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I '' AlUUOR-JANiARY-fEBRUARY 1951

.a *

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ARMOR . .\.TbeMaguzine of MobileWmfare. .

....i.

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ARMORirst ttcn, m ho the U.S. Amy'spidorial Record of World War II .

TllE W A R AMINST GERMANY A ND ITALY:I I D I T E I R A H E A N AND ADJACENT 4REAS Tht United S t u a No. 2olume LXI MARCH-APRILB 1952~ CONTENTS- T o T E B m . ....................................................... 2BDm1LB .................................................................... 4t m r s INm I R ~ ~ TIWS~ON ........................................... 0

0

r n ~ W a B w m c . R k b6 -m?J N TAN8 CANNON .................................... 10

8.-.U C.m.MrPmk Jr.. . . . . 3.50ami-. . . .nnmr-.QoOl. .................................................. u

b- e h D 0. wmatTIIE WA R AGAINST GERMANY: ar m -- ............................................................ 10D r I A U C m . r c N . .I.w ~. k .. -. Jr- U.Aw Lbrrr .h.r..rr.A c.LI.L.Au .-cw l IACd. J. m.-TOP CO a H PA8 mst ...................................... ...... PYlVIcI490.- otor O C I U f l o N .......................... ut ~ . . R n t D p 1 J U I I c I ? M X O ~ N ~.......................... LI

b L.D. Jr.C O I U ? TBAmnwFOBTmB ? TRAM ......................... mWE4T W O W YOU OO? ......................................................... S4

kL.LDr Jt.

k-m-e V n W A n .............................................................. alb R . L . r I b

n o m T8&68 p- ............................................................ 41

E U R W E ' AWD ADJACENT AREAS. . . . . 3.25

I l R l TElIWE m T OUNT ..................................................0Sy.lr h...lt 3 D.

NOT u .................................................................. 44m MI.~y ........................................................ Y.oo.accno~........................................................... am- ......................................................... aA n W b W b . r h I . W

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PRESIDENT ~

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* LETTERS to the EDITOR

_ -h e a d . LT.TEOMAS. cauuclrUSFA TACCOMDN a *Aeo 174

t

I

The MemoirsofHerbert Hoover

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Let's Not Lose Division Vision

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Writing American Military His tory

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- O F - . l twasfeitthutkOpparunity for th empkpmau ofuma W i t b idantry divisions woulddependuponalmostidalcaditionsporirionrwBen~claLwouldof terrain. weather and a m n v dis-be attached to the divisiar to pu-ticipate in tbe attrk. While t h i s FS-tem appeared to be right in tbegi.it did not work 8m-y well indpractice.

AIl-Id.cdFint of all. i nstad of being usedrarely, tanks wcm uscd almost con-tinuously. Idcll conditioDs tu&o u t t o b e a m y t h . Rcgardksofenemv dispositions tankswere empbyed

over every type of terrain during allweather conditions, including rain.snow and ice. Teamwork gainedthrough combioed training and soncccsaq for SUCCCOSfUI tankinfinpnot enough tank battalions to pvide t h m on the &of me per in-fanny division. h a uk battaliomwere shifted fmm one d vir i on to an-other apendulg upon which &\ision

opera* was lacking. Thm wm

~ o f q r r um a p r o g nmi n t a m s d y s e o f ~that every etron must be made tomaLC themaximumuseof every pieceof equipment. Tb e ci iminah dunnccesary items a d mprovementsin manufacturing pcbnique~,whi l evital, are not enough. After the temhas been produced. we must fit itinto OUT organizat ions n such a man-ner that we obtain the maximumbene6t from t on he battk6dd. We-should examine a m T / W s inthe light of experknce gained sinceWorld War 11 in maneuvers and inKorea.In cue of mobJitltiar many ofou r tankswill be eqdoyed in inf lntqdivisions T h k v t i d e w i l l d i s c u s f t hpresent organiutian of tank units

thetadsnowauthoritedbyT / W tthe background of our present organ-

mmatiriel a d ollars is nrb

in infanny divisiont and pOpOYCchanges tomakemoreemcialt useofIt might be well initially to review

izatim. Duringworldwar IL annlxsuuppoct for nancTydivisionswas pro-vi&d by attached tank in d tank de-

TANKSin& --INFANTRY DIVISION

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Bunker Destruction by Tank Cannon

aDd io ability to deliver'direct can-M n k he tank was UNnSioely

W a r d a s t h e t e n a i n d p e r m i r ,

inaqriarc of tank crcIRJ.in the

empbyed in the neutralization anddesmrtionofbunln.Tank were employed as fv for-

often clming to within a few yardsd he rarge~Initially, much am-munititin was wasted because of theteshque of bunkexdestruction andtheir lack of know- of the gun-nery problem presented by a bunker.Insomeimmnce5iIeu&Kn tammu-n i t i onwasexpendedon~bunk-exsfatheramereasons. Asthebadepmgmsedcertain emcient techniqueswcredevebqedbytankcmwthroughtanbwere desmying or neutralitingbunkas swiftly and ctticiently witha minimum expenditure of ammuni-ton.Tolrsistinthetcainin oftankby tank h e nd to insure maximum

ARMOR--April, 1952

o f n i a l a n d m . h-Y r-ng kttaaagaoftbe-paign,a c w s i n t h e ~ J b u a k e I s

W n g k n ea sy wm occasioned by tbe dragging tr w e talksat Parmuffjorn, botbs i d e s bave dug in on be &wtahom K o r e a m d n . ,Tbe long winter bas @w e nom forcesa ch ace to h e l o p vm'oys metbods of redwing Cowtrnwristp~si t ion~.Bnnker reduction bas become a key operation in t& rrrontbs of psition warfare.

position. The principle of the for-ward dope deknse was fobwed tosome degrrc, however,bythethlocationof bunker aabrarurrs at vary-

booby traps were irrorponted intocrest.ng d i s t m 2 ~ Z i o wide or no theaxiT P Mir e andfew antipasonnel mine fields andthe defensive system.made of antitank mines.were laid in profuaon and with wstadad p t em in all avenuesof a ppmach avai lable to f x i d yWhere the terrain would permit, nt i -tankditcheswereconsfilncdIn&e QlElstnrtiollof his e m p bmen 6 the enemp used the techniqueOfNnnelin andshoringupmtherthan theD$%-of excavation. Hed i d m a s i s d p m a d u r rwith the Amaioln Amy , di g an an-placemcatfnmlthe downand

and roc t In s teadan entire hiuenlarging scctans of the tunnel intosheltasa d i g hambers. H e hen

cwerthemultingboE wi thbgs

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n

- i s-Illismfarmbaat h n E atedtothemmpswho

it was violated a X -complbbedonmvrpoocldarz h aattack without a ck u Lnawbdge ofthe locatonof bunkers in their pm.although the wasavail-able at their&t unit h a dqu v tmThe obvioush hat the assaultinbunkers in their area cannot bestressed too much. This infamationis vital to hn.) Caacurrcntly withthe actual location of bunkas andthe- ofthuinform?tion,a bunker desmxtion campaign wasinitiated. This shouldk

result. aoops were d a c d o the- '

forces must know ck location d

ginroundeveralssaultays ndriorhouldo theontinuectualthroughout the opntion. On tbewestcentnl front in Korea, themenced.The initial problem confronting acankcmvcanminedm a bunker de-struction mision is thepinpoint loca-tion of the firing embrasurr. Sioceural growth from the area in whichtheembrasure isusually cumu8aged,it is fira neceaary to remove all nat-the bunker has been located. Thismission may be accomplished byotherweapons. Air strikes from friendlyetective as they bum the growthfrom a large area. and mar-tar tire,utilizing HE, usequick, andWP hells,is amther &ective meth-absence of these -S tanks canon the wpectedarea,usingHE,fusequick, and WP ammunition. This~ u e u I l l o l i l aM t b e c a u s e o f t h en d y arge of am-munition.A f t a t h e n d unvthacsmou-has been removal and the

aircraft eIIlPbyhgM* arC highlV

o d o f r r w w i n g ~ntheremove oamouaage by delivering fin?h l d Kmallp bedcmeonly if other

er. T h i s i s ~ p l i r b c d b p t k d climy of direct tank uI111(111h e intothe embrasure itself. HE. fuse quick,, fo lbwedbyafewrrrmds of f u s e ~ , o r w Pto culse casualties among wmbersof tbe enemy gunacwwbo m y aveARMOR--mah-A@I, 1932

WitMnWn ineo tbe cmncaing tun-d a P D o p a s u p & S b d f C I .WbentbCenaayaaparhPbeQsilrnccdtbedcanrwn asaiarrdynagcoftbebmLaisbcgrm.Tberequirement fo r silencing enemyweapons in orba bunkasmay*this p'ocedurr but it must be agulla s m spossibktopolrnt ROCCII-pkm of the gun chunk by tbe"em?. TO vofd wzste of m u n i -tion, tank crews must tie infamedas to the enemfs metbods of con-untction and trabaiintbetedmiquedbunkerdesucoan p r i o r t o t h eopaation.Theprobkmpcseatedinbunkerdesuctlon is the collapse of the roofand the undermmng of tbe gunchamber Boor with the end resultbein amassdeanhandlopoccupy-in g i e pace where the chamber was

"interwe fireporn a arge bwtl%er."

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ARMOR

84

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Turkey'sJ~RM ORE D CHOOL

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thaxy in tbc CLsaoOm a d &e a pfield.

Poar COIIcll- brtrolarr hdi-plkatiom ofthat tbeapon heboalc-

mcIl hovc d h b d M tbc d d S OftanLWhikuDda6reinOrdertospeakwith the tank anman&. Thisdespite the fad h a l l peritive a-dpnl t in te r pba a e w a s inr tdbdan the t?n t I t k thempoos ib i l i t yoth ank unit koda ndof& in-d i v i m u l d c o m m a d u t o i n n u rth?t he infantrywn "OPQlting withthem know al l tbe mcllls of arm-m u n i c a t h a v a i l a k --infintrymen during h e i r basic train-ingsboUlddvei.sauctloo intank-infanay cammuniatons and shouldb e l l l a s p a i t o p r a a i c e t b o r e ~available to than for communiatiooWithiDdividUlltlaLs. Misdanrhavefailed becaused the a b r am o f co rn -ktwecn infancry anduLuc?tl(lIltank although tbt wlnr for oam-municathwaspsent and in wort-ingcondition. Thenumberoftanksorganic to themodan infancry divi-sionrsquirrstbaterrrp-combptinfona)lsddialmrspboartofigbt with than. cammunicltioa sO p a a t i a n sInfanlrpen, w t blowillg the pin-

accufacy of tank cannal firediaancesmquiredbyvtilkrykare reluctant toadvanceckx enoughcake fullest dvlnoge of the h es u p d n i y P .

. .

the lifebbod d mnk-infancry tam

S:U-*8pp~gtheIpcapbehind tank camma shell bun0 toDespite the erras listed here,moa

of which have bcend hetank-infantry teams in this divisioaengaged in combat n Korea for ov aa year have proven &l-; iffurther proof weren If tank-infantry teams can operate so S L K X ~ O -fully in Korea, a kndwhich containslittle or no "tank -try," then ank-fully in any part d he world. Tanksalone and infanny done have theirlimitationsWhen combmedasa teamthese limitations ue ountabalancedby each unit's apabilities result ingin an unbeatable combina tion-p\*g they are well m i d in thetechniques of fighting as a tank-in-fane). teamLT.COLC hi cFm, R.

infanny teams can operate nmsJ-

M M O l ~ A p d ,952

rear. In inw

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uuwada

The krralCln whicb I presentlycomnvadhosbeminrtioninthisl l lco baa Much, 1951.

lmittoaninfanaydividoncampmy D/S to each infnnhy regi-ment Thisdhlotioll is~unWHIin that tbeboaplion hasadirsct supportmhsion .Thereasonfarsuchami.dm bps n o b e o r i n g ~his story.Thispnrticulnrtypemissionbn a t u d y the answer to a tank com-mondaipyer. It l l lowsthecom-mandcr a wde latitude in the com-mitnrPntofhiscommand noc normallyfamd iu thed ank attachments.when the d vir i on commandingGaK!Ialhprdecidal tous ank andinfanay combined in an operation,tbe commapdas of the particularun i r r a r n c a n e d a x e dkd i n f o r a~ T b e p r o j e a e d o p r a t i o nis laid betac tbem and they are re-quested to submit a plan as to theirmprcivcrola. Wetberrforeenterthe picture in the planning stage,whue each b able to advise at oncet h e m a s t ~ ~ m c t b o d s o ftank and infanay UJe in support oftbeet iat We are no( concerned thenwitb tocc iabrt are faced with theproblan~aechniqwofempbymrnt.whch.after all, we hd sof primaryimporrplrcThis is the stage when we deter-mine whether the infantry rides the!the tanks, or followsthe*re etermine what mutesthe wiu use. where they meettbe nfmntry, and what infantry unitswill bewith the tanks, or vice versa.0 t h items ofmordhation such assignal. tc hone and pyrotechnics.=kit$L t this time butnot in detail. You will note that allthis is done in the lanning stagew~ e ~ a ~ e ~be d - i n f a n n v com-manders to be consulted before the

eatdiaoisaperPtingasadirstr t b e d - o fone

being briefed on

u -u-

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am.-.=

dcrnlap P b a.'. n t i o a o f t hobpct ioe,f irkrgpoeoarrfaacht a m k ~ a n d e x a c t ~ o f t b cinfantry dl tbc way to beobjat i ve.p i rns rbou ld i oc iudcap imyyand~ m t p u o f c o m m u n i c l t i a r rbchentankudiafaatry .andnarmllpcomrmadarsbaJdbemgetbcl.. Tbeobjjvein bCpLnningphppcsbOUldbeto6xtbCopn;rtionin the miads d 1 Orcidpena 90tht lit& or no carno1 b required3 f k r ~a p n t i o n s o r r s . ~arersDommardcdforthispurpovwbmaductedovt?rrimilarvrrPinOI 011 impavirta sand tablesA succedd opention would con-sist ofh sti act phares neatlydorm?ikdto com each other,and to pave the way for the c a p r eof the objective by the infantry withbale &ort and a minia~umf casual-ti&

First b tbe preparatory h e phase,w b ll available artillery, mortarsand air soften the target area, knockout gunr andOPS, and c a q out theisolatioaofdie ob ' eve by fire.Thismay be omitted on d o n .ga.tary tires the tanks move n and takeup the fire. So- support artilleryareas upon which tanks are unableto6re. Tanks hould attempttoworkd round Banks and rear of the theobpctivc to isolate tbe W e reaand nupcctedO b unpositions andbmLasan a prearra~gedlan. Whileess is being condune& tankersmustb bdd and aggrraivc but alwaysremembet to have tank cover tanka n d ~ c o v e r M i o n .p k he infantry d e s h a r ddraws, ravinesandgroundfolds.Whentbe loa cova is passed the infantryshou!d proceed with all haste todzetheabject@. Often cheprrperatoqrh a n d ankfirewill have driven the

rkys~EX! everything you canunder tbe cover of these prepara-

rmythenshifttodefildedtarget

hurhr and place fire on all knownthtisdation and neutralization proc-

During the tank mutralizationlmdaoarm, dngp m io u d y seecte!d

aKmp fnmr the obj jve into caves01 adjacent can#kd positions. Nowlast delay m tbe assault can be cost-is the infautry oppor tudrg. and thelv. T d reshouldcontinueon theob- until the infantry is withinhand@ ispnce. The CCF

---MI, 1952

We've al l dreamed of being tbeveritablemilitarygabswho hascampounded a new su of principles forthe empbymcntd anks with nfan-try-piacipleJ so effective%50 d*,IodifFmnt that h e y will revolution-ize this whole buri nas of the tank-infanay team. Buttheamre I observeand partidpate in t d - i n f a n qations the more sr~piciaus becomeof the fact that thm isa stronglikeli-hood that such a mlut ion is notathand. SointlisarticleIamnotcumnt ones either.state in passing that tank n Koreaare doing v e q .icely, thank you,with the plain old isJuccype princi-ples available to mpoae with accmtotbermnuals.Rattler, I would like to make M-d a m n a a d a f a vbed at latn rom,d ntaat andv l h K t o t h e r r d a . F a r ~ :tnesc?bilitydpaddiawithhema*

to

Much h?s beenwritten about theAIM--, 1-2

&Led.-emphasis on the lack d &. Inour sector we have ulother p o b hdrainageand mgatioaditches. Bridg-one could get bridging m a t 4 tothem. but m e can't. Gnl y . that is.We simply whittle themdown to ou rsize with TNTbyMowingthesbarl-de n d o make a aegaiaMe zbpefor the ank todescead into be canaland another to enable it crawl out.In order to avoid going into a "d-umn ctf sitting ducks" to cross thecanals, we blow as many QossiDgs asposribleavereacholK.

-that of Hide. deep. vertical walleding them would be no problem if

T h a t b r i n g s u p a n o c h e r p o i n t Arthe engineers p,so go the t;m4 is

A R M E DF O R C E S

D A YMAY 1 7 t h

UNITYS T U E WG T HF R E E D O M

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22

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Tbe Top *i n - h e

Far Eas t

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SOVIET ARMOR TACI'ICS

.TheSEELOW Operation. .

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MAJOR ATTACK EAST OF BERl lW

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made Americanjtyle raidson herearAt about 0730, w h i k the artillerypotding was still continuing andthe h g prevented all visibility, the

bsians o p e d their attack on he' ti aas. It was launched

areas.

Qd a d the & ~ - K u s -an estimatedsixtywave. Infantry fol-Mecbr?baedindepth.The attacking tanks wman theGe!nnan rart-Iine nfanmv, which re-d disoK er behiad the "B"ditch. The first wave north of thehigbway tbcn ran into the advanced1st PLtoon d the 2nd Company,compised of four Panther tanks. Ate x t r a d y cbse r ane approximatelyfifteen Russiantank were d emy e dby the platoon. and the attack wasrepelkdat this spot Following Rus-sian infantryalso waswhih thepia- w s z & . i n g&the Russian tanks, the bridge inits rear- he 3" itch was de-s tqed , cutting& ts retreat Toag-&ravlte the situation,. the platoonrsceived several hits from the friend-ly& Withtheplammlederkilledand m all of the confusion, the Rus-sipn tank moclredout the four Ger-mal l r ank

. v - A p r l l , 952

Russian units r&g sarth am y and fmm the oorm dahormlioootbcdefiCILIcpodilas and the tank p d itch'Ibe rartbanmorrgroup mr a i d d i n c a p -the secoa at the d j t itrisiop.AneadlasstrrpmofRusdvltmL.i n f a n t r y a n d ~ ~ t o

T

sca*rtbt%"Qtchm

Z a c K s S tbishidge,visibkin theA countcrrhrustby the 1stb p o n ying the bridge. Limited Garmnaction.Friendly a d a y made no axwea g a i n n t h i s m a s s t a r g e t . R d i o ~Russian artillery bnmge. the inces-

was repelled by enemy mnks ama-ammunition supplies rrstrictcd the

santair aidson ear pobtioor,perh?pssome Russian in6ltration UndaaJveCd the +all oc tbis brought com-plete elimination d th obravltionposts and thorougldy neutralid the1q.umerically su- German a d -

the area a Farm " A" By w o ~ lheinfantry had abandoned the d i dline and had ma~edack to the lioeformed by the tanks.The load black 011 tbe sbpe belowSeebw was dared, pohibiting the

In the afternoon the e ~ m yncompanystrength attacked Farm "A "from the MntbtaQ. Th9 were re-pulsed by the tanks.In late aftenroon, division eve OFden to withdraw the tanks to pori-tions on tbe heights, which was

The Russiaas had achieved pene-rration in the stor of the divisicmto the left and had -pied theheights. The 2nd Battalion,coveringthe left tlanlr, w s ordered to Qwptec-attack after dark,along with theann-p a q quippea for night firing. Itsaction did not m a d y elieve the

I n t h e e a r l y l I O u n o f ~seelow,WhiChhodkcnshellcdandbarnbed intoninsly tbe Russians ina single day, was abeadaaed as un-tenable hecause ofpenemationsto thenorth and south.ARMoI--Mach-April, 1952

During the morning the CeImantankswerewithdrawn to positions in

recovery of damaged tank.

accomplished bJ nightfalk

situation.

-n he firn p k d ; b e b a r t k , one

bridge ov a3" itch was & m o wb n d g e s b a u l d b e a e m ! d o n l y a otoo soon, while the secund was n ademoh&e4i.ataL Danohoan of atheadexof the ummader inchargeof a ocoo1,ab0 must maintain dosccontactwith all units, and must posta su&kndy strmg detail at tbeb n d g e u a d a a n o 8 6 m t o ~ t s c i .zurebysprpiseactioa.carmppaitionsind.iisrtionwere no t echeloned in sufficientdepth. The secbw heights shouldhave been p e p a d and oacupied astherminlinedredstoacc.wth thebulk d he troop5 h g ith heavyanns a d anks poritiolKd on this

action went, b t m k w o d y tToops nth-

dominating remain, leaving lightf a ~ ~ ~ f o r w a r d a obeplain f a directcontactwith &e enemy. Even as the

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* TANK -REBUILD. '. 0 . . IN JAPAN

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-Combat Training for theTANPINFANTRY TEAlM

than twoquare miles of the reserva-tion; boweva, tkarea is large. FocunaT% IS suf-hriert azea at Fort Hood to permit6 h g he %mmtank gun at movingtioq- 13miksoftrailshaveKFamsuucd. These trails also providea safety feature in that vehicularmenKnt is guided in th e properd rsa onAsBecltgroundfor the exercise. thetank-infantiy team is told that it is

?Pact

TO nsue all-weathet

Rsumetheadvvrcollorda.TheB?hk guard has reached p i n t " A"

balscurirgbydepbgingareriflequad and tk ight machine gunsquad 01) hill -B,"azJdonesectionofranks cavaing the rods leading to-Apr I t , 1952

"k"Tkrrmaindaofthefacckhl tedintbew0odrat"A." A s k

Inasmu& as the enemy guns appeartokd i n , t k & n k g u v d ~tugh explosive shell,k k x oJtde

and machine p a quad leaders aretold which padcuh mound is thetarget. Two tanks a w e to 6 M g pcui-tions oil "B"and the infanay poinoout tk target with tncer. Each tankfires threed HE, nd hits ared.0rwin i . g-JT- twomore tanksmove up the lnfantryrnarksanewtuget. the Bankguard c umma d x is o&ed to re-sume be advance. Havingbeen firedon be decidesto cour hisadvancebymwin thoughtbewoodstohisrightand &a x in g to tk igh ground aton "B"as a bese d .k ntil 'C ssecwed, and tohe t likely automaticwhik he advancegets under way.

mandera l u v e OM sectsoa dweapons. The

the tanks are f i M

X." he machine gun squad is leftor antitank WeapOM pc6itansonTguardistomoveare uitethidtsothecormpaadct dirap &e infanhy pla-toon (less the base of lire3 to sweepthe woods, dismounted, abead of thetanks upon reachin the clearingbetween"B"andTYL anks are topass through tbe infantry and movera idly to defiladed tions on "C."de passing Y K e nfantry thetanks ceconnoiter y fire with theirc0;udaandbowmachineguns T h emopupif""isoccu ied. Wben theobjective is secured i e machine gunsquad eft on "B"as a base of fire re-joins he infantry platoon on T."

After the tanh amve on "c'charge is set off to represent the fireof a hostleantitank gun in positionon hill "E." Locatidn of the gun isdisclosed by its muzzle blast, so theBank guard cammpnder requests and e x y concentration ~n the M etion. Upon&ginfcmdbyhiscommitted toanothnmision-thecan-mandet&combatcomrmndf0ran air seike on & antitank gun.Thicrequestisappoved.

Thewoodsthraughwhich the Bank

infanay f o h hetanks quickly to

p"rward obdcrrm that the artilkry is

ARmol--mardr-, 1-2

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Three Civil Wars of -1934Ilrredng bi s account of bistory in our time it is & to conceive t b r tbeeuents described could possibly bate lwppened-yet fnrtbtr considerdon krdrinevitably to tbe r ecop't ion tbat e q d y ap-g tbings cclll a d o +peatoday. T k ompensation lies in t& fact tbat today we are awake. An activewar against aggression on one side of tbc worldand concerteddieda-tion on k 0 t h willgo far toward d i p p i n g tbe wor ld 's bad boys into li#

IGELBERT Dollfuss be-came

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IIHERE was once a mythicalP b u s . He nvented beer,

myed asaide a bem4witb a sainin his jovial paw. He was the guild-master d the Remib bmvcm, be-be d by each and evcry happy tippler. and his rdme bcmunemptedinto Gambrinus This ruddyHapsburg monarch was very pup-lac with the vienaac-in the springseason, although he badtoValhallainthethincen cenug.Becwem Moody February, 1934, andthe sumrqer, Vienna people COLDm u d with Lord Gaxnbci~us,hisbecchic goeq and bir carefree maltpcult. They cried to quiet their slut :tered nenns while DolIfuss sweatedin the ChaDCcllery. But the AustroNazis would not h hem f a t g ~ ,despite Gambrinus' best effortsandThe Ausnizn brownshim, who in

white soclrs for a uniform badgc, agi-ated d sopden in places of blicbut efkctively. Theywere, in increar-ing numbers,joining themfortu~tesocialispintheDollpss risoaswberethan the capturedV i orkmen.On Jdy 4, 1934, Alfrrd F ~ a ~ e n -feld-an Ausadazi associateof Ha-a German radio *tion that threwould be a civil war in Austxia ifanyof seven Nazis held byEr&overnment were executed. Next day came the secondAustrian civil war.Some 154 N e our trucLloodsc e k y at lunchtinu. They bebngedVIII. OC the Municbt h e N a z i m a w m m , t t h e y w mslrilfullp disgulscd IS A& rrgu-lan in thed f a m f DeutschmeismReginvnt NurmncrVim.Their kad-en were Planma and Holzweber.

K i O g o f ~ r r y a c d J ~sl) tbestary BOQ.pndisgam?tty par-

$"don

tboseofcheDollfuapdice.reality were in the b a h t of Wearingtated against Ddlfurs, threw born&committed acts of abogge, and crpa m u s e m m t ~ b c h a v e d c & ,

they - eneray.L dbichtSs in nimicb-broedolsted from

of them suddenly seized the ch?n-to standard Eigbty-nine" sectonPmfdFey in the . LinleDoll-of a scc~ct oor,butPlanetta shot himin the back at a mnge of one foot.His captors f themselves inthe chance-, rdused to admitARMOI--Mach-Aprll, 932

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S e l f a p n r S r i a a g e n a a l f r r m B ~bur& wids an 'inmaptitmal" hcnchasrrrhmw Nazi Germany.hndintbcabwcingafthcJtonn-Tbat6tnxwatmrcom-F y Hdnrich Himmkr's sp ec i a l ~ p o l i f c , a r r p r i n g h u m a lbkxkrmizamr"fwlmdicdycllingandshrieking,with the uoi ntcmpedcry of 1 amCbNstathh-eVen ifclnlyagainslh i S m m d a m ; b t , W h O b d a rg a n i ze d

e"usrioll amy, bowmt, hod Ly)

witbout using the revolverpolitkal mux& a hundred times,adacd itadahnostgbrifieditcyni-d y s a P P ~q , soldier'stcadc-he cried, foaming at theIDouth: Whot irking done ome ispoliticpl murder.' But he was fright-a w d b y t b e l e v o l v a .- W b 4 b C a t l U I h a l f d e ! a d dwaded, was brought by airplanefnnn BLrcmea to the taror barracksin x 3 a l b r m f e l l t o h i sLMabeFonthef iringsquadandbe& for mexcy; 'Heil Hitler!' hesbwsd, 'I m inmcent.' HeinikShrieLd 90d bat be COtlM bekaiddgbt thrargh the whole BrownHOUSCa Munich.. ha~ser. hiled live# was trampled to death int b e f a a t d G n u r c w a l d , m B e r -lin.The ady man-if one is to be-litveccrroin who, faced bvprates a d tarl as retaliation, was athe wife of the non-NaziGeneral ScMekk the next momentshe was lying with a bullet in hertuab."Tbe above were amwmnist com-ments. But readingbetweenthe lines,June 30, 1943 xras a first, indirect1939. Meanwhile the Hitler purgingscontinua& ndduring1936-an "aver-age- year-the following arrests weremade: 864 communists, 417 trade-

the l l n u d e d ~ w a d rf .pa

victolyfatberrorg2niredPrusri?n army, en mute to P O E T ;

un oa srs,2% saci?lists,153 Socialist-mdials, 22 oppositoa Nazis. 1-11membenof theSxiety For theStudyof tbe Bible," 38 priests an d pastors,ers.and a motley collection of "race-polluters, a d thers lacking in pride"as N a dia and anti-Semites. Therewere, in all, sixty concentrationcamps then in Gennany. holding2 5 , W F r r o d a l r ?Union in this Year of Grace.

ARH--Apd, 1952

17 ndic;ll Catbolia, Ji x stonn-troop

Kid asscanparedto sowet

FROM THESE PAGES

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A Rorrl Trip TbrtCosts More Tb t n One Way

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IU I

This is a part of the testing giventhey updergo indicated0 0 0

e m l a l m W P a d T a n k Wbsion and fire recently

dollar tank plant being built by thed 2 e I 3 oprmcL tbe 5omillion-Ford M00ar Compcrny at Livonia, aSuburbOCmroit.The fire apparently resulted froma n e x p k n h i n a p a i n t s b o p . Flames

swept a large seccionof the plant.

- 4 s.

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C.S. Pbcr.

m is a rod and clo~scaurtyoot- hich bas been initiated withlwalcystpciau requiriug oolutionr tob o s i c m i l i t a i p , t a c t i c l l , o r ~typepbkms. TbecauscisaredlebngerthantheFortRlleystllresof1947 and amtestants lase five pointsfor eachminute in excessd "stand-ad - running lime of 105 minutesthey require to 6nish. Additionala a t i o a s d b e a d d e d b d a e ~ f i r uArmor 0 4 6 ~ ~andidate class com-petesinMPrch,during& 21sweekoftbeirraunebeguninvancedck9 ompeted in a trial runo f t he stakesandmaderecommenda-tions oward improvingthecoune.Atoftbestakcsbym e m h ofZZEnced Class General Whitepointedout tbatthe MilitaryStakeJ is"bosially a county fair" type of com-K"dearmmendedmarep

%E?id-hArmorrdschool

amlpetitians penaining tomibtarypdicisamewk mare di&cult than ts FortRilep pdaxsmr because of the hillyterrain f e o h m ~ f Kentucky. ThemoadifficulttaninfeatImistherunBu- Creek and up a long inclineto Statiom 12 through 19 in &estationone, in the steeles No. 1area, quires the contestant to locatea ddectm wire c h i t . to connect6dd tdcpbme EE-8 Q field wire

- T h e I I rm r r ~ h a s b c e n c a l l e d

fnrm sttao 11, CIOSJ country acfossBrumlhldbgeare4.

lines, and tod y plice a brokenAt Station Two he must assembleSubMachine Gun M3A1, 6re 10rounds at two silhouette targets anddissemble.Starion Three requires him to as-semble M1 &, losd and fin 10

firr at two silhouettetargets 125 and200 yardsdistant,and disassemble.The equirement at.Stat ion Four isto assemble a .45 caliber pistol. firef ive rounds at silhouette target, anddisassemble.At Station Five thcm ~ as askedto solve an attack situation includingdesignation of attack 'tion andmutes tbereto, lineof&,hedirection of the main attack and for-mation to be used during the attack.Station Six requires the recon-noiteringd pmparedmadblock anda d j j t rea, selection of the areas tobe minedanddispositionof the recon-naioance platoon securing the roadblock.S t d o n h e n equires the contest-ant tolocate andremove tw o antitankmines in a given area.Stntion Eight is a map readingproblemwhere he stdetermine hegridcoordimtereadin tothenearest

elevation to the nearest five feet andARMoR--Aprll, 1952

mdu c t a OD field wire W-l1GB.

r o d ncluding two rounds tracer,

t h d men of.% station, the

and l oc r t i a rd t ksbc l l r i t ye l cmmpfa a tank campy1y d y reamust be sckcted..% Station T d r v the c o n ~ s t ~ tmust throw. hreehand grades into

d=iPatedoParingsstariorr nirtrrr, daipsed 1stEchekm Maintmarrp-requiresd e r -

sbmnan tank penMnent ly main-mination of correct track tenskm. 514tained on tbe B d d ange areag=-re utilized at thisandsucceatinrions requiringthe use of tanks.

Station Fmrte4n s a field messagemustr i t ingroperlyxerciseillw b a eut a the conteruntwriting a clear. c o m p ~message-The requirement at Station Fi f t e enis to prepare and p k demolitionchargetofellatree.

station SixttYU tests tbeuse ofcor-rect Rdio Telephonepmrrdurr.At stptiorr sewmeen the ~ f c s l ? n tmust lay a tank gun ontarget. H e i s t o - r a n g e dhave ~lcrrcf ight picture fa ';meandde8ectiao.St&m Eiglrtcrrr, invohng lankTabkachine11gund coax).b i p d a t hrquira

FXI 23-55.At S t a t i m Ni~uet?n he runnermustcorrsta+debaeacpin a eep and start &moa*.

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A P O S T W D U A T E C OU R SE ON A C O N T R O V E R S I A L B A T T L E

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II1ft

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\ /WE IR POINT

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I

Tke Ifed m y eb

.The Defense of.WWEUN UROP

RAG,TAG AND BOBTAIL

The ofPrivateWheeler

Personal Memoirsof U.S. GRANT

Intmduetiomand Annotations by E . LONG

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The Irony ofAmerican Hietory

-GLORY ROAD:

IWas-W i n ' s P r i m e r

w

w.00

MainFleet to Singapore

$3.75--&d,

Lincoln and

eThe Extrao-Mr. Morris

His Generals

mostntedwith ma p andpho'osnpruJ $4800

His -7 of the Arrbs

$9.00

PENSION ANDRETIREMENT RIGHTS

. jli.00

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'I%&ge ofGlobal Str i fe COMBAT BOOTS 88

888888888888888I888888888888888888888888

Tactical Problems for Armor UnitsBy C o l d Paul A. Disney, Annor, USA

Th i s new boo& pmsentsa highly interesting mrchod 'o f kooming fomiliar withww pmcricol- i l lwtmting the kdi-he tactics of- unitr.

co l use of kmor, from the tonk plaroon on up to the)--k.)commad.There are omple &etch mops, conveniently 0rmng.d in the hxt . Thm mdu it

easy to loy out the exercises on the sand tobk or CCWtermin. Theproblemsare based on combat expedmce.

Many phdor of Armor in adion in K o r w . 1ee--/ ---

214 PAFES $2.50 wORDER R O M THE BOOK OEPARTMENT

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