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A Historical Constructivist Perspective of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy

Katsuhiko Mori

International Christian University

Abstract: Why did Japan attempt to take a leadership role on some occasions, while it

became a bystander or even a dragger on other occasions? By examining three cases of

environmental diplomacy, i.e., hosting the Kyoto conference on climate change, the

Nagoya conference on biodiversity, and the diplomatic conference for the Minamata

Convention, this paper will identify the key drivers of effectiveness in Japan’s

environmental diplomacy from the perspective of historical constructivism. The study

accounts for the historical trajectory and conjunctures of Japan’s environmental

diplomacy in the changing global environmental governance with a combination of

power, interests, and ideas across time and areas of concern at both international and

domestic levels.

Introduction

Why did Japan attempt to take a leadership role on some occasions, while it became

a bystander or even a dragger on other occasions? In the 1980s, Japan was accused of

being one of the world’s “eco-outlaws,” especially regarding the tropical timber,

whaling, and ivory trades.1 Since the 1990s, Japan has become more active in hosting

multilateral environmental conferences, such as the 1997 Third Session of the

Conference of Parties (COP-3) of the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on

Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 2010 COP-10, the fifth Meeting of the Parties to the

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (MOP-5) of the Convention on Biological Diversity

(CBD), and the 2013 Diplomatic Conference for the Minamata Convention on Mercury.

These conferences were concerned with the atmosphere, biosphere, and hydrosphere,

which were on the diplomatic agenda in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s, respectively.

On the one hand, these conferences appear to be symbolic signals of Japan’s

environmental diplomacy, especially by adopting the protocols and conventions using

the names of the Japanese host cities: Kyoto, Nagoya, and Minamata.2 However, there

is a difference between hosting these conferences and contributing to the conference

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outcomes. Japan lost credibility and the opportunity to take environmental leadership by

deciding not to participate in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol,

and by having not ratified the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing (ABS)

and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. On the other hand, Japan ratified the Minamata

Convention relatively early, before it will enter into force.

What are the key driving forces of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental

diplomacy? This paper will answer this question from the perspective of historical

constructivism. The next section will establish a framework of analysis for the historical

trajectory of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. The following sections will account for

the three cases of environmental diplomacy in deconstructing and reconstructing the

changing global environmental governance with a combination of power, interests, and

ideas across time and areas of concern.

A Comprehensive Analysis Framework

Historical Trajectory of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy

To what extent was Japan’s environmental diplomacy successful or not successful

in which areas of environmental concern? To answer this question, it is first important

to identify the historical trajectory and conjunctures of Japan’s symbolic environmental

diplomatic actions, such as hosting conferences for multilateral environmental

agreements (MEAs), inviting international organization headquarters to Japan, hosting

summitry meetings, and committing and disbursing environmental official development

assistance (ODA). Japan’s environmental diplomatic actions are varied, with different

conjunctures in different environmental issues, such as the atmosphere, biosphere,

geosphere, and hydrosphere.

As shown in Table 1, the history of international environmental governance can be

roughly periodized using the UN environmental summits as thresholds, although there

were some early attempts, such as the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and

the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, before the 1972 UN

Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm.

A salient feature of the main issues that the 1972 Stockholm conference dealt with

was the “internationalization” of environmental pollution issues or transboundary

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environmental pollution. At that time, Japan was preoccupied with domestic

environmental pollution and there were no transboundary environmental issues. The

Diet session held in late 1970 was called the “Pollution Diet,” which discussed a series

of environmental pollution-related legislation and established the Environment Agency

in 1971. Compared with Sweden and Canada, Japan’s environmental diplomacy was

premature. Japan joined the MEAs created in the 1970s many years later. Japan entered

the World Heritage Convention (WHC) in 1992, the Convention on International Trade

in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1980, and the International

Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) in 1983. Currently,

Japan is not under the geographical coverage of the Long-Range Transboundary Air

Pollution (LRTAP) Convention, and Japan is not a member of the Convention on the

Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (the Bonn Convention). Stockholm

was a starting point of Japan’s environmental diplomacy. A Japanese diplomat had the

idea of hosting a second UNCHE for further learning. In reality, Deputy Prime Minister

Takeo Miki officially expressed such an idea to the UN Secretary-General Kurt

Waldheim, but it was not realized.3

The session of a special character of the Governing Council of the UN Environment

Programme (UNEP) was held in Nairobi in 1982. The Nairobi conference was

characterized as “worldization” in the sense that the socioeconomic dimension of the

North–South problems became the main agenda. Rather than human (social) and

environmental pillars, economic development was the main concern for developing

countries. In 1982, Japan responded to this demand by proposing the establishment of a

World Commission on Environment and Development to UNEP. Japan also hosted the

first World Lake Conference in 1984. Japan also increased its ODA rapidly in the

middle of the 1980s and became the world’s largest donor in 1989. Japan joined the

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1988 and the Montreal

Protocol in 1989, although Japan was a dragger in the early phases of the ozone

negotiations. Japan was the world’s largest timber importer, and its responsibility for

deforestation was seriously criticized by the early 1980s. Japan invited the headquarters

of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) to Yokohama in 1986. The

negotiations on the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of

Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

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(UNCLOS) also faced difficulties due to the North–South divide. Japan joined the Basel

Convention in 1993 and the UNCLOS in 1996.

A dominant idea of the 1992 Rio conference is characterized as the “globalization”

of environmental issues, as symbolized by the emphasis on the “common” element of

the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which was applied to all three

Rio conventions on climate change, biodiversity, and desertification. Japan played some

intermediate roles by hosting the Kyoto conferences on CITES in 1992, and on climate

change in 1997, and playing a mediator role in adopting the Cartagena Protocol on

Biosafety in 2000.4 The UN Commission on Sustainable Development established by

the Rio summit became a forum to create the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions

related to hazardous materials. Instead of socioeconomic world trade, toxic chemicals

were recognized as a “global” environment issue, in the sense of global distillation, or

the “grasshopper” effect, by which persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are vaporized at

high temperatures and blow around on winds and travel to cooler places in the Arctic

and high-altitude areas in the global climate process.

At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, the

three pillars of environment, economy, and society were reconfirmed and public–private

partnerships of multiple stakeholders were widely recognized. Japan hosted the third

World Water Forum in 2003. Japan’s environmental diplomacy seemed revitalized

when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in

a landslide in the August 2009 general election. At the UN General Assembly in

September 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama pledged a 25% reduction in

greenhouse gases below 1990 levels by 2020 leading up to the 2009 Copenhagen

conference, and expressed in May 2010 the idea of hosting the diplomatic conference

for the Minamata Convention on Mercury. However, after Copenhagen talks failed,

Japan decided not to join the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 2010.

Japan also hosted the COP-10 of CBD, where the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, the

Nagoya Protocol, and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol were

adopted. However, Japan has not yet ratified these Protocols.

At the 2012 Rio+20, new diplomacy for sustainable development began. After

Japan experienced the triple disaster of earthquakes, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown in

2011, voters gave the LDP a landslide victory in 2012. In October 2013, Japan hosted

the Diplomatic Conference on the Minamata Convention on Mercury, and ratified it in

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February 2016. In 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the

Sustainable Development Goals were adopted at the UN General Assembly, and the

Paris Agreement on climate change at the COP-21 of the UNFCCC.

Table 1: Historical Trajectories of Japan’s Environmental Diplomacy

Drivers of Effectiveness

How can the driving forces and effectiveness of Japan’s environmental diplomacy

be conceptualized? This section will establish an analytical framework (Figure 1) from

the historical constructivist perspective.

Figure 1: Framework of Analysis

tmosphere Biosphere/Geosphere Hydrosphere

Ramsar(71)IWC(46)

1972Stockholm

LRTAP(79)

WorldHeritage(72)CITES(73)Bonn(79)

MARPOL(73)

1982Nairobi

Vienna(85)Montreal(87)

ITTO(86)Basel(89)

KyotoCOP8(92)

UNCLOS(82)WLC(84)

1992Rio

UNFCCC(92)

Kyoto(97)

UNCBD(92)KushiroCOP5(93)

UNCCD(94)RoSerdam(98)Cartagena(00)Stockholm(01)

Watercourses(97)

2002Johannesburg

Cancun(10) Nagoya(10)Nagoya-KL(10)

WWF3(03)

2012Rio+20

Paris(15)

Minamata(13)

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First, foreign policy is defined as a set of ideas and other inputs intended in

managing foreign affairs, while diplomacy is conceptualized as the practice and actions

taken through which inputs are mobilized in handling foreign affairs to produce specific

outputs. Although early works, such as Gabriel Almond’s developmental approach,5

identified some historical tendencies, the systematic input–process–output thinking

often becomes ahistorical in the sense that a linear pathway to teleological development

is assumed.

Environmental diplomacy is a process through which diplomatic actions are taken

and inputs are mobilized to produce specific outputs on the environment. This process

of actions emerges at the historically constructed conjunctures in global environmental

governance trajectories described in the previous section. Japan’s diplomatic position

may be as a leader, supporter, mediator, dragger, bystander, or something else.6 When

Japan acts as a chair of a multilateral environmental conference, it is also important to

explore negotiation management. Elements of negotiation management may include:

transparency and inclusiveness, capability and authority of the conference chair, and

negotiation modes.7

To understand and explain drivers of effectiveness in Japan’s environmental

diplomacy, it is important to reconsider the classical input–process–output model

dynamically with reference to John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris’ proposed 3 × 3 matrix for the study of environmental foreign policy.8 “Input” can be conceptualized as a

combination of three basic causal variables, power, interests, and ideas,9 which emerge

INPUTS DIPLOMACY OUTPUTS OUTCOMES IMPACTS

KeyDrivers•  Power•  Interest•  Idea/knowledgeLevelofAnalysis•  stem•  tate DomesCc•  ociety/Individual

EffecCveness

(DiplomaCc)(Environmental)

Short-term•  Decision•  Output•  Resultant

Medium-term(behavioralchange)•  PrecontemplaCon•  ContemplaCon•  PreparaCon•  AcCon•  Maintenance•  TerminaCon

Long-term(environmentalimpact)•  ProtecCon•  ConservaCon•  RestoraCon

History•  Trajectory•  ConjunctureProcess•  Leader•  Supporter•  Mediator•  Dragger•  Bystander

(ForeignPolicy)(Diplomacy)

Drivers

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at a specific historical conjuncture and are used or constrained for diplomatic

intervention.

The orthodox levels of analysis—international system, state, and society—are the

location where these causal variables interact dynamically in diplomatic processes,

which are contextualized using historical trajectory as a unit of analysis. Some variables

embraced by agents may become driving forces to promote intended foreign policy,

while others may be constrained as structural variables. Between agents and structures,

institutions at both international and domestic levels may be arranged to promote or

constrain intended foreign policy.

Power can be concentrated or distributed in a unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar world

at the international system level. In the changing context of the post-World War II

international system, Japan can be considered to have transformed itself from a small

power to a middle power. Normative ideas and international institutions are inherent to

middle power diplomacy especially in development and environment issues, as shown

in Canada and Sweden. Following the scenarios posited by Robert Cox, Japan’s

middlepowermanship can be viewed in the following options: a revived US hegemony

supported by Japan, an enlarged G7/G8/G20 in which Japan functions as a principal

power, a neomercantilist world of rival blocks, in which Japan works as a regional

hegemon, and a multilevel, counterhegemonic vision of greater diffusion of power for

which Japan is a potential leader.10 At the state level, the position of environmental

authority in Japan’s government institutions can work as a catalyst for environmental

policy and diplomacy. In 1971, the subcabinet level Environmental Agency was

established and it was upgraded to the cabinet level Ministry of the Environment in

2001. After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, the Nuclear Regulation Authority was

established under the Ministry of the Environment in 2012. In 1999, the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs created the Global Environment Division under the International

Cooperation Bureau. And in 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the

ambassadorial position of Director-General for Global Issues. At the society level,

Japanese-style neocorporatism with the government, business, and labor unions has

been recognized since the 1970s, especially after the oil crises.

Considering interests, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta provided an interest-based

framework focusing on ecological vulnerability and abatement costs of countries, which

are categorized as bystanders, pusher, draggers, and intermediates. 11 However,

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economic interests of abatement costs in the short term at home can be further

elaborated by costs of inaction in the long run and competitive advantages of abatement

technologies and practices at the international system level. 12 Environmental

vulnerability at home is difficult to analyze because some environmental issues are

transboundary, regional, or global. For instance, desertification tends to be regarded as

an issue for other countries, although the Tottori sand dunes are an area of

desertification in Japan. Different ministries may interpret national interests at the state

level differently. For instance, climate policy is closely related to not only

environmental policy, but also energy and industrial policies. National interest at the

international level may also be interpreted in connection to another environmental or

nonenvironmental regime. For instance, it is understood that Russia’s acceptance of the

Kyoto Protocol was made in exchange for Russia’s entry into the World Trade

Organization.

Ideas and scientific knowledge can be key input variables. Public opinion and civil

society campaigns based on norms can lead, follow, or have nothing to do with

environmental diplomacy. Some normative ideas across time may or may not be spread

throughout Japan and the world. The key idea of sustainable development, e.g., is not

always referring to environmentally sustainability, but also sustainable social

development and sustained economic growth.13 The role of individual moral leaders

and media is also important. Not only normative ideas, but also scientific knowledge,

another form of intangible ideas in epistemic communities, can be included as a key

input.

Effectiveness

As the dependent variable, there exists a loose consensus on the three types of

effectiveness suggested by Oran Young’s conception on regime effectiveness: outputs,

outcomes, and impacts.14 These are equivalents of what Davenport calls “effectiveness

in a negotiated outcome,” “effectiveness as enforcement,” and the “effectiveness of

agreement,” respectively. 15 In development community practice, planning and

implementation are identified in a line of “inputs,” “activities,” direct immediate term

“outputs,” medium-term “outcomes,” and long-term “impacts.” 16 In the case of

biodiversity, the Drivers–Pressures–States–Impacts–Responses (DPSIR) framework

was applied to the new Strategic Plan for Biodiversity. Policy responses can be made to

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all the levels of drivers, pressures, states, and impacts. In this paper, diplomatic

effectiveness refers to short-term outputs and medium-term outcomes, while

environmental effectiveness refers to long-term environmental impacts.

Inputs will be transformed into outputs, which are agreements or disagreements that

resulted from diplomatic interactions at specific conjunctures. Following Allison’s

classic model of foreign policy decision-making, outputs are rational “decisions,”

“outputs” of organizational processes, or negotiated “outcomes,” which are often

unintended “resultants.” 17 The outputs can be outcome documents that describe

regulations, mechanisms, and institutions to be created.

Outcomes are medium-term changes in the behavior of actors. They include

implementation and policy actions by the government, and the behavioral changes of

other stakeholders. Following the transtheoretical model of behavioral change, different

stages of behavioral change can be posited: precontemplation, contemplation,

preparation, action, maintenance, and termination.18

Impacts here are defined as the problem-solving effectiveness of long-term

environmental impacts. Environmental impacts can be conceptualized separately from,

jointly, or integrated with other dimensions of sustainable development. Environmental

impacts can be protection (or preservation), conservation (or sustainable use), or

restoration (or redress) of the natural environment.

Case 1: Kyoto

Japan’s Climate Diplomacy

Japan was the host country of the COP-3 where the Kyoto Protocol on climate

change was adopted, so why did Japan express its opposition to extend the Kyoto

Protocol at the COP-16 in Cancun? Japan was still a major economic power and the

fifth largest greenhouse gas emitter, so why did Japan lack diplomatic presence at the

COP-21 in Paris? Japan’s climate diplomacy in Kyoto, Cancun, and Paris shows

Japan’s trajectory from being an attempted mediator to being a less-visible bystander

through a dragger.

When Sukio Iwatare, the head of the Environment Agency, officially offered to

host the COP-3 in 1996 in Geneva, he had mixed feelings. Knowing that CO2 emissions

from Japan in 1995 already exceeded the 1990 levels by about 7–8%, he was concerned

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that this trend would undermine the credibility of Japan’s leadership in Kyoto. At the

same time, however, he saw it would be a good opportunity for not only Japan’s

environmental diplomacy, but also democratization of Japanese foreign policy-making

by involving non-State actors, including businesses, labor unions, and nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs). He was a social democrat in the coalition government led by

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (LDP).

Domestic politics were unstable, and in September 1997, Hashimoto reshuffled his

Cabinet and appointed Hiroshi Oki (LDP) as the new head of the Environment Agency.

Although Oki served as the COP-3 President, the actual negotiation was managed by

experienced Argentine diplomat Raul Estrada-Oyuela as chair of the Committee of the

Whole (COW). Many observers questioned and even ridiculed the Japanese presidency,

when Oki, during the COP-3 session, almost had to return to Tokyo to prevent a

nonconfidence vote against the Hashimoto Cabinet. When Japan became the 74th ratifier

of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, three years before it entered into force, Hiroshi Oki was

the Environment Minister of the coalition government led by Prime Minister Junichiro

Koizumi (LDP).

At the beginning of the COP-16, Jun Arima, a chief negotiator from the Ministry of

Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI, formerly the Ministry of International Trade and

Industry (MITI)) said, “Japan will not inscribe its target under the Kyoto Protocol on

any conditions or under any circumstances.”19 One year after the failure of climate talks

in Copenhagen, his statement was a surprise to the other delegations in Cancun. Japan

dishonorably won the first place award as the Climate Action Network’s “Fossil of the

Day.”

At the COP-21, Japan became less visible. Japan gave only one official press

conference for the foreign press, but avoided being awarded the “Fossil of the Day”

during the COP-21. In the second week of the negotiation, when the “high ambition

coalition” was visible, Japan did not participate until the very end of the conference. A

Japanese government source said, “What’s better than not getting a dishonorable

award? Environment Minister Tamayo Marukawa has actively participated in

negotiations, including 13 bilateral meetings.”20 Some observed that “Japan bashing”

had now changed into “Japan passing.”

Drivers of Effectiveness

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The key drivers and constraints for Japan’s climate diplomacy are explained by

interest-driven coalition building both at home and abroad. Japan’s climate diplomacy

in the conjunctures of Kyoto, Cancun, and Paris was also bombarded by the shocks of

the US, Premier Hatoyama, and the 3.11 disasters, respectively.

The source of Japan’s position making in Kyoto was the bureaucratic rivalry

between the then MITI representing business interests and the then Environment

Agency supported by environmental NGOs. To persuade the opponents within the

government, both camps sought for “foreign pressure” or gaiatsu. At the international

system level, while the EU was active in forcing other countries to comply with the

UNFCCC, non-EU developed countries, or JUSSCANNZ (Japan, US, Switzerland,

Canada, Norway, and New Zealand, later called the Umbrella Group) were generally

reluctant to strengthen the UNFCCC regime. The US initially avoided using the word

“protocol,” but agreed to the Berlin Mandate (named by the US) to begin a process to

adopt “a protocol or another legal instrument” at the COP-1, which was presided by

Angela Merkel. At the COP-2, for the first time, the US officially supported a legally

binding agreement. Following the US position, MITI proposed a “feasible” (or critics

called “too little, too late”) emission reduction target for Japan that aimed to be as lower

as possible to stabilize the 1990 levels, i.e., 0%. By contrast, the Environment Agency

proposed a “challenging” target of 5.7% reduction, in an attempt to mediate between the

pusher position of the EU and the dragger position of the US. Prime Minister

Hashimoto intervened in the interministerial rivalry to set the reduction rate at 5%, but

the Japanese position was overridden by the US at the COP-3. The US shock in Kyoto

further traumatized Japan’s climate diplomacy in 2001 when the George Bush

administration declared that it had no interest in implementing the Kyoto Protocol and

intended to withdraw the US signature from the accord.

Japan’s climate diplomacy attracted international attention in September 2009 when

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ) announced at the UN General Assembly that

Japan would aim to reduce its emissions by 25% by 2020 on the premise that all of the

major economies would agree on the ambitious target in Copenhagen. Hatoyama’s

initiative was driven by his top-down political leadership, but the Japan Business

Federation strongly opposed it. Hatoyama’s diplomatic campaign failed to create

momentum for climate talks in Copenhagen, where the US and China collided. Instead,

Hatoyama’s campaign had a negative impact on Japanese bureaucracy, which drove

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Japan’s surprise speech in Cancun. Arima’s speech was expressed as an official

statement supported by not only METI, but also the Ministry of the Environment and

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.21

The COP-3 and COP-15 meetings were held during very sluggish economic

conditions for Japan. The currency and financial crisis in Asia, starting from July 1997,

slowed the growth of Japan’s exports to Asia. The collapse of the Hokkaido Takushoku

Bank and Yamaichi Securities in November 1997 destabilized the Japanese financial

system, which affected financial confidence. Japanese export-led economic growth was

hit harder by the world financial crisis of 2008–2009 than the US or the EU, while the

appreciation of the yen provided Japan with a permissive cause for cheap import of

fossil fuels.

The failure of Copenhagen also affected more skepticism in multilateral

environmental negotiations, and Japan sought for minilateral (such as G7/G8/G20) and

bilateral diplomatic actions. The relative weight of the Foreign Ministry increased after

resolving the differences between METI and the Ministry of the Environment. When

Japan chaired the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, the Foreign Ministry created and made

the best use of the position of Director-General for Global Issues (Ambassador) in

charge of global negotiations.

Effectiveness

The Kyoto Protocol was a diplomatic resultant rather than an outcome of

organizational processes or rational decisions. The figures of emission reduction by 8%

for the EU, 7% for the US, and 6% for Japan specified in the Kyoto Protocol were

diplomatically created when US Vice President Al Gore met Prime Minister Hashimoto.

Neither MITI nor the Environment Agency was involved in this process. It was

understood that the seemingly high target of 8% for the EU would be not so difficult to

achieve when the former East Germany and other central European countries were

taken into account. The relatively modest 6% target for Japan could actually be the most

economically challenging among the industrial countries from the perspective of the

MITI and Japanese businesses because they felt they have already made their best

efforts in improving energy efficiency after the oil shock. The expression, “wringing a

dry towel,” was often used to describe this output.

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Japan’s climate diplomacy at COP-3 walked a tightrope. The negotiations on the

issue of forest sinks were confused at the very late stage of the Kyoto conference. Once

COW Chair Estrada adopted that forest sinks would not be allowed for the first

commitment period. Yet with the request from Japan this issue was re-negotiated and

agreed in early morning of the last day of the meeting.22

While Japan achieved its Kyoto Protocol commitments for the first commitment

period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008–2012), its achievement tools were forestry

absorption and the Kyoto mechanism, especially through the purchase of emission

rights from other developed countries. The amount of emissions in Japan fluctuated

with the ups-and-downs of the economy. The relatively low level of emissions during

the 2008 world financial crisis was superseded by an increase in fossil fuel consumption

after the economic recovery and after the 3.11 tragedy.

When the COP-13 of 2007 adopted the Bali Road Map for the two tracks of

negotiations, the Convention track and the Kyoto Protocol track, the trauma Japan

experienced after Kyoto and the subsequent US shock inhibited Japan’s behavioral

change for activism. The COP-16 set a transitional period from 2013 through 2020 with

a combination of the Cancun Agreements (the pledge and review approach only for

Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Russia) and the second commitment period of the

Kyoto Protocol (the cap and trade approach for the EU, Australia, and other Annex B

countries). For Japan, the Kyoto Protocol was neither fair nor effective any longer: “it is

unfair, since only the Parties under the Kyoto Protocol are bound by the Kyoto Protocol,

while other major economies such as the US and China have no legally binding

commitments. Also, it is ineffective in terms of achieving emissions reduction at global

scale.”23 Japan stressed repeatedly, “the total CO2 emissions from the Parties under the

obligation of the Kyoto Protocol account for only 27%.” Japan also noted that “it is very

unlikely that the US and China will participate in the new future,” and that “it is

groundless to believe that the US and China will follow to accept legally binding

commitments once developed countries take a lead in undertaking their obligations.”

As such, Japan’s perspective was betrayed again at the COP-21 in Paris, where the

US and China took the lead in producing the legally binding Paris Agreement. Japan’s

limited inputs to the substance of the Paris Agreement included bureaucratic wording

for the ambiguous concept that was difficult to understand, and defining the entry into

force conditions. Because the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) countries

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strongly opposed using the expression, “market mechanisms” for mitigation actions, the

Japan-proposed phrase “cooperative approaches that involve the use of internationally

transferred mitigation outcomes” was adopted in Article 6. Japanese bureaucracies often

intentionally use this kind of opaque expression. In this case, the real intention of

Japanese negotiators was to ensure that Japan’s proposed bilateral Joint Crediting

Mechanism could be used under this concept. Another input was Article 21, which

determined that the agreement would enter into force after 55 parties ratified the

Convention accounting for at least 55% of total greenhouse gas emissions. These

conditions are the same as the Kyoto Protocol, and Japan strongly adhered to these

numbers. This is because China and the US could not be allowed to run away again.

These examples indicate that Japan had not yet recovered from the trauma of the Kyoto

Protocol.

To evaluate the environmental impact of Japan’s climate diplomacy, a scientific

assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was used as a

reference. The IPCC was established by the World Meteorological Organization and the

UN UNEP in 1988, and issued a series of assessment reports for important conjunctures

of climate negotiations. The IPCC’s first assessment report issued in 1990 served as a

scientific basis for creating the UNFCCC regime, and its second assessment report

issued in 1995 provided a momentum for the Berlin Mandate process to adopt the

Kyoto Protocol. However, the emission reduction target of the Kyoto Protocol was far

behind the IPCC’s second scientific assessment, which noted that “to keep the

concentration at the present level, emissions would have to be reduced drastically to

30% of present immediately and to less than 20% by 2050.”24

As compared to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement’s objective to limit global

warming to well below 2 degrees and to pursue efforts for 1.5 degrees above

preindustrial levels is much more consistent with evidence-based recent assessment.

However, the aggregated Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)

submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat was not enough to meet these objectives, and

could bring 2.7 degrees of warming. Japan’s INDC submitted in July 2015 includes an

emission reduction target of 26% below 2013 levels by 2030, which is equivalent to

18% below 1990 levels by 2030. This target was regarded as being both infeasible and

inadequate. It is not feasible because the nuclear generation target between 20–22% is

unrealistic economically and not supported socially after Fukushima. It is inadequate

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because if all countries adopted this level of less-ambitious emission reduction targets,

global warming would likely exceed 3–4% in this century.25

Case 2: Nagoya

Japan’s Biodiversity Diplomacy

Japan hosted the Nagoya conference in 2010, so why did not Japan ratify the

Nagoya Protocol on ABS and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol?

Aichi Target 16 says, “by 2015, the Nagoya Protocol … is in force and operational,

consistent with national legislation.” The Nagoya Protocol entered into force in 2014;

therefore, this target was achieved internationally, but Japan has not yet ratified it. Japan

was a mediator for the Cartagena Protocol, but Japan has not yet ratified the

Supplementary Protocol. Therefore, it appears that Japan’s position for CBD diplomacy

shifted from being a mediator to being a laggard.

Nagoya was another candidate city for the COP-3 of the UNFCCC. However, at the

meeting of the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE) in 1997, Japan won against

Canada’s Calgary to host the 2005 World Exposition in Aichi, with the theme of

“Nature’s Wisdom.” Toyota Motor Corporation, which is based in Aichi, helped to

form a majority of the BIE member voters by playing the card of Toyota’s second

manufacturing plant in Europe. The Japanese government made the best use of the

venue of this international specialized exposition by using forest and conservation sites

and the nearby city of Toyota as a high-technology base in appealing to the CBD’s

COP-10 participants.

In the historical trajectory of Japan’s biodiversity diplomacy, however, Japan often

acted as a dragger or a laggard while being a supporter of selected issues. Japan adhered

to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and joined the IWC in

1951. So far, Japan has hosted six IWC meetings. With the US proposal, the 1972

Stockholm Conference recommended a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling,

although the IWC rejected the proposed moratorium. When the IWC passed a

moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982, Japan filed a formal objection. Japan

withdrew its objection in 1986 and ended commercial whaling in the Antarctic by

March 1987. However, Japan has issued special scientific permits in the Antarctic and

in the western North Pacific every year since 1987–1988.

16

Local communities and environmental NGOs have extended Japan’s commitment

and support of the conservation of wetlands and the implementation of the Ramsar

Convention widely. Kushiro became Japan’s first Ramsar site, where COP-5 was held

in 1993. This contributed to raise awareness of Ramsar and wetland conservation, and

since then engagement has increased to 46 sites in 2016.

The Stockholm Conference sparked a series of multilateral environmental regimes.

Japan’s acceptance of the WHC, which was adopted in 1972, was long delayed until

June 1992 when Japan became the 125th member. In 1992, the concept of “cultural

landscape” was introduced. Among the 18 Japanese world heritage sites, only four are

natural (Ogasawara Island, Shirakami-Sanchi, Shiretoko, and Yakushima), and others

are cultural.

In 1980, Japan accepted the CITES, which was adopted in 1973. Initially Japan had

reservations about nine listings, although it removed these reservations by the early

1990s. Japan hosted the CITES COP-8 in Kyoto in 1992, when the new Conservation

Act was enacted. However, Japan currently has reservations on seven species of whales

listed in Appendix I and nine species of sharks listed in Appendix II. The Convention

on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), also known as the

Bonn Convention, which was adopted in 1979, has 120 members. However, Japan has

not yet joined the Bonn Convention because whales and sharks are included in the CMS

species list.

The negotiation for the UNCLOS, which includes the protection and preservation

of the marine environment, was a marathon that started in 1974 and ended in 1982.

Japan signed the UNCLOS in 1983 and ratified it in 1996. In 1999, New Zealand and

Australia requested the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to

prescribe provisional measures in their disputes with Japan over southern bluefin tuna.

The ITLOS did so, although the arbitral tribunal later found that it did not have

jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. Two Japanese judges, Soji Yamamoto and

Shunji Yanai, were elected to the ITLOS chamber, and Yanai has served as President of

the ITLOS.

The Rio conference did not produce a global forest treaty; however, the

International Tropical Timber Agreement of 1983 was revised in 1994 and again in

2006. Japan was one of the largest tropical timber importers (China has now become the

largest tropical log importer; however, Japan’s tropical plywood imports increased in

17

the 1990s), and the ITTO was headquartered in Yokohama in 1986. The ITTO issued

guidelines on the conservation of biological diversity in tropical production forests in

1993, and updated it as the Guidelines for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of

Biodiversity in Tropical Timber Production Forests, in collaboration with the

International Union for Conservation of Nature in 2009. The ITTO with the CBD

Secretariat also launched a collaborative initiative for tropical forest diversity in the

Year of Biodiversity 2010 and the International Year of Forests 2011.

Unlike the previously mentioned treaties in the field of biodiversity, Japan signed

the CBD immediately after the treaty was open for signatures at the June 1992 Rio

Conference on the assumption that other countries would also do so. However, the US

did not ratify the CBD, which was like déjà vu of Kyoto for Japan.

Drivers of Effectiveness

At the international system level, the relative weight of the G77+China presence

was higher for the Nagoya negotiations without the presence of the US as a formal

member of the CBD. With the firm negotiation stance of G77+China, a fear of another

failure like Copenhagen was widely shared by the COP-10 delegations. Japan expected

to adopt a new nonbinding strategic plan after its poorly performed 2010 Biodiversity

Target without serious diplomatic difficulties, but the prolonged negotiations on legally

binding protocols on ABS and biosafety unexpectedly posed great challenges for the

Japanese presidency.

The presidency for the COP/MOP-5 meeting on biosafety was represented by

Michihiko Kano, Japanese Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. Two

outstanding issues that remained unresolved before Nagoya were the issues of “living

modified organisms (LMOs) and products thereof” and financial security in the draft

text.26 While Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol addresses the issue of liability and

damage resulting from transboundary movements of “LMOs,” the Protocol’s Annex III

on risk assessment contains the words “living modified organisms or product thereof,”

i.e., processed materials that are of LMO origin. LMO-exporting countries and Japan

wanted to limit the scope of the liability regime within the LMOs only, whereas

Malaysia and the African group (except South Africa) as well as environmental NGOs

argued that the narrow definition of LMOs was not enough, and proposed alternative

wording, such as LMOs “including products containing LMOs” and “replicating” or

18

“naturally reproducing” in the environment. Japan proposed to replace “products thereof”

with an alternative expression, “including LMOs contained in products.” Financial

security, such as insurance or another financial safeguard, is required in case that

compensation for damage from LMOs exceeds the financial capacity of an operator.

Malaysia and other proponents preferred the inclusion of a provision of financial

security, while Brazil and other exporters opposed it by worrying that such a provision

would become a trade barrier.

As for the Strategic Plan debated in the COP-10, the most contentious issue was the

strategic goal on implementation, especially resource mobilization.27 The Plan was

further refined as the Strategy for Resource Mobilization. Developed countries wanted

to have an innovative financing mechanism including the idea of the Green

Development Mechanism, which was modeled after the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean

Development Mechanism (CDM). For developed countries, mainstreaming of the

valuation of ecosystem services is effective for biodiversity conservation, as

demonstrated by The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study. On the

contrary, many developing countries opposed the market-based approach, partly

because it would shift the responsibility of the government to the private sector, and

partly because most developing countries had negative experiences on the CDM scheme.

The ALBA group strongly opposed the “commodification” of nature, which would

result in further environmental destruction and human rights violations. Instead, they

demanded to include measurable targets and indicators to monitor aggregated financial

flows. The concept of innovative financing mechanism can refer to different things for

different countries, and the ABS protocol itself can be regarded as an innovative

financing mechanism for developing countries with generic resources.

The COP-10 negotiations on the ABS protocol managed by Environment Minister

Ryu Matsumoto were the most challenging in Nagoya. The excluded negotiating groups

heavily criticized the Japanese presidency’s risky arrangement of a secret meeting of

selected countries.28 The key conflicting point in the ABS protocol was that developed

countries with competitive biological industry wanted to guarantee “access” to genetic

resources, while developing countries with diversified genetic resources wanted

“benefit-sharing.” Concrete conflicts included derivatives, retroactive application,

compliance, and traditional knowledge. While developed countries argued that the

utilization of derivatives of genetic resources should be judged on a case-by-case basis,

19

developing countries wanted derivatives of genetic resources to be covered by the

protocol. Developed countries argued that a retroactive application of the protocol was

against the principle of international law, whereas developing countries lobbied for

retroactive application. Developed countries were worried about burdensome disclosure

requirements for compliance of businesses, while developing countries requested that

one or more checkpoints for compliance should be established in each country.

Developed countries argued that the regulation of publicly available traditional

knowledge could be suggested, while developing countries, especially the Like-Minded

Asia-Pacific Group, preferred that it is required.

What were key drivers for the successful conclusion of the Nagoya conference?

Many delegates from both developed and developing countries felt that a further

prolonged stalemate on key issues would not be in their interests. Unlike Copenhagen,

the number of top-level leader participants was limited in Nagoya, which helped to

minimize face-losing diplomacy for hardliners. As for the supplementary protocol,

Japan shifted position on the definition of “product” in previous negotiations to a

flexible position, which was perhaps because of the regime shift from a

business-supported LDP-led government to a union-supported DPJ government.

Alternatively, this shift was because Japan’s presidency wanted to prevent Nagoya from

becoming another Copenhagen.

Japan’s checkbook diplomacy worked as another possible driver. In the middle of

the COP-10, Japan pledged to establish the Japan Biodiversity Fund with $5 billion over

5 years to support the implementation of the outcomes of the Nagoya conference. Two

days later, Prime Minister Naoto Kan (DPJ) pledged another $2 billion to preserve

biodiversity in developing countries. In addition, on the last day of the Nagoya

conference, Japan made an additional pledge of $1 billion if the ABS protocol would be

adopted in Nagoya.

Parties also discussed the establishment of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy

Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) and the launch of TEEB.

These were realized later as the epistemic communities of natural and social sciences on

biodiversity respectively. In Nagoya, international perceptions on key issues were also

changed in the historical conjuncture. For instance, it was observed that unnecessary

confusion in the definitions of LMOs was a reflection of the rapid changes in life

science. The changing food economy after the 2008 world food crisis reflected the

20

more-flexible attitudes about LMOs of importing countries. Ambiguity in many aspects

of the ABS protocol was also reflected in the complexity and uncertainty of various

situations of member countries and different uses of genetic resources on a case-by-case

basis. COP-10 President Ryu Matsumoto felt that the success in Nagoya held “a

razor-thin margin.29”

Effectiveness

The outputs of Nagoya were the package of the Nagoya Protocol, the Strategic Plan

for Biodiversity 2011–2020, the Strategy for Resource Mobilization, and the Nagoya–

Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol. The vision of the Strategic Plan was written

using general wording, “by 2050 biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored and wisely

used, maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a healthy planet.” Following the

DPSIR framework, the Strategic Plan included five goals and twenty Aichi Biodiversity

Targets. As for the Strategy for Resource Mobilization, the compromise on financial

resources included deleting the concept of TEEB, mentioning innovative financial

mechanisms, and adopting targets at the COP-11.

The text of the Nagoya Protocol on ABS was filled with “creative ambiguity” by

deleting contentious words and phrases or by providing a broader definition. The terms

“retroactive application” and “benefit-sharing of publically available traditional

knowledge” disappeared from the text of the ABS protocol. On the one hand, the

utilization of derivatives can be assessed on a case-by-case basis as requested by

developed countries. On the other hand, one or more checkpoints are to be established

as requested by developing countries (although with some flexibility).

The two outstanding issues of the Supplementary Protocol were also resolved with

ambiguity. After long negotiations, the delegates agreed to remove reference to all the

“product” definitions from the Supplementary Protocol. This left the ambiguity in the

definitions of these terms, which the Cartagena Protocol contains, and importers can be

liable if a causal link is found between LMOs and the damage caused by a LMO

product. As for the provision of financial security, a diluted compromise was expressed

in the Supplementary Protocol to allow the parties to retain the right to provide for

financial security in their domestic law in a manner consistent to international law. An

elaboration of financial security mechanisms was postponed.

21

In implementing the CBD, the Japanese government formulated the first

Biodiversity Action Plan in 1995, the second Plan in 2003, and the third Plan in 2007.

The Basic Act on Biodiversity bill was sponsored by a cross-party group of lawmakers

and passed by the Diet in June 2008. The Cabinet decided the fourth national

biodiversity strategy based on the Basic Act in March 2010. With the great East Japan

earthquake disaster of March 11, 2011, the national biodiversity strategy 2012–2020

was updated in response to the Nagoya outcomes.

Japan’s delayed ratification of the Nagoya Protocol and the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur

Supplementary Protocol is a shameful symptom of the fading activism in Japan’s

environmental diplomacy. The revived LDP-led government, supported by business

interests, did not give priority to the ratification of these protocols, which were adopted

by the DPJ-led government. When the CBD was adopted in Rio, the Japanese

bureaucracy did not always assume that reasonable assurance by the legislation and

regulation regarding necessary domestic action would be needed. However, the

Ministry of the Environment has been struggling to obtain interministerial consensus on

the domestic legislation necessary for implementing the ABS protocol. In addition, the

Japanese government thought that another legislation would not be needed in addition

to the Cartagena Act promulgated in 2003 and entered into force in 2004. However,

Japanese consumers and environmental NGOs are lobbying for a revision of the

Cartagena Act by inserting a precautionary principle and compensation to ratify the

Supplementary Protocol.

The long-term environmental impacts of the Nagoya outcomes are to be evaluated

in relation to the three main objectives of the CBD regime: conservation of biodiversity,

sustainable use of its elements, and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from

genetic resources. Conservation, rather than protection, by the ecosystem approach to

biodiversity should be monitored and evaluated with the emphasis of the environmental

aspect of biodiversity with other environmental issues. The biosafety concept is a

combination of biological (environmental) and safety (social), which tends to

de-emphasize economic benefits, whereas the concept of ABS, in which economic

access and social benefit-sharing are combined, tends to de-emphasize the

environmental aspect of the use of genetic resources.

Case 3: Minamata

22

Japan’s Diplomacy on Mercury

Japan experienced large-scale mercury pollution and poisoning in the 1950s, so

why was Japan’s diplomacy on mercury inactive and delayed? While Japan attempted

to focus on environmental pollution as a main topic for the Stockholm conference, the

national report submitted by the Japanese government to the Stockholm conference

secretariat in March 1971 contained a one-sentence reference to heavy metal poisoning

as a part of the water pollution paragraph.30 It did not mention Minamata disease at all,

while even the national report submitted by Indonesia mentioned it. An angered civil

society group prepared an alternative report describing Minamata disease and other

pollution diseases in Japan, and sent the Minamata victims to Stockholm to share their

experience at parallel events.31 These actions drew worldwide attention to Minamata

disease victims and corporate and government attitudes on this issue.

Minamata disease victims went to the Nairobi conference to report on the situation

during the ten years since Stockholm, and warned about a spread of methylmercury

poisoning in other Asian countries.32 According to a Minamata disease patient who

stopped over Asia on his way back from Nairobi, “… Japan’s rapid economic growth

had been achieved not only at the cost of environment, but also at the expense of natural

resources from other Asian countries.”33 Saburo Okita, former Foreign Minister, was

actively involved in the Brundtland Commission, and its report Our Common Future

mentioned that the problems of chemical poisoning “have also be found in many parts

of the world, as industrial growth, urbanization, and the use of automobiles spread.”

These concerns were reflected in the Basel Convention, which covers transboundary

movement of mercury wastes. It became effective in 1992, and Japan’s accession on the

Basel Convention was in 1993. However, Japan has not yet agreed to the Basel ban

amendment and the Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation.

The UN Commission on Sustainable Development, which was created after the Rio

conference, became a functional forum for chemical-related MEAs and

the Stockholm and Rotterdam Conventions. Japan became a party to these two

conventions when they became effective in 2004. According to Table 2, Japan’s

diplomacy on mercury looks more active than these conventions of UNEP chemical and

waste cluster. Japan was not a signatory for the Basel and Stockholm Conventions.

Japan became a signatory for Rotterdam one year after its adoption, but ratified it six

23

years after its adoption. By contrast, Japan hosted and became a signatory when the

Minamata Convention was adopted in 2013, and accepted it three years later before its

entry into force.

Table 2: Japan’s Diplomacy for the UNEP Chemical Cluster

MEAs Adopted Effective Japan’s Ratification

Basel Convention 1989

Japan did not sign

1992 1993

(accession)

Rotterdam Convention 1998

Japan signed 1999

2004 2004

Stockholm Convention 2001

Japan did not sign

2004 2004

(accession)

Minamata Convention 2013

Japan signed 2013

still-pending 2016

The Minamata Convention on Mercury was adopted in October 2013 in Kumamoto,

where Minamata disease was officially identified in 1956. The cause of this disease was

a long-term discharge of methylmercury from the Chisso Company’s Minamata factory

into Minamata Bay. Thus, Japan’s diplomatic actions on mercury became active more

than fifty years after child patients with Minamata disease were recognized. However,

Japan’s diplomatic stance in a mercury treaty was as a laggard, rather than as a leader,

even during the prenegotiation stages in the early 2000s.

In 2002, when the Johannesburg summit was held, the Global Mercury Assessment

was submitted to the UNEP Governing Council. When the council started discussion in

2005 on what type of instrument should be developed, there were two approaches: a

voluntary or legally binding instrument. Japan supported the US-proposed idea of a

voluntary instrument, which was also supported by Australia and Canada, while

Norway, Switzerland, and the EU proposed a legally binding instrument. There were

two options for the legally binding approach: a new stand-alone mercury treaty or using

one or more existing binding treaties of the UNEP chemical cluster.34

In February 2009, Japan shifted position to agree to a new legally binding treaty on

mercury at the UNEP Governing Council meeting. In May 2010, when Prime Minister

24

Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ) attended the memorial service for the victims of Minamata

disease, he expressed the idea of inviting the UNEP-proposed conference on a mercury

treaty and wished to name it the Minamata treaty.35 It was the first time Japan’s Prime

Minister had attended the service. The outcome document of the Rio+20 conference,

The Future We Want, called for a successful outcome of the negotiations on a global

legally binding instrument on mercury.

Drivers of Effectiveness

Although the Umbrella Group countries were split on the type of instrument to use

to regulate mercury, Japan was a supporter of the US position, which was also backed

by the increased weight of the emerging countries, such as China and India, who also

favored a voluntary approach. Japan’s position shift, as well as that of Australia and

Canada, to support for a legal-binding treaty, can be explained by the unilateral position

change of the US due to the transition from the ideological Bush administration’s

position for a voluntary approach to the legalism of the Barack Obama administration

inaugurated in January 2009. 36 Controlling mercury was also Obama’s personal

concern, as seen in his introduction of a bill to minimize the mercury market to the

Senate in 2007.

Another picture can be drawn on power-based leadership in Japanese domestic

politics of the administrative, legislative, and judiciary branches over the relief

programs for Minamata disease victims. As shown in Figure 2, the increased number of

pending applications for Minamata disease patient certification decreased in 1995 and

2010, when two “political settlements” were made. The legislative branch and political

parties drove these changes in the compensation issues. The LDP–Socialist–Sakigake

coalition government led by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama (Japan Socialist Party)

made the first “political settlement” of 1995. This settlement was made partly because

of the increased number of lawsuits from the victims who were rejected as “patients” by

the certification criteria issued by the then Environment Agency following the 1973 Act

Concerning Compensation and Prevention of Pollution-Related Health Damage, and

partly because Chisso Company faced financial difficulties meeting its compensation

requirements based on its business profits. Bipartisan politicians from the LDP, New

Komeito, and the DPJ also supported the second political settlement and the Special

25

Relief Act of 2009. Thus, the issue of political initiative for compensation was an

important driver in Japan.

Figure 2: Pending Applications for Minamata Disease Patient Certification37

Another important domestic power was the judiciary. In October 2004, the

Supreme Court ruling for the Kansai lawsuit decided that both the national and local

governments were jointly liable for one-quarter of the payment of the compensation in

view of their failure to prevent the outbreak and spread of Minamata disease. The

Supreme Court ruling also applied looser criteria than the 1977 criteria set by the

government for Minamata disease patients. After this ruling, the number of applicants

for certified patients sharply increased, but the government retained strict criteria for

Minamata disease patients and a second political settlement was demanded in 2009.

Thus, leadership in domestic politics can explain Prime Minister Hatoyama’s 2010

speech inviting a diplomatic conference for a mercury treaty, although the liability and

compensation issues remain unresolved.

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26

Economic interests also worked as drivers for the Minamata Convention.

According to the UNEP, fossil fuel combustion for power and heating is the largest

sector of the global anthropogenic emission to air. The largest mercury-emitting region

is Asia, where China and India are the two largest emitters.38 It is estimated that

increased Asian emissions are transported to and concentrated in the US and Europe.

With the turnover of the US preference for a legally binding approach, the Chinese and

Indian economic interests would be hit hard by a binding approach. Switzerland

persuaded the emerging economies by explaining that a new treaty on mercury would

de-link mercury from other heavy metals, and mandatory financial mechanisms are only

found in legally binding, but not voluntary, instruments.39

Japan’s position shift to a legally binding approach can also be explained by

potential interest for possible financial mechanisms, through which Japan can enjoy the

competitive edge of its technological development on mercury control and management.

The abatement cost for mercury reduction in Japan was not reduced rapidly, but was

reduced significantly by the end of the 20th century. For instance, mercury-based

chlor-alkali production was replaced by a high-cost, low-quality asbestos diaphragm

process in 1973, and then by the ion-exchange membrane process in 1979. With

intensive research and development (R&D) and cost reduction, the previous method

was completely replaced by the best-available techniques (BAT) in 1999.40 Industries

and central and local governments learned the cost of inaction, including financial

compensation and relief, and socioeconomic losses. More importantly, the timing of

Japan’s diplomacy on mercury can be explained by the competitive edge of its

technological development of mercury control and management. The UNEP Global

Mercury Partnership includes some BAT and best-environmental practices (BEP) areas

where Japan has a competitive edge, which include mercury control of coal combustion

using Japan’s “clean coal” technology and mercury waste management.41 The Japanese

government promoted its competitive advantage in abatement technology by budgeting.

In 2013, the Ministry of the Environment budgeted support for the Minamata Treaty

initiatives by promoting the international deployment of Japan’s technologies and

measures for mercury management, creating international and national mercury

management strategies, such as the BAT/BEP guidelines, promotion of monitoring and

prediction of mercury emissions and concentrations in Asia, and financial contributions

to the UNEP.

27

Knowledge-based leadership for the Minamata Convention was undertaken by the

UNEP. Arctic Council members and the executive body of the LRTAP Convention

asked the UNEP to perform a global mercury assessment. The UNEP chemical cluster

shared some dimensions of scientific knowledge. The Basel Convention can cover

mercury wastes, but not other stages of mercury circulation. The Stockholm Convention

can cover methylmercury as an organic substance, but not other forms of mercury. The

Rotterdam Convention can cover mercury compounds for the required prior informed

consent procedure in international trade, but cannot cover nontrade transboundary

movements of mercury. In 1998, the LRTAP Convention adopted the Aarhus Protocol

on Heavy Metals, including mercury, which became the basis for the Minamata

Convention. Japan took leadership in launching the Acid Deposition Monitoring

Network in East Asia (EANET), but this network deals with acid rain, not mercury and

other heavy metals.

Civil society organizations abroad, such as the Zero Mercury Working Group and

the International POPs Elimination Network (IPEN), and in Japan joined the global

campaign on mercury. The main items of the joint statement include the polluter’s

responsibility for contaminated sites and victims, and the government and polluter’s

responsibility for transparent investigation and information disclosure.42 Civil society

also requested the Japanese government to enact a mercury export ban act, to place all

surplus mercury produced in Japan in long-term storage safely, to take the leadership

for a mercury treaty, to build mercury storage capacity in Asia, and join the Global

Mercury Partnership.43

Effectiveness

An outline of the Minamata Convention is summarized in Table 3. While it is a

legally binding instrument, many elements of the Convention contain voluntary or

discretionary actions. Japan’s early acceptance of the Convention can be understood

because of its watered-down substance. The fact that the US quickly became the

world’s first nation to use the instrument of acceptance may also be unexpected for

Japan. This section highlights some of the items closely related to key drivers for

Japan’s diplomacy on mercury.

First, while the Rio principles in general, including the common, but differentiated

responsibility principle, are reaffirmed in the Preamble, there is a precautionary

28

approach and no explicit mention of the polluter-pays principle. This contrasts with the

Stockholm Convention, which mentions precautions in both its Preamble and Articles

and reaffirms that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution in its Preamble. It is also

insufficient in terms of Japan’s Compensation Act, which recognizes the polluter’s

responsibility and requires compensation expenses to be provided by a government

subsidy and pollution load levy for polluters. Critics argue that Japan should have made

better efforts to insert these principles in the Convention, especially on “health-care

services for prevention, treatment and care for populations affected by the exposure to

mercury” (Article 16).

Table 3: Outline of the Minamata Convention

Preamble No mention of precautions or polluter-pays principle

1. Objective To protect the human health and the environment

3. Supply sources and trade Primary mining not allowed after 15 years of entry;

mercury export not allowed with some exceptions

4. Mercury-added products A positive list approach

5. Manufacturing processes Not allowed for Part I with some exceptions; restricted

use for Part II

6. Exemptions Maximum 10 years after the phase-out date

7. Artisanal small-scale gold

mining (ASGM)

Reduce and “where feasible eliminate”; Party

determines ASGM is “more than insignificant”

8. Emissions Control and “where feasible reduce”; use BAT and

BEP “where feasible” for new sources; emission limit

from a point of source

9. Releases Control and “where feasible reduce”; use BAT and

BEP for relevant sources; release limit from a point of

source

11. Mercury wastes Take appropriate measures

12. Contaminated sites “Endeavor” to develop appropriate strategies;

incorporate, where appropriate, an assessment of the

risks to human health and the environment

Others Finance, technology, implementation, health aspects,

29

education, R&D, effectiveness evaluation, etc.

Second, while the Minamata Convention controls the international trade in mercury,

there are exceptions. Virtually, mercury trade is possible for “use allowed” or “interim

storage.” As shown in Figure 3, Japan still exports mercury and increased its exports

even after the adoption of the Minamata Convention, while the US and the EU enacted

laws banning metallic mercury exports in 2008 and in 2011, respectively. Civil society

organizations heavily criticized Japan for continuing to be a major mercury exporter and

requested the Ministry of the Environment to enact a mercury export ban act.

Figure 3: Japan’s Mercury Trade 1988-201544

Article 8 on emissions to the atmosphere concerns “controlling and, where feasible,

reducing emissions of mercury and mercury compound.” “Total mercury” and its

mission limit value are based on a point of source, rather than aggregated sources.

Therefore, the total “total mercury” can increase if the number of relevant sources

increases. In addition, the source categories listed in Annex D do not cover oil and gas

power plants or iron and steelmaking facilities. Coal power plants are included, and

BAT and BEP are required to use new sources where feasible. The Party has the

discretion to assess whether it is “feasible” or not, which is reflected in the interest of

these countries who rely greatly on coal power plants, including emerging economies,

such as China and India. It is also in the interest of some Japanese companies with

BAT/BEP for “clean coal” power plants.

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30

Article 12 on contaminated sites was also watered down to “endeavor to develop

appropriate strategies for identifying and assessing sites contaminated by mercury or

mercury compounds.” Japan has the world’s largest mercury-contaminated sites in

Minamata and Niigata. Even when releases of methylmercury stopped, the residual

presence of mercury still contaminated water and marine lives. Rather than remove the

contaminated sediment, “the Kumamoto Prefectural Government dredged some 1.5

million m3 of bottom sediment showing a mercury concentration above the provisional

reference value for removal (25 ppm) and reclaimed 58 ha of land using this sediment

(sealed filling).”45 The cost of removal and reclamation was paid by Chisso Company,

the Kumamoto Prefectural Government, and the national Government. The Japanese

experience was not reflected in this Article. Rather, Japan removed the provision of

financial and technological support for strategy development for contaminated sites, for

which Japan does not have effective techniques and practices.

Conclusion

In response to the “Japan bashing,” Japan began contemplating environmental

diplomacy in the 1980s by ratifying the CITES, the Ramsar Convention, the London

Convention, and by proposing to establish the World Commission on Environment and

Development. Japan’s active environmental diplomacy started in the 1990s by hosting

the CITES COP-8 in Kyoto, the Ramsar COP-5 in Kushiro, and the UNFCCC COP-3 in

Kyoto. Japan’s diplomatic activism during this period was supported by domestic

institutionalization, including the establishment of the Environment Agency’s Global

Environment Department and the enactment of the Basic Environmental Law. Symbolic

activism was also supported by providing environmental ODA. Since the Rio

conference, however, the rivalry between the MITI and the Environmental Agency

became salient. The Ministry of Foreign Policy had to play the role of mediator both at

home and abroad, where proxy battles were seen between the MITI’s and the

Environmental Agency’s allies, respectively.

Japan’s economic decline continued experiencing “the lost 20 years” in the 2000s

and symbolic activism began to fade out. The DPJ-led government, especially Prime

Minister Hatoyama, attempted to revitalize environmental diplomacy in 2009, when

Hatoyama expressed willingness to reduce greenhouse gas sharply and hosted the

31

Minamata conference. While the Japanese presidency for CBD COP-10 in 2010 in

Nagoya successfully led to the adoption of the Aichi Targets, the Nagoya Protocol, and

the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol, Japan has not yet ratified both

protocols. The successful conclusion of the CBD COP-10 was luck, if anything, due to

the international fears of a repeat of the Copenhagen failure. The ghosts of

Copenhagen’s failure also led to the Cancun Agreements on climate change, although

Japan’s chilling attitude further undermined the credibility of Japan’s environmental

diplomacy.

The 2011 triple disaster of earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown affected

further Japan’s environmental diplomacy in the 2010s. Japan’s climate diplomacy has

been deeply influenced by pre-existing “business as usual” energy and industrial

policies, rather than transformational policies for renewable energy and social

inclusiveness. Japan’s actions in hosting the diplomatic conference for controlling

mercury and its seemingly relatively early acceptance of the Minamata Convention still

looks like symbolism, rather than substantial social compensation and environmental

leadership without reflecting fully the Japanese experience on mercury pollution and

poisoning. The key driver for Japan’s diplomacy on mercury was market-driven and

diplomatic effectiveness was still limited. The constraining factors for Japan’s

laggardness include domestic as well as international institutions in the changing

historical trajectory and conjunctures. Without transforming from business-as-usual

economic, social, environmental, and foreign policies, “Japan passing” in global

environmental governance can result in further failure or “Japan nothing.”

1 Sharon Begley, Hideko Takayama, and Mary Hager, “The World Eco-outlaws?” Newsweek (May 1, 1989), p. 68, and Hidefumi Imura and Mirand A. Schreurs, “Learning from Japanese environmental management experiences,” in Imura and Schreurs, eds., Environmental Policy in Japan (Edward Elgar, 2005), p. 123. 2 Loren R. Cass, “The symbolism of environmental policy: foreign policy commitments as signaling tools,” in p. 41-56. 3 Kumao Kaneko, “For only one Earth,” Jurist, 496 (1972), 110, and Letter from Kurt Waldheim to Takeo Miki, (22 February 1972), UNARMS, S-0971-0004015 Env-2nd UN conference – Japan. 4 Japan’s position was expressed as an importer and potential exporter of LMOs. Kiyo Akasaka, “Compromise Group: Japan,” in Christoph Bali, Robert Falkner & Helen Marquard, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), pp. 200-206. Akasaka also observed that the successful

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conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol was due to Juan Mayr who iutroduced the “Vienna setting,” an innovative way to secure inclusive and transparent negotiation, following his experience of negotiating with indigenous peoples in Colombia. Kyototaka Akasaka, Sakai no eriito wa hitomae de hanasu chikara wo doo mi ni tsukeru ka (Tokyo: Kawadeshobo Shinsha, 2015), p. 168. 5 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 6 Modified from Sprints and Vaahtranta (1994). 7 Kai Monheim, How Effective Negotiation Management Promotes Multilateral Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2015). 8 Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, “A framework for research on foreign policy behavior,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13:1 (1969), 75-94, and John Barkdull and Paul G. Harris, “Theories of environmental foreign policy: power, interests, and ideas,” in Paul G. Harris, ed., Environmental Change and Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2009), pp. 19-40. 9 Not only normative ideas, but also scientific knowledge, which is another form of intangible ideas in epistemic communities, are included. 10 Robert Cox, “Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order,” International Journal, 44 (Autumn 1989), 823-869. 11 Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, “The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy,” International Organization 48:1 (1994), 77-105. 12 Deborah Saunders Davenport, Global Environmental Negotiations and US Interests (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 20-21. 13 The sustainable development concept can also be regarded as a “failure to launch.” Jennifer Hadden and Lucia A. Seybert, “What’s in a norm? Mapping the norm definition process in the debate on sustainable development,” Global Governance, 22:2 (2016), 249-268. 14 Oran R. Young, “Effectiveness of international environmental regimes: existing knowledge, cutting-edge themes, and research strategies,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108:50 (2011), 19853-19860. 15 Davenport (2006), pp. 17-26. 16 UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation for Development Results (2009), p. 55. 17 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little Brown, 1971). 18 J.O. Prochaska and W.F. Velicer, “The transtheoretical model of health behavioral change,” American Journal of Health Promotion (1997), 12(1) 38-48. 19 The Guardian (December 1, 2010) “Cancun climate change summit: Japan refuses to extend Kyoto protocol.” 20 Mainichi Shimbun, (December 12, 2015). 21 This statement was not pre-determined to announce on the first day of COP-16. After some hesitation, however, Jun Arima decided to make an explicit statement on Japan’s position, when Norway, another member of the Umbrella Group expressed its own position which was much closer to the EU, rather than the Umbrella Group. Jun Arima, Chikyu Ondanka Kosho no Shinjitsu, (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2015), pp. 118-124.

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22 Kiyotaka Akasaka, Kokusai kikan de mita sekai eriito no syotai (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2014), pp. 83-86. 23 Japan’s position regarding the Kyoto Protocol, December 20, 2010. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/kp_pos_1012.html 24 IPCC, Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 15. 25 Climate Action Tracker. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan 26 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9: 533, (October 18, 2010), pp. 14-16. 27 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9: 544, (November 1, 2010), p. 27. 28 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 9: 544, (November 1, 2010), p. 26. 29 Ryu Matsumoto, Kankyo gaiko no butai ura, (Tokyo: Nikkei BP, 2011). 30 Government of Japan, Problems of the Human Environment in Japan (1971). 31 Jun Ui, ed., Industrial Pollution in Japan (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992). p. 225. 32 Ui, Industrial Pollution in Japan, p. 231. 33 Tom Gill and Kazuko Tsurumi, “New lives: Some case studies of Minamata,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, 12:34 (2014), 2. 34 UNEP Chemicals, Global Mercury Assessment (Geneva: UNEP Chemicals, December 2002), pp. 237-238. 35 Asahi Shimbun, (May 2, 2010) 36 Steinar Anderesen, Kristin Rosenthal, and Jon Birger Skjoerseth, “Why negotiate a legally binding mercury convention?” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law, and Economics (2012). 37 Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Management in Japan (2013), p. 12. 38 UNEP, The Global Atmospheric Mercury Assessment: Sources, Emissions, and Transport (Geneva: UNEP Chemical Branch, 2008). 39 Steinar Anderesen et al., pp. 11-12. 40 Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Management in Japan (2013), pp. 29-31. 41 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry developed a low-cost technology to remove mercury emissions for thermal coal plants. Nihon Keizai Shimbun (October 8, 2013). Masaru Tanaka, a Japanese expert from the Ministry of Environment was appointed as a leader in mercury waste management by the UNEP Global Mercury Partnership. http://www.unep.org/chemicalsandwaste/Mercury/GlobalMercuryPartnership/tabid/1253/Default.aspx 42 Civil Society Organizations Joint Statement, January 23, 2012. 43 Civil Society Organizations Joint Statement, February 29, 2012. 44 Mainichi Shimbun, (February 3, 2016), based on the Ministry of Finance data. 45 Ministry of the Environment, Lessons from Minamata Disease and Mercury Management in Japan (2013), p. 15.