jurisprudence in political law

JURISPRUDENCE IN POLITICAL LAW

Funda-mental Powers of the State

EMINENT DOMAIN; Expropriation; It may be initiated by court action or by legislation. In both instances, just compensation is determined by the courts.

Republic v. Salem Investment Corp., GR 137569, June 23, 2000.

Same; Same; Two stages: (1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; (2) the determination by the court of just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The two stages apply to both judicial and legislative expropriation and said stages are not complete until payment of just compensation. It is only upon payment of just compensation that title to the property passes to the government

id.

Same; Same; Expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC, regardless of the value of the subject property.

Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor, GR 138896, June 20, 2000.

Same; Same; Entry; The requirements of EO 1035, i.e., conduct of feasibility studies, information campaign and detailed engineering/surveys, are not conditions precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession against the property being expropriated. The reqmts for the issuance of a writ of possession, once the expropriation case is filed, are expressly and specifically governed by Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Pursuant to said rule and the Robern Development Corp. case, the only requisites for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings are: [1] the FILING of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; [2] the making of a DEPOSIT equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to LEGAL INTEREST on the compensation eventually adjudged from the date the condemnor takes possession of the land until the full compensation is paid to them or deposited in court.

Biglang-awa v. Judge Bacalla, GR 139927 and 139936, Nov. 22, 2000.

Same; Same; Right of Way; The acquisition of an easement of right of way falls w/in the power of eminent domain.

Camarines Norte Electric Coop. v. CA, GR 109338, Nov. 20, 2000

Citizenship

If an Alien [i] gave or donated his money to a citizen of the Phils. so that the latter could invest it in the purchase of private agricultural lands, or [ii]

Chan Sui Bi v. CA, GR 129507,

purchased private agricultural lands for a citizen of the Phils., such acts, provided they are done in GOOD FAITH, do not violate our laws. What is prohibited by the Anti-Dummy Law and the Retail Trade Law then prevailing were the acquisition by an alien for himself of private lands in the Phils., and his conduct of retail trade, respectively.

Sept, 29, 2000.

EXTRADITION; Right to Notice and Hearing; Private respondent does not have the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process, for the ff. reasons: [1] PD 1069 w/c implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extradite shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the said petition in the extradition court. There is no provision in the above law and treaty w/c gives an extrditee the right to demand from the Sec. of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation; [2] All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in the light of their intent. The RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of the extradite form the long arm of the law and expidite their trial; [3] The Executive Dept., thru the DFA and the DOJ, has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This understanding of the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty. Other countries w/ similar extradition treaties w/ the Phils. have expressed the same interpretation adopted by the Phils. and Us governments; [4] An extradition proceeding is sui generic . It is not a criminal proceeding that will call into operation all the rights of the accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Sec. of Justice v. Lantion, GR 139465, Oct. 17, 2000.

Bill of Rights

DUE PROCESS; A decision is void for lack of due process, as when a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void judgment never acquires finality.

The Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita, GR 130443, April 6, 2000.

Same; A denial of due process suffices to cast on the official acts taken by whatever branch of government the impression of NULLITY. A decision rendered w/o due process is void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally.

Uy v. CA, GR 109557, Nov. 29, 2000.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW; the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to convict the co-accused, the acquittal of the former should benefit the latter. Such doctrine does not apply to this case. The strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner

Peligrino v. People, GR 136266, Aug. 13, 2001.

were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which Buenafe was not involved. Hence, the evidence against petitioner and that against his co-accused were simply not at par with each other.

FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

Posadas vs. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990), citing People vs. CFI of Rizal, 101 SCRA 86 (1996).

Same; Warrant of Arrest; Requirements for the valid issuance of search warrant: [1] the warrant must be issued upon probable cause; [2] PROBABLE CAUSE must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; [3] In determining probable cause, the judge must EXAMINE under oath or affirmation the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; [4] the warrant issued must PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer w/ the warrant can, w/ reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Search Warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of PARTICULARITY, especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The search warrant is separable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off w/o destroying the whole warrant.

Uy v. BIR, GR 129651, Oct. 20, 2000.

Same; Same; Probable Cause; For the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection w/ one specific offense to be DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Since, in this case, there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant is null and void and all property seized by virtue thereof shall be returned in accordance w/ established jurisprudence.

Savage v. Judge Taypin, GR 134217, May 11, 2000.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; A search warrant is merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action w/c it may entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search

id.

warrants is inherent in all courts and may effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts of IPR. Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified w/c court could try and decide cases involving violations of the IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction w/ regard to all matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law, in this case, BP Blg. 129, and not by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative order. The power to issue search warrants for violation of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in SC Admin Order No. 113-95. Certification against forum-shopping is not required in applications for search warrants.

Warrantless Search and Seizure; The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence [PP vs. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679 (1995); Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968); Davis vs. United States, 328 U.S. 582.]; (2) SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW [Obra vs. CA, 317 SCRA 594 (1999); P vs. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63 (1992); Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997); PP vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 (1991); Coolidge vs. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443.]; (3) SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES [PP vs. Escaño, 323 SCRA 754 (2000); Aniag, Jr. vs. Comelec, 237 SCRA 424 (1994); PP vs. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325 (1994); PP vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494 (1993); Valmonte vs. de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989); Carroll vs. United States, 267 U.S. 132.]; (4) CONSENTED WARRANTLESS SEARCH [PP vs. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 (1998); PP vs. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 (1996); Mustang Lumber vs. CA, et al., 257 SCRA 430 (1996); PP vs. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 (1993); PP vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462 (1992).]; (5) CUSTOMS SEARCH; (6) STOP AND FRISK SITUATIONS (“TERRY SEARCH”) [PP vs. Salayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996); Posadas vs. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990) citing Terry vs. Ohio, 20 L. Ed. 2d 896.]; and (7) EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES [PP vs. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994) citing PP vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991) and Umil, et al. vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)].

PP v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994) citing PP v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991) and Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990).

Same; “Plainview Doctrine”; The prosecution against illegal search and seizure covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers. The “plainview” doctrine (w/c may justify a search w/o a warrant) applies only where the police officer is NOT SEARCHING for evidence against the accused, but INADVERTENTLY comes across an incriminating object. Just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by the Constitution. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, w/c includes his residence, papers and

PP v. Valdez, GR 129296, Sept. 25, 2000.

other possessions. For a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he need not be in his home or office, w/in a fenced yard or private place.

Same; Same; An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized.

Caballes v. CA, GR 136292, Jan. 15, 2002.

Same; Consented Search or Waiver; It is fundamental that to constitute waiver: [i] it must first appear that the right exists; [ii] the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and [iii] the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

PP v. Figueroa, GR 134056, July 6, 2000.

Same; Same; Essential Requisites; In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.


Same; Same; An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors.

PP v. Baula, GR 132671, Nov. 15, 2000.

Same; Same; The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is A PERSONAL RIGHT which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; 44 (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;


45 (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State w/c has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

Same; Search of Moving Vehicle; A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches w/o warrant of automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or constructive borders like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches w/o warrants if made w/in the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.


Same; “Stop and Search”; Stop and search at military or police checkpoints has been declared to be NOT ILLEGAL PER SE, for as long as it is warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an extensive search.


Same; Same; Routine Inspection; They are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. The search w/c is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the ff: [1] where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle w/c is parked on the public fair grounds; [2] simply looks into a vehicle; [3] flashes a light therein w/o opening the car’s doors; [4] where the occupants are not subjected to aphysical or body search; [6] where the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and [7] where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. In this case, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakwati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine check.


Same; Same; Extensive Search; When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible ONLY if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or PROBABLE CAUSE to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct w/o a judicial warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in


situations where (1) there had emanated from a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcom of the PNP had received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be transporting marijuana; (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy — one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belonged — that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country. In the case at bar, the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves w/c, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle LOOKED SUSPICIOUS simply because it is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. And Absence of any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where Tipped Information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case.

Same; Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; A search incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of one arrested and the premises within his immediate control. Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. 16 Nonetheless, the seizure of evidence in plain view must comply with the following elements: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

PP v. Aspiras, GR 138382-84, Feb. 12, 2002.

Illegal Search and Seizure; Exclusionary Rule; Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.


Illegal search/arrest; This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug offenders. The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable." For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable." The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obedience to the fundamental law.

PP v. Bolasa, GR 125754, Dec. 2, 1999.

Searches and Seizures; Confiscation; Even if the medicines or drugs seized were genuine and even if they had the proper chemicals or ingredients in their productions, if the producer, manufacturer or seller has no permit or authority from the appropriate government agency, the drugs or medicines cannot be returned although the search warrants were declared illegal. The policy of the law enunciated in RA 8203 is to protect the consumers as well as the licensed businessmen.

PP v. Judge Estrada, GR 124461, June 26, 2000.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS; Academic Freedom on Campus Journalism; Sec. 7 of the Campus Journalism Act prohibits expulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, EXCEPT when such article materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. The power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly environment to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.

Mirriam College Foundation v. CA, 127930, Dec. 15, 2000.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION; A self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen

Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR

before the courts. The Court classified the right to information as a public right and “when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general ‘public’ which possesses the right.” However, Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the reasonable claims of confidentiality.

140835, Aug. 14, 2000.

Same; Limited to “matters of public concern,” to “transactions involving public interest.” The negotiation and subsequent sale of the property by the GSIS to private respondent was not imbued w/ public interest as it was a purely private transaction. Petitioners cannot therefore demand that they be informed of such negotiation and sale, more so since they no longer had any interest in the property upon their failure to comply w/ GSIS terms for repurchase and its denial of petitioner’s offer to repurchase.

Urbano v. GSIS, GR 137904, Oct. 19, 2001.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION; The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one. Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws w/o their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to promote their common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the association. True also, memberships in homeowners' associations may be acquired in various ways — often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms of evidence of property ownership. In the present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that private respondents have agreed to be SCHA members. Hence, membership in a homeowners' association is voluntary and cannot be unilaterally forced by a provision in the association's articles of incorporation or by-laws, which the alleged member did not agree to be bound to.

Sta. Clara Homeowner’s Assn v. Sps. Gaston, GR 141961, Jan. 23, 2002.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL; Guidelines on Hold-departure Orders (HDO):(1) HDO shall be issued only in criminal cases w/in the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC;(2) The RTC issuing the HDO shall furnish the DFA and the BI w/ a copy each of the HDO w/in 24 hours from the time of issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal;(3) The HDO shall contain the ff. information: [a] The complete name (incl. the middle name, the date and place of birth and the place of last residence of the person against whom the HDO has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined; [b] The complete title and docket number of the case w/c the HDO was issued; [c] The specific nature of the case; and [d] The date of the HDO. If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a HDO has been issued or whose departure from the country has been enjoined should also be included.(4) Whenever the accused has been acquitted or the case against him dismissed, the judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal shall include therein the cancellation of the HDO issued. The courts concerned shall furnish the DFA and the BI w/ a copy each of the judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal 24 hours from the time of promulgated/issuance and through the fastest available means of transmittal.

RE: Hold-Departure Order Issued by Judge Sardido, A.M. No. 01-9-245, MTC, Dec. 5, 2001.

EX POST FACTO LAW; An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively take "from an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the offense charged against him?" The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and liberty.?" We find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation operate

Benedicto v. CA, GR 125359, Sept. 4, 2001.

prospectively. Penal laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the accused. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular Section 36, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this case.

Rights of the accused

RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT; The law presumes the accused innocent unless shown otherwise by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged lies upon the prosecution. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of w/c is consistent w/ his guilt, then the evidence is not sufficient to support conviction.

PP v. Laxa, GR 138501, July 20, 2001.

RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; Custodial investigation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into CUSTODY or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. It begins when the inquiry as to one’s involvement in a crime is no longer general but starts to focus on a particular person as a SUSPECT.

PP v. Morial, GR 129295, Aug. 15, 2001.

Same; Section 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution embodies the mandatory protection afforded a person under custodial investigation for the commission of a crime and the duty of the State to enforce such mandate, w/c are: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

PP v. Suela, GR 133570-71, Jan. 15, 2002.

Same; A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, w/c attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.

PP v. Morial, GR 129295, Aug. 15, 2001.

Same; The mantle of protection under Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in custody.

PP v. Bravo, GR 135562, Nov. 22, 1999.

Same; The mantle of protection under Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a crime, or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime, although not yet in custody. Custodial investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. The place of interrogation is not determinative of the existence or absence of custodial investigation but the tone and manner of questioning by the police authorities. Thus, there was custodial investigation when the police authorities, upon their arrest of some of the accused, immediately asked them regarding their participation in the commission of the crime, even while they were still walking along the highway on their way to the police station. This is in line w/ prevailing jurisprudence and the provisions of RA 7438, that the requisite of a custodial investigation are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but “merely invited for questioning”.

PP v. Bariquit, GR 122733, Oct. 2, 2000; PP v. Felixminia, GR 125333, March 20, 2002.

Same; Procedure; A suspect in custodial investigation must be given the following warnings: (1) He must be informed of his RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT; (2) he must be WARNED that anything he says can and will be used against him; and (3) he must be told that he has a RIGHT TO COUNSEL, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. In this case, accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his rights, signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional requirements. This manner of giving warnings has been held to be "merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect." For this reason, we hold accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is invalid.

PP v. Samolde, GR 128551, July 31, 2000.

Same; It has been held that these rights attach from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. It is always incumbent upon the prosecution to prove at the trial that prior to in-custody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers complied with these constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, made during custodial investigation are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of a case. In other words, confessions and admissions in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution are inadmissible in

PP v. Figueroa, GR 134056, July 6, 2000.

evidence against the declarant and more so against third persons. This is so even if such statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given. Such statements are useless except as evidence against the very police authorities who violated the suspect's rights.

Same; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; [T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.

PP v. Labtan, GR 127493, Dec. 8, 1999.

Same; Same; The right refers to “COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,” not the mere presence of a lawyer beside the accused. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. The lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. The modifier competent and independent stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

PP v. Suela, GR 133570-71, Jan. 15, 2002.

Same; Right to have a Competent and Independent Counsel; It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer. Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is willing

PP v. Labtan, GR 127493, Dec. 8, 1999.

to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.

Same; Same; Such right refers to ‘EFFECTIVE COUNSEL”. In essence, it refers to the right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an accused is not denied the collateral right to due process.

PP v/ Liwanag, GR 120468, Aug. 15, 2001.

Same; Same; The term "effective and vigilant counsel", is necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. An “effective counsel” is characterized as "one who can be made to act in protection of his [accused’s] rights, and not by merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law degree.

PP v. Labtan, GR 127493, Dec. 8, 1999.

Same; Same; The accused must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start of custodial investigation until its termination. This right was negated by the precipitate departure of the lawyer of the accused before the termination of the investigation.

PP v. Morial, GR 129295, Aug. 15, 2001.

Same; Same; A counsel who failed to inform the accused of the latter’s right to remain silent, who kept “coming and going” during the custodial investigation, and abruptly departed before the termination of the proceedings, can hardly be the competent, vigilant and effective counsel contemplated in the Constitution.

PP v. Morial, 2001; PP v. Aranzado, 2001.

Same; Same; Where the accused is represented by someone who is not a member of the Phil. Bar, conviction in the lower court was set aside and the case remanded for new trial.

PP v. Santociles, GR 109149, Dec. 21, 1999.

Same; Same; Confession; Confessions of the accused in the absence of counsel are invalid.

PP v. Tulin, GR 111709, Aug. 30, 2001.

Same; Same; Same; Even if a confession is subsequently signed in the presence of counsel, it is not cured of constitutional defects.

PP v. Morial, 2001.

Same; Same; it is more than just the presence of a lawyer in the court room or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. It means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly, at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.

PP v. Aranzado, GR 132442-44, Sept. 24, 2001.

Same; Same; Police Line-up; The stage of investigation wherein a person is asked to stand in a police line-up has been held to be outside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel because it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigative in nature.

PP v. Pavellare, GR 129970, April 5, 2000.

Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.

PP v. Escordial, GR 138934-35, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; Same; Out-of Court Identification; An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him.

PP v. Escordial, GR 138934-35, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; Same; Invitations; Said right was not PP v.

violated in this case where the police invited for questioning residents of the compound, including the appellants. They were not yet singled out as the perpetrators of the crime. When the accused was asked a single question at the police station regarding his whereabouts on the evening of Nov. 28, it was not a custodial investigation inasmuch as the query was merely part of the “general exploratory stage.”

Pavellare, GR 129970, April 5, 2000.

Same; Administrative Investigation; The right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation and not to administrative investigation.

Remolona v. CSC, GR 137473, Aug. 2, 2001.

Same; WAIVER; As a rule, to be valid, must be made in writing, and in the presence of counsel. Granting that appellant consented to his counsel’s departure during the investigation and to answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was not a valid waiver of his right to counsel.

PP v. Morial, 2001.

Same; Same; No valid waiver where admissions obtained during custodial investigations w/o the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.

PP v. Matignas, GR 126146, March 12, 2002.

Same; Same; Same; However, the manifestation of accused-appellants that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer was deemed a valid waiver of the right, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and w/ full assistance of a bona fide lawyer .

PP v. Tulin, GR 111709, Aug, 30, 2001.

EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; A confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. A suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellant's confession were gospel truth.

PP v. Suela, GR 133570-71, Jan. 15, 2002.

Same; A judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. Indeed, it is hard to believe that a person, of whatever economic status, would confess to a crime that he did not commit for monetary considerations and thus barter away his liberty, and for that matter, even his life, for a mess of potage, for that is what the mere sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to him to make the confession means.

PP v. Samolde, GR 128551, July 31, 2000.

Same; As a Rule, these rights "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." A suspect's confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellant's confession were gospel truth.

PP v. Dano, GR 117690, Sept. 1, 2000 ;

Same; Same; However, SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS voluntarily given, as where appellant orally admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a police officer nor a law enforcement agent), do not fall under custodial investigation. Such admission, even w/o the assistance of a lawyer, does not violate appellant’s constitutional rights.

PP v. Dano, GR 117690, Sept 1, 2000; PP v. Mayorga, GR 135405, Nov. 29, 2000

Same; Presumption; The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed cannot by itself prevail over positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of an accused.

PP v. Dano, GR 117690, Sept. 1, 2000 ;

RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; What is actually proscribed is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when material to the case.

PP v. Rondero, GR 125687, Dec. 9, 1999.

Same; The essence of this right is TESTIMONIAL COMPULSION or the giving of evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. Hence, an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination and have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from a disease that was contracted by his victim w/o violating this right.

PP v. Banihit, GR 132045, Aug. 25, 2000; PP v. Continente, GR 100801-02, Aug. 25, 2000.

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; An accused is placed in double jeopardy when he is again tried for an offense for w/c he has been convicted, acquitted, or in w/c the indictment against him was dismissed w/o his consent.

Tupaz v. Hon. Ulep, GR 127777, Oct 1, 1999.

Same; To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the following elements must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

Sarabia v. People, GR 142024, July 20, 2001.

Same; Evolution of the doctrine. Appeal by the Government from verdicts of acquittal. As mandated by the Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the CA. In general, the rule that remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the SC on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a

PP v. Velascoi, GR 127444, Sept. 13, 2000.

finding of MISTRIAL, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.

Same; Judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappeallable whether it happens at the trial court level or before the CA. This means that a review of alleged errors in the said judgment arising from misappreciation of facts and the evidence adduced cannot be made w/o trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy.

Yuchengco v. CA, GR 139768, Feb. 7, 2002.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM; this means that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The accused is presumed to have no knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense charge.

PP v. Tabion, GR 132715, Oct. 20, 1999.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR HIS DEFENSE; In this case, the non-appearance of counsel fort he accused on the scheduled hearing was not construed as a waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his defense. Denial of due process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case.

PP v. Yambot, GR 120350, Oct. 13, 2000.

Same; A counsel assisting an accused is guided by the provisions of Sec. 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; Canon 2, 12, 17, 18, and 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons 4, 5, and 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. The proper measure of a counsel’s performance is REASONABLENESS under the prevailing professional norms. In this case, the issue raised regarding a lawyer’s acts or omissions in the conduct of his duties as counsel for the accused was deemed not proper as it may breed more unwanted consequences than merely upholding an accused’s constitutional right or raising the standard of the legal profession.

PP v. Liwanag, 2001.

Same; Waiver of presentation of Evidence; The accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. This is in consonance w/ the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed w/ and relinquished w/o infringing on any public right, and w/o detriment to the community at large.

PP v. Banihit, GR 132045, Aug. 25, 2000.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THE CASE; The right of the accused to speedy trial shall not be used to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals. It allows for reasonable continuance. It is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or, when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured.

Tai Lim v. CA, GR 131483, Oct. 26, 1999.

Same; It is deemed violated ONLY when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when w/o cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period as allowed to elapse w/o the party having his case tried.

Ty- Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 143885-86, Jan. 21, 2002.

Same; The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took about 8 years before the trial of this case was resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not attributable to the prosecution.

Sumbang v. Gen. Court Martial, GR 140188, Aug. 3, 2000.

Same; Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated: [1] Length of delay; [2] Reasons for such delay; [3] Assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused; and [4] The prejudice caused by the delay.

Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, GR 136757-58, Nov. 27, 2000

Same; Not limited in a Criminal Proceeding but All Cases and Proceedings before Judicial, Quasi-judicial or Administrative bodies. The failure of the Ombudsman to resolve the complaints that have been pending for almost 4 years is clearly violative of this mandate and the rights of the petitioner as a public official. In such event, petitioner is entitled to the dismissal of the cases filed against him. Indeed, the Court directly dismissed the informations already filed before the Sandiganbayan against petitioner.

Lopez v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR 140529, Sept. 6, 2001.

RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL; The Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA 8493); The authority of the Sec. of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict w/ the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 7 of RA 8493. Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 prescribing the thirty-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section 10 of the same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence. The exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of "speedy trial" is "a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept." prudence and wisdom dictate that the court should hold in abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition for review questioning the resolution of the prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because the determination of whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the right to a speedy trial, cannot be simply reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the length of delay is not the lone criterion to be considered, several factors must be taken into account in determining whether or not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been

Solar Team Entertainment v. Hon. How, GR 140863, Aug. 22, 2000.

violated. The factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such delay. The importance of the review authority of the Secretary of Justice cannot be overemphasized; as earlier pointed out, it is based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies that holds that "mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts."

Same; Concept of Speedy Disposition of Cases Broader than Speedy Trial; The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair TRIAL RIGHTS and to Protect Citizens From Procedural Machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.

Abadia v. CA, GR 105597, Sept. 23, 1994.

State Immunity from Suit

A suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable.

Calub v. CA, GR 115634, April 27, 2000.

Legislative Depart-ment

Franchise; PAGCOR; A historical study of its creation, growth and development will readily show that it was never given a legislative franchise to operate jai-alai.

Del Mar v. PAGCOR, GR 138298, Nov. 29, 2000

Judicial Depart-ment

DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS; When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same.

Tala Realty Services Corp. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR 137980, June 20, 2000.

Jurisprudence; The Court’s interpretation of laws are as much a part of the law of the land as the letters of the laws themselves.

Evangelista v. Sistoza, GR 143881, Aug. 9, 2001.

SUPREME COURT; En Banc Cases; It includes all other cases as the Court en banc, by majority of its actual membership, may deem of sufficient importance.

Firestone Ceramics v. CA, GR 127022, June 28,

2000.

Same; Same; The Court en banc is not an appellate court to w/c a decision or resolution a Division may be appealed.

id., Dissenting opinion of Justice Gonzaga-Reyes.

Same; Supervision over Lower Courts and their Personnel; Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the presiding Justice of the CA to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Judge Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, supra.

JUDICIAL POWER; The inherent power of the Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them comformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse it.

Tocao v. CA, GR 127405, Sept. 20, 2001.

JUDICIAL REVIEW; The Court has control over a case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably w/ established legal process. It has the authority to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when a supervening event warrants it.

PP v. De los Santos, GR 121906, April 5, 2000.

Same; The SC has the discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition at bar where the issues have generated an oasis of concern, even days of disquiet in view of the public interest at stake.

Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 2000.

Same; The SC has inherent power to suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice. For equitable considerations, the Court has relaxed the application of otherwise stringent rules by giving due course to appeals filed out of time, treating petitions for certiorari as petitioners for review, and remanding the case for trial even though their previous dismissal had become final.

Anacleto v. Van Twest , GR 131411, Aug. 29, 2000.

LEGAL STANDING (Locus Standi); Strict interpretation; The question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness w/c/ sharpens the presentation of issue upon w/c the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” [i] Citizen suit. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [ii] Taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have a standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise of Congress of its taxing power or spending power. In the final analysis, the Court retains the power to

Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835, Aug. 14, 2000.

decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer’s suit.

Same; Same; The question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness w/c/ sharpens the presentation of issue upon w/c the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” [i] Citizen suit. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [ii] Taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer is deemed to have a standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer’s action is properly brought only when there is an exercise of Congress of its taxing power or spending power. In the final analysis, the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayer’s suit.

Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835, Aug. 14, 2000.

Same; Liberal Policy; A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation. In line w/ the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to society, the Court finds the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives, to have legal standing to file the petitions at bar, as they claim that the operation of jai-alai constitute infringement by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise.

Del Mar v. PAGCOR, GR 138298, Nov. 29, 2000.

Same; Difference between the Rule on Real-Party-in-Interest and the Rule on Standing; There is a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, as the latter has constitutional underpinnings. In the case at bar, petitioner has sufficiently alleged constitutional ramifications in the questioned public bidding of the PHILSECO that merit the attention of the Court. Moreover, the prospect of financial gains arising from the award of the sale of PHILSECO is enough personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to vest upon petitioner the locus standi to file the petition for mandamus. A winning bidder has personality to initiate proceedings to prevent setting at naught his right; otherwise, his right to due process would be violated.

JG Summit Holdings v. CA, GR 124293, Nov. 20, 2000.

DECISION; Faithful adherence to the requirements of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution is a paramount component of due process and fair play.

Yao v. CA, GR 132428, Oct. 24, 2000

Same; The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court w/o expressing therein clearly and

PP v. Baring, GR 137933, Jan. 28,

distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. This vital requirement is not only demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code whose roots may also be traced to the Constitutional mandate. A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal's assessments and conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law.

2002.

Same; Efficacy of the Decision; The judge who rendered the decision was not the one who tried and heard the testimonies of the witnesses. The complete records of the case, including the transcript of stenographic notes, were before Judge who rendered the decision and it can be fairly assumed that, in rendering the decision, the records were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by him. Indeed, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial.

PP v. Yatco, GR 138388, March 19, 2002.

Same; Memorandum Decision; Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusion of law of its own.

Ong v. CA, GR 113006, Nov. 23, 2000.

Same; Form of decision; There is no hard and fast rule as to the form of a decision. Whether or not the trial court chooses to summarize the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties is immaterial. What is called for is that the judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared and signed by the judge and that it should contain clearly and distinctly a statement of facts proved or admitted by the parties and the law upon w/c the judgment is based.

PP v. Ordoño, GR 12953 & 143533-35, July 10, 2000.

Same; Obiter Dictum; An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon

Villanueva v. CA, GR

some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.

142947, March 19, 2002.

PRINCIPLE ON HIERARCHY OF COURTS; While the Court has concurrent jurisdiction w/ the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice concerning the court to w/c application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ is allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

SGMC Realty Corp. v. Office of the Pres., GR 126999, Aug. 30, 2000; People v. Cuaresma , GR 67787, 1989; Enrile v. Salazar, GR 92163-64, 1990.

Same; It is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of hierarchy of courts. For "there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings," as eloquently declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes.

Sps. Mallari v. Arcega, GR 106615, March 20, 2002.

Same; While the petition is denominated as one for certiorari and prohibition, its object is actually the nullification of the PAL-PALEA agreement. As such, petitioners' proper remedy is an ordinary civil action for annulment of contract, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.

Rivera v. Espiritu, GR 135547, Jan. 23, 2002.

Same; Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the more that the appeal of the main case was already before it.

Yared v. Ilarde, GR 114732, Aug. 1, 2000.

Ombuds-man

Jurisdiction; The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges against a judge of the RTC relative to his handling cases before the court. The determination of whether a judge maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is EXCLUSIVELY a judicial function.

De Vera v. Pelayo, GR 137354, July 6, 2000.

INVESTIGATIVE POWERS; The duty of a government prosecutor to prosecute crimes does not preclude him from refusing to file information when he believes there is no prima facie evidence to do so. The Court will not intervene in this case. The power to withdraw the information already filed is a mere adjunct or consequence of the Ombudsman’s overall power to prosecute.

Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR 135775, Oct. 19, 2000.

Same; The POWER TO INVESTIGATE and TO PROSECUTE granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be ILLEGAL, UNJUST, IMPROPER or INEFFICIENT. The law does not make any distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. The clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official: is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated w/ the limited authority of the SPECIAL PROSECUTOR under Sec. 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct prelim. Investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases w/in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Hence, in this case, The Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute the criminal cases against respondents in the RTC, even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared w/ the regular prosecutors.

Same; it has been the consistent policy of the SC not to interfere w/ the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigative powers.

Mamburao v. Office of the Ombudsma

n, GR 139141-42, Nov. 15, 2000

Same; It is not the Court to review the Ombudsman’s exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before his office.

Blanco v. Sandiganbayan, GR 136757-58, Nov. 27, 2000

Same; Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be ILLEGAL, UNJUST, IMPROPER, or INEFFICIENT. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it w/ a wide latitude of investigative and prosecutorial powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. The Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint w/o going through a preliminary investigation as provided in Administrative Order No. 07 of the Office of the Ombudsman, otherwise known as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.”

Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Comm. On Behest Loans v. Ombudsman, GR 135482, Aug. 14, 2001; Pres. Ad Hoc Fact Finding Comm. V. Desierto, GR 137777, Oct. 2, 2001.

Same; The Ombudsman’s resolution of criminal cases under preliminary investigation cannot be the subject of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court w/c covers only judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC’s and other courts, whenever authorized by law. In other words, a party may appeal only from orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.

Nava v. COA, GR 136470, Oct. 16, 2001.

Same; However, judicial review of the actions of the Ombudsman via an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is available.

id; Baylon v. Ombudsman, GR 142738, Dec. 14, 2001.

Same; Limitations; (1) The Ombudsman may not pass upon errors of the prosecutor’s office in the exercise of powers intrinsic to the resolution itself of the case as that function pertains to the power of review of the Sec. of Justice.

Garcia-Rueda v. Amores, GR 116938, Sept. 20, 2001.

Same; Same; (2) The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a judge. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the SC for appropriate action.

Judge Fuentes, v. Office of the Ombidsman-Mindanao, GR 124295, Oct. 23, 2001

Same; Same; No Authority to Directly Remove or Dismiss Government Officials or Employees; Under Sec. 13, subpar. (3) of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only RECOMMEND the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The Ombudsman has no authority to sirectly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly, from his position in the BID.

Tapaidor v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR 129124, March 15, 2002.

Preliminary Investigation; Despite the Ombudsman’s non-compliance w/ the affidavit reqmt., petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and answered the charges against him. Hence, having submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and having allowed the proceedings to go on until the prelim investigation was terminated and the information filed w/ the Sandiganbayan, petitioner is deemed to have waived whatever right he may otherwise have to assail the manner in w/c prelim investigation was conducted.

Bautista v. Sandiganbayan, GR 136082, May 12, 2000.

Decision; Not Final and Executory; A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding respondent administratively liable for misconduct and imposing a penalty of 1 year suspension w/o pay – is not among those listed in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. There is no general legal principle w/c mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory. Sec. 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Similarly, the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating the execution pending review applies to administrative decisions of the CSC involving members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Adminitrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the said Act w/c provides for such suppletory application. Courts, may not, under the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the inclusion.

Gov. Lapid v. CA, GR 142261, June 29, 2000.

Sandigan-bayan

Jurisdiction; As construed in Garcia, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, PD 1606 creating the Sandiganbayan gave it LIMITED jurisdiction that did not include jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. After the Garcia decision, Congress enacted RA 7975 (An Act Strengthening the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose PD 1606, as Amended), w/c took

Abbot v. Mapayo, GR 134102, July 6, 2000; Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, GR 136806, Aug. 22,

effect on May 6, 1995. Sec. 4 © thereof EXPANDED the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

2000.

Same; It has FULL AUTHORITY to decide on all incidents in the ill-gotten wealth case, including the propriety of the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 135789, Jan. 31, 2002.

Sequestered Assets; The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to pass upon the parties’ compromise agreement is beyond dispute. The compromise agreement does not deal merely w/ private interest; it involves sequestered shares of stock - and the parties expressly acknowledged the need to obtain approval of the Sandiganbayan.

SMC v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104637-38, Sept. 14, 2000.

Recovery of Ill-gotten Wealth

Sec. 15, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution provides that such power is imprescriptible; It applies ONLY TO CIVIL ACTIONS and not to criminal cases.

Pres. Ad Hoc Fact Finding Comm. On Behest Loans v. Desierto, GR 130140, Oct. 25, 1999.

Sec. 15, Art. XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth,

Republic v. Desierto, GR 136506, Aug. 23, 2001.

Sequestra-tion Procee-dings

PCGG; Legal and Historical background; Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1, 2 and 14. “On the explicit premise that ‘vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad,’ the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created by EO No. 1 to assist the President in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth thus accumulated whether located in the Philippines or abroad.”

EO No. 2 states that the ill-gotten assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world.

EONo. 14, on the other hand, empowered the PCGG, with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, inter alia, to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under E.O. Nos. 1 and 2.

Republic v. COCOFED, GR 147062-64, Dec. 14, 2001.

Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal. Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged “one million coconut farmers,” the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.

Coco Levy Funds; Prima Facie Public Funds; the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public funds. Public funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivision of the State; more specifically, taxes, customs duties and moneys raised by operation of law for the support of the government or for the discharge of its obligations. Undeniably, coconut levy funds satisfy this general definition of public funds, because of the following reasons:1. Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State.2. They are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers.3. Respondents have judicially admitted that the sequestered shares were purchased with public funds.4. The Commission on Audit (COA) reviews the use of coconut levy funds.5. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), with the acquiescence of private respondents, has treated them as public funds.6. The very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.

Republic v. COCOFED, supra.

Right to vote Sequestered Shares; In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Cojuanco, Jr., the Court ruled that who should vote the sequestered shares requires the determination of the ill-gotten character of those shares and consequently the rightful ownership thereof.

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, GR 119609-10, Sept. 21, 2001.

Same; The right to vote sequestered shares of stock registered in the names of private individuals or entities and alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth shall, as a rule, be exercised by the registered owner. The PCGG may, however, be granted such voting right provided it can (1) show prima facie evidence that the wealth and/or the shares are indeed ill-gotten; and (2) demonstrate imminent danger of dissipation of the assets, thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the government until a decision, ruling with finality on their ownership, is promulgated by the proper court. However, the foregoing “two-tiered” test does not apply when the sequestered stocks are acquired with funds that are prima facie public in character or, at least, are affected with public interest. Inasmuch as the subject UCPB shares in the present case were undisputably

Republic v. COCOFED, supra.

NOTE: See dissenting opinions of Justices Vitug, Melo and Bellocillo.

acquired with coco levy funds which are public in character, then the right to vote them shall be exercised by the PCGG. In sum, the “public character” test, not the “two-tiered” one, applies in the instant controversy.

Writ of Sequestration: San Miguel Corporation (SMC); SMC shares were sequestered in 1986 and the government filed Civil Case No. 0033 in 1987 to determine whether they are part of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his cronies. Said case has remained unresolved by the Sandiganbayan. The DELAY is no longer tolerable for it locks in billions of Pesos w/c could well rev-up the sputtering economy. The Sandiganbayan must not be the burial ground of cases of far-reaching importance.

SMC v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104637-38, Sept. 14, 2000.

Same; The writ of sequestration issued against OWNI is not or has ceased to be valid because the suit in Civil Case No. 0009 against some defendants therein, as stockholders of OWNI, is not a suit against OWNI. Failure to implead these corporations and merely annexing a list of such corporations to the complaints is a violation of their right to due process for it would in effect be disregarding their distinct and separate personality w/o a hearing.

PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, GR 119609-10, Sept. 21, 2001.

Commis-sion on Election

COMELEC; Its powers may be classified into [1] adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory functions; and [2] administrative function or ministerial in character. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, w/c provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of the plebiscites; thus, said resolution may not be deemed a “final order” reviewable by certiorari by the Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary action before the trial courts.

Salva v. Makalintal, GR 132603, Sept. 18, 2000.

Same; The Court once more reiterates that the Constitution gives the Commission on Elections the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall. " 21 The Commission indisputably exercises the power of supervision and control over boards of election inspectors and boards of canvassers. The Commission must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. 22 The Constitution upgraded to a constitutional status the statutory authority under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 to grant the Commission broad and more flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and to serve as the guardian of the people's sacred right of suffrage.

O’hara v. COMELEC, GR 148941-42, March 12, 2002.

COMELEC EN BANC; No jurisdiction to hear Abad v.

and decide election cases in the first instance. The power pertains to the divisions of the COMELEC.

COMELEC, GR 128877, Dec. 10, 1999; Zarate v. COMELEC, GR 129096, Nov. 19, 1999.

Same; It does not have the requisite authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance. This power pertains to the Divisions of the COMELEC. Any decision by the COMELEC en banc as regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.

Soller v. COMELEC, GR 142907, Nov. 29, 2000.

Same; Exhaustion of Administrative remedies in the COMELEC; Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

Bernardo v. Abalos, GR 137266, Dec. 5, 2001.

House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of MEMBERS of the House of Representatives. Once a winning candidate is proclaimed, takes his oath, and assumes office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the protests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Guerrero v. COMELEC, GR 137004, July 26, 2000.

Same; Appeal directly to the COMELEC En Banc from the decision of the trial court of origin. Such recourse transgressed Sec. 3 (c), Art. IX of the Constitution.

Typoco v. COMELEC, GR 136191, Nov. 29, 1999.

Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus; Jurisdiction to issue; Both the SC and the COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue such writs. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Carlos v. Angeles, supra.

Civil Service Commis-sion (CSC)

Career Executive Service Officers (CESO); Appointments, assignments, reassignments, and transfers in the CESO are based on rank. Security of tenure in the CESO is thus acquired w/ respect to rank and not to position. Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, to better cope w/ the exigencies of public service, is the distinguishing feature of CESO.

Sec. of Justice v. Bacal, GR 139382, Dec. 6, 2000.

APPOINTMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM REASSIGNMENT; RE: DESIGNATION; An appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an

Dr. Osea v. Dr. Malaya, GR 139821, Jan. 30,

individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official.

2002.

Same; Permanent Status; It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed." First, in order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess the rank appropriate to the position. Second, security of tenure in the career executive service ("CES") is thus acquired with respect to rank, and not to position. The guaranty of security of tenure to members of the career executive service does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed — a concept w/c is applicable only to first and second-level employees in the civil service — but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.

Dimayuga v. Benedicto, GR 144153, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; Same; In the recent case of (De Leon v. Ca, GR 27182, Jan. 22, 2001), it held that the mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. In this case, the subsequent inclusion of petitioner’s position under CES, w/o the required eligibility, did not automatically qualify her fort he said position. The permanent status accorded to her appointment would only allow her to occupy said position until the appointing authority would replace her w/ someone who has the required eligibility therefor.

Dimayuga v. Benedicto, GR 144153, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; Acting Capacity; The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place

De Leon v. CA, 127182, Dec. 5, 2001.

or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

Same; Temporary Appointment; Petitioner was recommended to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, having been endorsement by the Provincial School Board. However, her qualification to the office lacks the essential ingredient, of appointment thereto. Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject to further advice from the DECS. Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity. Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Dr. Osea v. Dr. Malaya, GR 139821, Jan. 30, 2002.

SECURITY OF TENURE; Failure to make a courtesy call to the superior or to submit appointment papers is not a ground for dismissal. Failure to report to work in this case is not tantamount to abandonment. For failure to accord due process to respondent, the termination of her employment is illegal. Consequently, she is entitled to reinstatement, plus payment of back salaries.

Adiong v. CA, GR 136480, Dec. 4, 2001.

BACK SALARIES; Payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges. However, if the employee is not completely exonerated of the charges, such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would not be entitled to the payment of back salaries.

Castro v. Gloria, GR 132174, Aug. 20, 2001.

Terminal Leave; The money value of the terminal leave of a retiring government official shall be computed at the retiree’s highest monthly salary. In this case, petitioner’s highest monthly salary is that corresponding to position of Sec. of Finance w/c petitioner received while he was Acting Sec., during the travel abroad of the Secretary.

Belicena, v. Sec. of Finance, GR 143190, Oct. 17, 2001.

PARENS PATRIAE AND PATRIA POTESTAS; applied in the Civil Service; Paternal power should consist or be exercised w/ affection, not in atrocity. Is a government employee who has been ordered arrested and detained for a non-bailable offense and for which he was suspended for his inability to report for work until the termination of his case, still required to file a formal application for leave of absence to ensure his reinstatement upon his acquittal and thus protect his security of tenure? Concomitantly, will his prolonged absence from office for more than one (1) year automatically justify his being dropped from the

Municipality of Makati City v. CSC, GR 131392, Feb. 6, 2002.

rolls without prior notice despite his being already placed under suspension by his employer until the termination of his case, which finally resulted in his acquittal for lack of evidence? This case was resolved by the Court w/ a view to do justice to the worker where the punctilious adherence to technicality, the requirement that private respondent should have filed an application for leave of absence in proper form, petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension order couched in simple language that she was being suspended until the final disposition of her criminal case petitioner had actual notice, and the suspension order couched in simple language that she was being suspended until the final disposition of her criminal case. The meaning of her suspension until the final disposition of her case is that should her case be dismissed she should be reinstated to her position with payment of back wages. She did not have to apply for leave of absence since she was already suspended by her employer until her case would be terminated. We have done justice to the workingman in the past; today we will do no less by resolving all doubts in favor of the humble employee in faithful obeisance to the constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE; Automatic Leave of absence; As a general rule, Secs. 20 and 52, as well as Secs. 35 and 63 (Sec. 20 of the Civil Service Rules is now Sec. 52 of Rule XVI, on Leave of Absence, of Resolution No. 91-1631 dated 27 December 1991 as amended by CSC MC No. 41, s. 1998, and Sec. 35 is now Sec. 63 as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999.), require an approved leave of absence to avoid being on AWOL. 33 However, these provisions cannot be interpreted as exclusive and referring only to one mode of securing the approval of a leave of absence which would require an employee to apply for it, formalities and all, before exceeding thirty (30) days of absence in order to avoid being dropped from the rolls. There are, after all, other means of seeking and granting an approved leave of absence, one of which is the CSC recognized rule of automatic leave of absence under specified circumstances, i.e., where an applicant could not probable do so as he is legally and physically prevented from doing it or is beyond his control, or in case of illness (Sec. 20, CSC Rules). The rule of automatic leave of absence clearly falls within the constitutionally delegated power of the CSC and is reasonable under the circumstances to address absences from work which are not attributable to the concerned government employee.


CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC); Authority to Interpret its Own Rules; The CSC like any other agency has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them w/ its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. An administrative body has power to interpret its own rules which have the force and effect of law, and such an interpretation becomes part of the rule (Foley vs. Benedict, 122


Tex 193, 55 SW [2d] 805, 86 ALR 477). . . The contemporaneous construction of a statute (and similarly of rules and regulations) by the executive officers of the government whose duty it is to execute it is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts (United States vs. Philbrick, 120 U.S. 52, 30 L Ed. 559). And the interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer. Thus, Courts is guided in cases where the dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency of its own rules, we should apply only these standards: "Whether the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was within that delegation; and if so, whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test." An affirmative answer in each of these questions should caution us from discarding the agency's interpretation of it own rules.

Same; SUSPENSION; In placing private respondent under suspension until the final disposition of her criminal case, the Municipal Personnel Officer acted w/ competence so he presumably knew that his order of suspension was not akin to either suspension as penalty or preventive suspension since there was no administrative case against private respondent. As competence on the part of the MPO is presumed, any error on his part should not prejudice private respondent, and that what he had in mind was to consider her as being on leave of absence w/o pay and their ER-EE relationship being merely deemed suspended, not severed, in the meanwhile. This construction of the order of suspension is actually more consistent with logic as well as fairness and kindness to its author, the MPO. Significantly, the idea of a suspended ER-EE relationship is widely accepted in labor law to account for situations wherein laborers would have no work to perform for causes not attributable to them. We find no basis for denying the application of this principle to the instant case which also involves a lowly worker in the public service.


Same; DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS; Due process demands serving upon the employee himself the notice dropping him from the rolls. The City Government of Makati City slept on the request of private respondent to reinstate her on the basis of the condition in the order suspending her, i.e., her reinstatement upon her acquittal; instead, after three (3) long years, without prior warning and out of the blue, adversely by dropping her from the service for not filing an application for leave. The action of herein petitioner cuts too deeply into private respondent's right to continue her employment in the government and unduly dilutes the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and due process.


Same; REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES; In locking her out of her job, the City Government

Municipality of Makati

illegally deprived her of the opportunity to work and so must be held liable for such unlawful action. All in all, we hold that private respondent must be reinstated as Clerk III or a position of equivalent rank and compensation in the City Government. She must also be paid back wages and other benefits lawfully due her counted from 19 October 1994 when she presented herself for resumption of duties but was refused. This is very much consistent with the elementary rule that a government official or employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose reinstatement had later been ordered is considered as not having left his office (Justice Vitug is his separate opinion said the award of back salries should be reduced to 5 years conformably w/ the pronouncement of the Court in a long line of cases), so that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.

City v. CSC, GR 131392, Feb. 6, 2002.

Commis-sion on Audit (COA)

Hiring of Private Lawyers by Government Agencies; COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 1, 1986 RESTRICTS government agencies and instrumentalities from hiring private lawyers to render legal services or handle cases and provides that no funds shall be disbursed for payment to private lawyers UNLESS prior to the hiring of said lawyer, there is written conformity and acquiescence from the SOLGEN or the Government Corporate Counsel.

Polloso v. Gangan, GR 140563, July 14, 2000.

POWER TO EXAMINE AND AUDIT; Under Sec. 2 (1), Art. IX-D od the Constitution, the power of COA to examine and audit is NON-EXCLUSIVE. On the other hand, under Sec. 2 (2) of the same Article of the Constitution, COA’s authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is EXCLUSIVE. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as [a] when there is a private investment in a GOCC, or [b] when a government corporation is privatized or publicly –listed, or [c] as in the case at bar, when the government borrows money abroad, In these instances the government enters the marketplace and competes w/ the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To succeed, the government must abide w/ reasonable business practices of the marketplace. Otherwise, no investor or creditior will do business w/ the government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly shattered national economy as in the case at bar.

DBP v. COA, GR 88435, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors or creditors who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials, however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings and

DBP v. COA, GR 88435, Jan. 16, 2002.

conclusions of the COA, whether the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts.

Same; The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while non-exclusive (Sec. 3, Art. IX-D of the Constitution). The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even w/ a private auditor, the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. As the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COA’s findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are concerned.

DBP v. COA, GR 88435, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; Hiring of Private Auditors; Section 31 of PD No. 1445 merely grants authority to the COA to hire and deputize private auditors to assist the COA in the auditing of government agencies. Such private auditors operate under the authority of the COA. On the other hand, Section 8 of PD No. 2029 states in part that "The audit of government corporations by the COA shall not preclude government corporations from engaging the services of private auditing firms: Provided, however, that even if the services of the latter are availed of, the audit report of the COA shall serve as the report for purposes of compliance w/ audit requirements as required of government corporations under applicable law." Said Section also provides that the "policy of withdrawal of resident auditors shall be fully implemented . . ." Section 2 of the same decree also excludes from the term "GOCC" two classes of corporations. The first are originally private corporations the majority of the shares of stock of w/care acquired by government financial institutions through foreclosure or dacion en pago. The second are subsidiary corporations of government corporations, w/c subsidiaries are organized exclusively to own, manage or lease physical assets acquired by government financial institutions through foreclosure or dacion en pago.

DBP v. COA, GR 88435, Jan. 16, 2002.

Same; Same; Government Auditing Code of the Phils. (PD 1445, Secs, 26, 31, and 32) does not prohibit the hiring of private auditors by government agencies. Thus, Sec. 26 must be applied in harmony w/ Sec. 58 of the Central Banking Law of 2000 (RA 8791) w/c authorizes unequivocally the Monetary Board to require banks to hire independent auditors and Sec. 25 and 28 of the New Central Bank Act (RA 7653), w/c authorize expressly the Monetary Board to conduct periodic or special examination of all banks.

DBP v. COA, GR 88435, Jan. 16, 2002.

POWER TO REGULATE DISBURSEMENTS FUNDS AND DISALLOWANCES OF ILLEGAL OR

NEA v. COA, GR 143481,

IRREGULAR DISBURSEMENTS OF FUNDS; The Constitution specifically vests in the Commission the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in the disbursement of government funds and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. In the case at bar, NEA's accelerated implementation of the Salary Standardization Law II is not in accordance with law. The 1997 GAA is not self-executory so as to serve as outright legal authority for NEA to spend what had been appropriated for NEA's "Personal Services" under the 1997 GAA. Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the appropriated amounts as they may wish. It requires further process as the entire budget process consists of four major phases, namely: Budget Preparation, Budget Authorization, Budget Execution and Budget Accountability. After approval of the "proposed budget" by the DBM, the same is submitted to Congress for evaluation and inclusion in the appropriations law w/c sets forth the authorized appropriations of the departments and agencies. However, this "authorization" does not include the authority to disburse. A program of expenditures is first prepared showing approved programs and projects. An itemization of personal services is also prepared listing authorized itemized positions and their corresponding classifications and authorized salaries. As clearly stated in Section 60, Chapter 7, Book VI of the Administrative Code, "no portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salary increase or adjustment unless specifically authorized by law or appropriate budget circular." NBC No. 458 is the appropriate budget circular referred to by the law with respect to the payment of the last phase of the Salary Standardization Law II.

Feb. 15, 2002.

Omnibus Election Code

ELECTION; In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote," through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate." An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. Specifically, the term election, in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes.


FAILURE OF ELECTION; Calling of Special Elections; Before COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and second, the votes cast would affect the result of the election. And that the cause of such failure of election should have been any of the following:

Typoco v. COMELEC, GR 136191, Nov. 29, 1999; Carlos v. Angeles, GR 142907, Nov. 29, 2000.

force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud of other analogous cases. Clearly then, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In all instances there must have been failure to elect; this is obvious in the first scenario where the election was not held and the second where the election was suspended. As to the third scenario, the preparation and transmission of the election returns which give rise to the consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.

Same; The Comelec is duty-bound to conduct an investigation as to the veracity of respondents' allegations of massive fraud and terrorism that attended the conduct of the May 14, 2001 election.

Datu Ampatuan v. COMELEC, GR 149803, Jan. 31, 2002.

Same; Jurisdiction; The trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, w/c power is vested exclusively in the COMELEC sitting en banc.

Carlos v. Angeles, GR 142907, Nov. 29, 2000.

ELECTION RETURNS; Discrepancies; The wisdom of the order to examine the election returns is that . . . between another copy of the COC and the election returns, the latter could provide a more accurate basis for the determination of the true and genuine results of the votes cast. This is obvious because the former constitutes a mere summary of the latter and errors, deliberate or otherwise, may be committed in entering therein the figures obtained from the election returns. Besides, among the copies of the election returns readily available to the Commission, those intended specifically for it are the least likely to be tampered with after leaving the hands of the board of election inspectors. If it finds discrepancies in the election returns, Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the remedy w/c is a re-canvass of the election returns or the re-counting of the ballots.


Same; Manifest Errors; In the case of Trinidad vs. Comelec [320 SCRA 836, 843 (1999)] , definition of "manifest error" is that it is evident to the eye and understanding; visible to the eye; that which is

O’hara v. COMELEC, GR 148941-42, March

open, palpable, uncontrovertible; needing no evidence to make it more clear; not obscure or hidden. . . "A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, and is apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have committed . . . " In the case of Chavez vs. Comelec [211 SCRA 315 (1992)], this Court explained that. . . To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings. Thus, in this case, The alleged error w/c the MBC of Binangonan committed and w/c it attributes to physical exhaustion and sleepless nights, is obviously not a plain error apparent from the Certificate of Canvass.

12, 2002.

Same; Correction of Manifest Errors; Section 5 of Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC requires that the correction be one involving a manifest error such as "a mistake in the copying of the figures into the Statement of Votes or into the Certificate of Canvass." The provision, however, also requires that "such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence." The rationale for the provision is obvious. If the error sought to be corrected is truly a manifest error, then the matter should have already been raised before the board of canvassers. The exception is if the error is one that "could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence." In the case at bar, the error allegedly committed by the MBC of Binangonan, w/c it attempted to describe and rationalize in their affidavits, is one that should have been discovered even with ordinary diligence. The truth of the matter, however, is that the error, even assuming it to be true, is not manifest and was not apparent from the Certificate of Canvass and, therefore, cannot be corrected simply by correction of alleged tabulation error.


PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY; refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the BOC or any matter raised under Secs. 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the OEC, in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of ER’s. Sec. 243 of the Code enumerates the specific issues that may be raised in a pre-proc controversy. In addition to the RESTRICTIVE AND EXCLUSIVE SCOPE of its subject matter, all pre-proc controversies on ER’s or COC’s shall be disposed of summarily – by the BOC and then the COMELEC.

Chu v. COMELEC, GR 135423, Nov. 29, 1999; Siquia v. COMELEC, GR 135627, Dec. 9, 1999.

Same; The BOC and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind ER’s w/c are on their face regular and authentic. Being a summary proceeding, there is no room for the presentation of evidence

Chu v. COMELEC, GR 135423, Nov. 29,

aliunde. 1999; Siquia v. COMELEC, GR 135627, Dec. 9, 1999.

Same; A party seeking to raise issues the resolution of w/c would compel or necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of ER’s w/c are prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest.

Chu v. COMELEC, GR 135423, Nov. 29, 1999; Siquia v. COMELEC, GR 135627, Dec. 9, 1999.

Same; The legislative intent of the summary disposition of pre-proc controversy is to give life to the policy that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible for it is in the public interest that the position for w/c the election was held should be filled promptly, even though the proclamation of the winning candidates be provisional in nature, as the same may still be subject to the results of the election protests that may be subsequently filed. Besides the BOC’s are merely ad hoc bodies, existing only for the interim task of canvassing ER’s and do not have the facitlities, time, nor competence to hear, examine and decide on alleged election irregularities, unlike regular courts, the COMELEC, or the Electoral Tribunal.

Chu v. COMELEC, GR 135423, Nov. 29, 1999.

Same; It may be filed directly w/ the COMELEC pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC.

Pre-Proclamation Controversy vs. Annulment of Election Result, or Failure of Election; A pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections. These two remedies were more specifically distinguished in this wise: "While, however, the Comelec is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is w/o jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the Comelec is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the same. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean."

Loong v. COMELEC, 326 Phil. 790, 814, cited in Matalam v. COMELEC, 338 Phil. 447 (1997).

ANNULMENT OF ELECTION AND/OR FAILURE Datu

OF ELECTION; The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the Comelec of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal proclamation. In the case at bar, we cannot assume that petitioners' proclamation and assumption into office on June 30, 2001, was legal precisely because the conduct by which the elections were held was put in issue by respondents in their petition for annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections. We are not unmindful of the fact that a pattern of conduct observed in past elections has been the pernicious “grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest” slogan of some candidates or parties such that even if the protestant wins, it becomes "a mere pyrrhic victory, i.e., a vindication when the term of office is about to expire or has expired." . . . We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.

Ampatuan v. COMELEC, GR 149803, Jan. 31, 2002.

Same; The Comelec en banc has the authority to annul election results and/or declare a failure of elections as provided for in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Datu Ampatuan v. COMELEC, GR 149803, Jan. 31, 2002.

Same; The great breadth of the constitutional and statutory powers granted Comelec has brought to the fore judicial pronouncements which have long become guidelines. Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made.

O’hara v. COMELEC, GR 148941-42, March 12, 2002, cited Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883 (1968).

ELECTION CONTEST; Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. In any election contest, the ultimate issue is to determine the electoral will. In other words, who among the candidates was the voters' choice.


RA 6646 DISQUALIFICATION PROCEEDINGS; Sec. 6, RA 6646 authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification, even after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. Proclamation bars further proceeding of such nature.

Perez v. COMELEC, GR 133944, Oct. 28, 1999.

Same; Possible Remedies: (1)Move for the suspension of the proclamation reiterating his prayer in the petition for disqualification and in the vent it is denied, to file a petition for Certiorari in

Perez v. COMELEC, GR 133944, Oct. 28,

the SC w/ prayer for TRO; or (2) File a petition for Quo Warranto w/in 10 days after the proclamation.

1999.

Same; Disqualifications of Candidates for Public Office; Violation of BP 22 involves moral turpitude. The deletion in recent jurisprudence of the penalty of imprisonment and the imposition in lieu thereof, of a fine – does not mean that the offense no longer involves moral turpitude.

Villaber v. COMELEC, GR 148326, Nov. 15, 2001.

CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY; Failure to specify the public office he was seeking in his COC was not a fatal defect in this case.

Conquilla v. COMELEC, GR 139802, April 28, 2000.

Ballots; Counting of contested ballots. Since the main issue at hand is the contested ballots claimed by the parties, the computation shall be based on the number of uncontested ballots after revision at the lower court. Thus, petitioner who garnered 251 uncontested ballots would be credited with 29 valid votes per findings after revision. He therefore has a total of 280 votes. On the other hand, private respondent with 268 uncontested ballots shall be credited with 8 valid votes out of the 11 votes claimed, or a total of 276 votes.

Ferrer v. COMELEC, GR 139489, April 10, 2000.

Candidates for Elective Public Office; Certificate of Candidacy. Use of Nickname; Under par. (2), Sec. 74 of the OEC, 3 kinds of votes are considered stray: [1] a vote containing initials; [2] a vote w/c is illegible; and [3] a vote w/c does not sufficiently identify the candidate for whom it is intended. he first category of stray votes under this rule is not to be qualified by the third category in the sense that votes in initials only may be counted for a candidate provided that the initials would sufficiently identify the candidate voted for. Such construction of the rule fails to give meaning to the disjunctive conjunction OR separating the first category from the second, and the second from the third.

Villarosa v. HRET, GR 143351, Sept. 14, 2000.

Same; Same; Same; The initials “JTV” were used by petitioner as a nickname, for purpose of being voted upon. There is no law or rule that prohibits the adoption of initials as a nickname; nor is there any law or rule that requires that the initials adopted by a person as a nickname strictly correspond to his or her own initials. Petitioner is the lawful wife of Jose T. Villarosa and could legally present or identify herself as "Mrs. JTV". No law was transgressed when she registered "JTV" as her nickname in her certificate of candidacy. Therefore, the applicable provision of the OEC is Section 211, par (13), which sets out the rule for the appreciation of votes using nicknames. Said rule establishes that a nickname alone is a valid vote, provided: (1) it is that by which a candidate is generally or popularly known in the locality, and (2) there is no other candidate with the same nickname running for the same office. The underlying purpose for the rule, as explained in the

id.

opening provision of Section 211 of the OEC, is to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the voter, where such intention could be determined with reasonable certainty. To this end, every ballot is presumed to be valid and all doubts are to be liberally construed in favor of its validity if only to give effect to the will of the voter as reflected therein.

Same; Residency Requirement; The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate.

Torayno v. COMELEC, GR 137329, Aug. 9, 2000.

Election Protest; Payment of filing fees; The non-payment of the proper filing fees is no longer excusable and is a valid ground for the dismissal of election protests.

Soller v. COMELEC, 2000.

Same; Period for disposition of election protest must be observed faithfully.

Rizon v. Judge Zerna, supra.

Same; Opening of Ballot Boxes; When there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the determination and counting of ballots deposited therein.

Miguel v. COMELEC, GR 136966, July 5, 2000.

Timeliness of Motion; Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed on June 1, 1998 considering that May 31 was a Sunday, hence, he had until the next working day, w/c was June 1, w/in w/c to ask for reconsideration.

Conquilla v. COMELEC, supra.

RA 8189 Reassignment of Election Officers; Voter’s Registration Act of 1996 (RA 8189). Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. It does not violate equal protection: The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal

De Guzman v. COMELEC, GR 129118, July 19, 2000.

protection clause of the Constitution. Neither infringe security of tenure: The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. More so, undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint: Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. It is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress.

Party-List System

Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered w/ the COMELEC may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are: First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." [1] The 20% allocation: translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows: No. of district rep. ——————————— x .20 = No. of party-list rep.

.80This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, GR 136781, Oct. 6, 2000.

seats. Thus, Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling.[2] The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation. [3] In adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation. Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House. [4] To distribute additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law. Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party: Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of ———————— = first party relative to Total votes for total votes for party-list system party-list systemFormula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties:

No. of votes of Addt’l seats concerned party No. of addt’l. for concerned = ———————---- x seats allocated party No. of votes of to the first party

first party

National Economy and Patrimony

Fishpond Lease; The Fisheries Act prohibits the holder of a fishpond permit from transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to him, w/o the previous consent or approval of the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Diancin v. CA, GR 119991, Nov. 20, 2000.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas; Examination and Audit of Banks; Central Bank’s constitutional power of “supervision” over banks under Sec. 20, Art. XII of the Constitution includes the power to examine and audit banks. Thus, COA and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction under the Constitution to examine and audit government banks. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, w/c

DBP v. COA, GR 88435, Jan. 16, 2002.

succeeded the Central Bank, retained under the 1987 Constitution and the General Banking Law of 2000 (RA337) w/ respect to the independent audit of banks.

Urban Land Reform and Housing

The Urban Reform Law (PD 1517); RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL; The right of refusal applies only to tenants who have resided for ten (10) years or more on the leased land declared as w/in the Urban Land Reform Zone, and who have built their homes on that land. It does not apply to apartment dwellers. PD 2016, w/c amended PD 1517, did not extend its benefits to apartment dwellers. The said law grants the right of first refusal only to legitimate tenants who have built their homes on the land they are leasing.

Arlegui v. CA, GR 126437, March 6, 2002.

Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION; Originally, administrative supervision over homeowners’ associations was vested by law in the SEC. Pursuant to EO 535, however, the Home Insurance and Guarranty Corporation (HIGC) assumed the REGULATORY AND ADJUDICATORY FUNCTIONS of the SEC over homeowners’ associations. The powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC w/ respect to homeowners’ associations were later transferred to the HLURB pursuant to RA 8763.

Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Assn. v. Sps. Gaston, GR 141961, Jan. 23, 2002.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; HIGC exercises limited jurisdiction over homeowner’s disputes. The law confines its authority to controversies that arise from any of the ff. intra-corporate relations: [1] between and among members of the association; [2] between any and/or all of them and the association of w/c they are members; and [3] between the association and the State insofar as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity. The Complaint here is for damages. It does not assert membership in the SCHA as its basis. Rather, it is based on an alleged violation of the alleged right of access through the subdivision and on the alleged embarrassment and humiliation suffered by the plaintiffs.

Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Assn. v. Sps. Gaston, GR 141961, Jan. 23, 2002.

Educatio-nal Institutions

Incremental Tuition Fee Increases; The mandatory share of an educational institution in the SSS, Medicare and Pag-Ibig premiums of its employees may be charged against the 70% incremental tuition fee increase authorized under Sec. 5 (2) of RA 6728.

Cebu Institute of Medicine v. Cebu Institute of Medicine Employee’s Union, GR 141285, July 5, 2001.

Local Govern-ment Code

POWER TO APPOINT; Local Chief Executive; The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive. The power of the city council, on the other hand, is limited to creating, consolidating, reorganizing city offices/positions and confirmations.

Mathay v. CA, GR 124374, Dec. 15, 1999.

POWER TO LEGISLATE; Limitation; The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized under RA 1169, as amended by BP 42, the law w/c grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute remains valid today. Hence, a provincial board may not prohibit the lotto by ordinance or resolution. The power of the local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. This basic relationship between the local government unit and Congress has not been enfeebled by the new provisions of the Constitution strengthening local autonomy or the State policy requiring all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations w/ appropriate local government units (Secs. 2 [c] and 27 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

Lina v. Paño, GR 129093, Aug. 30, 2001.

BOUNDARY DISPUTE; The significance of the monument marker cannot simply be disregarded. It has a technical purpose of preserving the survey being conducted.

Prov. Of Camarines Norte v. Prov. Quezon, GR 80796, Oct. 11, 2001.

Claim against Local Government Officials and Private Counsel; In resolving whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered, as where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, w/c, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.

Mancenido v. CA, GR 118605, April 12, 2000.

Hiring of Private Counsel by Local Government Units; LGU’s may be represented by a private attorney only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified from representing a particular municipality, as in the ff. instances: (1) when the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies w/ the SC; (2) when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; or (3) when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise.

id.

RECALL; The Resolution providing for recall is no longer applicable inasmuch as the respondent had already vacated the office of the Vice Mayor to w/c the Recall was directed and has assumed the position of Mayor. Even if the Preparatory Recall Committee were to convene to adopt another resolution for the recall of respondent, this time as Mayor, the same would still not proper since no recall shall take place w/in one (1) year from the date the official assumes office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election.

Afiado v. COMELEC, GR 141787, Sept. 18, 2000.

Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA); The Pimentel v.

President of the Philippines may not withhold portions or alter any IRAs legally due to the LGUs.

Aguirre, GR 132988, July 19, 2000.

TAX ORDINANCE and REVENUE MEASURES; Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice w/in thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. The timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before a competent court is not a "mere technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are MANDATORY. Posting was validly made (The Ordinance was posted during the period from November 4-25, 1996 in three (3) public places) in lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy.

Hagonoy Market Vendor Assn. v. Hagonoy, GR 137621, Feb. 6, 2002.

Local Franchise Tax; Exemption claimed by the PLDT – not established. Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. It does not appear that, in approving Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers.

PLDT v. City of Davao, GR 143867, Aug. 22, 2001.

LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; Term of Office; To apply the disqualification under Sec. 8. Art. X of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur: [a] that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and [b] that he has fully serve the three consecutive terms. Under Sec. 43 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991, the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local post, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION of a term (as exception to the rule) does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.

Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR 147927, Feb. 4, 2002.

Public Officers

Code of Conduct; Sec. 5 of RA 6713 requires public officials and employees to respond to letters, telegrams or other communications from the public, w/in 15 working days from receipt thereof, stating the action taken thereon.

Notary Public; Ex-Officio Public Oficers; As ex-officio notary public or a public officer authorized to administer oath, cannot subscribe a document in w/c he is one of the affiants citing Art. 22 of the Notarial Law. The function of a Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public is one of the signatories to the instruments.

Vales v. Arzagao-Quijano, AM No. P-99-1338, Nov. 18, 1999.

Same; A notary public is not prohibited from acting at the same time as witness to the document notarized by him. The only EXCEPTION is when the document is a will.

Solarte v. Atty. Pugeda, A.c. No. 47512, July 31, 2000.

Same; The party acknowledging a document must appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of documents. Notarization is not an empty routine. It converts a private document into a public one and renders it admissible in court w/o further proof of its authenticity.

Coronado v. Atty. Felongco, A.c. No. 2611, Nov. 15, 2000.

Clerks of Court; Duties and Functions: Under Section 7, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court and Section A, Chapter II of the Manual for Clerks of Court, it is the clerk of court's duty to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the library of the court and the seal and furniture belonging to his office. As court custodian, it was his responsibility to ensure that records are safely kept and the same are readily available upon the request of the parties or order of the court. He must be diligent and vigilant in performing his official duties and in supervising and managing court dockets and records. 7 This custodial duty necessarily extends to evidence submitted by the parties and marked as exhibits.

Bongalos v. Monungolh, A.M. No. P-01-1518, Nov. 14, 2001.

Same; Custody of Funds; Clerks of Court may not keep funds in their custody. All collections from bailbonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections shall be deposited within twenty-four (24) hours by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon receipt thereof, with the Land Bank of the Philippines. Undue delay in remitting collections amounts no less to grave misfeasance if not malversation of funds. No protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Failure of a Clerk of Court to turn over money deposited with him and to explain and present evidence thereon constitutes gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and even malversation of public funds which this Court will never countenance as they indubitably diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.

Mallare v. Ferry, A.M. NO. P-00-1381 and A.M. No. P-00-1382, July 31, 2001.

Same; A clerk of court had no authority to mediate among constituents.

Arroyo v. Alcantara,

A.M. No. P-01-1518, Nov. 14, 2001.

Sheriff; The sheriff has the primary responsibility of ensuring the speedy and efficient service of court processes and orders. In the discharge of his duty a high degree of professionalism is demanded. For it cannot be overemphasized that a decision or process that is left unexecuted or unserved because of the inefficiency, negligence, misconduct, or ignorance of the law of those charged with their execution inevitably delays the administration of justice and rightly deserves the condemnation of the parties who are prejudiced thereby. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the service of summons may be entrusted to the sheriff. The sheriff has the duty to serve the process promptly and to make a return of his service within a reasonable time. This is necessary in order for the court to determine if the period for filing an answer has not yet expired.

Talion v. Ayupan, A.M. No. P-01-1529, Jan. 23, 2002.

Same; Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice. As agents of the law, they are called upon to discharge their duties with due care and utmost diligence because in serving the court's writs and processes and implementing its orders, they can not afford to err without affecting the integrity of their office and the efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court, Sheriff Nequinto was obliged to conduct himself with propriety and restraint. He cannot make use of his public office to oppress or abuse a party especially a sensitive financial institution like the DBP. His conduct showed unjustified braggadocio. He did not comply with the set procedure in the rules.

DBP v. Nequinto, A.M. NO. MTJ-01-1376, Jan. 23, 2002.

Same; Ministerial duty to promptly enforce writs of execution.

Aquino v. Lavadia, A.M. No. P-01-1483, Sept. 20, 2001; Visitacion v. Ediza, A.M. No. P-01-1495, Aug. 9, 2001.

Same; Respondent sheriff was tasked to enable a prevailing party to benefit from the judgment. After 9 years, complainant is entitled to realize the law’s promise that his right to possession would be vindicated as speedily as possible to preserve peace and order in the community.

Valencia v. Valeña, A.M. No. P-00-1409, Aug, 16, 2000.

Same; Rule 141, Sec. 9, final paragraph, governs the payment of expenses for the enforcement of writs of execution.

Tiongco v. Molina, A.M. No. P-00-1373, Sept. 4, 2001.

Same; Respondent is guilty of misconduct for his failure to prepare an estimate of expenses to be incurred in executing the writ, for w/c he must seek the court’s approval; to render an accounting; and to issue official receipt for the total amount received from the judgment debtor; and for deducting the money he should have deposited in court the amount for expenses the former incurred.

Tan v. Dael, A.M. NO. P-00-1392, July 13, 2000.

Same; Only the payment of the sheriff’s fees can be lawfully received by a sheriff and acceptance of any other amount is IMPROPER, even if it were applied for lawful purposes. A sheriff acts irregularly when he submits his Sheriff’s Partial Report and Sheriff’s Return w/o liquidating the amounts previously received.

Ignacio v. Payumo, A.M. No. P-00-1396, Oct. 24, 2000.

Govern-ment Employees

Grounds for Dismissal; Grave Misconduct and Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service; A gov’t. employee should be dismissed from the service not only for his failure to give due courtesy and respect to his superiors or to maintain good conduct and behavior, but because of his defiance of basic norms or virtues w/c a government employee must uphold at all times.

Maningas v. Barcenas, AM No. P-99-1315, Nov. 3, 1999.

Same; Dishonesty; Failure to turn over the excess of the bid price.

Neeland v. Villanueva, AM No. P-99-1316, Oct. 29, 1999.

Administrative Law

PUBLICATION; Mandatory requirement for the effectivity of BOI Manual of Operations that is meant to enforce or implement BP 391 (Incentives for Registration of New or Expanding Export Producers), a law of general application.

Pilipinas Kao v. CA, GR 105014, Dec. 18, 2001.

ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS; Public School Teachers; Their mass action was for all intents and purposes a strike, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work. Dismissal orders of Dept. Heads are immediately executory even pending appeal. Under Sec. 47(2), Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, the decision of a department secretary confirming the dismissal of an employee under his jurisdiction is executory even pending appeal thereof. Since dismissal orders remain valid and effective until modified or set aside, the intervening period during which an employee is not permitted to work cannot be argued as amounting to unjustified suspension.

Acosta v. CA, GR 132088, June 28, 2000.

Same; Same; Petitioners, who were earlier dismissed for allegedly participating in a mass action/strikes, are entitled to their back salaries upon their reinstatement after they were found guilty only of violating reasonable office rules and regulation and penalized only with reprimand.

Caniete v. Sec. of Education, GR 140359, June 19, 2000.

Same; Phil. National Police (PNP); The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or charges against any member of the PNP is laid down in RA 6975, otherwise known as the "Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990." This law defines the summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors, among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer." Memo. Circular No. 92-006 prescribes the "Rules and Regulations in the conduct of summary dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members" and defines conduct unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule II, as: “Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any behavior or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to remain as a member of the organization. On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the performance of duty" are defined in Memo. Circular No. 91-002. It is a light offense, incurred, among others, by a member of the PNP who shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or smell of alcohol on his breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2.A, Rule VI).

The Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita, supra.

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS; A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself. Admissions by respondent during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify his dismissal.

Remolona v. CSC, 2001.

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION; Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4) states that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e. if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the

Gloria v. CA, GR 131012, April 21, 1999.

final penalty of suspension or dismissal.

Administrative Cases; Right to Counsel; Said right is not imperative in administrative investigations.

Sebastian, Sr. v. Garchetorina, GR 114028, Oct. 18, 2000.

Same; Due Process; The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times essential to due process, the reqmts. Of w/c is satisfied where parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side. The filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfills the rqmts. of due process.

Damasco v. NLRC, GR 115755, Dec. 4, 2000.

Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. There is greater reason for not requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case since the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself.

Sec. of Justice v. Bacal, 2000.

Same; Death of Respondent; The charges against respondent Antonio were referred to Judge Parazo for investigation, report and recommendation, and therafter, to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. Respondent was able to answer the complaint and substantiate his defenses. While the administrative case was pending, respondent die. His heirs moved for the dismissal of the case against him and to facilitate the release of whatever benefits may have accrued to him during his 20 years in service. The Court resolved that respondent Antonio's death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any criminal action against him for malfeasance in office. However, we are not precluded from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him.

Office of the Court Administrator v. Atty. Saguyod, A.M. Nos. P-96-1229-30, March 25, 2002.

Appeals from Administrative Decisions; Philippine Civil Service Law does not allow the complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee. The above doctrine may have been modified to allow the CSC to appeal decisions exonerating an employee. Nonetheless, excepting the privilege of appeal granted to the CSC, the law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges.

Justice Melo, dissenting in Flora v. Sunga, 2001.

Same; Administrative charges comprising grave or less grave offenses filed against judiciary employees are to be immediately referred to the Court En Banc, from whose decision there is no

id.

appeal.

Desistance; Subsequent desistance by the complainant in an administrative case does not necessarily warrant its dismissal.

Rizon v. Judge Zerna, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1575, Sept. 17, 2001.

RULE-MAKING POWER of Administrative Agencies; Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF); The HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Sec. 5 of RA 7742 and Sec. 13 of PD 1752. However, rules and regulations w/c are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law should be w/in the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the object and purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.

Romulo Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles v. HDMF, GR 131082, June 19, 2000.

Same ; Same ; Sec. 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations implementing RA 7742 and HDMF Circular No. 124-B prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for filing application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, are null and void insofar as they require that an employer should have both provident fund/retirement plan and a housing plan superior to the benefits offered by the Fund in order to qualify for waiver or suspension of the Fund Coverage.

id.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES AND PENALTIES; Immorality; A grave offense but first offenders are only suspended as provided for under Section 23 (O), Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws) that for disgraceful and immoral conduct <1st Offense, Suspension for six (6) months and one day (1) day to one (1) year; 2nd Offense, Dismissal.>" Moreover, such suspension is w/o pay under the general proposition that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.

Castro v. Gloria, GR 132174, Aug. 20, 2001.

Same; Dishonesty; A grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense. Need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty. Although no pecuniary damage was incurred by the gov’t., there was still falsification of official document that constitute gross dishonesty.

Remolona v. CSC, GR 137473, Aug. 2, 2001.

Same; Same; The entry in the record of birth that respondent is married is certainly spurious. Why she has not taken any legal step to have it corrected clearly indicates her predeliction to dishonesty.

Flora v. Sunga, A.M. No. CA-01-10-P1, Nov. 14, 2001.

Same; Same; Demanding and receiving “grease Office of the

money” for the implementation of a writ of demolition.

Court Administrator v. Magno, A.M. No. P-00-1419, Oct. 17, 2001.

Same; Dishonesty and Falsification of Official Document; This case involves falsification of DTR. Dishonesty under Rule XIV, Sec. 23, of the Omnibus Rules of the Civil Service is punishable by dismissal on commission of the first offense. The penalty becomes even more deserved when the dishonesty amounts also to falsification of an official document the penalty for which is dismissal from the service, it being grave in nature, under Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1989, of the CSC re Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Administrative Cases. Thus we have not hesitated in previous cases to impose the ultimate penalty of dismissal on officials and employees found guilty of the offense.

The Court Administrator v. Abdullahi, A.M. No. P-02-1560, March 20, 2002.

Prescription of Offense; Administrative offenses do not prescribe.

Flora v. Sunga, A.M. No. CA-01-10-P1, Nov. 14, 2001.

Govern-ment Agencies and Instrumentalities;

Urban Land Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279); Eviction and Demolition; RA 7279, is not applicable to the instant case. Sect. 28 of the said law which partially provides that: Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds;(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.The petitioner subsequently seeks the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction on account of the demolition of the houses and forcible eviction of its members from the Calderon compound conducted by the respondents in alleged violation of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 7279. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the said demolition and eviction were done legally and in accordance with the Orders of the trial court; that the trial court found that the relocation site in Gaya-gaya was already fully developed for occupancy; and that the petitioner agreed and undertook to transfer its members to the said relocation site on or before April 15, 1997 provided that the amenities are substantially completed. With the complete development of the relocation

Nagkakaisang Kapisanan Kapitbahayan sa Commonwealth Ave. v. CA, GR 135865, July 20, 2001.

site at Gaya-gaya, to which the remaining members of the petitioner can be relocated, and considering the said Memorandum of Agreement of the parties, respondent Court of Appeals correctly found and ruled, in effect, that there is no factual and legal basis to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the respondents to allow the members of the petitioner to return to the Calderon compound especially since the facilities and structures of the lot owner, respondent Toyota, have already been established therein. In other words, petitioner's reliance on Republic Act No. 7279 in connection with its prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction is indeed misplaced.

Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP); E.O. No. 561 creating the COSLAP was issued in 1979. Relative thereto, Section 3(2) of the executive order provides:Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, that the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.The Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. However, appeals from

Sy v. COSLAP, GR 140903, Sept. 12, 2001.

the COSLAP may not be brought directly before us in view of Rule 45, Section 1. Likewise, if a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy, the Court of Appeals cannot be bypassed without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this connection, it cannot be doubted that the COSLAP is among those quasi-judicial agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions. No convincing reason exists why appeals from the COSLAP should be treated differently from other quasi-judicial agencies whose orders, resolutions or decisions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, the enumeration of the agencies therein mentioned is not exclusive. In that sense, Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 declaring that the COSLAP's orders, resolutions or decisions are appealable exclusively to this Court is erroneous in the light of Section 1, Rule 45 and Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,

Same; EO 561 creating the COSLAP. Jurisdiction over land disputes involving occupants of the land in question and pasture lease agreement holders.

Alcantara v. COSLAP, GR 145838, July 20, 2001.

Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB); Jurisdiction and Regulatory Powers; Exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory powers of the HLURB under PD 957 (issued on July 12, 1976), PD 1344 (issued on April 2, 1978, EO 648 dated Feb. 7, 1981 and EO 90 dated Dec. 17, 1986. The HLURB and not the SEC has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision developer (under receivership) for specific performance regarding basic homeowners’ needs such as water, security and open spaces. The ruling has consistently been that the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply w/ its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of that jurisdiction. The appointment of a receivership does not dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere w/ the exercise of its corporate rights. Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more secure, existing rights; it cannot be used as an instrument for the destruction of those rights.

Arranza v. B.F. Homes, GR 131683, June 19, 2000.

Same; Jurisdiction; An aggrieved townhouse buyer may seek protection from the HLURB under PD 957, otherwise known as “Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree.” A direct resort to the SC questioning the Arbiter’s refusal to issue writ of execution is improper and premature. The 1996 Rules of Procedure of the HLURB provides that the decision of the Arbiter is reviewable by the Board Commission. In turn, any party may appeal the Board of Commissioner’s

Atty. Cole v. CA, GR 137551, Dec. 26, 2000.

decision to the Office of the President, the aggrieved party can resort to the CA.

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA); Bids and Awards of Contracts; HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmistakable right to be declared the winning bidder w/ finality, such that the SBMA can be compelled to negotiate a Concession Contract w/ HPPL. The SBMA Board Resolution declaring HPPL as the winning bidder is subject to the control and supervision of the Office of the President. All projects undertaken by SBMA require that approval under LOI NO. 620 dated Oct. 27, 1997. The President may, w/in this authority, overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Directors FOR JUSTIFIABLE REASONS. The discretion to accept or reject a bid, or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the courts will not generally interfere w/ the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless it is apparent that such exercise of discretion is USED TO SHIELD UNFAIRNESS OR INJUSTICE.

Hutchison Ports Phils. v. SBMA, GR 131367, Aug. 31, 2000.

Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB); The PAB has not been divested of its authority (under RA 3931 entitled “An Act Creating the National Water and Air Pollution Control Commission,” as amended by PD 984) to hear pollution cases connected w/ mining operations – by virtue of the subsequent enactment of RA 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995) and in relation to EO 192, series of 1987 (The Reorganization Act of the DENR). While the mines Regional Director has express administrative and regulatory powers over mining operations and installations, it has no adjudicatory powers over complaints for violation of pollution control statutes and regulations. Such powers pertain to PAB.

Republic v. Marcopper Mining Corp., GR 137174, July 10, 2000.

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR); Has a valid franchise by itself but not in association w/ any other person or entity to operate, maintain and/or manage the game of jai-alai.

Del Mar v. PAGCOR, GR 138298, Aug. 24, 2001.

Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA); PRA is a government-owned and controlled corporation under the Office of the President. It was created to oversee an unconventional program designed to meet the tight foreign exchange situation in the country. Its objective is to promote and develop the Philippines as a retirement destination for foreign nationals and former Filipino citizens. To become a PRA member, a retiree must maintain a minimum U.S. dollar time deposit account with a PRA-accredited bank. The PRA then converts this account into active investment. In return, the foreign retiree is extended benefits and incentives, such as grants of certain tax exemptions, resident status, balikbayan privileges, etc. The qualified retiree is also given a multiple entry Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV). Should he decide to withdraw his dollar account, he shall surrender his passport to the PRA for cancellation of the SRRV by

PRA v. Rupa, GR 140519, Aug. 21, 2001.

the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID). The PRA shall then issue the retiree's withdrawal clearance to the bank where he has a deposit. Only then shall the bank concerned return the dollar deposit to the retiree.

Board of Investment (BOI) ; Form and contents of BOI Decisions ; Lacking of the essential attribute of a decision, the acts in question were at best interlocutory orders that did not attain finality nor acquire the effects of a final judgment despite the lapse of the statutory period of appeal.

Pilipinas Kao v. CA, GR 105014, Dec. 18, 2001.

Bureau of Immigration has authority to correct its own records.

Go kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy, GR 137674, Sept. 20, 2001.

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS); Liable for damages resulting from the negligence of its employees.

GSIS v. Sps. Gonzalo, GR 135644, Sept. 17, 2001.

Same; Housing assistance to the less-privileged GSIS members and their dependents. 5 year restriction on the assignment of the awardees’ rights or the resale of the lot awarded to them.

San Agustin v. CA, GR 121940, Dec. 4, 2001.

Sugar Regulatory Administration; Social Amelioration Benefits (SAB). The classification of COA as to who were entitled to the SAB and excluding therefrom those employees hired after October 31, 1989, has no legal basis. Evidently, any distinction among employees must be based on substantial differences, that is, level or rank, degree of difficulty and amount of work. To discriminate against some employees on the basis solely of date of hiring is to run against the progressive and social policy of the law. The Commission on Audit, in COA Decision No. 96-020, ruled that the board resolutions of the Sugar Regulatory Administration could no longer be considered as the "prior authority" for the release of the social amelioration benefits as per R. A. No. 6758 and CCC No. 10. It further ruled that such benefits may be granted if there was a prior authority from the Office of the President. Yet, when the SRA employees were finally able to secure a post facto approval/ratification from the Office of the President, the COA declared, by sweeping statement, that only those hired before October 31, 1989, were entitled to the SAB. It did not mention any legal basis or justification for the distinction. R. A. No. 6758 and CCC No. 10 do not make any distinction between those hired before and after October 31, 1989. Neither did the 1st Indorsement of the Office of the President make any such distinction. The legal maxim that "when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court" apply in this case.

Cruz v. COA, GR 134740, Oct. 23, 2001.

Public Estate Authority (PEA); The government agency tasked by the Bases Conversion Development Authority to develop the first-class memorial park known as the Heritage Park, Located in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila.

PEA v. Uy, GR 147933-34, Dec. 12, 2001.

Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC); EO 1008 vest upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected w/ contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Phils., whether the disputes arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the CA can now review questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law in appeals from judgments or final orders of the CIAC.

Metro Construction v. Chatam Properties, GR 141897, Sept. 24, 2001.

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC); Nature of office and Functions; The NTC was created pursuant to EO 546, promulgated on July 23, 1979. It assumed the functions formerly assigned to the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau, w/c were both abolished under the said Executive Order. Previously, the NTC's functions were merely those of the defunct Public Service Commission (PSC), created under CA 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act, considering that the Board of Communications was the successor-in-interest of the PSC. Under EO 125-A, issued in April 1987, the NTC became an attached agency of the Department of Transportation and Communications. In the regulatory telecommunications industry, the NTC has the sole authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems. Such power includes the authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for telecommunications services. Specifically, Section 16 of the Public Service Act authorizes the then PSC, upon notice and hearing, to issue Certificates of Public Convenience for the operation of public services within the Philippines "whenever the Commission finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner."

Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., GR 147096, Jan. 15, 2002; Bayan Telecommunications v. Express Telecommunications Co., GR 147210, Jan. 15, 2002.

Same; Provisional Franchise; Rule 15, Sec. 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure, which provides:“Sec. 3. Provisional Relief. — Upon the filing of an application, complaint or petition or at any stage thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own initiative, the relief prayed for, based on the pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting documents attached thereto, without prejudice to a final decision after completion of the hearing which shall be called

id.

within thirty (30) days from grant of authority asked for.” While the 1993 Revised Rules deleted the phrase "on its own initiative;" accordingly, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission.

Same; Tax Exemptions; Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Phils. (RA 7925). The grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. When exemption is claimed, it must be shown indubitably to exist. At the outset, every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. It is only when the terms of the concession are too explicit to admit fairly of any other construction that the proposition can be supported. In this case, the word "exemption" in §23 of R.A. No. 7925 could contemplate exemption from certain regulatory or reporting requirements, bearing in mind the policy of the law. It is noteworthy that, in holding Smart and Globe exempt from local taxes, the BLGF did not base its opinion on §23 but on the fact that the franchises granted to them after the effectivity of the LGC exempted them from the payment of local franchise and business taxes. In approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we hold that §23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

PLDT v. City of Davao, GR 143867, Aug. 22, 2001.

Department of Natural Resources and Environment (DENR); Confiscation, Forfeiture and Disposition of Gathering Timber or Other Forest Products w/o License; By authority of the Sec. of the DENR, subject vehicles seized in accordance w/ law are validly deemed in custodia legis and are not subject to an action for replevin.

Calub v. CA, GR 115634, April 27, 2000.

Same; Same; Under Sec. 68-A of the Forestry Code of the Phils., the Sec. of the DENR or a duly authorized representative has EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY to order the confiscation in favor of the government of vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code. [Admin. Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Dept. Admin. Order (DAO) No. 59-90 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations). On the other hand, Sec. 68 of the same Code penalizes the transportation,

DENR v. Daraman, GR 125797, Feb. 15, 2002.

movement or conveyance of forest products w/o legal documents and the criminal case is w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC. However, the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case is IMMATERIAL to the confiscation of the vehicle under Sec. 68-A w/c involves a different matter cognizable by the DENR Secretary. Hence, the RTC cannot order the release of the confiscated vehicle on the ground that the accused in the criminal case was acquitted.

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL; The legal representative of the government of the Republic of the Philippines and its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer, excepting only as may otherwise be provided by law. That the City Warden appears to have acquiesced in the release order of the trial court by his compliance therewith does not preclude the SOLGEN from taking contrary position and appealing therefrom.

City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, GR 141211, Aug. 31, 2001.

Public Bidding; The right to top, the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) in favor of KHI-PHI violated the rule on competitive public bidding. While it may be argued that the right to top was aimed at giving the best financial advantage to the government, the manner by w/c right was conceived and arrived at in this case manifested bias in favor of KHI, clearly brushing aside the rule on fair competition and completely disregarded the stipulation in the JVA between NIDC and KHI of the 60%-40% capitalization arrangement. Consequently, the APT rendered nugatory the constitutional and contractual proscriptions clearly to favor a foreign investor.

JG Summit v. CA, GR 124293, Nov. 20, 2000.

Same; Not required under the circumstances of these cases: involving GSIS disposition of acquired assets (Urbano v. GSIS, GR 137904, Oct. 9, 2001); purchase of Terumo blood bags by the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (Baylon v. Ombudsman, GR 142738, Dec. 14, 2001).

Government Infrastructure Contracts; Realizing the need to adopt a comprehensive, uniform, and updated set of policies, guidelines, rules and regulations covering government contracts for infrastructure and other construction projects in order to achieve a more efficient and effective implementation of these projects, PD 1594 was enacted to prescribe policies, guidelines, rules and regulations for government infrastructure contracts. Petitioner’s dredging contract w/ NAPOCOR being considered as a government infrastructure contract (“a construction, improvement or rehabilitation of roads and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings, and other related construction projects that form part of the

JC Lopez & Associates v. COA, GR 128145, Sept. 5, 2001.

government capital investment.”), is subject to the provisions of PD 1594 (Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure Contracts) and its IRR. An "infrastructure project" such as Petitioners’ having acquired mobilization lump sum as provided in the dredging contract is, and should be, considered an advance-payment item which forms part of the contract price and not an addition thereto;" and "subject to the conditions provided under CI 4 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations for P.D. No. 1594 that upon the written request of the contractor, the government shall make an advance payment in an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the total contract price, subject to recoupment from periodic progress billings submitted by the contractor.

GOCC’s Jurisdiction; Corporations organized pursuant to the Corporation Code of the Phils. are under the SEC, even if the majority or controlling shares thereof are owned by the government.

PNCC v. Pabion, GR 131715, Dec. 8, 1999.

Same; The SEC may not have authority over government corporations w/ original charters or those created by special law, it does have jurisdiction over “ACQUIRED ASSTES CORPORATIONS” as defined in Admin. Order No. 59.


Same; The SEC en banc has competence to distinguish a private corporation from a GOCC.


Definition; Par. (13), Sec. 2, Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, i. e., any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. The definition mentions three (3) requisites, namely, first, any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation; second, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and, third, owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock. Thus, Legaspi Oil, Inc., Granexport Manufacturing Corp. and United Coconut Chemicals, Inc., are private corporations.

Leyson v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR 134990, April 27, 2000.

Water Districts; The members of the board of directors of water districts are not entitled to receive benefits and allowances in excess of those allowed by PD 198 (as amended by PD 768 and PD 1479) and the guidelines of the Local Water

Baybay Water District v. COA, GR 147248-49,

Utilities Administration (LWUA) and other applicable law. RA 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, does not apply to water districts nor refer to the compensation of its board of directors who do not receive salaries but per diems for their compensation. The right to compensation of members of the board of directors of water districts is limited to per diems.

Jan. 23, 2002.

jurisprudence in political law

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