al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2015 part 19-142-caliphate-isis-36

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-142-Caliphate-ISIS-36

DAESH has demonstrated its intention to create a new hybrid war weapon in its arsenal against the United States—a hidden weapon designed to be difficult to trace

operationally back to the jihadist organization or to detect before an operation is executed.

Despite this manual’s title (Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen), it is likely not intended for the true lone wolf. Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s theories, on which most of the manual is based, begin with the lone wolf, but argue that while lone wolf attacks may raise jihadist morale, they do not move toward a useful political outcome. To be effective, clandestine terrorists need to be connected to jihadist goals and doctrine, but unconnected organizationally from anyone except members of their own cell. Ideally—according to al-Suri but not mentioned in the manual—one individual builder unit would create a number of operational cells in a given country, providing them with rudimentary training and perhaps some funding. [11] Only the builder knows about the cells’ existence and location, and he would instruct them to start operations only after he has departed the country in which they reside. There could also be a propaganda cell, which has no direct connection with the operational cells and could even be located in another country.

If not us, who? If not here, where? If not now, when?

DAESH is the abbreviation of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wal-Sham, the Arabic name for the group referred to as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. DAESH is the Arabic acronym equivalent of ISIS in

English.

November 24, 2015, Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.1205Delegitimizing ISIS On Islamic Grounds: Criticism Of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi By Muslim Scholars By: Prof. Ella Landau-Tasseron*

*Most of the terms and categories used by the critics here are borrowed from the Western doctrine of just war. However, the rules of jihad are not entirely compatible with that doctrine. Contrary to the critics' claim, the Koran, the hadith and pre-modern Islam did preach offensive war. In fact, the Islamic lawful goal of "making Allah's word supreme" means establishing the reign of Islam by converting or subduing non-Muslims – either by preaching and persuasion or by violent means. Thus there is a contradiction between the critics' two statements ("jihad is only defensive" and "jihad's goal is to make Allah's word supreme"). To resolve this contradiction the critics devise an innovative interpretation: The goal of jihad has already been achieved by the Prophet, they say, so only defensive jihad is now legitimate. To my knowledge, no pre-modern Muslim scholar has offered this interpretation.

*Most of the terms and categories used by the critics here are borrowed from the Western doctrine of just war. However, the rules of jihad are not entirely compatible with that doctrine. Contrary to the critics' claim, the Koran, the hadith and pre-modern Islam did preach offensive war.

The following is the executive summary of Prof. Ella Landau-Tasseron's paper. The full paper is available here. http://www.memri.org/publicdocs/MEMRI_IA_1205_Delegitimizing_ISIS_On_Islamic_

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 16 01/05/2023

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Grounds-FINAL.pdf

On September 19, 2014, a group of 126 Muslim scholars addressed an open letter to the ruler of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. In it they severely criticize ISIS' policies and actions, claiming that they are deviations from Islam, which is a merciful religion. In justifying their position, the critics sometimes cite the same texts used by ISIS, giving their own interpretation. It should be mentioned that the letter did not spark public debate in the Muslim world. Below I present the points of the clerics' criticism, with a short analysis of each point (marked by an asterisk).1. A Muslim claiming religious authority must have a formal education; he must correctly apply Koran, hadith and legal theory, consider all the texts relevant to any issue discussed, and avoid selective reading. ISIS religious authorities do not meet these requirements.

* Al-Baghdadi has a PhD in Islamic legal studies (Shari'a) from Baghdad University. This certainly makes him quite knowledgeable in Shari'a. Furthermore, reading sacred texts selectively is unavoidable because they always contain contradictions. The critics read selectively too, omitting or explaining away texts that do not fit their arguments.2. A religious authority must possess a mastery of Arabic. ISIS presents itself as the fulfilment of Allah's promise in Koran 24: 55, "Allah has promised those who believe and do good works that He will establish them as successors (la-yastakhlifannahum) [to those who preceded them] on earth..." ISIS maintains that the word la-yastakhlifannahum, derived from the same root as the word khilafa, refers to Al-Baghdadi's Caliphate. This interpretation discloses ignorance of Arabic, as it distorts the true meaning of the verse.

* This verse has always been interpreted as foretelling the victory and conquests of the Prophet and the early caliphate in the seventh century. ISIS, emulating the pristine model, understandably applies the verse to itself. True, the word la-yastakhlifannahum does not literally refer to a caliphate, but some pre-modern Muslims thought that it did. This means that ISIS has not introduced a new uninformed interpretation.3. It is forbidden to oversimplify the Shari'a and ignore established Islamic sciences and experts.

* The critics protest here the current trend of "democratizing religious knowledge," in which autodidact Muslims read the sources for themselves and sometimes reach legal conclusions. This trend is facilitated by the internet and its appeal is great.4. Leniency is always preferable in religious matters. The propagation of Islam has always been done by preaching, not by coercion. ISIS' actions contravene this Islamic principle.* In devising this argument the critics resort to a practice that they censure ISIS for, namely take verses out of their context or rely on verses that are traditionally considered abrogated. It is also erroneous to say that Islam was always propagated only by preaching. Both history and Islamic law books prove otherwise.5. The Shari'a must not be applied rigidly and literally, as done by ISIS, but flexibly, according to circumstances of place and time.

* Indeed, Muslim scholars have always shown ingenuity in adapting Shari'a laws to changing realities. In modern times the debate around adaptability has intensified, as Muslims face problems resulting from a clash between Islamic and Western cultures and values. ISIS represents an ultra-puritan attitude which, in part at least, is precisely a response to Western and Westernized modernity. The critics take a more flexible




http://www.memri.org/publicdocs/MEMRI_IA_1205_Delegitimizing_ISIS_On_Islamic_Grounds-FINAL.pdf


approach.6. It is forbidden to kill the innocent, as ISIS often does. There must be a lawful cause for killing.

* "Lawful cause" is mentioned in the Koran but without specification, so the term is vague. Pre-modern Muslims debated whether unbelief was sufficient cause for killing, or only unbelief combined with aggression. Both positions are supported by Koranic verses and various interpretations and Prophetic sayings.7. ISIS kills journalists and aid-workers; these are comparable to envoys, whose killing is forbidden.

* This analogy drawn by the critics illustrates the feasibility of applying lenient traditional norms to modern circumstances by deduction. Another such analogy is made between the modern visa and the pre-modern aman, i.e. the legal institution that protected foreign visitors in Islamic lands and vice versa, on condition that they keep the laws of the host country. After 9/11, many Muslims argued that the perpetrators had American visas, comparable to aman given to Muslims in foreign countries. By committing a crime against their American hosts, these Muslims thus broke Islamic law.8. ISIS attacks Muslims, but jihad must be defensive and waged only against non- Muslims. Furthermore, it must be waged with a lawful cause, right intention, lawful goal and lawful conduct. The cause must be prior aggression against Muslims, the intention must be to fight in Allah's way, the goal must be "to make Allah's word supreme," and the right conduct is to kill combatants only. ISIS deviates from all of these. The goal of jihad was achieved when the Arabian Peninsula was Islamized by the Prophet in 630-31 CE, so that offensive jihad has become redundant. The post-Prophet Islamic conquests cannot serve ISIS as a model because they were merely defensive. The Prophet's execution of prisoners cannot serve ISIS as a model, because those prisoners were war criminals like those tried in Nuremberg. ISIS also errs by urging every Muslim to participate in jihad, because jihad is incumbent upon the community as a whole, not upon each and every Muslim.

*Most of the terms and categories used by the critics here are borrowed from the Western doctrine of just war. However, the rules of jihad are not entirely compatible with that doctrine. Contrary to the critics' claim, the Koran, the hadith and pre-modern Islam did preach offensive war. In fact, the Islamic lawful goal of "making Allah's word supreme" means establishing the reign of Islam by converting or subduing non-Muslims – either by preaching and persuasion or by violent means. Thus there is a contradiction between the critics' two statements ("jihad is only defensive" and "jihad's goal is to make Allah's word supreme"). To resolve this contradiction the critics devise an innovative interpretation: The goal of jihad has already been achieved by the Prophet, they say, so only defensive jihad is now legitimate. To my knowledge, no pre-modern Muslim scholar has offered this interpretation. As for the right conduct of war, early Muslim scholars set some rules, such as "do not kill children," but these were later voided of content by means of ingenious interpretations. Similarly, the Koranic rules concerning prisoners of war stipulated that they may be released for a ransom or gratuitously. Muslim jurists complemented these rules based on reported actions of the Prophet, so that prisoners could also be executed or enslaved. It seems that the earliest rules of conduct for jihad are more compatible with current international norms than are the classical Shari'a regulations.

The critics do not take into account all the Koranic verses and reports relevant to the issue of jihad (thus contravening their own advice to al-Baghdadi). In particular, they omit to mention the traditional interpretations of the so-called "sword verses," and many





other verses and hadiths, which enjoin the Muslims to fight infidels "in the way of Allah" regardless of the need for defense.

Furthermore, the terms lawful cause, right goal, and right intention are fuzzy. They appear to be means to restrict offensive war, but they are not necessarily so. In Islam there is precedent for regarding as aggressors all non-Muslims who refuse to convert, thus providing a "lawful cause" for attacks on them even if they have not committed actual aggression against Muslims. The goal of making Allah's word reign supreme is "right" in Islamic terms, but it does not stipulate restrictions on offensive war. As for the conduct of war, ISIS can easily find in the Islamic sources precedents or justifications for most of their actions. 9. It is forbidden to label other Muslims "unbelievers" (takfir), as ISIS does.

* Labeling other Muslims "infidels" or "unbelievers" has serious consequences, because in Islam apostates must be executed. The consensus in pre-modern Sunni Islam has been to refrain from excommunication as much as possible. Since the mid-twentieth century, radical Muslims use takfir in order to legitimize violence against governments in Muslim countries, and against other Muslims in general.10. ISIS persecutes Christians although they have had a covenant with the Muslims for 1,400 years (dhimma, meaning that they paid a poll tax, abided by certain restrictions, and were protected in return). Moreover, Koran 9:29 – "Fight those who have been given the Scripture but do not believe in Allah... until they pay the poll tax, humiliated" – applies only to those amongst the Peoples of the Book (Christians, Jews and Sabians) who are aggressors. The Christian of Arab descent, who were allies of the Muslims, had a special status, in which they did not pay a humiliating poll tax but rather a non-humiliating tax equivalent to the zakat tax paid by Muslims.

* The dhimma was abolished by the Ottomans in 1856. Nevertheless the predecessor of ISIS, "The Islamic State of Iraq," declared the dhimma contract null and void in 2007 on the grounds that the dhimmi had violated it. A new dhimma covenant was drafted by ISIS in 2015. Thus the organization in fact offers Christians the same three options traditionally offered to most non-Muslims: Convert to Islam, pay tribute and become protected-humiliated subjects (dhimmi), or face the sword. By this measure ISIS equates itself to the second caliph, Umar bin al-Khattab (d. 644 CE), considered to be the initiator of the dhimma arrangement.

As for the historical arguments regarding the special status of Christian Arabs, it has some basis. The Christians of the Arabian Peninsula were part of Arab Muslim society, and apparently experienced no discrimination. The Christian Arabs in the Fertile Crescent did pay tribute, but were treated more leniently than Christians of other descent.I know no basis in the sources for the argument that Koran 9:29 only applies to defensive war against aggressive Christians (or Jews, etc.) 11. ISIS harshly persecutes the Yazidis, but they belong to the Peoples of the Scriptures, like Zoroastrians, Hindus, Buddhists and many others. All of these were recognized by the greatest pre-modern Muslim scholars as eligible for the protected-humiliating status, and the Yazidis must be accorded the same status and must not be persecuted.

* The Koran accorded the protected status only to "the Peoples of Scriptures," identified as Jews, Christians and Sabians. Other idolaters must either convert or face the sword. However, early Muslim scholars recognized most non-Muslims as comparable to the Peoples of the Scriptures, and accorded them the protected-humiliating status; this is the basis of the critics' demand regarding the Yazidis. ISIS, however, claims that the Yazidis are idolaters, on the basis of research conducted by ISIS scholars.12. ISIS takes slaves, but enslavement is forbidden. Islam always strove to abolish slavery,





which indeed has been banned throughout the world based on a universal, including Muslim, consensus.

* Contrary to the critics' claim, the Shari'a never strove to abolish slavery but only to regularize it. It was, however, considered virtuous to set Muslim slaves free. Slavery has indeed been abolished, at least in theory, by the international community, but ISIS members do not regard the international community as a model. They see themselves as reviving a custom of the Prophet when they enslave prisoners of war and take slave girls as concubines.13. It is forbidden to coerce anyone to convert to Islam. Many verses in the Koran express toleration of non-Muslims. It is also forbidden to enforce the Shari'a in the public sphere, because, as the Koran says (13:31, 26:4), Allah wants there to be infidels and sinners on earth.

* Pre-modern Muslim scholars had to determine the attitude of Islamic law towards non-Muslims, given the contradictory Koranic verses such as: "No compulsion is there in religion…"(2:256) versus the recurrent injunction to fight non-Muslims "until all religion belongs to Allah" (Koran 2:193, 8:39, 48:16). Pre-modern Muslim scholars considered as abrogated, or otherwise explained away, the tolerance verses; the injunction to wage jihad was considered binding, superseding all the verses expressing tolerance. Differences in detail notwithstanding, the scholars established that some groups must be coerced to convert to Islam or die, such as Arab idolaters, apostates and Manicheans. Others must not be coerced, but they must surrender to the Muslims. The critics in fact refute the pre-modern consensus by reestablishing the validity of the tolerance verses.Enforcing the Shari'a in the public sphere is by no means an ISIS innovation. In pre-modern Shari'a books it is considered one of the major tasks of the Muslim ruler. Religious police (hisba) in some modern Muslim countries and in ISIS territories continues this tradition.14. ISIS denies women their rights, their freedom of movement, and their right to study, work, and dress according to their taste. Forced marriages are also practiced under ISIS. Islam forbids all this.

* The Shari'a contains many rules that, by modern liberal standards, are discriminatory against women. However, these may be interpreted and applied in a variety of ways. The critics point at ways to improve social conditions for Muslim women without renouncing the Shari'a or adopting a foreign system of law.15. ISIS kills children and forces children to participate in fighting and other atrocities. Islam forbids such practices.

* As far as I can tell there are indeed no Islamic legal precedents, or reports about the Prophet, that can justify ISIS' treatment of children.16. ISIS enacts the Koranic punishments (hudud) without following the correct procedures that ensure justice and mercy.

* The Koran stipulates specific punishments for certain crimes, such as public stoning for unlawful sexual intercourse and amputation of hand and/or foot for theft. Pre-modern Islamic law usually evinces a strong tendency to limit the application of the hudud as far as possible, by complex procedures for establishing guilt and by defining mitigating circumstances. Apparently, a nascent, controversial Islamic regime such as ISIS may attempt to show Islamic fervor through strict application of the hudud.17-18. The torture and abuse inflicted by ISIS on both the living and the dead are un-Islamic, and they harm Islam's image among other nations.

* The Shari'a does not enjoin torture and abuse; sometimes it bans such conduct explicitly. For example, Prophetic sayings forbid abuse of the dead and execution by fire.





ISIS justified the latter atrocity as a measure-for-measure act: The Jordanian Pilot was executed by fire because he caused innocent people to burn by bombing them.19. ISIS members attribute their conquests to Allah, thus attributing to Him the atrocities that they commit during their conquests. It is forbidden to imply that Allah is responsible for evil acts.

* The critics adduce here an innovative theological argument against the perpetration of atrocities.20. ISIS destroys tombs of prophets and of Companions of the Prophet; but visiting such tombs is permitted, even beneficial, and destroying them is forbidden. This is indicated by the Koran and hadith, and by the fact that the Companions buried the Prophet and the first two caliphs near the mosque in Medina.

* The issue of pilgrimage to holy graves has been hotly debated among Muslims for centuries. Some regarded it as an infringement upon monotheism. Vehement opponents to these customs were, among others, Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab. ISIS is not the first Islamic movement to oppose the veneration of the dead and the cult of tombs.21. ISIS has rebelled against legitimate rulers, which the Shari'a forbids. A legitimate ruler may be deposed if he becomes an avowed apostate or prevents Muslims from practicing Islam. However, a ruler may not be deposed merely for being unjust, hated or even for failing to implement the Shari'a.

* Apparently, the critics assume that no Muslim ruler is likely to openly renounce Islam or ban the Shari'a; therefore, no rebellion is likely to be licit by Islamic law. They cite Koranic verses to the effect that failure to judge by Allah's law brands one as a sinner, a wrongdoer or an unbeliever (Koran 5:44-45, 47) – but not such that falls beyond the pale of Islam. This quietist attitude developed under the traumatic impact of the early civil wars (fitan, 656-661, 680-692 CE) and became a Sunni consensus. Radicals despise this attitude and rise against Muslim governments precisely because these governments fail to judge by Allah's law as they understand it. The radicals cite precisely the same verses as do the critics to justify their revolutionary view. 22. It is forbidden to declare a caliphate without the consensus of all Muslims, lest internecine wars ensue. If ISIS regards the 1.5 billion Muslims currently living around the globe to be believers, then al-Baghdadi cannot be caliph, because they do not all accept him. Conversely, if ISIS considers all Muslims except its followers to be infidels, then the number of its followers is too small to establish a caliphate, because a small community of Muslims does not require a caliph.

* Here the critics again express the attitude born of the historical Sunni trauma of internal wars (fitan) and reflect the theories banning opposition to government. The argument that a small number of Muslims needs no caliph has no basis in the Islamic sources. Indeed the early history of the caliphate points to the opposite, since the first caliph was rejected by most of the Arab tribes and even by some of the Companions of the Prophet. Tradition dealt with the problem by reporting that all the Companions eventually complied, and by branding the remaining dissidents as apostates (i.e., as non-Muslims).23-24.It is forbidden to abolish the boundaries of nation states, as ISIS does. It is also unjust to call upon foreigners to immigrate into Syria and Iraq at the expense of the local population; in fact, it is similar to Israel's crime of replacing Palestinians with Jewish immigrants. Contrary to ISIS' doctrine, migration ceased to be an obligatory or a meritorious Islamic act after the conquest of Mecca in 630 CE.

* Arabs and Muslims did not reject the concept of nation-states even though, in the Middle East, it was related to the demise of the Ottoman caliphate and was artificially





implemented by imperial powers. However, the concept of nation-states has no root in the Shari'a. For radicals who wish to emulate pristine Islam, nation-states are a foreign element that must be uprooted, and migration to the one true Islamic caliphate is currently the right course of action, just as it was in the Prophet's time. Long after the Prophet's time, Muslim scholars usually held that Muslims should not live in a land where they were not free to practice their religion. ISIS can easily claim that the restrictions in Europe on the veil, and on the level of the sound of the call for prayer (adhan), are restrictions on Muslims that necessitate their migration to a truly Islamic land.

ConclusionThe critics are appalled by ISIS' atrocities and do their best to delegitimize it. They make no reference to the fact that ISIS is building an Islamic state that revives past Islamic institutions, such as the contract between community and ruler (bay'a), the seizure of war booty, the poll tax on Christians, the Koranic punishments for specific crimes (hudud), Shari'a courts and civil courts (mazalim), the choice offered to polytheists between conversion and the sword, and the owning of slaves. ISIS' goal, to make Allah's word supreme (by force if necessary), is directly derived from pre-modern Sunni consensus. In modern times most Muslims are not driven to commit atrocities in order to implement this goal. However, objecting to it explicitly or refuting it convincingly is a difficult task, as this goal and the jihad needed to achieve it, are based on the core texts of Islam.Both ISIS and its critics rely on Islamic texts, sometimes the very same texts. The nature and content of these texts require selective reading and allow various and even contradictory conclusions. *Ella Landau-Tasseron is a retired professor at the Department for Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research fields are early Islamic history, the Arabian tribal system, Islamic political institutions, hadith, Islamic historiography, and jihad. Among her publications are a series of articles on the tribal society in pre- and early Islamic times, two monographs on the institution of the Islamic "oath of allegiance," and a monograph on non-combatants in Islamic thought.

Hot Issue: How DAESH’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s Threat to the United StatesPublication: Volume: 0 Issue: 0 November 24, 2015 By: Michael W. S. Ryan

Reportedly, three former members of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence service now with this jihadist organization in Raqqa, Syria, produced the document, which was adapted from an older al-Qaeda online Arabic language course.

The cover of a recently released DAESH manual intended for lone wolf terrorists in the United States and other English speaking countries (Source: SITE).Executive Summary On October 18, 2015, a DAESH promoter posted a 63-page English-language manual entitled Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen on Twitter. [1] Reportedly, three former members of Saddam Hussein’s intelligence service now with this jihadist organization in Raqqa, Syria, produced the document, which was adapted from an older al-Qaeda online Arabic language course. The new manual advises clandestine small-cell and individual jihadist terrorists operating





in Western countries on how to maintain security. Although these guidelines are based on al-Qaeda doctrine and tactics, they have been updated to include the latest technology and thinking. With the manual’s publication, DAESH has demonstrated its intention to create a new hybrid war weapon in its arsenal against the United States—a hidden weapon designed to be difficult to trace operationally back to the jihadist organization or to detect before an operation is executed. In the wake of the DAESH attacks on Paris on November 13, 2015, the United States and other English-speaking allies would do well to consider the instructions contained in this terrorist manual as another significant warning.

Introduction DAESH and al-Qaeda both claim the same Salafist-Jihadist ideology, and the leaders of both organizations have often called for attacks inside the United States. The two groups also share many of the same terrorist and small-group guerrilla tactics. However, before the terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, one of the key differences often noted between DAESH and al-Qaeda was the former’s strategic priority on the “near” enemy, while al-Qaeda is known for its attacks on the United States and its European allies, which are considered “far” enemies. After Paris, that distinction between al-Qaeda’s and DAESH’s strategic targets is no longer valid, if indeed it ever was.

Although al-Qaeda today engages mainly in regional insurgencies and terrorism against the near enemy, it has always asserted that attacking and actually defeating the United States is inseparable from achieving victory in the greater Middle East. In keeping with this strategy, al-Qaeda has consistently attempted to attack the U.S. homeland. Al-Qaeda has also promoted what has become known popularly in North America as random “lone wolf” and “home-grown” terrorism, but is closer to the theories espoused by jihadist strategist Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri for establishing small clandestine sleeper cells in enemy countries. [2] Selections from al-Suri's writings were translated serially in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) online magazine Inspire, which became infamous as a training aid to the Tsarnaev brothers for their April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon attack. [3]Most DAESH attacks on U.S. citizens and interests in the Middle East have been opportunistic. Analysts and policymakers have therefore tended to see the organization as focused mainly on the near enemy, such as the governments, people and other jihadist groups of Syria and Iraq, despite its occasional call for attacks on the far enemy such as France, the United States or the UK. The prominent al-Qaeda online pundit, Abu Sa‘d al Amili, however, dismisses the usual discussion about these two types of enemies (Militant Leadership Monitor, October 2013). As early as 2010, he argued that the near enemy is part of the concept of the far enemy, and the two concepts depend upon one another in a “dialectical” relationship. [4] Based on his argument, DAESH probably always intended to attack the “far enemy” when the time was judged right for such an attack, which was after they established an Islamic emirate in the heart of traditional Muslim lands, not before as in al-Qaeda doctrine. DAESH has also unilaterally declared its emirate to be the caliphate for all Muslims, which has strengthened its ability to recruit adherents beyond the territory it holds.Now, with the online publication of the English language manual, Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen, DAESH may have turned the concept of the near enemy on its head. [5] By adapting al-Qaeda’s doctrine of individual and small cell terrorism to its own strategy, DAESH may be laying the groundwork for terrorist attacks within the United States, Canada and other English speaking countries using local recruits





—for whom the United States is the near enemy. In short, they appear to be planning to attack their main far enemy, the United States, under the operational cover of home grown attacks by Americans or Canadians, instead of sending individual terrorists and small groups to fight against the United States and its allies from overseas.

Safety and Security Guidelines The new security manual's title indicates that it is intended for lone wolves in English speaking countries. However, the “translator's forward” clarifies that his small book is intended for “lone wolf mujahideen and small cells.” [6] He also points out that the work was originally entitled Course on Security and Intelligence, which al-Qaeda prepared for traditional jihadist groups. The author has adapted the original for the occasional lone wolf and clandestine small cells in the West, whose attacks could differ significantly from the Paris attacks. For example, the killers in Paris appeared to expect to end their attacks in suicide, either by detonating suicide vests before capture or by what is sometimes called suicide by police. Although many recruits are drawn to DAESH as a religious death cult, this manual urges clandestine “brothers” to stay alive to continue operations. As the author points out: “A lot of the brothers come here and their only concern is how they are going to get killed.” He goes on to provide a religious justification for surviving to fight on and cites a basic rule not heard from those who promote suicide operations: “Individual safety is more important than the operation.” [7]

Many of the basic guidelines offered to clandestine cells in the West are universal rules well known to national intelligence, police and military services worldwide. For example, constant vigilance against host country security must be paramount; prevention through planning is better than trying to fix mistakes after the fact; clandestine actors must avoid negligence and not succumb to crippling paranoia; cells must practice information security on a strict need-to-know basis; mistakes come in groups, as one begets another; and sound security practices, such as varying everyday routines, must be faithfully adhered to. [8]The manual also covers how to devise a cover story; how to set up and maintain safe houses; how to hold meetings safely or attend conferences without revealing one's intentions; how to maintain weapons security and safely transport weapons and other operatives; and how to perform surveillance of a target and detect surveillance by others. Covert operatives are cautioned to be wary when recruiting members to a cell and to use family members or individuals with whom they have a lifelong acquaintance. Covert operatives should not keep weapons or incriminating documents in their homes. The security advice is specific. Individuals should disguise their Muslim identity by wearing a Christian cross. Clandestine jihadists should make sure they have no Quran apps on their cellphones, no prayer beads and no beard. They are also counseled to shave a beard well before going operational so that an individual's face will be of one color. They should dress in harmony with their surroundings. They should stay away from mosques. In general, operatives must blend in with their surroundings and not draw attention to themselves in any way. Clandestine operatives should always use encryption online. The author goes on to name specific apps and operating systems that operatives should not use because they have been “compromised” while recommending other apps and devices; the author advises would-be jihadists to study certain computer protocols and generally keep up to date on the latest technology. [9]

The manual’s clearest message is that the United States and its allies, like Canada, have extremely competent security and intelligence services that routinely uncover





clandestine groups within their countries. Without vigilance and operational and information security, any cell should expect to be discovered. The security guidelines are timeless, and “any brother working in covert operations” should follow them. [10] Furthermore, in a “unipolar world,” groups cannot expect to perform an operation in a country like the United States and return to a safe haven as they could have done during the Cold War. In the current environment, the clandestine individual cell is more effective than a group with a pyramidal structure. Cells, moreover, should not have any contact with or knowledge of other cells in a given country, so that discovery of one cell does not lead to discovery of others.Despite this manual’s title (Safety and Security Guidelines for Lone Wolf Mujahideen), it is likely not intended for the true lone wolf. Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri’s theories , on which most of the manual is based, begin with the lone wolf, but argue that while lone wolf attacks may raise jihadist morale, they do not move toward a useful political outcome. To be effective, clandestine terrorists need to be connected to jihadist goals and doctrine, but unconnected organizationally from anyone except members of their own cell. Ideally—according to al-Suri but not mentioned in the manual—one individual builder unit would create a number of operational cells in a given country, providing them with rudimentary training and perhaps some funding. [11] Only the builder knows about the cells’ existence and location, and he would instruct them to start operations only after he has departed the country in which they reside. There could also be a propaganda cell, which has no direct connection with the operational cells and could even be located in another country.

Conclusion The known clandestine cell that most closely approximates the intended audience for this security manual is that of the Tsarnaev brothers, who were behind the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. The major difference is that the Islamic State clearly wants their clandestine proxies to be able to survive to fight another day and, therefore, spend as much time designing an exit plan as they do designing the operation itself. The manual instructs its audience to read AQAP’s English magazine Inspire, much like Tamerlane Tsarnaev. The magazine has instructions about bomb making and al-Suri’s theories, both beyond the scope of the Islamic State manual. The manual also recommends reading Dabiq, the magazine in which the Islamic State publishes propaganda and policy goals along with regular criticism of al-Qaeda's current leadership. Nevertheless, a potential clandestine jihadist terrorist in the United States does not have to choose between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in order to serve the latter group’s purpose. Clearly, creating such cells at long distance is extremely difficult, but the Islamic State has signaled its intention to try because such cells are so hard to detect before they act. Thus, the challenge to U.S law enforcement, intelligence agencies and the general public, ideally working together, is clearly laid out in this latest jihadist manual.Michael W. S. Ryan is an independent consultant and researcher on Middle Eastern security issues and a senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation.Notes1. DAESH is the abbreviation of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wal-Sham, the Arabic name for the group referred to as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham. DAESH is the Arabic acronym equivalent of ISIS in English.2. For a description of al-Suri’s theory of “individual and small group terrorism,” see Michael W. S. Ryan, Decoding Al-Qaeda's Strategy: The Deep Battle Against America, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 235-251.3. Michael W. S. Ryan, “Hot Issue: The Boston Marathon Bombing: Radicalization





Process and the Tsarnaev Brothers,” May 9, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/hotissues/single-hot-issues/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=40849&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=593&cHash=fe630860336b711ee10cd88888fbd866.4. See Abu Sa‘d al-Amili, “The Reality and Future of the Jihadi Current” (Waqi wa Mustaqbal al-Tayyar al-Jihadi), (Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad website, 2010/2011). The author dated the composition November 7, 2010, but the website simply gave the date as simply 2011. Citing different dates probably reflects the lag between the author completing the clandestinely produced article and its publication on the openly available jihadist website. In context “regional jihad” (jihad qutri) refers to a country-based clandestine insurrectionist group fighting the government while “global jihad” (jihad alami) refers to its networked international counterpart fighting the United States and its allies, some of whom are local.5. See MEMRI, “Cyber and Jihad Lab”: http://cjlab.memri.org/lab-projects/tracking-jihadi-terrorist-use-of-social-media/safety-security-guidelines-for-lone-wolf-mujahideen-distributed-on-twitter/; or The Site Intelligence Group, https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/jihadist-publishes-english-adaptation-for-lone-wolves-of-al-qaeda-security-expert-s-audio-series-on-security.html. The document has also appeared on a number of jihadist websites after the Twitter account in which it first appeared was taken down because of its content. Site Intelligence Group identified the author of the al-Qaeda lecture series.6. See John Rossomando, “New Islamic State Document Shows U.S. Still In the Crosshairs,” IPT News, November 9, 2015, http://www.investigativeproject.org/5021/new-islamic-state-document-shows-us-still-in#.7. SITE, op. cit.8. Ibid.9. Ibid.10. Ibid.11. Michael W. S. Ryan, op. cit.

If at First You Don’t Succeed, Try Deception: The Islamic State’s Expansion Efforts in AlgeriaPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 22 November 13, 2015 By: Nathaniel Barr

The emblem of the Islamic State in Algeria (Wilayat al-Jazair)Since announcing the establishment of the caliphate in June 2014, the Islamic State has broadcast its successes in expanding into new territories outside of Syria and Iraq, aiming to create the perception that it is growing rapidly throughout the Muslim world, and steadily chipping away at al-Qaeda’s position as the preeminent global jihadist organization. But contrary to the former’s claims, the group’s expansion efforts have often been fraught with setbacks. In some theaters, the Islamic State





has confronted more powerful jihadist organizations, many of them al-Qaeda affiliates, who have resisted efforts to sow internal discord and inspire defections. The Islamic State has also run up against state security forces who have sought to eliminate affiliated groups before they can gain a foothold. To date, however, the Islamic State’s expansion struggles have often gone relatively unnoticed, as the group has effectively masked its weaknesses and projected an image of strength through its propaganda.

Nowhere have the organization’s struggles been more pronounced than in Algeria. While Algeria was one of the first countries outside of Syria and Iraq where the Islamic State established a physical presence, two factors have prevented the group from solidifying its gains and making further inroads. First, a superior jihadist organization in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has pushed back against the Islamic State’s encroachment in Algeria. AQIM has waged a propaganda battle against its jihadist rival, and has mounted a military campaign aimed at demonstrating to rank-and-file militants in Algeria that it is more powerful than the Islamic State. Second, Islamic State factions in Algeria have been unable to evade Algeria’s security forces, who have aggressively and proactively cracked down on them. With both AQIM and Algerian security forces pressuring the Islamic State, the group has resorted to a familiar propaganda strategy of deception and exaggeration to preserve its influence in Algeria. The article will examine the Islamic State’s struggles in Algeria in the context of the group’s broader international expansion efforts.

Islamic State’s Initial Advance into Algeria. The Islamic State’s expansion into Algeria came without warning, when members of AQIM’s “center zone,” led by Abdelmalek Gouri, announced in September 2014 that they were joining the rival jihadist group. In his statement, Gouri said that AQIM had “deviat[ed] from the true path,” and he proclaimed that his group would henceforth be known as Jund al-Khilafah, or Soldiers of the Caliphate (al-Jazeera, September 14, 2014). Less than two weeks after Gouri’s pledge of allegiance, Jund al-Khilafah announced its arrival on the world stage by kidnapping and beheading Herve Gourdel, a French citizen who had been hiking in the mountains of the Kabylie region, a longtime hotbed of jihadist activity (al-Jazeera, September 25, 2014). Jund al-Khilafah filmed Gourdel’s beheading and presented the execution as an act of retaliation against France for its involvement in the anti-Islamic State military campaign in Iraq. the group’s decision to carry out a high-profile beheading as its first act of violence was emblematic of the Islamic State’s global messaging strategy; in theaters outside of Iraq and Syria, the organization has repeatedly conducted spectacular attacks as a means of drawing attention to new Islamic State affiliates.

However, although the Islamic State had announced its presence in Algeria with a bang, Jund al-Khilafah’s prospects thereafter declined rapidly. In December 2014—a month after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Islamic State’s amir, accepted Jund al-Khilafah’s pledge of allegiance and announced the creation of Wilayat al-Jazair (Algeria province)—the Algerian Army killed Gouri, who was Jund al-Khilafah’s top commander, and two other militants in a raid in northern Algeria (al-Arabiya, December 23, 2014). A crippling blow was delivered to Jund al-Khilafah in May 2015, when Algerian security forces killed approximately 25 Islamic State militants in two days of military operations in the mountains of Bouira Province (Reuters, May 20). At the time of the first raid, which resulted in the death of 22 fighters, Jund al-Khilafah’s top commanders had reportedly been meeting to plan major attacks, possibly in Algiers or against Algerian military facilities, and Algerian troops recovered a sizable weapons arsenal during the operation





(El Watan [Algiers], May 22).The May raid devastated Jund al-Khilafah. International media reports placed the size of the group at only 30 fighters, meaning that the raid in May had wiped out almost all of the group’s manpower (New York Times, December 23, 2014). The raid also decimated Jund al-Khilafah’s leadership ranks: five of the group’s six commanders were killed in the operation, including Abdullah Othman al-Asimi (a.k.a. Bachir Kherza), who had been appointed to lead Jund al-Khilafah after Gouri’s death (El Watan [Algiers], May 24).Jund al-Khilafah’s precipitous collapse revealed the fragility of the Islamic State’s foothold in Algeria. Its rapid and highly public rise to prominence may have been to its detriment, as the group was not strong enough in its nascent stages to withstand the crackdown that inevitably followed the release of the beheading video. Indeed, though Jund al-Khilafah claimed responsibility for three minor attacks against security forces in February and March of 2015, the group has not mustered enough force to carry out another high-profile attack since the kidnapping and beheading of Gourdel (Jihadology, March 19). And while Jund al-Khilafah had reportedly been in the process of wooing AQIM fighters based in southern Algeria and northern Mali, the near obliteration of the group in May likely curtailed these recruitment operations and reduced the Islamic State’s influence in the region (El Khabar [Algiers], July 21).Jund al-Khilafah, or what remains of the group, is now a strategically irrelevant player in Algeria. Though remnants of the group may continue to operate in the Kabylie region, the group does not presently possess the manpower or resources to significantly threaten Algeria’s security or AQIM’s Algerian network.

Smoke and Mirrors: Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy in AlgeriaWith its physical network in Algeria decimated, the Islamic State has turned to its propaganda machine to help reestablish itself in the country. In particular, the group has exploited social media and other platforms to create the illusion that militants in Algeria are defecting from AQIM and flocking to the Islamic State in droves. According to their logic, if the Islamic State can foster the perception that it is ascendant and AQIM is internally factious, it can persuade Algerian jihadists to defect from AQIM. Thus, the Islamic State’s strategy is designed to turn the myth of momentum into a reality. This is an approach that the organization has also implemented in other areas where it is seeking to expand, including Afghanistan and Somalia.The primary means by which the Islamic State has sought to cultivate momentum in Algeria is by publicizing pledges of allegiance that Algerian jihadists have made. Four jihadist groups have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State since Jund al-Khilafah did so, with some of the pledges timed to maximize the attention they receive. The first pledge of allegiance that the Islamic State received in 2015 came in May from a group of fighters in Skikda Province, in eastern Algeria. [1] The pledge, which was issued via audio statement, provided little information on the members of the Skikda faction, aside from the fact that they had previously been aligned with AQIM. The next pledge of allegiance came in late July, when militants claiming to be part of AQIM’s al-Ghuraba Brigade, which operates in the vicinity of the eastern Algerian city of Constantine, announced their defection to the Islamic State in an audio statement and called upon other AQIM members to join the other group as well. [2] In early August, Islamic State militants from Iraq’s Saladin Province released a video praising the al-Ghuraba militants, thereby drawing further attention to the defection. [3]The Islamic State’s next moves in Algeria further showed how the group manipulates social media to inflate its presence and create the perception of discord within rival jihadist





organizations. On September 3, Islamic State Twitter supporters released a video of the al-Ghuraba cell’s pledge of allegiance (only an audio statement had been released when the group initially pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in July). The next day, militants claiming to be from AQIM’s al-Ansar Brigade, which operates in central Algeria, released an audio statement announcing their defection. [4] The re-release of the al-Ghuraba militants’ pledge of allegiance appears to have been strategically timed to coincide with the pledge from the al-Ansar Brigade, creating the illusion that AQIM militants were defecting to the Islamic State en masse. Approximately two weeks after the pledge of allegiance from the al-Ansar militants, Humat al-Da’wah al-Salafiyah, a low profile Algerian jihadist group that had joined AQIM in 2013, announced that it too was pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (SITE, September 22). The organization’s social media operatives immediately sought to publicize the defections; one prolific pro-Islamic State Twitter account remarked that a new group was defecting from AQIM to the Islamic State every day, while another Twitter supporter claimed that AQIM was fracturing as a result of Islamic State pressure. [5] [6]

Despite the Islamic State’s efforts to foment unrest within AQIM, the group has been unsuccessful in turning the impression of strength into a reality. None of the four groups that have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Algeria in 2015 have carried out an attack since joining. Indeed, there is reason to believe that some of these groups comprise fewer than a dozen militants; one news report claimed that the al-Ghuraba and Skikda cells had been inactive for several years, and also noted that the al-Ghuraba cell consisted of no more than ten fighters (al-Arabi al-Jadeed [London], July 27). The situation has become so grim for the Islamic State in Algeria that the group itself has acknowledged its struggles. On October 21, the Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Jazair released an audio statement in which a militant reassured jihadists that the group’s presence in Algeria was sustainable, and urged Islamic State fighters in Algeria not to risk their lives unnecessarily, fearing a repeat of Jund al-Khilafah’s collapse. [7] That the Islamic State, a group that endlessly parades its victories and conceals its defeats, felt the need to reassure its supporters in Algeria that it was still relevant reveals the organization’s bleak prospects in the country.

AQIM’s Response to the Islamic State Threat. One explanation for Islamic State’s struggles in Algeria is the strong front that AQIM has presented against encroachment. AQIM has implemented a two-pronged strategy to counter the Islamic State’s influence in Algeria. On the propaganda front, AQIM has sought to discredit the other group. For instance, in July 2015, AQIM released a statement via Twitter accusing the Islamic State of sowing discord within the jihadist community and blaming the group for inciting a jihadist civil war in the Libyan city of Derna. [8] AQIM has also directly undercut the Islamic State’s propaganda operations in Algeria; following the al-Ansar Brigade’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State, AQIM released a statement claiming that the al-Ansar Brigade remained loyal to al-Qaeda, and said that no more than ten men from the brigade had defected. [9]In addition, AQIM has intensified its military operations in Algeria to demonstrate to militants that it remains the most potent jihadist force in the country and that defections from AQIM to the Islamic State have not diminished AQIM’s military capabilities. In July 2015, AQIM carried out an attack that amounted to a show of force, killing at least nine Algerian soldiers in the Ain Defla region southwest of Algiers (Reuters, July 19). In a statement, AQIM noted that it had carried out the attack, the bloodiest jihadist operation in





Algeria in over a year, in response to Algerian military claims that the militant group had been “eradicated and destroyed.” [10] However, the attack also sent a clear message to the Islamic State, and to AQIM’s own fighters, that AQIM was still a force to be reckoned with in Algeria. Since the Ain Defla incident, AQIM, which had been largely inactive militarily in 2014, has carried out several more attacks inside Algeria, suggesting that AQIM has made a strategic decision to ramp up its operational tempo in Algeria to ward off a challenge from the Islamic State.

Implications for Algeria. AQIM’s escalation in response to the challenge from the Islamic State comes at a fraught time for Algeria, whose policymakers and security officials are preoccupied with resolving the conflicts in Libya and Mali and preventing spillover into the country. These security challenges also come as tensions between Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and the DRS, Algeria’s powerful intelligence service, are mounting. In addition, in the background is the potential succession crisis when Bouteflika, whose health has deteriorated following a stroke in 2013, eventually passes away. These concerns are compounded by persistent economic and social discontent among the Algerian population; in early 2015, thousands of Algerians took to the streets of Algiers and other cities to protest against corruption, political and economic stagnation and the government’s decision to begin fracking for shale gas in southern Algeria.AQIM’s resurgence and the lingering threat of Islamic State expansion therefore poses yet another challenge for Algerian policymakers. Even though the Islamic State has proven incapable of gaining a foothold in Algeria thus far, the group’s expansion efforts have still had a negative impact on Algeria’s security, as AQIM increases its operations against Algerian security forces in response to the Islamic State challenge. In addition, AQIM’s attempts to out-compete the Islamic State through conducting attacks will almost certainly intensify if the latter manages to solidify its presence in Algeria. As such, the competition between the Islamic State and AQIM can be expected to have an outsize impact on Algeria’s security and stability in the coming months.Nathaniel Barr is a threat analyst at Valens Global, a D.C.-based consulting firm that focuses on the global challenges posed by violent non-state actors.Notes1. For the audio clip of “Statement from the Mujahidin: Bay’ah To the Caliph of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,” see http://jihadology.net/category/countries/algeria/page/2/.2. For the audio clip of “Bay’ah of the Mujahidin in the City of Qusantinah (Constantine) To the Caliph of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Joining The Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Jaza’ir,” see http://jihadology.net/2015/07/25/new-audio-message-from-sarayyah-al-ghuraba-bayah-of-the-mujahidin-in-the-city-of-qusan%E1%B9%ADinah-constantine-to-the-caliph-of-the-muslims-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-and-joining-the-islamic-state/.3. For the video clip of “One Body #2: Congratulations To Our Brothers In Algeria – Wilayat Salah al-Din,” see http://jihadology.net/2015/08/10/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-one-body-2-congratulations-to-our-brothers-in-algeria-wilayat-%E1%B9%A3ala%E1%B8%A5-al-din/.4. For the audio clip of “Statement from the Mujahidin: Bay’ah To the Caliph of the Muslims Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Joining The Islamic State’s Wilayat al-Jaza’ir,” see http://jihadology.net/2015/09/04/new-audio-message-from-katibat-al-an%E1%B9%A3ar-statement-from-the-mujahidin-bayah-to-the-caliph-of-the-muslims-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-





and-joining-the-islamic-states-wilayat-al-jaz/.5. Tweets from Twitter account of M. Gharib al-Ikhwan (@bhbhbhbh131), September 21, 2015.6. Tweets from Twitter account of Uyun al-Ummah (@Oyoon_is), September 21, 2015.7. For the audio clip of “One Body – Wilayat al-Jaza’ir”, see https://archive.org/details/algasd.8. Tweets from Twitter account of @AI_Andalus, July 7, 2015.9. For the statement from AQIM, titled “About the Rumor of the Allegiance of Katibat al-Ansar to the ‘State Organization,’” see https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/al-qc481_idah-in-the-islamic-maghrib-22about-the-rumor-of-the-allegiance-of-katc4abbat-al-ane1b9a3c481r-to-the-state-organization22.pdf.10. For the statement from AQIM, titled “The Raid of Jebel al-Luh: The Destruction of 14 Soldiers and Spoils of Their Weapons,” see https://justpaste.it/Jbl_Allouh.

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