case study presentation 8

International Organisational Behaviour

Case Study Presentation

Dave SutcliffeHeather Newton

Kate MaleyLeah Collison

Missed the Goal for Workers:The Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers

in Pakistan, India, China, and Thailand

How the creation of International Labour Standards, promoted jointly by governmental, non-

governmental and corporate bodies, and monitored by NGOs significantly addresses abuses of labour

rights in Global Production Networks.

• Introducing the case of soccer ball stitchers• Governmental Promotion• Non-governmental and Corporate promotion• NGO Monitoring Activities • Actors collectively address abuses of labour rights

Agenda

• Defining a GPN (Levy 2008) • Direct and indirect relationships• Coordination • Organisational capacity• Geographic reach• Significant FDI and international trade

• Economic and political nature of the GPN:• Is regulated by complex forms of governance at multiple levels

(Levy 2008)• Enables a dialectical approach to labour within global capitalism

environments (Selwyn 2012)

• Facilitates international changes such as the creation and implementation of ILS

Global Production Network - GPN

Introducing the case of soccer ball stitchers

International

Agreements

National Regulations

Corporate Internal Regulations

Supply Chain Coordination

• The International Labour Rights Forum (2010) highlight issues within soccer ball manufacturers in:

• The Atlanta Agreement (1997)• Child Labour

Soccer Ball Manufacturing GPNContext of the case

Pakistan India China Thailand

States

Society& NGOs

FirmsInternational Labour

Standards

Global Production Network

Government plays a key role in promotion of ILS, ILRF (2010).

• China: 1994 Labour Law• India: 1948 Factories Act• Thailand: 1998 Labour Protection Act• Pakistan: 1968 Industrial Commercial Employee

Ordinance

• Criticisms

Governmental Promotion

States

• Thai Ministry of Labour in collaboration with Private Sector

• Thai Labour Standards (TLS-8001) 2006

(Suttawet and Yawichian 2008)• Company Engagement

• Voluntary participation from companies engaged with US and European organisations.

• Increased regulation enforcement

• Encouraging firms to meet international labour laws and standards to increase their attractiveness (ILRF 2010).

An example: ThailandGovernment and Business

States

Firms

• Global ‘first tier’ companies • Ethical and Social Scrutiny• Corporate Image• Incentive to improve ILS through the GPN• Code of Conducts and Compliance Systems

• The Value Chain (Porter 1985)• Maximising Value-adding activities and minimizing value-

extracting activities = Increased Competitive Advantage

NG and Corporate Promotion

Firms

Society& NGOs

Promoting ILS

Low-value Exploitative Activities

Improved Labour Conditions throughout GPN

High Value-adding activities

• Nike• Saga Sport key supplier in Pakistan• Termination of contract 2006• Resumed production in 2007• Silver Star adhered to strict labour conditions

• Atlanta Agreement

Effectively regulated Nike’s Value Chain

Improved working conditions

Simplified monitoring Process

Value Chain examplesNG and Corporate Promotion

Firms

Value Chain Struggles

The Soccer Manufacturing industry in Jalandhar, India

Lund-Thomsen, P., & Khara, N. (2011)

Soccer Manufacturers in

Jalandhar, India:

• Value Chain Struggles

in GPN

• Combination of work

structure forms

Pressures:

• Increased demand

• Reduce Child Labour

violations

• Technology upgrades

• FIFA • Quality marks• Financial contributions• Assist rights violations prevention

• World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI)

• Ethical consulting services• Facilitates collaboration of different actors-

members: Adidas and Nike. • Additional Collaboration e.g. South Asia Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS).

Other NG PromotersSociety&

NGOs

• The Independent Monitoring Association for Child Labour (IMAC)

• Training so manufacturers could effectively monitor child labour

• The Sports Goods Foundation of India (SGFI) • looks to eradicate the roots of child labour completely

Monitoring AssociationsNGO Monitoring Activities

Society& NGOs

• The Social Accountability International (SA8000)

• manufacturers who meet voluntary standards surrounding ‘workers’ rights, workplace conditions, and management systems’.

• Fairtrade Labelling Organisation (FLO)• Certifications to manufacturers who are concurrent

with labour standards

• FIFA

Monitoring CertificationsNGO Monitoring Activities

Society& NGOs

International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC 2007) • Thailand: 5 out of 8 core ILO Labour Conventions

• Overall monitoring by NGO’s through GPN is successfully addressing the implementation of ILS

Case Example: ThailandFurther Monitoring

Improvements are required

Freedom of Associations

Collective Bargaining

Rights to Strike

Child Labour

Migrant Workers

Discrimination

Issues

Financial Independence

Sustainability

Transparency

Human Capacity

Collaboration of Actors

States

Society& NGOs

FirmsInternational Labour

Standards

Sustained through three ‘spheres’:

• Economy • State • Civil Society.

Concept of Hegemony-(Bohm et al 2008)Collaboration of Actors

• ‘Hegemonic bloc’ (Gramsci 1971) • Two Dimensions.

• Organisational Structure

• Specific Alignment

• A hegemonic bloc occurs when “the synchronisation of various elements achieves a degree of stability and consent grounded in the construction of common interests” (Levy, 2008).

Hegemonic BlocCollaboration

• Subordinate (Pakistani manufacturers) consent to higher ILS imposed by superordinates (‘first tier’ firms/NGO’s) (Bohm et al 2008);

• Resulting in:• Improved working conditions.

• Concessions from capital

Collaboration Within Soccer Ball GPN

• Continual global concern

• GPN facilitates promotion and enforcement

• Hegemony supports the idea that GPNs can indirectly and directly create unity (Levy 2008)

Conclusion

•Any Questions?

• Böhm, S., A. Spicer, and P. Fleming (2008) ‘Infra-political dimensions of resistance to International business: A Neo-Gramscian approach.’ Scandinavian Journal of Management 24(3): 169–182.

• Gramsci, A. (1971). ‘Selection from prison notebooks.’ London: Lawrence & Wishart.• ITUC (2007) ‘Internationally recognised core labour standards in Thailand. Report for the WTO

general council review of the trade policies of Thailand’ [online] Available at: <http://www.ituccsi.org/IMG/pdf/Thailand_report_final.pdf > [Accessed 26 February 2012]

• ILRF (2010) 'Missed the Goal for Workers: the Reality of Soccer Ball Stitchers in Pakistan, India, China and Thailand', International Labor Rights Forum, 7 June 2010

• Kaplinsky, R., Morris, M. (2001) ‘A Handbook for Value Chain Research.’ Available at: <http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/fisheries/docs/Value_Chain_Handbool.pdf> [Accessed February, 2012].

• Levy, D. (2008) “Political Contestation in Global Production Networks.” Academy of Management Review 33(4): 943–963

• Lund-Thomsen, P., & Khara, N. (2011). 'Making A Last Minute Save?: Value Chain Struggles, Work Organization, and Outcomes for Labor in the Football Manufacturing Industry of Jalandhar, India'. (Working Paper; 02-2011). Frederiksberg: Center for Corporate Social Responsibility, CBS.

• Porter, M. E. (1985). ‘Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance.’ New York: Free Press.

• Selwyn, B. (2012) 'Beyond firm-centrism: re-integrating labour and capitalism into global commodity chain analysis.' Journal of Economic Geography 12(1): 205–226

• Spicer, A. and S. Böhm (2007) ‘Moving Management: Theorizing Struggles against the Hegemony of Management’ Organization Studies 28(11): 1667-1698

• Suttawet, C. and Yawichian, S. (2008). “Around the World: Thailand. Current Situation of Labour Standards for Trading in Thailand” [online] Available at: <http://www.udel.edu/fiber/issue2/world/LaborStandards-Thailand.html> [Accessed 26 February 2012]

References