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Degrees of violence: exploratory data for
the Brutalisation project
Using the Global Terrorism Database and other
data(sets) to assess brutalities and degrees of
brutalisation by Chechen and Albanian insurgents in
1979 – 2001 and beyond
A WORKING PAPER
By Caspar ten Dam
Adapted version, updated in March 2012 and April 2015
Based on Chapter 3 of the original 2009 PhD-thesis Ways to Rebel: Testing a Theory of
Brutalisation on the Chechen and Albanian Insurgents, 1979 - 2001
© 2009, 2012, 2015 Caspar ten Dam
Master of Arts (MA) in Political Science
Leiden, the Netherlands www.ctdamconsultancy.com
http://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/
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Introduction
What brutalises rebels? What makes them cruel, or do things we consider cruel? That is a
primary question of my research, and of prime importance to the field of conflict studies:
arguably most conflicts are internal, insurgent, and separatist in nature (see section
‘Relevance: conflict patterns’), and one wishes to prevent or curtail the suffering involved. A
secondary yet crucial question precedes this: do rebels brutalise all the time, increasingly so,
or at all? And if so, to what quantifiable degrees? At first glance the answer to that seems
affirmative – indeed, rather obvious. Reputations of armed opposition groups plummeted
following the end of the Cold War. The ideals of a ‘people’s war’ propounded by Ché
Guevara, Mao Tse-tung and Frantz Fanon lost appeal among the young, gained ridicule when
people observed the atrocities from Afghanistan to Sierra Leone, from Colombia to Congo.
So-called ‘freedom fighters’ brought little liberation but plenty of savagery and crime; Ché,
Mao and Fanon held no sway among them. The remaining ideologues seem according to
many observers to be Islamic terrorists who show little regard to human life. Their violence is
the more frightening, because of their so-called catastrophic terrorism i.e. violence intended
to kill as many people (civilians) as possible. This trend arose in the early 1980s, superseding
a classical terrorism intended to gain media attention and its objectives with as few casualties
as possible.1 Indeed, it seem as if “even the old guerrilla struggles have grown more awful.
Increasingly, the rebel – Irish or Arab, urban or rural – has appeared cruel, a new barbarian.
… The romantic rebel is dead and gone”.2 In order to determine whether that bleak
assessment is true, and if so, why it has come about, one needs to ask the following
questions:3
1. Has the decent liberation fighter become extinct? Has it ever existed?
2. Many studies observe the ‘degeneration’ of the freedom fighter into a criminal, bandit
or terrorist. Is this observation correct?
1 Marianne van Leeuwen, ‘Catastrophic Terrorism: Elusive Phenomenon, Deadly Threat’ in: P. van Ham, K.
Homan, M. van Leeuwen, D. Leurdijk & F. Osinga, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Insights and Perspectives
after September 11 The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, December 2001,
esp. pp.7,11-12.
2 J. B. Bell, The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle London/Portland (Oregon): Frank Cass, 1998, p.4.
3 I need to thank my former supervisor Prof. Adrian Guelke for helping me to formulate these first probing
questions during the early phase of my PhD research at Queen’s University Belfast in 2005-2006. I added the
eight research question in later years, when I studied the literature on combat-stress.
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3. Have these studies focused too much on ‘new’ conflicts, overlooking the
commonalities with Cold War and pre-Cold War conflicts?
4. Why do regulations such as The Hague and Geneva conventions seem to have so little
impact? Do local values and customs deviate so much from international law? Or do
premature and unfair condemnations of rebels as ‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’ lie at the
root of their later brutalisation, as they have nothing to lose by violating basic norms?
5. Can we determine what constitutes a ‘just revolt’, given that there may be different
‘just war’ notions in different cultures?
6. Do motivations like anger about pain, humiliation and injustice or greed for power,
prestige and riches not just spawn rebellions per se, but also terrorism, banditry, and
other (war) crimes by rebels?
7. Apart from motivations, do the pressures and horrors of battle brutalise rebels – and
any other kinds of combatants for that matter?
8. Do all kinds of combatants exhibits similar kinds and degrees of brutality and
brutalisation (if any)? Or does the type, status and circumstance of the armed actor in
question at least partially determine his or her resort to brutalities i.e. violations of
local and/or norms of violence (if any)? We focus on the nature and behavior of rebels
and other non-state actors, but in the end we also need to analyse the nature and
behavior of soldiers and other state and semi-state actors like paramilitaries.
The first three first research questions are about whether and how much brutalisation, i.e.
increasing resort to violence that violates local and/or international norms, occurs. The next
four questions are about why and how brutalisation occurs for so far it does occur, and the last
one is about whether it occurs similarly or differently among all kinds of combatants – even
though our present research focus is on insurgents. A good way to answer these questions is
by testing a Brutalisation theory4 I have developed myself, by incorporating what I consider
to be the best concepts available in cultural anthropology, military psychology and other
4 I have developed and first tested my Brutalisation theory in my initial PhD-research project titled ‘Ways to rebel: violence values, aims and methods of Chechen and Albanian insurgents 1979-2001’. An adapted and
updated version of the original manuscript will appear as Ways to Rebel: Values, Aims and Methods of Violence –
Testing a Theory of Brutalisation on the Chechen and Albanian insurgents 1979-2001 (Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, forthcoming). Actually, a major part of the analysis and findings is already appearing as a Series in a
peer-reviewed journal: Caspar ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and
Albanians’ Iran and the Caucasus (Brill) Vol.14 No.2, November 2010, pp.331-65; ‘2. Histories, Cultures and
Grievances of the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.15 Nos.1-2, June 2011, pp.234-73; ‘3. Combat-stress and
Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Vol.16 No.2, July 2012, pp.225-45; ‘4. Conflict
Motivations among the Chechens and Albanians’ (forthcoming). For this Series, I seek to receive a PhD degree
at the History department of Leiden University, the Netherlands.
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disciplines. My theory is thus made up of the variables violence-values (my composite term)
on proper and improper violence; conflict-inducing motivations, in particular grievances,
avarices, interests and ideologies that bring about i.e. cause or trigger the conflict; combat-
stresses like fear, fatigue and rage resulting from or leading to trauma’s (and hypothetically to
brutalities as well); and conflict-induced motivations, in particular grievances, avarices,
interest and ideologies that happen by, through and during the conflict.5 The theory thus
assumes rebels or other armed non-state and state actors to increasingly violate local and/or
international norms, in a cycle of escalating and worsening violence. As a first preliminary
test of this theory, I compare recent rebellions by Chechens and Albanians, particularly in
Chechnya (1994-96, 1999-present) and Kosovo (1997-99).
One must keep in mind, however, that my overarching Brutalisation project is a wide-ranging
and ongoing one. The current study for a PhD concerns an early phase of that project: it
presents a number of my publications that assess, primarily in an exploratory thick-
description manner, the saliency of some of the theory’s (sub-)variables among Chechen and
Albanian insurgents and their wider communities in their often little known, understood,
researched and archived histories.6 Therefore, the project will know many more phases,
including:
a) expanding the analysis of brutalisation characteristics among non-state actors like the
typically anti-regime rebel communities (my composite term) of the Chechens and
Albanians, to an equally in-depth treatment of such characteristics among (semi-)state
actors like the typically incumbent regime communities (ibid) of Russians and Serbs;
b) expanding the comparative analysis to several more cases on the Eurasian continent
between 1979 and 2001, like the 1992-97 civil war in Tajikistan and one or more
distinguishable conflicts in Afghanistan, to see whether brutalisation i.e. increasing
violations of proper or justifiable violence has occurred in any of these cases (as well);
5 From 2005 till 2013, I have described my brutalisation theory, with some minor modifications, as “a cycle
of violence involving four main variables: “values on “good” and “bad” violence (variable 1); grievances
leading to armed conflict (variable 2); combat stress leading to atrocities (variable 3); and new conflict
grievances emanating from such atrocities (variable 4), spawning counter-atrocities and eventually hardening or
debasing the original violence-values (the cycle returns to the first variable)”: C. ten Dam, ‘How to Feud and
Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians’ Iran and the Caucasus Vol.14 No.2, November
2010, p.332. Yet since then, I have widened and reformulated the theory’s variables, so as to more equally
represent different motivations as explanations of brutal behaviour, taken from or inspired by diverse theories
propounding particular kinds of motivations as the primary causes of such behaviour.
6 See note 4.
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c) testing the Brutalisation theory through both qualitative and quantitative analyses on
several and eventually dozens of past and present conflicts on other continents like
Africa (e.g. in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan), in order to arrive at a general if
contestable assessment of the overall validity of the theory.
The second basic question of the project’s current phase – do rebels brutalise and by ‘how
much’ – is exceedingly difficult to answer. Quantitative analysis will be partial and contested,
as no global dataset with commonly agreed suppositions, concepts and data-readings appears
to exist. Thus Ted Robert Gurr’s Minorities at Risk, J. D. Singer’s Correlates of War and
other projects do not present the discrete incidents one needs to quantify brutalisation over
time.7 Monty G. Marshall & Ted Robert Gurr detected an increase of attacks and fatalities by
‘high profile’ terrorists between 3 November 1998 and 3 October 2005, and suggested that
Chechens did brutalise. Yet even they rarely distinguish incidents in their research findings.8
Most variables in most conflict datasets are too aggregated to reliably reflect particular
actions and actors, let alone their causes, dynamics and effects. Fortunately, as Clionadh
Raleigh & Håvard Hegre point out, the “fundamental unit of observation .. is the event” in the
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project; at the time, this project, at the
International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) from 2003 until 2012, was still in its
infancy, initially covering eight African countries between 1960 and 2004; but they intended
to “expand the data to cover the remaining conflict countries in West Africa, Sudan and the
Balkans”.9 In ACLED, the “politically violent event is a single altercation where often force is
used by one or more groups for a political end, although some instances – including protests
and non-violent activity – are included in the dataset to capture the potential pre-cursors or
7 In 1963 J. D. Singer founded the Correlates of War project to accumulate data on wars since 1816.
However, e.g. the COW Intra-State War and Non-State War datasets contain no variable denoting or
distinguishing between discrete violent incidents, only the start and end dates of sustained combat. See
www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war (as first noted on 19-08-2009; last visited on 2-04-2015).
8 Increase high-profile terrorism (at least 15 deaths in one or more coordinated attacks) mainly by militants in
“Iraq (Sunni and pan-Arab), Israel (Palestinian), Pakistan (Sunni and Shi’a), Philippines (Moro), and Russia
(Chechens)”: M. G. Marshall & T. R. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005 Center for International Development and
Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, May 2005, p.73 (figure 9.2); ‘onset events’ Africa:
figure 7.3, p.47.
9 Clionadh Raleigh & Håvard Hegre, Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset Centre for the Study of Civil War (2003-2012), International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Paper at
conference ‘Disaggregating the Study of Civil War and Transnational Violence’, University of California
Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, CA, 7–8 March 2005, pp.7 (1st quote; most events
“battles, but .. dataset [also] records on other activities”), 24 (2nd
quote). See
www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1022 (last visited 2-04-2015). See further www.acleddata.com.
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-warhttp://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1022http://www.acleddata.com/
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critical junctures of a conflict”.10
Such conceptualisations make the ACLED project and
datasets potentially the most promising to use for studying, tabulating and (re) interpreting
whole ranges of discrete violent actions, incidents and events by and among Chechen and
Albanian insurgents and other actors. As far as I have been able to determine, there are (still)
no ACLED figures on Chechnya or any other countries or regions in which Chechen actors
may have played a role across the 1979-2001 period or beyond. Nowadays, ACLED data
cover “all countries on the African continent from 1997-2014”, and earlier and/or upcoming
data on “South and South East Asian states” and “additional countries” like “Haiti, Laos,
Cambodia, Nepal, Myanmar” and “Afghanistan and Pakistan”11
– but still hardly any if
anything on countries in the former Soviet Union. Fortunately, the “ACLED Version 1 (1997
– 2009/2010) dataset” does contain detailed data on violent incidents in Kosovo and FYR
Macedonia (and Bosnia and Croatia).12
Other ready-made datasets like those by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) and Jane’s Intelligence Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JITC; more recently called
Jane’s World Insurgency & Terrorism) 13
may seem well-suited as well. Yet their data, on for
instance arms exports and transfers (SIPRI) 14
, are at most indirectly related or interpretible to
violence by armed non-state actors; and their access costs are often (far too) steep for
individual researchers like me. It may thus be necessary to collect own data from sources
specialised in daily reporting, like BBC’s BBC’s Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) and
10 Clionadh Raleigh & Caitriona Dowd, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Codebook 2015 University of Sussex (formerly at PRIO), 2015, p.7; see www.acleddata.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf.
11 Ibid, p.3; see www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdf. 12 See www.acleddata.com/data/versions-1-4-data-1997-2013/archived-data/. Yet the Balkan data “were not coded by an ACLED coder, but by a separate project under Ola Listhaug at NTNU” (www.acleddata.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_note.pdf). Also relevant is the “Actor information”: see ‘Balkan data
descriptions’, www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_description.pdf.
13
JTIC, http://jtic.janes.com (first visited 20-12-2007), later at later at www.ihs.com/products/janes-
terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.html (last visited 2-04-2015; unclear what IHS stands for). In 2007,
access to JTIC data cost well over £7,700 annually. JTIC/JWIT datasets and reports probably remain very
expensive, though the expenses are not immediately apparent to prospective customers; some sample reports are
freely available, like the “Analysis of the Threat Posed by Imarat Kavkaz in Central Asia and the Caucasus
Region”, www.ihs.com/pdf/IHS-Janes-World-Insurg-Terror_Imarat-Kavkaz_146073110913052132.pdf (acc. 3-
04-2015).
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SIPRI, www.sipri.org (first visited 9-10-2007; last visited 2-04-2015). The SIPRI Yearbook 2007 alone
cost £85 at the time. Fortunately, nowadays most SIPRI reports and other documents are freely downloadable.
See e.g. Gennady Chufrin, ‘Russia: separatism and conflicts in the North Caucasus’, Chapter 3 in: SIPRI
Yearbook 2000, www.sipri.org/yearbook/2000/files/SIPRIYB0003.pdf. Pál Dunay, ‘Appendix 1A. Status and
statehood in the Western Balkans’, SIPRI Yearbook 2006,
www.sipri.org/yearbook/2006/files/SIPRIYB0601a.pdf.
http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ACLED_Codebook_2015.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/data/versions-1-4-data-1997-2013/archived-data/http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_note.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_note.pdfhttp://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/documents/Balkans_description.pdfhttp://jtic.janes.com/http://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.htmlhttp://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.htmlhttp://www.ihs.com/pdf/IHS-Janes-World-Insurg-Terror_Imarat-Kavkaz_146073110913052132.pdfhttp://www.sipri.org/http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2000/files/SIPRIYB0003.pdfhttp://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2006/files/SIPRIYB0601a.pdf
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).15
Then one needs not to ‘deconstruct’ already
collected and classified data from preconceptions I do not share. I have started to collect
violence-and-casualty data from BBC’s SWB and RFE/RL, and put these in annual tables
between 1979 and 2001. Naturally, this task proves to be gargantuan and is still in its infant
stage; still, I try to complete this particular part of the Brutalisation project for future
publications in the not too distant future. Given the complicated, expensive and/or time-
consuming obstacles that the aforementioned datasets pose, I have thought it best to first do
some exploratory data (re)interpretations and (re)classifications of violence by Chechen and
Albanian actors from the more easily accessible and pliable Global Terrorism Database
(GTD).
1. Testing the Global Terrorism Database
The freely accessible Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START) at the University of Maryland, United
States, offers a suitable backdrop to identify, however tentatively, ‘terrorisation’ levels and
trends through my own concepts. The database consists of two datasets, GTD1 and GTD2,
covering ‘terrorist’ incidents in practically all countries over 1970-1997 (not 1993) and 1998-
2004 respectively. For Chechens and Albanians, I reinterpreted the GTD1 data from 1992 till
1997 (no data for 1979-1991), and all GTD2 data till 2004 so that one also captures post ‘9-
11’ patterns (see the Appendix for the original data reinterpretations).16
The table reproduced
below summarises the main differences between the two datasets.
15 BBC’s SWB is freely accessible through www.lexisnexis.com for researchers at Leiden University.
RFE/RL reports are freely accessible for all at www.rferl.org. My qualitative two-case study uses both sources as
well. However, RFE/RL’s online archives for the Balkans and the ex-USSR now only go back to the year 2000
at most (back to mid-1990s when I first extensively used its site in 2005-2007); I have downloaded hundreds of
individual articles and reports over the years, yet many of their online-identifications have become outdated or
fully defunct. For earlier articles and reports, one needs to gain access to the “archives of the RFE/RL Research
Institute and its successor, the Open Media Research Institute, .. in the custody of the Open Society Archive in
Budapest”, which seems to involve quite complex procedures (www.rferl.org/info/archive/1854.html; see
www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/open-society-archives-budapest-hungary; acc. 2-04-2015).
16
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START), University of
Maryland, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), www.start.umd.edu/start/data. Accessed 16-09-2007, 27-10-2007,
27-04-2009 and (?)-04-2012 (relevant texts and data found unchanged at least until 2009).
http://www.lexisnexis.com/http://www.rferl.org/http://www.rferl.org/info/archive/1854.htmlhttp://www.hoover.org/library-archives/collections/open-society-archives-budapest-hungaryhttp://www.start.umd.edu/start/data
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Table 1.1 Two Global Terrorism Databases compared
GTD1 GTD2
Period Covered 1970 – 1997 (not 1993)
1998 – 2004 (expanding to 2007 by May 2008)*
Definition of Terrorism
The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation.
No set definition; configurable approach covering several definitions of terrorism.
Criteria for Inclusion
Incidents that substantially concur with the above definition.
Two necessary criteria and two out of three sufficient criteria required to be met (see GTD2 Methodology).
Required Sources Single open-source report. Multiple independent open-source reports or single "highly credible" source.
Number of Fields Collected
Approx. 44 descriptive records per incident. The same as for GTD1 plus an additional 84 records.
Total Number of Incidents (May 2007)
68,986 10,000
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror (START), University of
Maryland, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/gtd1_and_gtd2.asp.
*: ‘by Spring 2009’ when re-accessed on 27 April 2009.
In my book Conceptualising Brutality and Violence (Cambridge Scholars, forthcoming) and
other publications, I will amply criticise definitions as applied for the GTD1 and GTD2
datasets. Suffice to say here that one might best define terrorism as violence against unarmed
and otherwise defenceless people for whatever reason by either state or non-state combatants.
Otherwise, conceptual confusion and partisan bickering may reign. In the near future, I plan
to reinterpret the additional GTD data for the Chechens and Albanians after 2004, at least
until 2011. Then I will verify whether the relevant GTD data between 1992 and 2004 have
been modified in any shape or form since I last checked in 2009; in that case these data
require another round of reclassifications and reinterpretations and reclassified datasets. I plan
to do this in collaboration with Pawan Kumar Sen, consultant at Interdisciplinary Analysts
(www.ida.com.np) in Kathmandu, Nepal17
; he will help me to apply more advanced statistics
(for so far as this is possible) on the selected GTD datasets according to my concepts and
consequent reclassifications and reinterpretations.
17 I worked with Pawan Kumar Sen in the past; thus I helped to publish, offer comments on and/or edit his
following publications: P. K. Sen, ‘Ethnicity-Based Federalism: An Issue of State Restructuring in Nepal’
Forum of EthnoGeoPolitics Vol.1 No.1, Spring 2013, pp.40-43 (see www.ethnogeopolitics.org); ‘Dynamic of
Nepali public’s opinion on the linguistic issue’ Nepalese Linguistics, Vol. 28, 2013, pp.199-210; ‘Should Nepal
be a Hindu State or a Secular State?’ Himalaya - Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies
Vol.34 No.2, forthcoming.
http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/methodology.htmhttp://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/GTD/gtd1_and_gtd2.asphttp://www.ethnogeopolitics.org/
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Chosen dataset, own concepts
Just as with the ‘White Book’ data on National Liberation Army violence in FYR Macedonia
(see next chapter), it will be interesting to see how many GTD incidents, supposing they are
correctly described, are ‘terrorist’, or violate other humanitarian and human rights principles.
My terrorism concept covers certain human rights violations such as sudden kidnappings and
killings of non-combatants. It refers to violence during the act, like bomb explosions, not
violence after the act, like abuses after arrest. Most violations one finds in the GTD1 and
GTD2 data took place in battles, military operations or during the wider conflict; these
usually do not refer to arrests, disappearances and other violence outside the conflict zone, or
during a cease-fire or lull. GTD researchers do not count incidents falling outside their
terrorism definition(s), meaning they do not count most violent events. This brings me to
concepts by which one needs to reinterpret and reclassify their data.
Table 1.2 Reinterpreting GTD1 and GTD2 data on alleged Chechen and Albanian violence
Main concepts
TER: Terrorism, i.e. lethal violence without warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups
of) unarmed and thereby defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers, policemen and other
defenceless non-combatants. 18
HRV: any gross human rights violation (GHRV) other than terrorism, i.e. torture and ill-treatment
(including slavery); extrajudicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary arrests and detentions without
trial; forced deportation or expulsion and political murders and mass killings (including genocide and
crimes against humanity). For simplicity’s sake the concept also covers Geneva’s main out-of-battle
18 This definition, formulated in 2009, has been modified several times since then. The latest formulation is as
follows: “Terrorism: sudden lethal violence without preceding warning of the act for whatever purpose against
(groups of) unarmed or weakly armed and thereby effectively defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers,
policemen and other defenceless non-combatants”. See http://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/wp-
content/uploads/Definitionsidentityviolence2014.pdf.
http://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/Definitionsidentityviolence2014.pdfhttp://www.ctdamconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/Definitionsidentityviolence2014.pdf
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treatment provision (Geneva C.art. 3.1; artt. 4 to 6 Protocol II).
Simplified violence classifications*
HRV: gross human rights or humanitarian violation other than terrorism**
TER: terrorist
NTR: non-terrorist and not violating other humanitarian or human rights (otherwise HRV).
*: incidents left blank are certainly or likely non-Chechen (North-Caucasian) or non-Albanian (Balkan) cases; or
conflict contexts cannot be determined, and are not counted.
**: incident descriptions are so minimal that HRV classifications will be rare; indeed they are virtually absent.
Certainty and reliability levels of classifications
Bold-and-cursive only, e.g. ‘ter’: certainly, practically certain
( ): apparently, allegedly, probably
[ ]: partially (only for HRV or TER)
? : uncertain
?? : unknown bias, or biased, partisan
NB: all partial ‘[ ]’ cases are categorised as uncertain ‘?’ in all final tabulations.
Incidents against non-combatants with no fatalities are classed as ‘probable’ or ‘certain’
terrorist incidents – even though my definition involves lethal violence against non-
combatants, and thus likely fatalities. Only a closer look at these incidents will tell us whether
they really fall within our terrorism concept. For now, they are classified as ‘terrorist’ –
though closer scrutiny may diminish the number of terrorist incidents. The same applies for
labelling attacks against combatant personnel as ‘non-terrorist’: in some cases these personnel
may be unarmed or off-duty – making these terrorist cases (incident descriptions are too
minimal to determine this). Hopefully both biases cancel each other out. Finally, in most
cases the perpetrators are unknown; many involve alleged culprits from (pro-)regime forces.
The next table is an example of just one of the GTD ‘data-strings’ shown in the Appendix,
with my classifications put in the ‘perpetrator’ column (which I did during September-
October 2007), just to show how the summary tables and diagrams came about.
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Table 1.3 A GTD ‘data-string’
For Chechen case http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/browse.aspx?what=location (GTD1)
Country: Russia
Event
ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type
874 12/28/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown (ter)
0 0 Business
875 12/28/1997 Russia Vladikavkaz Unknown (ter)
0 0 Business
990874 12/28/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
873 12/24/1997 Russia Kazbeksky District Dagestanis ter?
0 0 Government
870 12/22/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 2 Unknown
871 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan/Chechen border
Chechens ntr
0 0 Police
872 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan People's Militia of Dagestan ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
868 12/21/1997 Russia Buinaksk [Dagestan mil. base]
Unknown ntr
0 4 Military
869 12/21/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ntr
1 0 Police
867 12/19/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 2 0 Diplomatic
866 12/10/1997 Russia Unknown 0 0 Airports & Airlines
865 11/13/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 3 0 Business
864 11/9/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr
1 0 Police
863 9/30/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr
2 1 Military
862 9/13/1997 Russia Zapadny Unknown 0 0 Private Citizens & Property
861 9/11/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown ntr
0 0 Police
860 9/9/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ter
0 2 Private Citizens & Property
859 9/1/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr
0 0 Police
857 8/31/1997 Russia Chechnya/Dagestan border
Unknown ntr
0 0 Military
858 8/31/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Chechens ntr
1 11 Police
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
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NB: one can click on the case-numbers in the leftmost column, and via the Ctrl button (PC keyboard) get an
internet link to more detailed incident descriptions (though even those remain quite succinct).
The incident diagrams and tables below may not exclusively depict Chechen violence in
Chechnya or Albanian violence in Kosovo; some militants operated outside these areas, or
were not solely ethnic Chechens or Albanians; GTD data lack the depth to make these
distinctions. Thus many ‘ter’ incidents may be rather classified as ‘hrv’, like non-sudden
revenge attacks; all this one can verify at a later stage only by delving into the original
incident reports or further investigating these incidents.
Summary incident diagrams and tables
Chechen and/or North-Caucasian rebel violence, 1992-2004
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
Diagram GTD1 N-C violence, 1992-97 (not 93): incidents, own concepts N = 119
certain
probable
uncertain
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13
Kosovar-Albanian and/or Balkan-Albanian rebel violence, 1992-2004
0
50
100
150
200
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
Diagram GTD2 N-C violence, 1998-2004: incidents, own concepts N = 383
certain
probable
uncertain
0
5
10
15
20
25
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
GTD1 Alb violence, 1992-97 (not 93): incidents, own concepts N = 39
certain
probable
uncertain
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14
Albanian rebel violence in FYR Macedonia, 1998-2004
NB: just four GTD1 incidents in FYR Macedonia between 1994 and 1997, too few to deduce any
meaningful trends.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
GTD2 Alb violence, 1998-2004: incidents, own concepts N = 177
certain
probable
uncertain
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
GTD2 FYROM violence, 1998-2004: incidents, own concepts N = 31
certain
probable
uncertain
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15
NB: diagram 2.1 from chapter reproduced here for direct comparison.
Incident tables
Chechen and/or North-Caucasian rebel violence, 1992-1997
Table GTD1.92 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 11 in 1992 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist* 5 1 0
Terrorist** 2 0 3
Non-terrorist yet other
violations**
*: generally or fully respects humanitarian and human rights law
**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law. GTD cannot distinguish non-terrorist
human rights violations from terrorist ones; ‘hrv’ category remains empty and is deleted in subsequent tables.
NB 1: In most incidents perpetrators unknown; many cases must involve culprits from (pro-) Russian forces.
NB 2: GTD1 did not collect data for 1993.
Table GTD1.94 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 14 in 1994 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 1 1 1
Terrorist 3 2 6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
Diagram 2.1 'Whitebook' NLA violence, 2001: incidents, own concepts N = 129
certain
probable
uncertain
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16
Table GTD1.95 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 14 in 1995 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 4 2 2
Terrorist 0 0 6
Table GTD1.96 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 26 in 1996 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 4 4 4
Terrorist 5 1 8
Table GTD1.97 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 54 in 1997 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 19 3
Terrorist 13 6 13
Summary table GTD1 Chechen a/o North-Caucasian (rebel) violence, 1992-1997
N= 119 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 33 8 10
Terrorist 23 9 36
Chechen and/or North-Caucasian rebel violence, 1998-2004
Table GTD2.1998 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 18 in 1998 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 7 0 0
Terrorist 5 1 5
Table GTD2.1999 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 38 in 1999 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 17 0 1
Terrorist 10 2 8
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17
Table GTD2.2000 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 114 [113] in 2000 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 57 0 0
Terrorist 21 4 32
Table GTD2.2001 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 60 [61] in 2001 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 24 2 5
Terrorist 15 0 14
Table GTD2.2002 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 73 in 2002 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 52 1 1
Terrorist 7 1 11
Table GTD2.2003 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 61 in 2003 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 23 1 4
Terrorist 11 2 20
Table GTD2.2004 Chechen a/o N-Caucasian violence
N= 19 in 2004 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 5 1 1
Terrorist 6 0 6
Summary table GTD2 Chechen a/o North-Caucasian (rebel) violence, 1998-2004
N= 383 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 185 5 12
Terrorist 75 10 96
Kosovar-Albanian and/or Balkan-Albanian rebel violence, 1992-1997
Table GTD1 Kosovo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1992-1997
N= 18 in 1992-97 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist* 13 1 1
Terrorist** 1 1 1
Non-terrorist yet other
violations**
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18
*: generally or fully respects humanitarian and human rights law
**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law. GTD cannot distinguish non-terrorist
human rights violations from terrorist ones; ‘hrv’ category remains empty and is deleted in subsequent tables.
NB: in most incidents perpetrators unknown; many cases must involve culprits from (pro-) Serbian/Slavic
forces.
NB 2: both tables GTD1 ‘Kosovo’ and ‘Yugo’ are added up for summary GTD1 1992-97 table and diagram.
NB 3: GTD1 did not collect data for 1993.
Table GTD1Yugo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence outside Kosovo, 1992-1997
N= 21 in 1992-97 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 9 0 1
Terrorist 5 4 2
Summary table GTD1: Albanian violence in the Balkans, 1992-1997
N= 39 in 1992-97 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 22 1 2
Terrorist 6 5 3
Kosovar-Albanian and/or Balkan-Albanian rebel violence, 1998-2004
Table GTD2 Yugo/Kosovo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1998-2004
N= 170 [177] Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 49 0 9
Terrorist 74 15 23
NB 1: after a recount seven extra cases are added to the total count, from next table ‘GTD2 Kosovo’.
NB 2: in most incidents perpetrators unknown; many cases must involve (pro-) Serbian/Slavic forces.
NB 3: 4 GTD1 incidents in FYR Macedonia in 1994-97: 1 ntr, 2 tr?, 1(tr); too few to deduce meaningful trends.
Table GTD2 Kosovo: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 2003-2004
N= 7 in 2003-4 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 3 0 1
Terrorist 2 0 1
Summary table GTD2 Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1998-2004
N= 177 in 98-2004 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 52 0 10
Terrorist 76 15 24
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19
Summary table GTD2 FYROM: Kosovar a/o Albanian violence, 1998-2004
N= 31 in 1998-2004 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist 15 0 2
Terrorist 6 3 4
Findings
Remarkably, the Chechen-North-Caucasian diagrams suggest that the relative frequency of
terrorism was lower in the later 1998-2004 period, directly contravening the degeneration
premise. While certain, probable, and uncertain terrorist incidents added together make up
roughly 57% of all violence in 1992-97, such incidents altogether constitute just 47% of all
violence in 1998-2004. The percentages for both periods will be much lower if the largest
‘uncertain terrorist’ categories turn out to be (mostly) non-terrorist after all.19
Even then
terrorism will likely be counted a rarer occurrence in the later period. However, the Global
Terrorism data are so constrained that they exclude most violent incidents that actually
happened during, between and after the Russo-Chechen wars – many of which we would
classify as either terrorist, non-terrorist or violating other norms. So we can hardly conclude
that the reinterpreted GTD data (can) disprove the degeneration theory. All one can say is that
Chechen rebels and other Mountaineers who joined them were only ‘half-terrorist’ according
to our conception (43% and 53% non-terrorist in the first and second periods respectively for
all certain, probable and uncertain cases), and may have debrutalised during and after the
second war. The latter suggestion remains questionable, as the qualitative research has
generally shown increasing if still partial brutalisation throughout the 1990s and beyond.
One needs to be even more careful in interpreting the Albanian-Balkan diagrams. The Global
Terrorism database counts 177 incidents over 1998-2004, but just thirty-nine over 1992-97. It
also counts just thirty-one incidents in FYR Macedonia over 1998-2004, and a mere four
incidents in that country over 1992-97. Compare this to the 129 incidents we discern in
Skopje’s White Book on Terrorism (2001) on alleged rebel atrocities in mainly 2001 alone.
Nevertheless, the GTD2 FYROM 1998-2004 and the reproduced ‘Whitebook NLA violence,
2001’ diagrams exhibit roughly similar distributions. Moreover, the apparent trend reversal
19 Categories are not fully exclusive, with a particularly thin line between the uncertain ‘non-terrorist?’ and
‘terrorist?’ categories. This alone requires one to be cautious about the data interpretations.
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20
outside FYR Macedonia – 64% non-terrorist and 36% terrorist incidents (certain, probable
and uncertain) in 1992-97, as opposed to 35% non-terrorist and 65% terrorist incidents (ibid)
in 1998-2004 – give credence to the degeneration premise. Be as it may, these findings do not
tally with the picture emerging from the qualitative research that Chechen separatists started
out with higher moral standards yet degenerated more fully than their Albanian counterparts.
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21
2. National Liberation Army ‘terrorism’: a case study in
data reinterpretation
Right after a short yet sharp ‘near-civil war’ ended in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM)20
in August 2001, a detailed yet partisan Interior Ministry report
describes and condemns alleged atrocities of the National Liberation Army (Ushtria
Çlirimtare Kombetare, ‘NLA’); its shadowy predecessor, the Macedonia National Liberation
Army (MNLA); the former Kosova Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, ‘KLA’)
including its successor the Kosovo Protection Corps; and other Albanian armed groups.21
The
report provides an ideal backdrop to apply my terrorism conception, reinterpret and reclassify
its data through that conception, and determine the degree of ‘terrorisation’ among NLA
fighters in particular.
Between 22 January and 10 August 2001, the National Liberation Army allegedly killed sixty,
injured seventy and kidnapped six security force members; murdered ten, wounded over a
hundred, and abducted thirty-six civilians; and forced over a hundred-thousand people to flee
their homes in or near Tetovo and Sar Planina.22
Even if the numbers are correct – which one
must seriously doubt as hardliner Boskovski then led the interior ministry – we have serious
issue with the ministry’s all-encompassing and one-sided terrorism conception: thus the
National Liberation Army “took responsibility for the terrorist attacks of police objects and
police officers”.23
It considered all armed NLA attacks terrorist acts, suggesting that only the
enemy’s violence is ‘terrorist’, i.e. heinous. It made no mention of any army or police
brutality. If I apply my terrorism definition (see Table 1.2) on the interior ministry’s NLA-
inflicted casualty numbers (supposing the descriptions are correct), only killings and injuries
of civilians and off-duty security personnel – not distinguished in White Book’s data –
constitute terrorist acts, and all abductions and expulsions as well if we relax our delineation
20 The United Nations recognised the country under the provisional name Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) on 8 April 1993 (UNRES/47/225), given objections by Greece on the name and symbols
considered part of the Greek heritage. I usually refer to ‘FYR Macedonia’.
21
Ministry of the Interior of the ‘Republic of Macedonia’, White Book: The Terrorist attack of (on the
Terrorism by) the so-called NLA Skopje, August 2001, www.macedonia.org/crisis/ (download difficulties).
22
Interior ministry FYR Macedonia, White Book on Terrorism by so-called NLA August 2001, p.8.
23
Interior ministry FYROM, White Book on Terrorism, August 2001, p.7; pp.55-7,69,73. It cobbles security
forces together with civilians as being all ‘terrorist’ targets. It tries to formulate its terrorism concept in part V
(esp. pp.91,97-106), yet its citing of multiple legal and political definitions dilutes and skews the concept.
http://www.macedonia.org/crisis/
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22
somewhat.24
If in a single day armed, violent actions occurred in separate areas without
apparently belonging to a single campaign or battle, these actions are numbered as separate
incidents. Such actions are not always easily distinguishable; such cases are treated and
numbered as a single incident.25
The diagrams and tables below show the interior ministry’s
data on NLA violence recategorised through our concepts: well over three quarters of NLA’s
actions appear not to have been terrorist, nor violated human rights or humanitarian norms.
24 My terrorism concept is very narrow: it refers only to lethal and sudden violence; abductions may not
necessarily take place with lethal weaponry or force, or may not necessarily end with the deaths of the abductees.
25
I counted 129 incidents, with 4 incidents in 2000 I consider belonging to the 2001 conflict: FYROM, White
Book on Terrorism, 2001, pp.109-135. Raw data available in: http://sites.google.com/site/tristansolutions.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Nonterrorist Terrorist Other violators
Diagram 2.1 'Whitebook' NLA violence, 2001: incidents, own concepts N = 129
certain
probable
uncertain
http://sites.google.com/site/tristansolutions
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23
NB: presumes all police and army casualties were armed and/or on-duty
Nt = non-terrorist; t = terrorist; v = other violation of humanitarian and human rights law
(*): total casualty numbers from 129 incidents in table 3.5 (violence-distributions simplified)
Source tables & diagrams: Interior Ministry ‘Republic of Macedonia’, White Book: The Terrorist
attack of the so-called NLA Skopje, 2001, pp.109-135. Report labels all 129 incidents as ‘terrorist’.
Table 2.1 Incidents of non-terrorist, terrorist & other improper NLA violence
N= 129 (Diagram
2.1)
Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist* 61 28 9
Terrorist** 6 5 13
Non-terrorist yet
other violations**
3 3 1
*: generally or fully respects humanitarian and human rights law
**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law
NB: almost all cases certainly or probably involve NLA-insurgents; break-down at that dimension insignificant.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
police (nt) army (nt) civilian(t) civilian(v)
Diagram 2.2 'Whitebook' NLA violence, 2001: casualties, own concepts N = 452 (* N = 280)
killed
wounded
killed (*)
injured (*)
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24
Table 2.2 Casualty distributions in 129 counted NLA incidents
N = 280* Police Killed Police
wounded
Military
killed
Military
wounded
Civilians
killed
Civilians
wounded
N-ter
(N-ter)
N-ter?
9
2
56
18
12 8
1
2
12
Ter
(Ter)
Ter?
11
1
11
14
4
3
6
2
9
HRV
(HRV)
HRV?
10
1
3
1 abd
1 1 26 abd; 52
2 abd
2
Totals 34 102; 1 abd 17 13 10 75; 28 abd
* Nearly half of 129 incidents do not describe precise and/or certain casualty numbers. Casualty total of 280 is
much lower than the 452 the ‘Whitebook’ report (table 3.6) comes up with.
N-ter = non-terrorist; Ter = terrorist; HRV = non-terrorist, yet other violations
( ): probable; ?: uncertain; neither ( ) or ?: certain NB: abd = abducted
Table 2.3 Whitebook’s numbers on non-terrorist, terrorist & other NLA violence
N= 452 (Diagram
2.2)
Police Army Civilians
Non-terrorist 15 k + 150 w
(34 k + 103 w)
43 k + 119 w
(17 k + 13 w)
Terrorist 12 k* + 75 w
(10 k + 75 w)
Non-terrorist yet
other violations
38 mal/abd
(28 abd) *: incl. two abductees certainly ‘murdered’ as known by late August 2001
k = killed; w = wounded; mal = attacked/mistreated; abd = abducted
NB: FYROM interior ministry’s numbers, not from 129 incidents we counted. Numbers between
brackets are from those 129 incidents (table 3.5), put in this table’s simplified violence-distributions.
Findings
The results in table 2.1 are staggering: given our definitions and classifications, almost half
(47%) of all incidents are unambiguously non-terrorist, well over two-thirds (69%) together
with likely non-terrorist cases. The numbers of certain and probable terrorist incidents are
almost negligible; only the uncertain ‘terrorist’ category (10%) may be significant. If all
certain, probable and uncertain terrorist incidents are added up, one arrives at a respectable
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25
number of cases representing 19% of the total. Even then the result is too meagre to call the
National Liberation Army generally or even partially terrorist. Still, apparent terrorist acts
occurred too often to call these rare or incidental.26
Notably, almost half of the twenty-four
cases falling in the ‘terrorist’ rubric happened during the last two months of the conflict,
perhaps a sign of incipient brutalisation. Finally, just a few cases seem to consist of atrocities
of a non-terrorist nature. Diagram 2.1 presents the findings in a sharper contour.
The interior ministry’s casualty numbers in table 2.3 are much higher than from the 129
incidents in table 2.2 – except that in the latter case many more police were apparently killed
(or many described as ‘police’ were in fact soldiers).27
The numbers from the 129 incidents
are less complete (or more incomplete), as many descriptions fail to indicate if and how many
people were harmed or expired. In both cases we assume that all killed and wounded soldiers,
policemen and other security personnel have been armed and on duty; probably some must
have been unarmed and/or off-duty, but one cannot discern them in the data. For now, I
consider all civilians killed and wounded as victims of terrorism (plus the two murdered
abductees), and all those missing as victims of atrocious yet non-terrorist violence. One must
assume the same for table 2.3, though fifty-two civilians were injured by disproportionate
shelling (violating humanitarian law) rather than deliberate targeting (also terrorism).
Diagram 2.1 and its table 2.1 show patterns roughly similar to those of diagram 2.2 and its
table 2.3. Yet the latter diagram put the National Liberation Army in a less favourable light:
though according to the ministry’s casualty numbers 72% of all killed and wounded are armed
targets, the civilian targets make up 19% of all casualties (due to many civilians injured) –
almost identical to the percentage of all certain, likely and uncertain terrorist incidents in table
2.1. Close to a third (28%) of all fatal and non-fatal casualties fell victim to both terrorist and
non-terrorist atrocities. The National Liberation Army was hardly a restrained, disciplined
force even if it concentrated on military, police and other security targets. The findings may
be less painful for the former rebels if we assign a greater measuring weight to fatalities; that
would increase the relative size of non-terrorist casualties.
26 Categories are not fully exclusive, with a thin line between ‘non-terrorist?’(uncertain) and ‘terrorist?’(ibid).
Some or all 9 cases of the ‘uncertain non-terrorist’ category in table 2.1 may belong to the terrorist category, and
some or all 13 cases of the ‘uncertain terrorist’ category may fall under that category too. All 22 cases may be
terrorist; with the 11 ‘old’ certain/possible ones that could be 33 altogether.
27
In table 2.3: 15 police officers killed, 150 wounded; 43 soldiers and senior military officers killed, 119
wounded; 10 civilians killed, 75 wounded, 20 attacked and maltreated, and 20 missing after kidnapped by
(allegedly) the NLA (at least two murdered). FYROM, White Book Terrorism, p.8. Casualty lists on pp.139-153
give generally higher numbers, usually from early March till a few days after 10 August 2001.
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26
Appendix: original data reinterpretations from GTD1 and GTD2
Copyright © 2007 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA 301.405.6600
infostart@start.umd.edu http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/ Last Updated: July 17, 2007
Accessed 27-10-2007
http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/
Re-access attempt 27-04-2009: ‘page cannot be found’;
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/ accessible:
About START
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terror
(START) is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, tasked
by the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate with using state-of-the-art theories, methods, and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics, and social
and psychological impacts of terrorism. START, based at the University of Maryland, College Park, aims to provide timely guidance on how to disrupt terrorist networks, reduce the incidence of terrorism, and enhance the resilience of U.S. society in the face of the terrorist threat.
To achieve this goal, START has assembled a team of more than 30 researchers from institutions across the United States and around the world to conduct cutting-edge research related to the terrorist threat. These researchers represent the full range of disciplines within the social and behavioral sciences, including sociology, criminology, political science, psychology, communication, geography, economics, and anthropology. Adding to this truly interdisciplinary endeavor are the
efforts of experts in public policy, history, public health, foreign languages, and engineering working as part of the START research team.
Through individual research projects and in-depth collaborative efforts, this research team provides the homeland-security community as well as the public at large with insights about how and why terrorist groups form, about the decisions and behaviors of individual terrorists and terrorist groups, and about how societies can best respond to and prepare for known and unknown terrorist threats.
START researchers use a variety of approaches in their projects, ranging from analyses of statistical data to in-depth examinations of individual case studies, from survey-based analyses to reviews of public documents, and beyond. This range of methods will help to provide both a broad and deep understanding of the dynamics of terrorism and terrorists, allowing for more effective counter-terrorism measures.
mailto:infostart@start.umd.eduhttp://www.start.umd.edu/start/http://www.umd.edu/http://www.orau.gov/DHS_RE_Summit07/factsheet/START.pdf
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27
START will also launch a wide-ranging educational program and plans to serve as a clearinghouse for resources on teaching about terror and counter-terrorism to all audiences.
Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). Unlike many other event
databases, the GTD includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes almost 80,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and -- when identifiable -- the identity of the perpetrator.
Go to the GTD
Use of the Global Terrorism Database
© 2008 drs. Caspar ten Dam,
Master of Arts in Political Science
Tel.: (31-523) 649 949
Email: ctendam01@qub.ac.uk
Belfast, 16 September 2008
Washington DC, 19 September 2008
Belfast, 27 April 2009
Original classification scheme of violence & types of violence respecting or violating
humanitarian law and human rights (2007)
ter: terrorism (nonter: non-terrorism); liq: liquidation; asin: assassination; gang: gangsterism i.e.
violent criminality; bnd: banditry (ibid); brg: brigandry;
jbel: jus in bello (‘justice in war’) i.e. violence that honours laws of war as (partially) set in the
Geneva Conventions, like not targeting non-combatants;
hhr: ‘honouring human rights’ i.e. violence that honours universal human rights for so far distinct
from humanitarian law principles;
vjbel: violence that violates one or more jus in bello principles, especially “a) .. murder .., mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) … humiliating and degrading
treatment”(Com.Art.3, GC);
hrv: human rights violations, particularly ‘gross human rights violations’ like torture and ill-treatment;
extrajudicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary arrests and detentions; and genocide and other
‘mass killings’ (though latter category often not formally designated as GHRVS).
NB: much overlap between vjbel and hrv; for so far possible we use former category for ‘war’
situations and latter category for ‘peace’ situations.
Note: overall type of conflict, such as rebellion or coup d’état is mentioned under table heading or in
full at the incident(s) that change the nature of the conflict.
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/gtd/http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/gtd/
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28
Simplified violence classifications for GTD1 & 2 (2008)* HRV: Gross human rights or humanitarian violation other than terrorism**
TER: Terrorist
NTR: Non-terrorist and not violating any other humanitarian or human rights (otherwise HRV).
*: ones left blank are certainly or likely non-Chechen (N-Caucasian) cases, or their conflict-context
cannot be determined, and are not counted.
**: the incident descriptions are so minimal that HRV classifications will be rare.
Level of certainty and reliability***
( ): apparently, allegedly, probably
[ ]: partially (only for HRV or TER)****
? : uncertain
?? : unknown bias: biased, partisan
***: Incidents against non-combatants with no fatalities will be classed as ‘probable’ or ‘certain’
terrorist incidents – even though our definition involves lethal violence against non-combatants (and
thus likely fatalities). Only a closer look at these incidents will tell whether they really fall within our
terrorism concept. For now they will be classified as ‘terrorist’ – though closer scrutiny may diminish
the number of terrorist incidents. The same is true for labelling attacks against combatant personnel as
‘non-terrorist’: in at least some cases the personnel may be unarmed and/or off-duty – making these
terrorist cases (incident descriptions are too minimal to determine this). Hopefully both biases cancel
each other out. Last but not least, in most incidents the perpetrators are unknown – so many cases
must involve culprits from pro-Russian and Russian forces. So the GTD data are not exclusively
limited to Chechen separatists.
****: all partial ‘[ ]’ cases are categorised as uncertain ‘?’ cases in all final tabulations.
Explanation of main concepts
HRV: any gross human rights violations (GHRV) other than terrorism, i.e. torture and ill-treatment
(incl. slavery); extrajudicial executions; disappearances; arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial;
forced deportation or expulsion and political murders and mass killings (incl. genocide and crimes
against humanity).
NB: for simplicity’s sake we include the main out-of-battle treatment provision of humanitarian law,
as it prohibit acts roughly corresponding to GHRVS: “a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment”(C.Art. 3.1; see esp. Artt. 4 to 6
Protocol II). It also prohibits summary executions (C. Art. 3.1(d)).
TER: Terrorism, i.e. lethal violence without warning of the act for whatever purpose against (groups of) unarmed and thereby defenceless civilians, unarmed off-duty soldiers, policemen and other
defenceless non-combatants. Our terrorism definition covers certain human rights violations such as sudden kidnappings and
killings of non-combatants. Terrorism refers to violence during the act, like bomb explosions, not
violence after the act, like abuses after arrest. Incidentally, most HRVS we identify in the GTD1 and
GTD2 tables took place in battles, military operations or during the wider conflict; the data usually do
not refer to arrests, disappearances etc. outside the conflict zone, or during a cease-fire or other
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29
peaceful lull. Finally, the GTD data are limited in the sense that they do not count armed, violent
incidents falling outside their terrorism definition(s).
Table General: Incidents non-terrorist, terrorist & other violence
N= Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist*
Terrorist**
Non-terrorist yet
other violations**
*: generally or fully respects humanitarian and human rights law
**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law.
NB: in most incidents perpetrators are unknown – so many cases must involve culprits from pro-Russian and
Russian forces.
Global Terrorism Database
Open GTD1 | Open GTD2 (best viewed using Internet Explorer)
See also the differences between GTD1 and GTD2
Overview
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world since 1970 (currently updated through 2004). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period and now includes almost 80,000 cases. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and -- when identifiable -- the identity of the perpetrator.
The START Center is making the GTD available to government policy makers and academics in an effort to increase understanding of terrorist violence so that it can be more readily defeated.
Characteristics of the GTD
Contains information on over 80,000 terrorist attacks
The main types of information found in the GTD are items that you would expect to find in a well written newspaper story about a terrorist attack: the type of attack, the number of persons killed, the group claiming responsibility, the date of the event and so on
The GTD is currently the most comprehensive unclassified data base on terrorist events in the world
It includes information on more than 27,000 bombings, 13,000 assassinations, and 2,800 kidnappings
The original data include information on over 45 variables; the new data include over 120 variables
http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/http://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/gtd1_and_gtd2.asp
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30
More than 75 data collectors with expertise in six language groups are currently engaged in collecting GTD data
Data collection is supervised by an advisory panel of 12 terrorism research experts
Over 2,000,000 news articles and 25,000 new sources were reviewed to collect GTD from 1998 to 2004 alone
The goal of START is to make all GTD data available to government employees immediately and to release all data to researchers approximately one year after the end of data collection
The original GTD data base (1970-1997) is available to researchers through the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04586.xml)
The GTD Story
The Global Terrorism Database -- or GTD -- began in 2001 when researchers at the University of Maryland obtained a large database originally collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, a relative of the famous Irish detective agency.
From 1970 to 1997, Pinkerton trained researchers -- mostly retired Air Force personnel -- to identify and record terrorism incidents from wire services, government reports, and major international newspapers. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, the Maryland team finished computerizing the original Pinkerton data in December 2005, making corrections and adding additional information wherever possible.
In April 2006, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), working with the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies (CETIS), received additional funding from the Human Factors Division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to extend the GTD beyond 1997. By June 2007 data collection was completed through 2004.
During the next year the new data will be systematically integrated with the original data to form a single source of information on terrorist attacks, covering the entire period 1970 to 2007.
See also the differences between GTD1 and GTD2
NB 27-04-2009: text practically unchanged.
Open GTD1 | Open GTD2 (best viewed using Internet Explorer)
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04586.xmlhttp://www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd/gtd1_and_gtd2.asphttp://209.232.239.37/gtd1/http://209.232.239.37/gtd2/
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31
For Chechen case http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/browse.aspx?what=location (GTD1)
Country: Russia
Event
ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type
874 12/28/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown (ter)
0 0 Business
875 12/28/1997 Russia Vladikavkaz Unknown (ter)
0 0 Business
990874 12/28/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
873 12/24/1997 Russia Kazbeksky District Dagestanis ter?
0 0 Government
870 12/22/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 2 Unknown
871 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan/Chechen border
Chechens ntr
0 0 Police
872 12/22/1997 Russia Dagestan People's Militia of Dagestan ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
868 12/21/1997 Russia Buinaksk [Dagestan mil. base]
Unknown ntr
0 4 Military
869 12/21/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ntr
1 0 Police
867 12/19/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 2 0 Diplomatic
866 12/10/1997 Russia Unknown 0 0 Airports & Airlines
865 11/13/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 3 0 Business
864 11/9/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr
1 0 Police
863 9/30/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr
2 1 Military
862 9/13/1997 Russia Zapadny Unknown 0 0 Private Citizens & Property
861 9/11/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown ntr
0 0 Police
860 9/9/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ter
0 2 Private Citizens & Property
859 9/1/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr
0 0 Police
857 8/31/1997 Russia Chechnya/Dagestan border
Unknown ntr
0 0 Military
858 8/31/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Chechens ntr
1 11 Police
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
Country: Russia
Event
ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type
856 8/26/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 0 Journalists & Media
855 8/24/1997 Russia St. Petersburg
Unknown 1 0 Business
http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/browse.aspx?what=locationjavascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=874http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=875http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=990874http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=873http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=870http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=871http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=872http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=868http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=869http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=867http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=866http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=865http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=864http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=863http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=862http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=861http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=860http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=859http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=857http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=858javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$2')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$3')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=856http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=855
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32
854 8/18/1997 Russia St. Petersburg
Unknown 1 1 Government
852 8/6/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr 0 0 Police
853 8/6/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown (ter) 0 0 Business Business
851 8/3/1997 Russia Dagestan Unknown ntr 0 0 Military
849 7/30/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 2 0 Business
850 7/30/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter? 3 1 Transportation
848 7/21/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 2 1 Business
847 7/17/1997 Russia Prigorodny District
Unknown ter? 0 17 Transportation
846 7/13/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter? 0 0 Government
844 7/11/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter 0 0 Private Citizens & Property
845 7/11/1997 Russia Urus-Martan Unknown ter 0 0 Private Citizens & Property
841 7/10/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown (ter) 0 0 Business
842 7/10/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter 0 0 Private Citizens & Property
843 7/10/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown ntr? 0 0 Unknown
838 7/8/1997 Russia Khasavyurt Unknown ntr 7 13 Police
839 7/8/1997 Russia Beslan (North Ossetia)
Unknown ter? 0 0 Transportation
840 7/8/1997 Russia Dagestan Unknown ntr 9 0 Police
837 7/6/1997 Russia Moscow Revolutionary Military Council ter?
0 0 Government
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
Country: Russia
Event
ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type
835 7/3/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr
0 0 Military
836 7/3/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 1 Government
834 7/2/1997 Russia Nazran (Insushetia) Unknown 0 0 Military
833 7/1/1997 Russia Nazran Unknown ntr
0 0 Military
832 6/30/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ntr
0 0 Military
831 6/27/1997 Russia Jorbino Unknown 5 11 Airports & Airlines
830 6/26/1997 Russia Batakoyurt Chechens ntr
0 0 Police
829 6/24/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown (ter)
0 2 Business
828 6/15/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
827 5/28/1997 Russia Makhachkala Unknown ter?
3 3 Government
826 5/26/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 1 NGO
825 5/10/1997 Russia Chechnya Chechens 0 0 Journalists &
http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=854http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=852http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=853http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=851http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=849http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=850http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=848http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=847http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=846http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=844http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=845http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=841http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=842http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=843http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=838http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=839http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=840http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=837javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$1')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$3')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=835http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=836http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=834http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=833http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=832http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=831http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=830http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=829http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=828http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=827http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=826http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=825
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33
ter Media
824 5/8/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 0 Business
823 4/30/1997 Russia between towns of Malgobek and Sagatshi
Unknown ter?
2 0 Government
822 4/28/1997 Russia Pyatigorsk Unknown (ter)
2 12 Airports & Airlines
820 4/23/1997 Russia Armavir Unknown 3 8 Airports & Airlines
821 4/23/1997 Russia North Caucasus region
Unknown ter?
2 0 Government
819 4/22/1997 Russia Omitrov Unknown 1 1 Business
818 4/21/1997 Russia Gekhi-Chu Unknown ntr?
0 0 Other
817 4/9/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter?
0 1 Government
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
Country: Russia
Event
ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type
815 3/21/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 1 Government
813 3/17/1997 Russia Chechnya - N. Ossetia border
Unknown ntr
0 0 Military
814 3/17/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter?
0 0 Government
812 3/15/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ntr?
0 0 Unknown
816 3/13/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
811 3/4/1997 Russia Chechnya Unknown ter
0 0 Journalists & Media Journalists & Media
810 2/23/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter
0 0 Private Citizens & Property
808 2/7/1997 Russia Almetyevsk Unknown ntr
2 11 Police
809 2/5/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 1 Private Citizens & Property
807 2/3/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 0 Government
806 1/27/1997 Russia Grozny Unknown ter?
0 0 Government
804 1/19/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 0 Business
805 1/19/1997 Russia Chechnya region
Unknown ter
0 0 Journalists & Media
803 1/17/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 2 Business
802 1/14/1997 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 0 Business
801 1/9/1997 Russia Urus - Martan Unknown ter
0 0 Religious Figures/Institutions
800 1/8/1997 Russia Nalchik Unknown ter?
0 0 Government
1997
3344 12/19/1996 Russia St. Petersburg Unknown 0 1 Transportation
3343 12/18/1996 Russia Grozny Unknown 6 0 Private Citizens &
http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=824http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=823http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=822http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=820http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=821http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=819http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=818http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=817javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$1')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$2')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$4')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$5')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$6')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$7')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$8')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$9')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$10')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Page$11')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$EventID')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$IncidentDate')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$Country')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$City')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfFatalities')javascript:__doPostBack('GridView1','Sort$TotalNumberOfInjured')http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=815http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=813http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=814http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=812http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=816http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=811http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=810http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=808http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=809http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=807http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=806http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=804http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=805http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=803http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=802http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=801http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=800http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3344http://209.232.239.37/gtd1/ViewIncident.aspx?id=3343
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34
ter Property
3342 12/17/1996 Russia Novye Atagi Unknown ter
6 1 NGO
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ...
Table GTD1.97 Incidents non-terrorist, terrorist, other N-Caucasian (reb) violence
N= 54 Certain Probable Uncertain
Non-terrorist* 19 3
Terrorist** 13 6 13
Non-terrorist yet
other violations**
*: generally or fully respects humanitarian and human rights law
**: generally or gravely violates humanitarian and human rights law.
NB: in most incidents perpetrators are unknown – so many cases must involve culprits from pro-Russian and
Russian forces.
Country: Russia
Event
ID Date Country City Perpetrator Fatalities Injured Target Type
3341 12/14/1996 Russia Unknown 0 0 Military
3340 11/20/1996 Russia Tyumen Unknown 2 0 Business
3339 11/19/1996 Russia St. Petersburg
Unknown 1 0 Business
3338 11/16/1996 Russia Kaspiysk Unknown ntr
43 8 Military
3336 11/13/1996 Russia Grozny Unknown ter?
0 0 Government
3337 11/13/1996 Russia Grozny Unknown ntr
0 4 Police
3335 11/10/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 14 13 Private Citizens & Property
3334 11/3/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 0 Business
3333 10/31/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 0 Police
3332 9/26/1996 Russia Unknown 0 0 Military
3331 9/13/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 1 1 Private Citizens & Property
3330 9/8/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 3 Business
3329 8/22/1996 Russia Moscow Unknown 0 0 Religious Figures/Institutions
3327 8/20/1996 Russia Makhachkrin Unknown 0 0 Private Citizens & Property
3328 8/20/1996 Russia Markachkala Unknown ter?
4 8 Government
3326 8/15/1996 Russia Pyatigorsk Unknown ter
0 0 Business
3325 8/13/1996 Russia Manhackala Unknown 0 1 Unknown
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