american strategy in the soviet-afghan war

8/3/2019 American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War Schearer 2

ABSTRACT

After the American disaster in Vietnam, U.S. foreign policy

gave way to significant Soviet gains in the 1970s. With the

fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Soviet expansionism in Southeast

Asia and Africa, the Soviets capitalized on the lack of

leadership in American foreign policy to expand their influence

around the globe.

This paper explores one particular strain of the Cold War,

in particular the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that the United

States strategy played in affecting the outcome of that war.

The Americans first sought to increase costs for the Soviet

Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the Afghan

resistance (mujahadeen). Second, President Reagan escalated the

conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine."

Third, the American strategy was integral in the Soviet

withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important component to

ending the Cold War.


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SUMMARY

This paper explores the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that

the United States strategy played in affecting the outcome of

that war. This paper first establishes the historical context

by briefly exploring the events that precipitated the Soviet

invasion. Second, the initial American response, dictated

largely by President Carter and his National Security Advisor

Zbigniew Brzezinski, is discussed in the context of the Soviet

invasion. Third, I review the continuation of this policy under

President Reagan. Fourth, I explore the escalation between

1983-1986 and the role of the Chinese and the impact that it had

on the eventual Soviet withdrawal. Finally, I attempt to

determine the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal as well as the

strategic implications of the end of the Soviet-Afghan war.

I reach three conclusions: First, Presidents Carter and

Reagan, as part of a "bleeder" strategy, supplied funds and

Soviet-style arms to the mujahadeen. Second, The escalation by

the United States in 1985-1986 sought to push the Soviets out of

Afghanistan. Third, the covert campaign against the Soviets in

Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy, the "Reagan

Doctrine," which sought to roll-back Soviet gains in the Third

World. Ultimately, this helped to end the Cold War.


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AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

PROLOGUE

On July 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter's National Security

Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote a note to the President in

which he explained how he believed American aid to the

mujahadeen in Afghanistan would increase the likelihood of a

Soviet invasion. That same day, President Carter signed a

secret directive that began the CIA's decade-long program of

assistance to the Afghan resistance. According to Brzezinski,

"[t]hat secret operation was an excellent idea...The effect was

to draw the Russians into...[Afghanistan]."1 Brzezinski, "[a]

virulent anti-Communist of Polish origin...saw his chance in

Moscow's Afghanistan intervention to rival Henry Kissinger as a

heavyweight strategic thinker."2 The trap had been set.

INTRODUCTION

After the American disaster in Vietnam, U.S. foreign policy

gave way to significant Soviet gains in the 1970s. With the

fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Soviet expansionism in Southeast

Asia and Africa, the Soviets capitalized on the lack of

1 "CIA Helped Mujahideen Before Soviet Intervention," NouvelObservateur, 15 January 1998, accessed online athttp://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/9803/world_affairs/cia_afgan.html; 20 April 1999.

2 Dilip Hiro, "Islamic Militants, Once Encouraged by the United States,Now Threaten It," The Nation, 15 February 1999, accessed online athttp://www.afghanradio.com/jan29g1999.htm; 20 April 1999.


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leadership in American foreign policy to expand their influence

around the globe. Soviet repression of Czech human rights and

the perceived deficiencies of SALT II were seen vis--vis the

weakness of President Carters foreign policy. Further, the

economic recession, together with the Islamic fundamentalist

revolution in Iran, further entrenched Americans in pessimism.

Finally, in December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

This event, more than any other, marked the failure of SALT II,

the end of dtente, and the beginning of a new phase in the Cold

War.

The goal of this paper is to explore one particular strain

of that new phase, in particular the Soviet-Afghan war and the

role that the United States (especially the Central Intelligence

Agency) played in affecting the outcome of that war. The thesis

of this paper is threefold. First, the goal of the initial

American response was to increase costs for the Soviet Union by

supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the Afghan resistance

(mujahadeen). Second, President Reagan sought to escalate the

conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine,"

which sought to move beyond containment and roll back Soviet

gains made in the Third World as a result of its 1970s

expansionist policy. Finally, American assistance to the

mujahadeen, especially the escalation by President Reagan,

together with assistance from China (and others), was integral


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in the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important

component to ending the Cold War.

To these ends, this paper will first establish the

historical context by briefly exploring the events that

precipitated the Soviet invasion. Second, the initial American

response, dictated largely by President Carter and his National

Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, will be discussed in the

context of the Soviet invasion. Third, we will review the

continuation of this policy under President Reagan. Fourth, and

perhaps most importantly, the escalation between 1983-1986 and

the role of the Chinese and the impact that it had on the

eventual Soviet withdrawal will be explored. Finally, we will

attempt to determine the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal as

well as the strategic implications of the end of the Soviet-

Afghan war.

BACKGROUND

While this paper does not intend to be a historical piece

on either Afghanistan or the Soviet-Afghan war, it would be

impossible to discuss the role of the United States in this

conflict without first establishing some sort of historical

context.

Soviet Imperialism and the Breakdown of Dtente


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Soviet imperialism in the Third World characterized the

later half of the 1970s. As part and parcel of the Brezhnev

Doctrine, the Soviet Union supported socialist and communist

movements in their national liberation wars.3 Between 1975 and

1979, eight dictatorships were established as Soviet client-

states: South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Mozambique, Angola,

Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua. A ninth, Afghanistan,

suffered its communist coup in April 1978. In addition, despite

signing the Helsinki Accord in 1975, Moscow intimidated,

persecuted, and imprisoned the Czechoslovak Charter 77

dissidents, among them the playwright Vclav Havel. The

American Right, led by then-candidate Ronald Reagan, condemned

SALT II and suggested Carter was soft on the Soviet Union.4

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick summed up the prevailing opinion that

emerged:

There was a strong view that dtente was not workingand that the United States was becoming progressivelyweaker and the Soviet Union not only progressivelystronger in relationship to the United States and theWest, but also more aggressive.5

The fall of the Shah in Iran (worsened by the resulting oil

shortages and the failed Desert One disaster) together

3 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, HumanRights, and International Law, in Right v. Might: International Law and theUse of Force. 2nd ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991),23.

4 Ronald Reagan, Interview, CNN's Cold War, Cable News Network, Episode19, accessed online athttp://cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/script.html; 20 April 1999.

5 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Interview, Ibid.


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with the deepening economic crisis entrenched the United

States in a deep pessimism. In short, dtente had broken

down, its future in serious jeopardy.

Afghanistan, 1978-1979

If ever a country needed a revolution it was Afghanistan. By themid-1970s all other forms of government had been tried and hadproved themselves bankrupt. Successive governments had failed tomake Afghanistans people literate, failed to improve the lot ofminority ethnic groups, failed to gain respect or status forwomen, and failed to give the country any substantialgovernmental or industrial infrastructure. In short, they hadfailed to create a 20th-century state. In April 1978, Afghanistan

got its revolution.6

The revolution in Afghanistan had its roots in the April

15, 1978 murder of Mir Akber Khyber, a leader in the Peoples

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). When Khybers funeral

developed into a demonstration, the secret police of President

Mohammed Daoud subsequently arrested a number of significant

PDPA leaders, yet failed to arrest their military counterparts.7

On April 27, the 4th and 15th Armored Brigades (those forces loyal

to the PDPA) moved on Kabul, securing the Defense Ministry and

the airport.8 MiG-21s of the 322nd Air Regiment strafed the

Central Corps and 8th Division headquarters of the Army,

primarily to deter wavering units from intervening.9 Finally,

the combination of a deadly air strike and armor and mechanized

6 Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press,1990), 5.

7 Ibid., 7.8 Ibid., 7-8.9 Ibid., 8.


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infantry attacks on the Presidential Palace resulted in the

defeat of the Daoud regime.10 On April 30, 1978, Nur Mohammed

Taraki became President and Prime Minister of the Democratic

Republic of Afghanistan.

The establishment of the new regime met with immediate

resistance within both the Army and among the peasantry.

Despite two purges, military units lacked any significant party

organization.11 The allegiances of the Afghan soldier,

journalist Mark Urban writes, were...torn between state and

tribe or village.12 Furthermore, the new governments socialist

reforms provoked opposition among rural rebels. Combined with

mass executions and the brutal suppression of Islam, the

governments socialist agenda mobilized peasants against the

government. In September 1978, the rebel groups declared a

jihad (holy war) against the Taraki government.13 In this

declaration lies the birth of the Afghan resistance movement

known as the mujahadeen (holy warriors or fighters of God).14

Throughout 1979, the mujahadeen continued to gain strength,

primarily in rural areas. This was bolstered in mid-1979 when

the CIA began to intervene.15 A power struggle ensued between

10 Ibid.11 Ibid., 22.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.; Kurt Lohbeck, Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the

CIAs Secret War in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993), 36.14 Lohbeck, 36; Urban, xi.15 While most literature focuses on post-invasion operations by the

Central Intelligence Agency, it appears likely that covert assistance beganin mid-1979, primarily from three sources: first, the admission by then-


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President and Prime Minister Taraki and deputy prime minister

and foreign minister Hafizullah Amin. Amin capitalized on

continued revolt by the resistance and further demoralization of

the Army.16 By July 1979, he had taken over as both Prime

Minister and Defense Minister. When a confrontation between

Taraki and Amin erupted into gunfire, Major Taroun (an aide of

Taraki) was killed.17 Within days, Tarakis death was announced;

Amin had now seized control of the government.18

The Soviets opposed Amin. Claiming they despised the KGB,

[Soviet military officers] assured [Amin] of their protection.

In order to protect Amin, the number of Soviet advisors

increased dramatically....19 The initial Soviet objective of

the operation was to replace Amin with Babrak Karmal, another

PDPA leader who was thought to be able to secure broader

support from the people and the party.20 As Soviet paratroops

remarked to Kabul Radio operators on the night of December 27,

we've come "to save the revolution."21

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, "CIA Helped Mujahideen BeforeSoviet Intervention," Nouvel Observateur, 15 January 1998, accessed online athttp://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/9803/world_affairs/cia_afgan.html; 20 April 1999; second, a Soviet source who claimed that a freighter

called the Al-Kasum, laden with arms, arrived at the Pakistani port ofKarachi in June 1979, Vladimir Efros, Afghanistan: US Terrorism in Action,in Urban, 29; and third, the report that documents from the American embassyin Tehran suggest CIA involvement at this time, Urban, 29.

16 Urban, 31-36.17 Ibid., 38.18 Lohbeck, 40-41; Urban, 38.19 Lohbeck, 41.20 Urban, 42.21 Ibid., 46.


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The Invasion

By the last week of December, all was quiet as far as theAfghan military was concerned uneasy, perhaps, but quiet. The

Westerners in the Afghan capital were preparing for a subduedcelebration of the Christian feastday. Although Christmas Eve isnot celebrated in Kabul, and it is certainly not an Islamicholiday, December 24, 1979, will not be soon forgotten in Islamic

Afghanistan.22

Beginning on December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan with four motor rifle divisions (66th, 201st, 357th,

and 360th) and one and a half air assault divisions (105th

Guards, reinforced with regiments from the 103rd Guards and

104th Guards).23 The reinforced air assault division was flown

in to seize key targets, while the 40th Army made a two-pronged

thrust toward the Salang pass in the east and to Herat in the

west.24

At the same time, the Communist party paper Pravda was

calling Western reports of the invasion "pure inventions" and

repeated charges that the CIA and the Chinese were aiding Afghan

rebels.25 By the time the invasion could no longer be denied,

Karmal, newly-installed by the Soviet-back coup, made a fait

accompli plea for Soviet assistance.26 Brezhnev abetted Karmal's

plea by responding to President Carter with the reply that the

22 Lohbeck, 41.23 Urban, 42. See Appendix II, 314-319, for the Soviet order of battle.24 Ibid., 46-47.25 Paper Denies Troop Reports, The Washington Post, 25 December 1979,

A39.26 Urban, 47. In fact, 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet troops were already in

Afghanistan by this time.


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Soviet action was a response to an invitation.27 Karmal

continued the absurd rhetoric by suggesting that "with the

fraternal assistance and undiminishing cooperation [of the

Soviets,] we shall win and overcome...."28 The war had begun.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

After the April 1978 communist coup, the Carter

administration remained silent:

No official statements were issued decrying the lossof thousands of lives of Afghans during the coup, nopresidential voice rang out against the murderouspurges that instantly swept the country...Washingtonhad conceded the legitimacy of a Soviet puppet regime.29

Given this response (or lack thereof to be more precise), it is

not difficult to wonder why the Soviets expected the American

response to the invasion to be "equally spineless."30 Yet in

this respect, the Soviets miscalculated. According to

journalist Kurt Lohbeck, "Carter reacted explosively."31 In

remarks on December 28, Carter called the invasion "a grave

threat to peace."32 In a January 4, 1980, address to the nation,

Carter called for the suspension of Senate consideration of SALT

II, halted the exportation of certain high technology items,

27 Lohbeck, 43.28 Kevin Klose, Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels in Pakistan, The

Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3.29 Lohbeck, 37.30 Ibid., 43.31 Ibid.32 White House, "American Hostages in Iran and Soviet Intervention in

Afghanistan," 28 December 1979, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents15:52 (1979): 2287.


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restricted Soviet fishing rights, and blocked further grain

sales.33 Speaking to Members of Congress at the White House,

Carter said that he believed "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.

It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet

Union."34 Perhaps most significant, though, was Carter's call

that "[t]he response of the international community to the

Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of

the Soviet action."35 This statement, more than any other,

marked the beginning of a new phase in the Cold War.

Brzezinski had persuaded Carter in July 1979 to aid the

mujahadeen based on the strategic calculation that it would

increase the likelihood of Soviet invasion. The goal was the

potential ability, as Brzezinski put it, "to finally sow shit in

their backyard."36 Brzezinski saw the opportunity to make

Afghanistan the Soviet Union's Vietnam. Just days after the

invasion, Carter increased covert aid to the mujahadeen,

funneling weapons through Pakistan.37

33 White House, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 4 January 1980, WeeklyCompilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 26-27.

34White House, "Situation in Iran and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 8

January 1970, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 40.

35 "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 27.36 Lohbeck, 43.37 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and

American Foreign Policy(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 45.According to Scott, the weapons were mainly .303 Enfield rifles. Furtherresearch by this author suggests that these weapons, British in manufacture,mayhave been fabricated and refurbished at the Pakistan Ordnance Factory inWah, Pakistan. See "A Brief History of Lee-Enfield Rifles," accessed online


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The covert weapons program begun under President Carter and

continued under President Reagan was an international effort

with the financial efforts of the United States (mainly the

CIA), the Saudis, and the British, and weapons from China,

Egypt, Pakistan, and eventually Israel.38 To maintain plausible

deniability, "it was a firm policy that only communist block

weapons could be bought."39 To secure these commitments, the

Carter administration sent Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to

China and Brzezinski to Pakistan.40 Brown "found the Chinese

ready to commit to active opposition...they began to funnel

weapons...through Pakistan, with whom they had a long-standing

relationship."41 Brzezinski visited Pakistan to meet with

General Zia. According to journalist Kurt Lohbeck:

Brzezinski was the perfect envoy to send to Zia.The two men were among the few in the world's

political hierarchy who believed that merely haltingSoviet expansion would be insufficient; it must besharply curtailed. Furthermore, they agreed thatAfghanistan was the place to begin.42

These meetings, together with a new-found sense of urgency in

the Carter administration, resulted in the development of an

internationally-supported arms network operating against the

at http://www.uidaho.edu/~stratton/history.htm; 29 April 1999.38 Lohbeck, 45; Mohmammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap:

Afghanistan's Untold Story(London: Leo Cooper, 1992) 83-84. General Yousafnotes that the Israeli weapons were Soviet-style "that had been captured inlarge quantities during Israel's invasion of the [sic] Lebanon."

39 Yousaf and Adkin, 83.40 Lohbeck, 44-45.41 Ibid., 44.42 Ibid., 45.


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Soviets (see Figure 1).

While the program was covert, reports of assistance began

to surface immediately. Soviet reports of CIA training of the

mujahadeen appeared as early as December 25, 1979.43 On February

15, 1980, The Washington Post reported on the weapons supply,

which an unidentified source called "neither big nor dramatic,"

yet "is a significant step beyond the aid the United States was

providing...prior to the Soviet invasion."44 But whether covert

or overt, the objective was clear: the goal of the initial

American response was to increase costs for the Soviet Union.

The trap set by Brzezinski in July 1979 had begun to close.

Figure 1. The Money Flow

MONEY

USA ARABSSAUDI ARABIA

CIA

Arms Purchases

ChinaEgypt

Israel

America

Britain

ISI ISIRawakpindi & Quetta IsIamabad

43Paper Denies Troop Reports, The Washington Post, 25 December 1979,

A39; see also Kevin Klose, Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels inPakistan, The Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3.

44 Michael Getler, "U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to AfghanInsurgents, Afghan Rebel Forces Reportedly Getting U.S. Arms Assistance," TheWashington Post, 15 February 1980, A1.


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M U J A H A D E E N

Money

Arms and Software

Figure 1. The Money Flow. Reprinted from Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story(London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 82.

THE REAGAN ESCALATION

Of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because the U.S.was too strong.

--Ronald Reagan

The foreign policy situation at the outset of the Reagan

administration was not at all positive. It became clear that

dtente had failed. American restraint in weapons development

and deployment combined with the "unprecedented" Soviet military

build-up and Third-World expansion had demoralized the United

States.45 According to Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "[t]he problem

confronting Ronald Reagan: to redress the correlation of forces,

stop Soviet expansion, clarify the nature of the contest and its

stakes, and to do this simultaneously."46

Yet early on, the Reagan administration sought to continue

to continue the "bleeder" strategy, "designed to hurt Moscow and

raise the costs of its occupation."47

Funding was still low.

This was primarily due to maintaining plausible deniability.

45 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), 5-6, 9.

46 Ibid., 9.47 Scott, 46.


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However, the seeds had been sown for a major escalation.

The roots of the escalation are found primarily in two

individuals: William Casey and Charles Wilson. Casey, Reagan's

1980 campaign manager, was appointed Director of Central

Intelligence. According to journalist Kurt Lohbeck:

Casey envisioned his job as having a twofoldpurpose: first, to restructure the agency and lift itout of the despondency caused by the unendinginvestigations and purges of the 1970s; and second, toconfront what he saw as the caldron of evil in theworld - the expansionist Soviet Union. It thatregard, he became the foremost adherent of the sloganof the first Reagan administration: "Peace ThroughStrength."48

Wilson, a Texas Congressman on the Appropriations

Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and the House

Intelligence Committee, became the major congressional supporter

of the covert assistance program. In an interview with CBS News

in 1987, Wilson gave his rationale for supporting the

mujahadeen: "I wanted to hurt [the Soviets]. I wanted them to

count bodybags going back to Moscow."49 Wilson saw Afghanistan

as Brzezinski did: payback for Vietnam.

The Reagan Doctrine

The escalation by the Reagan administration began in 1983

and continued through 1987 (see Figure 2).

48 Lohbeck, 49.49 Quoted in Lohbeck, 52.


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Figure 2. American Assistance to the Mujahadeen

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

Year

Billions

Assistance ( in Billions of Dollars)

Figure 2. American Assistance to the Mujahadeen. Compiled fromvarious sources in James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The ReaganDoctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke UniversityPress, 1996), 43-74.

With Congressman Wilson marshaling congressional support and

Director Casey directing the CIA's covert program, the

administration sought to expand this program through the

application of a "broad U.S. strategy vis--vis the Soviet

Union."50 This strategy was codified in National Security

Decision Directive 75 (written primarily by then-National

Security Council staffer Richard Pipes in 1982) and signed on

January 17, 1983.51 In terms of Afghanistan, NSDD-75 proposed to

"keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal" and "ensure

that the Soviets'...costs remain high."52

Publicly, the rhetoric began to intensify. A November 1984

report by the influential Heritage Foundation singled out

50 Scott, 51.51 Ibid, 21.52 Quoted in Scott, 51.


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Afghanistan as one of nine countries that ought to be targeted

for "anti-Communist insurgency."53 Secretary of State George

Shultz visited the Nasebagh Refugee Camp in Peshawar, Pakistan,

and declared: "Fellow fighters for freedom, not only in

Afghanistan but through the world. My message to you from the

United States is very simple. We are with you."54 However, the

two clearest statements of what eventually became known as the

Reagan Doctrine were made by President Reagan himself. In his

1985 State of the Union address, Reagan proclaimed that

we must not break faith with those who are riskingtheir lives--on every continent, from Afghanistan toNicaragua--to defy Soviet-supported aggression andsecure rights which have been ours frombirth...Support for freedom fighters is self-defense....55

At the Bitburg Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany,

Reagan sounded the clarion call for anti-Communist insurgency:

Twenty-two years ago President John F. Kennedywent to the Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too,was a Berliner. Well, today freedom-loving peoplearound the world must say: I am a Berliner, I am a Jewin a world still threatened by anti-Semitism, I am anAfghan, and I am a prisoner of the Gulag, I am arefugee in a crowded boat foundering off the coast ofVietnam, I am a Loatian, a Cambodian, a Cuban, and aMiskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potentialvictim of totalitarianism...[F]reedom must always be

stronger than totalitarianism and good must always be

53 Bill Keller, "U.S. Aid to Rebels in 9 Countries Suggested ByConservative Group," The New York Times, 20 November 1984, A20.

54 Department of State, Press Release 269, 8 July 1983, American ForeignPolicy Current Documents 1983 (Washington, D.C.: 1985).

55 White House, 1985 State of the Union, accessed online athttp://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su85rwr.htm; 29 April 1999.


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stronger than evil.56

The nadir of escalation came in March 1985, when President

Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166. NSSD-

166 marked the codified change in policy from a "bleeder"

strategy to a "victory" strategy. Reagan emphasized this in his

1986 State of the Union Address: "You are not alone, freedom

fighters. America will support you with moral and materiel

assistance, your right not just to fight and die for freedom,

but to fight and to win freedom in Afghanistan...."57

With more and better weapons, intelligence, and international

pressure, the United States believed that it could succeed in

forcing the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.58 Two of these

factors deserve special attention: the role of the Chinese and

the introduction of the Stinger missiles.

The Chinese Role

According to the scholar Michael Yahuda, in 1979 "China's

new policies of economic reform began to take shape and...the

United States and China commenced a new period of normalized

56 White House, "Bitburg Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany," 5 May1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21 (1980): 589.

57 White House, 1986 State of the Union, accessed online athttp://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su86rwr.htm; 3 May 1999.

58 Scott, 59.


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relations."59 As a result of the deteriorating situation with

Moscow, the United States saw in Afghanistan a chance to exploit

the growing Sino-Soviet rift. Deng Xiaoping's insistence that

the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was an obstacle to

normalizing Sino-Soviet relations made the Chinese strategic

allies of the United States.60

Chinese support for the mujahadeen had already begun prior

to the invasion.61 It seems no surprise, then, that when

Secretary of Defense Brown visited Beijing soon after the

invasion, he "found the Chinese ready to commit to active

opposition...they began to funnel weapons...through Pakistan,

with whom they had a long-standing relationship."62 Beijing

solidified their support when Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua

visited Pakistan's President Zia. According to journalist Mark

Urban, Chinese weapons

included 12.7mm Type-54 machine guns (copies of theSoviet Dshk), 14.5mm Type-58 single and twin anti-aircraft machine guns (called Zigouaks by themujahadeen), and some 23mm twin anti-aircraft guns.The equipment was robust, could be broken down intoman-pack loads, and was identical to that used to sucheffect by the Viet Cong. Other Chinese deliveriesincluded 82mm mortars, 82mm recoilless rifles andinnumerable different types of mine.63

59 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 79.

60 Yahuda, 93-94. Deng Xiaoping's two other famous "obstacles" were theend of Soviet support for Vietnam in Cambodia and the reduction of Sovietforces on the Sino-Soviet frontier.

61 Urban, 32.62 Ibid., 44.63 Urban, 123.


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Moreover, many of these weapons were financed through the CIA.64

According to General Yousaf, China was the major supplier of

guns and ammunition until 1984, and "proved to be an excellent

supplier, completely reliable, [and] discreet...."65

The Reagan escalation was also accompanied by increased

assistance from China. In early 1986, Senator Orrin Hatch of

Utah, along with representatives of the NSC, Department of

Defense, and the CIA, traveled to Beijing to enlist Chinese

support for both the escalation and the introduction of the

Stinger missiles.66

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan thus provided a "growing

Sino-American agreement on security issues."67 Capitalizing on a

growing Sino-Soviet rift, the United States worked with China to

provide large amounts of weapons (generally through Pakistan) to

the mujahadeen.

The Stinger Missiles

Perhaps the most significant debate concerning the Reagan

escalation that occurred concerned the decision to supply the

mujahadeen with the portable "Stinger" anti-aircraft missile.

According to Walter B. Wriston:

64 Lohbeck, 44.65 Yousaf, 85.66 Scott, 63.67 Ibid.


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its basic ground-to-air version uses an IR (infrared)homing sensor, can be carried by one man, and is firedfrom the shoulder. The Stinger is effective againstlow-flying helicopter gunships as well as fixed-wingaircraft. It is a so-called fire-and-forget missile

and carries on board a sophisticated informationsystem to identify friend from foe....Weighing 34.5pounds, including the launcher, the missile uses asolid-fuel rocket motor [and has]...an estimated rangeof two to three kilometers and a very high targetinterception rate....68

The decision to send Stinger missiles to the mujahadeen was a

result of increasing pressure from an alliance consisting of

activists within the CIA and the Department of Defense and

mostly conservative legislators in the Congress. On February

25, 1986, an inter-agency review recommended introducing the

Stinger missiles.69 Journalist Kurt Lohbeck (who spent a

significant time with the mujahadeen) believes his

conversation with Director Casey "tipped the scales in his

mind in favor of providing the Stinger missiles."70

Conservatives in the Congress brought pressure on Secretary

of State Shultz to support the introduction of the Stingers.71

Reagan himself had apparently first made the suggestion as

early as September 1983 that Stingers should be sent, but the

68 Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information

Revolution is Transforming Our World(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1992), 161. Some reports suggest the Stinger has a range of up to fivemiles, David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels;Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy," The WashingtonPost, 30 March 1986, A1.

69 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, AngolansGet Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."

70 Lohbeck, 151.71 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans

Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."


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CIA voiced cautions over concerns of escalation, technology

transfer, and plausible deniability for both the United

States and Pakistan.72 By 1986 however, "Soviet-backed forces

[among them spetznaz troops] were employing more lethal

weaponry and more aggressive tactics...where they have

inflicted heavy casualties."73 Together with support from

within the CIA and the Department of Defense, as well as

pressure from Congress, Reagan approved the first shipment of

Stingers in March 1986.74

Following several months of training from the CIA, U.S.

Special Forces, and the British SAS,75 the first use of Stingers

came on September 25, 1986. The mujahadeen ambushed a group of

Mi-24 Hind helicopters, shooting down three and damaging several

others.76 Soon thereafter, the Soviets publicly acknowledged the

Stinger threat.77 While the success rate of the Stingers remains

subject to debate, best estimates put the rate between 50-79 per

cent.78 Regardless the exact rate, it appears now the Stinger

72 David B. Ottaway, et al., "The CIA in Transition; Casey StrengthensRole Under 'Reagan Doctrine,'" The Washington Post, 31 March 1986, A1.

73 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, AngolansGet Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."

74 Ibid.75 Scott, 62; Michael Evans, "Ex-soldier Says SAS Helped in Afghan War,"

The (London) Times, 4 November 1998.76 Yousaf, 174-176; Urban, 206.77 "Soviets Confirm Afghan Rebel Use of Stinger Missiles," The Los

Angeles Times, 20 December 1986, 1-14.78 Based on statistics compiled by Pakistan and the U.S. Army and

interviews with the mujahadeen. See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Outof Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995), 199; Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: SovietMilitary Performance in Afghanistan (London: Brassey's, 1991), 90; Yousaf,183.


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was taking its toll. As we will see next, privately the Soviets

were already considering withdrawal.

THE IMPACT OF THE STINGER AND THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

Despite some debate, it is generally acknowledged that the

introduction of the Stinger missile marked a turning point in

the Soviet-Afghan war.79 According to Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates:

There is little question that providing theStingers was a major turning point in the Afghan war.It greatly increased Soviet and Afghan aircraft (andpilot) losses and thus the cost of the war to Moscow;it forced changes in Soviet tactics that helped the[mujahadeen] on the ground; and it was a bigpsychological boost for the resistance. The hugeincreases in funding, which vastly improved the flowof all kinds of assistance to the [mujahadeen], moresophisticated targeting of Soviet and Afghaninstallations based on U.S. satellite information, andthe flow of Stingers by the end of 1986, had begun to

turn the tide. The Soviets had to either reinforce orlose. Because they clearly were not winning.80

General Yousaf of the Pakistani ISI writes that the Stingers

marked "the turning-point of the campaign...."81 While he

questions the military effectiveness of the Stinger, journalist

Mark Urban suggests that "undoubtedly the arrival of the weapons

bolstered guerrilla morale."82 Scott R. McMichael, writing in

79 Cordovez and Harrison dispute this "widespread assumption," 199.80 Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of

Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War(New York: Simon & Schuster,1996), 350.

81 Yousaf, 177.82 Urban, 214, 296-297.


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Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan,

argues that "[t]he real breakthrough in rebel air defence [sic]

came with the arrival of the US-made Stinger missiles."83

According to Walter B. Wriston, "[i]t is probably not an

exaggeration to say that not since the musket destroyed the

once-overwhelming firepower of massed men has new technology

performed such an equalizing role."84

More importantly, though, was the effect the Stinger had on

the Soviets. According to the Politburo minutes of November 13,

1986, Andrei Gromyko complained that "[t]he situation is worse

today than it was six months ago. We must be more active in

searching for a political solution."85 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev

intoned, "[w]e have lost the struggle for the Afghan people."86

According to the scholar Richard Crockatt, "[the minutes] also

show that the American supply of 'Stinger' missiles to the

[mujahadeen] guerrillas in 1986 was decisive in making up

Gorbachev's mind [to leave Afghanistan]."87

Journalist Mark Urban identifies six factors which led the

Soviets to withdraw:

(a) the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and his 'new thinking' in

83 McMichael, 90.84 Wriston, 161.85 Quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of

War; Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out of Quagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986Debate," The Washington Post, 16 November 1992, A1.

86 Ibid.87 Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the

Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (London: Routledge, 1995), 362.


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foreign policy;

(b) Afghan resistance;

(c) diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union;

(d) the internal cost to the USSR;

(e) a belief that the PDPA regime would survive;

(f) external military support for the mujahadeen.88

In terms of this paper, the most important factors to consider

are the Afghan resistance, the internal cost to the USSR, and

external military support for the mujahadeen. What Urban fails

to recognize is that, in reality, these three factors are

interrelated. The mujahadeen provided the foundation for

opposition against the Soviets. External military support from

the United States (and other nations such as China) was provided

for the explicit purpose of increasing the costs for the Soviet

Union. This was the stated purpose of the Reagan Doctrine. I

believe this strategy was an integral component in the Soviet

withdrawal.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The thesis of this paper has been threefold. First,

Presidents Carter and Reagan sought to increase costs for the

Soviet Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the

mujahadeen. Second, President Reagan sought to escalate the

88 Urban, 299.


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conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine,"

which sought to move beyond containment and roll back Soviet

gains made in the Third World as a result of its 1970s

expansionist policy. Finally, the escalation by President

Reagan, together with assistance primarily from China, was

integral in the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as

an important component to ending the Cold War.

To these ends, I have attempted to demonstrate that the

American strategy was, in large part, a coordinated effort of

the first the Carter administration (especially Brzezinski),

then the Reagan administration (including Casey, Shultz, and

Reagan himself) together with strong support from the Congress

(especially Wilson and conservatives like Hatch). Early on,

efforts to support the resistance were kept low-key, because of

concerns about escalation, technology transfer, and plausible

deniability for both the United States and Pakistan. However,

by the time of the Soviet escalation, momentum had finally

reached a culminating point within the administration. The

counter-escalation by the United States in 1985-1986 sought to

push the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

Two secondary factors stand out as integral parts of the

covert effort against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. First,

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the Americans a chance

to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift, and they capitalized on it


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immediately. The provision of large amounts of Soviet-style

weapons by the Chinese to the mujahadeen helped the United

States to maintain plausible deniability. Furthermore, as

General Yousaf confirmed, the Chinese were "an excellent

supplier, completely reliable, discreet, and, at a later stage,

even providing weapons as aid as well as for sale."89 Finally,

the Chinese helped to facilitate the introduction of Stinger

missiles through Pakistan. Incidentally, the second factor

which proved to be an integral component of the covert campaign

were the Stinger missiles themselves. While ultimately the

Stinger's military success rate may be in doubt, the positive

psychological impact that Stingers had on the mujahadeen and the

negative psychological impact they had on the Soviets is

unquestioned. The American counter-escalation ordered by

Reagan, of which the Stinger was the most prominent feature, was

the decisive factor in persuading Gorbachev to first consider

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

In a strategic sense, the covert campaign against the

Soviets in Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy to

roll-back Soviet gains in the Third World. Covert programs were

attempted in other Third World states, such as Angola and

Nicaragua, with varied success. Yet military victoryper se by

the resistance movements was never really an objective of the

89 Yousaf, 85.


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Reagan Doctrine. Perhaps the best description of the relative

success of the efforts to support the mujahadeen is how the

Soviets saw their failure:

There is not a single piece of land [in Afghanistan]that the Soviet soldier has not conquered. Despitethis, a large chunk of territory is in the hands ofthe rebels. We control Kabul and the provincialcenters, but we have been unable to establishauthority over the seized territory. We have lost thestruggle for the Afghan people.90

It would be wrong to suggest that the mujahadeen ever defeated

the Soviet army in a military sense. But, the implications of

Marshal Akhromeyev's statement are clear: Soviet failure is

rebel victory. Even larger than that is the strategic

ramification: Soviet failure meant victory for the United

States. Without the loss of one American soldier, the United

States engaged the Soviet Union in their backyard and defeated

them. The Reagan Doctrine exploited the Soviet strategic

overstretch, set back the Soviets on a number of fronts, and

helped to bring an end to the Cold War.

90 Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, quoted in Michael Dobbs, "DramaticPolitburo Meeting Led to End of War; Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out ofQuagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986 Debate."


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