[A.M. No. P-94-1067.January 30, 1997]CONCERNED CITIZENS OF LAOAG CITY,complainants,vs. BIENVENIDO ARZAGA and ALFREDO MAURICIO,respondents.D E C I S I O NPER CURIAM:This administrative matter arose from two (2) anonymous letters, one dated April 21, 1994 addressed to Judge Federico A. Llanes, MTCC, Branch I, Laoag City and the other dated April 27, 1994 addressed to Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC, Branch 13, Laoag City, charging Bienvenido Arzaga and Alfredo Mauricio, both process servers of the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Laoag City, with influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and manipulation of bonds by using the same property for different cases.On June 22, 1994, Judge Llanes forwarded the said letters, together with the respondents' comments, to the Office of the Court Administrator.In a resolution dated September 19, 1994, this Court referred the matter to Executive Judge Wenceslao Agnir, RTC, Laoag City, for investigation, report and recommendation.In his investigation report dated December 16, 1994, Judge Agnir stated, among others, that both respondents had submitted their written comments denying the charges; that upon receipt of the complaint, he requested the local media to announce to the public that anyone who had evidence against the two respondents could see him; that however, after two months of waiting, nobody came forward to offer any evidence against respondents; that he also interviewed the employees of the City Court to verify the truth of the charges against the respondents, but he obtained no information to give credence to said charges.Judge Agnir, however, reported that he received a certification from the City Prosecutor's Office of Laoag City, to the effect that Alfredo Mauricio was convicted of Frustrated Murder on September 29, 1983 in Criminal Case No. 1260-XIII, but was placed on probation. Alfredo Mauricio had also been charged with eleven (11) other criminal cases like Illegal Possession of Firearms, Grave Slander by Deed, Grave Threats, Serious Physical Injuries, but all of these had been dismissed.Judge Agnir made no definite recommendation in his report, except to say that he was leaving it to the Court Administrator to determine whether on the basis of "such a criminal record, Alfredo 'Boy' Mauricio deserves to stay in the service of the Judiciary."On February 1, 1995, this Court referred the Investigation Report of Judge Agnir to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.Accordingly, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted a memorandum to this Court recommending that the charges against the two respondents be dismissed for lack of merit.After a careful examination of the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, this Court on May 29, 1995, resolved to dismiss the charges against Benjamin Arzaga as recommended but referred the case against Alfredo Mauricio to Judge Agnir for further investigation relative to how said respondent managed to be appointed to the position of process server despite a previous record of conviction of the crime of frustrated murder.Judge Agnir was likewise directed to conduct an inquiry on whether said respondent made untruthful statements in his application by suppressing the fact of his conviction as well as other criminal charges filed against him though subsequently dismissed.In compliance with the aforementioned resolution, Judge Agnir submitted his second investigation report dated July 21, 1995.In his report, Judge Agnir narrated that respondent Mauricio joined the judiciary on October 4, 1990 as Utility Worker I of MTCC, Branch 2, Laoag City.His commission was signed by then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified by Chief Administrative Officer Adelaida Cabe-Baumann upon recommendation of Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., then presiding judge of Branch 2, RTC, Laoag City.On May 5, 1992, respondent was promoted to the position of process server of the Office of the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Laoag City.His commission was signed by Romeo P. de Leon in behalf of Adelaida Cabe-Baumann.Judge Agnir further narrated that respondent disclosed his conviction of the crime of frustrated murder and that he was on probation for the same in his application.When respondent was asked by Judge Agnir why he did not indicate that other criminal charges were filed against him, he replied that the question in the application form simply asked for conviction, not mere charges.The Second Investigation Report also mentioned the name of two (2) persons from whom respondent Mauricio allegedly asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez.The first was Jimmy Lao, a realtor-businessman of Laoag City who told Judge Agnir that two (2) years earlier when he had a case pending before the sala of Judge Fernandez, respondent Mauricio approached him and asked for two (2) tires allegedly for the car of Judge Fernandez.Mr. Lao said that when he went to verify the request, he was not able to talk to Judge Fernandez but a court staff member told him that Judge Fernandez was not in the habit of asking favors from litigants and that in all probability, the tires were intended for Mauricio's owner-type jeep which was then in the process of being assembled.When he confronted Mauricio about it, the latter told him that he (Mauricio) was only joking.The second interviewee was German Reantillo, administrative officer of the City Engineer's Office of Laoag City who confirmed that sometime ago he gave Mauricio thirty (30) liters of gasoline on the respondent's representation that this was for Judge Fernandez; that sometime later he had the occasion to mention the matter to Judge Fernandez who denied that he authorized Mauricio to ask gasoline in his behalf.Both Lao and Reantillo however refused to be placed under oath or to reduce their statements in writing because they did not wish to be involved in a formal investigation where they would have to be confronted by respondent.Furthermore Lao said he did not wish to incur the ire of the respondent and that anyway he did not give Mauricio the tires.On July 17, 1995, Judge Agnir called respondent Mauricio to another hearing and confronted him with these new charges.Respondent denied them as expected.Judge Agnir further claimed that respondent is known to be a troublesome fellow. MTC Judge Llanes even had to file an administrative case against respondent for serious misconduct and insubordination.Judge Agnir then strongly recommended the immediate and summary dismissal from the service of respondent Mauricio for being the "ultimate undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary."[1]He added that he was recommending this course of action aware of the potential danger to his person given respondent's violent nature as documented by his criminal record.Judge Agnir was "hopeful though that the respondent's summary dismissal will send a chilling message to other court employees similarly engaged in nefarious activities and unethical practices which though petty in many instances indelibly stain the image of the judiciary."[2]Thereafter, the case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.The Deputy Court Administrator to whom the case was assigned for review submitted the following observations,viz:A careful scrutiny of the 201 File of respondent Mauricio shows that he joined the judiciary not on 4 October 1990 as Utility Worker I but on 1 August 1989 as a Court Aide of MTCC, Branch 2 of Laoag City as a recommendee of Judge Angelo M. Albano, MTCC, Laoag City.Respondent's appointment was by virtue of a Supreme Court Resolution dated 1 August 1989 and his commission was signed by then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro and certified by Former Assistant Chief Administrative Officer Orlando B. Carino and Former Chairman of the Selection Board Daniel T Martinez.It was also discovered that on 24 January 1990 Atty. Carino sent a telegram to Mauricio ordering him to submit a copy of the Order placing him on probation pending the approval of his appointment as Utility Worker I. Accordingly respondent sent a copy of the said Order and in his 1st indorsement dated 22 February 1990, Atty. Carino referred the Probation Order to Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa, Assistant Director of the Civil Service Commission Field Office for appropriate action.Per Court Resolution dated 4 October 1990 respondent was appointed as Utility Worker I and was promoted as Process Server by virtue of a Court Resolution of 5 May 1992.On 19 January 1993 Police Inspector Felizardo Ellano of the PNP-CIS Command in Camp Capt. Valentin San Juan, Laoag City, sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice through the Record Section requesting that a check be conducted on the records of Mauricio who was at that time being charged by their Office with the crimes of Less Serious Physical Injuries and Resistance and Disobedience Upon Agents of a Person in Authority. Police Officer Ellano likewise informed the Court that the respondent has already been charged of several offenses in different courts in Laoag City which according to him was a clear showing that Mauricio is a violent man, a habitual offender and extremely defiant of the law.Records show that the respondent twice accomplished Personal Data Sheet (Civil Service Commission Form 212, Revised 1982) on two (2) separate occasions: on 5 June 1989 before his appointment as Court Aide and on 13 September 1990 prior to his appointment as Utility Worker.In both instances, Mauricio disclosed his conviction of Frustrated Murder and the fact that he was on probation.The charges against respondent Mauricio for influence peddling, drunkenness, gambling, bribery, extortion and manipulation of bonds by using the same property for different cases do not appear to have been sufficiently established by clear evidence. The two (2) persons from whom the respondent allegedly asked favors using the name of Judge Fernandez both refused to be placed under oath or reduce their statements in writing.But administrative charges cannot be based on mere conjecture. The complainant has the burden of proof and such proof must be clear, solid and convincing to compel the exercise of disciplinary power over the person indicted.On respondent's conviction of Frustrated Murder, there was full disclosure of the conviction and apparently was not a legal obstacle to respondent's appointment because he was placed on probation. Therefore, respondent's conviction of a crime should not be taken as a basis of any administrative action against him.The foregoing notwithstanding we do not see any reason to disturb the Investigating Judge's finding that respondent is a troublesome and violent person as shown by his criminal record certified by the City Prosecutor of Laoag City. There is therefore merit in Judge Agnir's recommendation of immediate and summary dismissal of the respondent from the service for being the "ultimate undesirable employee and a disgrace to the judiciary."It is commendable that Judge Agnir has opted to resist the temptation to be silent in the face of what he perceives to be a deleterious influence in the court.Under Section 23, Rule 14 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws "being notoriously undesirable" is classified as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of dismissal, or forced resignation under Resolution No. 89-506 dated 20 July 1989 of the Civil Service Commission.Time and again the Court has held that "A court employee being a public servant must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his duties but also in his personal and private dealings with other people to preserve the court's name and standing. Therefore, it becomes imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice." (Paredes vs. Padua, 222 SCRA 81).Equally compelling is the decision of the Court in the case ofMirano vs. Saavedra,225 SCRA 77 which states that "The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the office charged with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility."[3]On the foregoing antecedents, it was recommended by the Deputy Court Administrator that respondent be declared notoriously undesirable and be considered resigned from the service with forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from employment in the government service for a period of one (1) year. It was further recommended, however, that respondent be reemployed in the government service other than the judiciary.In reviewing the aforesaid report and recommendation submitted for the Court's consideration, we find the foregoing observations to be correct. We, nonetheless, find the penalty recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator to be very light. Consequently, we adopt the investigating judge's recommendation for respondent's dismissal from the service, the same being warranted and justified by the facts attendant to the instant case.Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other people.[4]No less than the Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust, and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.[5]In addition, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provide that every public servant shall at all times uphold public interest over his or her personal interest.[6]By his acts and misdeeds, respondent has undermined the public's faith in our courts and, ultimately, in the administration of justice. The same make him unfit as a court employee.His employment must therefore be terminated at once. Court personnel must adhere to the high ethical standards of public service in order to preserve the Court's good name and standing.[7]Time and again, this Court has emphasized that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.ACCORDINGLY, respondent ALFREDO MAURICIO is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to his reemployment in any branch of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

G.R. No. 116418March 7, 1995

SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners, vs.HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue the same.

Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City, Metropolitan Manila. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Patricia A.. Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994. 1 Resolution No. 94-3710 needs to be quoted in full:

RESOLUTION NO. 94-3710

WHEREAS, Section 17 of Book V of Executive Order 292 provides that ". . . as an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the organization as the need arises;"

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it imperative to effect changes in the organization to streamline its operations and improve delivery of public service;

WHEREAS, the Commission finds it necessary to immediately effect changes in the organization of the Central Offices in view of the need to implement new programs in lieu of those functions which were transferred to the Regional Offices;

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to effect the following changes in its organization, specifically in the Central Offices:

1.The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and Development Office (RDO).

2.The Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) is renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO).

3.The following functions and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said functions are hereby transferred to HRDO:

a.Administration of the Honor and Awards program under OCSS;

b.Registration and Accreditation of Unions under OPR; and

c.Accreditation of Agencies to take final action on appointments under OPIA.

4.The Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) is renamed Management Information Office (MIO).

5.The Information technology functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit are transferred to MIO.

6.The following functions of OPM and the personnel assigned to the unit performing said functions are hereby transferred to the Office of the Executive Director:

a.Financial Audit and Evaluation;

b.Internal Management and Improvement;

c.Research and Statistics; and

d.Planning and Programming.

7.The library service and its personnel under OCPR are transferred to the Central Administrative Office.

8.The budget allocated for the various functions shall be transferred to the Offices where the functions are transferred. Records, fixtures and equipment that go with the functions shall be moved to where the functions are transferred.

Annex A contains the manning list for all the offices, except the OCES.

The changes in the organization and in operations shall take place before end of July 1994.

Done in Quezon City, July 07, 1994.

(Signed)Patricia A. Sto. TomasChairman

(Signed)Did not participateRamon P. Ereneta, Jr.,Thelma P. GamindeCommissionerCommissioner

Attested by:(Signed)Carmencita Giselle B. DaysonBoard Secretary V 2

During the general assembly of officers and employees of the Commission held in the morning of 28 July 1994, Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners, expressed the determination of the Commission to implement Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority.

Petitioners then instituted this Petition. In a Resolution dated 23 August 1994, the Court required public respondents to file a Comment on the Petition. On 21 September 1994, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders. The Court, in a Resolution dated 27 September 1994, granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners.

The Commission filed its own Comment, dated 12 September 1994, on the Petition and then moved to lift the Temporary Restraining Order. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a separate Comment dated 28 November 1994, defending the validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 and urging dismissal of the Petition. Petitioners filed separate Replies to these Comments. The Commission in turn filed a Rejoinder (denominated "Comment [on] the Reply").

The principal issues raised in this Petition are the following:

(1)Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office]; and

(2)Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of tenure.

I.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the Commission in the following terms:

Sec. 16.Offices in the Commission The Commission shall have the following offices:

(1)The Office of the Executive Director . . .

(2)The Merit System Protection Board . . .

(3)The Office of Legal Affairs . . .

(4)The Office of Planning and Management . . .

(5)The Central Administrative Office . . .

(6)The Office of Central Personnel Records . . .

(7)The Office of Position Classification and Compensation . . .

(8)The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement . . .

(9)The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal, merit promotion and employee incentive benefits and awards.

(10)The Office of Human Resource Development . . .

(11)The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and regulations for the effective conduct of inspection and audit of personnel and personnel management programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel programs and evaluation systems.

(12)The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations governing corporate officials and employees in the areas of recruitment, examination, placement, career development, merit and awards systems, position classification and compensation, performance appraisal, employee welfare and benefits, discipline and other aspects of personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.

(13)The Office of the Corporate Affairs . . .

(14)The Office of Retirement Administration . . .

(15)The Regional and Field Offices. . . . (Emphases in the original)

Immediately after the foregoing listing of offices of the Commission and their respective functions, the 1987 Revised Administrative Code goes on to provide as follows:

Sec. 17.Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one (1) Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out their respective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect chances in the organization as the need arises.

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(Emphasis supplied)

Examination of the foregoing statutory provisions reveals that the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed in Section 16 above, consist of aggregations of Divisions, each of which Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division and Office comprises a group of positions within the agency called the Civil Service Commission, each group being entrusted with a more or less definable function or functions. These functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced by a common or general subject matter. Clearly, each Office is an internal department or organizational unit within the Commission and that accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of the CSC. Put a little differently, these offices relate to the internal structure of the Commission.

What did Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Commission do? Examination of Resolution No. 94-3710 shows that thereby the Commission re-arranged some of the administrative units (i.e., Offices) within the Commission and, among other things, merged three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a new grouping called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)." The same Resolution renamed some of the Offices of the Commission, e.g., the Office for Human Resource Development (OHRD) was renamed Human Resource Development Office (HRDO); the Office for Central Personnel Records (OCPR) was renamed Management Information Office (MIO). The Commission also re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from one Office to another; e.g., the information technology function of OPM (Office of Planning and Management) was transferred to the newly named Management Information Office (MIO). This re-allocation or re-assignment of some functions carried with it the transfer of the budget earmarked for such function to the Office where the function was transferred. Moreover, the personnel, records, fixtures and equipment that were devoted to the carrying out of such functions were moved to the Offices to where the functions were transferred.

The objectives sought by the Commission in enacting Resolution No. 94-3710 were described in that Resolution in broad terms as "effect[ing] changes in the organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and improve delivery of service." These changes in internal organization were rendered necessary by, on the one hand, the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's functions effected by the creation of fourteen (14) Regional Offices and ninety-five (95) Field Offices of the Commission throughout the country, to the end that the Commission and its staff may be brought closer physically to the government employees that they are mandated to serve. In the past, its functions had been centralized in the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and Civil Service employees all over the country were compelled to come to Manila for the carrying out of personnel transactions. Upon the other hand, the dispersal of the functions of the Commission to the Regional Offices and the Field Offices attached to various governmental agencies throughout the country makes possible the implementation of new programs of the Commission at its Central Office in Metropolitan Manila.

The Commission's Office Order assigning petitioner de Lima to the CSC Regional Office No. 3 was precipitated by the incumbent Regional Director filing an application for retirement, thus generating a need to find a replacement for him. Petitioner de Lima was being assigned to that Regional Office while the incumbent Regional Director was still there to facilitate her take over of the duties and functions of the incumbent Director. Petitioner de Lima's prior experience as a labor lawyer was also a factor in her assignment to Regional Office No. 3 where public sector unions have been very active. Petitioner Fernandez's assignment to the CSC Regional Office No. 5 had, upon the other hand, been necessitated by the fact that the then incumbent Director in Region V was under investigation and needed to be transferred immediately to the Central Office. Petitioner Fernandez was deemed the most likely designee for Director of Regional Office No. 5 considering that the functions previously assigned to him had been substantially devolved to the Regional Offices such that his reassignment to a Regional Office would result in the least disruption of the operations of the Central Office. 4

It thus appears to the Court that the Commission was moved by quite legitimate considerations of administrative efficiency and convenience in promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 94-3710 and in assigning petitioner Salvador C. Fernandez to the Regional Office of the Commission in Region V in Legaspi City and petitioner Anicia M. de Lima to the Commission's Regional Office in Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga. It is also clear tothe Court that the changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-3710 re-naming of existing Offices; re-arrangement of the groupings of Divisions and Sections composing particular Offices; re-allocation of existing functions (and related personnel; budget, etc.) among the re-arranged Offices are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code), quoted above, as "chances in the organization" of the Commission.

Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place.

The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. 5 We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. 6 It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." 7 Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission

as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish acareer service, adopt measures to promote efficiency [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. (Emphasis supplied)

II.

We turn to the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of tenure was breached by the respondents in promulgating Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V. Section 2(3) of Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution declared that "no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law." Petitioners in effect contend that they were unlawfully removed from their positions in the OPIA and OPR by the implementation of Resolution No. 94-3710 and that they cannot, without their consent, be moved out to the Regional Offices of the Commission.

We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks. Thus, a person may be appointed to the position of Director III or Director IV; or to the position of Attorney IV or Attorney V; or to the position of Records Officer I or Records Officer II; and so forth. In the instant case, petitioners were each appointed to the position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office or station. The same is true with respect to the other persons holding the same position or rank of Director IV of the Commission.

Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil service:

Sec. 26.Personnel Actions. . . .

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As used in this Title, any action denoting the movement or progress of personnel in the civil service shall be known as personnel action. Such action shall include appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, re-instatement, re-employment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation. All personnel actions shall be in accordance with such rules, standards, and regulations as may be promulgated by the Commission.

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(7)Reassignment. An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank status and salary. (Emphasis supplied)

It follows that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory authority and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows that such re-assignment did not involve any violation of the constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned stations which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head Office.

Secondly, the above conclusion is compelled not only by the statutory provisions relevant in the instant case, but also by a long line of cases decided by this Court in respect of different agencies or offices of government.

In one of the more recent of these cases, Department of Education Culture and Sports, etc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 8 this Court held that a person who had been appointed as "Secondary School Principal II" in the Division of City Schools, District II, Quezon City, National Capital Region, and who had been stationed as High School Principal in the Carlos Albert High School in Quezon for a number of years, could lawfully be reassigned or transferred to the Manuel Roxas High School, also in Quezon City, without demotion in rank or diminution of salry. This Court held:

The aforequoted provision of Republic Act No. 4670 particularly Section 6 thereof which provides that except for cause and in the exigencies of the service no teacher shall be transferred without his consent from one station to another, finds no application in the case at bar as this is predicated upon the theory that the teacher concerned is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Thus:

The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far asthe appointed indicates a specification. Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her. In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain even as public service dictates that a transfer be made in a particular station. Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following statement in Ibaez, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No. L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);

That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate. The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals without cause but also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciatEd, are tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee. However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].) Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439 [1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil. 728 [1963]). [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138 (1969)]

The appointment of Navarro as principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school. (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623) When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it could not have been with the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the exigencies of public service require even without consent. As this Court ruled in Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138,143

Plaintiff's confident stride falters. She took too loose a view of the applicable jurisprudence. Her refuge behind the mantle of security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution is not impenetrable. She proceeds upon the assumption that she occupies her station in Sinalang Elementary School by appointment. But her first appointment as Principal merely reads thus: "You are hereby appointed a Principal (Elementary School) in the Bureau of Public Schools, Department of Education", without mentioning her station. She cannot therefore claim security of tenure as Principal of Sinalang Elementary School or any particular station. She may be assigned to any station as exigency of public service requires, even without her consent. She thus has no right of choice. 9 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

In the very recent case of Fernando, et al. v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, etc., et a1., 10 the Court addressed appointments of petitioners as "Mediators-Arbiters in the National Capital Region" in dismissing a challenge on certiorari to resolutions of the CSC and orders of the Secretary of Labor. The Court said:

Petitioners were appointed as Mediator Arbiters in the National Capital Region. They were not, however, appointed to a specific station or particular unit of the Department of Labor in the National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR). Consequently, they can always be reassigned from one organizational unit to another of the same agency where, in the opinion of respondent Secretary, their services may be used more effectively. As such they can neither claim a vested right to the station to which they were assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioners' reassignment is not a transfer for they were not removed from their position as med-arbiters. They were not given new appointments to new positions. It indubitably follows, therefore, that Memorandum Order No. 4 ordering their reassignment in the interest of the service is legally in order. 11 (Emphases supplied)

In Quisumbing v. Gumban, 12 the Court, dealing with an appointment in the Bureau of Public Schools of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, ruled as follows:

After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). A such, she could be assigned to any station and she is no entitled to stay permanently at any specific station (Bongbong v. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 [1974]; Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of Appeals [G.R. 81032, March 22, 1990] citing Brillantes v. Guevarra [27 SCRA 138 [1969]). 13

Again, in Ibaez v. Commission on Elections, 14 the Court had before it petitioners' appointments as "Election Registrars in the Commission of Elections," without any intimation to what city, municipality or municipal district they had been appointed as such. 15 The Court held that since petitioners "were not appointed to, and consequently not entitled to any security of tenure or permanence in, any specific station," "on general principles, they [could] be transferred as the exigencies of the service required," and that they had no right to complain against any change in assignment. The Court further held that assignment to a particular station after issuance of the appointment was not necessary to complete such appointment:

. . . . We cannot subscribe to the theory that an assignment to a particular station, in the light of the terms of the appointments in question, was necessary to complete the said appointments. The approval thereof by the Commissioner of Civil Service gave those appointments the stamp of finality. With the view that the respondent Commission then took of its power in the premises and the demand of the mission it set out to accomplish with the appointments it extended, said appointments were definitely meant to be complete as then issued. The subsequent assignment of the appointees thereunder that the said respondent Commission held in reserve to be exercised as the needs of each locality justified did not in any way detract from the perfection attained by the appointments beforehand. And the respective appointees were entitled only to such security of tenure as the appointment papers concerned actually conferred not in that of any place to which they may have been subsequently assigned. . . . As things stand, in default of any particular station stated in their respective appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments which were given to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as two distinct concepts in the law of public officers. 16 (Emphases supplied)

The petitioner, in Miclat v. Ganaden, 17 had been appointed as a "Welfare Office Incharge, Division of Urban, Rural and Community Administration, Social Welfare Administration." She was assigned as Social Welfare Incharge of the Mountain Province, by an office order of the Administrator, Social Welfare Administration. After a little more than a year; petitioner was assigned elsewhere and respondent Ganaden transferred to petitioner's first station in Baguio City. The Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to remain in her first station, In Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 18 petitioner Dr. Jaro had been appointed "Physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals." He was first assigned to the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics in Batulati, Davao, and later to the corresponding clinic in Saug, Davao and then to Catil, Davao. He was later assigned to the Municipality of Padada, also of Davao Province. He resisted his last assignment and brought mandamus against the Secretary of Health to compel the latter to return him to his station in Catil, Davao as Municipal Health Officer thereof. The Court, applying Miclat v. Ganaden dismissed this Petition holding that his appointment not being to any specific station but as a physician in the Municipal Maternity and Charity Clinics, Bureau of Hospitals, he could be transferred or assigned to any station where, in the opinion of the Secretary of Health, his services may be utilized more effectively. 19

Also noteworthy is Sta. Maria v. Lopez 20 which involved the appointment of petitioner Sta. Maria as "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." Dean Sta. Maria was transferred by the President of the University of the Philippines to the Office of the President, U.P., without demotion in rank or salary, thereby acceding to the demands of student activists who were boycotting their classes in the U.P. College of Education. Dean Sta. Maria assailed his transfer as an illegal and unconstitutional removal from office. In upholding Dean Sta. Maria's claim, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, laid down the applicable doctrine in the following terms:

4.Concededly, transfers there are which do not amount to removal. Some such transfer can be effected without the need for charges being preferred, without trial or hering, and even without the consent of the employee.

The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." Where the appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned provided the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary. Thus one who is appointed "principal in the Bureau of Public Schools" and is designated to head a pilot school may be transferred to the post of principal of another school.

And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service cannot-be objected to. . . .

5.The next point of inquiry is whether or not Administrative Order 77 would stand the test of validity vis-a-vis the principles just enunciated.

xxxxxxxxx

To be stressed at this point, however, is that the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university." His appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station. 21 (Citations omitted; emphases supplied)

For all the foregoing we conclude that the reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions Regional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively, without their consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.

G.R. No. 145368 April 12, 2002

SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs.HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On June 13, 1991, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 "constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration in 1998." The Committee was mandated "to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."1

Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, "reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1988." It renamed the Committee as the "National Centennial Commission." Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons.2

Characterized as an "i body," the existence of the Commission "shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations."3 Like its predecessor Committee, the Commission was tasked to "take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress."

Per Section 6 of the Executive Order, the Commission was also charged with the responsibility to "prepare, for approval of the President, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of" the Executive Order.

E.O. No. 128 also contained provisions for staff support and funding:

Sec. 3. The Commission shall be provided with technical and administrative staff support by a Secretariat to be composed of, among others, detailed personnel from the Presidential Management Staff, the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, and the National Historical Institute. Said Secretariat shall be headed by a full time Executive Director who shall be designated by the President.

Sec. 4. The Commission shall be funded with an initial budget to be drawn from the Department of Tourism and the presidents Contingent Fund, in an amount to be recommended by the Commission, and approved by the President. Appropriations for succeeding years shall be incorporated in the budget of the Office of the President.

Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created.4 Petitioner was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Petitioner was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.

On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon motion of Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Cosetengs privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation.

On February 24, 1999, President Joseph Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial projects, including its component activities. Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag was appointed to chair the Committee.

On March 23, 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed with the Secretary of the Senate its Committee Final Report No. 30 dated February 26, 1999. Among the Committees recommendations was "the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law."5

Later, on November 5, 1999, the Saguisag Committee issued its own report. It recommended "the further investigation by the Ombudsman, and indictment, in proper cases of," among others, NCC Chair Salvador H. Laurel for violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Section 4(a) in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Reports of the Senate Blue Ribbon and the Saguisag Committee were apparently referred to the Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman. On January 27, 2000, the Bureau issued its Evaluation Report, recommending:

1. that a formal complaint be filed and preliminary investigation be conducted before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman against former NCC and EXPOCORP chair Salvador H. Laurel, former EXPOCORP President Teodoro Q. Pea and AK President Edgardo H. Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended in relation to PD 1594 and COA Rules and Regulations;

2. That the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of this Office, act as the nominal complainant.6

In an Order dated April 10, 2000, Pelagio S. Apostol, OIC-Director of the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau, directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses.

On April 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office.

In an Order dated June 13, 2000, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion to dismiss.

On July 3, 2000, petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the June 13, 2000 Order but the motion was denied in an Order dated October 5, 2000.

On October 25, 2000, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari.

On November 14, 2000, the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau issued a resolution finding "probable cause to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEA before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1594." The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said law be filed against Laurel and Pea. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pea.

In a Resolution dated September 24, 2001, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, commanding respondents to desist from filing any information before the Sandiganbayan or any court against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

On November 14, 2001, the Court, upon motion of petitioner, heard the parties in oral argument.

Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because:

A.

EXPOCORP, THE CORPORATION CHAIRED BY PETITIONER LAUREL WHICH UNDERTOOK THE FREEDOM RING PROJECT IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH VIOLATIONS OF THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES WERE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED, WAS A PRIVATE CORPORATION, NOT A GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION.

B.

THE NATIONAL CENTENNIAL COMMISSION (NCC) WAS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICE.

C.

PETITIONER, BOTH AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NCC AND OF EXPOCORP WAS NOT A "PUBLIC OFFICER" AS DEFINED UNDER THE ANTI-GRAFT & CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.7

In addition, petitioner in his reply8 invokes this Courts decision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,9 where it was held that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, i.e., over public officers of Grade 27 and higher. As petitioners position was purportedly not classified as Grade 27 or higher, the Sandiganbayan and, consequently, the Ombudsman, would have no jurisdiction over him.

This last contention is easily dismissed. In the Courts decision in Uy, we held that "it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan."

In its Resolution of February 22, 2000, the Court expounded:

The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsmans and Special Prosecutors authority to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. [Emphasis in the original.]

The foregoing ruling in Uy, however, was short-lived. Upon motion for clarification by the Ombudsman in the same case, the Court set aside the foregoing pronouncement in its Resolution dated March 20, 2001. The Court explained the rationale for this reversal:

The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.

Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public officers and employees by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770.

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. A review of the development of our Ombudsman law reveals this intent. [Emphasis in the original.]

Having disposed of this contention, we proceed to the principal grounds upon which petitioner relies. We first address the argument that petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was not a public officer.

The Constitution10 describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as "protectors of the people," who "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations." Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution11 upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to "[i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."

The foregoing constitutional provisions are substantially reproduced in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." Sections 13 and 15(1) of said law respectively provide:

SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people shall act promptly on complaints file in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people.

SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

x x x.

The coverage of the law appears to be limited only by Section 16, in relation to Section 13, supra:

SEC 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.

In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.12

Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence13 is that provided by Mechem, a recognized authority on the subject:

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.14

The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.15

Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.

Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as "[t]he most important characteristic" in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.16

Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly, the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial. May the functions of the NCC then be described as executive?

We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."17 The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.

The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports) thereof:

Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State. The State shall conserve, promote, and popularize the nations historical and cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic creations.

In its preamble, A.O. No. 223 states the purposes for the creation of the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998:

Whereas, the birth of the Republic of the Philippines is to be celebrated in 1998, and the centennial presents an important vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity;

Whereas, the centennial can effectively showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values;

Whereas, the success of the Centennial Celebrations may be insured only through long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, the active participation of the private sector in all areas of special expertise and capability, particularly in communication and information dissemination, is necessary for long-range planning and continuous developmental programming;

Whereas, there is a need to create a body which shall initiate and undertake the primary task of harnessing the multisectoral components from the business, cultural, and business sectors to serve as effective instruments from the launching and overseeing of this long-term project;

x x x.

E.O. No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998, cited the "need to strengthen the said Committee to ensure a more coordinated and synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-government or private organizations." It also referred to the "need to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries."

The NCC was precisely created to execute the foregoing policies and objectives, to carry them into effect. Thus, the Commission was vested with the following functions:

(a) To undertake the overall study, conceptualization, formulation and implementation of programs and projects on the utilization of culture, arts, literature and media as vehicles for history, economic endeavors, and reinvigorating the spirit of national unity and sense of accomplishment in every Filipino in the context of the Centennial Celebrations. In this regard, it shall include a Philippine National Exposition 98 within Metro Manila, the original eight provinces, and Clark Air Base as its major venues;

(b) To act as principal coordinator for all the activities related to awareness and celebration of the Centennial;

(c) To serve as the clearing house for the preparation and dissemination of all information about the plans and events for the Centennial Celebrations;

(d) To constitute working groups which shall undertake the implementation of the programs and projects;

(e) To prioritize the refurbishment of historical sites and structures nationwide. In this regard, the Commission shall formulate schemes (e.g. lease-maintained-and-transfer, build-operate-transfer, and similar arrangements) to ensure the preservation and maintenance of the historical sites and structures;

(f) To call upon any government agency or instrumentality and corporation, and to invite private individuals and organizations to assist it in the performance of its tasks; and,

(g) Submit regular reports to the President on the plans, programs, projects, activities as well as the status of the preparations for the Celebration.18

It bears noting the President, upon whom the executive power is vested,19 created the NCC by executive order. Book III (Office of the President), Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Section 2 describes the nature of executive orders:

SEC. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. [Underscoring ours.]

Furthermore, the NCC was not without a role in the countrys economic development, especially in Central Luzon. Petitioner himself admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court:

MR. JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO:

And in addition to that expounded by Former President Ramos, dont you agree that the task of the centennial commission was also to focus on the long term over all socio economic development of the zone and Central Luzon by attracting investors in the area because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SALVADOR H. LAUREL:

I am glad Your Honor touched on that because that is something I wanted to touch on by lack of material time I could not but that is a very important point. When I was made Chairman I wanted the Expo to be in Batangas because I am a Batangeo but President Ramos said Mr. Vice President the Central Luzon is suffering, suffering because of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo let us try to catalize [sic] economic recovery in that area by putting this Expo in Clark Field and so it was done I agreed and Your Honor if I may also mention we wanted to generate employment aside from attracting business investments and employment. And the Estrada administration decided to junk this project there 48, 40 thousand people who lost job, they were employed in Expo. And our target was to provide 75 thousand jobs. It would have really calibrated, accelerated the development of Central Luzon. Now, I think they are going back to that because they had the airport and there are plan to revive the Expo site into key park which was the original plan.

There can hardly be any dispute that the promotion of industrialization and full employment is a fundamental state policy.20

Petitioner invokes the ruling of this Court in Torio vs. Fontanilla21 that the holding by a municipality of a town fiesta is a proprietary rather than a governmental function. Petitioner argues that the "holding of a nationwide celebration which marked the nations 100th birthday may be likened to a national fiesta which involved only the exercise of the national governments proprietary function."22 In Torio, we held:

[Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code] simply gives authority to the municipality to [celebrate] a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless it is [a] private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking may be, is that it is government in essence, otherwise, the function becomes private or propriety in character. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Torio, however, did not intend to lay down an all-encompassing doctrine. Note that the Court cautioned that "there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and will be decisive." Thus, in footnote 15 of Torio, the Court, citing an American case, illustrated how the "surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds" could produce a conclusion different from that in Torio:

We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven, et al. was an action to recover damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence in the performance of which no statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held inter alia:

Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of purely public governmental duties, unless made liable by statute.

A municipality corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statute, conducted a public Fourth of July celebration, including a display of fireworks, and sent up a bomb intended to explode in the air, but which failed to explode until it reached the ground, and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty. (99 A.R. 51)

This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.

At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from [this] excerpt:

"July 4th, when that date falls upon Sunday, July 5th, is made a public holiday, called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision, the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. Throughout the country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations, calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompanied by a musical program including patriotic air sometimes preceded by the firing of cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be questioned. x x x"

Surely, a town fiesta cannot compare to the National Centennial Celebrations. The Centennial Celebrations was meant to commemorate the birth of our nation after centuries of struggle against our former colonial master, to memorialize the liberation of our people from oppression by a foreign power. 1998 marked 100 years of independence and sovereignty as one united nation. The Celebrations was an occasion to reflect upon our history and reinvigorate our patriotism. As A.O. 223 put it, it was a "vehicle for fostering nationhood and a strong sense of Filipino identity," an opportunity to "showcase Filipino heritage and thereby strengthen Filipino values." The significance of the Celebrations could not have been lost on petitioner, who remarked during the hearing:

Oh, yes, certainly the State is interested in the unity of the people, we wanted to rekindle the love for freedom, love for country, that is the over-all goal that has to make everybody feel proud that he is a Filipino, proud of our history, proud of what our forefather did in their time. x x x.

Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer.

That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good.23 Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached.24 But it is a public office, nonetheless.

Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an "ad-hoc body" make said commission less of a public office.

The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. "But," says Chief Justice Marshall, "if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer."

At the same time, however, this element of continuance can not be considered as indispensable, for, if the other elements are present "it can make no difference," says Pearson, C.J., "whether there be but one act or a series of acts to be done, -- whether the office expires as soon as the one act is done, or is to be held for years or during good behavior."25

Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss.26 There the Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission is an "office of trust" as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United States President and Vice-President. (Under Article II of the United States Constitution, a person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States is disqualified from being appointed an elector.)

x x x. We think a Commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under the United States, and that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President and Vice-President of the United States.

The commission was created under a statute of the United States approved March 3, 1871. That statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products, and manufactures, "under the auspices of the government of the United States," and for the constitution of a commission, to consist of more than one delegate from each State and from each Territory of the United States, "whose functions shall continue until close of the exhibition," and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of the plan for holding the exhibition." Under the statute the commissioners are appointed by the President of the United States, on the nomination of the governor of the States and Territories respectively. Various duties were imposed upon the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have exclusive control of the exhibit before the President should announce, by proclamation, the date and place of opening and holding the exhibition. By an act of Congress approved June 1st, 1872, the duties and functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That act created a corporation, called "The Centennial Board of Finance," to cooperate with the commission and to raise and disburse the funds. It was to be organized under the direction of the commission. The seventh section of the act provides "that the grounds for exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings erected by the corporation, in accordance with plans which shall have been adopted by the United States Centennial Commission; and the rules and regulations of said corporation, governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise affecting the rights, privileges, or interests of the exhibitors, or of the public, shall be fixed and established by the United States Centennial Commission; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings, or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and said commission shall have power to control, change, or revoke all such grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners and award all premiums." The tenth section of the act provides that "it shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to supervise the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United States the financial results of the centennial exhibition."

It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that the duties and functions of the commission were various, delicate, and important; that they could be successfully performed only by men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest degree authoritative, discretionary, and final in their character. We think that persons performing such duties and exercising such functions, in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are not to be regarded as mere employees, agents, or committee men, but that they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places which they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which they were appointed declares, section 7, that "no compensation for services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers, provided for in this act, from the treasury of the United States." The only other officers provided for were the "alternates" appointed to serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to attend.

Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.27

Finally, it is contended that since petitioner supposedly did not receive any compensation for his services as NCC or Expocorp Chair, he is not a public officer as defined in Republic Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and is, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

Respondent seeks to charge petitioner with violation of Section 3 (e) of said law, which reads:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

A "public officer," under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term

x x x

(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a "public officer" is expressly limited to the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the Ombudsmans jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial.

To illustrate, the use of the term "includes" in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.28 The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define "public officers." Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:

x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.

Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987,29 on the other hand, states:

Officer as distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a "public official" whether or not one receives compensation, thus:

"Public Officials" include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.

Which of these definitions should apply, if at all?

Assuming that the definition of public officer in R.A. No. 3019 is exclusive, the term "compensation," which is not defined by said law, has ma