221078536 jurisprudence in political law

8/11/2019 221078536 Jurisprudence in Political Law

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JURISPRUDENCE IN POLITICAL LAW

Funda-mentalPowers of the State

EMINENT DOMAIN; Expropriation; It may beinitiated by court action or by legislation. In bothinstances, just compensation is determined by thecourts.

Republic v.SalemInvestment

orp., !R"#$%&',

(une )#,)***.

Same; Same; Two stages +" the determinationof the authority of the plainti to e ercise thepower of eminent domain and the propriety of itse ercise in the conte t of the facts involved in thesuit/ +) the determination by the court of justcompensation for the property sought to be ta0en.

1he two stages apply to both judicial andlegislative e propriation and said stages are notcomplete until payment of just compensation. It is

only upon payment of just compensation that titleto the property passes to the government

id.

Same; Same; Expropriation s!it is in"apa#$eo% pe"!niar& estimation and falls w2in the

jurisdiction of the R1 , regardless of the value of the subject property.

3arangaySan Ro4uev. 5eirs of Pastor, !R"#66'&,

(une )*,)***.

Same; Same; Entr&; 1he re4uirements of 78"*#%, i.e., conduct of feasibility studies,information campaign and detailedengineering2surveys, are not conditions precedentto the issuance of a writ of possession against theproperty being e propriated. 1he re4mts for theissuance of a writ of possession, once thee propriation case is 9led, are e pressly andspeci9cally governed by Sec. ), Rule &$ of the"''$ Rules of ivil Procedure. Pursuant to said ruleand the Robern :evelopment orp. case, the onlyre4uisites for authori;ing immediate entry ine propriation proceedings are< ="> the FI?I@! of acomplaint for e propriation suAcient in form andsubstance/ =)> the ma0ing of a :7P8SI1 e4uivalentto the assessed value of the property subject toe propriation. 1he owners of the e propriated landare entitled to ?7!B? I@17R7S1 on thecompensation eventually adjudged from the datethe condemnor ta0es possession of the land untilthe full compensation is paid to them or depositedin court.

3iglang-awav. (udge3acalla, !R"#'')$ and"#''#&,@ov. )),)***.

Same; Same; Rig't o% Wa&; 1he ac4uisition of an easement of right of way falls w2in the power of eminent domain.

amarines@orte7lectric

oop. v. B,!R "*'##6,@ov. )*,)***

iti;enship

I% an A$ien =i> gave or donated his money to aciti;en of the Phils. so that the latter could invest itin the purchase of private agricultural lands, or =ii>

han Sui 3iv. B, !R")'%*$,


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purchased private agricultural lands for a citi;en of the Phils., such acts, provided they are done in!88: FBI15, do not violate our laws. Chat isprohibited by the Bnti-:ummy ?aw and the Retail

1rade ?aw then prevailing were the ac4uisition byan alien for himself of private lands in the Phils.,and his conduct of retail trade, respectively.

Sept, )',)***.

E(TRADITION; Rig't to Noti"e an) *earing;Private respondent does not have the right tonotice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the e tradition process, for the . reasons< ="> P:"*&' w2c implements the RP-DS 7 tradition 1reatyprovides the time when an e tradite shall befurnished a copy of the petition for e tradition aswell as its supporting papers, i.e., after the 9ling of the said petition in the e tradition court. 1here isno provision in the above law and treaty w2c givesan e trditee the right to demand from the Sec. of

(ustice copies of the e tradition re4uest from theDS government and its supporting documents andto comment thereon while the re4uest is stillundergoing evaluation/ =)> Bll treaties, includingthe RP-DS 7 tradition 1reaty, should be interpretedin the light of their intent. 1he RP-DS 7 tradition

1reaty calls for an interpretation that will minimi;eif not prevent the escape of the e tradite form thelong arm of the law and e pidite their trial/ =#> 1he7 ecutive :ept., thru the :FB and the :8(, hassteadfastly maintained that the RP-DS 7 tradition

1reaty and P: "*&' do not grant the private

respondent a right to notice and hearing during theevaluation stage of the e tradition process. 1hisunderstanding of the treaty is shared by the DSgovernment, the other party to the treaty. 8thercountries w2 similar e tradition treaties w2 thePhils. have e pressed the same interpretationadopted by the Phils. and Ds governments/ =E> Bne tradition proceeding is sui generic . It is not acriminal proceeding that will call into operation allthe rights of the accused guaranteed by the 3ill of Rights.

Sec. of (ustice v.?antion, !R"#'E&%,8ct. "$,)***.

3ill of Rights DUE PROCESS; B decision is void for lac0 of dueprocess, as when a party is deprived of theopportunity of being heard. B void judgment neverac4uires 9nality.

1heSummary:ismissal3oard v.

1orcita, !R"#*EE#,Bpril &,)***.

Same; B denial of due process suAces to cast onthe oAcial acts ta0en by whatever branch of government the impression of @D??I1 . B decisionrendered w2o due process is void ab initio and maybe attac0ed directly or collaterally.

Dy v. B, !R"*'%%$,@ov. )',)***.

E+UAL PROTECTION O, T*E LAW; the doctrinethat if the conviction of the accused rests upon thesame evidence used to convict the co-accused, theac4uittal of the former should bene9t the latter.Such doctrine does not apply to this case. 1hestrongest pieces of evidence against petitioner

Peligrino v.People, !R"#&)&&,Bug. "#,)**".


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were the ones obtained from the entrapment, inwhich 3uenafe was not involved. 5ence, theevidence against petitioner and that against his co-accused were simply not at par with each other.

,REEDOM ,ROM UNREASONA-LE SEARC*ESAND SEI.URES; In cases where warrant is

necessary, the steps prescribed by the onstitutionand reiterated in the Rules of ourt must becomplied with. In the e ceptional events wherewarrant is not necessary to e ect a valid search orsei;ure, or when the latter cannot be performede cept without a warrant, what constitutes areasonable or unreasonable search or sei;ure ispurely a judicial 4uestion, determinable from theuni4ueness of the circumstances involved,including the purpose of the search or sei;ure, thepresence or absence of probable cause, themanner in which the search and sei;ure was made,

the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

Posadas vs.B, "66

S RB )66+"''* ,citing Peoplevs. FI of Ri;al, "*"S RB 6&+"''& .

Same; Warrant o% Arrest; Re4uirements for thevalid issuance of search warrant< ="> the warrantmust be issued upon probable cause/ =)>PR83B3?7 BDS7 must be determined by the

judge himself and not by the applicant or any otherperson/ =#> In determining probable cause, the

judge must 7GBHI@7 under oath or aArmation thecomplainant and such witnesses as the latter mayproduce/ =E> the warrant issued must

PBR1I D?BR? :7S RI37 the place to be searchedand the persons or things to be sei;ed. Bdescription of the place to be searched is suAcientif the oAcer w2 the warrant can, w2 reasonablee ort, ascertain and identify the place intendedand distinguish it from other places in thecommunity. Search Carrants are not issued onloose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on meresuspicion or belief. In this case, most of the itemslisted in the warrants fail to meet the test of PBR1I D?BRI1 , especially since the witness hadfurnished the judge photocopies of the documents

sought to be sei;ed. 1he search warrant isseparable, and those items not particularlydescribed may be cut o w2o destroying the wholewarrant.

Dy v. 3IR,!R ")'&%",8ct. )*,)***.

Same; Same; Pro#a#$e Ca!se; For the issuanceof search warrants, the Rules of ourt re4uires a9nding of probable cause in connection w2 onespeci9c o ense to be :717RHI@7: P7RS8@B?? 3

157 (D:!7 after e amining the complainant andthe witnesses he may produce. Since, in this case,there is no crime to spea0 of, the search warrant isnull and void and all property sei;ed by virtuethereof shall be returned in accordance w2established jurisprudence.

Savage v. (udge 1aypin, !R"#E)"$,Hay "",)***.

Same; Same; J!ris)i"tion; B search warrant ismerely a process issued by the court in thee ercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not acriminal action w2c it may entertain pursuant to itsoriginal jurisdiction. 1he authority to issue search

id.


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warrants is inherent in all courts and may e ectedoutside their territorial jurisdiction. Petitionersapparently misconstrued the import of thedesignation of Special ourts of IPR. Bdministrative8rder @o. ""#-'% merely speci9ed w2c court couldtry and decide cases involving violations of the IPR.It did not, and could not, vest e clusive jurisdiction

w2 regard to all matters +including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes inany one court. (urisdiction is conferred upon courtsby substantive law, in this case, 3P 3lg. ")', andnot by a procedural rule, much less by anadministrative order. 1he power to issue searchwarrants for violation of IPR has not beene clusively vested in the courts enumerated in SBdmin 8rder @o. ""#-'%. erti9cation againstforum-shopping is not re4uired in applications forsearch warrants.

Warrant$ess Sear"' an) Sei/!re; 1heconstitutional proscription against warrantlesssearches and sei;ures is not absolute but admits of certain e ceptions, namely< +" CBRRB@1?7SSS7BR 5 I@ I:7@1B? 18 B ?BCFD? BRR7S1recogni;ed under Section "), Rule ")& of the Rulesof ourt and by prevailing jurisprudence = PP vs.Figueroa, )E6 S RB &$' +"''% / Horfe vs. Hutuc, ))S RB E)E +"'&6 / :avis vs. Dnited States, #)6 D.S.%6). >/ +) S7I DR7 8F 7JI:7@ 7 I@ P?BI@ JI7C=8bra vs. B, #"$ S RB %'E +"''' / P vs. 3agista, )"ES RB +"'') / Padilla vs. B, )&' S RB E*) +"''$ / PPvs. ?o 5o Cing, "'# S RB ")) +"''" / oolidge vs. @ew5ampshire, E*# D.S. EE#. >/ +# S7BR 5 8F H8JI@!J75I ?7S = PP vs. 7scaKo, #)# S RB $%E +)*** / Bniag,

(r. vs. omelec, )#$ S RB E)E +"''E / PP vs. Saycon,)#& S RB #)% +"''E / PP vs. 7 ala, ))" S RB E'E+"''# / Jalmonte vs. de Jilla, "$6 S RB )"" +"'6' /

arroll vs. Dnited States, )&$ D.S. "#). >/ +E8@S7@17: CBRRB@1?7SS S7BR 5 = PP vs. Hontilla,

)6% S RB $*# +"''6 / PP vs. ui;on, )%& S RB #)%+"''& / Hustang ?umber vs. B, et al., )%$ S RB E#*+"''& / PP vs. Ramos, ))) S RB %%$ +"''# / PP vs.8maweng, )"# S RB E&) +"'') . >/ +% DS18HSS7BR 5/ +& S18P B@: FRISL SI1DB1I8@S +M17RR

S7BR 5N = PP vs. Salayao, )&) S RB )%% +"''& /Posadas vs. B, "66 S RB )66 +"''* citing 1erry vs.8hio, )* ?. 7d. )d 6'&.> / and +$ 7GI!7@1 B@:7H7R!7@ IR DHS1B@ 7S =PP vs. de !racia,)## S RB $"& +"''E citing PP vs. Halmstedt, "'6S RB E*" +"''" and Dmil, et al. vs. Ramos, "6$S RB #"" +"''* >.

PP v. de!racia, )##S RB $"&+"''E citingPP v.Halmstedt,"'6 S RBE*" +"''"and Dmil v.Ramos, "6$S RB #""+"''* .

Same; 0P$ain1iew Do"trine2; 1he prosecutionagainst illegal search and sei;ure covers bothinnocent and guilty ali0e against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers. 1he MplainviewN

doctrine +w2c may justify a search w2o a warrantapplies only where the police oAcer is @81S7BR 5I@! for evidence against the accused, butI@B:J7R17@1? comes across an incriminatingobject. (ust because the marijuana plants werefound in an unfenced lot does not prevent theappellant from invo0ing the protection a orded bythe onstitution. 1he right against unreasonablesearches and sei;ures is the immunity of oneOsperson, w2c includes his residence, papers and

PP v. Jalde;,!R ")')'&,Sept. )%,)***.


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other possessions. For a person to be immuneagainst unreasonable searches and sei;ures, heneed not be in his home or oAce, w2in a fencedyard or private place.

Same; Same; Bn object is in plain view if theobject itself is plainly e posed to sight. Chere the

object sei;ed was inside a closed pac0age, theobject itself is not in plain view and thereforecannot be sei;ed without a warrant. 5owever, if thepac0age proclaims its contents, whether by itsdistinctive con9guration, its transparency, or if itscontents are obvious to an observer, then thecontents are in plain view and may be sei;ed.

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).

Same; Consente) Sear"' or Wai1er; It isfundamental that to constitute waiver< =i> it must9rst appear that the right e ists/ =ii> the personinvolved had 0nowledge, either actual or

constructive, of the e istence of such right/ and =iii>the said person had an actual intention torelin4uish the right.

PP v.Figueroa, !R"#E*%&, (uly&, )***.

Same; Same; Essentia$ Re3!isites; In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutionalguarantee against obtrusive searches, it isfundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must9rst appear that +" the right e ists/ +) that theperson involved had 0nowledge, either actual orconstructive, of the e istence of such right/ and +#the said person had an actual intention to

relin4uish the right.

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).

Same; Same; Bn alleged consent to a warrantlesssearch and sei;ure cannot be based merely on thepresumption of regularity in the performance of duty. 1his presumption, by itself, cannot prevailagainst the constitutionally protected rights of anindividual, and ;eal in the pursuit of criminalscannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods thatthe onstitution itself abhors.

PP v. 3aula,!R "#)&$",@ov. "%,)***.

Same; Same; 1he constitutional immunity againstunreasonable searches and sei;ures is B P7RS8@B?RI!51 which may be waived. 1he consent must bevoluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegaldetention and search, i.e., the consent isune4uivocal, speci9c, and intelligently given,uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. 5ence,consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, butmust be shown by clear and convincing evidence.

1he 4uestion whether a consent to a search was infact voluntary is a 4uestion of fact to bedetermined from the totality of all thecircumstances. Relevant to this determination arethe following characteristics of the person givingconsent and the environment in which consent isgiven< +" the age of the defendant/ +) whether hewas in a public or secluded location/ +# whether heobjected to the search or passively loo0ed on/ EE+E the education and intelligence of the defendant/+% the presence of coercive police procedures/ +&the defendant s belief that no incriminatingevidence will be found/ E% +$ the nature of the

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).


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police 4uestioning/ +6 the environment in whichthe 4uestioning too0 place/ and +' the possiblyvulnerable subjective state of the personconsenting. It is the State w2c has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that thenecessary consent was obtained and that it wasfreely and voluntarily given.

Same; Sear"' o% Mo1ing 4e'i"$e; B warrantlesssearch of a moving vehicle is justi9ed on theground that it is not practicable to secure a warrantbecause the vehicle can 4uic0ly moved out of thelocality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must besought. Searches w2o warrant of automobiles isalso allowed for the purpose of preventingviolations of smuggling or immigration laws,provided such searches are made at borders orconstructive borders li0e chec0points near theboundary lines of the State. 1he mere mobility of

these vehicles, however, does not give the policeoAcers unlimited discretion to conductindiscriminate searches w2o warrants if made w2inthe interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).

Same; 0Stop an) Sear"'2; Stop and search atmilitary or police chec0points has been declared tobe @81 I??7!B? P7R S7, for as long as it iswarranted by the e igencies of public order andconducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. Bchec0point may either be a mere routine inspection

or it may involve an e tensive search.

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).

Same; Same; Ro!tine Inspe"tion; 1hey are notregarded as violative of an individualOs rightagainst unreasonable search. 1he search w2c isnormally permissible in this instance is limited tothe < ="> where the oAcer merely draws aside thecurtain of a vacant vehicle w2c is par0ed on thepublic fair grounds/ =)> simply loo0s into a vehicle/=#> Qashes a light therein w2o opening the carOsdoors/ =E> where the occupants are not subjectedto aphysical or body search/ =&> where the

inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visualsearch or visual inspection/ and =$> where theroutine chec0 is conducted in a 9 ed area. In thiscase, the police oAcers did not merely conduct avisual search or visual inspection of hereinpetitionerOs vehicle. 1hey had to reach inside thevehicle, lift the 0a0wati leaves and loo0 inside thesac0s before they were able to see the cable wires.It cannot be considered a simple routine chec0.

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).

Same; Same; Extensi1e Sear"'; Chen a vehicleis stopped and subjected to an e tensive search,such a warrantless search would be constitutionallypermissible 8@? if the oAcers conducting thesearch have reasonable or PR83B3?7 BDS7 tobelieve, before the search, that either the motoristis a law-o ender or they will 9nd theinstrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime inthe vehicle to be searched. 1his ourt has in thepast found probable cause to conduct w2o a judicialwarrant an e tensive search of moving vehicles in

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).


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situations where +" there had emanated from apac0age the distinctive smell of marijuana/ +)agents of the @arcom of the P@P had received acon9dential report from informers that a si;eablevolume of marijuana would be transported alongthe route where the search was conducted/ +#@arcom agents had received information that a

aucasian coming from Sagada, HountainProvince, had in his possession prohibited drugsand when the @arcom agents confronted theaccused aucasian, because of a conspicuousbulge in his waistline, he failed to present hispassport and other identi9cation papers whenre4uested to do so/ +E @arcom agents hadreceived con9dential information that a womanhaving the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana/ +%the accused who were riding a jeepney werestopped and searched by policemen who had

earlier received con9dential reports that saidaccused would transport a large 4uantity of marijuana/ and +& where the moving vehicle wasstopped and searched on the basis of intelligenceinformation and clandestine reports by a deeppenetration agent or spy one who participated inthe drug smuggling activities of the syndicate towhich the accused belonged that said accusedwere bringing prohibited drugs into the country. Inthe case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner wasQagged down because the police oAcers who wereon routine patrol became suspicious when they

saw that the bac0 of the vehicle was covered with0a0awati leaves w2c, according to them, wasunusual and uncommon. 1he fact that the vehicle?88L7: SDSPI I8DS simply because it is notcommon for such to be covered with 0a0awatileaves does not constitute probable cause aswould justify the conduct of a search without awarrant. Bnd Bbsence of any con9dential report ortipped information that petitioner was carryingstolen cable wires in his vehicle which couldotherwise have sustained their suspicion. 8ur

jurisprudence is replete with cases where 1ipped

Information has become a suAcient probablecause to e ect a warrantless search and sei;ure.Dnfortunately, none e ists in this case.

Same; Sear"' In"i)enta$ to a Law%!$ Arrest; Bsearch incident to a lawful arrest is limited to theperson of one arrested and the premises within hisimmediate control. Dnder the plain view doctrine,unlawful objects within the plain view of anoAcer who has the right to be in the position tohave that view are subject to sei;ure and may bepresented in evidence. "& @onetheless, the sei;ure

of evidence in plain view must comply with thefollowing elements< +a a prior valid intrusion basedon the valid warrantless arrest in which the policeare legally present in the pursuit of their oAcialduties/ +b the evidence was inadvertentlydiscovered by the police who had the right to bewhere they are/ +c the evidence must beimmediately apparent/ and +d plain view justi9edmere sei;ure of evidence without further search.

PP v.Bspiras, !R"#6#6)-6E,Feb. "),)**).


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I$$ega$ Sear"' an) Sei/!re; Ex"$!sionar& R!$e;7nshrined in our onstitution is the inviolable rightof the people to be secure in their persons andproperties against unreasonable searches andsei;ures. 1he e clusionary rule under Section #+) ,Brticle III of the onstitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.

aballes v.B, !R

"#&)'), (an."%, )**).

I$$ega$ sear"'5arrest; 1his case clearly illustrateshow constitutional guarantees against illegalarrests and sei;ures can be violated by over;ealouspolice oAcers in the arrest of suspected drugo enders. 1he State cannot in a cavalier fashionintrude into the persons of its citi;ens as well asinto their houses, papers and e ects. 1heconstitutional provision sheathes the privateindividual with an impenetrable armor againstunreasonable searches and sei;ures. It protects theprivacy and sanctity of the person himself against

unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, andprevents him from being irreversibly cut o fromthat domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not ablan0et prohibition against all searches andsei;ures as it obviously operates only againstsearches and sei;ures that are unreasonable. 1hearrest being illegal ab initio , the accompanyingsearch was li0ewise illegal. 7very evidence thusobtained during the illegal search cannot be usedagainst accused-appellants/ hence, their ac4uittal

must follow in faithful obedience to thefundamental law.

PP v. 3olasa,!R ")%$%E,:ec. ),"'''.

Sear"'es an) Sei/!res; Con6s"ation; 7ven if the medicines or drugs sei;ed were genuine andeven if they had the proper chemicals oringredients in their productions, if the producer,manufacturer or seller has no permit or authorityfrom the appropriate government agency, thedrugs or medicines cannot be returned althoughthe search warrants were declared illegal. 1hepolicy of the law enunciated in RB 6)*# is to

protect the consumers as well as the licensedbusinessmen.

PP v. (udge7strada, !R")EE&",

(une )&,)***.

,REEDOM O, T*E PRESS; A"a)emi" ,ree)omon Camp!s Jo!rna$ism; Sec. $ of the ampus

(ournalism Bct prohibits e pulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he or shehas written, 7G 7P1 when such article materiallydisrupt class wor0 or involve substantial disorder orinvasion of the rights of others. 1he power of theschool to investigate is an adjunct of its power tosuspend or e pel. It is corollary to the enforcementof rules and regulations and the maintenance of asafe and orderly environment to learning. 1hatpower, li0e the power to suspend or e pel, is aninherent part of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the onstitution.

Hirriamollege

Foundationv. B,")$'#*,:ec. "%,)***.

RI7*T TO IN,ORMATION; B self-e ecutoryprovision which can be invo0ed by any citi;enbefore the courts. 1he ourt classi9ed the right to

!on;ales v.@arvasa, !R"E*6#%,


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information as a public right and Mwhen amandamus proceeding involves the assertion of apublic right, the re4uirement of personal interest issatis9ed by the mere fact that the petitioner is aciti;en, and therefore, part of the general TpublicOwhich possesses the right.N 5owever, ongressmay provide for reasonable conditions upon the

access to information. Such limitations wereembodied in Republic Bct @o. &$"#, otherwise0nows as the M ode of onduct and 7thicalStandards for Public 8Acials and 7mployees,Nwhich too0 e ect on Harch )%, "'6'. 1his lawprovides that, in the performance of their duties, allpublic oAcials and employees are obliged torespond to letters sent by the public within 9fteen+"% wor0ing days from receipt thereof and toensure the accessibility of all public documents forinspection by the public within reasonable wor0inghours, subject to the reasonable claims of

con9dentiality.

Bug. "E,)***.

Same; ?imited to Mmatters of public concern,N toMtransactions involving public interest.N 1henegotiation and subse4uent sale of the property bythe !SIS to private respondent was not imbued w2public interest as it was a purely privatetransaction. Petitioners cannot therefore demandthat they be informed of such negotiation and sale,more so since they no longer had any interest inthe property upon their failure to comply w2 !SISterms for repurchase and its denial of petitionerOs

o er to repurchase.

Drbano v.!SIS, !R"#$'*E,8ct. "',)**".

,REEDOM O, ASSOCIATION; 1he constitutionallyguaranteed freedom of association includes thefreedom not to associate. 1he right to choose withwhom one will associate oneself is the veryfoundation and essence of that partnership. Itshould be noted that the provision guarantees theright to form an association. It does not include theright to compel others to form or join one. Privaterespondents cannot be compelled to becomemembers of the S 5B by the simple e pedient of

including them in its Brticles of Incorporation and3y-laws w2o their e press or implied consent. 1rue,it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners ina subdivision to band themselves together topromote their common welfare. 3ut that is possibleonly if the owners voluntarily agree, directly orindirectly, to become members of the association.

1rue also, memberships in homeownersassociations may be ac4uired in various ways often through deeds of sale, 1orrens certi9cates orother forms of evidence of property ownership. Inthe present case, however, other than the said

Brticles of Incorporation and 3y-laws, there is noshowing that private respondents have agreed tobe S 5B members. 5ence, membership in ahomeowners association is voluntary and cannotbe unilaterally forced by a provision in theassociation s articles of incorporation or by-laws,which the alleged member did not agree to bebound to.

Sta. lara5omeownerOs Bssn v.Sps. !aston,!R "E"'&",

(an. )#,)**).


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RI7*T TO TRA4EL; 7!i)e$ines on *o$)8)epart!re Or)ers 9*DO:+" 5:8 shall be issued only in criminal cases w2inthe e clusive jurisdiction of the R1 /+) 1he R1 issuing the 5:8 shall furnish the :FBand the 3I w2 a copy each of the 5:8 w2in )E hoursfrom the time of issuance and through the fastest

available means of transmittal/+# 1he 5:8 shall contain the . information< =a> 1he complete name +incl. the middle name,the date and place of birth and the place of lastresidence of the person against whom the 5:8 hasbeen issued or whose departure from the countryhas been enjoined/ =b> 1he complete title and doc0et number of the case w2c the 5:8 was issued/ =c> 1he speci9c nature of the case/ and =d> 1he date of the 5:8. If available, a recent photograph of the person

against whom a 5:8 has been issued or whosedeparture from the country has been enjoinedshould also be included.+E Chenever the accused has been ac4uitted orthe case against him dismissed, the judgment of ac4uittal or the order of dismissal shall includetherein the cancellation of the 5:8 issued. 1hecourts concerned shall furnish the :FB and the 3Iw2 a copy each of the judgment of ac4uittal or theorder of dismissal )E hours from the time of promulgated2issuance and through the fastestavailable means of transmittal.

R7< 5old-:eparture8rder Issuedby (udgeSardido,B.H. @o. *"-'-)E%, H1 ,

:ec. %,)**".

E( POST ,ACTO LAW; Bn e post facto law is onewhich< +" ma0es criminal an act done before thepassage of the law and which was innocent whendone, and punishes such an act/ +) aggravates acrime, or ma0es it greater than it was whencommitted/ +# changes the punishment andinQicts a greater punishment than the law anne edto the crime when committed/ +E alters the legalrules of evidence, and authori;es conviction uponless or di erent testimony than the law re4uired atthe time of the commission of the o ense/ +%

assuming to regulate civil rights, and remediesonly, in e ect imposes penalty or deprivation of aright for something which when done was lawful/and +& deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has becomeentitled such as the protection of a formerconviction or ac4uittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 1he test whether a penal law runs afoulof the e post facto clause of the onstitution is thatthe lawyer be present and able to advise and assisthis client from the time the confessant answers the9rst 4uestion as0ed by the investigating oAceruntil the signing of the e trajudicial confession.Horeover, the lawyer should ascertain that theconfession is made voluntarily and that the personunder investigation fully understands the natureand the conse4uence of his e trajudicial confessionin relation to his constitutional rights. B contrary

rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to theconstitutional rights to remain silent, to counseland to be presumed innocent. Bn Me ectivecounselN is characteri;ed as one who can be madeto act in protection of his =accusedOs> rights, andnot by merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a lawdegree.

PP v.?abtan, !R")$E'#,:ec. 6,"'''.

Same; Same; 1he accused must continuouslyhave a counsel assisting him from the very start of custodial investigation until its termination. 1his

right was negated by the precipitate departure of the lawyer of the accused before the termination of the investigation.

PP v. Horial,!R ")')'%,Bug. "%,

)**".

Same; Same; B counsel who failed to inform theaccused of the latterOs right to remain silent, who0ept Mcoming and goingN during the custodialinvestigation, and abruptly departed before thetermination of the proceedings, can hardly be thecompetent, vigilant and e ective counselcontemplated in the onstitution.

PP v. Horial,)**"/ PP v.Bran;ado,)**".

Same; Same; Chere the accused is representedby someone who is not a member of the Phil. 3ar,conviction in the lower court was set aside and thecase remanded for new trial.

PP v.Santociles,!R "*'"E',:ec. )","'''.

Same; Same; Con%ession; onfessions of theaccused in the absence of counsel are invalid.

PP v. 1ulin,!R """$*',Bug. #*,


15/64

)**".

Same; Same; Same; 7ven if a confession issubse4uently signed in the presence of counsel, itis not cured of constitutional defects.

PP v. Horial,)**".

Same; Same; it is more than just the presence of

a lawyer in the court room or the merepropounding of standard 4uestions and objections.It means that the accused is amply accorded legalassistance by a counsel who commits himself tothe cause for the defense and acts accordingly. 1heright assumes an active involvement by the lawyerin the proceedings, particularly, at the trial of thecase, his bearing constantly in mind of the basicrights of the accused, his being well-versed on thecase, and his 0nowing the fundamental procedures,essential laws and e isting jurisprudence.

PP v.

Bran;ado,!R "#)EE)-EE, Sept. )E,)**".

Same; Same; Po$i"e Line8!p; 1he stage of investigation wherein a person is as0ed to stand ina police line-up has been held to be outside themantle of protection of the right to counselbecause it involves a general in4uiry into anunsolved crime and is purely investigative innature.

PP v.Pavellare,!R ")''$*,Bpril %,)***.

Same; Same; Same; Bs a rule, an accused is notentitled to the assistance of counsel in a policeline-up considering that such is usually not a partof the custodial in4uest. 5owever, the cases at bar

are di erent inasmuch as accused-appellant,having been the focus of attention by the policeafter he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie asthe possible perpetrator of the crime, was alreadyunder custodial investigation when these out-of-court identi9cations were conducted by the police.

PP v.7scordial,!R "#6'#E-#%, (an. "&,

)**).

Same; Same; O!t8o% Co!rt I)enti6"ation; Bnout-of-court identi9cation of an accused can bemade in various ways. In a show-up, the accusedalone is brought face to face with the witness foridenti9cation, while in a police line-up, the suspectis identi9ed by a witness from a group of personsgathered for that purpose. :uring custodialinvestigation, these types of identi9cation havebeen recogni;ed as critical confrontations of theaccused by the prosecution which necessitate thepresence of counsel for the accused. 1his isbecause the results of these pre-trial proceedings

might well settle the accused s fate and reducethe trial itself to a mere formality. Ce have thusruled that any identi9cation of an uncounseledaccused made in a police line-up, or in a show-upfor that matter, after the start of the custodialinvestigation is inadmissible as evidence againsthim.

PP v.7scordial,!R "#6'#E-#%, (an. "&,)**).

Same; Same; In1itations; Said right was notviolated in this case where the police invited for4uestioning residents of the compound, includingthe appellants. 1hey were not yet singled out asthe perpetrators of the crime. Chen the accusedwas as0ed a single 4uestion at the police station

PP v.Pavellare,!R ")''$*,Bpril %,)***.


16/64

regarding his whereabouts on the evening of @ov.)6, it was not a custodial investigation inasmuch asthe 4uery was merely part of the Mgenerale ploratory stage.N

Same; A)ministrati1e In1estigation; 1he rightto counsel applies only to admissions made in a

criminal investigation and not to administrativeinvestigation.

Remolona v.S , !R

"#$E$#,Bug. ),)**".

Same; WAI4ER; Bs a rule, to be valid, must bemade in writing, and in the presence of counsel.!ranting that appellant consented to his counselOsdeparture during the investigation and to answer4uestions during the lawyerOs absence, suchconsent was not a valid waiver of his right tocounsel.

PP v. Horial,)**".

Same; Same; @o valid waiver where admissionsobtained during custodial investigations w2o thebene9t of counsel although later reduced to writingand signed in the presence of counsel are stillQawed under the onstitution.

PP v.Hatignas,!R ")&"E&,Harch "),)**).

Same; Same; Same; 5owever, the manifestationof accused-appellants that they were adopting theevidence adduced when they were represented bya non-lawyer was deemed a valid waiver of theright, considering that it was une4uivocally,0nowingly, and intelligently made and w2 full

assistance of a bona fde lawyer.

PP v. 1ulin,!R """$*',Bug, #*,)**".

E(TRA8JUDICIAL CON,ESSION; B confession tobe admissible must satisfy the followingre4uirements< +" the confession must bevoluntary/ +) the confession must be made withthe assistance of competent and independentcounsel/ +# the confession must be e press/ and+E the confession must be in writing. B suspect sconfession, whether verbal or non-verbal, whenta0en without the assistance of counsel without avalid waiver of such assistance regardless of theabsence of coercion or the fact that it had beenvoluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, evenif appellant s confession were gospel truth.

PP v. Suela,!R "##%$*-$", (an. "%,)**).

Same; B judicial confession constitutes evidenceof a high order. 1he presumption is that no saneperson would deliberately confess to thecommission of a crime unless prompted to do so bytruth and conscience. Indeed, it is hard to believethat a person, of whatever economic status, wouldconfess to a crime that he did not commit formonetary considerations and thus barter away hisliberty, and for that matter, even his life, for amess of potage, for that is what the mere sum of P"*,***.** allegedly paid to him to ma0e theconfession means.

PP v.Samolde,!R ")6%%",

(uly #",)***.

Same; Bs a Rule, these rights cannot be waivede cept in writing and in the presence of counsel. Bsuspect s confession, whether verbal or non-verbal,when ta0en without the assistance of counsel

PP v. :ano,!R ""$&'*,Sept. ",)*** /


17/64

without a valid waiver of such assistanceregardless of the absence of coercion or the factthat it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible inevidence, even if appellant s confession weregospel truth.

Same; Same; 5owever, SP8@1B@78DS

S1B17H7@1S voluntarily given, as where appellantorally admitted 0illing the victim before thebarangay captain +who is neither a police oAcernor a law enforcement agent , do not fall undercustodial investigation. Such admission, even w2othe assistance of a lawyer, does not violateappellantOs constitutional rights.

PP v. :ano,

!R ""$&'*,Sept ",)***/ PP v.Hayorga, !R"#%E*%,@ov. )',)***

Same; Pres!mption; 1he presumption thatoAcial duty has been regularly performed cannotby itself prevail over positive averments concerningviolations of the constitutional rights of an accused.

PP v. :ano,!R ""$&'*,Sept. ",)*** /

RI7*T A7AINST SEL,8INCRIMINATION; Chat isactually proscribed is the use of physical or moralcompulsion to e tort communication and not theinclusion of his body in evidence when material tothe case.

PP v.Rondero, !R")%&6$,:ec. ',"'''.

Same; 1he essence of this right is 17S1IH8@IB?8HPD?SI8@ or the giving of evidence against

oneself through a testimonial act. 5ence, anaccused may be compelled to submit to physicale amination and have a substance ta0en from his

body for medical determination as to whether hewas su ering from a disease that was contractedby his victim w2o violating this right.

PP v.3anihit, !R"#)*E%,Bug. )%,)***/ PP v.

ontinente,!R "**6*"-*), Bug. )%,)***.

RI7*T A7AINST DOU-LE JEOPARD ; Bnaccused is placed in double jeopardy when he isagain tried for an o ense for w2c he has beenconvicted, ac4uitted, or in w2c the indictmentagainst him was dismissed w2o his consent.

1upa; v.5on. Dlep,!R ")$$$$,8ct ", "'''.

Same; 1o raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the following elements must be present ?ength of delay/ =)> Reasons for such delay/ =#> Bssertion orfailure to assert such rights by the accused/ and =E>

1he prejudice caused by the delay.

3lanco v.Sandiganbayan, !R"#&$%$-%6,@ov. )$,)***

Same; Not $imite) in a Crimina$ Pro"ee)ing

#!t A$$ Cases an) Pro"ee)ings #e%ore J!)i"ia$


20/64

based on the doctrine of e haustion of administrative remedies that holds that mista0es,abuses or negligence committed in the initial stepsof an administrative activity or by anadministrative agency should be corrected byhigher administrative authorities, and not directlyby courts.

Same; Con"ept o% Spee)& Disposition o% Cases -roa)er t'an Spee)& Tria$; 1he 3ill of Rights provisions of the "'6$ onstitution wereprecisely crafted to e pand substantive fair 1RIB?RI!51S and to Protect iti;ens From ProceduralHachinations which tend to nullify those rights.Horeover, Section "&, Brticle III of the onstitutione tends the right to a speedy disposition of casesto cases before all judicial, 4uasi-judicial andadministrative bodies. 1his protection e tends toall citi;ens, including those in the military and

covers the periods before, during and after thetrial, a ording broader protection than Section"E+) which guarantees merely the right to aspeedy trial.

Bbadia v.B, !R

"*%%'$,Sept. )#,"''E.

StateImmunityfrom Suit

A s!it against a p!#$i" o "er %or 'is o "ia$a"ts is< in e e"t< a s!it against t'e State if itspurpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.

alub v. B,!R ""%E,Bpril )$,)***.

?egislative :epart-

ment

,ran"'ise; PA7COR; B historical study of itscreation, growth and development will readily show

that it was never given a legislative franchise tooperate jai-alai.

:el Har v.PB! 8R, !R

"#6)'6,@ov. )',)***

(udicial:epart-ment

DOCTRINE O, STARE DECISIS ; Chen a court haslaid down a principle of law as applicable to acertain state of facts, it will adhere to that principleand apply it to all future cases where the facts aresubstantially the same.

1ala RealtyServices

orp. v.3ancoFilipinoSavings andHortgage3an0, !R"#$'6*,

(une )*,)***.

J!rispr!)en"e; 1he ourtOs interpretation of lawsare as much a part of the law of the land as theletters of the laws themselves.

7vangelistav. Sisto;a,!R "E#66",Bug. ',)**".

SUPREME COURT; En -an" Cases; It includes allother cases as the ourt en banc, by majority of itsactual membership, may deem of suAcientimportance.

Firestoneeramics v.B, !R

")$*)), (une )6,)***.

Same; Same; 1he ourt en banc is not anappellate court to w2c a decision or resolution a:ivision may be appealed.

id.,:issentingopinion of

(ustice


21/64

!on;aga-Reyes.

Same; S!per1ision o1er Lower Co!rts an)t'eir Personne$; Brt. JIII, Sec. & of the

onstitution e clusively vests in the Sadministrative supervision over all courts and court

personnel, from the presiding (ustice of the B tothe lowest municipal trial court cler0.

(udgeFuentes v.8Ace of the8mbudsman

-Hindanao,supra.

JUDICIAL POWER; 1he inherent power of theourt to amend and control its processes and

orders so as to ma0e them comformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse it.

1ocao v. B,!R ")$E*%,Sept. )*,)**".

JUDICIAL RE4IEW; 1he ourt has control over acase until the full satisfaction of the 9nal judgmentconformably w2 established legal process. It hasthe authority to suspend the e ecution of a 9nal

judgment or to cause a modi9cation thereof as andwhen it becomes imperative in the higher interestof justice or when a supervening event warrants it.

PP v. :e losSantos, !R")"'*&,Bpril %,

)***.

Same; 1he S has the discretionary power to ta0ecogni;ance of the petition at bar where the issueshave generated an oasis of concern, even days of dis4uiet in view of the public interest at sta0e.

:el Har v.PB! 8R,)***.

Same; 1he S has inherent power to suspend itsown rules in a particular case in order to do justice.For e4uitable considerations, the ourt has rela edthe application of otherwise stringent rules bygiving due course to appeals 9led out of time,treating petitions for certiorari as petitioners forreview, and remanding the case for trial eventhough their previous dismissal had become 9nal.

Bnacleto v.Jan 1west ,!R "#"E"",Bug. )',)***.

LE7AL STANDIN7 9 Locus Standi :; Stri"tinterpretation; 1he 4uestion of standing iswhether a party has Malleged such personal sta0ein the outcome of the controversy as to assure thatconcrete adverseness w2c2 sharpens thepresentation of issue upon w2c the court so largelydepends for illumination of diAcult constitutional4uestions.N =i> Citizen suit . B citi;en ac4uiresstanding only if he can establish that he su eredsome actual or threatened injury as a result of theallegedly illegal conduct of the government/ theinjury is fairly traceable to the challenged action/and the injury is li0ely to be redressed by afavorable action. =ii> Taxpayers suit . B ta payer isdeemed to have a standing to raise a constitutionalissue when it is established that public funds havebeen disbursed in alleged contravention of the lawor the onstitution. 1hus, a ta payerOs action isproperly brought only when there is an e ercise of

ongress of its ta ing power or spending power. Inthe 9nal analysis, the ourt retains the power todecide whether or not it will entertain a ta payerOssuit.

!on;ales v.@arvasa, !R"E*6#%,Bug. "E,)***.

Same; Same; 1he 4uestion of standing is whethera party has Malleged such personal sta0e in theoutcome of the controversy as to assure that

!on;ales v.@arvasa, !R"E*6#%,


22/64

concrete adverseness w2c2 sharpens thepresentation of issue upon w2c the court so largelydepends for illumination of diAcult constitutional4uestions.N =i> Citizen suit . B citi;en ac4uiresstanding only if he can establish that he su eredsome actual or threatened injury as a result of theallegedly illegal conduct of the government/ the

injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action/and the injury is li0ely to be redressed by afavorable action. =ii> Taxpayers suit . B ta payer isdeemed to have a standing to raise a constitutionalissue when it is established that public funds havebeen disbursed in alleged contravention of the lawor the onstitution. 1hus, a ta payerOs action isproperly brought only when there is an e ercise of

ongress of its ta ing power or spending power. Inthe 9nal analysis, the ourt retains the power todecide whether or not it will entertain a ta payerOssuit.

Bug. "E,)***.

Same; Li#era$ Po$i"&; B party suing as ata payer must speci9cally prove that he hassuAcient interest in preventing the illegale penditure of money raised by ta ation. In line w2the liberal policy of the ourt on locus standi whena case involves an issue of overarching signi9canceto society, the ourt 9nds the petitioners, asmembers of the 5ouse of Representatives, to havelegal standing to 9le the petitions at bar, as theyclaim that the operation of jai-alai constituteinfringement by PB! 8R of the legislatureOs

e clusive power to grant franchise.

:el Har v.PB! 8R, !R"#6)'6,@ov. )',)***.

Same; Di eren"e #etween t'e R!$e on Rea$8Part&8in8Interest an) t'e R!$e on Stan)ing;

1here is a di erence between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, as thelatter has constitutional underpinnings. In the caseat bar, petitioner has suAciently allegedconstitutional rami9cations in the 4uestionedpublic bidding of the P5I?S7 8 that merit theattention of the ourt. Horeover, the prospect of 9nancial gains arising from the award of the sale of

P5I?S7 8 is enough personal sta0e in the outcomeof the controversy to vest upon petitioner the locusstandi to 9le the petition for mandamus. B winningbidder has personality to initiate proceedings toprevent setting at naught his right/ otherwise, hisright to due process would be violated.

(! Summit5oldings v.

B, !R")E)'#,@ov. )*,)***.

DECISION; Faithful adherence to the re4uirementsof Sec. "E, Brt. JIII of the onstitution is aparamount component of due process and fair play.

ao v. B,!R "#)E)6,8ct. )E,)***

Same; 1he Philippine onstitution no less,mandates that no decision shall be rendered byany court w2o e pressing therein clearly anddistinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

1his vital re4uirement is not only demanded fromthe courts. Vuasi-judicial bodies are similarlyre4uired to give basis for all their decisions, rulingsor judgments pursuant to the Bdministrative odewhose roots may also be traced to the

PP v. 3aring,!R "#$'##,

(an. )6,)**).


23/64

onstitutional mandate. B decision need not be acomplete recital of the evidence presented. So longas the factual and legal basis are clearly anddistinctly set forth supporting the conclusionsdrawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid.@onetheless, in order to e ectively buttress the

judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision

should not be simply limited to the dispositiveportion but must state the nature of the case,summari;e the facts with references to the record,and contain a statement of the applicable laws and

jurisprudence and the tribunal s assessments andconclusions on the case. 1his practice would betterenable a court to ma0e an appropriateconsideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistentwith the 9ndings of facts and conclusions of lawmade by the tribunal that rendered the decision.

ompliance with this re4uirement will suAciently

apprise the parties of the various issues involvedbut more importantly will guide the court inassessing whether the conclusion arrived at isconsistent with the facts and the law.

Same; E "a"& o% t'e De"ision; 1he judge whorendered the decision was not the one who triedand heard the testimonies of the witnesses. 1hecomplete records of the case, including thetranscript of stenographic notes, were before (udgewho rendered the decision and it can be fairlyassumed that, in rendering the decision, the

records were thoroughly scrutini;ed and evaluatedby him. Indeed, the eAcacy of a decision is notnecessarily impaired by the fact that its writer onlytoo0 over from a colleague who had earlierpresided at the trial.

PP v. atco,!R "#6#66,Harch "',)**).

Same; Memoran)!m De"ision; Blthough amemorandum decision is permitted under certainconditions, it cannot merely refer to the 9ndings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court. 1hecourt must ma0e a full 9ndings of fact andconclusion of law of its own.

8ng v. B,!R ""#**&,@ov. )#,)***.

Same; ,orm o% )e"ision; 1here is no hard andfast rule as to the form of a decision. Chether ornot the trial court chooses to summari;e thetestimonies of the witnesses of both parties isimmaterial. Chat is called for is that the judgmentmust be written in the oAcial language, personallyand directly prepared and signed by the judge andthat it should contain clearly and distinctly astatement of facts proved or admitted by theparties and the law upon w2c the judgment isbased.

PP v.8rdoKo, !R")'%# W"E#%##-#%,

(uly "*,)***.

Same; Obiter Dictum ; Bn obiter dictum has beende9ned as an opinion e pressed by a court uponsome 4uestion of law which is not necessary to thedecision of the case before it. It is a remar0 made,or opinion e pressed, by a judge, in his decisionupon a cause, by the way, that is, incidentally orcollaterally, and not directly upon the 4uestionbefore him, or upon a point not necessarily

Jillanueva v.B, !R

"E)'E$,Harch "',)**).


24/64

involved in the determination of the cause, orintroduced by way of illustration, or analogy orargument. Such are not binding as precedent. Bnadjudication on any point within the issuespresented by the case cannot be considered asobiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent4uestions, although only incidentally involved,

which are presented and decided in the regularcourse of the consideration of the case, and led upto the 9nal conclusion, and to any statement as tomatter on which the decision is predicated.Bccordingly, a point e pressly decided does notlose its value as a precedent because thedisposition of the case is, or might have been,made on some other ground, or even though, byreason of other points in the case, the resultreached might have been the same if the court hadheld, on the particular point, otherwise than it did.B decision which the case could have turned on is

not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,owing to the disposal of the contention, it wasnecessary to consider another 4uestion, nor can anadditional reason in a decision, brought forwardafter the case has been disposed of on one ground,be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a casepresents two +) or more points, any one of whichis suAcient to determine the ultimate issue, butthe court actually decides all such points, the caseas an authoritative precedent as to every pointdecided, and none of such points can be regardedas having the status of a dictum, and one point

should not be denied authority merely becauseanother point was more dwelt on and more fullyargued and considered, nor does a decision on oneproposition ma0e statements of the court regardingother propositions dicta.

PRINCIPLE ON *IERARC* O, COURTS; Chilethe ourt has concurrent jurisdiction w2 the R1and the B to issue writs of certiorari, thisconcurrence is not to be ta0en as an unrestrainedfreedom of choice concerning the court to w2capplication for the writ will be directed. 1here is

after all a hierarchy of courts. B direct invocation of the ourtOs original jurisdiction to issue thee traordinary writ is allowed only when there arespecial and important reasons clearly andspeci9cally set out in the petition.

S!HRealty orp.v. 8Ace of the Pres.,!R ")&''',Bug. #*,

)***/People v.uaresma ,

!R &$$6$,"'6'/ 7nrilev. Sala;ar,!R ')"-&E, "''*.

Same; It is the duty of the lower courts to obey the:ecisions of this ourt and render obeisance to itsstatus as the ape of hierarchy of courts. For there

is only one Supreme ourt from whose decisions allother courts should ta0e their bearings, aselo4uently declared by (ustice (.3.?. Reyes.

Sps. Hallariv. Brcega,!R "*&&"%,

Harch )*,)**).

Same; Chile the petition is denominated as onefor certiorari and prohibition, its object is actuallythe nulli9cation of the PB?-PB?7B agreement. Bssuch, petitioners proper remedy is an ordinary civilaction for annulment of contract, an action which

Rivera v.7spiritu, !R"#%%E$, (an.)#, )**).


25/64

properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regionaltrial courts.

Same; Petitioner has failed to advance asatisfactory e planation as to her failure to complywith or non-observance of the principle of judicialhierarchy. 1here is no reason why the instant

petition could not have been brought before theourt of Bppeals, considering all the more that theappeal of the main case was already before it.

ared v.Ilarde, !R""E$#),Bug. ",

)***.

8mbuds-man

J!ris)i"tion; 1he 8mbudsman has no jurisdictionto entertain criminal charges against a judge of theR1 relative to his handling cases before the court.

1he determination of whether a judge maliciouslydelayed the disposition of the case is 7G ?DSIJ7?a judicial function.

:e Jera v.Pelayo, !R"#$#%E, (uly&, )***.

IN4ESTI7ATI4E POWERS; 1he duty of a

government prosecutor to prosecute crimes doesnot preclude him from refusing to 9le informationwhen he believes there is no prima facie evidenceto do so. 1he ourt will not intervene in this case.

1he power to withdraw the information already9led is a mere adjunct or conse4uence of the8mbudsmanOs overall power to prosecute.

7spinosa v.

8Ace of the8mbudsman, !R"#%$$%,8ct. "',)***.

Same; 1he P8C7R 18 I@J7S1I!B17 and 18PR8S7 D17 granted by law to the 8mbudsman isplenary and un4uali9ed. It pertains to any act oromission of any public oAcer or employee when

such act or omission appears to be I??7!B?,D@(DS1, IHPR8P7R or I@7FFI I7@1. 1he law doesnot ma0e any distinction between cases cogni;ableby the Sandiganbayan and those cogni;able byregular courts. 1he clause Many illegal act oromission of any public oAcial< is broad enough toembrace any crime committed by a public oAceror employee. Horeover, the jurisdiction of the8Ace of the 8mbudsman should not be e4uated w2the limited authority of the SP7 IB? PR8S7 D18Runder Sec. "" of RB &$$*. 1he 8Ace of the SpecialProsecutor is merely a component of the 8Ace of the 8mbudsman and may only act under thesupervision and control and upon authority of the8mbudsman. Its power to conduct prelim.Investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminalcases w2in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.5ence, in this case, 1he 8mbudsman has authorityto investigate and prosecute the criminal casesagainst respondents in the R1 , even as thisauthority is not e clusive and is shared w2 theregular prosecutors.

Same; it has been the consistent policy of the Snot to interfere w2 the 8mbudsmanOs e ercise of his investigative powers.

Hamburaov. 8Ace of the8mbudsman, !R"#'"E"-E),@ov. "%,)***

Same; It is not the ourt to review the 3lanco v.


26/64

8mbudsmanOs e ercise of discretion in prosecutingor dismissing a complaint 9led before his oAce.

Sandiganbayan, !R"#&$%$-%6,@ov. )$,)***

Same; Dnder RB &$$*, the 8mbudsman has the

power to investigate and prosecute any act oromission of a public oAcer or employee when suchact or omission appears to be I??7!B?, D@(DS1,IHPR8P7R, or I@7FFI I7@1. 1he prosecution of o enses committed by public oAcers is vested inthe 8Ace of the 8mbudsman. 1o insulate the 8Acefrom outside pressure and improper inQuence, the

onstitution as well as RB &$$* has endowed it w2a wide latitude of investigative and prosecutorialpowers virtually free from legislative, e ecutive or

judicial intervention. 1he 8mbudsman has thepower to dismiss a complaint w2o going through a

preliminary investigation as provided inBdministrative 8rder @o. *$ of the 8Ace of the8mbudsman, otherwise 0nown as the MRules of Procedure of the 8Ace of the 8mbudsman.N

Presidential

Bd 5oc FactFindingomm. 8n

3ehest?oans v.8mbudsman, !R"#%E6),Bug. "E,)**"/ Pres.Bd 5oc FactFinding

omm. J.:esierto, !R"#$$$$,8ct. ),)**".

Same; 1he 8mbudsmanOs resolution of criminalcases under preliminary investigation cannot bethe subject of review under Rule E% of the Rules of

ourt w2c covers only judgments or 9nal orders orresolutions of the B, Sandiganbayan, R1 Os andother courts, whenever authori;ed by law. In other

words, a party may appeal only from orders ordecisions of the 8mbudsman in administrativecases.

@ava v.8B, !R

"#&E$*,8ct. "&,)**".

Same; 5owever, judicial review of the actions of the 8mbudsman via an original action for certiorariunder Rule &% is available.

id/ 3aylon v.8mbudsman, !R"E)$#6,:ec. "E,)**".

Same; Limitations; +" 1he 8mbudsman may notpass upon errors of the prosecutorOs oAce in thee ercise of powers intrinsic to the resolution itself of the case as that function pertains to the powerof review of the Sec. of (ustice.

!arcia-Rueda v.Bmores, !R""&'#6,Sept. )*,)**".

Same; Same; +) 1he 8mbudsman may notinitiate or investigate a criminal or administrativecomplaint before his oAce against a judge. 1he8mbudsman must indorse the case to the S forappropriate action.

(udgeFuentes, v.8Ace of the8mbidsman-Hindanao,!R ")E)'%,8ct. )#,)**"

Same; Same; No A!t'orit& to Dire"t$&Remo1e or Dismiss 7o1ernment O "ia$s orEmp$o&ees; Dnder Sec. "#, subpar. +# of Brt. GI of the "'6$ onstitution, the 8mbudsman can onlyR7 8HH7@: the removal of the public oAcial oremployee found to be at fault, to the public oAcial

1apaidor v.8Ace of the8mbudsman, !R")'")E,Harch "%,


27/64

concerned. 1he 8mbudsman has no authority tosirectly dismiss the petitioner from the governmentservice, more particularly, from his position in the3I:.

)**).

Pre$iminar& In1estigation; :espite the8mbudsmanOs non-compliance w2 the aAdavit

re4mt., petitioner 9led his counter-aAdavit andanswered the charges against him. 5ence, havingsubmitted himself to the jurisdiction of the8mbudsman and having allowed the proceedingsto go on until the prelim investigation wasterminated and the information 9led w2 theSandiganbayan, petitioner is deemed to havewaived whatever right he may otherwise have toassail the manner in w2c prelim investigation wasconducted.

3autista v.Sandiganba

yan, !R"#&*6),Hay "),)***.

De"ision; Not ,ina$ an) Exe"!tor&; B decision

of the 8Ace of the 8mbudsman 9nding respondentadministratively liable for misconduct and imposinga penalty of " year suspension w2o pay X is notamong those listed in the 8mbudsman Bct of "'6'as 9nal and unappealable, hence, immediatelye ecutory. 1here is no general legal principle w2cmandates that all decisions of 4uasi-judicialagencies are immediately e ecutory. Sec. &6 of the?ocal !overnment ode only applies toadministrative decisions rendered by the 8Ace of the President or the appropriate Sanggunianagainst elective local government oAcials.

Similarly, the provisions of the Bdministrative odeof "'6$ mandating the e ecution pending reviewapplies to administrative decisions of the Sinvolving members of the ivil Service. 1here is nobasis in law for the proposition that the provisionsof the Bdminitrative ode of "'6$ and the ?ocal!overnment ode on e ecution pending reviewshould be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the 8mbudsman Bct as there is nothing in the saidBct w2c provides for such suppletory application.

ourts, may not, under the guise of interpretation,enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein

situations not provided or intended by thelawma0ers. Bn omission at the time of enactment,whether careless or calculated, cannot be judiciallysupplied however later wisdom may recommendthe inclusion.

!ov. ?apid v.

B, !R"E))&", (une )',)***.

Sandigan-bayan

J!ris)i"tion; Bs construed in !arcia, (r. v.Sandiganbayan, P: "&*& creating theSandiganbayan gave it ?IHI17: jurisdiction that didnot include jurisdiction over petitions forprohibition, mandamus and quo warranto . Bfter the!arcia decision, ongress enacted RB $'$% +Bn BctStrengthening the Functional and Structural8rgani;ation of the Sandiganbayan, Bmending forthat Purpose P: "&*&, as Bmended , w2c too0e ect on Hay &, "''%. Sec. E Y thereof 7GPB@:7:the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include

jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,certiorari , habeas corpus , injunction and otherancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate

jurisdiction.

Bbbot v.Hapayo, !R"#E"*), (uly&, )***/Blarilla v.Sandiganbayan, !R"#&6*&,Bug. )),)***.


28/64

Same; It has FD?? BD158RI1 to decide on allincidents in the ill-gotten wealth case, including thepropriety of the writs of se4uestration issued bythe P !!.

Republic v.Sandiganbayan, !R"#%$6', (an.#", )**).

Se3!estere) Assets; 1he jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan to pass upon the partiesOcompromise agreement is beyond dispute. 1hecompromise agreement does not deal merely w2private interest/ it involves se4uestered shares of stoc0 - and the parties e pressly ac0nowledged theneed to obtain approval of the Sandiganbayan.

SH v.Sandiganbayan, !R"*E$-#6,Sept. "E,)***.

Recoveryof Ill-gottenCealth

Sec. "%, Brt. IG of the "'6$ onstitution providesthat such power is impres"ripti#$e; It applies8@? 18 IJI? B 1I8@S and not to criminal cases.

Pres. Bd 5ocFact Finding

omm. 8n3ehest

?oans v.:esierto, !R"#*"E*,8ct. )%,"'''.

Sec. "%, Brt. GI of the onstitution applies only tocivil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,

Republic v.:esierto, !R"#&%*&,Bug. )#,)**".

Se4uestra-tionProcee-dings

PC77; Lega$ an) *istori"a$ #a" gro!n);Immediately after the "'6& 7:SB Revolution, thenPresident ora;on . B4uino issued 7 ecutive8rder +7.8. @os. ", ) and "E. M8n the e plicitpremise that Tvast resources of the governmenthave been amassed by former President Ferdinand7. Harcos, his immediate family, relatives, andclose associates both here and abroad,O thePresidential ommission on !ood !overnment+P !! was created by 78 @o. " to assist thePresident in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealththus accumulated whether located in thePhilippines or abroad.N

78 @o. ) states that the ill-gotten assets andproperties are in the form of ban0 accounts,deposits, trust accounts, shares of stoc0s,buildings, shopping centers, condominiums,mansions, residences, estates, and other 0inds of real and personal properties in the Philippines andin various countries of the world.

78@o. "E, on the other hand, empowered theP !!, with the assistance of the 8Ace of theSolicitor !eneral and other government agencies,inter alia, to 9le and prosecute all casesinvestigated by it under 7.8. @os. " and ).

Pursuant to these laws, the P !! issued andimplemented numerous se4uestrations, free;eorders and provisional ta0eovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real orpersonal. Bmong the properties se4uestered by the

Republic v.8 8F7:,

!R "E$*&)-&E, :ec. "E,)**".


29/64

ommission were shares of stoc0 in the Dnitedoconut Planters 3an0 +D P3 registered in the

names of the alleged Mone million coconutfarmers,N the so-called oconut IndustryInvestment Fund companies + IIF companies andPrivate Respondent 7duardo ojuangco (r.

Co"o Le1& ,!n)s; Prima ,a"ie P!#$i" ,!n)s;the coconut levy funds are not only a ected withpublic interest/ they are, in fact, prima facie publicfunds. Public funds are those moneys belonging tothe State or to any political subdivision of theState/ more speci9cally, ta es, customs duties andmoneys raised by operation of law for the supportof the government or for the discharge of itsobligations. Dndeniably, coconut levy funds satisfythis general de9nition of public funds, because of the following reasons when there is aprivate investment in a !8 , or =b> when agovernment corporation is privati;ed or publicly Xlisted, or =c> as in the case at bar, when thegovernment borrows money abroad, In theseinstances the government enters the mar0etplaceand competes w2 the rest of the world in attractinginvestments or loans. 1o succeed, the government

must abide w2 reasonable business practices of themar0etplace. 8therwise, no investor or creditior willdo business w2 the government, frustratinggovernment e orts to attract investments orsecure loans that may be critical to stimulatemoribund industries or resuscitate a badlyshattered national economy as in the case at bar.

:3P v. 8B,!R 66E#%,

(an. "&,)**).

Same; 1he 9ndings and conclusions of the privateauditor may guide private investors or creditorswho re4uire such private audit. !overnmentagencies and oAcials, however, remain bound bythe 9ndings and conclusions of the 8B, whetherthe matter falls under the 9rst or second paragraphof Section ), unless of course such 9ndings andconclusions of the 8B, whether the matter fallsunder the 9rst or second paragraph of Section ),unless of course such 9ndings and conclusions aremodi9ed or reversed by the courts.

:3P v. 8B,!R 66E#%,

(an. "&,)**).

Same; 1he power of the 8B to e amine and audit :3P v. 8B,


37/64

government agencies, while non-e clusive +Sec. #,Brt. IG-: of the onstitution . 1he mere fact thatprivate auditors may audit government agenciesdoes not divest the 8B of its power to e amineand audit the same government agencies. 1he 8Bis neither by-passed nor ignored since even w2 aprivate auditor, the 8B will still conduct its usual

e amination and audit, and its 9ndings andconclusions will still bind government agencies andtheir oAcials. Bs the constitutionally mandatedauditor of all government agencies, the 8BOs9ndings and conclusions necessarily prevail overthose of private auditors, at least insofar asgovernment agencies and oAcials are concerned.

!R 66E#%, (an. "&,)**).

Same; *iring o% Pri1ate A!)itors; Section #" of P: @o. "EE% merely grants authority to the 8B tohire and deputi;e private auditors to assist the 8Bin the auditing of government agencies. Such

private auditors operate under the authority of the8B. 8n the other hand, Section 6 of P: @o. )*)'states in part that 1he audit of governmentcorporations by the 8B shall not precludegovernment corporations from engaging theservices of private auditing 9rms< Provided,however, that even if the services of the latter areavailed of, the audit report of the 8B shall serveas the report for purposes of compliance w2 auditre4uirements as re4uired of governmentcorporations under applicable law. Said Sectionalso provides that the policy of withdrawal of

resident auditors shall be fully implemented . . .Section ) of the same decree also e cludes fromthe term !8 two classes of corporations. 1he9rst are originally private corporations the majorityof the shares of stoc0 of w2care ac4uired bygovernment 9nancial institutions throughforeclosure or dacion en pago . 1he second aresubsidiary corporations of governmentcorporations, w2c subsidiaries are organi;ede clusively to own, manage or lease physicalassets ac4uired by government 9nancialinstitutions through foreclosure or dacion en pago .

:3P v. 8B,!R 66E#%,

(an. "&,)**).

Same; Same; !overnment Buditing ode of thePhils. +P: "EE%, Secs, )&, #", and #) does notprohibit the hiring of private auditors bygovernment agencies. 1hus, Sec. )& must beapplied in harmony w2 Sec. %6 of the entral3an0ing ?aw of )*** +RB 6$'" w2c authori;esune4uivocally the Honetary 3oard to re4uire ban0sto hire independent auditors and Sec. )% and )6 of the @ew entral 3an0 Bct +RB $&%# , w2c authori;ee pressly the Honetary 3oard to conduct periodicor special e amination of all ban0s.

:3P v. 8B,!R 66E#%,

(an. "&,)**).

POWER TO RE7ULATE DIS-URSEMENTS,UNDS AND DISALLOWANCES O, ILLE7AL ORIRRE7ULAR DIS-URSEMENTS O, ,UNDS; 1he

onstitution speci9cally vests in the ommissionthe authority to determine whether governmententities comply with laws and regulations in thedisbursement of government funds and to disallowillegal or irregular disbursements of government

@7B v. 8B,!R "E#E6",Feb. "%,)**).


38/64

funds. In the case at bar, @7B s acceleratedimplementation of the Salary Standardi;ation ?awII is not in accordance with law . 1he "''$ !BB isnot self-e ecutory so as to serve as outright legalauthority for @7B to spend what had beenappropriated for @7B s Personal Services underthe "''$ !BB. 3udgetary appropriations under the

!BB do not constitute unbridled authority togovernment agencies to spend the appropriatedamounts as they may wish. It re4uires furtherprocess as the entire budget process consists of four major phases, namely< 3udget Preparation,3udget Buthori;ation, 3udget 7 ecution and3udget Bccountability. Bfter approval of the

proposed budget by the :3H, the same issubmitted to ongress for evaluation and inclusionin the appropriations law w2c sets forth theauthori;ed appropriations of the departments andagencies. 5owever, this authori;ation does not

include the authority to disburse. B program of e penditures is 9rst prepared showing approvedprograms and projects. Bn itemi;ation of personalservices is also prepared listing authori;editemi;ed positions and their correspondingclassi9cations and authori;ed salaries. Bs clearlystated in Section &*, hapter $, 3oo0 JI of theBdministrative ode, no portion of theappropriations in the !BB shall be used forpayment of any salary increase or adjustmentunless speci9cally authori;ed by law or appropriatebudget circular. @3 @o. E%6 is the appropriate

budget circular referred to by the law with respectto the payment of the last phase of the SalaryStandardi;ation ?aw II.

8mnibus7lection

ode

ELECTION; In this jurisdiction, an election meansthe choice or selection of candidates to public

oAce by popular vote, through the use of theballot, and the elected oAcials of which aredetermined through the will of the electorate. Bnelection is the embodiment of the popular will, thee pression of the sovereign power of the people.Speci9cally, the term election, in the conte t of the

onstitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls,including the listing of voters, the holding of theelectoral campaign, and the casting and countingof votes.

8Ohara v.8H7?7 ,

!R "E6'E"-E), Harch"), )**).

,AILURE O, ELECTION; Ca$$ing o% Spe"ia$E$e"tions; 3efore 8H7?7 can act on a veri9edpetition see0ing to declare a failure of election,two 9H: "on)itions must concur< 9rst, no votinghas ta0en place in the precincts concerned on thedate 9 ed by law or, even if there was voting, theelection nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect/and second, the votes cast would a ect the resultof the election. Bnd that the cause of such failureof election should have been any of the following , de9nitionof manifest error is that it is evident to the eyeand understanding/ visible to the eye/ that which isopen, palpable, uncontrovertible/ needing noevidence to ma0e it more clear/ not obscure orhidden. . . B manifest clerical error is one that isvisible to the eye or obvious to the understanding,and is apparent from the papers to the eye of theappraiser and collector, and does not include anerror which may, by evidence dehors the record be

8Ohara v.8H7?7 ,

!R "E6'E"-E), Harch"), )**).


40/64

shown to have committed . . . In the case of have; vs. omelec = )"" S RB #"% +"'') >, thisourt e plained that. . . 1o be manifest, the errors

must appear on the face of the certi9cates of canvass or election returns sought to be correctedand2or objections thereto must have been madebefore the board of canvassers and speci9cally

noted in the minutes of their respectiveproceedings. 1hus, in this case, 1he alleged errorw2c the H3 of 3inangonan committed and w2c itattributes to physical e haustion and sleeplessnights, is obviously not a plain error apparent fromthe erti9cate of anvass.

Same; Corre"tion o% Mani%est Errors; Section %of Rule )$ of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the

8H7?7 re4uires that the correction be oneinvolving a manifest error such as a mista0e in thecopying of the 9gures into the Statement of Jotes

or into the erti9cate of anvass. 1he provision,however, also re4uires that such errors could nothave been discovered during the canvassingdespite the e ercise of due diligence. 1herationale for the provision is obvious. If the errorsought to be corrected is truly a manifest error,then the matter should have already been raisedbefore the board of canvassers. 1he e ception is if the error is one that could not have beendiscovered during the canvassing despite thee ercise of due diligence. In the case at bar, theerror allegedly committed by the H3 of

3inangonan, w2c it attempted to describe andrationali;e in their aAdavits, is one that shouldhave been discovered even with ordinary diligence.

1he truth of the matter, however, is that the error,even assuming it to be true, is not manifest andwas not apparent from the erti9cate of anvassand, therefore, cannot be corrected simply bycorrection of alleged tabulation error.

8Ohara v.8H7?7 ,

!R "E6'E"-E), Harch"), )**).

PRE8PROCLAMATION CONTRO4ERS ; refers toany 4uestion pertaining to or a ecting theproceedings of the 38 or any matter raised under

Secs. )##, )#E, )#% and )#& of the 87 , in relationto the preparation, transmission, receipt, custodyand appreciation of 7ROs. Sec. )E# of the odeenumerates the speci9c issues that may be raisedin a pre-proc controversy. In addition to theR7S1RI 1IJ7 B@: 7G ?DSIJ7 S 8P7 of its subjectmatter, all pre-proc controversies on 7ROs or 8 Osshall be disposed of summarily X by the 38 andthen the 8H7?7 .

hu v.8H7?7 ,

!R "#%E)#,

@ov. )',"'''/ Si4uiav. 8H7?7 ,!R "#%&)$,:ec. ',"'''.

Same; 1he 38 and the 8H7?7 are not to loo0beyond or behind 7ROs w2c are on their face regularand authentic. 3eing a summary proceeding, thereis no room for the presentation of evidencealiunde .

hu v.8H7?7 ,

!R "#%E)#,@ov. )',"'''/ Si4uiav. 8H7?7 ,!R "#%&)$,:ec. ',"'''.

Same; B party see0ing to raise issues the hu v.


41/64

resolution of w2c would compel or necessitate the8H7?7 to pierce the veil of 7ROs w2c are primaacie regular on their face, has his proper remedy

in a regular election protest.

8H7?7 ,!R "#%E)#,@ov. )',"'''/ Si4uiav. 8H7?7 ,!R "#%&)$,:ec. ',

"'''.Same; 1he legislative intent of the summarydisposition of pre-proc controversy is to give life tothe policy that the canvass and proclamation bedelayed as little as possible for it is in the publicinterest that the position for w2c the election washeld should be 9lled promptly, even though theproclamation of the winning candidates beprovisional in nature, as the same may still besubject to the results of the election protests thatmay be subse4uently 9led. 3esides the 38 Os are

merely ad hoc bodies, e isting only for the interimtas0 of canvassing 7ROs and do not have thefacitlities, time, nor competence to hear, e amineand decide on alleged election irregularities, unli0eregular courts, the 8H7?7 , or the 7lectoral

1ribunal.

hu v.8H7?7 ,

!R "#%E)#,@ov. )',"'''.

Same; It may be 9led directly w2 the 8H7?7pursuant to Section % of Rule )$ of the RevisedRules of Procedure of the 8H7?7 .

Pre8Pro"$amation Contro1ers& 1sF Ann!$ment

o% E$e"tion Res!$t< or ,ai$!re o% E$e"tion; Bpre-proclamation controversy is not the same as anaction for annulment of election results, or failureof elections. 1hese two remedies were morespeci9cally distinguished in this wise< Chile,however, the omelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an e amination of theelection returns on their face and is w2o jurisdictionto go beyond or behind them and investigateelection irregularities, the omelec is duty boundto investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism,violence, and other analogous causes in actions for

annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the 8mnibus 7lection odedenominates the same. 1hus, the omelec, in thecase of actions for annulment of election results ordeclaration of failure of elections, may conducttechnical e amination of election documents andcompare and analy;e voters signatures andthumbprints in order to determine whether or notthe elections had indeed been free, honest andclean.

?oong v.

8H7?7 ,#)& Phil.$'*, 6"E,cited inHatalam v.

8H7?7 ,##6 Phil.EE$ +"''$ .

ANNULMENT O, ELECTION AND5OR ,AILUREO, ELECTION; 1he fact that a candidateproclaimed has assumed oAce does not deprivethe omelec of its authority to annul any canvassand illegal proclamation. In the case at bar, wecannot assume that petitioners proclamation andassumption into oAce on (une #*, )**", was legalprecisely because the conduct by which theelections were held was put in issue byrespondents in their petition for annulment of

:atuBmpatuan v.

8H7?7 ,!R "E'6*#,

(an. #",)**).


42/64

election results and2or declaration of failure of elections. Ce are not unmindful of the fact that apattern of conduct observed in past elections hasbeen the pernicious Mgrab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protestN slogan of some candidates orparties such that even if the protestant wins, itbecomes a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication

when the term of oAce is about to e pire or hase pired. . . . Ce have but to reiterate the oft-citedrule that the validity of a proclamation may bechallenged even after the irregularly proclaimedcandidate has assumed oAce.

Same; 1he omelec en banc has the authority toannul election results and2or declare a failure of elections as provided for in Section & of the8mnibus 7lection ode.

:atuBmpatuan v.

8H7?7 ,!R "E'6*#,

(an. #",)**).

Same; 1he great breadth of the constitutional andstatutory powers granted omelec has brought tothe fore judicial pronouncements which have longbecome guidelines. 1ime and again, this ourt hasgiven its imprimatur on the principle that omelecis with authority to annul any canvass andproclamation which was illegally made.

8Ohara v.8H7?7 ,

!R "E6'E"-E), Harch"), )**),cited Bguamvs.

8H7?7 ,)# S RB66# +"'&6 .

ELECTION CONTEST; 7lection contests involvepublic interest, and technicalities and proceduralbarriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle tothe determination of the true will of the electoratein the choice of their elective oAcials. 1he ourtfrowns upon any interpretation of the law thatwould hinder in any way not only the free andintelligent casting of the votes in an election butalso the correct ascertainment of the results. In anyelection contest, the ultimate issue is to determinethe electoral will. In other words, who among thecandidates was the voters choice.

8Ohara v.8H7?7 ,!R "E6'E"-E), Harch"), )**).

RB &&E& DIS+UALI,ICATION PROCEEDIN7S; Sec. &, RB&&E& authori;es the continuation of proceedingsfor dis4uali9cation, even after the elections if therespondent has not been proclaimed. Proclamationbars further proceeding of such nature.

Pere; v.8H7?7 ,

!R "##'EE,8ct. )6,"'''.

Same; Possi#$e Reme)ies +" Hove for thesuspension of the proclamation reiterating hisprayer in the petition for dis4uali9cation and in thevent it is denied, to 9le a petition for ertiorari inthe S w2 prayer for 1R8/ or +) File a petition forVuo Carranto w2in "* days after the proclamation.

Pere; v.8H7?7 ,

!R "##'EE,8ct. )6,"'''.

Same; Dis3!a$i6"ations o% Can)i)ates %orP!#$i" O "e; Jiolation of 3P )) involves moralturpitude. 1he deletion in recent jurisprudence of the penalty of imprisonment and the imposition inlieu thereof, of a 9ne X does not mean that theo ense no longer involves moral turpitude.

Jillaber v.8H7?7 ,

!R "E6#)&,@ov. "%,)**".


43/64

CERTI,ICATE O, CANDIDAC ; Failure to specifythe public oAce he was see0ing in his 8 was nota fatal defect in this case.

on4uilla v.8H7?7 ,

!R "#'6*),Bpril )6,)***.

-a$$ots; ounting of contested ballots. Since the

main issue at hand is the contested ballots claimedby the parties, the computation shall be based onthe number of uncontested ballots after revision atthe lower court. 1hus, petitioner who garnered )%"uncontested ballots would be credited with )' validvotes per 9ndings after revision. 5e therefore has atotal of )6* votes. 8n the other hand, privaterespondent with )&6 uncontested ballots shall becredited with 6 valid votes out of the "" votesclaimed, or a total of )$& votes.

Ferrer v.

8H7?7 ,!R "#'E6',Bpril "*,)***.

Can)i)ates %or E$e"ti1e P!#$i" O "e;

Certi6"ate o% Can)i)a"&F Use o% Ni" name;Dnder par. +) , Sec. $E of the 87 , # 0inds of votesare considered stray< ="> a vote containing initials/=)> a vote w2c is illegible/ and =#> a vote w2c doesnot suAciently identify the candidate for whom it isintended. he 9rst category of stray votes under thisrule is not to be 4uali9ed by the third category inthe sense that votes in initials only may be countedfor a candidate provided that the initials wouldsuAciently identify the candidate voted for. Suchconstruction of the rule fails to give meaning to thedisjunctive conjunction 8R separating the 9rst

category from the second, and the second from thethird.

Jillarosa v.

5R71, !R"E##%",Sept. "E,)***.

Same; Same; Same; 1he initials M(1JN were usedby petitioner as a nic0name, for purpose of beingvoted upon. 1here is no law or rule that prohibitsthe adoption of initials as a nic0name/ nor is thereany law or rule that re4uires that the initialsadopted by a person as a nic0name strictlycorrespond to his or her own initials. Petitioner isthe lawful wife of (ose 1. Jillarosa and could legallypresent or identify herself as Hrs. (1J . @o law was

transgressed when she registered (1J as hernic0name in her certi9cate of candidacy. 1herefore,the applicable provision of the 87 is Section )"",par +"# , which sets out the rule for theappreciation of votes using nic0names. Said ruleestablishes that a nic0name alone is a valid vote,provided< +" it is that by which a candidate isgenerally or popularly 0nown in the locality, and +)there is no other candidate with the samenic0name running for the same oAce. 1heunderlying purpose for the rule, as e plained in theopening provision of Section )"" of the 87 , is toascertain and carry into e ect the intention of thevoter, where such intention could be determinedwith reasonable certainty. 1o this end, every ballotis presumed to be valid and all doubts are to beliberally construed in favor of its validity if only togive e ect to the will of the voter as reQectedtherein.

id.

Same; Resi)en"& Re3!irement; 1he 1orayno v.


44/64

onstitution and the law re4uires residence as a4uali9cation for see0ing and holding elective publicoAce, in order to give candidates the opportunityto be familiar with the needs, diAculties,aspirations, potentials for growth and all mattersvital to the welfare of their constituencies/ li0ewise,it enables the electorate to evaluate the see0ers

4uali9cations and 9tness for the job they aspire for.Inasmuch as Jicente . 7mano has proven that he,together with his family, +" had actually resided ina house he bought in "'$# in agayan de 8ro ity/+) had actually held oAce there during his threeterms as provincial governor of Hisamis 8riental,the provincial capitol being located therein/ and +#has registered as voter in the city during the periodre4uired by law, he could not be deemed astranger or newcomer when he ran for and wasoverwhelmingly voted as city mayor. 7lection lawsmust be liberally construed to give e ect to the

popular mandate.

8H7?7 ,!R "#$#)',Bug. ',)***.

E$e"tion Protest; Pa&ment o% 6$ing %ees; 1henon-payment of the proper 9ling fees is no longere cusable and is a valid ground for the dismissal of election protests.

Soller v.8H7?7 ,

)***.

Same; Period for disposition of election protestmust be observed faithfully.

Ri;on v. (udge erna,supra.

Same; Opening o% -a$$ot -oxes; Chen there is

an allegation in an election protest that wouldre4uire the perusal, e amination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of thetrial court to order the opening of the ballot bo esand the determination and counting of ballotsdeposited therein.

Higuel v.

8H7?7 ,!R "#&'&&, (uly %, )***.

Time$iness o% Motion; Hotion for Reconsiderationwas timely 9led on (une ", "''6 considering thatHay #" was a Sunday, hence, he had until the ne twor0ing day, w2c was (une ", w2in w2c to as0 forreconsideration.

on4uilla v.8H7?7 ,

supra.

RB 6"6' Reassignment o% E$e"tion O "ers; JoterOsRegistration Bct of "''& +RB 6"6' F Section EE of RB 6"6' enjoys the presumption of validity, andthe ourt disc

221078536 jurisprudence in political law

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