The Captain in Aragonese Sicily: An official with a Composite NatureARAGONESE SICILY AS A MODEL OF LATE MEDIEVAL STATE BUILDING
Fabrizio Titone*
Abstract: This article illuminates the role played by Sicilian cities in state building in the late Middle Ages through their involvement in the intense process of negotiations between the king and his subjects. This study heads in the opposite direction of the interpretations that negate the existence of municipal freedom and allege the existence of an exclusively top-down model of power relationships between king and king- dom. The focus is on one of the main royal officials in local government—the capitaneus or captain, who was intended to be the king’s instrument of control. The captain gradually came to represent the municipal will and his role was defined by decision-making interaction between the king and local governments. The dynamics surrounding the captaincy go well beyond the local sphere and will lead us to address the positive effects of the encounter of various political traditions in the Crown of Aragon. This in turn, made the estab- lishment of new political balances possible, which had a crucial role in government building in Sicily. Keywords: Sicily, Italian Mezzogiorno, Crown of Aragon, municipal freedom, captain, high justice, pactism, Martin I, Alphonso V, royal demesne, alienations.
INTRODUCTION Late medieval Sicily has long been seen as the Italian backwater. The historiographic debate has been dominated by a standard interpretation maintaining that in the late Middle Ages the baronage was the only sector able to stand up to and act as a check on the Crown’s activities so that it was impossible for the municipal sector to de- velop.1 Recently it has been suggested again that the modern backwardness of the Ital- ian Mezzogiorno or southern Italy dates back to medieval times and that beginning in the twelfth century, and more clearly in the following centuries under Aragonese rule (1282) onward, the establishment of a feudal monarchy rendered the population of the south mere subjects rather than citizens. The monarchy in the south put down any form of municipal participation.2
* Universidad del País Vasco. Facultad de Letras. Paseo de la Universidad 5. 01106 Vitoria. Spain. An ear- lier version of this paper was read at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. I thank Joce- lyn Hillgarth, and Nicholas Terpstra. I am particularly grateful to Barbara Rosenwein and Julius Kirshner for their critical suggestions. The following abbreviations are used: R.C.: Palermo, Archivio di Stato, Real Cancelleria; Cancillería: Barcelona, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Cancillería, Registros; P. R.: Palermo, Archivio di Stato, Protonotaro del Regno. The unit of currency in medieval Sicily was the onza which corre- sponded to 30 tarì. A tarì was worth 20 grani and a grano was equivalent to 6 denari.
1 The origins of this theory, especially in relation to the role of the barons, can be retraced to an interpretation by Rosario Gregorio (1805) which was maintained in later studies. See R. Gregorio, Consi- derazioni sopra la storia di Sicilia dai tempi normanni sino ai presenti, 3 vols. (Palermo 1972). Among the most recent studies, I shall limit myself to H. Bresc, Un monde méditerranéen: Économie et société en Si- cilie 1300–1450, 2 vols. (Rome-Palermo 1986). For a critical analysis of the development of this historio- graphic interpretation, see S. R. Epstein, An island for itself. Economic development and social change in late medieval Sicily (Cambridge 1992) 1–23; and for a more general analysis, Rappresentazioni e immagini della Sicilia tra storia e storiografia. Atti del convegno di studi, ed. F. Benigno and C. Torrisi (Caltanissetta 2003).
2 R. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 1993) 121–137, in particular, for the medieval period. For distinct analyses critical of Putnam’s study, see G. Brucker, “Civic traditions in premodern Italy,” Patterns of social capital. Stability and change in historical perspec- tive, ed. R. I. Rotberg (Cambridge 2001) 19–40; and E. Muir, “The sources of civil society in Italy,” ibid. 41–68. See also D. Abulafia, “Signorial Power in Aragonese Southern Italy,” Sociability and Its Discon- tents: Civil Society, Social Capital, and Their Alternatives in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. N. Eckstein and N. Terpstra (Turnhout 2009) 173–192. Brucker’s study is traditional in regard to references
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Attention must also be called to the rise of interpretative hypotheses diametrically opposed to the studies cited above.3 Stephan Epstein lucidly disproved the theory of the backwardness of the Sicilian economy and its subordination to northern economy in medieval times.4 In reference to Sicilian urban institutions and society, common elements shared with other lands of the Crown have been pointed out and a picture has been put together of the very broad degree of autonomy enjoyed by cities that were political subjects capable of interacting with the Crown and offsetting the power of the barons.5
In a recent wide-ranging synthesis, John Watts concludes that governmental and political growth in late medieval Europe underwent a process of political integration spurred by pressure from the bottom up and top down.6 Building on the revisionist view of Sicily’s urban vitality and on Watts’s model, this paper will illuminate the role played by cities in the state building process in the late Middle Ages through their in- volvement in the intense process of negotiations between the king and his subjects. The objective is to underscore the pivotal role of the urban environment in affairs of the kingdom. This central role is undeniably confirmed by a gradual increase in lee- way accorded to undertakings of municipal governments, which paralleled a some- times sizable restructuring of areas open to royal intervention. This study leads in the opposite direction of those interpretations negating the existence of municipal freedom and alleging the existence of an exclusively top-down model of power relationships between king and kingdom.
The focus will be on one of the main royal officials in local government—the capi- taneus or captain. In order to delineate the boundaries and balances of power between king and local governments, the methods for appointing the captain and the areas un- der the purview of this official, who was intended to be the king’s instrument of con- trol, will be examined. We shall see that only at certain times was he a magistrate who constituted an effective restraint on the communities’ constant efforts to advance their prerogatives and he limited municipal autonomy only in well-circumscribed instances. Indeed, the captain gradually came to represent the municipal will and the relative bal- ance of alignments in local government, and his role was defined by decision-making interaction between the king and local governments rather than pressure from a higher level. It will be shown how royal intervention at the local level was not imposed from the top down but rather was negotiated in conjunction with forces and interests at a lower level. A total of 358 appointments to the captaincy in thirteen urban communi-
to Sicily; he stresses that surveillance was present in a republican reality, i.e., under the Medici rule of Flor- ence, and the feudal government of Piedmont and Sicily.
3 For an important revision of the interpretation claiming that the Norman conquest did not allow self- governance in the cities, see P. Oldfield, City and community in Norman Italy (Cambridge 2009), who ar- gues for the presence of civic consciousness and municipal participation under the Normans, focusing on Campania and Apulia.
4 Epstein, Island (n. 1 above). 5 F. Titone, Governments of the universitates: Urban communities of Sicily in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries (Turnhout 2009). 6 J. Watts, The making of Polities: Europe, 1300–1500 (Cambridge 2009).
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ties have been taken into consideration in this study which mainly involves a time span covering the reigns of Martin I (1392–1409) and Alphonso V (1416–1458).7
These two reigns are focused on for the following reasons. It was not until the 1360s that the captain became a local official in every community and, due to a sig- nificant lack of documentation for the 1370s and 1380s—which will be explained shortly—a solid body of primary sources regarding this office commences starting with the reign of Martin I. In addition, special attention is given to the reign of Al- phonso V, because during his time the Crown of Aragon’s policy of territorial con- quest led to a considerable increase in the Crown’s financial needs. Alphonso identi- fied new sources of income in ceding property belonging to the royal demesne, in- cluding the captain’s office. This strategy had important repercussions, giving the communities greater autonomy.
The dynamics surrounding the captaincy go well beyond the local sphere and will lead us to address the positive effects of the encounter of various political traditions in the Crown of Aragon. This in turn, made possible the establishment of new political balances having a crucial role in the high degree of municipal freedom and, more gen- erally in government building in Sicily. The coronation of Peter III of Aragon as king of Sicily, which followed the revolt of the Vespers begun in Palermo on 31 March 1282, placed Sicily in a new international position and spurred an encounter with the other lands of the Crown of Aragon, bringing about a considerable exchange of di- verse cultural traditions.8 The Principality of Catalonia is probably the land within the Crown of Aragon that most significantly exported its own cultural models, in particu- lar, a relationship between the king and his subjects commonly defined as “pactism” in which not all decisions were made unilaterally.9 The term pactism indicates a contrac-
7 Agrigento, Catania, Corleone, Nicosia, Noto, Patti, Piazza, Polizzi, Randazzo, Salemi, Sciacca, Ter-
mini, and Trapani. Despite the fact that the captaincy serves as a fundamental interpretive framework for understanding the relative balance of power between the central government and urban communities, it has received little attention in historiographical debate. Only one study specific study has been made: P. Sar- dina, “Il Capitanato di Agrigento dai Chiaromonte alla morte di Alfonso V (1355–1458),” Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo 109 (2007) 271–327. On the captain’s role, see also B. Pasciuta, In Regia Curia civiliter convenire: Giustizia e città nella Sicilia tardomedievale (Turin 2003) 54– 60, which draws general conclusions based on data related almost exclusively to the city of Palermo.
8 Before the conquest of Sicily, Mallorca and Valencia had been conquered in 1231 and 1238, respec- tively. On the Aragonese Crown, see J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish kingdoms 1250–1516, 2 vols. (Oxford 1976–1978). See also the overview by T. N. Bisson, The Medieval crown of Aragon: A Short History (Ox- ford 1986). For the Vespers, see I. Peri, La Sicilia dopo il Vespro: Uomini, città e campagne, 1282/1376 (Rome 1990) 1–16.
9 The pactist political system has stimulated contrasting interpretations. For an interpretation according to which pactism limited royal power, see J. Sobrequés Callicó, El pactisme a Catalunya: Una praxi polí- tica en la història del país (Barcelona 1982) See also Juan Vallet de Goytisolo, Valor jurìdico de las leyes paccionadas en el principato de Cataluña, in El pactismo en la historia de España, Simposio del 24–26 aprile 1978 (Madrid 1980) 75–110; and L. M. Sánchez Aragonés, Cortes, monarquía y ciudades en Aragón, durante el reinado de Alfonso el Magnánimo (1416–1458) (Saragossa 1994) 20–31. J. L. Martin, Economía y sociedad en los reinos hispánicos de la Baja Edad Media, 2 vols. (Barcelona 1983) 1.239–245, sees pactist constitutionalism as originating from a phase of monarchical weakness and as a limitation of royal power. For Sicily, F. Benigno, “La questione della capitale: lotta politica e rappresentanza degli interessi nella Sicilia del Seicento,” Società e Storia 47 (1990) 27–29, maintains that the king was bound to the pacts and concessions granted. See also M. Caravale, “Potestà regia e giurisdizione feudale nella dottrina giu- ridica siciliana tra ‘500 e ‘600,” Annali dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per l’Età Moderna e Contemporanea 29–30 (1977–1978) 139–178. For a contrasting interpretation, according to which there was no limitation whatsoever of royal power, see J. A. Maravall, Stato moderno e mentalità sociale (Bologna 1991) 347–351;
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tual type of relationship, the main feature of which is traditionally identified with par- liamentary activity according a contribution (donativum) in exchange for the king’s approval of parliamentary requests. Given that these contractual relations constituted a political procedure binding the king with respect to his concessions because they were the result of bargaining, parliament was not the only site where such procedures took place and similar arrangements took on differing forms in other settings.10 Politics based on negotiations had a decisive impact on the stabilization of royal power and royal coordination of the different lands under the Crown of Aragon where political unity was achieved through personal union rather than the incorporation of conquered territories.11 The personal union consisted in the subordination of conquered lands un- der one king while each land retained its judicial autonomy.
The Sicilian kingdom is not a fully recognized case in point of pactism. Indeed, in- tense negotiations of an essentially pactist type can be identified in various stages of the transactions between the king and his subjects. A type of governance by the king based on shared decision-making rather than being one-sided is already discernible in the fourteenth century, especially during the reign of Frederick III (1296–1337), and was particularly evident during the first half of the fifteenth. The urban environment, which experienced a gradual expansion of the role played by cities of the royal de- mesne in the kingdom’s internal power relations after 1282, provides a useful context for understanding this approach to governance.12 The pivotal position of demesne cit- ies is borne out by the complex organizational structures that existed for officials holding elective offices in local government, the ample leeway and autonomy of cities
and esp. A. Iglesia Ferreirós, La creación del derecho: Una historia de la formación de un derecho estatal español, 2 vols. (Madrid 1996) 2.67–130. See also A. Iglesia Ferreirós, “Del pactismo y de otra forma de escribir la historia,” Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, Homenaje a Francisco Tomás y Valiente 67 (1997) 643–659.
10 On the different medieval practices corresponding to a form of negotiation, see M. T. Ferrer Mallol et al., “Negociar en la edad media: Négocier au Moyen Âge,” Actas del Coloquio celebrado en Barcelona 14– 16 octubre 2004, Actes du Colloque tenu à Barcelona 14–16 octobre 2004 (Barcelona 2005).
11 With regard to the personal union, see L. G. de Valdeavellano, Curso de historia de las instituciones politicas españolas de los origines al final de la Edad Media (Madrid 1968) 412; and, in particular, C. Giardina, “Unione personale o unione reale fra Sicilia e Aragona e fra Sicilia e Napoli durante il regno di Alfonso il Magnanimo?” Atti del congresso internazionale di studi sull’età aragonese (Bari 1972) 191–225.
12 Sicily was not always an integral part of the Crown of Aragon. In 1295, James II, king of Aragon and Sicily, fostered an agreement with the papacy that was to return Sicily to the Angevins. Frederick, in oppo- sition to the policy of his brother, James II, was elected rex Trinacriae by the Parliament of Catania in 1296. Sicily thus acquired full autonomy from Barcelona which would however be lost: in 1409 Martin I, king of Sicily, died and the Sicilian throne passed to Martin, king of Aragon. Martin of Aragon died in 1410, and in 1412 Ferdinand I of the Castilian house of Trastámara was elected as king of Aragon, The election of Ferdi- nand resulted in a gradual institutional transformation of Sicily from kingdom to vice kingdom. With regard to the Ferdinand’s election, see Hillgarth, Spanish (n. 8 above) 2.229–238. The election of Frederick III did not interrupt the dynastic ties with the reigning house of Barcelona, the Iberian nobility’s economic con- cerns in Sicily, and the spread of the same political procedures. A statement of Blasco I Alagona, one of the main Iberian nobles in favour of the Sicilian conquest, is revealing in this regard. Blasco I hailed the coro- nation of Frederick III, claiming that through Frederick the Aragonese and Catalan institutions and customs would be transplanted in Sicily, and that his government therefore would favour the Iberian nobility. See V. D’Alessandro, Politica e società nella Sicilia aragonese (Palermo 1963) 51. Participating in the Catanese Parliament which proclaimed Frederick III king of Sicily were members of the new Aragonese and Catalan political class: this suggest that the election of 1296 did not sanction a break between the two reigns but ra- ther maintained a dialogue. See S. Tramontana, Il mezzogiorno medievale: Normanni, svevi, angioini, ara- gonesi nei secoli XI–XV (Rome 2000)106.
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in local matters, and the impressive systems of rights and privileges they held as a re- sult of the practice of negotiation between cities and the king. In this regard, municipal petitions, which ensured a direct confrontation between the cities and the king or his representative, furnish some of the most emblematic proof of the impact of negotia- tions in late medieval Sicily. Put differently, as will be illustrated through the analysis of the captain, cities became major participants in the process of consolidating or broadening the system of their rights and privileges.
FROM JUSTICIAR TO CAPTAIN: THE RISE OF A LOCAL MAGISTRACY
It is not easy to attempt an identification of the constants in a study of urban societies and institutions. There are so many variations that, along with those between individ- ual localities, numerous temporal and spatial distinctions are also necessary. Likewise, it appears difficult to reconstruct a portrait of the captain whose prerogatives placed him in a prominent position in government. Generally speaking, he was an official present in the universitates (communities) who presided over a court (Curia capitanei) having original jurisdiction over criminal cases. Such a definition is valid for specific periods and susceptible to numerous refinements in conjunction with shifts in power relations between the cities of the kingdom after the Aragonese conquest in 1282 and, in particular, from the late 1300s onwards.13 The captain’s operations were not ini- tially limited to the urban level. He normally dealt with high justice but he sometimes acted in other fields as well or even had his duties curtailed. Lastly, the captain was normally appointed by the king but municipal governments often played a part in his selection during the reign of Alphonso V and sometimes even appointed him directly. It is for these reasons that, beginning in the second half of Alphonso’s reign, the cap- tain became an official with a composite nature: the position was normally a royal ap- pointment but the captain was chosen in many instances on the basis of indications from local leaders or appointed directly by the cities themselves.14 Previously, the mu- nicipal governments were in charge of each area of the administration but were ex- cluded from any influence on high justice. During the reign of Alphonso V the univer- sitates extended their control even into this area, traditionally controlled solely by royal officials.15
Both the convergence of numerous interests and a growing state of tension sur- rounding the captaincy make it necessary to separate the analysis of the office into dif- ferent stages. The role of the captain which emerges clearly during the reigns of Mar- tin I and Alphonso V, i.e., the period under consideration in this study, is one which reflects an approach to relations between the king and his subjects that differed in many ways from what had taken place in previous years.
13 Regarding changes made by the Aragonese in relations between the king and his subjects, see Be-
nigno, “La questione della capitale” (n. 9 above) 27–64. 14 In examining the means used for selecting a municipal official, reference is made here to the notion of
“composite” as traditionally used to indicate the existence of multiple subjects participating in the function- ing and construction of the state. See J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past & Present 137 (1992) 48–71; and M. Gentile, “Leviatano regionale o forma-stato composita? Sugli usi possibili di idee vecchie e nuove,” Società e Storia 88 (2000) 91–103.
15 Titone, Governments (n. 5 above).
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In the earlier Norman period, jurisdiction over criminal affairs was assigned to the justiciars of the two large districts which covered the entire island and were situated on either side of the Salso River.16 As early as 1282, however, they began to operate in smaller jurisdictions. Indeed, there were multiple justiciarates in both the eastern and western parts of the island as well as justiciars assigned, albeit sporadically, to mu- nicipalities, and these justiciars were also sometimes referred to as captains from this point onwards.17 Justiciarates were not immediately abandoned: they were phased out gradually by being broken up into increasingly circumscribed areas of jurisdiction. Four districts, not including the cities of Palermo and Messina, existed according to what Frederick III (1296–1337) stipulated in 1296.18 Within just a few years, a greater number of districts had already been recorded, some of which coincided with a de- mesne city—an overlap institutionalized by the dual title of captain and justiciar.19 Eventually, from the 1350s, the number was reduced until the districts ultimately cor- responded to urban centers: jurisdictional authority at first instance in criminal matters passed entirely into the hands of captains whose sphere of activity specifically re- garded the urban front (although the title of justiciar was still sometimes used).20
The position was officially conferred by a grant of jurisdiction over criminal law. The duration of the term of office was not specified for the earliest appointments 21 but it gradually came to be fixed for the length of an administrative year (annum indic- tionis) lasting from 1 September to 31 August. Taking office, according to a document from the 1400s, entailed passing the official symbol of office—the virga (rod)—from the outgoing magistrate to the newcomer.22
16 See P. Colliva, Ricerche sul principio di legalità nell’amministrazione del Regno di Sicilia al tempo di Federico II: gli organi centrali e regionali (Milan 1964) 153; and T. Pedio, “I giustizierati provinciali nel regno di Sicilia in età federiciana,” Atti delle IV giornate federiciane Oria 29–30 ottobre 1977 (Bari 1980) 163–179.
17 Caro di Palmerio, justiciar of Palermo; Natale Ansalone, justiciar of the vallo di Castrogiovanni, Demone, and Milazzo; Bonifacio Camarano, justiciar of the val di Noto; Ruggero Mastrangelo, justiciar of the duchy of Geraci and the partes of Cefalù; Berardo Ferro, justiciar of the vallo di Agrigento; and Ugo Tallac, justiciar of the val di Mazara. See De Rebus Regni Siciliane. Documenti inediti estratti dall’Archivio della Corona d’Aragona, 2 vols. (1882; repr. Palermo 1982) (references will be to the repr.) 1.128–129, 1282. There may also have been captains in Palermo, Assise e consuetudini della terra di Corleone, ed. R. Starrabba and L. Tirrito (Palermo 1880) 130–131, 1282; in Messina, De Rebus 1.321, 1283; and in Taormina, ibid. 1.43, 1282. See also P. Corrao and V. D’Alessandro, “Geografia amministrativa e potere sul territorio nella Sicilia tardomedievale (secoli XIII–XIV)” L’organizzazione del territorio in Italia e in Ger- mania: secoli XIII–XIV, ed. G. Chittolini and D. Willowet (Bologna 1994) 418–419.
18 Capitula regni Siciliae, cap. VII, ed. F. M. Testa, 2 vols. (Palermo 1741) 1.51. 19 Justiciar of Agrigento and the partes of Termini and Cefalù, justiciar and captain of Trapani; see Acta
Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi 3, ed. L. Citarda (Palermo 1984) 25–26, 1323; and 124–125, 1326. A master justiciar, the highest-ranking official of the central judiciary, remained at the royal curia however; see Peri, Sicilia (n. 8 above) 25.
20 Justiciar, or justiciar and captain, of Palermo; Acta Curie Felicis Urbis Panormi 8, ed. A. Massa and C. Bilello (Palermo 1993) 104, 357, 1349. Aside from any considerations related to the areas over which they held jurisdiction, a captain’s powers were more restricted during the Aragonese period than those of the justiciars prior to the arrival of the Aragonese: besides jurisdiction over penal matters, earlier justiciars were charged with overseeing certain aspects of urban life and also had the task of collecting the collette (royal hearth taxes) and other royal taxes in their districts. For the Swabian period, see Pedio, “I giustizierati” (n. 16 above) 174–176.
21 For examples, see G. Cosentino, Codice diplomatico di Federico III d’Aragona re di Sicilia (Palermo 1866) 10, 1355 (Savoca, Caltanissetta, and Caltavuturo); 15, 1355 (Giuliana); 127, 1356 (Castiglione); 205, 1356 (Paternò); 251, 1356 (Randazzo).
22 R.C., vol. 80. fol. 103r, 1442 (Randazzo).
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It must be pointed out that the scope of the captain’s endeavors was not limited to jurisdiction over criminal matters. Records of cooperation between the captain and elected officials, in primis the baiulus and judges (officials charged with jurisdiction over civil justice and other administrative functions), exist from the earliest decades of Aragonese government and instances of collaboration between elected officials and the royal magistrate regarded mainly internal affairs, political conflict, the enactment of administrative measures,23and the procurement and distribution of foodstuffs.24
It was during the reign of Frederick IV, king of Sicily (1355–1377) that the posi- tion’s final collocation within the framework of local government was accomplished and the famous royal statement of 1363, according to which it was more highly valued to be the captain of a terra than justiciar of a province, indicates the definitive demise of the justiciarate system. Frederick IV declared, “our kingdom is in such a state that it is much more important and useful to be captain of a terra than justiciar of a prov- ince.”25 It should be remembered that communities referred to as terra was not episco- pal seats as were those designated as civitas.26 Frederick’s affirmation finds ample corroboration later on as it was precisely the captain’s position which, in light of its pivotal position in the local sphere, was sought after by seigniorial leaders or members of their entourage in order to gain control over metropolitan centers during the phase of utmost royal weakness, i.e., precisely the reign of Frederick IV.27
ROYAL CONTROL AND THE CAPTAIN’S PREROGATIVES IN THE 1300S
In the second half of the 1300s, dramatic political, economic, and demographic trans- formations took place that had an impact on the degree, nature, and dislocation of the phenomenon of violence. The impressive demographic changes in particular can clar- ify these dynamics. Population figures plummeted by fifty or sixty percent following the Black Death28 while noble income suffered a grievous decline. The economic cri- sis of seigniorial dynasties spurred their military expansion, to the detriment of royal assets, and spawned a crisis in the island’s domestic trade as well as a crisis over the task of coordination which had been up to the king until the mid-1300s. In this regard, notarial documents from the 1340s to the 1360s portray the situation on the island in a
23 Cosentino, Codice (n. 21 above) 14, 1355; 39, 1355; 78–79, 157–158, 187–188, 225–226, 284–285, 249–250, 1356.
24 For the order for the captain, judges, and “universis hominibus civitatis Messane” to choose two syn- dics responsible for the victuals, see De Rebus (n. 17 above) 1.321, 1283. I was possible for officials alone, without homines of the community, to be listed for the same function. There were separate orders at differ- ent times to the judges and captain of Taormina; ibid. 1.43, 1282.
25 “Lu regnu nostru e vinutu in tal partitu ki multu maiuri officiu et plui utili e esseri capitaneu di una terra ki justizeri di una provincia”; see D’Alessandro, Politica (n. 12 above) 322.
26 The term universitas can be used in referring to either a terra or a civitas. In most cases in this study, I use the name of a community with the understanding that it is the universitas to which reference is being made; for example, a simple reference to Agrigento is used to indicate Agrigento’s universitas.
27 With regard to the role of the seigneurial leaders, such as those who have the jurisdictional power over the population in their lands, see E. Mazzarese Fardella, “L’aristocrazia siciliana nel secolo XIV e i suoi rapporti con le città demaniali: alla ricerca del potere,” Aristocrazia cittadina e ceti popolari nel tardo Me- dioevo in Italia e in Germania, ed. R. Elze and G. Fasoli (Bologna 1984) 186–189. With regard to the grad- ual positioning of seigniorial leaders over the cities from the second half of the 14th c., see also Bresc, Monde (n. 1 above) 2.719–725; and P. Corrao, Governare un regno: Potere, società e istituzioni in Sicilia fra Trecento e Quattrocento (Naples 1991) 46–54.
28 Peri, Sicilia (n. 8 above) 246; and Epstein, Island (n. 2 above) 55–59.
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few graphic words: clauses referring to the hypothetical occurrence of war with “the king’s enemies” and “violence perpetrated by powerful individuals” in the countryside and in the streets are indeed plentiful.29
Along with the restoration of royal power, which will be discussed shortly, and the king’s reacquisition of control over most of the universitates at the end of the 1300s, the population in urban areas began to grow and would become stable during Al- phonso’s reign. The resultant increase in urban violence was accompanied by an inev- itable expansion of the captain’s responsibilities. As has been noted, “crime was overwhelmingly … an urban phenomenon” in the mid-1400s.30 An analysis of the power wielded by the captain at the end of the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth makes is possible to outline both the confrontation between king and uni- versitates and the degree of autonomy available to municipal governments.
In light of the preceding information regarding the captain’s office and seigniorial exponents, it is inappropriate to make reference merely to the royal or elective nature of the captaincy in order to identify the relationships of subordination to which it was subject. Instead, existing power relations must be verified to ascertain whether or not, and in what terms, they effectively represented royal intentions or, in the case of a magistrate chosen by an urban center, municipal intentions. Frederick’s affirmation on the one hand, and the interests of the seigniorial leaders on the other, make it possible to affirm that the position was valued in the second half of the 1300s for its preroga- tives rather than its royal nature. It is significant, however, that when the Crown re- gained full authority, it vigorously reasserted its control over the captain as a royal of- ficial.
The fact that the office was valued for it prerogatives rather than its royal nature begins to become evident in examining the royal crisis at the death of Frederick IV when the exercise of royal power was suspended from 1377 to 1392 and the heads of the four leading seigniorial families—the Vicarii Artale I Alagona, Manfredi III Chia- romonte, Francesco II Ventimiglia, and Guglielmo Peralta—established a government. The island was divided into four territories each controlled by a different seigniorial “court.”31 During the period of the Vicarii, the prerogatives of the captain were ex- panded. No longer a representative of royal authority, he functioned as the supreme local magistrate representing seigniorial authority and, consistent with strongly cen- tralized seigniorial governance, exerted authoritarian control in conflict with munici- pal liberties. The situation can be reconstructed by examining information pertinent to the subsequent monarchical restoration carried out by Martin I, because documenta- tion for the period of the great magnates is almost inexistent. The arrival on the island in 1392 of the duke of Montblanch (or Martin the Elder) and his son (Martin the Younger), who was married to the daughter of Frederick IV, Queen Maria, and be- came Martin I, king of Sicily, began a restoration and ended the period of the Vicarii. Martin I reigned from 1392 to 1409. Requests presented to the king by the cities in
29 Peri, Sicilia (n. 8 above) 144. 30 A. Ryder, “The incidence of crime in Sicily in the mid fifteenth century: the evidence from composi-
tion records,” in Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy, ed. T. Dean and K. J. P. Lowe (Cam- bridge 1994) 65.
31 D’Alessandro, Politica (n. 12 above) 91–126; Corrao, Governare (n. 27 above) 60–65.
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concomitance with the restoration of the monarchy reflect a widespread demand for the full involvement of the elected ruling class in government. It should be noted, en passant, that the title of justiciar was sometimes retained as synonymous with cap- tain.32 The captain was inevitably involved in all negotiations between universitates and king that concerned municipal autonomy. He was involved because of the pivotal role he played at a local level, the increase in his responsibilities caused by a gradual process of demographic reallocation and, lastly, the increase in his prerogatives which had come about during the period of the Vicarii.
Requests from diverse urban localities of differing population levels reveal, begin- ning in 1392, a generalized desire to circumscribe the role played by the captain or, rather, to avoid his intervention in areas normally under the purview of elected offi- cials. By exploiting the royal policy of contractual relations, municipal governments set into motion a strategy of governance aimed at gradually redefining the captain’s prerogatives.33 Royal policy appears attentive to these petitions: many proposals put forth by urban communities received the king’s approval. Moreover, the king involved various officials in carrying out these initiatives, thus promoting collaboration rather than a concentration of power in the hands of a single magistracy. Alongside jurats (iurati), from among the major elected officials involved in the administrative sphere, and judges, the captain played an important role in municipal government activity in this period, albeit more limited than in previous times. The prominent role played by these officials is evidenced by the numerous royal decrees addressing them as well as the pivotal functions they performed in negotiations with the king. Salemi and Agri- gento constitute cases in point. In 1397, Martin of Aragon (that is, Martin the Elder who succeeded to the throne of Aragon in 1395) and Martin I proclaimed to the judges and jurats in Salemi the abrogation of a grant of the castle made to Count Antonio di Moncada, thus confirming the status of the universitas within the royal demesne.34 That same year, Martin I announced to the captain, judges, and jurats in Agrigento his pardon of Enrico Chiaromonte’s supporters.35 In the first instance, the demesne status was meaningfully proclaimed only to the main elected officials whereas the captain was added for Agrigento, most likely to avoid persecution of anyone who had previ- ously taken part in the rebellions. A 1398 royal decree, no doubt part of the process of a gradual redistribution of functions, accentuated the prerogatives of the jurats by as- signing them jurisdiction, limited to querelas et questiones under the purview of the captain, over cases involving less than one onza and, since no distinction was made, over both low and high justice.36
During reign of Martin I, and Alfonso V as well, there is confirmation that original jurisdiction over criminal justice remained under the purview of the captain who was charged with the investigation, trial, and sentencing of such diverse crimes as homi-
32 R. C., vol. 39, fol. 272r–v, 1402 (Salemi). 33 R. C., vol. 33, fols. 120v–125v, 1399 (Trapani); Capitoli inediti delle città demaniali di Sicilia, ed. S.
Giambruno and L. Genuardi (Palermo 1918) 248, 1401 (Agrigento); R. C., vol. 33, fol. 261r–v, 1401 (Pi- azza).
34 R. C., vol. 31, fols. 69v–70v; Rollus Rubeus offici spectabilium juratorum baronum regiarum secreti- arum huius fidelis civitatis Salem, ed. P. Cammarata (Palermo-Roma 1998) 1–5.
35 R. C., vol. 28, fols. 210v–211r. 36 Capitula, cap. VII (n. 18 above) 1.142.
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cide, theft, rebellion, and high treason, as well as for illicit sexual relations and so forth. He would also be called on to carry out royal pardons.37 The captains’ sentences could be appealed to the Magna Regia Curia, or Regia Gran Corte, the supreme court of the kingdom. In addition to holding jurisdiction over criminal matters, the captain figures as one of the king’s preferred contacts when he required that measures be car- ried out, even in cases that concerned more general peace keeping operations and the protection of royal rights rather than criminal affairs.38
The important task of overseeing electoral proceedings also emerges as one of the captain’s prerogatives. Indeed, he was present during the execution of elections, in the name of the king, as someone “over and above the parties.” Forms of collaboration between the captain and elected officials can be further analyzed by examining the role played by the royal magistrate in election procedures. From the time of the reign of Peter III (1282–1285) on through the reign of Alphonso V, the captain was fre- quently the recipient of royal decrees regarding the execution of elections by scrutiny, i.e., the main municipal electoral procedure, or the captain was a member of the dele- gation of incumbent officials charged with presiding over these elections. Indications from Peter III regarding elections are addressed to the universi homines of the univer- sitas39 but are also destined for the captain in certain instances.40 Royal decrees by Frederick IV stipulated that a drawing of candidates names should take place in the presence of the preeminent outgoing officials, i.e., the captain, baiulus, judges, and jurats, and the probi homines.41 Further evidence of this is provided by documentation pertinent to the first half of the 1400s. Catanian ordinances regarding the appointment of city officials in 1426 name the captain and vice-captain who are charged with over-
37 It is worth noting Martin’s measure concerning Corleone’s universitas in 1400 which confirmed a rule
that applied to the entire kingdom: the captain held jurisdiction over penal matters but was not to be in- volved in civil affairs under the purview of the judges; R. C., vol. 38, fol. 126r. Compare this to the 1401 petition, approved by the king, from the community of Piazza asking that the captain not exceed his juris- diction; R.C., vol. 38, fol. 261rv. Several instances of a captain’s undertakings during the reign of Alphonso V follow. Homicide: P. R., vol. 33, fol. 119v, 1433 (Piazza); R. C., vol. 74, fols. 426v–427r, 1439 (Noto). The captain carried out a royal court order in assuring the execution of a pardon granted to a convicted mur- derer: P. R., vol. 47, fols. 241v–242v, 1456 (Catania). Fraud and other thefts: P. R., vol. 25, fols. 42v–43r, 1422 (Trapani); R. C., vol. 79, fol. 89rv, 1443 (Palermo); R. C., vol. 79, fol. 111rv, 1443 (Randazzo); R. C., vol. 84, fols. 280v–282r, 1451 (Palermo); P. R., vol. 43, fols. 179v–180r, 1451 (Randazzo); P. R., vol. 47, fol. 382v, 1457 (Termini); P. R., vol. 50, fol. 242rv, 1458 (Noto). Illicit sexual relations: P. R., vol. 28, fol. 60rv, 1425 (Nicosia); P. R., vol. 31, fol. 63v, 1430 (Palermo); R. C., vol. 70, fol. 277rv, 1435 (Agrigento). Uprisings and high treason: P. R., vol. 34, fol. 84rv, 1438 (Salemi); P. R., vol. 48, fol. 134rv, 1456 (Sci- acca). Other crimes: P. R., vol. 31, fol. 51r, 1430 (Palermo); P. R., vol. 33, fols. 78v–79v, 1432 (Agrigento); P. R., vol. 33, fol. 121rv, 1433 (Sciacca); R. C., vol. 70, fol. 56rv, 1434 (Catania); R. C., vol. 71, fols. 92v– 93r, 1436 (Randazzo); P. R., vol. 48, fol. 397rv, 1457 (Catania).
38 Concerning the role of the captain, see the royal notification sent to the captain of Randazzo regarding the restitution of goods and property to certain residents (R. C., vol. 27, fol. 34v, 1396); the royal notifica- tion ordering the captain, jurats, and the judges of Randazzo to make up for missing royal income since the tax on wine had brought in less than expected, R. C., vol. 27, fols. 27r–28r, 1396; and Martin I’s mandate to the captain and jurats of Noto about times for the application of a tax he had decreed (R. C., vol. 41, fol. 235r, 1404).
39 De Rebus (n. 17 above) 1.148, 1282. The same mandate was sent to the notarium publicum in Nicosia; ibid. 1.113–114, 1282.
40 Ibid. 1.48–49, 1282 (Syracuse). The same measure was sent to various communities; ibid. 1.49, 71– 72, 1282.
41 For example, Cosentino, Codice (n. 21 above) 227 and 229, 1356.
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seeing the elections.42 In keeping with the royal nature of his office, the captain was responsible for presiding over the elections by scrutiny while respecting municipal autonomy and the elective nature of the designated positions. I have uncovered no further mention of the captain in the rare references to electoral procedures although he was very likely part of the group of officials present at elections by scrutiny, even when not specifically cited.43 Precious information from the minutes of sessions of the town council—the main governing body responsible for local administration and eco- nomic policies in particular—corroborates this deduction. In 1461, Malta’s council decided to prolong the Captain’s term of office while awaiting royal confirmation of the elected officials.44
Having examined areas of collaboration between the captain and elected officials, a basic characteristic of the period of Martin I can be pointed out: the captaincy was normally conferred on persons from outside the area or outside the sphere of munici- pal politics, and the selection of the official remained strictly a royal prerogative. The earliest requests to have the position assigned to local persons began to be put forward by local governments in this period but this did not alter the general picture even though such requests received royal assent.45 Indeed, the situation was still far from equalling the strong local control that would stem from a widespread bestowal of the position on persons from the local area and appointments conferred on the basis of municipal recommendations. This is substantiated by an examination of the composi- tion of the delegations entrusted with presenting the requests to the king: judges and/or jurats were frequently included among the ambassadors and, at other times, the am- bassadorial delegations were made up entirely of jurats.46 In contrast to what would come about during the Alphonsian period, the absence of the captain in these delega- tions was a constant feature. This is a basic difference in comparison to the period of Alphonso V of the Castilian house of Trastámara:47 municipal autonomy at the end of the 1300s was still being reconstructed and its reconfiguration was more often en- trusted to elected officials than to a royal official who was often not of local extrac- tion.
Generally speaking, a political policy involving the presentation of petitions and the formation of ambassadorial delegations to confer with the king constitute clear evidence of pactist political policies in which bargaining served as a basis for a local institutional development that gradually involved the universitates in processes of royal decision making.
42 As recorded in Matteo Gaudioso’s registers of the acts of the jurats of Catania at the Archivio Storico
in Catania, vol. 2, quinterno 3–4, 371. 43 For example, see P. R., vol. 33, fol. 112r, 1433 (Trapani). 44 Acta iuratorum et consilio civitatis et insulae Maltae, ed. G. Wettinger (Palermo 1993) 180-181. On
the town council in Sicilian communities, see Titone, Governments (n. 5 above) 77–91. 45 R. C., vol. 33, fols. 120v–125v, 1399 (Trapani); Piazza obtained approval that all their royal officials
be of local extraction; R. C., vol. 25, fols. 23r–24r, 1396. 46 The praetor (as the baiulus was called in Palermo since 1311) and a jurat, P. R., vol. 5, fol. 352r–v,
1400 (Palermo). A jurat, R. C., vol. 46, fol. 270r–v, 1407 (Corleone) along with the notarius Matteo Cartoxio; other Cartoxios were elected in the same year: Rainerio as judge and Bartolomeo as judge, R. C., vol. 46, fol. 196v. Only jurats, R. C., vol. 38, fol. 261r–v, 1401 (Piazza); a judge R. C., vol. 46, fols. 302v– 304r, 1407 (Noto).
47 Alphonso V was the son of Ferdinand I; see n. 12 above.
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MUNICIPAL CONTROL OVER THE OFFICE IN THE ALPHONSIAN PERIOD The captaincy experienced significant innovations during the reign of Alphonso V as a consequence of the Crown of Aragon’s policy of territorial conquest. Aragonese mili- tary expansion was a constant factor during the late Middle Ages and this obviously led to a considerable increase in the Crown’s financial needs. Particularly during the first half of the 1400s, these needs intensified due to the realization of the grande am- prisa—the conquest of Naples by Alphonso V in 1442–1443. Alphonsian economic policy is characterized by the identification of new sources of income. These new sources of income were primarily the ceding of royal demesne property, including the captain’s office.48 This strategy had extremely important repercussions and makes it possible, among other things, to identify some basic features of Alphonso V’s finan- cial and fiscal policies. The king managed to intensify his economic demands and avoid open opposition from the subjects he taxed by significantly involving local ad- ministrations in the choices to be made regarding taxation49 and secondly by managing to increase revenue without recourse to taxation as evidenced mainly by the sale of the captaincy.
It must be pointed out, first of all, that alienations were of limited duration and the captain acquired his post for a year in most cases, even when it was a group of pur- chasers who were involved. For these reasons, it cannot be maintained that there was true public venality during the Alphonsian period—the sort attributing fundamental economic importance to a position obtainable in perpetuum that could be passed on to one’s heirs. A “patrimonialization” of the office was never achieved during the first half of the 1400s owing to the modalities and conditions of alienation procedures and to safeguards imposed by urban communities regarding, for example, the length of the concessions themselves. With these distinctions outlined, it can be said that during the reign of Alphonso V, a process was initiated which would eventually lead, in the early 1500s, to a “patrimonialization” of offices characteristic of governments in the Ancien Régime.50
48 For a comparison, on the salability of the offices in the early modern period, see V. Sciuti Russi,
“Aspetti della venalità degli uffici in Sicilia (secoli XVII–XVIII),” Rivista Storica Italiana 88.1 (1976) 342– 355. For Naples, see V. I. Comparato, Uffici e società a Napoli (1600–1647). Aspetti dell’ideologia del magistrato nell’età moderna (Florence 1974) 127–160. For France, see R. Mousnier, La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XI (Rouen 1945; Paris 1971) ; and D. D. Bien, “Les offices, les corps et le crédit d’État: l’utilisation des privilèges sous l’ancien régime,” Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations 43.2 (1988) 379–404. See also n. 50.
49 Epstein, Island (n. 1 above) 355–357; and Titone, Governments (n. 5 above) 131–147. 50 For a comparison with the Kingdom of Castile, see A. Dominguez Ortiz, “La venta de cargos y oficios
públicos en Castilla y sus consecuencia económicas y sociales,” Anuario de historia económica y social 3 (1970) 105–137; and M. Fraga Iribarne and J. Beneyto Pérez, “La enajenación de oficios públicos en su perspectiva histórica y sociológica,” Centenario de la Ley del notariado, 2 vols. (Madrid 1964) 1.395–472, who insist on the practice of alienating magistracies as an inherent feature of the modern beaurocratic state. For Castile beginning with the late medieval period, see Francisco Tomàs y Valiente, “Origen bajomedieval de la patrimonialización y la enajenación de oficios públicos en Castilla,” Actas del I Symposium de Histo- ria de la Administración (Madrid 1970) 125–159, which already foreshadows the process in the second half of the 14th c., when kings granted positions as a means of establishing a network of loyal followers without, however, taking economic advantage of such transactions. The Trastámara rulers, in fact, did not resort to the sale of royal offices but the beneficiaries sometimes did—a practice opposed by the central govern- ment—and only in the 17th c. did the Crown carry out alienations; ibid. 129, 132–133, and 146. See also Joaquìn Cerdá Ruiz Funes, “Hombres Buenos, jurados y regidores en los municipios castellanos de la Baja
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With reference to the monetary value of the captaincy, the exact amount paid for its purchase cannot always be identified, both because the length of the concession was often not specified and because the payment cannot always be calculated on the basis of the cost of its redemption (which was often higher than what the original purchaser had paid). Although margins of uncertainty remain, the purchase price ranged between twelve onze, which was most often the case, and sixteen to twenty onze or even thirty- three onze annually.51 The captain’s salary was lower, however, and could also be sub- ject to change and not be the same in every universitas (just as for the elected offi- cials):52 Nicosia’s captain received ten onze annually53 while the official in Castrogio- vanni received four onze “tantum.”54 The wide discrepancy between the magistrates’ salaries in Nicosia and Castrogiovanni was certainly not due to population differences in the two universitates given that significant differences in the populations of the two localities were not recorded for the first half of the 1400s.55 This diversity should be attributed to a difference in the individual economic policies of local administrations which, for example, might favor a lower salary enhanced by fees to which the official was entitled from fines levied. Moreover, in addition to the compensation guaranteed by his administration of financial penalties,56 the captain had ample opportunities at his disposal for increasing his earnings through managing events such as fairs that were not everyday occurrences.57 A distinction was also made between the salaries of other royal officials, for example the castellans responsible for prisons and the
Edad Media,” Actas del I Symposium 163–206; and J. Valdeón Baruque, “Las oligarquias urbanas,” Concejos y Ciudades en la Edad Media Hìspánica, II Congreso de Estudios Medievales, Leòn 25–29 sep- tiembre 1989 (León 1990) 514–515. The latter connects the development of patrimonialism to the oligarchi- zation of local political power. With reference to the Savoy dominion, see G. Castelnuovo, Ufficiali e genti- luomini: La società politica sabauda nel tardo medioevo (Milan 1994) esp. 137–147, and 257–261, who distinguishes between recourse to loans repaid through a grant of offices when “a systematic commerce of the offices considered to be the real property of the official” (ibid. 143), had not yet come into being during the 1400s, and what took place in the 1500s with an established tendency towards patrimonialism and the inheritance of administrative positions. Also for the Savoy dominion, see A. Barbero, “Reclutamento dei funzionari e venalità degli uffici nello stato sabaudo: l’esempio del vicariato di Torino (1360–1356),” Studi Veneziani 28 (1994) 17–44, according to which the magistracies took on a purely economic function in the 16th c.
51 With few exceptions, the price was normally about 12 onze, P. R., vol. 34, fol. 152r–v, 1438–1440 (Patti); R. C., vol. 78, fols. 287r–291v, 1442–1444 (Patti); P. R., vol. 44, fols. 335r–336r, 1446–1452 (Salemi); R. C., vol. 69, fols. 107r–108v, 110r–v, 1434–1441 (Sciacca). Also 16 to 20 onze, A. Barbato, Per la storia di Nicosia nel medio evo: Documenti inediti (1267–1454) (Nicosia 1919) 145–146, [1426–1431]; P. R., vol. 34, fols. 97v–98v, 1437–1439 (Nicosia); and 33 onze, Cancillería, vol. 2824, fols. 121r–122r, 1434–1437 (Piazza).
52 Messina obtained authorization to modify the officials’ salaries; Cancillería, vol. 2819, fol. 130r, 1432.
53 In 1433–1434 and 1435–1436; P. R., vol. 31, fols. 159r–160r. 54 In 1431, Capitoli (n. 33 above) 90. 55 The population of the two localities ranged between 5,000 and 6,000 inhabitants; see Bresc, Monde (n.
1 above) 1.63, 65; and Epstein, Island (n. 1 above) 44–45. A difference in population, along with proximity to the king, does explain the salary of 100 onze for Palermo’s captain in 1400, the royal camerlengus, Ni- cola de Abella; see Pasciuta, In Regia (n. 7 above) 56. In the 1430s, Palermo had about 12,000 inhabitants.
56 For example: P. R., vol. 21, fol. 108v, 1420 (Piazza); Barbato, Per la storia (n. 51 above) 127, 1423; P. R., vol. 30, fol. 102r, 1429 (Piazza); Cancillería, vol. 2850, fol. 39r, 1445 (Patti).
57 R. C., vol. 46, fol. 185r, 1406 (Patti); Statuti ordinamenti e capitoli della città di Polizzi, ed. A. Flan- dina (Palermo 1884) 264, 1407; P. R., vol. 48, fols. 504v–505r, 1456 (Catania).
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vicesecreti charged with collecting royal taxes, which varied between eighteen and thirty onze in the first instance and twelve and thirty in the second.58
The sale of the captaincy had extraordinarily important repercussions on municipal autonomy and the new power alignments it created within the universitas itself. Re- course to ceding the main local royal office resulted in a dramatic attenuation of the royal dimension of the position. The captaincy took on a more “composite” nature—a royal office filled on the basis of local recommendations. This particularly significant fact is proof of the decidedly broad sphere of autonomy administered by the universi- tates capable of directing the appointment of their captain. The inhabitants of the uni- versitates, therefore, were subjects, to be sure; but they were also citizens capable of asserting their political interests.59
Communities were sometimes able to exercise increasing control over the captaincy and the amount of time an incumbent remained in office as a consequence of the fre- quent recourse Alphonso V made to selling the position to an individual, a group of buyers, or even an entire community. In localities where repeated alienations took place, the practice of resorting to officials unfamiliar with the dynamics of the com- munity ceased due to the rapid adaptation of the royal appointments to municipal re- quests and, thus, to the local balance of power. This is a very important factor in the new power relations between the central and local governments: per viam emptionis concessions often reveal that the grantor’s initiative was limited by a restricted number of potential buyers. In addition, once the position had been sold, the king had no more say in the matter for the duration of the concession and incumbent captains could even re-sell the office to a third party.60 It must also be pointed out that even royal conces- sions not made per viam emptionis were the result of shifts in the balance of power generated by previous alienations: in many cases the central government had failed to observe existing municipal privileges, or rather certain aspects of the privileges, in selling the office and managed to appease municipal opposition by offering greater guarantees regarding the office, especially a rotation of control over its management and assurances regarding the origin of future incumbents.61 Such guarantees resulted from hard bargaining fostered by the cities through a significant increase in the num- ber of municipal petitions presented to the king. The confrontation between city and king through the presentation of municipal petitions and the king or viceroy’s reply to these petitions represents one of the possible models of contractual relations con- forming to pactist politics.
58 For the castellan, 18 onze in Castronovo and Monte San Giuliano (P. R., vol. 21, fol. 105v, 1420; R.
C., vol. 53, fol. 83r–v, 1425) but 30 onze in Termini (R. C., vol. 60, fol. 43v, 1427). For the vicesecretus, 12 onze in Piazza and Salemi (P. R., vol. 21, fols. 33r–v, 1419; P. R., vol. 21, fol. 52r–v, 1419), but 30 onze in Catania (P. R., vol. 25, fol. 132r, 1423).
59 For a contrasting position see Putnam, Making (n. 2 above) 130: “In the north [of Italy] the people were citizens; in the south they were subjects,”
60 R. C., vol. 81, fols. 300v–301r, 1444 (Agrigento); P. R., vol. 44, fols. 35v–36r, 1451 (Sciacca). 61 P. R., vol. 32, fols. 35v, 75v–76r, 1431 (Trapani); P. R., vol. 34, fols. 97v–98v, 1437 (Nicosia); R. C.,
vol. 78, fols. 262r–265r, 1442 (Noto).
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The first purchases by private individuals began appearing in the mid-1420s,62 intensified after the 1430s, and continued even after the conquest of Naples as demon- strated by the fact that revenue from alienations became a regular item in royal finan- cial policy. Especially at the end of the 1430s, sales of a new type were recorded, i.e., sales to groups of buyers who obtained the office for long periods of time, for exam- ple, from 1440 to 1455 in Nicosia, or from 1446 to 1454 in Salemi.63 It should be re- membered that, even in such instances, a purchaser rarely held the position continu- ously for over a year.64
It should be stressed that the intensification of sales inevitably brought about a strong correlation between the captain and municipal society in general, and more spe- cifically, the friction existing between rival urban factions tended to come to a head directly over the captaincy because of the prerogatives held by the captain.65 As a rule, continual recourse to alienation could easily generate tension, oftentimes serious, be- tween municipal sectors and any incumbent who frequently held the office. In this re- gard the king proved sympathetic to appeals as long as his own interests were safe- guarded. He accepted Nicosia’s complaint demanding the magistrate’s removal and, in carrying out further alienations, did not go against him since other residents of Nicosia had come forward at the same time as new purchasers.66 Instead, it seems that the universitas of Piazza’s refusal of Archinbau Barresi as captain was unsuccessful in 1439 because they had not been able to offer the king a valid alternative.67 Sicilian universitates could retain their impressive systems of rights and privileges only when they were not in conflict with the economic interests of the king and it was evidently up to municipal diplomacy to manage to find a point of common agreement. This did not always come about. In 1437, Alphonso V sold the castle, the land, the captaincy, and the secretia (the local royal revenues controlled by the secretus or vicesecretus) of Salemi to the councilor Bernardo de Requenses and his heirs perpetuum cum stru- mento perpetue redimendi et quietandi gracie. A number of privileges obstructed the sale in 1437 but later, in 1440, Alphonso reconfirmed the sale to Requesens and his heirs specifying that it was to be carried out despite privileges to the contrary.68 As has been pointed out for another environment, the Savoy dominion, the time lag between
62 For example, P. R., vol. 26, fol. 43r, 1423 (Randazzo); P. R., vol. 24, fol. 174r, 1425 (Salemi); P. R., vol. 32, fols. 75v–76r, 1431 (Trapani).
63 P. R., vol. 38, fols. 35r–41r (Nicosia); P. R., vol. 38, fol. 58r–v (Salemi); P. R., vol. 44, fols. 335r– 336r (Salemi); R. C., vol. 89, fol. 365r–v (Salemi).
64 The rare exceptions include the miles, Pietro Sabia of Nicosia, who bought the captaincy on 15 March 1446 for 115 onze for the years 1452–1453, 1453–1454, and 1454–1455; P. R., vol. 38, fols. 35r–41r. Anto- nio Desguanesch, captain of Malta from 1429 to 1452, constitutes an isolated case; Bresc, Monde (n. 1 above) 2.625, 764.
65 Capitoli (n. 33 above) 298–299, 1433 (Agrigento); R. C., vol. 78, fols. 262r–265r, 1442; and Cancil- lería, vol. 2882, fol. 109v, 1452 (Noto).
66 P. R., vol. 34, fol. 91r–v; new purchasers obtained the position from 1437 to 1439, P. R., vol. 34, fols. 97v–98v.
67 In 1434, Alphonso granted the captaincy of Piazza to Habus Barresi, Bernardo Barresi and Archinbau Barresi for the years 1434–1435, 1435–1436, and 1436–1437, respectively, for 100 onze despite municipal legal norms to the contrary; Cancillería, vol. 2824, fols. 121r 122r. In July 1439, the universitas claimed, through the jurats, that Archinbau Barresi had appointed hiself captain without a royal concession; R. C., vol. 74, fols. 595r–597r. Barresi, nevertheless, took over from Giovanni Liria pro certo precio in April 1440; R. C., vol. 75, fol. 293r.
68 Cancillería, vol. 2833, 167r–171r.
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enacting legal norms and carrying out the procedures was partly a result of the pro- gressive patrimonialism which inevitably befell the office when “the exponential growth of the financial needs of the prince and his administration finally led to using the castles as relief valves for the public debt.”69
In the Catalan community of Cervera, municipal delegates set about frenetic nego- tiations with Alphonso V towards the 1430s in an effort to avert the community’s pro- posed alienation. Only in exchange for substantial economic concessions were they able to ward off the threat. In remembering the numerous negotiations that had taken place with the king in the 1430s, Cervera’s ambassador to the Magnanimous, Pere Boquet, affirmed in 1455 that “nothing could be done at the royal court in those days without money.”70 This maxim was equally valid for municipal administrators of Sicilian universitates. The intense negotiations between king and local authorities in relation to the captaincy were characterized by a royal attitude alternating between in- difference and an attention to municipal petitions. Cities had a real chance of obtaining what they requested only in cases where the economic needs of the Crown were met.
These distinctions having been made, a consolidation of the cities’ role in obtaining the captaincy is undeniable. This sometimes caused political strife, however, as mani- fested by the protests over the sale of the magistracy, the rejection of a captain of local extraction or an insistence that the privilege of having one be respected, and espe- cially, an explicit request to exclude cives of a given rank from the office as well as accusations of clientelism in administering the office. An example that will shed light on these dynamics and also serve as a useful point of comparison with other localities comes from the universitas of Agrigento where, in December 1433, the syndics pre- sented the king with a series of particularly important petitions, some of which had to do with the captaincy.71 A connection between the proponents of the requests and the small merchants can be argued on the basis of the drafters’ thorough knowledge of trade as well as common interests shared with that sector.72 The petitions they pre- sented reveal a polarization of the conflict between the magnifichi (presumably wealthy merchants—a fact that can be deduced in light of Monteaperto’s petition)73 and persons linked to small-scale local trade who probably authored the petitions. They asked to redeem the office from the power of the brothers Misseri Antonio and Gaspare Monteaperto, who held it for life. At the same time, they proposed a number of countermeasures for future concessions: that the universitas be allowed to elect four cives from among whom the king would select one to whom the position would then be granted, and finally, that the incumbent not be magnificho. The method proposed
69 “La crescita esponenziale dei bisogni finanziari del principe e della sua amministrazione portava in-
fine a usare le castellanie come valvole di sfogo del debito pubblico.” Castelnuovo, Ufficiali (n. 50 above) 142–146, 252–259, and 325–326, at 328–329.
70 An episode highlighted by Pere Verdés Pijuan, “Car vuy en la Cort no s’i fa res sens diners: En torno a la negociación entre la villa de Cervera y el rey durante la baja edad media”’ Negociar (n. 12 above) 185– 21; the ambassador’s statement appears on 210.
71 Capitoli (n. 33 above) 298–299. 72 These aspects are reconstructed in Titone, Governments (n. 5 above) 153–155. 73 The Monteapertos began to amass their fortune in the second half of the 13th c. thanks, in part, to
strategic marriages; I. Peri, “Per una storia della vita cittadina e del commercio nel medioevo: Girgenti porto del sale e del grano,” Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani (Milan 1962) 69–70; and E. I. Mineo, Nobiltà di Stato. Famiglie e identità aristocratiche nel tardo medioevo. La Sicilia (Roma 2001) 258.
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for appointing the official was particularly innovative. A request was made to be granted the extraordinary privilege of electing the captain by scrutiny in a somewhat different manner from what took place for other elected officials. Indeed, in the scru- tiny, several names were to be selected from among which the king would make his choice: “that the universitas elect four citizens by scrutiny every year … the king will decide which of them to appoint as captain.”74 The meaning of Alphonso V’s assent is not clear: he agreed as requested to bestow the post on persons from Agrigento, but it seems to me that he evaded the question of the election by scrutiny to which he only makes indirect reference “concedatur civibus Agrigenti cui ex eis dicte maiestati placebit.”75 The vagueness of the reply is diminished in light of subsequent royal ac- tions. Because the universitas had repaid the money to the Monteapertos, the king de- clared them deposed from office and decreed that for the following ten years he would grant the office annually to a cives. This placet is an example of concession that was not actually put into practice, as demonstrated the following year by the royal sale of the office to ten purchasers.76 However, the sale represents a compromise between royal financial needs and the universitas’ demands: although the election by scrutiny was not achieved, local exponents maintained control of the office through the sale.
The detailed stand taken against the Montapertos highlights the interests of a large sector of the citizenry who did not identify with the group of the magnifichi of which the two brothers were prominent members. Moments of tension sometimes developed even within the confines of a single socio-professional group when the monopoly of a kinship group precluded a rotation of other persons, even those belonging to the same group, as office holders. This is what happened in Noto where the gentili homini, as the wealthy members of the municipal elite were called, gained radical control over the captaincy. The office was purchased for a long period of time (from 1439 to 1452) by the Salonia family77 but the community of Noto managed to mitigate their monop- oly by obtaining a guarantee of the privilege (which concerned all the offices, not only the captaincy) according to which the incumbent, after a year in office, would not be permitted to hold office again until two more years had passed.78 The privilege fol- lowed several petitions containing particularly detailed requests that make it possible to understand what the real issue was, namely a rotation of control over the office by the gentili homini and an end to the Salonia family’s monopoly. Indeed, it was re- quested that the ab antiquo custom be reinstated whereby all of the community’s gen-
74 “Ki la universitati omni annu digia eligiri per scrutiniu quatru chitatini … di li quali lu dictu signuri indi facza capitanu quillu ki plachira”; Capitoli (n. 33 above) 298–299.
75 Ibid. 298–299. 76 The camerarius, Dalmao Raiadell, held the office in 1433–1434; R. C., vol. 69, fol. 58r–v. That same
year it was granted via emptionis to a group of ten buyers, of which only five managed to serve for one year each: Giovanni Cachatu, Enrico Terrana, Antonio Silosi, Nicola Terrana, and the missere, Giovanni Mazara; R. C., vol. 76, fols. 371r–372r. The Crown again sold the position to the same Monteaperto brothers in 1441; R. C., vol. 76, fols. 371r–372r, 418v–419r.
77 The Salonia family represented the new 15th-c. oligarchy thanks, in part, to a number of substantial land acquisitions; Pietro Corrao, “Uomini e poteri sul territorio di Noto nel tardo medioevo,” Contributi alla geografia storica dell’agro netino, Atti delle “Giornate di studio,” Noto 29–31 maggio 1998, ed. F. Bal- samo and V. La Rosa (Rosolini 2001) 153–154.
78 R. C., vol. 78, fols. 262r–265r. The position was purchased by Antonio Salonia in 1439 for 200 onze to which Pietro Salvatore and Galcerando Salonia added 50 onze in 1442. The universitas redeemed it in 1452; R. C., vol. 75, fols. 173r–175r; R. C., vol. 78, fols. 262r–265r; Cancillería, vol. 2882, fol. 109v.
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tili homini could compete for the office. They had been denied that possibility since Pietro Salonia had taken office. Salonia was not regarded as extraneous to the group of gentili homini in this case. The protest regarded, instead, the fact that not all the mem- bers of this socio-professional status group were allowed to hold the office as they had in the past. It is an item revealing the privileged relationship between the members of this group and the captain’s post in Noto.79
AN OFFICIAL WITH A COMPOSITE NATURE
The situation in Agrigento clearly reveals the connection between the captainship and municipal factions there, and the attempt of the universitas to present itself per viam emptionis as owning the magistracy. A key element for understanding the model of power relations between the king and urban communities was the loosening of royal control over the captaincy while, at the same time, the community, posing as pur- chaser, managed to obtain the office and decide to whom it should then be assigned. These circumstances can be further explored by examining other urban environments because Agrigento’s 1433 proposal did not represent isolated circumstances. For ex- ample, in 1443 the universitas of Polizzi gained effective control over the captaincy which became an elective office managed locally.80 The universitas retained the privi- lege until 1448 when it decided, of its own accord, to renounce it and presented a se- ries of petitions requesting an assurance that the captain would be an outsider with no links to the community from that time onward.81 Nevertheless, opening up the office to outsiders could constitute a means by which seigniorial elements might obtain the position and this was an possibility foreseen by the universitas. The same corpus of petitions that forbade the captaincy to persons from the local area—no one of local extraction, not a relative of local persons up to the second degree of kinship, always an outsider—also granted that the office could never be put up for “sale to a powerful person who was a knight or a person of higher rank including barons, their retainers, or attendants present in a baron’s household.”82
Another important phenomenon can be noted in an incident involving Polizzi. The universitas continued to be involved in the captaincy and managed to impose certain conditions for future concessions even when they chose not to retain possession of the office. It was an indirect form of control and the result of a gradual process that, pre- cisely through the practice of alienation, consolidated an administration which, in most cases at least, benefited local persons.
Categorical requests for an outsider, in contrast to what had been previously at- tained, could only have been motivated by a partisan administration of the office. In support of this hypothesis, the situation in Piazza can be cited because of the various
79 Cancillería, vol. 2882, fol. 109v. 80 R. C., vol. 80, fols. 273v–275v; Cancillería, vol. 2822, fol. 21r–v. 81 P. R., vol. 39, fols. 205r–206r, 13 June 1448. A few months earlier, in February 1448, Viceroy Lop
Ximen de Urrea had granted the position to the miles, Antonio Sicilia, for that year (P. R., vol. 40, fols. 25v– 26r): the repeal of the privilege, which would be institutionalized in June, was evidently already in force.
82 “Titulo alienationis a persona potenti videlicet di cavalieri in susu inclusive necnon a nullu baruni ne alloru servitori et domestilii abitanti et commoranti in casa di li dicti baruni”; P. R., vol. 39, fols. 205r–206r.
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requests made for assurances that the captain would have no connections whatsoever with the urban environment. The 1448 petition approved by the king states that
no one who is a resident of the terra or who is a relative or has relations with anyone who is a recent or long-time resident or who has ties to any lay or religious person can ever hold the office. In the event His Royal Majesty should inadvertently make stipulations different from what is established in this petition it will not be carried out and His Majesty will declare null and void what was stipulated so that the terms of the petition will be respected.83
The pressure for a locally administered captaincy was sometimes followed by equally insistent petitions demanding exactly the opposite. Such demands stemmed from strictly local disputes and royal control over the captaincy appeared increasingly dis- tant. This finds indirect confirmation in the appointment of the camerarius, Orlando Amato, who received a lifetime grant of Polizzi’s captaincy from the king in 1451– 1452. The king stipulated that the concession was in derogation of the existing privi- leges but was not to be taken as a precedent to be repeated.84 As evidence of the im- portance of urban power relations in selecting a captain, the means by which Orlando Amato again held the office in the year 1455–1456 is enlightening. The concession of the office for that year stated that the king had previously granted the position to him for life but Amato had refused the grant because a lifetime concession conflicted with municipal norms. He obtained the magistracy again only subsequent to a decision by Polizzi’s town council: he could hold the office for as long as a majority of the men and municipal officials allowed it.85
The urban community’s control over the captaincy could be achieved through a more indirect means, and in this regard attention must be drawn specifically to the royal dignitaries—the familiares et domestici regis. First of all, the nature of the “dig- nity” attributed to them must be understood. Concessions of familiaritas began to be commonplace during the reign of Martin I.86 Such concessions were formalized by an appointment conferring numerous fiscal and judicial rights, the most important of which were the right to arm themselves, and above all, immunity from the jurisdiction of all courts except that of the royal official of the central government such as the si- niscalcus or the judges of the domus regia for both civil and criminal suits—a prerog- ative underlining the direct link between the dignitaries and the Crown.87
83 “Non le potendo per cosa alcuna capere iamai in lo detto officio homo ne persona alcuna habitatore de
la dicta terra ne che ci habia parentella alcuna ne affinitate tanto habitatore antique della terra quanto de novo habitatore tanto havendo parentella oy affinitate cum persona laica quanto cum ecclesiastica et religi- osa persona, et si per caso la prefata Mayesta per inadvertenza oy comodoqunque incontrarium ne dis- ponesse contra la forma di li presenti capituli et che eo casu siano nulli et ad nullum valorem ducantur como si mai non fosero state facte et ex nunc pro tunc la prefata Mayesta tale provisione annulla et cassa et vole lo presente capitulo sia inviolabiliter observato iuxta sua continentia et tenore”; Consuetudines terre Platee, Piazza Armerina, Biblioteca comunale, fols. 45v–46r. A vacatio of six years before a new grant could be awarded was also stipulated.
84 R. C., vol. 84, fols. 258v–259r; P. R., vol. 43, fols. 201v–202r. 85 P. R., vol. 48, fol. 431v. 86 R. C., vol. 18, fol. 46v, 1393; R. C., vol. 20, fol. 38r, 1392; R. C., vol. 25, fols. 172v-173r, 1397; R.
C., vol. 27, fol. 28v, 1396. 87 Cancillería, vol. 2806, fols. 27v–30r, 1422; Cancillería, vol. 2806, fols. 80v–81r, 1422; P. R., vol. 47,
fols. 149v–150v, 1456.
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The part played by royal dignitaries expanded during Martin I’s restoration of the monarchy that began in 1392. This was a period in which the king aimed to considera- bly expand the network of persons loyal to him. The obvious political importance of the bestowal of “dignity,” i.e., the assurance of an ample network of trusted followers in urban environments, became fully evident in 1398 when this privilege was be- stowed on all the exiles from Alcamo who had fought for the royal cause.88 The strat- egy pursued by Martin I was further developed by Alphonso V. He resorted regularly to concessions of “dignity” and the beneficiaries were usually of local extraction and represented a clear cross section of every social and political sector.89 At the same, time Alphonso V welcomed many instances of mediation on behalf of local members made by the familiares et domestici regis: a further element negating a top-down model of power relationship between king and subjects. With regard to the captaincy, the numerous concessions made on their intercession during the Alphonsian period further reduce the significance of appointments made autonomously by the king.90 The mediation of the familiares et domestici regis in royal grants of the captaincy, both in metropolitan centers and in less populous communities, is further evidence of a selec- tion of the magistrate which was guided at a local level.
The data considered thus far reveals why a clear-cut distinction between magis- trates appointed by the king and those chosen by municipal administrations cannot be relied on in describing the organizational structure of urban government, at least dur- ing the second half of Alphonso’s reign. In reigns prior to that of Alphonso V, the captain, who was the main local royal official, constitutes the most emblematic evi- dence of the dichotomy existing in the relative balance of power between royal repre- sentatives and local government. The developments which took place in Sicily during the Alphonsian period put an end to this dichotomy and similar counterparts and prec-
88 Capitoli gabelle e privilegi della città di Alcamo, ed. V. Di Giovanni (Palermo 1876) 44 and 48. 89 Some examples of familiares et domestici regis include the brothers Giovanni and Pietro Bonfilio,
owners of a feudal estate in Noto from which they exported victuals and lumber; Cancillería, vol. 2806, fols. 12v–13r 1422. The mercator, Thabia Campo, of Syracuse (P. R., vol. 30, fols. 36r–37r 1428) was originally from Pisa; G. Petralia, Banchieri e famiglie mercantili nel Mediterraneo aragonese (Pisa 1989) 351. Bene- detto Patrimoni was Secretus in Catania; Cancillería, vol. 2814, fol. 93r, 1427. The magister, Pino Salvo (P. R., vol. 26, fol. 122v, 1424), the magister, Pietro Turturichio, bombarderius (P. R., vol. 28, fols. 37v–38r 1425), and the aurifice, Giacomo Sanoguerra (P. R., vol. 51, fols. 33r–34r 1457) were all three from Pa- lermo. So was the miles, Simonis Andree or Mastrantonio: see Bresc, Monde (n. 1 above) 2.911; P. R., vol. 47, fols. 149r–150v 1456 (Palermo).
90 For example, on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis, Sanchio Dehirre was captain of Corleone in 1453–1454; R. C., vol. 90, fol. 214r. The miles, Nobilis Matteo Calandrino, was captain of Salemi for the year 1453–1454 and “de inde certo tempore habere et exercere” following the sale of the quota Francesco Maciocta and sons had purchased from the Crown and Calandrino was allowed, pursuant to a plea by familiares et domestici regis, to choose a substitute during his own absence; R. C., vol. 89, fol. 365rv. Iaimo Martines da (F)lena was captain of Sciacca for 1456–1457 on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis and in accordance with the expressed wishes of Pietro Bondilmunti (Buondelmonte) who held the office “nullo preiudicio dicto Petro generato annis futuris”; P. R., v. 47, fol. 110r. The familiaris, Giacomo Vaccario, became Captain of Termini in 1446–1447 on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis and Giovanni Valencia was to be captain during his absence; P. R., vol. 38, fols. 102v–103v. Giovanni Podio of Catania was captain of Piazza on the intercession of familiares et domestici regis for the year 1449–1450; P. R., vol. 41, fols. 168v–170r.
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edents can be found in other cities in the Crown of Aragon, for example, in Barce- lona.91
Widespread municipal control over the captaincy could take on different forms and inevitably involve this magistracy in what was the principal manifestation of political conflict in Sicilian cities—attempts to ban certain groups from holding public office. Depending on the nature of the existing political conflicts, these attempts were some- times directed at the captaincy. For example, the 1443 request that, for Caltagirone, the position be conferred only on gentiluomini from outside the area can be attributed to opposition between groups within the municipal oligarchy—the Landolina and Modica families.92 The motivations were of a completely different sort when, in 1444, Milazzo requested that the officials come from the local community. In this case, the dispute concerned power relations with the adjacent metropolitan center of Messina. Milazzo was trying to reduce Messina’s strong control by opposing the increasing in- troduction of citizens from Messina who were once habitatores of Milazzo. Their ex- clusion from offices in the local government, including the captaincy, was requested because these persons were no longer interested in defending the rights of their own “hometown.”93
The cases examined here point out the marked diversity characteristic of urban cir- cumstances and also demonstrate how the widespread bestowal of the captaincy on individuals from the local environment was strongly balanced by a continuation of royal concessions to outsiders and numerous municipal requests for grants to persons who were not of local origin. On this matter, an analysis of the captainship in Sicily would not be complete without also analysing the effects of concessions to both per- sons who held offices in the royal curia and to officials who transferred from one community to another. Appointments to the captaincy of officials from the royal cu- ria—algozirius, uxer d’arms, and camerarius who were evidently chosen for their close ties to the king—fostered the circulation of knowledge and provided the univer- sitates with a bargaining tool to facilitate their negotiations with the king.94 Moreover,
91 Sicilian urban communities were not isolated cases. Earlier, for example, a development began in
Barcelona in the first half of the 1300s that was similar in many ways. In the early 14th c., royal officials were chosen exclusively by the king but, by the mid-1300s, the consellers (elected officials) provided the king with a list of three names from which he would select the batlle, a royal official previously chosen by the king alone. Furthermore, between 1330 and 1340, the members of the Consell de Cent, the main mu- nicipal government body, were elected by the consellers together with the veguer, a royal representative. Then, after 1340, the consellers made the selection on their own without the participation of the veguer. See C. Batlle Gallart, “El Llibre del consell, font de coneixement del municipi i de la societat de Barcelona del segle XIV,” El “Llibre del Consell” de la ciutat de Barcelona. Segle XIV: les eleccions municipals, ed. Ca