ved du, hvor dine data er - og hvem, der har adgang til dem? ron ben natan, ibm us

© 2012 IBM Corporation

Database Security and Compliance

Ron Ben-Natan, IBM Distinguished Engineer

CTO for Data Security, Compliance and Optimization

Database Security in the Forefront

2

Data loss prevention

Compliance requirements

Mature best practices

7 Steps

• Hardening

• Assessing

• Classifying

• Monitoring

• Auditing

• Enforcing

• Encrypting

Which types of information assets are compromised?

3

The “Unknown” Factor

4

Scoping

Infrastructure

Database Discovery

Databases

Hosts

Applications

Requirements/Initiatives

SOXPCIDPD

Basel IIGLBA

...SecurityBreaches

Sep. of duties...

DataClassification Scope

&Technical

Requirements

Auditing

Protecting

Assessing

Discovery & Classification

5

Example 1 - ANY System Privileges

6

Oracle has over 100 system privileges

Nearly every ANY system privilege can be used by an attacker to assume DBA privileges:

EXECUTE ANY PROCEDURE There are many procedures within the SYS schema that run with definer rights – so if I

can run them I can assign myself privileges exec sys.dbms_repact_sql_util.do_sql(‘grant dba to ronb’, true); exec sys.dbms_streams_rpc.execute_stmt(‘grant dba to ronb’); exec sys.ltadm.executesql(‘grant dba to ronb’);

CREATE ANY VIEW I’ll create a procedure that gives me DBA privileges running with invoker rights I’ll create a view in the SYSTEM schema that will run the procedure I’ll convince a DBA to access the view

CREATE ANY TRIGGER I’ll create a procedure that grants me DBA, running with invoker rights Pick a user with DBA privileges Pick a table within that user schema for which PUBLIC has some privileges (e.g.

SELECT) I’ll define a trigger on the privilege that PUBLIC has (e.g. SELECT) that calls the

procedure I’ll access the object (since I’m using a PUBLIC privilege) I now have DBA privileges! (the trigger runs as the schema owner)

Example 2 – UTL_FILE

7

file_name := utl_file.fopen(<dir>,<file name>, ‘w’);

utl_file.put_line(file_name, ‘abcdefgh’, true);

utl_file.fclose(file_name);

The ability to write files to the OS is a very dangerous thing Runs with the database instance owner privileges Can be used to delete audit files Can be used to delete or corrupt a data file – including the SYSTEM

tablespace Can use it to change config files Can use it to write a .rhosts file to allow access to the OS Can use it to write to .cshrc or .login for the oracle OS account Can use it to write a login.sql or glogin.sql file to cause a SQL command to

be called with privileges of a DBA

Assessing

ConfigurationAssessment

BehavioralAssessment

SecurityRecommendations

SecureConfiguration

Vulnerability Assessment

Scope&

TechnicalRequirements

ChangeTracking

CASProven Config

Compliance

Assessing & Securing

8

“Though some movie plots would have us believe otherwise, cyber attacks in the real world rarely involve Mission Impossible-like scenarios. Quite the opposite, in fact.”

9

Complexity

Example 3 - Passwords

10

Spida –

Microsoft SQL Server

Empty sa password

Xp_cmdshell

PropagationMade it to 4th place in SANS “Top Ten”

APPS/APPS

weblogic.jdbc.connectionPool.eng=\ url=jdbc:weblogic:oracle,\ driver=weblogic.jdbc.oci.Driver,\ loginDelaySecs=2,\ initialCapacity=50,\ capacityIncrement=10,\ maxCapacity=100,\ props=user=scott,password=tiger,server=ORCL

<ias-resources><jdbc> <database>ORCL</database> <datasource>ORCL</datasource> <username>scott</username> <password>tiger</password> <driver-type>ORACLE_OCI</driver-type> </jdbc></ias-resources>

Provider=SQLOLEDB;Data Source=192.168.1.32;Initial Catalog=Northwind;User ID=sa;Password=sapwd;

Example 4 - Buffer Overflow Attacks

11

Sapphire worm/SQL Slammer“Zero-day attack”

Monitoring & Auditing

Scope&

TechnicalRequirements

InvestigationSupport

AuditCompliance

AuditingPolicy

AuditTrails

Data AccessInvestigation

PrivilegedUser

Monitoring &Auditing

ApplicationMonitoring

Monitoring & Auditing

12

Compliance – Many Regulations – Internal & External

13

Breach Discovery

14

15

More Oracle Performance tests

16

Sun E650028 CPUs, 28 GB100 concurrent connections

Each doing inserts (real application table, with indexes etc.)100 ms delay between each insert

Before Any Auditing

17

Throughout – Approximately 19,000 inserts per minute

last pid: 21715; load averages: 7.27, 4.66, 3.41 10:29:02271 processes: 269 sleeping, 2 on cpuCPU states: 66.3% idle, 25.3% user, 2.6% kernel, 5.8% iowait, 0.0% swapMemory: 26G real, 20G free, 4885M swap in use, 32G swap free

PID USERNAME LWP PRI NICE SIZE RES STATE TIME CPU COMMAND 15044 oracle10 12 49 0 2137M 965M sleep 1:17 0.34% oracle 20904 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 970M sleep 0:15 0.31% oracle 20773 oracle10 1 39 0 2124M 971M sleep 0:16 0.31% oracle 20932 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 970M sleep 0:14 0.31% oracle 21008 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 971M sleep 0:13 0.31% oracle 20946 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 971M sleep 0:13 0.31% oracle 20789 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 970M sleep 0:16 0.30% oracle 20873 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 971M sleep 0:15 0.30% oracle 20958 oracle10 1 54 0 2123M 971M sleep 0:13 0.30% oracle 21004 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 970M sleep 0:13 0.30% oracle 20795 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 970M sleep 0:15 0.30% oracle 21002 oracle10 1 59 0 2123M 971M sleep 0:13 0.30% oracle 20867 oracle10 1 53 0 2124M 972M sleep 0:15 0.29% oracle

Oracle with Standard Auditing

18

Throughout – Approximately 13,000 inserts per minute30% drop in throughputLoad average almost double

last pid: 7622; load averages: 14.51, 9.90, 8.72 11:32:32271 processes: 269 sleeping, 2 on cpuCPU states: 28.2% idle, 66.5% user, 3.0% kernel, 2.3% iowait, 0.0% swapMemory: 26G real, 19G free, 4930M swap in use, 32G swap free

PID USERNAME LWP PRI NICE SIZE RES STATE TIME CPU COMMAND 4036 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:13 0.65% oracle 4082 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:12 0.65% oracle 4086 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:12 0.65% oracle 4055 oracle10 1 55 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:13 0.64% oracle 4034 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:12 0.64% oracle 4139 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:12 0.64% oracle 4174 oracle10 1 53 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:11 0.64% oracle 4162 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:11 0.64% oracle 3927 oracle10 1 35 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:09 0.64% oracle 4078 oracle10 1 51 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:09 0.63% oracle 4010 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:12 0.61% oracle 3947 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:12 0.61% oracle 3939 oracle10 1 23 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:13 0.61% oracle 4119 oracle10 1 59 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:10 0.61% oracle 4020 oracle10 1 41 0 2124M 1239M sleep 1:11 0.60% oracle

Database Activity Monitoring - DAM

19

• Other reasons to look beyond native Auditing Heterogeneous support Easier to deploy and manage IPC interception to avoid impact to the database Functionality/Maturity

Security and AuditingAssessmentsPoliciesChange managementAudit (as opposed to auditing)

AutomationCompliance packages

Independence of the audit trail Separation of duties Allows security functions such as prevention and redaction

Security Monitoring & Data Protection

Scope&

TechnicalRequirements

Violations &Incidents

AccessCompliance

Data ExtrusionProtection

Data AccessProtecttion

Monitoring &Anomaly Detection

Privileged User Access

Control

Remidiation

Protecting

20

IBM Guardium - Addressing the Full Lifecycle

21

Integration with LDAP/AD, IAM, Change

Management, SIEM, Archiving, etc.

Optim

Development, Test & Training

Data Center 1

Data Center 2

Data-Level Access Control (S-GATE)

Collector

Collector

Central Policy Manager & Audit

Repository

IBM System z

Host-Based Probe (S-TAP)

22

Scalable Multi-Tier Architecture

22

Thank you!

23