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S J of I R

Development and Disorder

Striking a Balance

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Feature: Selection of

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e Sokolkovo Project: From

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Freedom of Technology Alexandra Cox

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School Feeding Programs in Kenya:

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Approach Nica Langinger

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Cover Photo: iStockPhoto

e Stanford Journal of International Relations, an aliate of theDepartment of International Relations at Stanford University, ispublished twice yearly.

Copyright © 2011. No material may be reproduced withoutthe consent of the Journal.



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Editors in Chief Amanda McFarlaneMitul Bhat

Layout DirectorAlison Ge

Financial DirectorBenjamin Lei

Managing DirectorDiana Chou

Section EditorsAriella AxlerIsabella Yunfei Fu

is Journal could not have been published without the support of the Department of International

Relations, and the Publications Board of the Associated Students of Stanford University. e Journal

would like to thank Professor Judith Goldstein for her guidance and assistance.

Mauricio GrandeSanjana ParikhSophie Wiepking-Brown

Associate EditorsAlexander Binnie

Alex HoltzmanBen GrafentinCharles SchroederChris KremerDerrick StatenElizabeth FairKelly DingMarcheta MarshallMark Johnson-HammerMarshall Watkins

Melissa HesselgraveNica LangingerPatrick CirenzaRaiyan KhanSamra AdeniStacey Wong

Sukrit NarulaTim NortonTony LiuUttara Sivaram

Layout EditorAlex Holtzman



e Fall issue of the Stanford Journal of International Relations, Development and Disorder:Striking a Balance, examines a wide range of issues in the arena of international politics. Fromthe political developments surrounding the Iranian nuclear program to the public-privatepartnership attempting to spur innovation in Russia, the articles and columns tackle the attemptsto balance a variety of conicting issues and interests in the pursuit of development.

First, Reagan ompson presents her paper, entitled “e E ectiveness of the Fourth Roundof Sanctions against Iran,” which examines the impact of the various US and EU unilateralsanctions against Iran. ompson nds that the sanctions have interfered with the country’seconomic growth but fail to actually cease Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Next, Alexandra Cox’s paper, “e Skolkovo Project: From the Mire of Corruption to theFreedom of Technology,” discusses the reasons that prevent Russia’s emergence as a globalbusiness power. Cox examines the e ectiveness of the proposed “Silicon Valley” project inRussia, as the latest initiative to transition the country into the competitive global businessmarket.

Lastly, Nica Langinger’s paper, “School Feeding Programs in Kenya: Transitioning to ahomegrown approach,” reveals the ineciencies in Kenya’s agricultural sector even thoughthe country possesses a sizeable sector. Langinger investigates the food-decit the country isexperiencing by providing reasons for Kenya’s failing food economy. She then introduces anapproach to mitigate the e ects of this problem on the group most heavily impacted, schoolchildren, by focusing on school-feeding programs.

e Journal launches a new feature with this issue, columns by sta on relevant internationalissues. ese columns begin with a timely column by Elizabeth Fair on the recent electionsin Tunisia and the country’s transition to becoming the rst truly democratic Arab nation.

Remaining within the sphere of the Middle East, Marshall Watkins argues that the United Statesshould overcome its di erences with Turkey and build stronger ties with the democratic Muslimnation, one that has been an increasingly important player in the region. Ariella Axler discussesthe energy needs of the US in the context of the ongoing turmoil in the Middle East and arguesfor greater diversity in energy sources and working towards energy independence. Furthereast, Raiyan Khan assesses the United States’ e orts in Pakistan, specically the increased useof drone strikes in the “Afpak” theater. Lastly, Chris Kremer looks at the historic relationshipbetween Malaysia and Indonesia, two countries closely related ethnically and linguistically butwith divergent colonial and recent histories. His look at the dynamics of that relationship isinteresting and ts smoothly with the overall theme of balance amidst competing internationalpressures.

It is our hope that these papers and columns provide thought-provoking fodder for discussionand debate. Happy reading and do write to us with feedback. Also, be sure to visit us on the webat http://sjir.stanford.edu/.

Mitul Bhat and Amanda McFarlaneEditors in Chief

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School Feeding Programs in Kenya:Transitioning to a Homegrown Approach

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Drone Strikes in Pakistan: Mitigating

Bloodshed or Amplifying it?#Z3BJZBO,IBO

18e Sokolkovo Project: From the Mireof Corruption to the Freedom of Technology

By Alexandra Cox

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e Politics, Economics, and Security of Middle Eastern Oil Supplies: A Callfor American Energy Independence

By Ariella Axler

6 e E ectiveness of the Fourth Roundof Sanctions against Iran

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Malaysia and Nusantara Heritage inthe Adik-Abang Relationship

By Christopher Kremer

e Election of Ennahda andthe Future of Tunisian Democracy

By Elizabeth Fair

Where West meets East:the Case for a Special US-Turkish Relationship

By Marshall Watkins

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by Reagan ompson

e E ectiveness of the

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In June 2010, the United Nations Security Council adopted its fourth round of sanctions against Iran. ere have been further US and EU unilateral sanctions against Iran and a large privatesector voluntary pullout from the country. But are these threeapproaches successful in slowing and ultimately ending Iran’snuclear program? A closer look reveals that these e orts arehelping to strangle the Iranian economy, but have not led to anend of the Iranian regime’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Until Russia, Germany, and China limit their trade with Iran, or until the world is ready to enact sanctions against the country’s

oil sector, Iran will continue to work toward a nuclear weapon.



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Reagan ompson is a senior studying International

Relations with a concentration in Comparative andHistorical Analysis and a minor in Chinese. She isinterested in US foreign policy and has interned the lastthree summers at the State Department. She will becompleting a thesis next year on the Chinese inuence inAfrica through the Center for International Security andCooperation’s (CISAC) Honors Program. She wrote thispaper as a student in Dr. Abbas Milani’s Political Scienceclass on Iranian politics.

This summer, the United Nations Security Counciladopted Resolution 1929 (UNSCR 1929) asthe rst part of the international community’s

three-pronged response to Iran. Following thisresolution, the United States and other nations enactedthe second prong: unilateral sanctions against Iran.e third prong is the withdrawal of private industry from Iran. As it is essential that the internationalcommunity prevent Iran from developing nuclearweapons, it is important that the sanctioning nationsare able to gauge the e ectiveness of their responses.While this recent round of sanctions has imposed asignicant burden on the Iranian regime, it has notled to any signicant changes in its behavior. Becauseother methods of pressuring Iran, such as oil sanctions,a military strike, containment, and engagement, arecurrently unfeasible, the international community isforced into an uneasy stalemate while Iran continues

to develop its nuclear program. is paper will broadly review sanctions against Iran and show that thethree-pronged approach of the United Nations (UN)sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and private pullouthas slowed Iran’s nuclear program. However, toughermeasures such as sanctions against Iran’s oil sectorare still necessary to force the regime into irreversibly dismantling its nuclear weapons program.

I will begin with a background of the previousrounds of sanctions against Iran before turning to adiscussion on the international community’s three-

pronged approach to Iran’s nuclear program. I willalso analyze the international and Iranian responsesto these sanctions. Next, I will examine the e ects of these sanctions, in light of their e ect on the economy,pressure on the regime, and ability to achieve theirobjectives. I will conclude by explaining that whilesanctions have ultimately failed in achieving their goals,they are the only realistic option currently available to

the international community.Iran has a dubious history of adhering to its

international obligations and cooperating with theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As asignatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT), Iran is allowed to engage in the peacefulproduction and use of nuclear energy. However, itssecret development of nuclear sites within its bordershas caused the world to doubt the peaceful intentionsof the country’s nuclear program. Tensions betweenIran and the IAEA reached a head in 2006 when Iranfailed to comply with IAEA requests and inspectionsWhen Iran announced that it had successfully enricheduranium, the Security Council was forced to respond.

On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Councilpassed UNSCR 1696, demanding that Iran suspendall enrichment and reprocessing, as well as researchand development, for its nuclear program. When

Iran failed to comply, the UN unanimously approvedUNSCR 1737 on December 23, 2006, calling on statesto impose a freeze on the nancial assets of persons andentities involved in Iran’s nuclear activities and to blockIran’s import and export of nuclear material. Followingfurther Iranian recalcitrance, the Security Councilunanimously voted in favor of UNSCR 1747 on March24, 2007. Resolution 1747 imposed an embargo on allIranian arms exports and extended the asset freeze andtravel ban to members of the Islamic RevolutionaryGuard Corps (IRGC). On March 3, 2008, the Security

Council unanimously approved another resolutionUNSCR 1803, which extended nancial and traderestrictions against Iran.1

Aer further resistance from Iran, the SecurityCouncil moved forward with sanctions once more andadopted UNSCR 1929 on June 9, 2010. e UnitedStates helped organize votes for this resolution, and theObama administration made signicant concessions toensure international solidarity. For example, in orderto obtain Russian support for enhanced sanctions

President Obama agreed to move a planned US missiledefense shield from Poland and the Czech Republic tothe Mediterranean.2 Brazil and Turkey voted againstthe resolution because of a deal they made with Iranin May 2010. e agreement stipulated that Iranwould ship 1,200 kilograms of low enriched uraniumto Turkey and then receive nuclear fuel for supposeduse in its medical research reactor. Turkey and Braziclaimed the deal would be more e ective than sanctions



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in getting Iran to cease its enrichment activities.3 Because Lebanon was the only Arab state on theSecurity Council, it handled its delicate situation by abstaining from voting to save face among its Westernallies while appeasing Hezbollah.4

UNSCR 1929 is the strictest round of sanctionsagainst Iran yet.5 It expanded upon previous rounds of UN sanctions and added further restrictions on Iraniantrade. First, 1929 subjects additional individuals andentities, including IRGC aliates, to an asset freeze andtravel ban. Second, the Resolution bans the provisionof nancial services and insurance to Iran. ird,if shipments are suspected of carrying prohibitedmaterial, 1929 gives countries authority to inspect theshipments, and dispose of cargo. Fourth, the resolutionbars Iran from investing in uranium mining and othernuclear activities in other countries. Finally, theresolution requires countries to insist that companies

in their country, including banks, refrain from doingbusiness with Iran if there is reason to believe thatsuch business could further Iran’s nuclear program. Tomonitor compliance with this Resolution, the Security Council established a panel of eight experts to collectand review reports with information on how countrieshave implemented the resolution.

Despite these provisions, there are severalloopholes in the resolution. For example, althoughthe resolution bans the sale of most categories of heavy arms to Iran, it only requests restraint in the sales

of light arms and does not bar sales of missiles (thatare not on the UN Registry of Conventional Arms).Furthermore, although countries have the legal rightto inspect shipments to and from Iran, the inspectingcountry must rst receive concurrence from thecountry that owns that ship.

Unilateral sanctions are the second prong of measures against Iran. e US is by far the most activeparticipant, though the European Union (EU) and othernations have followed suit.e US has been sanctioning

Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. US e

orts tocurb international investment in Iran’s energy sectorbegan in 1996 with the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA). eISA mandates US penalties on foreign companies thatmaintain business dealings with Iran’s energy sector.Aer the passage of 1929, President Obama approvedthe Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,and Divestment Act (CISADA), which expanded ISA.e CISADA attempts to restrict Iran’s ability to makeor import gasoline. Executive Orders 12959, 13324,13553, and 13382 similarly attempt to encircle Iran by

enacting US sanctions on Iranian ocials and freezingassets of those supporting terrorism and proliferationTo enforce these sanctions, the US can impose multi-million dollar nes on businesses found to be in violation of the law.

US sanctions, while strict, have not been ableto totally shut o US trade with Iran. e TreasuryDepartment has allowed around 10,000 exceptionsto US sanctions to companies like Kra and Pepsi forhumanitarian or other reasons. A State Departmentocial defended these exceptions by noting that“the legal export of popcorn, chewing gum, cakesprinkles and hot sauce is not propping up the Iraniangovernment.”6 Others acclaim, however, that favoritismhas allowed Iran economic freedom.

e US has led the way in encouraging othercountries to enact nation-specic regulations to furtherisolate Iran. e EU, Australia, Canada, India, Japan

Norway, and South Korea all have imposed restrictionsagainst Iran with varying levels of intensity. e EUhas somewhat aligned itself with the US by prohibitingEU involvement in Iran’s energy and nance sectorsWithin the EU, however, there are varying levels ofcooperation, as I will outline later. Russia and Chinahave not enacted their own unilateral sanctions againstIran. As noted above, both these countries supportthe rst pronged attack against Iran, UN sanctionsbut are much less enthusiastic about the second andthird prongs. Consequently, Russian and Chinese trade

with Iran is a signicant reason why the regime is stilnancially aoat.

e third prong is private sector voluntarypullout from Iran. is response is motivated by theUN sanctions, but is not required by law. Financialinstitutions, energy companies, and businesses makechoices based on cost/benet analysis and their strategythus far seems to be to prevent Iran, a country relianton global trade, from being able to do business outsideits borders. e US Treasury Department began by

blacklisting the largest Iranian

nancial institutionsand banks in other nations such as Britain, FranceGermany, Japan, China, Malaysia, Bahrain, and Italyfollowed suit. e withdrawal of more than 80 largenancial institutions such as UBS, HSBC, and AGhas begun to wreck havoc on Iran’s fragile nanciasituation. Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Ricenoted that while these actions were not sanctions in thetraditional sense, they were having similar e ects andworking towards the same goals.7



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e e ect of private pullout is evident in themajor industries, including the energy sector. Majorgasoline suppliers such as BP, Glencore, Lukoil, RelianceIndustries, Royal Dutch Shell, Total, Tragura, and Vitolhave stopped dealing with Iran. Among many others,Halliburton, GE, Huntsman Chemicals, Kia, SiemensAG, Mercedes Benz, Toyota, and yssen-Krupphaveocially ceased doing business in Iran.8 However,because there are few enforcement mechanisms,it is dicult to determine the e ectiveness of thisthird. ere have been several accusations that thesecompanies are making statements against Iran, whilestill engaging in clandestine trade with the country.e ultimate purpose of the three-pronged approachof UN sanctions, unilateral sanctions, and privatepullout is to ensure that Iran does not develop a nuclearweapon. e hope is that by making it more expensive

portray the international community as a weak forcethat desires to unfairly discriminate against Iran andhurt its people.

In contrast to Ahmadinejad, other Iranianleaders understand the gravity of the sanctionsFormer President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani warnedthe regime “to take the sanctions seriously and not as a joke,” recognizing the strictness of the world’s responseto Iran.11 Former Prime Minister and leader of theGreen Movement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi similarlyagree with Rafsanjani on the severity of these sanctionsOne of his senior advisors said that the sanctionswould have a “clear e ect on the day to day lives of thepeople.”12

With a grasp of the response to Iran, I now turnto examine the sanctions’ e ectiveness based on theirimpact on the economy, pressure on the regime, and

and dicult for Iran to obtain industrial

equipment and nuclear supplies, thecountry’s nuclear program will besubstantially slowed and the regimewill be forced to abandon its nuclearweapon ambitions. us, the sanctionshope to change the regime’s cost-benetcalculus of its nuclear program. einternational community would alsolike to see the Iranian public voice theirdissatisfaction with the Iranian regimeand state of the economy, which wouldpush the regime towards compromise.Further, the international community wants to ensure the integrity of the international treaty system and is thus punishing Iran for its decision toignore its NPT obligations.

Now with an understanding of the three-pronged approach to Iran, we can examine how Iranhas responded. Statements by Iranian leaders generally fall into two categories: those that recognize the impactof the sanctions, and those that refuse to acknowledge

their in

uence. A

er passage of UNSCR 1929, SupremeLeader Ayatollah Khamenei stated that sanctions have “noe ect on the people’s livelihood.”9 President MahmoudAhmadinejad said the sanctions “are annoying ies, like aused tissue.”10 While there is some truth in his statementthat sanctions have been tried in the past and havefailed, his overly colorful language points to his refusalto acknowledge the real pain sanctions are inicting onIran. Ahmadinejad further stated that sanctions actually make Iran stronger by encouraging self-suciency andtechnical progress. e Iranian regime is attempting to

completion of stated objectives. When evaluatingwhether or not sanctions have accomplished theirgoals, it is important to remember that it takes years forsanctions to a ect a nation. e cumulative e ect ofyears of sanctions is only starting to have a strongnegative impact on the Iranian economy. It is dicultto determine direct causality, but it is safe to assumethat sanctions have exacerbated the problems from

economic and political mismanagement of the regimeAnalysis is also made dicult by the fact that theregime has not released up-to-date numbers oneconomic data such as gross domestic product (GDP)or household expenditures. By looking at economicdata such as consumer prices, export prices, oil exportsand imports, the subsidy program, and GDP, it is clearthat the sanctions are having a strangling e ect onIran’s economy.

Iran’s economy is a mess. e regime claimsthat unemployment is 13.2 percent13 but opposition



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leaders insist that it is more likely around 20 percent.14 Similarly, the Central Bank says that ination is at 14percent,15 but some economic data indicates the ratecould be twice as high.16 e Iranian consumer priceindex (CPI), which measures the changes in the pricelevel of consumer goods and services, has skyrocketedin the past years. is means that consumer pricesare soaring and businesses are nding it increasingly dicult to make ends meet. According to the IranianCentral Bank, the general CPI for urban Iranians has jumped 12.9 percent from 2009-2010. In comparison,the US CPI increased 1.4 percent for this same timeperiod.17 e cost of food and beverages in Iran rosealmost 20 percent from 2009-2010. As Figure 1 shows,since about March 2002 until March 2011, Iran’s CPIhas been on a rapid rise.18 As the cost of living in Iranincreases, there is also greater chance for domesticunrest.

For the international strategy to be successful,it is essential that the Iranian people see the regime, notsanctioning nations as the reason for these economicproblems. The world hopes that as Iranian citizensfind it increasingly difficult to afford food, clothing,water, and other basic necessities, they will turnagainst the regime. If a backlash occurs, and Iraniansbegin to blame other nations for their economicmalaise, the purpose behind much of the sanctionswill no longer be valid. Currently, it seems that theIranian public rightly blames their government for the

economic management. The sanctions are workingto economically isolate Iran and squeeze it from theglobal market.

High levels of economic distress stoke existinglevels of social unrest. With about 60 percent of the

that the adverse business environment due to sanctionscontributed to the event. The economic disturbancecaused by the sanctions is also causing internal politicadisturbance. There have been several arrests osupposed “nuclear spies” and President Ahmadinejadfired Foreign Minister Mannouchehr Mottaki forfailing to prevent the imposition of sanctions, thoughthis move was also politically motivated. In responseto the economy’s poor performance, the IranianFinance Minister also fired six cabinet ministers and

two Central Bank governors.Iran is increasingly dependent on oil exports

for its economic livelihood, but sanctions areworking to curtail Tehran’s revenues. As a result omismanagement and the inability to procure Westerntechnology, Iran’s oil production has fallen from about4.1 million barrels a day in the mid-2000s to only 3.8million barrels a day in 2010. The graph on the rightshows this precipitous drop. Figure 2 shows that whileIran’s oil production has been cyclical since sanctions

Iranian populationunder 30, highunemployment meansthat many youngadults are willing

to participate inopposition movementsand advocate change.Although the regimeattempts to suppress

any uprisings, there is evidence of increasing domesticand political unrest. In July 2010, one month after thepassage of UNSCR 1929, there was a two-week strikein Tehran by bazaar merchants. Ostensibly it was aprotest against an increase in taxation, but it is likely



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were first imposed in 2006, there has been a generaldecrease in the total production. Figure 3 shows thatIran’s oil-pumping capacity is expected to declineabout 18 percent from current levels of 3.8 millionbarrels a day to 3.3 million barrels a day in 2015. Thisdecrease in production translates into fewer exports ascountries attempt to diversify their oil supply and turnaway from Iran and less revenue for the regime.

These economic pressures are forcing changesin the way the Iranian government is run. In orderto get basic goods, the government must pay bribes,middlemen, and black market fees. At the end of 2010,the regime began to phase out its substantial subsidy program. It is likely that the government was forcedto end these subsidies due to declining oil revenuesand the increasing cost of doing business in theinternational market. The government began with areduction in subsidies on gas and bread. Immediately,

the price of bread spiked from 15 cents to 40 cents.The biggest cuts and jumps in prices are likely yet tocome. This huge increase has the potential to turn theIranian people against the regime, though there has

900,000 a day. Further, investment in Iran’s energysector has decreased dramatically. All foreign firmshave pulled out of the South Pars Gas Field Project,which had the potential to greatly grow Iran’s naturalgas production.

Increases in consumer prices and decline in oilproduction and exports all point to a declining grossdomestic product (GDP). Although the numbers aredifficult to determine, it is clear that each successiveround of sanctions lowers Iran’s GDP. Figure 4 showsIran’s GDP growth from 1980 to the present. Eachdotted vertical line indicates new international or USsanctions against Iran. Although GDP growth hasbeen fairly stable over the past decade, predictions forthe present and future do not look promising.

In addition to the economic problems abovethe Iranian regime faces further commerce issuesTehran is unable to attract desperately needed foreign

investment. It is estimated that sanctions havedeterred about $50 billion in investment in Iran’senergy sector. Soon after the passage of 1929, Lloyd’sof Britain announced that it would cease to insureIranian ships and gasoline. This makes internationatrade substantially more difficult as firms areincreasingly wary of the risks associated with doingbusiness with Iran. The US Treasury Department’ssanction of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines(IRISL), the regime’s shipping company of choice, isharming Iran’s ability to ship goods. * There is unrest

among merchants whose trouble obtaining financinginsurance, and shipping is driving up their costs by anestimated 40 percent. As the cost of doing businessin Iran increases substantially, it becomes increasinglydifficult to provide employment and goods for acountry of almost 73 million.

Undersecretary of Treasury Stuart Levey noted“Iran is effectively unable to access financial servicesfrom reputable banks and is increasingly unable toconduct major transactions in dollars or Euros.” In

addition to the withdrawal of large banks noted abovethere seems to be a regional movement against Iran aswell. For example, out of the 48 banks in Dubai, albut a few have cut off new business with Iranian bankscited in UN resolutions. These decisions have widereaching effects on the Iranian economy. When theUnited Arab Emirates, a major Iranian financial hub,began restricting transactions with Iranian banks inSeptember 2010, the value of the rial, Iran’s currencyfell by about 15 percent.

been little public unrest as of yet. International sanctionsare forcing the regime to make tough economic decisionsthat further erode its domestic standing. Although thegovernment has offered payments to the lower classes,it is only small amount that few Iranians have actually

received.Although Iran is home to the world’s third largest oilreserves, it does not have the refinement capacity toproduce its own fuel and thus it imports a sizeableamount of gasoline. As many major oil companies haverefused to do business with Iran, it has faced difficulty inprocuring enough fuel to run the country. It is estimatedthat since the imposition of the US Comprehensive IranSanctions Act in 2010, gas deliveries to Iran have fallen75 percent, from about 3.5 million barrels a day to about



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To review, increases in consumer prices pointto the cultivation of a difficult business environmentin Iran, which is stoking domestic unrest. Decreasesin oil production and exports as well as declining GDPhave meant a drop in government revenue, promptingthe end of the subsidy program. Fewer oil imports andother commercial strains are further indicators of thetangible impacts sanctions are having on the Iranianeconomy and regime.

Despite this progress, there is evidence thatsubversion and illegal activity are allowing Iran tocontinue to function economically and to expand itsnuclear program. For example, a wide range of USmilitary and dual-use goods are illegally transshippedto Iran through the UAE, Malaysia, and Singapore.There have been several international cases of thissubversion. In a case in 2009, a well-connected Indianbusinessman secretly provided cladding, thermal

insulation, and ancillary equipment to Iran in a variety of shipments. Frighteningly, all of those materials canbe used in the construction of a nuclear reactor. Furtherevidence indicates that many Iranians in Azerbaijanare involved in Iranian regime-related profit making,sanctions busting, and money laundering.

The practice of establishing front companiesand reshipping materials to Iran also allows the regimeto circumvent sanctions. In 2008, it is estimated that

tell another story.The UAE is not the only culprit however. Several othernations have been increasing their trade with Iraneven while the UN and many other countries seek toeconomically isolate Iran as a way to encourage non-proliferation. According to Karim Sadjadpour, anassociate at the Carnegie Endowment, as trade between

to 2.5 billion Euros in less than ayear from January-August 2010

The German-Iranian Chamber ofIndustry and Commerce in Tehranlists 200 German firms in Iran thatare “making a major contributionto sustaining the present Iranianregime.”

While evidence clearlysuggests that sanctions are negativelyaffecting the Iranian economy andare pressuring the regime to change

there are substantial and successfuefforts to evade sanctions. In orderto judge the true effectiveness of the sanctions, onemust look at the original intentions of the sanctionsFrom the beginning of this paper, I noted that theprimary international objective was to prevent Iranfrom developing nuclear weapons. Sanctions are away to slow its development and ultimately lead to itsend. Has the three-pronged approach of UN sanctionsunilateral sanctions, and private pullout slowed Iran’snuclear program? Based on preliminary analysis, yes

80 percent of the trade between the UAE and Iran wasmade up of goods that were re-exported from the UAE.By shipping goods to the UAE and then shipping them toIran, the regime is able to evade sanctions. Thousands of front-companies in Dubai exist solely to get contrabandmaterials into Iran. To some, Dubai is known as “Iran’sbackdoor to the West” and provides Iran with everythingfrom household goods to military equipment. While theUAE officially supports the sanctions, its porous borders

Iran and the EU has declined for thepast years Iranian trade with Chinahas increased substantially. China is very dependent on Iranian oil and it ispredicted that trade between Iran andChina will hit $50 billion by 2015.

Figure 5 shows how trade betweenIran and other nations has changed since2003. China, India, South Korea andthe UAE show huge increases. In orderfor sanctions to be truly effective, every

nation needs to be cutting back on itstrade with Iran, not increasing it. Therehave been further changes since Figure5’s publication in 2009. Although itshows that German trade with Iran decreased from2003-2009, there is evidence to suggest that therehas actually been an increase in trade since 2009The German newspaper Handelsblatt reported thatexports from Germany to Iran increased 11.6 percent



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the sanctions have slowed the program, but not to asatisfactory level. On one hand, sanctions have madeit increasingly difficult for Iran to acquire criticalinputs for uranium enrichment, such as carbon fiberand a type of high-strength steel. On the other, eachday that passes is another opportunity for Iran todevelop its nuclear weapons program and figure outways to circumvent sanctions. Figure 6 shows that inFebruary 2008, Iran produced about 43 kilograms of low-enriched uranium and that the amount jumpedto almost 120 kilograms in April 2010. Despite all thesanctions, Iran has continued to enrich uranium and itsnuclear stockpile is increasing rapidly. With regards toconverting its nuclear materials into weapons, Iranianmissile capacity has been increasing as well. Furthermore, since 1985, Iranian missile range has also beensteadily improving, despite frequent sanctions.

As of yet, sanctions have failed to curtail the

regime’s nuclear program. Tehran seems as obstinateas ever in its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Publicoutcry has also failed to develop to a point where itcan force the regime to change directions on this issue.Fortunately, sanctions do not seem to be unfairly targeting the civilian population and Iranian citizensstill blame the regime for their economic situation.

Sanctions have helped show the Iranian regimethe pain of isolation. As private companies and countriesrefuse to do business with Iran, it is becoming clearerthat Tehran’s list of friends is quickly shortening. It is

evident also that by punishing Iran the internationalcommunity has helped ensure the integrity of theinternational treaty system, even while nations such asChina and Germany continually undermine that offer.Nevertheless, the offer of engagement still stands andthere is hope that Iran may one day reintegrate into theinternational community if it fulfills its internationalobligations.

Despite these positive results, however,significant loopholes remain. Subversion tactics

are hard to suppress and Iranian oil continues toflow amidst private withdrawal and a sufferingeconomy. Ultimately, there is inadequate internationalcommitment to truly isolate Iran. While there areestimates that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon until2015, it is entirely undesirable for Iran to ever have sucha weapon.

Two things are needed for internationalsanctions to effectively stop Iran’s nuclear program.First, there must be real international unity andsolidarity of mission in isolating Iran. Russia, Germany,

and China need to move to limit their trade with IranEach nation needs to enact its own strict sanctionsagainst Iran. Countries such as the UAE should nottolerate the subversion of sanctions. Second, the Iranianpeople must demand change. Recent uprisings in theMiddle East provide a glimmer of hope that domesticunrest can be a powerful tool against dictators.

Sanctions against Iran’s oil industry might bethe next step the international community is forcedto take against Iran. Iran currently exports about 2.5million barrels of oil a day, and the loss of this supplywould send global prices skyrocketing. In realityhowever, the world lacks preference and money forthis type of action. Additionally, because oil revenuesmake up about 80 percent of the government’s budgeta true embargo on Iranian oil would certainly harmthe civilian population. The sanctioning nations wouldhave to be sure to prevent any domestic blowback

against the sanctions because sanctions are neverintended to target innocent civilians. Althoughsanctions against Iran’s energy sector are currentlyunfeasible, it is plausible to enforce sanctions thathinder the regime’s ability to act. For example, the U.Ncould sanction monitoring technology that the regimeuses to spy on its people. Firms should be barred frommaking trades like Nokia did in 2008, which providedthe regime with the technology needed to monitor andcontrol telephone calls.

The international community’s three-pronged

approach to Iran’s nuclear program consisting ofUNSCR 1929, unilateral sanctions, and the privatepullout have slowed Iran’s nuclear program. Increasesin consumer prices, decreases in oil production andexports, the end of the subsidy program, decreasing oiimports, declining GDP and other commercial strainsshow that the sanctions are strangling Iran’s economyHowever, while sanctions have kept Tehran weak, theyhave not forced a fundamental change in the country’spolicies. Sanctions are the only realistic option

currently available to the international community butcurrently unsuccessful due to significant loopholesSanctions against Iran’s oil sector have the potentialto bring the regime to its knees but are currentlyinfeasible. Iran’s nuclear program has proceeded dueto a lack of international unity. Countries such asRussia, Germany, and China need to take their ownindependent steps to ensure Iran does not develop thebomb.



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1Smith, “Iran’s Nuclear Program”

2Philip “Russia Says It Will Join Sanctions”

3BBC “Iran Signs Nuclear Deal”

4Kollock “Lebanon Cautions on Iran Sanctions”

5Warner “Examining the E ects”

6Johnson, “Treasury Defends 10,000 Exceptions”

7Wright “Stuart Levey’s War”

8Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 329Erdbrink, “Iran’s Khamenei Says”

10A.P. “UN Approves New Sanctions”

Levey “Remarks”11e Green Voice of Freedom “Mousavi Advisor”

12Freedom Messenger “Real Unemployment Level”

13Inside of Iran “Conicting Reports on Iran’s Unemployment”

14Daily Star “Iran Central Bank Governor Says Ination Rate Rose”

15Newsweek “In Iran, Ination Couldreaten Regime”

16Bureau of Labor Statistics “Consumer Price Index”

17Central Bank “Consumer Price Index”

18Sadjadpour Lecture

19Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 50


21Wright “Stuart Levey’s War”22Blas “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports”

23Blas “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports”



26BBC “Squeezing Iran” (For an interactive version of the graphic, go tohttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10727616)



* For a short video on this topic, see http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/world/middleeast/08sanctions.html.

29Murphy, “Iran’s Getaway”

30Levey “Remarks”

31Wright “Stuart Levey’s War”

32

Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 4933GAO “Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed”

34Institute for Science and International Security, “State DepartmentCables”

35Pan Armenian Net, “Iranians in Baku Involved in Money LaunderingActivities”

36DiPaola, “Iran May Invade UN Sanctions”

Foroohar “Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions”37

Tehran Times, “Iran-China Trade”38

Blas “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil”39

Tehran Times, “Iran-Germany Trade”40

Kuntzel “Who Is Who in German Trade”41

Levinson, “Sanctions Slow Iran’s Warhead Capacity”42

Financial Times “Are Iran Nuclear Sanctions Working?”43

Katzman “Iran Sanctions” pg. 244Cellan-Jones “Hi-Tech Helps Iran”

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America.gov “Clinton: Iran Sanctions Working, Need to be Maintained”US Department of State, January 10, 2010 http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2011/January/20110110120608nehpets4.630679e-02.html.

Anton, Michael “Iran and the Costs of Containment” National Review,May 3, 2010. http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229663/iran-and-costs-containment-michael-anton.

Armagost, Jason “Iran and the Use of Force” Lecture to PS114S, January 12, 2010.

Associated Press “UN Approves New Sanctions Against Iran” Fox News.June 9, 2010. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/06/09/diplomats-say-russia-france-dismiss-turkish-brazilian-proposal-iranian-nuclear/.

BBC “Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel Deal with Iran” May 17, 2010. http://newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi/8685846.stm.

BBC “Squeezing Iran: Oil and Sanctions” July 26, 2010. http://www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10727616.BBC “Timeline: Iran-US Ties” January 16, 2009 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3362443.stm.

Blas, Javier “Sanctions Put Choker on Iran Oil Exports”e FinancialTimes, September 13, 2010. http://www..com/cms/s/0/8efd517e-bf5d-11df-965a-00144feab49a.html##axzz1GYK6dIln.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor “Consumer PriceIndex” News Release, January 2011 www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpipdf.

Bruno, Greg “e Lengthening List of Iran Sanctions”, Council onForeign Relations, June 28, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/lengtheninglist-iran-sanctions/p20258.

Byman, Daniel; Indyk, Martin; Maloney, Suzanne; O’Hanlon, Michael;Riedel, Bruce “Which Path to Persia” e Brookings Institution, June

2009.Cellan-Jones, Rory “Hi-Tech Helps Iran Monitoring” BBC News. June22, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8112550.stm.

Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran “Consumer Price Indexfor All Urban Customers Azar 1389” January 2011 http://www.cbi.ir/category/1624.aspx.

Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran “Export Price Index inIran” February 2011, http://www.cbi.ir/category/1618.aspx.

Daily Star “Iran Central Bank Governor Says Ination Rate Rose to 14Percent: IRNA”, April 30, 2011.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Apr/30/Iran-central-bank-governor-says-ination-rate-rose-to-14-percent-IRNA.ashx#axzz1Kxf9qXax.

Dareini, Ali Akbar “Ahmadinejad: Sanctions Make Iran Stronger”e Hungton Post, April 3, 2010, http://www.hungtonpost.com/2010/04/03/ahmadinejad-sanctions-mak_n_524425.html.

DiPaola, Anthony; Meyer, Henry “Iran May Evade UN Sanctions asUAE Delivers Fuel” Bloomberg News, October 29, 2009 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axOOTd6n4eBw.

Erdbrink,omas “Iran’s Khamenei Says Sanctions Appear Aimed atCreating Division”e Washington Post, October 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2010101904749.html.

Faucon, Benoit; Swartz, Spencer “Iran’s Falling Oil Output Means LessRevenue, Clout” June 26, 2010 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704569204575328851816763476.html.

Financial Times “Are Iran Nuclear Sanctions Working?” July 12, 2010.www..com/cms/s/0/994a262a-8dc6-11df-9153-00144feab49a.html.

Foroohar, Kambiz “Dubai Helps Iran Evade Sanctions as SmugglersIgnore US Laws” Bloomberg News, January 25, 2010

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=av5smtYe_DDA.

Freedom Messenger, “Real Unemployment Level in Iran Is Higher thanOcial Data” April 22, 2011.

http://www.freedomessenger.com/real-unemployment-level-in-iran-higher-than-ocial-data/.

Government Accountability Oce “Complete and Timely LicensingData Needed to Strengthen Enforcement of Export Restrictions”March 2010 www.gao.gov/new.items/d10375.pdf.

Inside of Iran “Conicting Reports on Iran’s Unemployment Rate” April7, 2011. http://www.insideoran.org/en/cultureaart/629-conicting-reports-on-irans-unemployment-rate.html.



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Institute for Science and International Security, “State DepartmentCables: Stopping Iran’s and North Korea’s Illicit Procurement for theirNuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs” December 10, 2010,

http://www.isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/state-department-cables-stopping-irans-and-north-koreas-illicit-procurement/.

Johnson, Bridget “Treasury Defends 10,000 Exceptions to Iran”e Hill,December 24, 2010. http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-brieng-room/news/135045-treasury-defends-10000-exceptions-to-iran-other-sanctions.

Katzman, Kenneth “Iran Sanctions” Congressional Research Service,February 3, 2011, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.Kollock, Paige “Lebanon Cautions on Iran Sanctions” Lebanon Now.

February 23, 2010. http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=148659.

Kuntzel, Matthias “Who Is Who in German Trade with Iran” February 4, 2010. http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/who-is-who-in-german-trade-with-iran.

Gottemoeller, Rose “e Evolution of Sanctions in Practice andeory”Survival Vol. 29 No. 4, Winter 2007-8.

e Green Voice of Freedom “Mousavi Advisor: Ahmadinejad Does NotRepresent Iranian People” October 12, 2010. http://en.irangreenvoice.com/article/2010/oct/12/2392.

Levey, Stuart “Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies” September 20, 2010. http://useu.usmission.gov/levey_092010.html.Levinson, Charles; Solomon, Jay “Sanctions Slow Iran’s Warhead

Capacity”e Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704739504576067911497955494.html.

MacFarquhar, Neil “UN Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran” eNew York Times, June 9, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/middleeast/10sanctions.html.

Murphy, Brian “Iran’s Gateway in Dubai Highlights Sanctions’ Bite”Associated Press, Yahoo News, February 1, 2011 http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110201/ap_on_bi_ge/ml_iran_sanctions_gateway_dubai.

Newsweek “In Iran, Ination Could reaten Regime” February 5, 2010.http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/wealth-of-nations/2010/02/05/in-iran-ination-could-threaten-regime.html.

Pan Armenian Net, “Iranians in Baku Involved in Money LaunderingActivities” November 29, 2010, http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/57586/Iranians_in_Baku_involved_in_money_laundering_activities.

Philip, Catherine “Russia Says It Will Join Sanctions against Iran” eSunday Times, September 24, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6846837.ece.

Sadjadpour, Karim, Lecture delivered on March 8, 2010, StanfordUniversity.

Sanger, David “Debate Grows on Nuclear Containment of Iran”e New York Times, March 13, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/weekinreview/14sanger.html.

Smith, Ben “Iran’s Nuclear Program, and Sanctions” International A airsand Defense Section, Library of the House of Commons, October 13,2010, www.nti.org/e_research/source_docs/uk/docs/03.pdf.

Tehran Times, “Iran-China Trade to Hit $50 Billion” June 12, 2010,http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=221174.

Tehran Times, “Iran-Germany Trade Prospering” November 4, 2010,http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=229816.

Wall, Christopher “Weak Tea” Foreign Policy. June 8, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/08/weak_tea.

Warner, Margaret “Examining the E ects of Economic Sanctions onIran” PBS News Hour broadcast. September 21, 2010. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec10/iran_09-21.html.

Wikileaks, “Iranian Source Names U.K.-Registered Company as IranSanctions-Buster Possibly Supporting Busheir Project” 09BAKU179,March 6, 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09BAKU179.html.

Wikileaks, “Iran’s Money Launderers, Sanctions-Busters, andRevolutionary Guard Money Makers: A Baku Sampler” 09BAKU175,March 6, 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/03/09BAKU175.html.

Wright, Robin “Stuart Levey’s War” e New York Times Magazine,October 31, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/magazine/02IRAN-t.html?pagewanted=all.



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US-Pakistan relations can worsen if drone strikes continue to harm civilians

Photo courtesy of Flikr Creative Commons user Travlr

by Raiyan Khan

%SPOF4USJLFTJO1BLJTUBO.JUJHBUJOH#MPPETIFEPS"NQMJGZJOHJU



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Tariq Aziz and his cousin Waheed Khan died ina Hellre missile attack launched by the CIA,bringing their aunt back to their native Pakistani

village last Monday. Tariq was 16 years old. His cousinwas only 12.1 eir deaths spurred 2,000 Pakistanis tostage a protest outside of the parliament building onNovember 42 and shed light on the fading ecacy of

drone tactics in United States foreign policy.In the past three years, dronology in the US

has undergone signicant changes in funding andapplication. Under Obama’s presidency, the use of drone strikes has escalated, in conjunction with analarming number of civilian casualties. Yet many individuals cannot accept this to be true, as thus far,US policy has been to err on the side of secrecy, leavingthe public in the dark regarding the details of the use of these drone strikes. is leaves the media to ll in theblanks, and as a result various news sources o er a wide

spectrum of statistics in terms of the e ectiveness of drone attacks – numbers ranging anywhere from a 98%civilian casualty rate to a 10% civilian casualty rate.3

Lack of ocial statements coupled with disingenuousreporting has led to a warped understanding of thecurrent situation.is creates tension on all sides of thesituation, from the US public to the Pakistani civilians.

In an attempt to construct an accurate portrayalof drone e ectiveness, Peter Bergen, a national security analyst at CNN and Katherine Tiedemann, policy

analyst at the New America Foundation analyzedthe reporting of civilian deaths from multiple mediaorganizations to predict the true civilian fatality rate as32%, or around a third of deaths resulting from droneattacks.4 is number, while on the lower end of thespectrum, is still a gruesome statistic. At what civilianfatality rate will the US government rethink their dronestrike strategy – 50%? 60%? 75%?

An aggressive drone campaign was developedwith good intentions, including the protection of USlives and the mitigation of damages to innocent people.

Drone strikes have been used to assassinate militantswho have been responsible for the murder of over 4,000Pakistani people.5 As seen in Tariq and Waheed’s casehowever, this campaign is not only inconsistent but alsoactually produces counterproductive e ects, creatinga pernicious cycle of civilian harm and consequently inspiring more hatred toward the US.

e worsening conditions in US-Pakistanrelations since the assassination of Osama Bin

Laden signals the ine ectiveness of Barack Obama’s

problematic stanceon aerial dronestrikes.6 If the US isto foster sustainablefriendships with thePakistani populacethen it needs torestructure theirdrone use policyUltimately, if it isto foster beneciadiscourse betweenboth nations, thenseparate tacticsmust be adoptedby United States

g o v e r n m e n ta g e n c i e sAttempting to

conduct negotiations in an emotionally chargedatmosphere only provokes further disagreement andtriggers irrational demands by both parties. Insteadadopting a policy of greater transparency regardingdrone strike information may provide feasible benetsin allowing all sides to reach an accurate understandingof the situation at hand. Drone strikes may be asituational necessity due to lack of alternatives, or

may be considered unwarranted. However, withouta complete picture, especially one for the Pakistanpeople, drone attacks will continue to be met withcriticism and protest.

R

1 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/04/opinion/in-pakistan-drones-kill-our-innocent-allies.html?_r=1

2http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2011/10/201110307584794254.html

3 http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/les/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf

4 Ibid.

5 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/21/the_hidden_war?page=0,5

6 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html

US drone strikes have escalatedin the past few years

Photo courtesy of Flickr

Creative Commons user james_gordon_los_angeles



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e newly built Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management

Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user Cea

by Alexandra Cox

ćF4LPMLPWP1SPKFDU'SPNUIF.JSFPG$PSSVQUJPO

UPUIF'SFFEPNPG5FDIOPMPHZ

e global nancial crisis of the past two years exposed Russia’s economy asdependent on oil, gas, and metallurgy, and devoid of the innovative advancesthat have come to de ne successful western nations. To promote research and

development in the spheres of alternative energy sources and technology, Russiais attempting to create a “Silicon Valley” in Skolkovo, a city west of Moscow.However, the legacy of corruption and bribery remains an impediment to Russia’sreemergence as a superpower in the modern business world. Only by combating corruption and cultivating an open political and business environment canRussia hope to develop an atmosphere in which a Skolkovo project can succeed.



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Alexandra Cox is a sophomore studying Economics with aminor in international relations. She is interested in UnitedStates Foreign Policy, particularly with regards to Russia.She has researched and produced documentary lmsabout the Cold War and hopes to continue researchingRussia's emergence from Communism. Alexandra wrotethis paper for her freshman year Program in Writing andRhetoric course.

R ussia knows that it needs business. If it wishesto remain competitive in the internationaleconomy Russia must develop business in the

sectors of technology and innovation (Laquer 155).However, it must rst address a legacy of corruption.As Robert K. Massie notes in his biography of Peter theGreat, “Bribery and embezzlement were traditional inRussian public life, and public service was routinely looked upon as a means of gaining private prot”(Massie 781). Although Massie’s statement describesthe country as it was three centuries ago, it could justas easily portray the Russia of today. In October 2010,the current President of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev,announced that one trillion rubles, or roughly thirty-three billion U.S. dollars, disappear annually ongovernment contracts (Andersen par. 5). is sumamounts to three percent of Russia’s GDP (Iofee par. 2).Despite the great uctuations in Russia’s history since

the days of Peter the Great, the legacy of bribery andcorruption remains a powerful impediment to Russia’sreemergence as a superpower in the modern businessworld. Russia’s latest initiative to create a “SiliconValley” of sorts in Skolkovo, a city twelve miles west of Moscow, has the potential to provide the impetus forRussia to transition into the digital age.

e global nancial crisis of the past twoyears exposed Russia’s dependence on oil, gas, andmetallurgy, and its lack of innovative advancementswhen compared to successful western nations (155). In

a world increasingly looking toward “green” initiatives,Russia’s dependence on its limited natural resourcesplaces its economy in a precarious situation (ornock and Whitaker par. 13). By acknowledging his country’sneed to promote research in technology and alternativeenergy sources in order to keep up with other nations,President Dmitri Medvedev hopes to fundamentally alter the foundation of the Russian economy. He stated,“During the next decade, Russia should become acountry in which the welfare and the good quality of

life is ensured by its intellectual rather than naturalresources, its innovative economy” (Medvedev, Solash

par. 16). Initiated by the government, the Skolkovoproject attempts to diversify Russia’s homogenouseconomy and launch Russia into the modern businessworld. Nonetheless, questions remain as to thelegitimacy of such an endeavor within the Russianpolitical system.

When Mikhail Gorbachev became GeneraSecretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unionin March 1985, he brought with him a plea for arestructuring of the Soviet system, called perestroika(Gorbachev 1). “Perestroika is an urgent necessityarising from the profound processes of development inour socialist society” (1). For nearly a century leadingup to Gorbachev’s perestroika reforms, all privateenterprise within Russia was banned or centralizedunder state ownership (ornock and Whitaker par. 9)Entrepreneurship and private enterprise were virtuallynonexistent in Soviet Russia. ough the Soviet Union

had attained superpower status as a military forcebecome the foremost producer of steel and oil, andled the world in space exploration, its economy wasstagnant as a result of Communist collectivizatione orts (Jones and Mosko 1).

With perestroika, Russia witnessed a looseningof its strict communistic practices. One of thefoundations of the perestroika reforms was a legalizedprivate economy, which Gorbachev introducedthrough cooperatives, permitting private ownershipof businesses for the rst time in nearly half a century

Gorbachev recognized that private enterprise couldmeet needs not being met by the state (Jones andMosko 12). Yet private enterprise meant private gainand private gain was directly related to capitalism andexploitation (12).

Aer the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991the Russian government began to pass legislation totransition from the centralized Soviet economy to a free-market system.e 1995 law entitled “On State Supportfor Small Business in the Russian Federation” called

for government “assistance with modern equipmentand technologies including the creation of a networkof business technoparks and business incubators” tostimulate the newly formed small-business sector ofthe economy. ough corruption in the early years ofthe Russian Federation and the nancial crisis of 1998prevented these reforms from inducing signicantchange, the reforms laid the foundation for the conceptof Skolkovo (ornock and Whitaker par. 9).

Following the election of President VladimirPutin in 1999, Russia continued an ideological movement



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away from its Soviet system. In his introductory speech,Putin stated, “It needs to be recognized that withoutthe development of [the small business] sector in thecountry, there will neither be a steady improvementin economic growth, nor an improvement in people’slives. e more people are involved in small business,the more stable and healthy is the Russian economy.”In adherence to Putin’s emphasis on the necessity of

small business development, current President DmitriMedvedev states that he hopes the Skolkovo projectwill foster an environment of technological innovationand imagination in Russia that will promote research inthe spheres of alternative energy sources, informationtechnology, communication, biomedical research,and nuclear technology (Razumovskaya par. 22).Skolkovo, President Medvedev says, will try to replicateSilicon Valley’s success while “paving its own way tocompletion” (ornock and Whitaker par. 20).

Currently, two major projects are underway in Skolkovo. e rst is Innograd, or “innovationcity,” which will be composed of various technologicalcompanies assembled in one geographic area. esecond is the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management,which is already open and training a new generation of Russian innovators (ornock and Whitaker par. 8).In order to determine whether Russia will be able tocultivate the right environment for the success of theSkolkovo project, it is important to analyze the majorfactors that have led to the growth of Silicon Valley from

its beginnings in the 1930s to its current prominence inthe worldwide innovation industry.

“It seems remarkable to me,” reected WilliamEitel, one of the rst radio hobbyists to come to theSilicon Valley, “that on the San Francisco Peninsulao the beaten paths of commerce, grew so manyindependent new industries, all now of national andinternational importance.” From just a small group ofrms employing a few hundred radio amateurs, SiliconValley has become the main center for electroniccomponent manufacturing in the United States andserves as the headquarters for major technologicalrmssuch as Apple and Cisco (Lecuyer 295). Silicon Valleyrose to its current prominence in the internationaleconomy due to a combination of skilled graduatesfrom nearby Stanford University and the Universityof California, Berkeley and patronage from the USDepartment of Defense. Recognizing the signicance

of university ties and government sponsorshipRussia is attempting to draw from the history of thedevelopment of Silicon Valley as it fashions Skolkovoand Innograd.

Former Stanford University Provost FrederickTerman is largely credited with establishing the long-standing relationship between Stanford Universityand Silicon Valley (“e Rise of Silicon Valley” par1). In 1925, he returned from his graduate career topursue his doctorate at Stanford University (Leslie76). At Stanford, he launched a commercially-

oriented program in radio electronics and encouragedcollaboration between his students and local electronicscompanies (Leslie 76). Under Terman’s guidanceStanford students David Packard and William Hewlettestablished an electronics company in their Palo Altogarage that would grow into today’s Hewlett-PackardCompany thus forming the long-standing relationshipbetween Stanford University and Silicon Valley (“eRise of Silicon Valley” par. 1). e partnership betweenStanford and Silicon Valley continues today with strong

ties between university aliates and companies suchas Google, Cisco Systems, Intuit, Silicon Graphics, andSun Microsystems (par. 6).

In a similar vein, President Medvedev hopesto foster a relationship between Innograd and theSkolkovo-Moscow School of Management. ForInnograd to succeed, Russia will need motivatedentrepreneurs and engineers knowledgeable abouttrends in emerging markets (Yana). In a speech atStanford University during his June 2010 visit to SiliconValley, President Medvedev addressed the “brain drain”

Russian President Medvedev, the drivingforce behind the Skolkovo project, speaking

at Stanford University about the need formore technological innovation in Russia.

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that has a ected Russia since the days of the Cold War.He stated, “We want our talented people, and Russia hasalways had a reputation for its talented people, to haveevery opportunity to fulll their potential. In order toachieve that we need to reform our education systemand create an opportunity for each talented individualto be reached by the people who support his or herideas” (Medvedev). President Medvedev hopes that theSkolkovo-Moscow School of Management will attractfuture business leaders who wish to remain in Russiaand pioneer new technology-based businesses, just asStanford University graduates continue to pioneer thegrowth of Silicon Valley (Kamyshev par. 8).

In the spirit of embracing innovation, theMoscow-Skolkovo School of Management o ersstudents a novel approach to graduate businessprograms. Students spend only four out of thetwenty-month program on campus in Skolkovo. e

remainder of the program is spent working o -campuson consulting jobs located in China, India, and the US(“Skolkovo MBA” par. 1). Should the school succeed inattracting potential students, Russian ocials hope itwill become the new standard for business educationand succeed in training “leaders who will set up andrun their own businesses and lead the development of the Russian economy” (ornock and Whitaker par.26, “Mission” par. 2). e global approach of the Moscow-SkolkovoSchool of Management MBA program may, however,

have an opposite e ect on the “brain drain” than thatwhich President Medvedev desires. With studentsspending over three-fourths of their education abroadand as a result establishing connections in countriesoutside of Russia, they may nd greater opportunitiesduring their terms overseas (Kamyshev par. 15).Russian trade union ocials estimate that more thanone-half million scientists and computer programmershave le the country since 1991 to nd well-paying jobselsewhere in Europe and in the US (“Building a Silicon

Valley in Russia” 3, Yana par. 4). As Vladimir Babkin,an advisor to the Russian State Duma’s Committeefor Science and Technology noted, “ose who aresuccessful overseas will not return” (“Building a SiliconValley in Russia” 3).

While the interactions between localuniversities and innovation centers like Silicon Valley provide the thought power to sustain continued growth,the history of Silicon Valley reveals the importance of military and government patronage that may be key toRussia’s development of Innograd. In a sense, the US

par. 7). During World War II, the Korean War, andthe Cold War, Silicon Valley companies were able tocapitalize on the military’s demand for microprocessors vacuum tubes, and semiconductors, which werecrucial in the manufacture of intercontinental ballisticmissiles, reconnaissance satellites, and other high-tech weapons and weapon systems (Heinrich 247Lecuyer 7). With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, fearsregarding Russia’s scientic prowess abounded andthe US government “kicked investment into a higher

gear” (O’Mara par. 7). By the end of the Cold Warthe nine largest contractors in Santa Clara CountyCalifornia, which included Lockheed Missile andSpace, Ford Aerospace, Westinghouse, and UnitedTechnologies, among others, reported more than $11billion in military defense contracts (U.S. Departmentof Defense). Stuart W. Leslie reects on the importanceof “the assumptions and priorities of Cold War defensepolicy” to the development of Silicon Valley. He statesthat Silicon Valley was “created and sustained in the

name of national security” (Leslie 75).While the military and the Department ofDefense sustained the formation and growth of SiliconValley, it also forced local rms to open up new marketsfor their products in the civilian sector (O’Mara par7). e Department of Defense sought access to themanufacturing and accounting processes of the SiliconValley rms in order to reduce their bargaining powers(Lecuyer 207). Additionally, the military’s inconsistent volume requirements made it an unreliable customerfor innovative rms. Because of this, many rms

government was Silicon Valley’s rst venture capitalist(O’Mara 5); it promoted innovation through researchgrants and defense contracts (Heinrich 251, O’Mara

e recent rapid growth of Russia's economy has dependedlargely on natural resource wealth, although projects likeSkolkovo are attempting to diversify the economy

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moved into commercial markets by expanding theirbusinesses into the public sector (Lecuyer 207). isnot only spurred business growth, but also inspired theinvention of new technology as capitalism and supply and demand generated competition.

e Russian government’s close involvementin the Skolkovo project emulates the US government’sparticipation in Silicon Valley’s history, with onecrucial di erence. ough the US government waslargely responsible for the creation of Silicon Valley,America’s free market economy promoted growthoutside of the governmental sector (O’Mara par. 9).e Russian economy, however, remains unstable eventwenty years aer the fall of Communism. Investorshold reservations about the bureaucracy, red tape, andexpensive capital that still plague the Russian economicsystem (Andersen par. 19, “Building a Silicon Valley in Russia” 1). As President Medvedev himself noted,

“Everything in Russia is a scheme; everything eventually turns into massive, legalized the” (ornock andWhitaker par. 19). e commonplace corruption thatpervades every sector of public life, all the way to theKremlin, could prevent the Skolkovo project fromachieving successes on par with those that PresidentMedvedev sees in Silicon Valley.

Russia’s reputation for corruption has become acliché. In Transparency International’s annual rankings,Russia is one of the few countries to consistently fallin the rankings year aer year. e 2010 survey ranks

Russia 154th out of the 179 countries surveyed, aposition it shares with Cambodia, Guinea-Bissau,and the Central African Republic (Transparency International). Corruption has reached such anextreme level that corporations involved in preparingfor the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi have reportedpaying kickbacks of more than y percent (Io epar. 2). One road in Sochi cost so much that it couldhave been paved in three and one-half inches of LouisVuitton handbags (par. 2).

In an e ort to dispel negative views of Russiaand encourage venture capitalists to invest in Skolkovo,President Medvedev declared a war on corruption(Andersen par. 5). During his visit to Silicon Valley in June 2010, he stated, “Russia is committed tobecoming an open country, open to cooperation witheveryone who is interested in working with us, opento investments, to trade, to joint projects in any area of public life and, of course, in the economy” (Medvedev).Nevertheless, Russia has a long way to go before itscorruption falls to an acceptable level and creates an

ease of entrepreneurship on par with that of its westerncounterparts.

Since President Medvedev’s election, the sizeof the average bribe has quadrupled, according toestimates from the Interior Ministry’s Department ofEconomic Security (Io e par.11). Many state projectsare undertaken for the sole purpose of creating apool of money that can be siphoned o by interestedparties. Corruption is so entrenched in the Russianpublic life that the government’s e orts have actuallyhad a reverse e ect on bribery. When bribery becomesmore risky, prices go up, making the bribes larger andmore detrimental to society. An extreme example ofthe escalating extent of Russia’s corruption took placein August 2004, when two passenger planes fell out ofthe sky within three minutes of each other (Doughertypar. 3). Eighty-nine people were killed (par. 1). Twosuicide bombers had hijacked the planes aer bribing

an airport security ocer with ve thousand rublesthe equivalent of one hundred seventy dollars (Io epar. 10). ese instances of corruption taint the world’sperception of Russia and call into question the futuresuccess of the Skolkovo project.

Nevertheless, Russia is trying to escape theseemingly unremitting cycle of corruption. Both theRussian people and the government are making e ortsto end endemic corruption in their country. In 2008,President Medvedev began an initiative to make algovernment requests for tender available online

From this initiative emerged Alexey Navalny’s websiteentitled RosPil. In 2008, Alexey Navalny read thatthe Ministry of Health and Social Development wasinviting bids to construct a two million dollar networkthat would connect doctors with their patients (Io epar. 32). e sixteen-day period that was designatedfor the development of the site tipped Navalny o tothe potential corruption within the project (par. 32)He wrote that “without a doubt” the site had alreadybeen developed for a much lower sum. Aer igniting

a campaign that resulted in two thousand complaintletters to the Federal Anti-Monopoly Agency, theHealth Ministry annulled the contract (par. 32)Navalny’s success with the campaign led to an inuxof email messages with links to similar contracts. ButNavalny realized, “I can’t, by myself, replace the Anti-Monopoly Agency and the state prosecutor’s oceAnd so the idea was born to make a site were thepeople could do it themselves” (par. 33). Any visitor tothe RosPil website can submit a government requestfor tender to public scrutiny (RosPil). If the document



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is deemed suspicious, it is posted to the main page,where registered members discuss the complaint.Experts associated with the site evaluate the price of theproject, the parameters, and the schedule to determineif it is reasonable (Io e par. 33). If not, Navalny declaresthe project a fraud on his blog, which oen causes theagency who submitted the request for tender to beinundated with hostile messages, enough so that inmany cases the agency annuls its contracts or shuts the

triumphant future for the Skolkovo project (Laquer160). As Russian politician Victor Chernomyrdinfamously quipped in 1993, “We intended for somethingbetter, but it turned out just as it always does” (“Buildinga Silicon Valley in Russia 3). is quote has become acatchphrase in post-Soviet Russia and one that has thepotential to dene the Skolkovo project.

Despite its comparisons to Silicon ValleySkolkovo will never enjoy the unparalleled success of its

project down completely (Io e par.33). In a tally maintained on thesite, RosPil has caused requests fortender worth $337,540,000 to beannulled (“Results”).

If President Medvedev’se orts and the crusades of theRussian people against corruptionprove to be more than unattainable

examples of idealism, the Skolkovoproject could establish Russia as a

Sourced from Flickr Creative Commons user kirill.ioris

participant in the international innovation economy.Innograd o ers investors a chance to establish afoothold in an emerging BRIC country. In the pastdecade, the BRIC countries accounted for 27.8 percentof global GDP growth in US dollars (Ahmed, Kelston,and Wilson par. 5). Prominent investment banks suchas Goldman Sachs anticipate that these countries willbe wealthier than most current economic powers by the year 2050 (par. 1). Whether or not these countries

represent the future of the business world will ultimately be determined by investors themselves and theirwillingness to take a risk in a developing economy.

Capitalizing on the world’s current interest inemerging markets, the Russian government is o eringinvestors and foreign companies access to tax breaksand lessened regulations if they invest in Skolkovo(“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia 2). Already, Russiao ers a corporate tax rate of 20 percent, nearly 15percent lower than the rates found in the US (ornock

and Whitaker par. 17). “… Special tax rules forSkolkovo, as well as preferential treatment and specialregistration procedures, special oversight and evenspecial jurisdiction regime,” will, President Medvedev hopes, protect investors from “ocials, from criminals,from some obstacles on their way…If all these rules areintroduced,” he said to a crowd assembled in StanfordUniversity’s Dinkelspiel Auditorium, “I am sure theproject will succeed” (Medvedev).

Despite President Medvedev’s optimisticrhetoric, history points towards a decidedly less

US archetype. e perfect storm oelements that led to the developmenof Silicon Valley, including thradio entrepreneurs, governmenwartime spending, and universitrelationships, is nearly impossiblto recreate. But, more so than thimpossibility of imitating in perfecproportion these elements, th

Russian government’s approacand involvement with the Skolkov

project will destabilize and perhaps destroy the grandream of a “Russian Silicon Valley” (Kamyshev par. 20e Skolkovo project is a top-down approach to businesdevelopment, one driven by the government to the extenthat it excludes the Russian people (Kamyshev par. 13Yana). e Russian government hopes to, in a sensecommand a technology center into existence. ouggovernment involvement was an essential component othe development of Silicon Valley, the innovation secto

in California was largely driven by the excitement anentrepreneurial spirit of the Bay Area residents (O’Marpar. 16). e Skolkovo project, however, will be a placapart for scientists. During the Cold War era, the SovieUnion isolated scientists in scientic centers located iSiberia (Ho man 13). ere, scientists were immunfrom the problems of starvation that plagued thgeneral population of the Soviet Union and were ablto focus exclusively on developing the Soviet nuclea

weapons and space programs (15).e Skolkovo projecposes alarming similarities to these Siberian scientienclaves. “[Scientists] should be isolated from oureality,” says Andrey Shtorkh, a former guard insidSverdlovsk-45, one of the Soviet Union’s secret scienticities. Skolkovo will be made up of ve villages, eaccorresponding to one of ve areas of innovativdevelopment of the Russian economy (Razumovskaypar. 22). Combined with the corruption already presenin the country, the isolation of scientists in technolog

Pervasive corruption has become amajor problem for the Russian people



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centers does not embody the openness that PresidentMedvedev has said is essential to advancing Russiansociety. For business to succeed, the people must beexcited and involved in the technology developmentprocess, not isolated from it. Silicon Valley was notcommanded into existence; rather the innovationsector developed in California from the bottom up

and was ensured continued growth by the Americaneconomic system, which values entrepreneurship andits protection (O’Mara par. 17).

President Medvedev’s words, his declarations of openness, his promises of an end to Russian corruption,need to become reality rather than slogans that mask the stagnation and corruption of Russia’s democraticprogress (Laquer 157, Yana). Before investing in aproject like Skolkovo, Russia needs to cultivate anenvironment in which it can succeed; it needs a betterbusiness climate (“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia"

1). A better business climate is created by enforcingstronger rule of law, by supporting entrepreneurship,and by making investors feel secure in their investments(Laquer 158). If Russia can truly open itself tocompetition in a free market system, then perhaps aproject like Skolkovo would be a feasible endeavor. Fornow, however, Russia should focus on creating the opensociety President Medvedev so earnestly proclaims.Otherwise, investing in the Skolkovo project wouldmerely be another disappointment, reminiscent of thenumerous fully-funded yet abandoned endeavors thatlitter the expanse of Russian history. e Skolkovo project was forced into existenceby the government in an attempt to stimulate growth.Two decades have passed since the fall of communism,yet Russia still does not embrace the competition thatmakes Silicon Valley successful or the transparency that creates a stable business environment. oughthe Skolkovo project is developing at a time in whichthe reality of Russia cannot sustain the grandeur of Skolkovo’s idealism, the e orts of those striving to end

the corruption point towards a future in which Russiamay be able to cultivate an open political and businessenvironment. As a result of the Skolkovo project,Russia has taken great strides towards ending thecorruption that has been entrenched in Russian society for so long. Websites such as Alexey Navalny’s RosPilensure the continued empowerment of the Russianpublic as they confront questionable government andbusiness practices. Technology, the foundation of theSkolkovo project, o ers the people of Russia a means to

end the corruption that has plagued Russia’s economicdevelopment.

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Swarnali Ahmed, Alex Kelston, Dominic Wilson. “Is this the ‘BRICsDecade’?” BRICs Monthly. 10/03 (20 May 2010). Web.

is article from Goldman-Sachs discusses the emergence of theBRIC countries as major players in the international economicsystem.

Derek Andersen. “What Lies Ahead aer a Year of ieving.” e St.Petersburg Times 21 Dec. 2010. Print.

is article discusses the corruption that pervaded Russian in the year2010 as well as the implications it has had on discouraging foreigninvestments.

“Building a Silicon Valley in Russia: An Ill-Fated Kremlin Experiment?”Ergo Nov. 2010. Web.

is article addresses the fundamental issues of Russia’s attempt torecreate Silicon Valley. It plays particular attention to Russia’s need tocreate an environment that is attractive for nanciers.

Jill Dougherty. “’Bribe Got Bomber on Russian Jet.” CNN International15 Sept. 2004: n . pag. Web. is article discusses the bribery involved in the 2004 Russian airline

bombings.

William Eitel. “Electronics Considered Pace-Setter in Region’sDevelopment.” Redwood City Tribune. 27 Dec. 1962. Print.

is document discussed the important role the electronics industry played in the development of Silicon Valley. It o ered a historical takeover the years of development from the early 1900s to 1960.

Mikhail Gorbachev. Perestroika: New inking for Our Country and theWorld. San Francisco: Perennial Library, 1988.

is text details Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika plans, his aspirationfor the future of the Soviet Union, and his realizations of its currentproblems.

omas Heinrich. “Cold War Armory: Military Contracting in SiliconValley.” Enterprise & Society 3. June (2002): 247-248. Web.is article argues that military funding for research established thefoundation for a new generation of startups that was necessary for thedevelopment of Silicon Valley.

David E. Ho man. e Dead Hand: e Untold Story of the Cold WarArms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy. New York: Doubleday, 2009.

is text discusses the development of the nuclear arms race betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It alsoasserts that the legacy of the Cold War is not over as thousands of nuclear and biological weapons remain in vulnerable positions.

Julia Io e. “Net Impact.” e New Yorker 4 Apr. 2011. Web. is article discusses Alexey Navalny’s campaign to end the

corruption that is so prevalent in Russian society.

Anthony Jones and William Mosko . Ko-ops: e Rebirth of Entrepreneurship In the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Indiana U.Press, 1991.

is book discussed Gorbachev’s attempts at reforming the Sovieteconomy through the use of cooperatives.

Vitaly Kamyshev. “Can a Russian Silicon Valley Rise from the Dust?”Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 23 June 2010. Web.

is text discusses the concerns surrounding Skolkovo, including thepossibility that it may not achieve all that President Medvedev hopes.It also acknowledges the opinions of Muscovites about the Skolkovoproject, which provides interesting insight into the local mentality.



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Walter Laquer. “Moscow’s Modernization Dilemma: Is Russia Chartinga New Foreign Policy?” Foreign A airs November/December 2010:153-160. Print.

is article discusses Russia’s foreign policy as it relates to itsrecognition of the necessity for economic development within thetechnology sectors of the economy.

Christophe Lecuyer. Making Silicon Valley: Innovation and the Growthof High Tech, 1930-1970. Cambridge, MA: e MIT Press, 2006.

is book discusses the growth of Silicon Valley and asserts that alarge portion of the development of the area was due to the presenceof radio entrepreneurs, government involvement, and interactionsbetween businesses and local universities.

Stuart W. Leslie. “How the West was Won: e Military and the Makingof Silicon Valley.” Technological Competitiveness: Contemporary andHistorical Perspectives on the Electrical, Electronics, and ComputerIndustries. Ed. William Aspray. New York: e Institute of Electricaland Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1993. 75-89. Print.In this document Stuart W. Leslie asserted that the growth of SiliconValley was largely attributed to federal subsidy.

Robert K. Massie. Peter the Great, His Life and World. New York:Knopf, 1980.

ough this book discusses Tsar Peter the Great, who lived nearly three centuries before the Skolkovo project was even conceived, the

tales of corruption that surrounded the bureaucratic dealings of theera were relevant to my argument that bribery and corruption areinherent aspects of the Russian way of life.

Dmitri Medvedev. Meeting with Representatives of US Public,Academic, and Business Communities. 24 June 2010, Palo Alto, CA.Ocial Site of the President of Russia. Web.

is is a transcript of President Medvedev’s speech and question andanswer session that he presented at Stanford University during his visit in June. It discusses his goals for the future of Russia’s innovativeeconomic sector.

“Mission.” Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. Accessed 9 May 2011. http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/en/about.

is text describes the mission of the Skolkovo-Moscow School of

Management as the education center for future Russian businessleaders.

Margaret Pugh O’Mara. Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and theSearch for the Next Silicon Valley. Princeton: Princeton U Press, 2005.

ough this text did not discuss Skolkovo explicitly, it outlined many of the key components that led to the development of the Silicon Valley and asserted that they may be dicult to replicate elsewhere.

Margaret Pugh O’Mara. “Don’t Try this at Home.” Foreign Policy Sept/Oct 2010: 149-151. Print.

is article discusses the business and technological innovationoriginating in Silicon Valley. O’Mara reects on internationalattempts to duplicate the innovative atmosphere.

Olga Razumovskaya. “Medvedev Hopes to Teach at Skolkovo One Day.”

e Moscow Times 26 April 2011. Web. is text discusses Medvedev’s hopes for Skolkovo as well as his

frustrations with its development, specically the lack of globalrecognition surrounding the project.

“Results.” RosPil.info. A. Bulk, Alexey Navalny, 2 June 2011. Web. 2 June2011.is page features the “Amount of questionable / corruptprocurement” stopped by the e orts of those associated with RosPil.

“e Rise of Silicon Valley.” History of Stanford. Stanford University.Web.

is article features an overview of the interweaving of history between Stanford University and the Silicon Valley. It argues that thedevelopment of Silicon Valley was largely due to the inux of talentedstudents from Stanford University.

RosPil. A. Bulk, Alexey Navalny. Web. 2 June 2011. is is Alexey Navalny’s website, RosPil, which features updates on

the e orts of those in Russia working to end corruption.

“Skolkovo MBA.” Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management. Accessed 9May 2011. http://www.skolkovo.ru/public/en/mba.

Contained within this webpage is a detailed account of the Skolkovo-Moscow School of Management MBA program, which includes thecorporate projects that take place in India, China, Russia, and theUnited States.

Richard Solash. “In Silicon Valley, Medvedev Looks for InvestmentPossibilities.” Radio Free Europe. 24 Apr. 2010. Web.

is article discussed Medvedev’s visit to the Silicon Valley and thehopes he expressed to American businesses about the future of theSkolkovo project.

Robert ornock and Wesley Whitaker. “Skolkovo: Russia’s EmergingSilicon Valley.” Knowledge@Wharton. 2011. Web.

is text addresses the development of Skolkovo as a parallel to thatof Silicon Valley. It addresses the history of the Silicon Valley andcompares it to Skolkovo.

Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010Results.” Ed. Transparency International. Web. 2010.

is table features the results of the thirteen surveys conducted by theTransparency International. It shows how Russia is perceived as oneof the most corrupt countries in the world.

U.S. Department of Defense. “Largest Defense Contractors in SantaClara County, 1990.” Eagle Eye Publishers, 1991. Web.

is table shows the companies in Santa Clara County and theirdefense sales at the end of the Cold War. It was crucial for my argument that the government involvement was necessary for thedevelopment of Silicon Valley.

Alekseenko Yana. Interview with Ben Judah. Can Russian GovernmentStop Brain Drain? 27 April 2011. Web.

is interview with Policy Fellow at the European Council onForeign Relations, Ben Judah, discusses Russia’s brain drain and how Medvedev hopes to combat it.

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Mikael Berstein, Chris Clark, Anda Gansca, and Pawel Waluszko. “ForEntrepreneurs.” Recreating Silicon Valley. Accessed 10 May 2011.http://www.recreatingsiliconvalley.com.

Gregory Feifer. “Russia’s Silicon Valley Dreams May reatenCybersecurity.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 14 Nov. 2010. Web.

Gail Lapidus. Personal Interview. 18 May 2011.A. Michal McMahon. e Making of a Profession: A Century of

Electrical Engineering in America. New York: IEEE Press, 1984.Iliya Pitalev. “Innovations lay foundation for Russia’s Power –

Condoleezza Rice.” Ria Novosti 25 March 2011. Web.“Resetting the Stage.” e Economist 23 April 2011: 53-54. Print.“Russian Hi-Tech Hub to Run Joint Projects with Stanford.” Ria Novosti

25 March 2011. Web.Barack Obama. 8 Apr. 2010. [Transcript]. Retrieved from C-SPAN

Video Library. Web.Robert Wessling. Personal Interview. 11 May 2011.



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Modern era globalization has endowedpower in resource-rich countries, enablingthem to derive inuence from the control

of vital commodities. Oil, one of the most crucialgoods, has therefore been used as a lethal weapon,sparking harsh repercussions on the global economy and political dynamic. e most recognized usageof the “oil weapon” was the 1973 oil embargo. Inresponse to US military assistance to Israel during

the 6-day war, the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) sought to exert politicpressure by declaring an oil embargo, raising thprice of a barrel by 70 percent and cutting productioin increments of 5 percent. Oil price shocks haimmediate economic e ects, as the quadrupled priof fuel led to recession, ination, reduced productiviand economic stagnation. e crises of the paserve as testimony to the power of geopolicity, anmust prompt caution in the eyes of the internation

community about the future of energy security.

by Ariella Axler

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"$BMMGPS"NFSJDBO&OFSHZ*OEFQFOEFODF



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5ĵĲ"ĿĮį4ĽĿĶĻĴ0ĶĹ3ļłŁAs civil unrest spreads throughout the Middle

East, fear of a new oil crisis has arisen. Beginning onFebruary 15, 2011, with protests in Benghazi, the worldwitnessed the unfolding of the Libyan revolution.e ensuing civil war between Qadda loyalists andthe “rebels” le the country ablaze- a haze of blood

and ash with over 25,000 buried in the remnants and4,000 refugees who ed the bloody civil war. In themidst of the anarchic insurgency, Libya’s 1.6 millionbarrels per day of supply were taken o the market.

Since Libya is the globe’s 18th top petroleumexporter, providing premium quality, low sulfuroil, Libya’s immobilization had tangible impactson the international oil market. is globalshortfall will not see immediate compensation;“OPEC ocials, oil analysts, and Libya’s former oilminister, Shokri Ganem, all agree that restoring

production to its previous levels will take years- until2013 or 2014 at the earliest.”1

Along with Libyan turmoil, there are concernsthat an incident could unfold with Al Qaeda terroristsroaming near Yemen’s Aden coast, where 40 percent of the world’s oil supplies pass through. Any occurrenceof an attack on an oil tanker or disruption to thetransit of fuel in the region would result in devastatingconsequences.

&ĻĲĿĴņ*ĻıĲĽĲĻıĲĻİĲ e volatility of oil supplies reinforces the nefor energy independence. In order to reduce sevemarket uctuation, building up a stockpile reservea necessity. Aer the OPEC embargo, in 1975, the Uestablished the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Yet, threserve is only a short-term solution; oil is a limit

resource, and cannot serve as a sustainable optifor the future. Seeking energy outside fossil fuelsthe most feasible means to absolute energy securiUS investment in alternative, renewable energy is trst step to achieving a fruitful energy economy. benets of investing in renewable energy sources amanifold—spanning from increased global politiinuence to job creation, and to cheaper energy pricesself-sucient US energy sector would be advantageoin relation to national security, and would be a lucratiasset to revitalize the economy.

&ĻıĻļŁĲŀ1 Lindsay, Greg. “How e Arab Spring Paved e Way For A Doub

Dip Recession, And Why It Might Prevente Next One .” Mon,11/21/2011 | Co.Exist: World Changing Ideas and Innovation. Codescom. Web. 21 Nov. 2011. <http://www.fastcoexist.com/1678446/howthe-arab-spring-paved-the-way-for-a-double-dip-recession-and-why-might-prevent-the-ne>.



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Sourced from Nations Online Projec

by Christopher Kremer

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Indonesia and Malaysia, which occupy the samearchipelago and have overlapping history andlanguage, have ercely disputed the ownership

of Nusantara (“Archipelago”) culture. Indonesia andMalaysia are both members of ASEAN, but, sincethey gained independence from Britain and theNetherlands, which originally created their articialborders, they have been locked in a contentious adik-abang (“younger brother-older brother”) relationship.e rst assumption that underlies the notion of the adik-abang relationship between Malaysia andIndonesia is that one is superior to the other, and thesecond is that the two countries are closely related.While the paradigm of the modern nation-state hasled Malaysia to view itself as superior within the adik-abang relationship, it acknowledges Nusantara as beingcommon to both countries because many Nusantarapractices can ultimately be traced back to islands in

Indonesia’s territory.Since Malaysia has become the so-called older

brother of the adik-abang relationship, it has adoptedthe stance that Malaysian and Indonesian cultures areseparate, implicitly asserting that Malaysian cultureis superior. Malaysia’s use of the notion of a distinctMalaysian culture as a way to assert its dominanceover Indonesia is shown by its shiing stance onimmigration from when it was the “younger brother”to when it became the “older brother.” In the yearsaer its independence, Malaysia welcomed the ow

of immigrants from Indonesia and the Philippines asa way to keep its Malay majority, a policy that “becameobsolete when the birth rates of non-Malays and Malaysturned very much in favor of the latter”1. e fact thatMalaysia shied from a policy of cultural inclusivenessto one of cultural separateness shows that, as thecountry began to secure a sense of national identity, itno longer needed to rely on an identity common acrossthe pre-colonial Malay Archipelago to give itself a senseof unity and history.

Today, Malaysia is able to claim a di

erencebetween Indonesian and Malaysian cultures because ithas succeeded in distinguishing itself from Indonesiaand does so in order to further the notion of theirdistinctness and to reinforce the notion common toboth that it is the stronger of the two countries. isattempt to distinguish between cultures was evidentwhen the Malaysian Family and Community ministerannounced plans to perform a study on the e ects of

Indonesian immigrant maids on the “cultural values”of the Malaysian children for whom they cared. Suchplans not only demonstrated a perception amongMalaysian ocials that the two countries have separatecultural values but also hinted that Malaysian cultural values are desirable and superior to Indonesian ones.

While Malaysia’s claim to Nusantara heritage hasbeen partly shaped by the juxtaposition of superiorityand inferiority in the adik-abang relationship, it has alsobeen shaped by Indonesia’s possession of the islandswhere many aspects of Nusantara originated. In orderfor Malaysia to reinforce its position as “older brother”it must not only accept that aspects of its cultureoriginated on islands currently under the jurisdictionof Indonesia but also demonstrate that its culture isnot derivative but is rather a distinct form of the sameheritage. One Malaysian ocial stated, “It [Rasa Sayang]is a folk song from the Nusantara and we are part of

the Nusantara”2. is statement is compatible withthe Malaysian notion that Malaysian culture, howeverit may be related to Indonesian culture, is distinctRasa Sayang, for example, originated on Maluku, anisland now part of Indonesia. As well, Gamelan andBatik, which have local variants throughout Nusantaracountries, both have their origins in Java.

While the majority of ethnic Malays of Malaysiaand the Indonesians are culturally and ethnically quitesimilar, the governments of both countries have usedNusantara heritage as a way to compete with each other

Both countries have asserted themselves in accordanceto their sense of superiority or inferiority as a nation-state and have had to shape their claims to correspondto the geography of the origins of Nusantara. e factthat Malaysia and Indonesia compete so ercely overNusantara heritage attests to how closely related thetwo major countries of the Malay Archipelago are andto how divisive the idea of the modern nation-statecan be for two countries whose lands were united forcenturies.

3ĲĳĲĿĲĻİĲŀ1 Holst, Frederik. “(Dis-)Connected History: The Indonesia-Malaysia

Relationship.” Indonesia - the Presence of the Past: a Festschrift in

Honour of Ingrid Wessel . Ed. Antje Missbach and Eva Streifeneder.

Berlin: Regiospectra, 2007. 327-40. Print.

2 Loudres, Marc. “Rasa Sayang ‘ours Too...we Have Right to Sing

It’” New Straits Times. 3 Oct. 2007. Web. 9 Nov. 2011.



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by Nica Langinger

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School feeding programs have been implemented in Kenya since the 1980’s with varying degrees of success. Used primarily to incentivize the enrollment and retention of rural childrenand girls, subsidized meal programs have played an integral part in realizing the country’s

goal of universal primary education. Historically, the involvement of large foreign players

has greatly limited the Kenyan government's role in the direction and stewardship of these programs. Heavy reliance on foreign aid and management has subjected the programs to uctuating, and o en conditional, international support. In an e ort to transition toward amore sustainable and nationally integrated alternative, the Kenyan government introduced the Homegrown School Feeding Program (HGSFP) in 2009. ough nancial strains and infrastructural challenges have called into question Kenya’s ability to successfully fund and operate its own school feeding program, the country’s renewed commitment to education,

agriculture, and rural development shows great promise.

Children in a rural Kenyan school returning from recess

Photo courtesy of Flikr user computerwhiz417



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Nica Langinger is a senior majoring in International

Relations, minoring in Spanish and Portuguese, and co-terming in Latin American Studies. During her time atStanford, she has developed a strong interest in Brazilianculture, history, and politics. Aer graduation, Nica hopesto work in Brazil to improve educational and employmentopportunities for historically disenfranchised groups.On the topic of educational quality and accessibility,Nica found many similarities between rural communitiesin Kenya and favelas in Brazil. In writing this paper forProfessor Joel Samo 's course on education policy inAfrica, she learned a lot about e ective policymakingamidst extreme social inequity.

Agriculture seek to limit the role of external players inorder to transform the program into a more sustainableand independent national enterprise.

ough much has already been done to boostrural attendance, more e ort and coordination will berequired to obviate many of the current impedimentsto School Feeding Programs. To fully realize theenormous humanitarian potential of the HGSFPspecial attention must be given to improving the qualityof rural infrastructure, investing in human capitalincreasing local stewardship of feeding programs, andsupporting economic opportunities for small-scalefood producers. Without these critical developmentsthe goals of the HGSFP will fail to serve the long-term interests of ASAL inhabitants and will insteadcontribute to a continued cycle of foreign dependencyand educational inequity in Kenya.

H

ĳĲĲıĶĻĴĶĻ,ĲĻņĮKenya’s school feeding program has experienced

continued expansion and renement, especiallyduring the past decade. Since the introduction offree compulsory primary education for all Kenyanchildren in 2003, the WFP-assisted feeding programhas developed alongside national policies of increased

R oughly 80 percent of Kenyans live in rural areasand eke out a living as

farmers, and poor land quality and chronic water shortages haveput the country in a constant stateof food insecurity (UNESCO2005). Although its economy boasts a sizeable agriculturalsector (mainly focused on exportsof rst-world luxuries likeowers, tea, and co ee), Kenyais a food-decit country withless than 20 percent of its landsuitable for successful cultivation.Compounding these diculties,frequent and severe droughts inthe historically precarious Arid

and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL)

land and scarce water (MoA 2010).e ASAL, home to roughly 30 percent of the

Kenyan population, has su ered through the cripplingsocial e ects of recently intensifying droughts and foodshortages. Kenya’s school-aged population is amongthe groups most negatively impacted. To alleviate thehealth and developmental consequences of childhoodmalnutrition, increase primary school enrollment,and combat social pressures that limit educationalopportunities for girls, the Kenyan government begana school-feeding program in 1980 (Regnault De LaMothe 2008). e initiative, signicantly backed by World Food Program (WFP) funds and management,is one of the largest and longest-standing school feedingpartnerships of its kind. In 2008, the program served

1.2 million children in 3,600schools—nearly 21.3 percent ofall primary school students inKenya (USDA 2010).

Recently, in accordancewith “Education for All”developmental targets, theKenyan government decidedto expand its role in theimplementation of school feedingprograms nationwide (MoE2003). rough the introductionof the Homegrown SchooFeeding Program, Kenyanpolicymakers are looking for waysto better integrate and promotegoals in education, agricultureand rural development through

inter-sectoral cooperation andprogressive policy changesOver time, the Kenyanministries of Education and

have contributed to high ratesof crop loss, malnutrition, and violence over limited arable

Child obtaining water, a scarce resource in KenyaPhoto courtesy of Flikr user angela7dreams



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student health, attendance, and performance (MoE2003). From its inception, it has targeted food inequality in the most vulnerable areas of Kenya, including schooldistricts in the ASAL and the informal urban slumsof large cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa (Espejo2009).

To address historical primary schoolabsenteeism among Kenya’s most impoverished andtraditional communities, free meals are used as anincentive to attract school-aged children to class.Within rural communities in which food is scarce,this daily meal provision relieves much of the burdenof childrearing. e beneciaries of the program areextremely poor families that are largely unable to providethe minimum recommended daily allowances (RDA)of calories, protein, and essential micronutrients totheir children. ese poor conditions may irreversibly stunt the mental and physical development of young

children, resulting in wasted potentials and lifelongdiculties (Galal 200). e nutritional importance of the school meal (usually around 700kcal) is immense,representing more than half of the consumed RDA values for 40 percent of the participating students(Finan 2010).

According to eld studies, the “magnet e ect”of the meal programs has greatly increased schoolattendance rates especially among young children. Ruralschools that provide meals show higher attendancerates and lower initial dropout rates than schools

that do not (Espejo 2009). e immediate nancialand nutritional benets provided by schooling attractparents struggling to support their children on low-yielding subsistence farming. On average, participatingfamilies save between four and nine percent of theirannual income by taking advantage of school mealsand avoiding added food expenditures (Finan 2010).

Additionally, many rural parents have been able toutilize schooling as a form of subsidized childcarewhich gives them more time to engage in householdchores, farming, or other income-generating activitiese short and long-term benets to the child are evenmore pronounced. Studies tracking the impact of schoofeeding have shown improvements in IQ, immunity toillness, height, and weight among participating children(Galal 2005). Micronutrient fortication, malariatreatment, and annual de-worming initiatives have beenimplemented alongside school meal programs and havehad considerable e ect on increasing overall studenthealth (Galloway 2009). No longer distracted by hungerand the crippling e ects of extreme malnutrition, thestudents are better able to concentrate, understand newmaterial, and socialize with both teachers and peersAccording to rsthand teacher accounts, children whoreceive meals are generally healthier, more receptive

energetic, and easier to teach (Galal 2005). FollowingWFP recommendations, some ASAL school districtshave begun providing fortied morning biscuits to geta jumpstart on the cognitive and nutritional benets offeeding (Finan 2010; Galal 2005).

3ĲĴĶļĻĮĹ$ĵĮĹĹĲĻĴĲŀ ough signicant gains have been achievedthroughout the country in terms of educationa

expansion and accessibility, rural Kenyans continue tolag far behind their urban counterparts. Between theyears 2002 and 2007, although Kenya’s net primaryschool enrollment increased from 77 percent to 92percent, enrollment in the ASAL increased from 17percent to 29 percent (Finan 2010).

ough school-feeding programs haveincreased student enrollment rates, attendance



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to secondary school (Finan 2010). With averagecompletion rates hovering at around 34 percent in aridand 57 percent in semi-arid districts, it is clear that evenwith the presence of school meals, regional disparitiesin education persist. Especially among poor childrenand girls, these numbers are far below the standardsKenya must meet in order to achieve MillenniumDevelopment Goals 1-3 (poverty reduction, universalprimary education, gender equality) by 2015 (MoE

2004).Unfortunately, the meal program’s positive

impact on school attendance appears to weaken with age.Within traditional rural communities, as children getolder they become valuable economic resources to theirfamilies, and the pressure to contribute to householdchores and earnings steadily mounts. Between seventhand eighth grade, the appeal of a school meal is suddenly much less signicant and dropout rates increase withthe rising opportunity costs of staying in school (Finan2010). As they reach adolescence, boys are expected to

start work as farmhands or manual laborers and girls aregroomed for early marriage in order to fetch a higherbride price (Bogonko 1992). If a rural child’s primary schooling experience has not instilled the merits of aneducation (the “catalyst e ect”), cultural and economicpressures thwart primary completion and progressionto secondary school (Njeru 2005). Furthermore, due toa general scarcity of secondary schools in the ASAL,many bright and otherwise willing rural childrenare forced to prematurely end their schooling aer

standard 8 (UNESCO 2005).Other factors such as water scarcity and

inadequate infrastructure continue to impede fullrealization of the central goals of Kenya’s school meaprogram. Certain nancially strapped schools requirefamilies to contribute money, labor, water, andrewoodto receive the daily meal allowance, compromising thefull e ect of the meal incentive (Finan 2010). Ruraschools, widely without rewood to fuel kitchen stovesclean water, and money to pay cooks, nd it dicult toprovide daily meal services without burdening parentsfor missing inputs (Bwonda 2005). Additionally, schoolsare not always equipped with suitable bathrooms andkitchens to ensure that food is prepared in a hygienicand safe environment. ese factors undermine thequality and e ectiveness of the feeding program inmany districts in rural Kenya.

Another large obstacle for Kenyan schools to

overcome is related to the poor quality of instructionDue in part to FPE initiatives and the popularity offree school meals, hungry students seeking food aidhave overrun many schoolhouses in the ASAL regionsAccording to WFP ndings, the average enrollmentof schools that o er meals is 28 percent higher thanschools that do not, and the average student-teacherratio is a staggering 11 points higher than the nationalaverage (Finan 2010). us, although the goal ofincreased attendance has been somewhat met, little hasbeen done to help schools cope with recently inated

student bodies and declining teacher incentives.e many challenges inherent to the ASAL

have made it increasingly dicult to recruit willingand qualied teachers to school districts. Kenyaneducators have largely avoided rural schools hundredsof miles from city centers with few roads, resources

and exam scores, rural districts have exhibited only modest gains in completion rates and advancement

Farmer attempting to water crops

Photo courtesy of Food Ethics Council

Lack of resources for schoolchildrenPhoto courtesy of USAID



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and networks of support. High student-teacherratios, cramped and dilapidated schoolhouses, poorinfrastructure, and a lack of necessary school suppliesthreaten to undo many of the notable gains associated

with increased primary school enrollment (Bwonda2005; UNESCO 2005).

5ĿĮĻŀĶŁĶļĻŁļĮĴļŃĲĿĻĺĲĻŁŀĽļĻŀļĿĲıĽĿļĴĿĮĺ

In an e ort to transition away from WFPassistance and create a more sustainable and locally integrated program, the Ministry of Education beganimplementing a Homegrown School Feeding Program(HGSFP) in July of 2009 (Espejo 2009). is is not the

rst time the government of Kenya has attempted toinstitute a federally funded school meals programthrough multi-sectoral cooperation. A short-livedschool milk program was introduced in 1980 underformer President Moi in order to simultaneously increase primary school enrollment and ensure a stablemarket for Kenyan dairy producers. e ambitiousinitiative that provided free milk to 4.3 million primary school students failed shortly aer its launch due to highcosts, low accountability, and poor road infrastructure

(Bogonko 1992).To ensure that the new program does not

meet a similar end, Kenyan policymakers are workingclosely with WFP and United Nations representativesto facilitate a gradual shi of nancial responsibilityBeginning in 2009, the Kenyan government transferredover 500,000 primary school children from WFPprograms (mostly from Semi-Arid districts) to HGSFPand promised to add 50,000 students each year untireaching full coverage (Finan 2010). Prior to thistransfer, 71 percent of associated program costs wereprovided by WFP, 15 percent were borne by localcommunities, and only 14 percent came from theKenyan government (Galloway 2009). To guarantee thesuccess of this new program, the Kenyan governmentallocated $5.3 million (along with an additional $2million from the Japanese government counterpartfund) in 2009 to subsidize the costs of expansion

(USDA 2009). Even so, with combined annual costsof the previous program estimated at around $20million a year (Galloway 2009), the Kenyan Ministry ofFinance must be ready to commit itself to even greaterinvestment if the government intends to replace WFPas the main benefactor of school meals in Kenya.

Rather than continuing to rely on WFP agentsto procure foodstu s and distribute meals, the newprogram transfers cash stipends directly into the bankaccounts of participating schools to be applied to theprogram (Finan 2010). e government makes these

cash payments twice a year at the beginning of eachthree-month term, with aid amounts determined bynet student enrollment. e government-subsidizedprogram sets funding levels at nine cents per studentmeal, approximately half of what WFP sponsoredprograms spend per meal (USDA 2009). Kenyanpolicymakers from the ministries of Education, Financeand Agriculture, have expressed condence that locaprocurement e orts and increased community supportwill allow school-feeding programs to survive despite

tighter resources (USDA 2009).To avoid additional overhead costs associatedwith management and distribution expenses, thegovernment of Kenya has transferred the logisticsof implementation to local School ManagementCommittees (made up of parents, teachers, andcommunity members) who are placed in charge ofpurchasing food from local farmers, cooperatives, andtraders. Based on eld research, it was observed that:Community participation and involvement was strongat every school visited. Each household is asked to

Map of food regions -- Finan (2010)

Legend: Orange=Arid, Yellow=Semi-Arid, Stripes=HGSFP, Dots=WFP



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contribute to the [School Feeding Program], andtypical contributions include rewood, water, cashfor cooks’ salaries, and salt. When households cannotcontribute, the SMC makes alternative arrangements

purchase of key “orphan crops” like sorghum, milletand cowpeas due to their drought-resistance and ASALsuitability (MoA 2010). Currently, due to presentsystem weaknesses, maize still constitutes a majority of

with the family (USDA 2009).

In these ways, the Kenyan government hopesto integrate schools more fully into rural communities,provide an economic stimulus for impoverished villages,boost local agricultural productivity, and establish asustainable school meals program independent fromheavy foreign subsidization.

$ĿĶŁĶľłĲļĳŁĵĲ)ļĺĲĴĿļńĻ4İĵļļĹ'ĲĲıĶĻĴ1ĿļĴĿĮĺ

Critics of the new program cite the fact thatmost rural communities in the ASAL do not have theproduction supply capability to support a potentially overwhelming demand for food. According to researchuntaken by the USDA with funds provided by the GatesFoundation:

“Without projects or collaboration withother partners to bolster the supply side of HGSFProgram, the project as currently implemented is a

local procurement project, and not a local productionproject. e project schools are in ASALs with limitedproduction capacity, with 60-70 percent of the foodimported from outside the district.” (USDA 2009).

Rural farmers are usually located far away from key agricultural inputs such as water, fertilizer,pesticides, and seed, lack adequate large-scale storagefacilities, have little access to a ordable bank credit,and are unable to eciently transport bulk harvests(MoA 2010). As a result, instead of funneling money into local communities, many claim that the mainbeneciaries of HGSFP are non-local commercial foodtraders. Oen, this is not a concern for policymakerswho tend to dene “local” in more national and even

regional terms (USDA 2009). To protect and foster thesafety net benets associated with small-scale localagriculture, the Government of Kenya needs tond waysto increase the production capabilities of rural farmers.To address this problem, the Ministry of Agricultureneeds to provide more support in the form of ruralfarming grants, infrastructure (roads, storage facilities,accessible inputs), encouragement of indigenous plantand animal husbandry, and sustainability reeducation(Finan 2010). e HGSFP currently encourages the

the food purchased for school meal programs (USDA2009).

Another point of contention surroundingHGSFP in rural Kenya is the cost-motivatedprohibition of the purchase of fruit, horticulture, andlivestock products for use within the school feeding

programs. Local communities are currently pushingfor the inclusion of meat in the meal budget to involvepastoralists who comprise the bulk of the economicactivity in the ASAL (USDA 2009). Incorporatingmeat and other livestock products in the school mealsprogram would go a long way in appeasing pastoralistgroups that may feel marginalized and excluded fromsocial planning and development initiatives that seemtailored to exclusively benet agriculturalists (MoA2010). Since the ASAL is home to a limited numberof productive farmers, more inclusive measures would

certainly serve to increase the food procurementrates from within vulnerable herding communitiesAdditionally, to better support ASAL interestspolicymakers ought to implement a scaled stipendsystem that adjusts for regional food scarcity andprice disparities, rather than the current at allowance(USDA 2009). Under the current system, droughts andever rising food costs have threatened the viability ofschool meals programs in food-scarce school districts.

Anal point of debate is founded on the fear that

Government school-feeding programs aim to improveconditions for Kenyan schoolchildren

Photo courtesy of Flikr user angela7drea



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direct money transfers to poor schools to be managedby civilian committees could expose the program to various strains of ineciency and corruption. Withinthe impoverished communities of the ASAL, potentialfailures could arise from schools reporting articially inated enrollment numbers, succumbing to bribery and seller favoritism, and using government funds for

non-meal related ends (Finan 2010). Without propertraining and oversight, some fear that the HGSFP runsa high risk of falling short of intended goals. However,SMC’s have been in charge of administrational dutieswithin the Kenyan educational system for decades(Bogonko 1992). Since the government has historically only provided funding for teachers’ salaries and few other basic expenses, communities have taken theessential role of raising funds and budgeting for new textbooks, supplies, and school beautication projects(Bwonda 2005). In this respect, local communities have

extensive experience in the administrational duties thatwould be required from them under HGSFP.

$ļĻİĹłŀĶļĻŀ e e ects of the school meal program onthe wellbeing of rural Kenyans cannot be overstated.rough providing daily meals, schools are able tomeet immediate food needs, provide future safety nets, and o er long-term assistance and empowerment

to children, families, and communities. As the WFPprepares its exit strategy from the region as themain agent of school feeding, much care should beundertaken in ensuring that the transitional periodbe free of potential crises. If HGSP has a securefoundation within Kenya with both funds andmanagement sourced internally, the program will nolonger need to rely on uctuating and oen conditionaldonor support (Espejo 2009). In addition, a successfultransfer of the food provision program to the Kenyangovernment would foster inter-ministerial cooperation

and involvement and better integrate the program witha wide range of national and economic goals.

In order to e ect lasting positive change inthe lives of Kenyan children, the government mustinstate policies that work toward achievable goals. If the Kenyan government hopes to ensure the successof Free Primary Education, there must be considerableand consistent investment in programs that increaseeducational access, participation, and quality,

especially among the most vulnerable and historicallymarginalized social groups (Vos 2004). In addition tosupporting programs like HGSFP, the ministries ofEducation and Agriculture must also invest in ruralinfrastructure by building roads and schools, improveagricultural capabilities by improving irrigationsystems, farming technologies, and indigenous plant

knowledge, and allocate more funds for basic schoolsupplies and new teachers (UNESCO 2005). Withoutthese necessary additions to the current system, therewards of FPE will remain elusive for a large andpromising segment of the Kenyan population.

8ļĿĸŀ$ĶŁĲı

Bogonko, Sorobea N. A History of Modern Education in Kenya (1895-1991). Nairobi, Kenya: Evans Brothers (Kenya), 1992.

Bwonda, Eldah N., and Enos H. Njeru. Primary Education in Kenya:Access and Policy Implications, 1989-2002. Working paper no. 62.Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2005.

Espejo, Francisco. Home-grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link School Feeding with Local Agricultural Production. Rome: WorldFood Programme, 2009.

Finan, Timothy. Impact Evaluation of WFP School Feeding Programmein Kenya (1999-2008): A Mixed-Methods Approach. Rome: WorldFood Programme, 2010.

Galal, Osman, ed. Proceedings of the International Workshop on

Articulating the Impact of Nutritional Decits on the Educationfor All Agenda. 2nd ed. Vol. 26. Tokyo: International NutritionFoundation for the United Nations University, 2005.

Galloway, Rae. School Feeding: Outcomes and Costs. Food andNutrition Bulletin, 2009.

Ministry of Agriculture. Agricultural Sector Development Strategy,2009-2020. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2010.

Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. Report of the Task Force on Implementation of Free Primary Education. Nairobi:Government of Kenya, 2003.

Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. A Policy Framework for Education, Training, and Research. Nairobi: Government of Kenya, 2004.

Njeru, Enos H., and John A. Orodho. Access and Participation inSecondary School Education in Kenya. Working paper no. 37.Nairobi: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, 2003.

Regnault De La Mothe, Marc. "Kenya Case Study." Learning fromExperience: Good Practices from 45 Years of School Feeding. WorldFood Programme, 2008. 45-47.



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UNESCO Nairobi Oce. Challenges of Implementing Free Primary Education in Kenya: Assessment Report. Nairobi, 2005

USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. Assessment of Local Production forSchool Feeding

in Kenya. Oce of Capacity Building and Development, 2009.

Vos, Rob, and Arjun Bedi. Achieving Universal Primary SchoolEducation in Kenya.

Working paper no. 46. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy

Research and Analysis, 2004.

Arid conditions pose problems for agriculturePhoto courtesy of Flickr Creative Commons user Carostan



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Turkey’s armed incursion into northern Iraq inOctober 2011, mounted in response to deadly attacks by Kurdish rebels based in semi-

autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, was the latest indicationof an emerging regional power increasingly condentof its capacities and sure of its interests. As Americanforces withdraw from Iraq andscal constraints compel

a more restrained and less interventionist foreignpolicy, the importance of stronger relations withMiddle Eastern partners becomes apparent. Relationsbetween Washington and Ankara, strengthened by the existence of a common enemy during the ColdWar, have begun to fray over political di erences

and recognition of the changing power dynamics ofthe Middle East. e “model relationship” touted byPresident Obama with regards to Turkey, however, hasmore relevance than ever in an increasingly multipolarregion. Finding common ground with Ankara, anddeveloping a willingness to address Turkish concernsand accommodate Turkish interests in the ultimate

pursuit of American foreign policy goals, will be criticato the success of US-led initiatives in the region, andwould indicate a desire on the part of Washington toforge new relationships to deal with the challenges ofthe 21st century.

by Marshall Watkins

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Stronger relations with Ankara could helpanswer some of the most pressing dilemmas confrontingWashington with regards to the Middle East. AsAmerican troops depart from Iraq, the potentially destabilizing power vacuum, the threat of increasedIranian inuence in Baghdad runs directly contrary

to Turkish interests. As shown by last the October2011 incursion into Iraqi Kurdistan, border security has remained a priority for the Sunni Muslim Ankararegime; the prospect of an Iraqi Shia governmentsupporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) andother insurgent groups that might destabilize thefrontier would likely be unacceptable.

Although Turkey’s willingness to confrontan increasingly assertive Iran is less out of concernfor the intentions of nuclear-armed Iran than for theramications of a regional arms race that would likely

ensue, Turkey’s position on Iran is suciently alignedwith American interests. Similarly, even if Turkey doesnot support United States led sanctions against Iran,demonstrated by opposition to an American measureat the UN, the ultimate objective of a regime change inTehran remains a common goalTurkey could serve as a model in the Middle East of asecular, stable government that respects Islam, but isnot ruled by it. As shown by the rapturous welcomesa orded Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan in hispost-Arab Spring regional trips, there is hope forWashington that the Turkish model will indeed prevailas more Middle Eastern nations gain the chance forself-determination. e support provided by Turkey to rebels in the ongoing Syrian rebellions also enjoysa degree of legitimacy among the rebels and Arabobservers that the US could currently never hope toreplicate.

However, substantial obstacles could hurt theUnited States’ pursuit of closer relations with Turkey.Ankara’s increasingly antagonistic relationship with

Israel and the United States’ Congressional attemptsto pass a resolution of the Armenian genocide couldcause a deterioration in relations. Even as both partiesseek to develop a comprehensive Middle Eastern peacesettlement, Turkey’s insistence on the inclusion of Hamas, a group identied as a terrorist organization

by both the United States and the European Unionis an impediment to co-operation. Moreover, theincreasingly autocratic nature of the Justice andDevelopment Party (AK Party) which has substantiallycurtailed individual freedoms, may seem unappealingto support, especially considering the US’ historica

links to the secular Turkish military and liberal elites.Nevertheless, the upcoming years o er anunusual convergence of interests between Turkeyand the US not only in the Middle East but withinEurope as well. As the Libyan intervention highlightedNATO’s material shortcomings and the US turnsaway from unilateral interventions, Turkey’s status aspossessing Europe’s largest military power becomesincreasingly important. Turkey’s ongoing desire forcloser aliation with Europe, historically thwarted byGermany and France, is a subject the US should seek to

advance whenever possible. e alternative would bean increasingly isolated and alienated Turkey lackingincentives for future co-operation with the West.Turkey and the US, while united on broader policyobjectives, diverge on the minutiae and methods inmany cases. Nevertheless, for both nations closerties o er means of safeguarding and advancingtheir interests in a manner stemming far more frompragmatism than ideology. e relationship thatemerges in the upcoming years thus has the potentialto be far more enduring and substantial than regionadynamics might otherwise suggest. e Middle Eastremains, and will remain, an area critical to Americaninterests. us, a re-allocation of resources to a “specialrelationship” with Ankara could e ectively servesAmerican policy goals in the decades to come.



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People gather in Tunis to protest electoral fraud.

by Elizabeth Fair

ćF&MFDUJPOPG&OOBIEBBOEUIF'VUVSFPG5VOJTJBO%FNPDSBDZ

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On October 24, Tunisia held its rst freeelection since the Revolution. Demonstrationsin Tunisia began the Arab Spring, and the

country has been a focal point of global attention asit creates a new government with dignity, enthusiasm,correctness, and little outside assistance. Describedas a day of festivities and equality, voters waited in

Ennahda has already expressed that women can chooseto wear the veil or not (it had previous been prohibitedin Tunisia). e party will conform to Tunisian visionsof democracy, not the other way around.

More generally liberal political parties ran a closesecond in the election, confounding commentatorsand challenging them to make sense of votes for both

line for their turn tocast a ballot. More than90 percent of registered voters (about 55 percentof the population) cameout on Election Day. Apartfrom a few small protestsconcerning electionfraud, the results wereissued without incident.e Ennahda Party won

41 percent of the vote, or90 of the 217 seats in theConstituent Assembly,and was charged with theresponsibility of creatinga new constitution.Congress for the Republic

Islamists and secularliberals. Tunisian unity came rst for voters, andparties that sought todistance themselves fromEnnahda or discountedsharing power with thegroup su ered at the ballotbox. Such parties wereaccused of not creating astrong platform of their

own and attempting totap into fears of a hard-line Islamist state. Afew hundred people didprotest against what they saw as Ennahda’s electionfraud, but most Tunisians

received the next highest number of votes, gaining 30 of the 217 seats. What do these parties and seat allocationmean for Tunisia’s future? e Ennahda Party, which won the vast majority

of seats, is a moderate Islamist group, sparking fearsamong commentators that their inuence will stiesecular liberal freedoms. Many Tunisians, however,saw their vote for the Ennahda Party as a vote forhonesty and morality, not necessarily for Islamicreasons. e Islamist party enlisted support fromthe more conservative, working class sectors of thecountry.e party was banned by the previous regime,but continued to work with its working class supportbase. Islamist parties represent organized opposition,

giving them an immediate advantage in the

rstelections. ey have brand recognition, but that doesnot necessarily mean that have an irrevocable mandatefrom the people. eir governance of the country willcount for more than their Islamist tendencies. Morefemale candidates ran in this party than in any of theothers. Following the spirit of the parity law institutedfor this election, every slate was required to be madeup half by females. e spokeswoman for the party isthe Western-educated daughter of the party leader, and

saw this as an opportunity for cooperation in politics,if not compromise in civil and human rights. e question remains of how the new Constituent Assembly will handle the next few steps

into democracy. Tunisians feel a sense of ownershipfor their country and will peacefully defend theirfreedoms, and the success of this election stands as aninspiration to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, thetriumph of Ennahda and the parties that chose not tobring up religion as an issue for the campaign, raisesa troubling issue that the role of religion will remaina silent deal-breaker, instead of something denedopenly in Tunisia’s forthcoming constitution. Tunisiagrapples with the legacy of French-inspired civil

rights and more conservative Islamic views that led towidespread protests of the recent TV showing of thelm Persepolis. Free religious expression is a priority,but if it is not acknowledged as an open right insteadof an assumed one, assumptions about morals couldbecome codied. Turkey has been cited thus far as agood example of a secular country ruled by an Islamistparty; let us hope that Tunisia takes this example andfashions it as their own.

Rachid Ghannouch, leader of the Ennahda party which won Tunisia’s first free election.

http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/tag/tunisia-ghannouchi-islamist-

ennahda-salafist-saudi-wahhabi-election/



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References

i. Cammett, Melani. “e Limits of Anti-Islamism in Tunisia.”31 October 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/31/will_an_islamist_victory_

translate_to_democracy

ii. “e Carter Center Answers Your Questions About the HistoricOct. 23 Tunisia Elections.” Oct. 21, 2011. Accessed 6 November

2011. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/elections/tunisia/questions.html

iii. Lewis, Aidan. "Prole: Tunisia's Ennahda Party." 25 October 2011.Accessed 5 November 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15442859

iv. Muasher, Marwan. “Opinion:e Overblown Islamist reat.” 2November 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/opinion/the-overblown-islamist-threat.html?_r=1&ref=tunisia

v. “Tunisia.” 28 October 2011. Accessed 5 November 2011. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/tunisia/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=tunisia&st=cse

vi. “Tunisian Election ‘Extraordinary Achievement,’ NDI Mission Finds.24 October 2011. Accessed 6 November 2011. http://www.ndi.org/tunisia-election-extraordinary-achievement



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