al-qaida chief ayman al-zawahiri the coordinator 2016 part 19-138-caliphate-the state of...

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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2016 Part 19-138-Caliphate-The State of al-Qaida-57-Zawahiri-3

“So the slogan ‘Mobilize the entire people, arm the entire people and fight on all fronts’ has become a most lively and heroic reality.”- Vo Nguyen Giap.”

Zawahirii says it is “our duty today” to work for the “unity of the mujahideen” until the Levant is “liberated” from the “Nusayri” (a pejorative term for Alawites) regime and their Shiite partners (meaning Iran and Hezbollah), as well as the Western “Crusaders” and Russia. The goal is to build a “rightly guided” Islamic “entity.”

." Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in

the cause of Allah.ii"

The most deadly conflicts have been fought on ideological grounds in revolutions and civil and religious wars

(Each of the 164 Jihad verses in this list -1 -was selected based on how clearly and directly it spoke about Jihad, at least when considered in its immediate context. Most of the listed passages mention a military expedition, fighting, or distributing war spoils. -)

Known at first as 'People's War', this idea developed in the 19th century as part of a growing sense of national identity. By the middle of World War One it was known as 'Total War' - the organisation of entire societies for war in a social, economic, and even spiritual sense.

But in all these wars, total war has come up against a formidable opponent – faith

Spiritual faith is playing a major role in the current war. This mindset is called in Arabic, "takfir wa hijra."

An Islamic website explains takfir: "Muslims are not allowed to wage war on each other, but they can on unbelievers. Hijra refers to the new world that the Prophet Muhammad proclaimed in the many years of his Medina exile.

For now, Al Qaeda seems ahead of America on the Middle Eastern chessboard. American total war and "takfir wa hijra" are two sides of the same coin. Tapping into long-standing Islamic cultural frustrations and humiliations, al

Qaeda’s ideology seeks to exploit the perception that the once-proud Muslim culture has become poor and weak, due to centuries of military, economic, and political losses against Western imperialist invaders

Al Qaeda also seeks to exploit religious differences rooted in the very beginnings of Islam and Christianity. Since Mohammed was both a prophet and a ruler, secularism is foreign to Islam. As such, espousing democracy appears to Islamic fundamentalists to be a direct attack upon the basic tenets of their religion

Total war became the norm only a few centuries ago. In medieval times, with exceptions, wars were between combatants. Civilian populations were left to themselves, except 1 http://thinkexist.com/quotes/ayman_al-zawahiri/

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 19 02/05/2023

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perhaps to raid their farms for food. In wars of conquest destroying producers and productive assets was counterproductive. In ancient times

armies could be quite brutal, but the term "total war" came into use to describe the difference between modern and medieval war, which had become the norm. A war in which every available weapon is used and the nation's full financial resources are devoted.

Vo Nguyen Giap (1911-2013) commanded the military forces that freed Vietnam from French colonialism in the 1946–1954 war that ended with the victory at Dien Bien Phu (1954), and that then defeated U.S. imperialist aggression in the 1962–1975 war that ended with liberation of Saigon.

Giap’s genius resides in his firm grasp of strategy, specifically revolutionary war or “people’s war”, as Giap prefers to call it. Giap’s strategy of revolutionary war totally integrated two principal forms of force—armed force and political force, military dau tranh and political dau tranh. Their combined use created a kind of war unseen before: a single war waged simultaneously on several fronts—not geographical fronts, but programmatical fronts—all conducted by one and the same authority, all carefully meshed. It was a war in which military campaigns were waged for political and diplomatic reasons; economic measures such as land reform were adopted to further political ends; political or diplomatic losses were accepted to forward military campaigns; and psychological campaigns were launched to lower enemy military effectiveness. All actions; political, military, economic, and diplomatic, were weighed for their impact on the other elements of dau tranh and on the advance towards the final goal—victory. Giap’s grasp and application of grand strategy clearly characterizes him as a genius and one of the premier strategists of the twentieth century.

All these successes were based on the strategy of people’s war.“The outstanding characteristic of people’s war in our country is that armed struggle and political struggle are very closely coordinated, supporting and stimulating each other,” wrote Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, founder of the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF).

“So the slogan ‘Mobilize the entire people, arm the entire people and fight on all fronts’ has become a most lively and heroic reality.”All efforts by the U.S. to defeat this core strategy — such as the “pacification” and “strategic hamlets” programs — were hopeless.

“When a whole people rises up, nothing can be done. No money can beat them,” Gen. Giap told the Liberation News Service in 1969. “That’s the basis of our strategy and tactics, which the Americans fail to understand.

“All 31 million of our people are valiant fighters,” Gen. Giap said, “using a small force to fight a bigger one, defeating a stronger force with a smaller one, combining big, medium-sized and small battles, stepping up big-unit fighting and at the same time carrying out widespread guerrilla warfare, constantly striking the enemy from a strong position and achieving very high combat efficiency, becoming ever stronger and winning ever bigger victories as they fight.” (Speech in Hanoi, Dec. 21, 1968)

The modern concept of total war can be traced to the writings of the 19th-century Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, who denied that wars could be fought by laws.The most deadly conflicts have been fought on ideological grounds in revolutions and civil and religious wars. The unleashing of massive human and technological means of destruction is thus seen as an irresistible and unsurprising phenomenoniii.





General Franz Halder, the senior planner for the operation that had been codenamed ‘Barbarossa’, carefully noted Hitler’s central

message in his diary: On 30 March 1941, We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A communist is no comrade before or after the battle. This is a war of annihilation. If we do not grasp this, we shall still beat the enemy, but thirty years later we shall again have to fight the Communist foe. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy

The ideas of General Erich Ludendorff on the matter have been characterized as ‘neither original nor interesting’. His 1935 book, ‘Der totale Krieg’, ‘rehearsed platitudes’ and, if it had any effect, ‘its immediate impact lay in its title’.

General Erich Ludendorff became acutely aware of these weaknesses in military theory and practice as they conspired against him retaining his effective professional grasp over war. As the man who effectively presided over Germany’s imperial military descent into destruction and defeat in the First World War, he had good reason to reflect on his experiences in enforced retirement. His theory of total war, which he presented to the world two years before his death in 1937, sought not simply to restore military professional control over war, but also to re-establish the lost link between political effect and war. Ludendorff’s concept of total war shows how well he had internalized the shift in the political rationalization of war and the resulting need for its means and methods to change.

The experience of actual war, however, began to reveal some unsettling developments. Mobilizing large armies required large domestic support structures. While nation-states provided an effective vehicle for organizing mass mobilization, the involvement of so many elements in society in support of the war effort created vulnerabilities. Whereas soldiers were selected and trained to endure the rigours of combat, the civilians on the ‘home front’ came unprepared. If they could be attacked in some way, a nation might collapse without suffering defeat in front line battle.

Ludendorff specified the missing strategic aim: ‘Total war is not only aimed against the armed forces, but also directly against the people.’ \Although the idea was ultimately legitimized by a defensive political objective –– survival of the nation –– this strategic aim had to be pursued by offensive means. The best security for the nation followed from the total annihilation of other nations. Total war thus involved the total mobilization by the total state for the pursuit of total –– political and strategic –– aims. However horrific we might now think Ludendorff’s product was, this was a coherent and seemingly practical concept of war that was adjusted directly to political demands.

Total war, military conflict in which the contenders are willing to make any sacrifice in lives and other resources to obtain a complete victory, as distinguished from limited war. Throughout history, limitations on the scope of warfare have been more economic and social than political. Simple territorial aggrandizement has not, for the most part, brought about total commitments to war. The most deadly conflicts have been fought on ideological grounds in revolutions and civil and religious wars. After World War II, especially during the Cold War, the prospect of all-out nuclear war raised a conceptual problem in that such a war presumably would short-circuit the processes of all-out mobilization of resources and regimentation of national effort—that is, the very mobilization and regimentation that had made the 20th-century world wars seem more total than earlier ones. The fear of nuclear war, in any case, severely inhibited the major





powers in waging wars themselves and in allowing their client states to do so, thus substituting deliberate restraint for the more impersonal constraints that

limited warfare in the past.

America's wars against Afghanistan and Iraq were quasi-total wars that brought about "shock and awe," not only among soldiers but also too many civilians.

But in all these wars, total war has come up against a formidable opponent -- faith.Vengeance is only a part of what's happening in the Middle East. Islamic suicide bombers are waging their own total war.

But unlike shock and awe, their voluntary death shows they believe they are part of a higher cause, in this case a new turn in Islam. Throughout the billion-plus Muslim world, a new ideological schism has been opening.

In his subsequent declaration of war against the United States, Osama bin Laden made jihad an imperative for all good Muslims worldwide:

We – with God’s help – call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on the Muslim community, leaders, youths and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan’s US troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson, Seemingly having little to lose, al Qaeda has proclaimed its willingness to continue the conflict until it is resolved in its favour.

For his part, Osama bin Laden decreed, [that] the one who stays behind and fails to join the Mujahidin when jihad becomes an individual duty commits a cardinal sin... the most pressing duty after faith is repelling the aggressor enemy. This means that the nation should devote its resources, sons, and money to fight the infidels and drive them out of its land

In considering the mobilization of society, the central importance of culture in the conflict cannot be understated. Al Qaeda’s centre of gravity is Islam, allowing it to be “...intertwined in the socioeconomic, political and religious fabric of Muslims living in at least 80 countries.”

Al Qaeda’s religion-based message has gained them widespread support from within the radical elements of the global Islamic community, while muted condemnation from western Islamic communities reflects, at the very least, silent sympathy. Often, actions taken by the GWOT to counter al Qaeda operations only serve to fill the latter’s ranks

When considering the stated objectives of war, one finds the strongest evidence of total war in the making. Above all else, the conflict is a war of ideas, a crucial struggle for the hearts and minds of Muslims worldwide in what some have termed “...the battle for strategic influence.” The ideological confrontation between democracy and Islam threatens to be a zero-sum struggle between secularism and fundamentalism, as both are diametrically opposed to each other, and there is little or no apparent middle ground available. As a result, the vital interests of parties are at stake. Al Qaeda’s demands to “purge the holy lands of infidels” in order to create an idealist’s caliphate represent the antithesis of Western liberal democratic freedoms and values. Discrediting this concept is part of official US policy.The United States has little choice, as even its harshest critics admit that changing its Middle Eastern policy or removing US troops will not make al Qaeda go away.





On May 7, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda, released an audio recording in which he announced that he had given his permission for the al-Qaeda affiliated Syrian jihadist group, al-Nusra Front, to create “a new emirate” in Syria. Currently, al-Nusra Front has militants scattered throughout western Syria and directly controls a region of approximately 2,000 square miles in Idlib Province.This was not the first al-Qaeda linked emirate. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had declared an emirate in Yemen back in 2012. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) announced the creation of the “Sahara Emirate” in 2010, although technically the emirate was created by a splinter group from al-Qaeda that later rejoined AQIM.The proposed “Syrian Emirate” is, however, the first emirate in which al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has taken the lead in organizing. As such, it represents a direct challenge to the Islamic State (IS) Caliphate announced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014, further underscoring the increasingly bitter and oftentimes violent rivalry between the two organizations.In the Islamic world an emirate is a political organization and the emir who governs it is a political leader. A caliphate is both a political and religious organization, and the caliph who governs it is simultaneously both a political and a religious leader. The caliph represents the highest political and religious authority within the Islamic world. Typically, in Islamic history, emirates have been subdivisions within a caliphate and emirs local leaders subordinate to the caliph.Under Sharia law there can only be one caliphate and only one Amir al-Mu’minin—leader of the faithful. The last official caliphate ended in 1922 with the abolishment of the Ottoman Sultanate. The leader of Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared the establishment of a new caliphate in June 2014, assuming for himself the title of caliph and “leader of the faithful.”Zawahiri’s announcement stopped short of calling for the establishment of a rival caliphate. He did, however, lay the foundation for declaring a caliphate at a later date by characterizing the Islamic State as “Kharijites.” The term is used by Salafists who agree with Islamic States’ religious doctrines but disagree with the organization’s political views and agenda. The Kharijites were a radical sect in the early history of Islam that was noted for its extremist views on takfir, the excommunication and killing of Muslims considered insufficiently devout or accused of having abandoned Islam. The term Kharijite or neo-Kharijite is often used as a synonym for extremist Islamic views.The announcement, although not wholly unprecedented, capped a sharp change from previous al-Qaeda policy, and has been in process since at least 2012. Bin-Laden had always opposed the creation of either an emirate or a caliphate in the Middle East until the United States was “defeated,” in other words, until it either voluntarily withdrew from the Middle East, or was forcibly ejected, and its protection of the Western leaning Gulf monarchies was ended.Bin Laden believed that the announcement of an emirate or caliphate prior to “defeating” America would result in the United States and its allies bringing overwhelming force against the new state and destroying it.There are at least three reasons that explain the shift in strategy on the part of al-Qaeda and Zawahiri over the last several years.First, it is clear that Islamic State has garnered a lot of prestige and influence in the jihadist world by proclaiming itself a caliphate. Since June 2014, IS has drawn over three dozen jihadist movements into its orbit and it has expanded its “geographic reach” to include 30 different provinces or wilayas.





In some cases, like the three Libyan wilayas (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan), Islamic State is heavily involved from an operational standpoint and

has supplied fighters, arms and financial assistance. Others, like the Nigerian Boko Haram or the Philippine Abu Sayyaf, have adopted some of the imagery and sophisticated media techniques of Islamic State, but do not maintain any direct operational links with IS nor does it appear that they are subject to Baghdadi’s direct control.Of the 30 different wilayas organized by Islamic State, 20 are in Syria and Iraq, and 10 are outside of its core territory. Not all of the wilayas in Iraq and Syria, however, are under its control. Some like the wilaya of Baghdad or Damascus, it has proclaimed but never actually governed. Moreover, outside of the city of Derna in Libya, all the cities it controls are in its core Syrian-Iraqi territory.Many of Islamic State’s affiliates and provinces outside of its core territory are simply existing jihadist organizations, or splinters of those organizations, that have attempted to leverage Islamic State’s prestige by rebranding themselves as affiliates. The Wilaya al Sudan al Gharbi (West Africa Province) is simply a repackaged Boko Haram. The Wilaya Sinai was the Sinai branch of the Egyptian jihadist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem) that broke away from the pro al-Qaeda parent organization and declared its allegiance to IS.

By declaring its own official “emirate”, al-Qaeda is leveling the playing field and trying to win back for itself some of the legitimacy and jihadist credentials that Islamic State obtained by declaring itself a caliphate. Secondly, it is also possible that al-Qaeda is anticipating the imminent destruction, or the severe curtailment, of Islamic State and is positioning itself to inherit the remains of IS. Many of the Islamic State’s foreign affiliates are either splinter groups, which emerged from existing pro al-Qaeda organizations, or former al-Qaeda affiliates that turned away to join IS. By positioning itself to absorb any remnants of Islamic State, al-Qaeda is creating the means for reintegrating those pro-IS splinter groups back into their pro-al-Qaeda parent.

It’s not entirely clear why Zawahiri chose al-Nusra Front as the vehicle for al-Qaeda’s first official emirate. The al-Nusra Front leadership is openly loyal to Zawahiri. It shows far less independence, and historically has been more willing to follow Zawahiri’s lead, than the powerful al-Qaeda affiliates like the North African based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the South Arabian based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). It may also reflect the fact that al-Nusra Front’s close proximity to IS means it is more likely to inherit, or be able to seize control, of major urban centers currently controlled by Islamic State militants.

Finally, Zawahiri’s announcement also probably signifies a reassessment of the threat that the US and its allies pose to the new emirate. Given how anemic the US response has been to the emergence of Islamic State, Zawahiri may have concluded that Bin Laden was mistaken in arguing that the US must first be “defeated” before an emirate or a caliphate could be established. He may now feel it is safe to declare al-Qaeda’s first official emirate in the heart of the historic Middle East, even if the US continues to remain engaged in Middle Eastern affairs. Will an official al-Qaeda caliphate be far behind?Regardless of the combination of reasons that may have prompted Zawahiri to approve the creation of an official al-Qaeda sponsored emirate, the emergence of two competing state organizations in close proximity to each other in the historic center of the Middle East further underscores the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Islamic State for the leadership of the international jihadist movement. This rivalry will only add to the rising violence in the Islamic world, further stoke the sectarianism that characterizes it and further polarize Middle East politics.





Killing bin Laden did not kill the radical Islamist ideology he embraced. Nor did killing Abu Musab Zarqawi before him.Indeed, the strategic plan that bin Laden's top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, outlined for Zarqawi in 2005 is at this moment being advanced by the late Zarqawi's terrorist group, which is now divorced from al-Qaida and calls itself the Islamic State. In October 2005, the office of the director of national intelligence released a letter Zawahiri sent to Zarqawi in July of that year. An English translation of this letter is currently available on the website of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Zawahiri told Zarqawi that he was "blessed" to be at the struggle's main front."What I mean is that God has blessed you and your brothers while many of the Muslim mujahideen have longed for that blessing, and that is Jihad in the heart of the Islamic world," said Zawahiri.He pointed to four "stages" he envisioned in that struggle.

"The first stage: Expel the Americans from Iraq," Zawahiri wrote."The second stage: Establish an Islamic authority or amirate," he said, "then

develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate — over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq, i.e., in Sunni areas, is in order to fill the void stemming from the departure of the Americans, immediately upon their exit and before un-Islamic forces attempt to fill this void, whether those whom the Americans will leave behind them, or those among the un-Islamic forces who will try to jump at taking power."

The third stage: Extend the jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq," said Zawahiri.

"The fourth stage: It may coincide with what came before: the clash with Israel, because Israel was established only to challenge any new Islamic entity," he said.What has happened since Zawahiri sent Zarqawi this letter?Almost 10 years ago, in June 2006, U.S. forces killed Zarqawi in Iraq. Five years after that, in May 2011, U.S. forces killed bin Laden in Pakistan.

For more than six years after Zawahiri sent his July 2005 letter to Zarqawi, the U.S. maintained troops in Iraq. According to the Congressional Research Service, those troops peaked at 170,300 in November 2007, more than a year after Zarqawi's death.In December 2011, President Obama removed all remaining U.S. forces from Iraq. "But we're leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq, with a representative government that was elected by its people," Obama said then.

In 2014, the Islamic State (now led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and Zawahiri's al-Qaida parted ways.

And the Islamic State now controls territory in both Syria and Iraq, where it has declared a "caliphate" and where it is committing genocide against Christians and other religious minorities. President Obama has sent more than 4,000 U.S. troops back into Iraq and last week the administration announced he was adding 250 U.S. troops to the 50 already in Syria. But, as recent history has demonstrated, a U.S. ground war in the Middle East will not eradicate the threat posed by radical Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State.Instead, America needs to do everything necessary to keep Islamist terrorists from entering





this country while supporting the Arab governments that understand the same threat.

Cees Do We See the Picture Unfolding!

Zawahiri’s new message is simply the latest confirmation of al Qaeda’s longstanding goal. Koran 9:41: " Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah."

Ayman al Zawahiri entitled, “Go Forth to the Levant.” Zawahiri says it is “our duty today” to work for the “unity of the mujahideen” until the Levant is “liberated” from the “Nusayri” (a pejorative term for Alawites) regime and their Shiite partners (meaning Iran and Hezbollah), as well as the Western “Crusaders” and Russia. The goal is to build a “rightly guided” Islamic “entity.”

"Our duty today is to support the jihad in Syria with all our might and rally around it, all of us, [both] light and heavy.[1] Our duty today is to call for unity among the muhajideen in Syria until it is liberated from the secularist Nusairi [i.e., Alawite] regime, its partners, the rawafid Safavis [i.e., Shi'ite Persians, referring to Iran], and their allies, the Russians and the Western Crusaders – until a righteous, jihadi Islamic entity is established in this land.

2014: Al Zawahir: "the road to Jerusalem passes through Cairo."

Hamza bin Laden: our brothers in Palestine” that “your blood is our blood.” Hamzah’s latest discussion, titled “Jerusalem Is But a Bride, Its Dowry Is Our Blood,” In a message released last November, for example, Zawahiri argued that the jihadists must establish a “state” in Egypt and in the Levant in order to “mobilize the ummah to liberate Palestine.”

The jihad in Syria as being key to the effort to “liberate Jerusalem.” Osama’s heir calls on the ummah (worldwide community of Muslims) to raise a “large army,” drawing in “experts” who can wage war on Israel.

And do not forget the importance of Afghanistan, Taliban in Muslim history !!

The Sixth Phase Hussein believes that from 2016 onwards there will a period of “total confrontation.” As soon as the caliphate has been declared the “Islamic army” it will instigate the “fight between the believers and the non-believers” which has so often been predicted by Osama bin Laden.The Seventh Phase This final stage is described as “definitive victory.” Hussein writes that in the terrorists’ eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the “one-and-a-half million Muslims,” the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. This phase should be completed by 2020, although the war shouldn’t last longer than two years.

May 9, 2016 Special Dispatch No.6420Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Mujahideen In Syria Must Unite; Syrians Must Beware Both Saudi And 'Crusader' PlotsThe following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, click here.On May 8, 2016, Al-Qaeda issued a new audio message from its leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, after several month of silence. In the message, Al-Zawahiri calls on the jihad groups in Syria to unite because this is a matter of life and death for them. He urges the Muslims of Syria to reject the initiatives of Saudi Arabia and its allies in the region, and





assures them that the jihadis will defeat "the Eastern and Western Crusaders war machine" – i.e., both Russia and America – as well as their allies, the

Syrian regime and Iran. Addressing the relationship between Al-Qaeda and its affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN), he hints that the ties between them are strong and that they should remain so, for the world will not accept JN as legitimate in any case, unless it completely changes its nature to suit the superpowers.The following are excerpts from the message:

"Syria today is the hope of the Islamic nation, for [its revolution] is the only Arab Spring revolution that is taking the correct path – the path of da'wa and jihad for the sake of strengthening the shar'ia and enacting [its laws], and for the sake of striving to establish a righteous caliphate, not the caliphate of Ibrahim Al-Badri [i.e., Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi]..."This is why the world's arch-criminals [i.e., the superpowers and the international community] have come together to prevent the establishment of a jihadi state in Syria... and have hatched [various] plots and [exerted various] pressures... However, Allah willed it that there should remain one jihad-fighting group [i.e., JN and its allies], comprising the best of the ansar [local fighters] and muhajiroun [foreign fighters], which cleaves to the truth and does not stray from it. The Muslims in Syria rallied around this group, seeing the difference between its correct path and the false path of the extremist Khawarij, the new takfiris [i.e., ISIS]..."My brothers the mujahideen everywhere, our duty today is to defend the jihad in Syria against the plots being hatched against it, plots which are directed by the pampered daughter of Britain and proxy of the U.S., the state of the Sa'ud [royal] family [namely Saudi Arabia] and its lackeys in the region. The aim of all these plots is to establish a regime in Syria that will present itself as Islamic but will be based on a false Islam that coexists in harmony with secularism and with the concept of the nation-state, with extremist nationalism and with the regime of the international arch-criminals. [This regime] will sacrifice the lives of the hundreds of thousands who took to the streets to call out the natural slogan: '[the Prophet] Muhammad is our commander and our lord forever.'"The greatest problem facing the world order and our apostate leaders and their governments [today] is that the mujahideen in Syria are standing on the borders of Palestine and threatening what they call 'the state of Israel,' [which is actually] the 51st American state and the largest military base outside America. Therefore, these criminals are compelled to cooperate in order to fight this jihad, kill it while it is still small, and divert it from its path [towards the path] of nationalism, secularism and capitulation to the world order of [these] arch-criminals. This is why they hatch one plot after another: Geneva, Riyadh, ceasefires, resolutions by the arch-criminals' Security Council– an endless series of deceptions, lies and duplicities."Our duty today is to support the jihad in Syria with all our might and rally around it, all of us, [both] light and heavy.[1] Our duty today is to call for unity among the muhajideen in Syria until it is liberated from the secularist Nusairi [i.e., Alawite] regime, its partners, the rawafid Safavis [i.e., Shi'ite Persians, referring to Iran], and their allies, the Russians and the Western Crusaders – until a righteous, jihadi Islamic entity is established in this land."My brothers the mujahideen in Syria, who come from all over the world, today unity is a matter of life and death for you. You can unite and live a life of honor, or you can stay divided and be devoured, one by one."

Al-Zawahiri then moves on to address the issue of the organizational ties between Al-Qaeda and JN: "There remains an open question that is dealt with extensively in an attempt to distract the Muslims in Syria from their true enemies, namely [the question of]





the ties between Al-Qaeda and the dear, honorable and glorious Jabhat Al-Nusra, with whom we are proud to have relations and pray to Allah that he

enhance its success and steadfastness. Let me say briefly and clearly: We have said time and again that, if and when the heroic people of Syria establish an Islamic government and choose for themselves a leader, whoever they choose will be acceptable to us. We are not power-hungry. We do not want to rule over the Muslims; we want the shari'a to rule and we want to be ruled as Muslims according to Islam. We call for unity among the mujahedeen in Syria, and urge them to agree on the establishment of a jihad-fighting and righteous Islamic government… that will wage jihad, liberate the lands, and strive to liberate Al-Aqsa and establish a caliphate in the path of prophecy. JN's organizational affiliation will never pose an obstacle to these great objectives that we, as part of the Islamic nation, hope for. [Unlike ISIS] we do not presume to be the patrons [of the Islamic nation], nor do we pounce upon it, demanding to that it swear loyalty to unknown people and to a caliph of surprises."Besides, would the arch-criminals accept JN if it left Al-Qaeda? Or will they obligate it to conduct negotiations with the criminal murderers, and then compel it to obey the agreements of abasement and shame and then capitulate to the governments of corruption and subordination… We in Al-Qaeda do not accept a pledge of loyalty unless it is voluntary. We do not force anyone to swear loyalty to us. We do not threaten to blow up or behead [our opponents]. We do not brand anyone fighting against us an apostate, as do the new Khawrij [ISIS], who make baseless claims.

"Al-Zawahiri concludes with an appeal to the Muslims in Syria: "We are part of you. Though we come from different countries, religion and faith unite us. We are with you, waging one war on many fronts against the Crusader arch-criminals and their apostate partners. Your victory is our victory, your dignity is our dignity, and your strength is our strength. Stand fast, oh servants of Allah, against the savage attack of the Crusaders from East and West [the Russians and Americans], who have forged an alliance with the secular Nusairis and the criminal rawafids. Stand fast and fight. Do not let the Crusader war machine intimidate you." Citing former Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, Al-Zawahiri states that "Allah promised us victory," and adds: "It was trust in Allah alone that shattered this Eastern and Western [i.e., Russian and American] Crusader war machine in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, and it is [faith in Allah] that will shatter it in Syria, Allah willing. Beware the seductions of the traitorous and subordinate apostate governments, which will not give you either freedom or dignity, because one who lacks something [himself] cannot provide it [to others]. Your deeds must justify your words when you say: 'death and not abasement.'"[1] Koran 9:41: " Go forth, whether light or heavy, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah."

Zarqawi's 'Total War'iv In February 2004, the State Department published a letter Zarqawi wrote to the al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan articulating his plan to attack Shiites in Iraq with the aim of igniting sectarian conflict. November 15, 2005 Groups linked to al-Qaeda have a history of perpetrating isolated attacks against Shiite targets. In 1988, Osama bin Laden himself led a group of Taliban fighters to suppress a Shiite revolt in Gilgit, Pakistan, which resulted in the massacre of several hundred Shiite civilians. Sunni and Shiite groups in Pakistan continue to target each other in tit-for-tat sectarian attacks, but al-Qaeda-linked Sunni groups exact by far the higher death toll. However, since the early 1990s, bin Laden has urged tactical and logistical cooperation among like-minded Shiite and Sunni groups. Iran and Hizballah have frequently assisted al-Qaeda





operatives. The two groups have overlapping contacts in South America, Africa, and the Middle East, and have cooperated in fundraising and training.

On September 14 Zarqawi issued an audiotape declaring "total war" on Iraq's Shiite population, announcing ex post facto a strategy he began to enact more than a year earlier. Though Zarqawi justifies targeting Shiite civilians on religious grounds, arguing that they are apostates, politics, not religion, motivates his assault on the Shiite community. He posted his declaration of war soon after the September counterterrorist raids on Tal Afar, in which 5000 troops from the New Iraqi Army's Third Division killed 156 terrorists and captured 246 others. It is almost impossible to obtain accurate information about the ethnic and religious composition of Iraq's army, but Iraq's Shiite majority and the terrorists' efforts to discourage Sunni enlistment means that Shiite soldiers almost certainly led the Tal Afar offensive. To Zarqawi, the raids must have confirmed his suspicion, articulated in his 2004 letter, that the Shiites had seized the strategic initiative and now dominated the security situation in Iraq. This helps explain why he broadened his group's mandate from attacking Shiites involved in direct assistance to the U.S. occupation to targeting Shiites generally in a "total" conflict.

leader of al-qaeda in iraq al-zarqawi declares ‘total war’ on shi'ites, states that the sunni women of tel'afar had ‘their wombs filled with the sperm of the crusaders’

The most publicized criticism came from Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's putative second in command.

‘Global War on Terrorv,’ popularly termed as ‘GWOT.’ Nearly a decade of attacks made by Islamic terrorist and insurgent organizations against the United States and its allies culminated with the events of 11 September 2001. Having previously called for ‘jihad’ against the ‘Great Satan,’ al Qaeda audaciously delivered its most deadly blows to date with a triple attack against the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and (presumably intended) the White House. Prior to the American-led counterattack, training was conducted in Afghanistan and other globally dispersed camps, where as many as 110,000 fighters were trained between 1989 and 2001 alone

Enigmatic by design, al Qaeda al-Sulbah (‘The Solid Base’) was founded as ‘Mujahidin al-Arab’ in 1984 to fight the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. It has since created the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders” in a bid to establish ideological, political, financial, and military control over a wide range of terrorist and insurgent groups. Seeking to broaden its organization in response to American GWOT successes, al Qaeda has renounced attacks against Shi’ites in a bid to unite anti-American Islamic radical groups, and now purportedly works with criminal organizations in mutually beneficial alliances. Despite being fragmented by the GWOT, al Qaeda continues to act successfully as a ‘force multiplier’ by providing experts, trainers, and funds to other groups, operating effectively and efficiently through its associates. Principally established in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus, al Qaeda is also believed to have cells in approximately 60 countries worldwide. Unlike previous Islamic-based terrorist groups whose attacks were usually localized events with limited national objectives, al Qaeda sponsors and leads a transnational, global insurgency.

Regards Cees:***

What if it was “blowback”? Jihadist terrorism would not exist without the nurturing of the “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”

― Sun Tzu, The Art of WarCdW Intelligence to Rent of 19 02/05/2023



West, which started with the Cold War, continued into the conflicts in the Balkans, and exploded with 9/11 and the “war on terrorism”, and continues to

metastasize with the so-called war on the Islamic State, a rebranded continuation of the same fabricated criminal war of deception.

Hybrid irregular and conventional military operations are playing an increasingly prominent role in international conflict, exploited by countries such as Russia and Iran. The United States requires new approaches for exerting influence, filling the "missing middle" — between the limitations of distant strike and the costly, indefinite commitment of conventional forces — to counter these increasing threats. Special warfare provides policymakers with an additional option that can help secure U.S. interests and manage risks. –Rand Feb 2016.

Al-Zawahiri's Article on 'Principles of War Highlighted by Raids'(2012) You have made the history wake up from its sleep. Therefore, Hattin; site of the Battle of Hattin in 1187] and Badr [first battle in Islam] have risen up. –Rand Feb 2016.

You have made the history wake up from its sleep. Therefore, Hattin; site of the Battle of Hattin in 1187] and Badr [first battle in Islam] have risen up.

The mujahidin in the raids of New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania managed to take the battle into enemy land

The Americans believe that the United States with its campaign against Afghanistan has overthrown the Taliban regime harboring Al-Qa'ida; dismantled the Al-Qa'ida network, its command centers, its camps, and means of communications; and killed or captured all its members and so on.

Their enemy is the Islamic ummah [the community of Muslims worldwide], with its jihadist vanguard, which has decided to confront the crimes committed by the United States.

There are two facts. The first fact is about the strength of the Muslim ummah and its jihadist vanguard because it follows the truth. The second fact is about the potential weakness of the US structure regarding the continuous crimes, which the United States has committed against the Muslims and all humankind.

- The leaders of the United States refuse to accept the obvious fact: 'We are fighting a global Islamic insurgency, which is neither criminality nor terrorism. In addition, our policies and measures only have had a slight influence on the enemy powers.'

It is possible that this war will continue even during our children's lifetime, and it will be often waged on the US soil.

This great victory for the mujahidin has been marked by taking the battle into the land of the enemy, after it had continued for centuries to wage wars on our land.

The mujahidin managed to outsmart the enemy's system at the security level; rather they managed to hit the enemy from within this system.

A. The West is no longer a mystery to the mujahidin; rather the mujahidin understood the points of weaknesses in the West's defenses, the weaknesses which the Western security services did not understand.

at this phase, we cannot produce weapons that are equal to Western weapons. Nevertheless, we can sabotage the Western complicated economic and





industrial system. In addition, we can deplete the Western forces, which are fighting without any creed until they flee. Thus, the

mujahidin should have innovated new techniques that do not come to the mind of the West. Among the examples of this courageous and brave thinking are using aircraft as a massive weapon.

New War on Two Fronts The September 11 attacks and their previous and subsequent events have shown that the jihadist vanguard of the Muslim ummah was prompted by its ijtihad [independent Shari'ah decision-making] to engage in two types of fights against the Crusader West:

First Type: Gangs Everywhere This type includes strikes by small groups that target the enemy's interests wherever they are found. Thereby, these groups adopt new means, and unexpectedly attack the enemy

Second type: Guerrilla Warfare in Specific Theaters of Operations As in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Algeria

These wars have considerably exhausted the United States in the theaters of operations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Perhaps I do not exaggerate by saying that nowadays the theater of Iraq is regarded as the main battleground of the confrontation between the Muslim ummah and the Zionist-Crusader campaign.

February 29, 2016 It’s Good to be CaliphBy Emilia San Miguel September 12, 2001. On that day, millions of Americans woke up shaken, wondering who or what could have been responsible for the murder of thousands. In the weeks that followed, the terrorist organization al Qaeda declared responsibility, a claim verified by the U.S. government.In the ensuing War on Terror, the United States and its allies have pursued al Qaeda and its affiliates, devastating their operational capacities and killing or capturing key leadership, including Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Despite the immense cost of this campaign to the United States and its allies in both blood and treasure, al Qaeda still exists—and in some places thrives—continuing to pose a threat to the United States, Israel, and other Western targets.In addition to the threat posed by the United States, al Qaeda is now locked in a power struggle against its own Iraqi ex-affiliate. Al Qaeda has been outmaneuvered—usurped by the Islamic State as the world’s foremost terrorist organization. It is now fighting to regain that mantle, though its strategy moving forward is not clear. IS’s foremost strategic asset is its organizational and ideological divergence from al Qaeda. Throughout IS’s rise and ensuing dominance of global jihad, al Qaeda’s foremost objection to the movement has been what it perceives as ideological illegitimacy. But al Qaeda’s capitalization on IS’s innovations through imitation would be to lend legitimacy to the organization—a self-defeating strategy.The Ideological ThreatThe Islamic State (or Daesh, as its detractors prefer) has had a long history of bad blood with al Qaeda’s central leadership. Preceding its divorce from al Qaeda, the group incurred the wrath of al Qaeda Central with its persecution of Shi’a Muslims and its unilateral incorporation of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra. Through these years of differences, al Qaeda Central consistently rebuked its unruly affiliate, while always attempting reconciliation. However, al Qaeda Central’s patience ended in February 2014, its leader Ayman al Zawahiri formally disavowed the group.In June the ex-affiliate, by then stylizing itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, shocked the world. Capitalizing on the chaos unleashed by the Syrian Civil war, ISIS





leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi unilaterally declared an Islamic caliphate. His invocation of the caliphate hearkened back to the golden days of Islam, and

implied the Islamic State’s dominion over all Muslims worldwide. Without consulting al Qaeda Central on the theological ramifications of

reestablishing the caliphate, Baghdadi had executed a move with profound religious implications. As caliph, Baghdadi positioned himself to accept the allegiance of all Sunni Muslims, who under this theological interpretation would be required to renounce all loyalties—including to states and other jihadi organizations—and travel to live under the new government. Under this system, there was no place for al Qaeda.Both IS and al Qaeda subscribe to Jihadi-Salafism, a pre-modern and radical interpretation of Islam. IS and al Qaeda conceptualize the world as a perpetual struggle of Islamic civilization against Western imperialists and the Arab governments they support. Ultimately, both organizations seek to galvanize a worldwide uprising of Muslims to reestablish the lost caliphate.Many experts refer to al Qaeda’s vision of their jihadist ambitions as “nihilistic:” a continual struggle against Western imperialism, culminating in the far-off establishment of the caliphate.

Most al Qaeda members do not expect to see the rise of the caliphate in their lifetimes, and instead see their mission as laying the groundwork for its eventual creation. Conversely, with Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate, IS leapfrogged al Qaeda’s entire struggle, essentially invalidating its justification for existence.

Though there are other theological differences between the two organizations, this split over the legitimacy of the caliphate is by far the most significant. After all, the mere existence of IS poses an existential threat to al Qaeda.This stark divergence in ideology is critical in shaping each group’s strategy. Unlike IS, al Qaeda never aspired to seize land from which it could enrich itself. Instead, it is singularly an international terrorist organization. Al Qaeda divides the world into the “near” enemy of Arab governments and apostate, non-Sunni Muslims, and the “far” enemy of Western imperialist powers and Israel. Though al Qaeda Central and its affiliates have led bloody insurgencies against fellow Arabs in the past, the organization prefers to target the “far” enemy through international terror plots and has previously rebuked attacks on the “near” enemy that targeted civilians. For example, IS’s predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq incurred the ire of Zawahiri over its targeting of Shi’a Muslims during the height of sectarian violence in Iraq around 2005-2006.

The Strategic Benefits of the CaliphateSince abandoning its allegiance to al Qaeda, IS has diversified and strengthened its operations, launching a dual insurgency and terror campaign with a scale and sophistication beyond any of al Qaeda’s previous efforts. Importantly, IS’ dual insurgency-terrorist ambitions have created a critical opportunity for IS to distinguish itself from al Qaeda, boosting its competitiveness in the power struggle.

Territorial acquisition is supremely important to both IS operations and legitimacy. IS now regards itself as a caliphate. As such, it has taken to governing its captured territories and raising funds by levying taxes and seizing oil, antiquities, and slaves from local populations to support its activities. Though there are reasons to doubt the long-term viability of this funding strategy, IS’s diversity of funding sources is novel amongst jihadist groups. It has become the world’s richest terror organization. Al Qaeda, because of its secretive nature, can never hope to compete.In addition to the accumulation of finances, IS’s possession of territory lends legitimacy to





its recruitment of foreign fighters. In Syria and Iraq, IS has recruited local and foreign militants (the latter of which total more than 27,000) into an

insurgency to control broad swaths of territory in both countries. Admittedly, al Qaeda Central is a secretive terrorist organization—not an insurgency—that probably would have neither the capacity nor the need for thousands of foreign recruits. That said, the number of fighters flocking to IS is higher than the numbers recruited when either al Qaeda or the Taliban were opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq or the U.S. and Soviet invasions of Afghanistan. This unprecedented phenomenon is at least an indication of the enthusiasm of jihadists worldwide for the new experiment.To recruit these fighters, IS has employed a slick combination of English and other foreign language publications and relentless Internet campaigns—primarily through social media. In its propaganda efforts, IS constructs a glamorous image of itself as a righteous, divinely ordained group. Foreign recruits are manipulated into believing that participation in the Islamic State is a “defense of their faith.” IS’s message is one of agency and invincibility, making it a huge draw for alienated and disaffected Muslims around the world—not just those radicalized during the course of the Syrian Civil War. Additionally, unlike past jihadist groups, the proto-state structure of IS requires it to recruit not just young male fighters, but also women as brides for the jihadists, along with social media propagandists, engineers, doctors, and construction workers.

Competing for Hearts and MindsThe Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate guarantees its ability to dominate al Qaeda in both fundraising and recruitment. In addition to the success of its insurgency, the Islamic State has actively sought to replace al Qaeda as the foremost global jihadi terror organization. Around the world, IS is dominating the competition for the hearts and minds of the world’s jihadists and their sympathizers.This competition carries into the online space. For years, jihadist groups have used online platforms for debate: first in heavily moderated chat rooms and now primarily though under-moderated social media. From these online platforms, experts can approximate global jihadi public opinion. Much of the conversation centers around the rival legitimacy claims of each group. According to J.M. Berger, an IS analyst, George Washington University Program on Extremism fellow, and co-author of “ISIS: The State of Terror,” the tide of opinion is with the Islamic State. As these discussions show, al Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate fractured global jihadist unity by exposing fault lines between al Qaeda’s and IS’s rival ideologies and strategies. Each group uses different ideological ammunition: al Qaeda blasts IS for its targeting of fellow Muslims, while IS accuses al Qaeda of theological impurity.

Perhaps most indicative indicator of each group’s influence, however, is the cohesion and expansion of its affiliates. The unity and expansion al Qaeda and IS partners signals the persuasiveness of each group’s rhetoric, and also indicates their respective abilities to facilitate international terror plots.In order to advance its capacity for international terrorism, IS has constructed an affiliate system mirroring al Qaeda’s.

Currently, al Qaeda is composed of several main branches: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al Shabaab in Somalia, Jabhat al Nusra in Syria, and a newly established branch in the Indian Peninsula (though it has struggled to gain traction). In addition to these main affiliates, al Qaeda maintains relations with smaller cells throughout Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

IS, meanwhile, has expanded its territorial claim by establishing administrative “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”

― Sun Tzu, The Art of WarCdW Intelligence to Rent of 19 02/05/2023



“provinces” in Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Russia, and Nigeria. Additionally, IS wields much influence among

jihadis in Bangladesh, Tunisia, and Somalia, where it has recently launched attacks.Because the Islamic State’s legitimacy is tied entirely to its claim of the caliphate,

each expansion reifies its ideological goal of domination. According to J.M. Berger, “groups who hold territory become centers of gravity” for recruits and ideological dominance. Therefore, the continued expansion of IS poses a direct challenge to al Qaeda.IS and its affiliates have, thus far, surpassed al Qaeda in plotting and carrying out regional and international terrorist attacks. The carnage of the November 2015 Paris attacks, particularly, has left Western governments struggling to respond. Lone-wolf attacks inspired by IS ideology, such as the San Bernardino shootings, have popped up as well.

The al Qaeda ResponseIt is no exaggeration to say that al Qaeda is now at a crossroads. The organization is in direct competition with IS in recruiting fighters and followers, achieving ideological dominance, and conducting global terrorist attacks. IS is currently outperforming the older organization across all of these measures.It seems that there is little al Qaeda can do to reclaim its former dominant position. Much of the Islamic State’s draw comes from its identity as an insurgency and territorial power, and because al Qaeda’s primary objection to IS’ legitimacy has been over its claim to govern territory, it’s stuck to its current model.Al Qaeda’s response to the rising threat posed by IS seems glacial in comparison to the rapidity of IS’s rise. Even in his denunciations of IS, Zawahiri has continually implored jihadists (including IS members) to focus not on infighting, but on banding together to oppose the “far enemy:” the Western imperialists operating in Libya, Syria, Mali, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Perhaps Zawahiri is biding his time and awaiting IS’s eventual demise in the form of an international military campaign created to defeat the group. Perhaps Zawahiri’s immense security precautions, are impeding his counter-campaign. After all, he has already shown himself to be a cautious successor to Osama bin Laden. Whatever the case, al Qaeda’s relative inaction remains puzzling.

Even in the midst of a great power competition, however, it is important to remember that al Qaeda is not going away—in fact, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Jabhat al Nusra have both grown as the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars drag on. Additionally, as Berger reminds, although most new foreign recruits are diverting to IS, “the rising tide in global jihadist recruitment has lifted all boats.” Al Qaeda is indeed continuing to draw recruits and cash. And with its affiliates’ recent plots against French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 and attacks leaving dozens dead in western hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso, al Qaeda has proven itself capable of posing a continued, formidable threat.The future of the al Qaeda-IS rivalry is far from certain. What is certain, however, is the continued threat posed to global peace and security by both of the notorious groups.

21 Aug 2015, Hamza bin Laden, the 24-year-old son of Osama bin Laden, has released his first audio message for Al Qaeda which lays out the terrorist group’s ideology and strategy. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian emir of Al Qaeda, introduces the young bin Laden in a clear effort to underscore his legitimacy as the heir to Osama bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri introduces Hamza as the son of the "lion" of jihad; in turn, Hamza pledges his loyalty to al-Zawahiri as the emir of Al Qaeda. Hamza also pledged loyalty to the Afghan





Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, whose death was announced

August 2015. The ultimate goal is to destroy Israel and “free” the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, which is under threat of destruction by Israel. Hamza and al-Zawahiri never mention the Islamic State or its self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim.

In case anyone needed reminding, the recent global terror alert illustrates that, 15 years after its first attacks on America, Al Qaeda is thriving. The coup in Egypt and the chaotic aftermath of the Arab awakening is only going to add more militants to this army of radicals. Failed revolutions and failing states are like incubators for the jihadists, a sort of Pandora’s Box of hostility and alienation. -2- Bruce Riedel 2013.

Toward Operational Art in Special Warfare -3 -RAND 26 Feb2016, Madden, Dick Hoffmann, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, Bruce R. Nardulli, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson and Abby Doll, RAND Corporation

Hybrid irregular and conventional military operations are playing an increasingly prominent role in international conflict, exploited by countries such as Russia and Iran. The United States requires new approaches for exerting influence, filling the "missing middle" — between the limitations of distant strike and the costly, indefinite commitment of conventional forces — to counter these increasing threats. Special warfare provides policymakers with an additional option that can help secure U.S. interests and manage risks. These campaigns stabilize a friendly state or destabilize a hostile regime by operating through and with local state or nonstate partners, rather than through unilateral U.S. action. Currently, there is no shared understanding of how special warfare campaigns should be designed and executed. This RAND study sought to fill this gap by (1) adapting conventional operational art to the unique characteristics of special warfare, (2) identifying the strategic advantages and risks associated with special warfare, (3) exploring how special warfare campaigns could be used to address challenges identified in strategic guidance, and (4) proposing a framework for military and civilian leaders to design and execute these campaigns. The research indicates that the U.S. Department of Defense should strengthen its special warfare planning capacity and culture, implement institutional reforms to facilitate unified action among relevant U.S. government agencies, and develop enhanced influence capabilities. An accompanying appendix volume provides additional context to supplement the analyses presented in this report.Key Findings Special Warfare Campaigns Call on Capabilities Across the Joint Force and U.S. Government to Advance U.S. Policy ObjectivesSpecial warfare campaigns have a distinctive focus that could include stabilizing or

destabilizing a targeted regime, employing local partners as the main campaign effort, and maintaining a small U.S. footprint in the targeted country. They also may employ political warfare methods to mobilize, neutralize, or integrate individuals or groups from the tactical to the strategic levels.

Special warfare campaigns are typically of long duration and may require extensive preparatory work better measured in months (or years) than in days.

Special warfare campaigns require intensive interagency cooperation. For example, the

2 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/06/the-coming-of-al-qaeda-3-0.html3 http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR779.html




http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR779.html


U.S. Department of Defense may be subordinate to the U.S. Department of State or the Central Intelligence Agency.

There Is a Need to Adapt Conventional Operational Art to the Unique Characteristics of Special Warfare• Commanders and planners must be proficient in all relevant forms of operational art,

including special warfare, if they are to design successful campaigns across the full range of military operations in modern conflicts.

• Keeping special warfare within the joint operational art construct will enable collaboration between special operations and conventional forces; the principles of operational art connect tactical actions and strategic objectives by supporting the design of successful campaigns.

• Special warfare makes a unique contribution to operational art in terms of the mobilization of partners' strategic and operational centers of gravity, and the neutralization or integration of the enemy's, in the human domain.

Recommendations• There should be a joint effort to educate special warfare campaign planners as a way of

strengthening special warfare strategic and operational planning capabilities. At the same time, because special warfare campaigns are inherently joint efforts, the special warfare community should help joint organizations develop a special warfare planning culture.

• Special warfare commanders and planners should help policymakers explore the implications of particular strategic objectives. Policymakers, in turn, should strive to provide clear policy guidance to inform the development of campaign plans.

The special operations community should consider establishing a general officer–level operational headquarters element as a way to remedy the current ad hoc command-and-control architecture that has inhibited special warfare commanders' ability to participate in theater-level planning.




i https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/dr-ayman-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-of-a-jihc481dc4ab22-en.pdfii In short, this message went public because Zawahiri’s guidance isn’t being followed. Al Qaeda Central messages and directives either can’t get to affiliates or they are being ignored. Both scenarios are problematic for the terror group.Second, the content of Zawahiri’s guidelines goes beyond grand vision instructing individual jihadis on what exactly to avoid. Previous messages, whether from Bin Laden, Zawahiri or even Anwar al-Awlaki, have given rather broad suggestions to jihadis such as go to “Jihad in country fill in the blank” or “Do-Jihad-At-Home”. But Zawahiri’s latest guidelines suggest something more specific. Today, he doesn’t seem to be speaking to the global jihadi movement as a whole but instead communicating directly to jihadis enmeshed in affiliates engaged in battles across North Africa and the Middle East. Zawahiri writes, We call upon the heads of all groups and organizations that work under Qaidatul Jihad Organization (al Qaida) and all our supporters and sympathizers to spread these guidelines amongst their followers, whether in positions of responsibility or ordinary individuals; for this document contains no hidden secrets, rather it is a general policy guideline.I can’t recall one paragraph in any al Qaeda document that reveals as much as this one. Zawahiri claims this “is a general policy guideline” yet the instructions provide targeting guidance down to the individual country and unlike in other public al Qaeda guidance spends far more time telling jihadis what not to do rather than what to do. Strategic vision documents usually discuss what to do broadly rather than what not to do specifically. These guidelines in general represent a public scolding of al Qaeda affiliate leaders and tries to redirect the energies of affiliates and their followers to focus on attacking the far enemy (the U.S. and the West) while in the near-term avoiding local near enemies to include Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, Ismailis, Sufis and most importantly Sunnis. Zawahiri seems to suggest that after killing off far enemies, jihadi’s can then return to killing local adversaries. http://www.fpri.org/2013/10/zawahiris-latest-message-please-listen-to-me-jihadis-stop-bickering/iii http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2011/08.pdfiv http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/zarqawis-total-war-on-iraqi-shiites-exposes-a-divide-among-sunni-jihadistsv http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no2/06-lovegrove-eng.asp

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