift is an ‘irrational’ process, such as accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, and the ‘like’ of each paradigm
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Kuhns wiew on scientific revolution
• Not (unexpected) new results from research, rather a new perspective or interpretation of data.
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Assignment
• Exemplify the following concepts:– Paradigm
– Normal-science
– Exemplars
– Anomalies
– Paradigm in crisis
– Extraordinary science
– Paradigm shift
– incommensurability
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Imre Lakatos
• ‘Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programs’ (1968 )
• Reacts to Kuhn’s views and claims that– there does exist an objective criteria
where scientists can make a rational choice between two competing theories
– it is due to dishonesty that some scientists do not give up their position
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Lakatos’ scientific research programs
• Research programs are series of theories which can be viewed in two ways– a. negative heuristic that states a ‘untouchable
hard core’ of hypothesis with a protective belt around it, protecting it from falsification
– b. positive heuristic declaring that the core can be altered slightly in order to fit progression
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Positive heuristic
• is the good one from Lakatos point of view– The development from Copernicus to Newton
is his good example
• Negative heuristic is the less good one – Tyco Brahes geocentric theory is Lakatos
example here
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The Lakatos view ?
• He revised the Popperian view after Kuhn
• If the Popperian view had been practiced through history none of the progressive theories would have survived
• He wanted to save the sciences from Kuhn's irrational grounds
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Anarchy
• Paul Feyerabend
• No single correct method in science
• Anything that works is fine
• = epistemological anarchy
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Social construction of science
• “laboratory life” is disorganized
• Scientific logic vs. availability of equipment, funds, careers etc.