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“Implementing EUs Water Framework Directive in Norway: Do new water

regions represent effective networks for multi-level coordination or a

decentralization of dilemmas?”

To be presented at: The 7th ECPR General Conference, Water management Across Borders, Scales

and Sectors: How to Adress Recent Developments and Future Challenges in Water Policy Analysis?

Panel 2. Collaborative Water Resource management: Defining/Evaluating Policy Process “integration”

for Effective Participation and Efficient Policy Outputs.

By:

Sissel Hovik, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, Oslo and Akershus University

College of Applied Sciences.

Jan Erling Klausen, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

Gro Sandkjær Hanssen, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research

Knut Bjørn Stokke, Associate Professor, Department of Landscape Architecture and Spatial Planning,

University of Life Sciences

Marthe Indset, Researcher, Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research

WORK IN PROGRESS – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE

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1. INTRODUCTION

This paper investigates how Norway’s complex, decentralized system of EU Water Framework

Directive (WFD1) implementation has performed so far, in terms of dealing with the unusually broad

range of aquatic environmental stressors found in this country. A common perception among actors

involved in the WFD system is that the integration of environmental policy aims has progressed with

a slower pace in some sectors than in others. This paper analyzes these perceptions with reference

to variances in regulatory instruments, institutional set-up and policy-making traditions in these

sectors.

Norway has implemented the WFD in a manner that sets it somewhat apart from the mainstream. In

line with the traditional emphasis on decentralization in Norwegian government, Norway has

delegated the planning responsibilities laid down in the WFD to as many as 11 national River Basin

Districts and more than 100 Sub-districts. In organizing these districts Norway has, furthermore,

allowed very few deviations from the ecosystem-based principle. Finally, in accordance with

Norway’s traditionally strong emphasis on participation and civil society involvement, a plethora of

actors participate in WFD-related activities throughout the planning process.

Norway is, however, an interesting case of WFD implementation for another reason: There is a

particularly diverse composition of water-related activities and, as a result, a highly composite

pattern of aquatic environmental stressors that needs to be dealt with in order to achieve the WFD

aims. A coastal country with high mountains and deep fjords, water has played a pivotal role in the

industrial development of Norway. Norway is Europe’s biggest hydropower producer with a total

production volume of 122 TWh2, and the EU Renewables directive has set the pace for further

development. In later years, coastal aquaculture has developed with a tremendous speed. Sales of

Atlantic salmon and Rainbow trout has almost tripled the last decade to more than 1,2 million tons,3

generating significant export revenues and much south-after activity in remote areas. Power

production and fish farming is perceived as a threat not least to wild Salmon fishing in Norwegian

rivers, which is a popular and profitable pastime as it draws tourists from across the globe. While

agriculture has been in a decline for several decades, it is still a significant stressor to the aquatic

environment in some regions, notably the south-eastern parts. These stressors often coincide with

sewage discharge from diffuse sources, due to Norway’s highly dispersed pattern of habitation.

Point-source pollution from the processing industries is still significant in a few locations, but diffuse

discharges from closed-down mines may all in all constitute a graver problem. All in all, achieving

1 Directive 2000/60/EC

2 2011. Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate

3 Source: Factsheet, Directory of Fisheries

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good environmental status in all of Norway’s waters implies potentially running against powerful

actors and dealing with numerous conflicts of interest. Huge profits are at stake, and the political

clout of some of the industries involved is very significant.

Our theoretical point of departure is to regard the WFD as a case of environmental policy integration.

This concept emanates from a discourse initiated by the World Commission on Environment and

Development. The Commission’s call for “the major central economic and sector agencies of

governments [to] be made directly responsible and fully accountable for ensuring that their policies,

programmes and budgets support development are ecologically as well as economically sustainable”

(WCED 1987 p. 314) was integral to Agenda 21 following the Rio summit in 1992. It was adopted by

the OECD, and was given a legal basis through its inclusion in the Single European Act (EU 1987) and

later on in the Maastricht Treaty (EU 1992).

The concept of environmental policy integration has been thoroughly explored by Lafferty (2004) and

associates (Lafferty and Hovden 2003, Lafferty and Ruud 2006). A definition of environmental policy

integration emanating from this work is as follows:

the incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of policymaking in non-

environmental policy sectors, with a specific recognition of this goal as a guiding principle for

the planning and execution of policy; accompanied by an attempt to aggregate presumed

environmental consequences into an overall evaluation of policy, and a commitment to

minimise contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by giving principled

priority to the former over the latter. (Lafferty, 2004: 201)

Lafferty and Ruud (2006) presented a simple conceptualization of environmental policy integration

based on two dimensions; one horizontal and one vertical. “Horizontal” policy integration denotes

the “greening” of the sectors of government; the extent to which each sector has integrated

environmental concerns into its operational goal structure. “Vertical” policy integration is about the

pursuit of environmental concerns across sectors – mediating conflicts between sectors, between

environmental and other social concerns or between “alternative possible consequences of specific

environmental initiatives” (ibid. p. 457).

The “sectors” in question in the context of the present paper are hydropower, aquaculture,

agriculture, sewage and processing industries. We chose to conceptualize “sectors” as established

patterns of interplay and interdependence between business actors, governmental agencies and

interest groups that relate to the sector’s key activity – a point to be elaborated further on.

Furthermore, we assess the sectors in terms of how their engagement and commitment to the WFD

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processes are perceived by actors in the system, as a proxy for actual “integration of environmental

concerns into goal structures”.

Following this, the main research question is as follows:

To what extent have the sectors in question allowed themselves to become integrated in

Norway’s system for WFD implementation?

At the time of writing, the first comprehensive round of River basin management plans in Norway is

still underway. As a consequence, it is for the time being not possible to answer this question based

on an assessment of the actual measures that are needed to achieve or maintain the environmental

aims laid down in the WFD. A comparative analysis of the measures implemented in the various

water-related sectors needs to be postponed until the first round of planning has been completed.

The ambition of this paper is to provide tentative insights based on the present situation, and to lay

down the groundwork for a comparative analysis of the measures.

In the following section (2), Norway’s system of WFD implementation is described in some detail.

Data and methods are described in section 3. Following this, the systems of regulation, institutional

set-up and policy-making modes of the five sectors are presented briefly in section 4. After this, we

turn to empirical evidence concerning perceptions about the various sectors’ actual WFD

involvement, which is analyzed with reference to the particular regulatory and institutional

contingencies in each sector.

The paper is based on research carried out by WAPABAT,4 a project funded by the Research council

of Norway in 2010-2013. The bulk of empirical research has been carried out by the authors.

2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU WATER FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE IN NORWAY

It can be contended that Norway’s water management system is among Europe’s most fragmented

and multi-faceted. As noted, there is a unusually broad range of water-related activities and

environmental stressors, notably hydro-power, industry, fish-farming, agriculture, roads, waste-

water and sewage, and urban-and rural planning (Hovik and Stokke 2004). In addition, New Public

Management (NPM) reforms have been associated with increased fragmentation of the public sector

in general, as in many other countries (Christensen and Lægreid 2011).

4 Water pollution abatement in a system of multi level governance

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The EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) addresses the problems of fragmentation in water

management, addressing not only the chemical aspects of water protection, but also its ecological

aspects. The main purpose is to make water management capable of reaching the environmental

goals of ecological good water status, as well as distributing the relative advantages and costs as

cohesive as possible, so that all affected parties are addressed (European Parliament, Council 2000).

This requires coordination of sector politics and of public actors at different governmental levels

(Nielsen, Fredriksen et al. 2013), and to achieve this, the WDF enforces a new system of

comprehensive water management5, based upon an ecosystem principle. The application of this

principle entails the designation of catchment areas and river basins as management units. The idea

is that water planning is to be integrated across all water uses as well as integrated with other

related policy-sectors (Nielsen, Fredriksen et al. 2013, Hammer et al 2011).

As one of few European countries, along with Sweden and Poland, Norway has understood article 3

in the WFD as opting for a scalar fit between ecosystem boundaries of the river basins and decision-

making unit (Nielsen, Fredriksen et al. 2013), designing new units. The 11 new River Basin Districts

(RBD) and 104 Sub-Districts (SB), are cutting across existing municipal-(428), County (19)- and

regional state administrative borders. Each of the River Basin Districts is guided by a cross-sector,

cross-level RBD-Water Board comprising all affected authorities at local, regional and national level6.

Local level participants in the boards are representatives from municipalities, often the Mayor and

the chief executive. The national level is represented by the regional branches of national agencies,

regional state authorities, representing sector concerns7. The regional level is represented by

Counties, one of them being assigned an important multi-level and multi-sector coordination role as

the formal “River Basin District authority”. As formal RBD-authority, the County chairs the Board (the

main formal network), and designates a fulltime-coordinator for this task. The coordination role is

restricted to being process-coordinator, while the County Governor maintains the role of

coordinating professional actors and knowledge.

Each RBD may cover parts of the territory of several counties. Due to this, one County has been given

a coordinating role in each RBD. This role entails the coordination of different regionalized state

agencies over which they have no binding authority, like the County Governor,8 The Directorate for

5 It requires that “Member States shall identify the individual river basins lying within their national territory

and, for the purposes of this Directive, shall assign them to individual River Basin Districts” (Directive 2000/60/EC, art. 4). 6 11 River Basin Districts (RBD, Vannregion), River Basin District Boards (RBDB, Vannregionutvalg), Sub-Districts

(Vannområder), Sub-District Boards (Vannområdeutvalg). 7 County Governor, The Directorate for fishery, The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the

Norwegian Food Security Authority and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration 8 The County government is a general-purpose regional office of the central government.

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Fishery, The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the Norwegian Food Security

Authority and the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. Many of these regional subdivisions,

however, are not of the same size and shape as the Counties. The Counties are also expected to

coordinate the efforts of the several municipalities within their River Basin District, but these enjoy

extensive autonomy and their authority is traditionally compatible or even stronger than the

Counties.

This institutional complexity can be illustrated with the organization chart of one of the River Basin

Districts (Vest-Viken), presented below.

Figure 1. Illustrating the complex cross-sector, multi-level organization of one of the River Basin

Districts (Vest-Viken9)

Private actor interests are included by the establishment of broad advisory reference groups. The

RBD-Boards are charged with drawing up mandatory Management plans which, by consensus,

identify all environmental threats and risks to water bodies within the catchment area, formulate a

joint plan for goal-achievement, and give an overview of relevant measures. The planning process

9 http://www.vannportalen.no/enkel.aspx?m=36904

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follows the EU schedule, having 6-year planning cycle10. In this process, 104 Sub-Districts (SB), with

their SD-Boards, are important arenas giving input. All the SBs have a full-time/half-time coordinator,

often financed by groups of municipalities, but also by private actors like hydro-power firms.

3. METHODS

The paper uses three types of data. Our discussions are based on public documents describing the

different sectors and the new water management system. In addition, we also use a national survey

to all members of the Water Boards in all the 11 River Basin Districts in Norway (digital survey

distributed by e-mail in April 2013). The actors represented here are municipalities, the county

municipalities and a specter of different national sectors authorities (their regional offices)

representing the interests of agriculture, businesses, environmental authorities, road and traffic

authorities etc. The size of these Water Boards varies – from about 270 participants in one Board, to

about 12 in another. The total number of respondents in the survey was 733, 301 answered, giving a

response rate of 41. Of these respondents answering the questionnaire, 64 percent represented

municipalities, and of the municipal representatives 41 percent were politicians, while 58 percent

represented administration/public services. Of the total number of respondents answering the

survey, 24 percent represented national sector authorities (regional offices), while 8 percent

represented county municipalities. 2 percent represented other actors.

The third data-source is semi-structured interviews of key actors in three River Basin Districts. The

key actors are the coordinators of River Basin District and the Sub Districts in three River Basin

Districts, as well as local politicians and county politicians, different regional state authorities, and

administrative representatives from the counties.

The following section (4) highlights some key features of the governance set-ups in the five sectors

covered by the study.

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The cycle has five mandatory elements, starting with a baseline in which the existing conditions are mapped and analyzed. In Norway this has implied a classification and categorization of the quality of all 17 000 water bodies in the country. In the next step, essential challenges are formulated and pressures on water bodies identified, and then analyses of necessary measures are conducted, and environmental targets and norms for river basins defined. Then comes the formulation of a Management plan and a Programme of measures (PoM) and a Monitoring programme (2015). As in Poland and Sweden (Nielsen et al 2013), the processes of producing the Management plans involve several levels of government.

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4. WATER MANAGEMENT IN FIVE SECTORS

Agriculture

Eutrophication is a significant problem in parts of Norway, mainly in calcareous waters in heavily

populated areas where agriculture is a dominant industry. It constitutes a huge pollution problem in

the south-eastern and south western part of Norway, as well as in some intensive farming districts in

other parts of the country. Agriculture is considered the third most important water polluter in

Norway.11 Nutrients leakages (phosphorous and nitrogen) from farmland causing eutrophication is

seen as the most serious problem.

While all sorts of pollution are generally prohibited in Norway, pollution from agriculture is

exempted. The ambition of reducing nutrient leakages from farm land is enforced by economic

incentives and other voluntary measures.12 First, in order to receive general production grants,

farmers need to fulfill some requirements, including the preparation of a fertilization plan for the

farm. Secondly, there is an environmental program for the agriculture sector. The farmers can apply

for grants in exchange of avoiding plowing in the autumn, constructing buffer zones along

watercourses, or implementing other measures. This program is targeted to the most important

environmental problems in each county, water pollution being the most prominent one in several

counties. Thirdly, local incentive schemes are designed, aiming at stimulating environmental friendly

investments, for instance constructing or repairing drainage systems or sedimentation ponds. These

schemes are handled by the municipalities. Economic incentives are combined by environmental

agreements and other voluntary programs, designed at local level. The county governor can issue

regulations forbidding autumn plowing in limited areas. This is, however, so far only implemented in

one sub district in Norway.

These incentive schemes and regulations are handled by the agricultural authorities at national,

regional and local level. The role of the municipalities is mainly to execute state policy. To secure and

increase food production are important aims of Norway’s agricultural policy, complemented by aims

of securing district settlements and sustainable agricultural production (Meld St 9 2011-2012).

The agricultural agreement is subject to annual negotiations between the government (Ministry of

Agriculture and Food) and the farmers’ associations. The price of agriculture products, diverse

market regulations and the level and distribution of diverse state subsidies are themes for

negotiation (www.regjeringen.no), including the total amount of money spent on the regional and

11

Source: Norwegian Environment Agency (miljøstatus.no) 12

Point source pollution from manure (lagre), silos, etc. is regulated by legal instruments, and is no longer an important pollution problem in Norway.

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local environmental programs. The profile of the regional environmental programs (running for four

years) is subject to consultation between agricultural authorities and the farmers organizations at

central and regional level. If the goal of good environmental status in all water courses is possible to

achieve through the existing voluntary measures of the agriculture policy, this corporatist feature of

the policy field might lead to strong compliance. This corporatist feature does however probably

make policy innovation and learning hard to achieve, making paradigmatic changes in policy goals or

instruments difficult. If compliance with the environmental goals of the water management requires

such changes in agriculture policy, we would expect low goal fulfillment. The policy allows for

flexibility in the farmers adaptation. The corporatist nature restricts the room of maneuver open for

the agricultural agencies, making the policy less flexible regarding adaptation to various

environmental circumstances.

Waste water

Another source of eutrophication is pollution from waste water. The main problem is the total

number of discharges from houses and cottages in sparsely populated areas, due to lack of or

ineffective (old fashion) treatment systems. Discharges of waste water from sparsely populated areas

are considered to be the fourth most important stressor to the water environment13. Discharges

from cities and towns are less prevalent, due to intensive remediation in the last 30 years. But it is

still a significant stressor in some places.

Discharges of waste water require allowances, or pollution permits. The authority to give allowances

for single households and small settlements (less than 50 pe) and towns (less than 2000 pe to fresh

water/10 000 pe to ocean) is maintained by the municipalities, for larger towns and cities the

authority is placed at the county governor (state representative). National and local regulations

define the standards for the treatment and the limits of discharges. Regarding discharges from

smaller settlements, the municipalities can decide local regulations covering the whole or parts of

the municipality. They can also demand that households connect to the municipal waste water

pipelines, if this is not too expensive. All municipal expenses are covered by waste water fees. The

system of pollution allowances and local regulations, results in a highly flexible regulatory regime,

both in time and place. The regulations can adjust to new technologies as well as to the vulnerability

of the recipient.

The water supply and waste water sector is described as highly compartmentalized – it is a sector

with strong vertical and weak horizontal linkages (Hovik et al forthcoming). The sector is strictly

13

Source: Norwegian Environment Agency (miljøstatus.no)

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regulated by international (EU) standards and national regulations, but with regard to discharges

from smaller settlements, the municipalities are given much discretion. The policy field is dominated

by professional expertise, both professional organizations and R&D-institutions play a significant role

in policy formulation (Hovik et al forthcoming). Neither national nor local politicians show much

interest in the area, due to the technical character and the financial autonomy of the sector. In

addition, the target group; the house owners, is not well organized and represents no strong

pressure group. As such, this policy field is an example of majority policy (Wilson 1973), both the

costs and benefits is shared by almost everybody, making in hard mobilized behind any of them.

The activity of the sector is often outlined in long-term waste water plans, where the need for

upgrading and extension of the waste water treatment system is described, the necessary economic

and professional resources identified, and a time schedule is formulated. The planning process is

dominated by engineers, but approved / decided by local politicians.

Industrial pollution

Point-source pollution from the processing industries has traditionally represented significant

stressors to the aquatic environment in Norway in a number of localities. New technologies as well as

a general decline in some industries have however caused the significance of these stressors to

decrease substantially. On the national level ongoing point source pollution from industrial plants is

no longer among the most significant impediments to WFD goal achievement, except from in a few

specific locations.

According to the Pollution act of 1983, industrial plants need to apply for a pollution license to

operate, in case they discharge pollutants to air or water. These licenses are granted by the

Norwegian Environment Agency (NEA), a unitary regulator which as the name implies is an

environmental authority, subsumed under the Ministry of the Environment. Licenses for smaller

plants are granted by the county governor, a multi-purpose regional administration of the national

government. The pollution license is a highly “flexible” regulatory instrument, in the sense that it

provides considerable leeway for direct intervention. Firstly, §16 of the act empowers the NEA to lay

down stipulations as preconditions for being granted a license. Such stipulations may include

measures for pollution abatement or damage reduction, energy efficiency, filtering/cleaning

measures or recycling. Furthermore, according to §18 of the pollution act, licenses can be revoked by

the NEA and the licensee can be subjected to entirely new conditions for being granted a new

license. For instance, in case emerging technologies allow further pollution abatement, the

implementation of these can be a precondition for a renewed license. Licenses may also be revoked

if the impacts of the pollution have turned out to be substantially more adverse or of a different

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nature than expected when the license was granted. Furthermore, requirements of different

strictness may be applied to similar plants in different locations because the sum total of stressors to

the water body is greater in one location than in another. Licensees are furthermore required to

monitor and report on their discharges, production volume, energy consumption and waste disposal.

Point source pollution from industry to aquatic receptors is not a politicized issue in Norway. The

NEA and the agencies preceding it have executed the pollution act of 1983 in a legal/technocratic

manner.

Fish farming

Both historically and today, oceanic fishery is a substantial industry and trade. However, fishing has

been replaced by aquaculture or fish farming as one of Norway’s largest export industries. Farming of

salmon and trout dominates the fish farming industry in Norway. Aquaculture has several impacts on

the environment, as emissions of nutrients, sea lice and escaped fish. Along the Norwegian coast

from Lindesnes to the Russian border, fish farming is the biggest source of eutrophication in the

sea14. Increased knowledge and improved technology have contributed to fish farming constructions

are moved from inner fjords and bays to the open sea where the environmental conditions are

better, which reduces the problem with local eutrophication. However, the production of fish

farming has increased more than fivefold during the last two decades, with the impact of a significant

increase in emissions of nutrients to the sea.

The recent years there has been increasing focus on the challenges associated with escaped fish and

sea lice (Riksrevisjonen 2012). Escaped trout and salmon is seen as a significant threat for wild fish

stocks, both genetically and ecologically. The ecological impacts are related to competition about

food and spawning. In addition escaped fish may increase the risks for resurgence for deceases and

parasites. The genetic impact is that farmed salmon will live together with wild salmon, and thus

reduce the survival conditions for wild salmon. The sea lice is a problem because this parasite is living

on the salmon (of its blood, skin and mucus), which reduces the survival rates of the smaller salmon.

Sea lice has always been a part of the Norwegian fauna, but has increased because of the growth in

the aquaculture industry.

Fish farming requires a license. The process is authorized in the Aquaculture Act from 2006. The main

objective in the acts is to secure profitability to the industry in a sustainable way. A license is

dependent upon permission from a number of sector authorities (the Environmental Department at

14

Source: Norwegian Environment Agency (miljøstatus.no)

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the County Governor, the Food Safety Authority, the Norwegian Coastal Administration and the

Norwegian Water and Energy Directorate), in addition to the local municipalities. The government

reform from 2010 delegate the responsibility for giving licenses to fish farming from the Directorate

for fisheries to the County Councils. The County Council gives the final decision according to the

Aquaculture Act. The license period is 5 years, and environmental stipulations may be included in the

license.

Hydropower

Norway is one of the world’s ten leading producers of hydropower, ranking 6th in 201015.

Hydropower constitutes about 98 per cent of total electricity production in Norway, and about 70

per cent of Norwegian water courses are regulated for the production of electricity. Thus,

hydropower is the number one environmental human influence on the country’s aquatic

environment.

Environmental damages are caused by manipulation of natural water quantity levels for storage

purposes, drainage of river sections by the use of pipelines, the drying out of river deltas and

marchlands due to reduced discharge of water, and the artificial filling of water magazines. Such

drainage and water flow manipulation threaten the bio diversity, fish stocks and flora. However,

climate changes have triggered the demand for renewable energy resources. With the

implementation of the WFD, the dilemma of how to balance renewable energy production with the

protection of water eco systems and biological diversity is revived.

The Norwegian state holds several roles in the management of water resources. On the one side, the

state is the owner of production capacity and hydropower plants as well as and large parts of the

hydropower grid, and on the other side it is also the regulator and the licensing authority for

hydropower production16. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Energy Ministry) is responsible for

the energy policy and the energy system, including hydropower. Through this, the Ministry serve as

secretariat for the political leadership.

Two of the most important tasks in Norwegian hydropower management are the issuing of licenses

for new hydropower production and revision of terms (i.a environmental terms) set out in existing

licenses. Revisions imply a new assessment and changes in the legal terms and requirements set out

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International Energy Agency (2012): “Key World Energy Statistics”, IEA Publications 16

State responsibility for electricity transmission and ownership of the grid is managed through a state owned

enterprise called Statnett. The tasks as hydropower plant owner and an actor on the free energy market is

handled by a state owned company called Statkraft. The state’s ownership of Statkraft is managed by the

Ministry of Trade and Industry.

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in licenses, but not a revision of the license itself. Licensing and revision are two separate legal

procedures. In Norway, the licensing authorities for hydropower are the Parliament and the

Government, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the subordinate Norwegian Water Resources

and Energy Directorate (WRED). Other Ministries and subordinate agencies, like the Ministry of

Environment and the Norwegian Environment Agency, have important roles as advisors in the case

handling procedures, but they are not considered a part of the licensing authorities.

The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (WRED) is a subordinate regulatory agency

to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and is delegated the managing responsibility according to

the main acts regulating hydropower17. The WRED is also delegated the responsibility to issue

regulations and to make individual decisions and perform preparatory procedures of cases to be

resolved by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. Furthermore, it calculates the quota

arrangements for the energy market and is the supervisor of hydropower production.

The legal framework for licensing of new hydropower production and for revision of (environmental)

terms is rather comprehensive. Very simplified, there are four main legal processes: 1)The licensing

of new, large-scale hydropower production, 2) the licensing of new, small-scale hydropower

production (< 10MW), 3) the revision of terms set in existing hydropower licenses, and 4) the up-

grading or refurbishment of existing hydropower plants. These processes are pursuant to different

legal acts and follow separate legal procedures. While the WRED prepares and issues proposals for

1) and the Ministry gives advice upon a final Governmental approval, the WRED both prepares,

proposes and decides for cases under 2). As for the revision of terms set out in existing licenses, the

Ministry is the final decision-making-authority, while the WRED prepares the cases and makes the

proposals. Despite comprehensiveness in legal case-handling terms, we see that the much of the

case-handling and all the decision-making authority are kept within the sectoral, licensing authorities.

So, whereas the state’s general activities within hydropower is divided between two Ministries, two

state-owned companies and a regulatory agency at the subordinate state level, the regulation of

hydropower is kept within one rather integrated sector. However, there is some vertical division of

tasks between the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy and the WRED.

Although the Norwegian Water Regulation is implemented in pursuance of the Water Resources Act,

no legal adjustments were made in the existing regulatory framework for hydropower. This has led to

discussions whether the existing provision are sufficiently flexible in order to comply with the 6-years

planning cycles and the continuous adjustments to environmental norms that are required by the

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The Energy Act and the Water Resources Act. The WRED assists the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in managing the Industrial Licensing Act and the Act Relation to Regulations of Water courses

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WFD. One issue is the time-frames for licenses and revisions, which have been referred to as rather

rigid. Some of the old hydropower licenses are perpetual. For those, a revision of the terms set in the

licenses may be conducted every 50 years. Depending on when they were issued and according to

what law, revision of terms set out in licenses can be done every 50 or 30 years. For other time

frames, other stipulations apply.

5. REGULATORY DIFFERENTIATION

As is apparent from the brief exposition in the preceding section, the five sectors vary tremendously

in terms of their regulatory frameworks and institutional set-ups. This variation could potentially

affect the relative degree of goal achievement related to the WFD environmental aims. We will, in

short, argue that the potential for “vertical environmental policy integration” seems greater in some

sectors than others, due to apparent differences in environmental governability. Table 1 below

summarizes a few key features presented so far.

Table 1: Key features of regulatory frameworks for WFD relevant issues in five sectors

Legal mandate

Regulation of activity

Regulation of stressor

Nature of regulation

Regulator (location)

Predominant level of government

Aquaculture [Aquaculture Act]

License License terms

Flexible Mixed Regional

Industrial pollution

Pollution act - Pollution permit

Flexible Environ-mental adm.

National/ regional

Hydropower Water resource act

License License terms

Time-limited

Sector adm. National

Agriculture - - - Incentive-based

General-purpose gov.

Regional

Waste water

Planning and building act, pollution act

Local regulations

Local regulations, pollution act

Flexible General-purpose gov.

Municipal

Legal mandate refers to the legal instrument which mandates environmental regulation in each

sector. A few items of variation should be noted:

The absence of a legal mandate for regulatory intervention in agriculture should be noted.

Agriculture is exempted from the provisions in the Pollution act, and there is no “Agricultural

act” in existence to mandate coercive regulation.

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Since the Water regulation is not a law, it needs to be mandated by other laws. It should be

noted that the Water regulation is mandated in the Pollution act, the Water resource act and

in the Planning and building act, but not in the Aquaculture act.

It should also be noted that these laws take precedence over the Water regulation. The

implication is that the Water regulation does not give legal basis for interfering with

decisions made on the basis of other laws.

Regulation of activity and stressor refers to the instruments available for regulating the activity in

question and/or the associated stressors to the aquatic environment.

The absence of either in agriculture should be noted, as well as the difference between

Industrial pollution and Aquaculture/Hydropower.

There is no license as such for running an industrial plant, rather the object of regulation is

the environmental stressor (the pollution) itself. In Aquaculture/Hydropower, however, the

environmental stressor is regulated through the introduction of terms in a license which

otherwise has the activity itself as the object of regulation.

The nature of the regulation refers predominantly to the scope for regulatory intervention:

In agriculture, policy measures are predominantly incentive-based. The County governor may

issue binding regulations, but this instrument is seldom used.

Hydropower licenses are, as noted, time limited. This constitutes a major impediment to

regulation, because the license terms are not open to revision until the end of the time limit

– which may be as long as 50 years. This is very much in contrast to the scope for

intervention in the sectors of Industrial pollution and Waste water. The term “flexible”

implies that the regulator is very much at liberty to introduce new environmental demands

to the polluter.

As for the regulator’s location and level of government, there is also great variation:

Note that pollution permits are issued by an environmental authority whereas hydropower

permits are issued by a sectoral authority. Both reside predominantly at the national level,

and both are unitary, consolidated authorities – there are no formal powers of veto vested in

other agencies.

Note the role of general purpose governments in environmental regulation, especially in the

Agriculture and Waste water sectors. These are, moreover, located on the regional or local

levels.

16

It would probably be presumptuous to put forward highly specific assumptions concerning the

feasibility of achieving vertical environmental policy integration in each sector, based on these

differences. The direct implications of each variable seem tentative at best, and there is small

guidance in the literature on environmental regulation to support theoretical assumptions. On a

more general level, however, we would argue that the absence of legally binding regulatory

instruments in agriculture, as well as the prominence of incentive-based instruments, could provide

actors in this sector with an ability to contravene environmental demands set down in the Water

regulation. The high degree of regulatory “flexibility” in Industrial pollution and Waste water,

moreover, suggests that these sectors will allow environmental policy integration to a greater extent

than hydropower, due to the time limits set on revising the licenses.

We now turn to the empirical results. How do key actors in Norway’s WFD system assess the relative

degree of vertical and horizontal “environmental policy integration” of the various sectors? And to

what extent can these assessments be attributed to differences in the regulatory frameworks?

6. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SECTORS’ DIFFERENT REGULATRY FRAMEWORKS ON VERTICAL AND

HORIZONTAL POLICY INTEGRATION

The integration of the different sectors in the Norwegian system for WFD implementation is

perceived as more or less challenging by the involved actors. As shown in Figure 2 below, the River

Basin District Board members report that it is more difficult to reach agreements regarding fish

farming, hydropower and agriculture, than regarding pollution and waste water. An obvious

explanation to this variation is that the responsible regulators of pollution and waste water is the

environmental authorities at central and local government level, while the sector authorities are

responsible for the regulations within the other sectors. As such, our finding supports the

observation made by Jansen and Mydske (1998) that the Ministry of environment has been most

successful on areas where the Ministry itself controls the policy instruments.

17

Figure 2. It is very difficult/ difficult to reach agreement on the following subject/sectors (Percentage,

survey to the participants in the River Basin District Boards, N=301)

While the environmental authorities share the goal of ecological good water status, the sector policy

goal guiding the activity of fish farming, hydropower and agriculture authorities will compete, and

some time may be contradict, the environmental goal of water management. The results reported in

Figure x (above) can be interpreted as a very coarse indicator of vertical environmental policy

integration (VEPI). The institutional frameworks of the sectors elaborated in part 4 and 5 above

define important conditions for the degree of VEPI.

Within agriculture, there is a dominant perception of goal conflicts between water and agriculture

policies. Particularly the combination of fulfilling the sector policy goal of increased food production

and the perceived WFD goal of zero pollution is understood to be impossible. “(….) there are limits to

how much we can impose on agriculture and still expect an increase in food production” (County

governor’s agriculture agency).

Furthermore, central paradigms of agriculture policy which are obstructing implementation of the

goal of ecological good water status is not questioned or discussed. This is true both regarding the

channeling policy of distribution of production forms across the country and the principle of

voluntary based instruments. As a representative of a farmer’s organization expressed with reference

to the process of formulating the regional environment programs:

“(…) you are sort of checkmate before starting, because there is the white paper (on

agriculture policy) which set the guidelines for how farming should be in Norway. This white

paper defines a tool kit and presupposes continuation of the so called channeling policy: The

30

25 24

17 16 15

11

23 23 26

11 12 12 10

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

River Basin District

Sub District

18

lowlands shall have a monoculture of grain, and the livestock districts shall keep the number

of domestic animals”.

The local and regional incentive schemes are adjusted to the WFD-implementation, as the grants

targeting to reduce discharges of nutrients are increased in counties facing huge problems of

eutrophication. Considerations regarding distributional effects on farmers’ income are effectively

limiting both the size of the reward for environmental friendly farming and the use of legal

instruments regulating the farming in catchment areas facing severe problems. The corporatist

nature of the policy field probably makes policy change and innovations harder to achieve. The policy

formulation processes is dominated by sector actors (representing both government and farmers),

actors representing other interests and perspectives are kept outside. The environmental

considerations and goals stays subordinated the considerations and goals of the sector policy,

resulting in a restricted VEPI.

We find a much higher degree of VEPI in the waste water sector, which is no surprise since the sector

is sharing the WDF goal of good ecological status in water bodies. The implementation of the WFD is

to a large extent perceived as a continuation of the existing sector policy. The representatives of the

sector do not see any conflict between the sector and the water management system. The

management plan of the pilot areas and the WDF-work in general is used to defend the existing

practice, if members of the target group do question the requirements: “… we use it (the WFD) for all

it is worth” (waste water manager at municipal level).

There are, however, also examples where the WFD-processes influence policy and practice of local

municipalities. Within the pilot river basins, we find examples where the WFD has trigged local waste

water regulations or revisions in existing regulations, imposing stricter demands regarding waste

water treatment in sparsely populated areas. There are also examples of minor adjustments of waste

water investment plans, such as changes in pace as well as in prioritizing among settlements. The

waste water sector is a sector with a unitary regulator managing sufficient and flexible regulations,

which seem to have incorporated the goals and rationales of the WFD into its policymaking and

practice. Even though agriculture represent a more important stressor to the aquatic environment

than waste water, efforts to handle eutrophication is mainly put on waste water. As expressed by a

coordinator of the local WDF-work in one municipality:

“… we do still lack the opportunity to do anything with the agriculture, as long as the state do

not put in requirements in the agricultural settlement (negotiations with the farmers

organizations) …… Regarding waste water from sparsely populated areas, there we have laws

and regulations making it possible for us to do something”.

19

These observations correspond to the analysis of Wang Andersen (Kart og Plan 2013, forthcoming),

who identifies specific legal areas where the Norwegian regulatory framework is insufficiently

adapted in order to secure a legal fulfillment of the environmental quality norms of the WFD.

The WFD (and the Norwegian water regulation) requires that deterioration of the aquatic

environment must be prevented for both ongoing and new activities. According to Wang Andersen

(2013), the no-deterioration requirement18 of the WFD is applied differently by the regulatory

agencies. While the pollution authorities apply the no-deterioration requirement as material limits

for the licensing of discharges in each case, the hydropower authorities seem to have incorporated a

general referral to “the exemption provision in the Norwegian water regulation §12”, without stating

the specific assessments that were made in each case. Whereas the WFD also apply for coastal

waters, the approximation of the WFD into Norwegian law did not make the WFD explicitly pursuant

to the Aquaculture Act. Thus, the aquaculture authorities do not seem to apply the provisions of the

WFD at all in their individual case handling i.a of licenses. Doing so would imply “a legal shortcircuit”

according to an official of the Norwegian Costal and Fisheries Ministry, since it is the Aquaculture Act

that is set to guide the case handling of new licenses (Interview 04.02.2013).

Furthermore, different application of the alteration provisions is evident. In order to comply with the

WFD objectives of “good ecological” or “good chemical” status, it can be necessary to alter the

environmental terms set out in existing licenses that permits activity. In Norway, the provisions for

altering such environmental terms are found in the respective sectoral legal acts. These were all

issued before the WFD was adopted. Wang Andersen (2013) questions whether both the Pollution

Control Act and the water regulation acts sufficiently take into account the environmental objectives

of the WFD and argue that adaptation of the national provisions is probably needed. The lack of

adjustment of the existing regulatory framework and the rigid case-handling procedures has been

particularly evident for the revision of environmental terms of hydropower licenses. This has led to a

complaint to the EFTA Surveillance Authority, as explained in section 4 on hydropower.

Diverse or lacking adaptation of the existing regulatory framework may lead to shortages as to

ensure a coherent application of the environmental objectives of the WFD, due to a noncompliant,

fragmented regulatory framework, in other words lacking VEPI. Incoherent application of the WFD

environmental objectives involves a breach of Article 3 § 4 of the WFD, stating that “Member States

shall ensure that the requirements of this Directive for the achievement of the environmental

objectives established under Article 4, and in particular all programs of measures , are coordinated

18

This means that new activity may well be permitted as long as it doesn’t cause any deterioration of the respective water body. If deterioration is expected, exemptions can be made pursuant to art. 4 §7 of the WFD

20

for the whole of the river basin district (our italic). In other words may shortages in the Vertical Policy

Integration of the sectors cause shortages in the Horizontal Policy Integration required by the

directive.

As we have presented above, the legal regime established in Norway to change terms and conditions

in permits is not designed to ensure compliance with environmental objectives. Secondly, the

"Norwegian Water Regulation» might fall short as to ensure a consistent application of the

environmental objectives by the different administrative bodies (Andersen 2013). In addition, the

institutional set-up of the different administrative bodies regulating pressures on water, as well as

their instruments at hand, varies. This affects their ability to effectively regulate the pressures on the

ecological status of water. In addition, our studies have revealed that there are differences in the will

to address these questions in the different sector administrative bodies, which results in different

degree of vertical environmental policy integration (VEPI) in different sectors. The lowest degree of

VEPI is found in fish farming, hydropower and agriculture.

Nevertheless, our studies also show that the network arenas established to implement the EU Water

framework Directive in Norway, especially the cross-sector and multi-level arenas of the River Basin

District Boards and the Sub-District Boards, have resulted in a certain degree of horizontal

environmental policy integration (HEPI).

We have asked the participants of the River Basin District Boards, which consist of sector

administrative bodies (regional state authorities), county municipalities and municipalities, about

how they evaluate the usefulness of catchment area as an organizing principle, and of the

management plan as a coordinating instrument of different sector interests (including environmental

interests). The figure below shows the results.

21

Figure 3. Percentages that agree on the following statements (Survey to the participants in the River

Basin District Boards, N=301).

The figure shows that the majority of the participants find the use of catchment area as organizing

principle to give a more comprehensive approach to water management. Here, participants

representing the county municipalities are the ones that agree the most, but also three of four of the

participants from municipalities and regional state authorities do agree.

When it comes to the question of how effective the management plans for each River basin district is,

or will be, as an instrument for coordinating different interest (environmental interests versus

interests that represent pressure on good ecological water status), a majority of the participants are

positive. Here the county municipalities are more reluctant, and this might be explained by the fact

that they are responsible for the planning process and are more aware of the challenges ahead.

Thus, these results might be interpreted as that the new water management system has resulted in a

certain level of horizontal environmental policy integration (HEPI). The interviews reveal that the

new water management system – with its network arenas, function primarily as arenas for

information and knowledge-sharing. This is presented as a major improvement, compared to the

earlier situation with sectors/ silos without meeting points. As a municipal representative

commented;

”The best thing about the EU Water Framework Directive is that we now have a joint system.

We now have common concepts, and every aspects of water management are – to a certain

degree – coordinated and discussed. And, not at least, we get to know each other (across

sectors)” (representative from a municipal agriculture authority)

73 73

82

65

75 78

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Catchment areas/river basins give a more comprehensive

approach to water management

The managment plan is/ will be a useful instrument for

coordination

Municipality

County Municipality

Regional State Authority

22

”It is very informative to be at the same arena as waste water, hydropower, transport, fish

interests. The information that is shared here contributes to mutual understanding among us

in these different sectors. We also understand that we face different challenges. And it is

useful for us that others question our way of doing things; it increases our consciousness and

sharpens us” (Representative from the agricultural authority within the County Governor)

However, as the earlier discussions have revealed, there are reason to question if the Norwegian

implementation of the EU Water framework directive is harmonized with the existing legal regime in

Norway and the politically decided aims of each of the sectors. Both the existing legal regime, the

fragmented system of water management, and the varying institutional set-up and instruments of

the sector authorities in Norway – represent severe challenges.

When asking the participants of the River Basin District Boards about this, we got a strong impression

that the aims and instruments of the EUs water Framework Directive are not in themselves

sufficiently strong to curb strong sector interests that represent pressure on the ecological status on

water. Even if many of actors find the new water management system – with its network arenas – as

useful constructions, many of them are doubtful that this is enough. This is clearly an impression

from the survey, where the figure below shows how the participants assess the new water

management system.

Figure 4. Percentages that agree on the following statements (Survey to the participants in the River

Basin District Boards, N=301)

57

39

61

45 41 38

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

The current water management system is adequate/functional

to acheive good ecological status

Water policy is still formulated on the sectors' terms

Municipality

County Municipality

Regional State Authority

23

The figure shows that much lower percentages of the different respondent groups – compared to the

questions in the figure above, consider the current water management system to be adequate to

achieve good ecological status. In the interviews the participants explain this by the lack of

coherence, and lack of will to curb strong sector interests – especially hydropower, agriculture and

fish farming. The second question in the figure strengthen this impression, as around 40 percentage

of all the respondent groups report that water policy is still formulate on the terms of the different

sector interests. This indicate that the coordination achieved at the arenas of the new water

management system is suitable for mutual learning and raising awareness, as reported above, but

have few ‘muscles’ to clarify hard sector conflicts. As one of the informants representing the County

governor expressed,

“everyone knows that it is impossible to get things done in such [network] arenas.. There is so

much hard work to be done in implementing the WFD that it does not work with committees,

- people sitting and chatting two hours every third month” (Representative of the County

Governor).

Similar findings are reported in the policy-field of climate change adaptation (Winsvold et al, Hanssen

et al, 2013, forthcoming).

In addition to the lack of fully harmonizing the WDF with Norwegian Law, as has been discussed

above, the problem also seems to be conflicting politically decided goals. These goal-conflicts are

most evident between the Water Regulation (implementing the WDF in the Norwegian legal regime)

and the sectors of hydropower, agriculture and fish farming. For example, representatives from

agricultural authorities and interest organizations stress that agriculture never will be able to be a

zero-polluter, as long as they also are expected to produce food. Lack of national prioritizing between

these conflicting goals and interest are reducing the ability of River Basin District Boards to be

effective arenas. As one representative of the County governor (regional state authority) comments;

“One of the huge problems with the Water regulation is that things (interest conflicts) are not

settled at national level” (County governor).

Some of the informants contend that the agricultural sector has been let off easy in terms of footing

their part of the bill for averting eutrophication from diffuse sources, and feel that this is in conflict

with the principle of WFD of prioritizing the most cost-efficiency measures (this is also reported in

Norwegian Water 2009, Magnussen og Holen 2011a:38-9). This affects the possibility to achieve the

overall goal of good ecological status. As a municipality comment;

24

‘Of course the waste-water and sewage-sector has to take action, but the main challenges

remain within the agricultural sector. The contemporary practices in agriculture cannot be

reconciled with the goals in the Water regulation, regardless of how much that is invested in

the waste-water and sewage-sector” (Norwegian water 2011:47).

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Pending the availability of hard data to assess each sector’s relative contribution to WFD goal

achievement, the observations and contentions made by the informants possibly provide the best

picture of the present situation currently available. While this picture is not unequivocally bleak in

terms of the feasibility of achieving environmental policy integration, it does give grounds for

concern regarding Norway’s potential for achieving the WFD’s aims. Institutional and regulatory

issues seem to be a significant factor in this regard.

Issues to do with the aquatic environment have the potential to set off potent conflicts of interest.

The reason for this is very straight-forward: Large sums of money are at stake, as well as export

revenues, employment, renewable energy production, to mention a few issues. It is no big surprise if

some business actors as well as public authorities are less than enthusiastic about implementing

environmental measures that go directly against the basic aims of their particular sector. The analysis

in the present paper indicates, however, that this kind of situation seems to require a system of

governance which is a great deal more consistent and authoritative than is the case today. Legal

inconsistencies seem to provide “loopholes” for shirking environmental demands. The fact that the

Water regulation is subordinate to the laws mandating the measures, that the Aquaculture act does

not mandate the Water regulation and that §12 in the Water regulation is used somewhat

indiscriminately by the hydropower authorities suggests that conflicts of interest need to be

addressed with a more consistent and unambiguous legal framework than the one currently in place.

Furthermore, the use of a network-like system of “voluntary” coordination may prove less than ideal

in a situation where a number of actors are motivated to shy away from the most costly measures.

Such a course of action would, furthermore, seem to be especially tempting in a sector marked by

absence of binding regulation – agriculture. It has become conventional wisdom that municipalities

carry a disproportionate part of the costs related to diffuse source nutritient leakage, and the

incentive-based system of regulation in agriculture probably has a lot to do with this.

This is not to say that environmental aims are not taken into account by decision-makers in the

aquaculture, hydropower and agriculture sectors, but it remains an open issue to what extent this

can be attributed to the system for “horizontal” environmental policy integration – the River basin

25

districts and the sub-districts. For the time being, their most important functions seem to be one of

deliberation and knowledge sharing, to a lesser extent mutually binding and enforceable

agreements. The regional coordinators – the county governments – are probably (and quite

paradoxically) the least powerful actors in the entire system, in the sense that they hold very limited

formal powers over the measures that have to be implemented. As long as regulatory power largely

remains sectorized, the question is whether this is sufficient to achieve the aims laid down in the

WFD.

[To be elaborated]

26

References

[To be provided in second draft]