art 448 nayon vs npf

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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jan2009/gr_170923_2009.html 1/7

TodayisSunday,June21,2015

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURT

Manila

FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.170923January20,2009

SULOSANAYON,INC.and/orPHILIPPINEVILLAGEHOTEL,INC.andJOSEMARCELE.PANLILIO,Petitioners,vs.NAYONGPILIPINOFOUNDATION,Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO,C.J.:

OnappealaretheCourtofAppeals(CAs)October4,2005Decision1inCAG.R.SPNo.74631andDecember22,2005Resolution,2 reversing theNovember29,2002Decision3 of theRegionalTrialCourt (RTC)ofPasayCityinCivilCaseNo.020133.TheRTCmodifiedtheDecision4oftheMetropolitanTrialCourt(MeTC)ofPasayCitywhich ruledagainst petitionersandordered them to vacate thepremisesandpay their arrears.TheRTCdeclaredpetitionersasbuildersingoodfaithandupheldtheirrighttoindemnity.

Thefactsareasfollows:

Respondent Nayong Pilipino Foundation, a governmentowned and controlled corporation, is the owner of aparcel of land in Pasay City, known as the Nayong Pilipino Complex. Petitioner Philippine Village Hotel, Inc.(PVHI),formerlycalledSulosaNayon,Inc.,isadomesticcorporationdulyorganizedandexistingunderPhilippinelaws.PetitionerJoseMarcelE.PanlilioisitsSeniorExecutiveVicePresident.

On June 1, 1975, respondent leased a portion of the Nayong Pilipino Complex, consisting of 36,289 squaremeters,topetitionerSulosaNayon,Inc.fortheconstructionandoperationofahotelbuilding,tobeknownasthePhilippineVillageHotel.The leasewas foran initialperiodof21years,oruntilMay1996. It is renewable foraperiodof25yearsunderthesametermsandconditionsuponduenoticeinwritingtorespondentoftheintentionto renewat least 6months before its expiration. Thus, onMarch7, 1995, petitioners sent respondent a letternotifying the latter of their intention to renew the contract for another 25 years. On July 4, 1995, the partiesexecutedaVoluntaryAddendumtotheLeaseAgreement.TheaddendumwassignedbypetitionerJoseMarcelE.PanlilioinhisofficialcapacityasSeniorExecutiveVicePresidentofthePVHIandbyChairmanAlbertoA.LimoftheNayongPilipinoFoundation.Theyagreedtotherenewalofthecontractforanother25years,oruntil2021.Underthenewagreement,petitionerPVHIwasboundtopaythemonthlyrentalonapersquaremeterbasisatthe rateofP20.00per squaremeter,whichshall besubject toan increaseof20%at theendofevery3yearperiod.Atthetimeoftherenewaloftheleasecontract,themonthlyrentalamountedtoP725,780.00.

Beginning January 2001, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their monthly rental. Respondent repeatedlydemandedpetitionerstopaythearrearsandvacatethepremises.ThelastdemandletterwassentonMarch26,2001.

OnSeptember5,2001, respondent filedacomplaint forunlawfuldetainerbefore theMeTCofPasayCity.ThecomplaintwasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.70801.Respondentcomputedthearrearsofpetitionersintheamountof twentysixmillion one hundred eightythree thousand two hundred twentyfive pesos and fourteen centavos(P26,183,225.14),asofJuly31,2001.

OnFebruary26,2002,theMeTCrendereditsdecisioninfavorofrespondent.Itruled,thus:

....Thecourtisconvincedbytheevidencethatindeed,defendantsdefaultedinthepaymentoftheirrentals.Itisbasic that the lessee isobliged topay thepriceof the leaseaccording to the termsstipulated (Art. 1657,CivilCode).Uponthefailureofthelesseetopaythestipulatedrentals,thelessormayeject(sic)andtreattheleaseasrescindedandsuetoejectthelessee(C.Vda[.]DePamintuanv.Tiglao,53Phil.1).Fornonpaymentofrentals,thelessormayrescindthelease,recoverthebackrentalsandrecoverpossessionoftheleasedpremises...

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xxx

....Improvementsmadebyalesseesuchasthedefendantshereinonleasedpremisesarenotvalidreasonsfortheirretentionthereof.TheSupremeCourthasoccasiontoaddressasimilarissueinwhichitruledthat:"Thefact that petitioners allegedlymade repairs on the premises in question is not a reason for them to retain thepossession of the premises. There is no provision of lawwhich grants the lesseea right of retention over theleasedpremiseson that ground.Article448of theCivilCode, in relation toArticle546,whichprovides for fullreimbursementofuseful improvementsandretentionofthepremisesuntilreimbursementismade,appliesonlytoapossessoringoodfaith,i.e.,onewhobuildsonalandinthebeliefthatheistheownerthereof.Thisrightofretention does not apply to a mere lessee, like the petitioners, otherwise, it would always be in his power to"improve"hislandlordoutofthelattersproperty(JoseL.ChuaandCoSioEngvs.CourtofAppealsandRamonIbarra,G.R.No.109840,January21,1999)."

Although the Contract of Lease stipulates that the building and all the improvements in the leased premisesbelong to thedefendants herein, suchwill not defeat the right of theplaintiff to its property as thedefendantsfailedtopaytheirrentalsinviolationofthetermsofthecontract.Atmost,defendantscanonlyinvoke[their]rightunderArticle1678oftheNewCivilCodewhichgrantsthemtherighttobereimbursedonehalfofthevalueofthebuildingupontheterminationofthelease,or,inthealternative,toremovetheimprovementsifthelessorrefusestomakereimbursement.

Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreadsasfollows:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered, judgment ishereby rendered in favorofNayongPilipinoFoundation,andagainstthedefendantPhilippineVillageHotel,Inc[.],andallpersonsclaimingrightsunderit,orderingthelatterto:

1.VACATEthesubjectpremisesandsurrenderpossessionthereoftoplaintiff

2.PAYplaintiffitsrentalarrearagesinthesumofTWENTYSIXMILLIONONEHUNDREDEIGHTYTHREETHOUSANDTWOHUNDREDTWENTYFIVEPESOSAND14/100(P26,183,225.14)incurredasofJuly31,2001

3. PAY plaintiff the sum of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTYPESOS (P725,780.00) per month starting from August 2001 and every month thereafter by way ofreasonablecompensationfortheuseandoccupationofthepremises

4.PAYplaintiffthesumofFIFTYTHOUSANDPESOS(P50,000.00)bywayofattorneysfees[and]

5.PAYthecostsofsuit.

ThecomplaintagainstdefendantJoseMarcelE.Panlilioisherebydismissedforlackofcauseofaction.Thesaiddefendants counterclaim however is likewise dismissed as the complaint does not appear to be frivolous ormaliciouslyinstituted.

SOORDERED.5

PetitionersappealedtotheRTCwhichmodifiedtherulingoftheMeTC.Itheldthat:

...itisclearandundisputedthatappellantslesseeswereexpresslyrequiredtoconstructafirstclasshotelwithcompletefacilities.TheappellantswerealsounequivocallydeclaredintheLeaseAgreementastheowneroftheimprovementssoconstructed.Theywereevenexplicitlyallowedtousetheimprovementsandbuildingassecurityorcollateralon loansandcreditaccommodations that theLesseemaysecure for thepurposeof financing theconstructionofthebuildingandotherimprovements(Section2pars."A"to"B,"LeaseAgreement).Moreover,atime framewas setforth (sic) with respect to the duration of the lease initially for 21 years and renewable foranother25yearsinordertoenabletheappellantslesseestorecouptheirhugemoneyinvestmentsrelativetotheconstructionandmaintenanceoftheimprovements.

xxx

Consideringtherefore,theelementsofpermanencyoftheconstructionandsubstantialvalueoftheimprovementsaswellastheundispute[d]ownershipoverthelandimprovements,these,immenselyengendertheapplicationofArt. 448 of the Civil Code. The only remaining and most crucial issue to be resolved is whether or not theappellantsasbuildershaveactedingoodfaithinorderforArt.448inrelationtoArt.546oftheCivilCodemayapplywithrespecttotheirrightsoverimprovements.

xxx

.. . it isundeniablethattheimprovementofthehotelbuildingofappellants(sic)PVHIwasconstructedwiththewrittenconsentandknowledgeofappellee. In fact, itwasprecisely theprimarypurposeforwhich theyentered

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intoanagreement.Thus,itcouldnotbedeniedthatappellantswerebuildersingoodfaith.

Accordingly, andpursuant toArticle448 in relation toArt. 546of theCivilCode,plaintiffappelleehas thesoleoptionorchoice,either toappropriate thebuilding,uponpaymentofproper indemnityconsonant toArt.546orcompel the appellants to purchase the land whereon the building was erected. Until such time that plaintiffappelleehaselectedanoptionorchoice,ithasnorightofremovalordemolitionagainstappellantsunlessafterhaving selected a compulsory sale, appellants fail to pay for the land (Ignacio vs. Hilario 76 Phil. 605). This,however, is without prejudice from the parties agreeing to adjust their rights in some other way as theymaymutuallydeemfitandproper.

ThedispositiveportionofthedecisionoftheRTCreadsasfollows:

WHEREFORE,and inviewof the foregoing, judgment ishereby renderedmodifying thedecisionof [the]MTC,Branch45ofPasayCityrenderedonFebruary26,2002asfollows:

1.Orderingplaintiffappelleetosubmitwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptofacopyofthisdecisionawrittenmanifestation of the option or choice it selected, i.e., to appropriate the improvements upon payment ofproper indemnity or compulsory sale of the land whereon the hotel building of PVHI and relatedimprovementsorfacilitieswereerected

2.Directingtheplaintiffappelleetodesistand/orrefrainfromdoingactsinthefurtheranceorexerciseofitsrightsanddemolitionagainstappellantsunlessandafterhavingselectedtheoptionofcompulsorysaleandappellantsfailedtopay[and]purchasethelandwithinareasonabletimeoratsuchtimeasthiscourtwilldirect

3. Ordering defendantsappellants to pay plaintiffappellee [their] arrears in rent incurred as of July 31,2001intheamountofP26,183,225.14

4.Orderingdefendantsappellants topay toplaintiffappellee theunpaidmonthly rentals for theuseandoccupation of the premises pending this appeal from July to November 2002 only at P725,780.00 permonth

5.ThefourthandfifthdirectivesinthedispositiveportionofthetrialcourtsdecisionincludingthatthelastparagraphthereofJMEPanlilioscomplaintisherebyaffirmed

6.Thepartiesaredirectedtoadjusttheirrespectiverightsintheinterestofjusticeastheymaydeemfitandproperifnecessary.

SOORDERED.6

RespondentappealedtotheCAwhichheldthattheRTCerroneouslyappliedtherulesonaccession,asfoundinArticles448and546oftheCivilCodewhenitheldthatpetitionerswerebuildersingoodfaithand,thus,havetherighttoindemnity.TheCAheld:

Byandlarge,respondentsareadmittedlymerelesseesofthesubjectpremisesandassuch,cannotvalidlyclaimthat theyarebuilders ingoodfaith inorder tosolicit theapplicationofArticles448and546of theCivilCode intheir favor. As it is, it is glaring error on the part of the RTC to apply the aforesaid legal provisions on thesuppositionthattheimprovements,whichareofsubstantialvalue,hadbeenintroducedontheleasedpremiseswith the permission of the petitioner. To grant the respondents the right of retention and reimbursement asbuilders ingood faithmerelybecauseof thevaluableandsubstantial improvements that they introduced to theleasedpremisesplainlycontravenesthelawandsettledjurisprudentialdoctrinesandwould,asstated,allowthelesseetoeasily"improve"thelessoroutofitsproperty.

....Introductionofvaluableimprovementsontheleasedpremisesdoesnotstripthepetitionerofitsrighttoavailof recourses under the lawand the lease contract itself in caseof breach thereof.Neither does it deprive thepetitioner of its right under Article 1678 to exercise its option to acquire the improvements or to let therespondentsremovethesame.

PetitionersMotionforReconsiderationwasdenied.

Hence,thisappeal.7

Petitionersassignthefollowingerrors:

I

THE HONORABLECOURTOF APPEALSCOMMITTED AGRAVEREVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOTHOLDINGTHATPETITIONERSWEREBUILDERSINGOODFAITHOVERTHESUBSTANTIALAND

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VALUABLE IMPROVEMENTSWHICH THEY HAD INTRODUCEDON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY,THUSCOMPELLINGTHEAPPLICATIONOFARTICLE448OFTHECIVILCODEINRELATIONTOARTICLE546OFTHESAMECODE,INSTEADOFARTICLE1678OFTHECIVILCODE.

II

THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDASERIOUSREVERSIBLEERRORWHENITDISREGARDED THE FACT THAT THE LEASE CONTRACT GOVERNS THE RELATIONSHIP OFTHEPARTIESANDCONSEQUENTLYTHEPARTIESMAYBECONSIDEREDTOHAVEIMPLIEDLYWAIVEDTHEAPPLICATIONOFARTICLE1678OFTHECIVILCODETOTHEINSTANTCASE.

III

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH, THEHONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN ITOVERLOOKEDTHEFACTTHATRESPONDENTALSOACTEDINBADFAITHWHENITDIDNOTHONOR AND INSTEAD BREACHED THE LEASE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THUSBOTHPARTIESACTEDASIFTHEYAREINGOODFAITH.

IV

TOSANCTIONTHEAPPLICATIONOFARTICLE1678OFTHECIVILCODEINSTEADOFARTICLE448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 546 OF THE SAME CODEWOULD NOTONLYWREAKHAVOCANDCAUSESUBSTANTIALINJURYTOTHERIGHTSANDINTERESTSOFPETITIONER PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL, INC. WHILE RESPONDENT NAYONG PILIPINOFOUNDATION, IN COMPARISON THERETO, WOULD SUFFER ONLY SLIGHT ORINCONSEQUENTIALINJURYORLOSS,BUTALSOWOULDCONSTITUTEUNJUSTENRICHMENTON THE PART OF RESPONDENT AT GREAT EXPENSE AND GRAVE PREJUDICE OFPETITIONERS.

V

THEHONORABLECOURTOF APPEALSCOMMITTED AGRAVEREVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOTHOLDINGTHATTHECOURTSAQUODIDNOTACQUIREJURISDICTIONOVERTHEUNLAWFULDETAINER CASE FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DUE TOTHEABSENCEOFANOTICETOVACATEUPONPETITIONERS.8

First,wesettle the issueof jurisdiction.Petitionersarguethat theMeTCdidnotacquire jurisdictiontohearanddecidetheejectmentcasebecausetheyneverreceivedanydemandfromrespondenttopayrentalsandvacatethepremises,sincesuchdemandisajurisdictionalrequisite.WereiteratetherulingoftheMeTC,RTCandCA.Contrary to theclaimofpetitioners,documentaryevidenceproved thatademand letterdatedMarch26,2001wassentbyrespondentthroughregisteredmailtopetitioners,requestingthem"topaytherentalarrearsorelseitwillbeconstrainedtofiletheappropriatelegalactionandpossesstheleasedpremises."

Further,petitionersargumentthatthedemandletteris"inadequate"becauseitcontainednodemandtovacatetheleasedpremisesdoesnotpersuade.Wehaveruledthat:

....Theword"vacate"isnotatalismanicwordthatmustbeemployedinallnotices.Thealternativesinthiscaseareclearcut.Thetenantsmustpayrentalswhicharefixedandwhichbecamepayableinthepast,failingwhichtheymustmoveout.Therecanbenootherinterpretationofthenoticegiventothem.Hence,whenthepetitionersdemanded thateitherhepaysP18,000 in fivedaysoracaseofejectmentwouldbe filedagainsthim,hewasplacedonnoticetomoveoutifhedoesnotpay.Therewas,ineffect,anoticeordemandtovacate.9

Inthecaseatbar,thelanguageofthedemandletterisplainandsimple:respondentdemandedpaymentoftherental arrears amounting to P26,183,225.14 within ten days from receipt by petitioners, or respondent will beconstrainedtofileanappropriatelegalactionagainstpetitionerstorecoverthesaidamount.Thedemandletterfurther stated that respondentwill possess the leasedpremises in caseof petitioners failure to pay the rentalarrearswithin tendays.Thus, it isclear that thedemand letter is intendedasanotice topetitioners topay therentalarrears,andanoticetovacatethepremises incaseof failureofpetitionerstoperformtheirobligationtopay.

Second,weresolvethemainissueofwhethertherulesonaccession,asfoundinArticles448and546oftheCivilCode,applytotheinstantcase.

Article448andArticle546provide:

Art.448.Theownerof the landonwhichanythinghasbeenbuilt,sownorplanted ingoodfaith,shallhavethe

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right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for inArticles 546 and548, or to oblige the onewhobuilt or planted to pay the price of the land, and the onewhosowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value isconsiderablymorethanthatof thebuildingortrees.Insuchcase,heshallpayreasonablerent, if theownerofthelanddoesnotchoosetoappropriatethebuildingortreesafterproperindemnity.Thepartiesshallagreeuponthetermsoftheleaseandincaseofdisagreement,thecourtshallfixthetermsthereof.

Art.546.Necessaryexpensesshallbe refunded toeverypossessorbutonly thepossessor ingood faithmayretainthethinguntilhehasbeenreimbursedtherefor.

Usefulexpensesshallberefundedonlytothepossessoringoodfaithwiththesamerightofretention,thepersonwhohasdefeatedhiminthepossessionhavingtheoptionofrefundingtheamountoftheexpensesorofpayingtheincreaseinvaluewhichthethingmayhaveacquiredbyreasonthereof.

WeupholdtherulingoftheCA.

ThelateSenatorArturoM.Tolentino,aleadingexpertinCivilLaw,explains:

Thisarticle[Article448]ismanifestlyintendedtoapplyonlytoacasewhereonebuilds,plants,orsowsonlandinwhichhebelieveshimselftohaveaclaimoftitle,10andnottolandswheretheonlyinterestofthebuilder,planterorsoweristhatofaholder,suchasatenant.11

Inthecaseatbar,petitionershavenoadverseclaimortitletotheland.Infact,aslessees,theyrecognizethattherespondentistheowneroftheland.Whatpetitionersinsististhatbecauseoftheimprovements,whichareofsubstantial value, that they have introduced on the leased premises with the permission of respondent, theyshould be considered builders in good faith who have the right to retain possession of the property untilreimbursementbyrespondent.

WeaffirmtherulingoftheCAthatintroductionofvaluableimprovementsontheleasedpremisesdoesnotgivethe petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith.Otherwise,suchasituationwouldallowthelesseetoeasily"improve"thelessoroutofitsproperty.Wereiteratethedoctrinethatalesseeisneitherabuilderingoodfaithnorinbadfaith12thatwouldcallfortheapplicationofArticles448and546oftheCivilCode.HisrightsaregovernedbyArticle1678oftheCivilCode,whichreads:

Art. 1678. If the lesseemakes, in good faith, useful improvementswhichare suitable to theuse forwhich theleaseisintended,withoutalteringtheformorsubstanceofthepropertyleased,thelessorupontheterminationoftheleaseshallpaythelesseeonehalfofthevalueoftheimprovementsatthattime.Shouldthelessorrefusetoreimbursesaidamount, the lesseemay remove the improvements,even though theprincipal thingmaysufferdamagethereby.Heshallnot,however,causeanymoreimpairmentuponthepropertyleasedthanisnecessary.

Withregardtoornamentalexpenses,thelesseeshallnotbeentitledtoanyreimbursement,buthemayremovetheornamentalobjects,providednodamageiscausedtotheprincipalthing,andthelessordoesnotchoosetoretainthembypayingtheirvalueatthetimetheleaseisextinguished.

Under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying onehalf of the value of the improvements which thelesseemade ingood faith,whichare suitable for theuse forwhich the lease is intended, andwhichhavenotalteredtheformandsubstanceoftheland.Ontheotherhand,thelesseemayremovetheimprovementsshouldthelessorrefusetoreimburse.

Petitioners argue that to applyArticle 1678 to their casewould result to sheer injustice, as itwould amount togivingawaythehotelanditsotherstructuresatvirtuallybargainprices.Theyallegethatthevalueofthehotelanditsappurtenantfacilitiesamountstomorethantwobillionpesos,whilethemonetaryclaimofrespondentagainstthemonlyamountstoalittlemorethantwentysixmillionpesos.Thus,theycontendthatit istheleasecontractthatgoverns the relationshipof theparties,andconsequently, thepartiesmaybeconsidered tohave impliedlywaivedtheapplicationofArticle1678.

Wecannotsustainthislineofargumentbypetitioners.Basicisthedoctrinethatlawsaredeemedincorporatedineachandeverycontract.Existinglawsalwaysformpartofanycontract.Further,theleasecontractinthecaseatbarshowsnospecialkindofagreementbetweenthepartiesastohowtoproceedincasesofdefaultorbreachofthe contract. Petitioners maintain that the lease contract contains a default provision which does not giverespondenttherighttoappropriatetheimprovementsnorevictpetitionersincasesofcancellationorterminationofthecontractduetodefaultorbreachofitsterms.Theyciteparagraph10oftheleasecontract,whichprovidesthat:

10.DEFAULT. . . .Defaultshallautomatically takeplaceuponthefailureof theLESSEEtopayorperformitsobligationduring the time fixedherein for suchobligationswithout necessityof demand,or, if no time is fixed,after90daysfromthereceiptofnoticeordemandfromtheLESSOR...

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Incaseofcancellationorterminationofthiscontractduetothedefaultorbreachofitsterms,theLESSEEwillpayallreasonableattorneysfees,costsandexpensesoflitigationthatmaybeincurredbytheLESSORinenforcingitsrightsunderthiscontractoranyofitsprovisions,aswellasallunpaidrents,fees,charges,taxes,assessmentandotherswhichtheLESSORmaybeentitledto.

Petitioners assert that respondent committed a breach of the lease contract when it filed the ejectment suitagainst them.However,wefindnothing in theabovequotedprovision thatprohibits respondent toproceedthewayitdidinenforcingitsrightsaslessor.Itcanrightfullyfileforejectmenttoevictpetitioners,asitdidbeforethecourtaquo.

INVIEWWHEREOF,petitionersappealisDENIED.TheOctober4,2005DecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.74631anditsDecember22,2005ResolutionareAFFIRMED.Costsagainstpetitioners.

SOORDERED.

REYNATOS.PUNOChiefJustice

WECONCUR:

ANTONIOT.CARPIOAssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONAAssociateJustice

ADOLFOS.AZCUNAAssociateJustice

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROAssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant toSection 13,ArticleVIII of theConstitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision hadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNOChiefJustice

Footnotes

1Rollo,pp.4353.

2Id.at5556.

3Id.at144159.

4Id.at138143.

5Id.at142143.

6Id.at158159.

7Id.at1041.

8Id.at2223.

9MeTCDecision,citingGoldenGateRealtyCorporationv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,No.L74289,July31,1987,152SCRA684.

10Tolentino,ArturoM.,CommentariesandJurisprudenceontheCivilCodeofthePhilippines,vol.II,2004,citingFlorezav.Evangelista,96SCRA130Appliedtocoowner:DelCampov.Abesia,No.L49219,April15,1988,160SCRA379.

11Alburov.Villanueva,7Phil.277(1907)DeLaureanov.Adil,No.L43345,July29,1976,72SCRA148Floreza v. Evangelista,No. L25462, February 21, 1980, 96SCRA130Balucanag v. Francisco,No. L

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33422,May30,1983,122SCRA498SouthwesternUniversityv.Salvador,No.L45013,May28,1979,90SCRA318Castillov.CourtofAppeals,No.L48290,September29,1983,124SCRA808.

12SouthwesternUniversityv.Salvador,No.L45013,May28,1979,90SCRA318,ConcurringOpinionofJ.MelencioHerrera,citingAlburov.Villanueva,7Phil.277.

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art 448 nayon vs npf

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