between islamists and liberals saudi arabia

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Between Islamists and Liberals:

Saudi Arabia’s New “Islamo-Liberal” Reformists

Stéphane Lacroix

MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL✭ VOLUME 58, NO. 3, SUMMER 2004

The last few years in Saudi Arabia have witnessed the rise of a new trend made

up of former Islamists and liberals, Sunnis and Shi‘ites, calling for democratic

change within an Islamic framework through a revision of the official Wahhabireligious doctrine. These intellectuals have managed to gain visibility on the

local scene, notably through a series of manifestos and petitions, and their project

has even received support from among the Royal Family. Indeed, the government

has since then taken a number of preliminary steps towards political and religious

reform. But does this mean that Saudi Arabia is about to enter the era of Post-

Wahhabism?

Stéphane Lacroix is a PhD candidate and teaching assistant at Sciences-Po Paris.

This article will examine a new phenomenon in domestic Saudi Arabian politics,namely the emergence of a constituency made up of former Islamists and liberals,Sunnis and Shi‘ites, calling for democratic change within an Islamic framework through

a revision of the official “Wahhabi”1 religious doctrine.

Since the end of the 1990s, the Saudi intellectual field has been subject to sig-

nificant internal developments that have led to the splitting up of its Sunni Islamist

component into three main orientations. First are the prominent members of the former

al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic Awakening,” the Islamist opposition of the early

1990s), such as Salman al-‘Awda or ‘A’idh al-Qarni, who have decided to move away

from domestic political issues and to restrain their activity to the religious field. In

other words, the government has co-opted them and uses them as a substitute for the

Council of Senior ‘Ulama’ ( Hay’at Kibar al-‘Ulama’), whose legitimacy and influ-

1. Although one has to be very careful when using the word “Wahhabism,” which in recent decades

has become more of a political anathema than a suitable tool for the social scientist, this term can

nevertheless be used as an operational concept on the condition of it being given a proper definition. I

thus define “Wahhabism” as the religious tradition developed over the centuries by the ‘ulama’ of the

official Saudi religious establishment founded by the heirs of Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahhab, an establish-

ment which in turn considers itself as the legitimate guardian of this tradition. However, the Wahhabis

never refer to themselves as such, and always use the terms Salafi (with reference to al-salaf al-salih or

pious ancestors) or Ahl al-Tawhid (People professing the absolute unity of God). It is worth noting that

not only the Wahhabis stricto sensu (i.e. the ‘ulama’ of the official religious establishment) call them-

selves Salafis in Saudi Arabia, but also most of the Islamists.

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346✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

ence have suffered a first blow with the Gulf War2

and a second blow with the succes-sive deaths of its two most respected figures, Shaykh Ibn Baz and Shaykh Ibn

‘Uthaymin, in 1999 and 2001. Second are the Islamists who have chosen to venture

into global Salafi-Jihadi politics, acting as ideologues or spokesmen for the new radi-

cal trend. Third are those who have taken a middle way. They are the focus of the

present study.

As early as 1998, these activists and thinkers began reformulating their calls for

political reform in an Islamo-democratic fashion while expressing unprecedented criti-

cism of the Wahhabi religious orthodoxy, thus insisting on the necessity to combine

political reform with religious reform. It is on this basis that they have striven to

forge alliances with individuals belonging to the remaining (non-Sunni Islamist) com-

ponents of the Saudi intellectual field, mainly liberals and Shi‘ites. Through theirefforts, they have managed to create with those a common democratic, nationalist,

and anti-Wahhabi political platform, thereby giving birth to a new trend within the

Saudi political-intellectual field. This trend thus stands out both because of the nov-

elty of its religio-political discourse and because of the extreme diversity of its propo-

nents, who come from very different generational, regional, and intellectual back-

grounds, reflecting in a way the Kingdom’s own diversity. While some of these intel-

lectuals refer to themselves as wasatiyyun (advocates of wasatiyya3 ), tanwiriyyun

(enlighteners) or even ‘aqlaniyyun (rationalists), most of them agree on defining

themselves as islahiyyun (reformists), and, as ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim put it less for-

mally in March 2003, as “a bunch of liberal Islamists… or Islamist liberals.” 4 Thus,

we will use the term “Islamo-liberal reformism” to designate the new trend’s intellec-tual framework, and we will refer to its sympathizers as “Islamo-liberals.”

There is no doubt that the tragic events of September 11, 2001 served as some-

thing of a catalyst for this Islamo-liberal reformism. Prior to that date, these intellec-

tuals expressed their views informally in private salons, Internet forums and articles

in the press. But in the wake of the attacks, they took advantage of the new political

climate prevalent in the Kingdom to create a wider consensus on their ideas and to

formalize their aspirations into political manifestos and petitions, the most elaborate

of which was presented to Crown Prince ‘Abdallah in January 2003. Therefore the

2. The Council of Senior ‘Ulama’, which represents the highest institution in the official religious

establishment, was at that time compelled to issue a fatwa (religious statement) allowing foreign troops

into Saudi Arabia.

3. This Arabic term, which can have both a religious significance (i.e. moderation) and a political one

(i.e. balancing the liberal “left” and the Islamist “right”), has been used by the Islamo-liberals since 1998

but is no longer specific to them. Indeed, since the Riyadh bombings in May 2003, the term wasatiyya

has become widely used among Saudi Islamists — notably Salman al-‘Awda, ‘A’idh al-Qarni, and Safar

al-Hawali — fearing of being assimilated to the radical Jihadis and willing to stand out as moderates. The

use of this term aims at granting religious legitimacy to this “moderation,” the idea of wasat being

frequently mentioned in the Qur’an. (See for example Sura II, al-Baqara, 143: “And thus We have made

you a community of moderation (wasat ).”)

4. “104 intellectuels proposent une profonde réforme en Arabie Saoudite,” [“104 Intellectuals Pro-

pose a Profound Reform in Saudi Arabia”], Le Monde, March 5, 2003.

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SAUDI ARABIA’S “ISLAMO-LIBERAL” REFORMISTS✭ 347

steps towards reform taken by ‘Abdallah in 2003 — notably, the organization of anational dialogue conference and the announcement of partial municipal elections —

came in part as a response to these domestic demands and can in no way be considered

as merely the result of American pressures. A study of the new Islamo-liberal trend

will thus throw light on the endogenous dimension of a Saudi reform process that

many observers have incorrectly described as purely exogenous.

In order to give the reader a better overview of this trend, we will begin by

drawing an intellectual portrait of several prominent figures representing its key com-

ponents. In doing so, we will illustrate the trend’s socio-cultural heterogeneity and, at

the same time, its ideological cohesiveness. We will then examine the conditions that

allowed for the emergence of this trend and analyze how it gradually fashioned a

unitary political discourse aimed at bringing together the whole Saudi intellectualfield. Finally, we will briefly evaluate the political significance of Islamo-liberal

reformism and analyze how the government has come to grips with this nascent religio-

political phenomenon.

PROMINENT FIGURES OF THE ISLAMO-LIBERAL TREND

‘A BD AL-‘A ZIZ AL-Q ASIM , THE D EMOCRAT S HAYKH

Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim was born in the early 1960s in the Riyadh re-

gion. After studying religion, he became a judge at the High Court in Riyadh. At the

beginning of the 1990s, he subscribed to the doctrines of al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya and

got involved in its political reform project, first by joining the 52 prominent Saudi

religious figures who presented the “Letter of Demands” (Khitab al-matalib) to King

Fahd in 1991, then by becoming an important figure of the “Committee for the De-

fence of Legitimate Rights” (CDLR — Lajnat al-difa‘ ‘an al-huquq al-shar‘iyya),

founded by members of the Islamic Opposition in 1993. He was subsequently arrested

and was freed in 1997. He has never been reinstated in his former functions and is

now working as an independent legal consultant.5 Since his liberation, he has become

a key figure in the emerging Islamo-liberal trend.

In al-Qasim’s thinking, the starting point is political. He begins by criticizing

the attitude of the contemporary Islamist movements which categorically reject West-

ern political systems. For al-Qasim, while these systems shouldn’t be adopted in their

current form, they should nonetheless constitute a source of inspiration for Muslim

reformers. He argues that all that Islam requires is a political system where justice

prevails, the definition of which is left to the ijtihad (interpretation) of men. So, since

democracy has proven the best way to create a just society, Muslims should embrace

it.6 He insists on the fact that democracy is only an operational scheme, the contents

5. Dialogue between ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, March 12, 2003 (http://

bb.tuwaa.com/showthread.php?s=c07110b4f71da52c9d23d11bb403b536&threadid=11198 ).

6. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim, “al-Nizam al-Huquqi al-Islami wa Azmat al-Wasa’il — al-Dimuqratiyya

ka Namudhaj li-l-Jadal al-Fiqhi” [“The Islamic Legal System and the Crisis of Means — Democracy as

a Paradigm for Legal Debate”], al-Watan, November 21 and 28, 2002.

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of which, in terms of values, must differ according to the nature of the society whereit is applied. In short, democratization neither means westernization, nor seculariza-

tion, which most Islamists still have great difficulty accepting.7

In other writings, al-Qasim calls for the creation of a genuine civil society,

without which his concept of an Islamic democracy would be meaningless.8 Interest-

ingly enough, al-Qasim considers jihad to be a pillar of an Islamic civil society: “The

principal characteristic of jihad is that it must be decided independently of the official

political authority, which makes it a tremendous means of pressure on the authority to

ensure it protects the country out of fear that jihad might otherwise be declared.”9

Al-Qasim also strives to demonstrate that Saudi nationalism is not incompatible

with Islam. The only problem with nationalism has been its instrumentalization by

the secular authoritarian Arab states, leading to its rejection by Islamists who came toconsider it an integral part of the regimes they were fighting. However, the idea of

Watan (homeland), he argues, is found in the Qur’an. Moreover, the Prophet loved

his native city of Mecca, to the extent that several hadiths recount that, when he was

in Medina, he felt deeply homesick.

Finally, al-Qasim believes it is essential to overcome the divide between Islam-

ists and liberals in Saudi society. He insists that only the lack of mutual knowledge

and understanding is responsible for the distrust between the two groups and says he

is confident that the increase in the level of communication within the intellectual

field will help to solve this problem.10

However, al-Qasim’s liberal conceptions in the realm of politics do not apply to

social issues. When asked his opinion about whether women should have the right todrive, he answers that, given the current conditions in Saudi Arabia, he opposes grant-

ing it to them. In another interview, he warns against “the dangers of mixing genders

in working places, since it can give a man the opportunity to be alone with a woman,

which is prohibited in Islam.”11 This example tells a lot about the difference between

political liberalism and social liberalism in Saudi Arabia.

A BDALLAH AL-H AMID , THE MUJADDID12

‘Abdallah al-Hamid shares common points with al-Qasim. First, he was also a

minor sahwist (i.e. adherent of al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya), and took his first importantpolitical stand with the CDLR. Second, the conclusions that he reaches are similar to

al-Qasim’s, although he adopts another approach and uses a different discourse.

Al-Hamid was born in 1950 in Burayda, in the Qasim region. He received

7. Dialogue between ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, March 12, 2003.

8. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim, “Mu’assasat al-Mujtama‘ al-Madani Makhraj Azmat al-Nukhba wa-l-

Dawla” (The Institutions of Civil Society are the Solution to the Crisis of the State and the Elite), al-

Watan, January 12, 2002.

9. Dialogue between ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, March 12, 2003.

10. Dialogue, March 12, 2003.

11. “Women’s Rights in Saudi Arabia,” Arab News, June 19, 2003.

12. i.e. The Religious Renewer.

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higher education at the Department of Arabic Language of Imam Muhammad IbnSa’ud University in Riyadh. He then went to Egypt, where he studied at al-Azhar and

came back with a doctorate in 1977. The same year, he was appointed Professor of

Literature. In 1993, al-Hamid became one of the six founding members of the CDLR

and subsequently lost his job and was thrown in jail, where he spent a couple of

months. He was jailed two more times, in 1994 and 1995. Since then, he has written

several books on religious issues, as well as numerous articles.13

Unlike al-Qasim, the starting point in al-Hamid’s thinking is a religious reflec-

tion. As he argues, “an innovative rereading of the sacred texts is necessary, nowadays

more than ever, for it is out of this that our political thought will emerge.” 14 He

explains his line of argument in the following terms: “The Islamic thought we know

dates back to the Abbasid period. Today, however, we tend to think that this is Islam,which is wrong. If we take a close look at it, we’ll discover that it contains many

secondary things that are solutions to problems that arose at that time, because the

jurists and thinkers were influenced by their environment.” Applying this argument to

the case of the medieval jurist Ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali school of Law and

one of Wahhabism’s main influences, he adds:

He completed important tasks, such as compiling the prophet’s traditions, but

he also expressed views. Among them are some that are open to ijtihad , and

wherever there is ijtihad , there is some right and some wrong.(…) It is essen-

tial to borrow from our ancestors, for they have played an important role, but

what I criticize is the behavior of these traditionalists who refuse to go beyondthem, (…) who regard them as saints, as if they were the incarnation of the

Book and the Sunna.15

There exist, according to al-Hamid, two forms of Salafism, one innovative, the

other conservative. The latter is closely associated with the Saudi religious establish-

ment. “Ibn Taymiyya has fashioned a discourse capable of dealing with the problems

of his era, and in this sense, he is an innovator. However, those of his disciples who

have today made him an absolute reference and hope to solve our contemporary

problems with his ideas are imitators and conservative Salafis.” For al-Hamid, “what

we need are people who base themselves on the Book and the Sunna to find solutions

to the particular problems we face: globalization, human rights, civil society, UnitedNations, etc… Can one find in Ibn Taymiyya’s medicine chest remedies to these

problems?”

What al-Hamid calls for, on the whole, is a revival of the “real” Salafism, in its

innovative and animated form, or, in his words, “to return to the methodology of the

13. For his biography, “Al-Duktur ‘Abdallah al-Hamid Yalhaq bi-Nadi Tuwa” [“Doctor ‘Abdallah

al-Hamid Joins Tuwa Club”], www.tuwaa.com, May 9, 2003.

14. Author’s interview with ‘Abdallah al-Hamid, Riyadh, June 2003.

15. “Tajdid al-fikr al-dini” [“The Renewal of Religious Thinking”], Al-Shari‘a wa’l-Hayat [Shari ‘a

and Life], Al-Jazeera TV, May 26, 2002.

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pious ancestors and not simply to their productions, with a clear vision of what themaqasid (objectives) of the shari‘a ought to be.”16 This vision may remind us of the

ideas of Muhammad ‘Abduh and his disciples from the Egyptian religious reform

movement of the early 20th century. However, although it might not sound novel

elsewhere in the Muslim world, this type of discourse is completely new among Saudi

Islamists.

This rereading of the texts is meant to show that, originally, “the Muslim faith is

double. It requires spiritual and social progress.” But men of religion, who were not

equipped to deal with the present, “have neglected the social, temporal, practical

principles imposed by religion and have most of the time concentrated on the spiri-

tual, the metaphysical and the theoretical.” Thus “the duties imposed by religion have

been restricted to the ritual, and the requirements concerning the life of the commu-nity have been neglected.”17 However, as al-Hamid argues, in the Islam of the pious

ancestors, politics cannot be distinguished from religion; and human rights, civil

society or shura (consultation) are established realities. What he calls for is a return to

these values.

It is therefore out of his reflection on Islam that al-Hamid calls for respect for

human rights, the establishment of a civil society and the rule of shura. He insists on

the use of this last term: “I prefer the use of ‘shura’ to the use of ‘democracy’ because

what we need is something that is a product of our own culture, not imported con-

cepts.”18 It is perhaps this manner of framing the debate that most clearly illustrates

the difference of approach between al-Hamid and al-Qasim. As for Hasan al-Maliki,

it is from yet another angle that he addresses the problem.

H ASAN AL-M ALIKI , THE I CONOCLAST

Hasan al-Maliki was born in 1970 in the region of Jizan, a few kilometers from

the Yemeni border, where he grew up. In his teenage years, he became, as he himself

confesses, a conservative Salafi, spending his free time distributing tapes of Ibn Baz

and even thinking about going to Afghanistan to fight the Russians. In 1987, he left

for Riyadh to study at Imam Muhammad Ibn Sa‘ud University, in the Communication

Department, from which he graduated in 1992. It is during the period of his studies

that, “shocked by the atmosphere of extremism that surrounded him,” he began to

open himself intellectually and became fond of history. In 1993, he joined the Minis-

try of Education where he worked first as a publication supervisor, then as a professor

and finally as a researcher. At the same time, he began contributing to newspapers on

a regular basis and was sent to jail for two months in 1996 for an article that was

considered too provocative.19 He has also published several books, all of them banned


17. ‘Abdallah al-Hamid, “Al-Sahwa al-Diniyya Lan Tuflih Hatta Takun Hadariyya” [“The Reli-

gious Awakening Will Not Succeed Until it Becomes Civilizing”], www.tuwaa.com, May 20, 2003.


19. Dialogue between Hasan al-Maliki and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, June 26, 2003. (http:// bb.tuwaa.com/showthread.php?s=c07110b4f71da52c9d23d11bb403b536&threadid=18333 ).

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in the Kingdom. His latest one, a fierce critique of the Saudi school curricula, was pub-lished shortly after September 11th (al-Maliki insists that this timing was a pure coinci-

dence), and triggered a scandal, to the extent that its author was dismissed from his job, to

which he has never been reinstated.

Hasan al-Maliki repeatedly insists that he is not a politician and does not intend to

become one. However, if his writings do not directly target the Saudi political system,

they nevertheless shake some of its most essential pillars: the writing of history, the school

curricula, and the Wahhabi tradition.

It is in his book To Save Islamic History20 that he exposes for the first time his views

on the way Islamic history is taught in Saudi Arabia. According to him, things are pre-

sented as if the pious ancestors were infallible, which, al-Maliki argues, is completely

false. The salaf are not, in this respect, different from the other human beings; some of them have succeeded in what they have undertaken and others have failed. Al-Maliki does

not hesitate to blame several characters central to Saudi historiography: the Caliph

Mu‘awiyya, whom he describes as a tyrant and an opportunist, and Ibn Taymiyya, whose

extreme positions, especially those related to takfir (excommunication), he denounces. For

al-Maliki, a reform of Saudi society could only succeed if it began with an unbiased

rewriting of history, so that people can learn from the past.21

In the same spirit, he violently attacks Saudi curricula, concentrating his criticism

on one of the pillars of Wahhabi religious learning, the subject called “Tawhid ” (the

uniqueness of God). In his book The Curricula: a Critical Reading of the Prescriptions of

“Tawhid” for the Classes of General Education,22 he demonstrates that the school books

used by young Saudis are replete with attacks against non-Wahhabi Muslims. Saudi stu-dents are incited to excommunicate them, to wage jihad upon them in certain instances

and, in any case, to be careful never to mix with them, even if this means making one’s

hijra to “the land of Islam.” In the case of non-Muslims, the attacks are even more viru-

lent, as al-Maliki denounces. But he goes further than this in his criticism, and this is

where his book becomes truly polemical. Saudi school books are only one of the multiple

expressions of a wider phenomenon. The real culprit, he maintains, is Wahhabism.

As we have just seen in those two cases, the critique of the Wahhabi dogma is the

mainspring of al-Maliki’s work. But this critique is in fact twofold. On the one hand,

al-Maliki criticizes the works of its primary sources of inspiration, Ibn Taymiyya and

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who have “exercised their right to ijtihad , and have, like any

other mujtahid (the one who practices ijtihad ), made mistakes.”23 For example, in

another polemical work , The Imperfections of the Elucidation of Doubts,24 he attacks

20. Hasan al-Maliki, Nahwa Inqadh al-Ta’rikh al-Islami (To Save Islamic History), (n.d., n.p.).

21. “I‘adat Qira’at al-Ta’rikh al-Islami” (“The Rereading of Islamic History”), Al-Shari‘a wa’l-

Hayat , Al-Jazeera TV , December 13, 2000.

22. Hasan al-Maliki, Manahij al-Ta‘lim : Qira’a Naqdiyya li-Muqarrarat al-Tawhid li-Marahil al-

Ta‘lim al-‘Amm [The Curricula: a Critical Reading of the Prescriptions of “Tawhid” for the Classes

of General Education], (n.d., n.p.).

23. Dialogue between Hasan al-Maliki and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, June 26, 2003.

24. Hasan al-Maliki, Naqs Kashf al-Shubuhat [The Imperfections of the Elucidation of Doubts],

(n.d., n.p.).

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one of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s core books, The Elucidation of Doubts, denouncingonce more the extremism that he exhibits regarding takfir. On the other hand, he

castigates the extreme doctrinal rigidity of Wahhabism, which he ironically calls “al-

tayyar al-madhhabi” — literally “the school-trend” — implying that Wahhabism,

which initially saw itself as going beyond the distinction between the established

juridical schools, has indeed become the contrary of what it had envisioned to be: a

new school, the particularity of which is to be even more rigid than all the others.25 In

this respect, he agrees with al-Hamid on the necessity of getting rid of this caricature

of Salafism that Wahhabism has become and of returning to the original idea, that of

a conscious and innovative Salafism, capable of giving rise to a civil society and of

permitting the establishment of shura.

Al-Maliki’s iconoclastic views have caused him much trouble: first, as we men-tioned, the Ministry of Education dismissed him. It is even rumored that Salih al-

Luhaydan and Salih al-Fawzan, two senior shaykhs from the official religious es-

tablishment, personally asked for his removal. Second, the Salafi-Jihadi shaykhs made

him one of the main targets of their writings. For example, on August 14, 2001, ‘Ali

al-Khudayr posted on the Internet a “Statement on Hasan al-Maliki”26 in which he

called him “a defender of the grave worshippers, the murji‘a and the Shi‘ites” and

condemned his “slander about the pious ancestors.” Without going so far as to excom-

municate him, he nonetheless called for al-Maliki to be tried by a religious court.

Other such statements, some of them signed by Nasir al-Fahd, Hamud al-Shu‘aybi

and ‘Abdallah al-Sa‘d, followed. However, as we will see, it is not just al-Maliki

among these Islamo-liberals who has incurred the wrath of the jihadi shaykhs.

M ANSUR AL-N UQAYDAN , THE R EPENTANT

Mansur al-Nuqaydan belongs to the same generation as al-Maliki and followed

a path that is in many ways comparable. He was born in 1970 in Burayda, where he

grew up. At the age of sixteen, he dropped out of school to devote himself completely

to what had become his driving interest, religion. However, the dogma to which he

subscribed at that time was a radical form of Islam, “neo-Salafism” as he calls it. “I

destroyed all my tapes, burnt the major part of the contemporary Literature I had,

took off the watch I used to wear on my wrist and decided I would adjust myself to

the sun,”27 he writes, remembering those days. He was arrested several times at the

beginning of the 1990s, notably for having set fire to a video store. It was during his

stay at Jeddah prison, far away from the “bad company” he had in Burayda, that the

transformation really took place. As soon as he was freed at the end of 1997, he spent

most of his time reading books, notably from Muslim modernist thinkers. In Decem-

25. Dialogue between Hasan al-Maliki and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, June 26, 2003.

26. ‘Ali al-Khudayr, “Bayan fi Hasan al-Maliki” (“Statement on Hasan al-Maliki”),

www.alkhoder.com, August 14, 2001.

27. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “Al-Hijra ila-l-Mustaqbal — Maqati‘ min Sira Ruhiyya” [“Exile to the

Future — Extracts from a Spiritual Biography”], Al-Majalla, May 28, 2000.

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ber 1998, he was appointed Imam at one of Riyadh’s small mosques. In February1999, he published his first article in al-Hayat , which he called: “Was Ibn Abi Dawud

the Victim of an Injustice?”28 In this historical reflection, he aims to demonstrate that

Ibn Hanbal’s status as the great Imam the Wahhabis extol today came more as a result

of a Caliph’s political calculation than as a natural consequence of his own qualities.

He also underlines the paradox of Ibn Hanbal excommunicating mu‘tazili Shaykh Ibn

Abi Dawud while ignoring Caliph al-Ma’mun’s own mu‘tazilism. This article came

as a bombshell in conservative religious circles. The extremely influential Shaykh

Hamud al-Shu‘aybi published a statement denouncing al-Nuqaydan’s words, and a

book was even written to refute them. The pressure exerted by al-Shu‘aybi was so

intense that al-Nuqaydan lost his position as an Imam. It is with this turn of events

that his career as a journalist began in earnest: He started publishing new articles andin September 2000, he was appointed editor of the religious section for the Saudi

daily al-Watan. He was dismissed two years later and has been working since then as

a freelance journalist.29

“What we urgently need is an enlightened understanding of the shari‘a, the

sacred texts and their maqasid (objectives) taking into account the considerable evolu-

tions and winds of change that blow upon nations and cultures,”30 al-Nuqaydan writes.

And he even goes further when confessing in private: “What we must have is a genu-

ine revolution of concepts: it is the masalih (interests) and the maqasid that ought to

determine the way we read the Qur’an, not the contrary. The Qur’an is an open book;

with it, everything is possible.” A wide-ranging and enlightened ijtihad would there-

fore provide the miraculous cure capable of rousing the Umma out of its torpidity.This, he explains, is where the socio-political reform Saudi Arabia and the Muslim

world have been waiting for will come from.31

It is not so much that al-Nuqaydan is more liberal in his ideas than most Islamo-

liberals, but, in order to make his voice heard, he does not hesitate to use expressions

likely to shock his readers. For example, he writes that “Islam needs a Lutheran

reform,” and that “we need a new Islam.” He evens defines himself as a humanist, no

matter how shocking this denomination would sound to hard-liners.32 In his articles,

he tends to deal with sensitive themes, always defending the position contrary to the

one adopted by the dominant Wahhabi discourse. For instance, in December 2001 he

published an article called “Judgment on the Woman’s ID,”33 in which he vigorously

28. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “Hal Kan Ibn Abi Dawud Mazluman ?” [Was Ibn Abi Dawud the Victim

of an Injustice?”], Al-Hayat , February 23, 1999.

29. Author’s interview with Mansur al-Nuqaydan, Riyadh, June 2003.

30. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “Hakadha Ta‘allamtu fi-l-Masajid” (This Is How I Was Taught in the

Mosques), www.elaph.com, February 8, 2002.


32. Dialogue between Mansur al-Nuqaydan and “Muntada al-Wasatiyya,” www.wasatyah.com,

December 28, 2002 (removed from “Muntada al-Wasatiyya” shortly after).

33. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “Hukm Bataqat al-Mar’a” [“Judgment on the Woman’s ID”], on

www.alnogaidan.com.

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defended the project of granting women personal identification. In two separate articles, hecriticized the “Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice” ( Hay’at al-

Amr bi’l-ma‘ruf wa’l-Nahi ‘an al-Munkar ) questioning its role, and finally arguing that its

existence is a bid’a (blameworthy innovation)!34 More recently, he drew a clear link between

Wahhabism with its inclination to takfir and the terrorist violence the country has been experi-

encing since May 2003.35 This last article caused him to be sidelined for two months.

His obstinacy and penchant for provocation made al-Nuqaydan the jihadists’ primary

target, and they acted all the more ferociously towards him as he used to be one of them. In their

eyes, he came to represent the archetypal traitor. This is how one should understand the relent-

lessness and determination that they showed against him. Finally, on January 24, 2003, after

numerous pamphlets, manifestos, and books had been written to denounce his intellectual dan-

gerousness, four leading jihadi shaykhs, among them ‘Ali al-Khudayr and Ahmad al-Khalidi,accused him of apostasy for the statements he made during his interview with the forum Muntada

al-Wasatiyya (the Forum of wasatiyya, as defined above in footnote 3) in December 2002. They

demanded that “the punishment ordained for apostates — death — be applied to him, if the

shari‘a is really the law in this country.”36

However, al-Nuqaydan refused to give in to intimidation. A few days later, he

replied to those who claimed the right to set themselves as judges of his words through

an article entitled “What I think of the Decrees of Takfir.”37 Showing that he has no

intention of putting an end to his criticism, he overtly called for a repudiation of

Wahhabism, as well as any other form of Salafism, and a revival of Irja’, an early

Islamic school of thought that was characterised by its insistence on keeping an apo-

litical attitude and its refusal to judge the faith of others. 38 “Wisdom today demandsthat we make every effort to teach people “Irja’ ” in faith. Because Salafi thought —

in its contemporary meaning — contains by nature an inclination to takfir and

exclusivism.” Salafism has thus become a term which al-Nuqaydan regards with great

suspicion: “I feel intellectually close to such thinkers as al-Hamid and al-Qasim. But

the great difference between us is that they call themselves Salafis and continue to

believe in this golden age of the first hegirian centuries.”39 Now, let us take a look at

the other components of this Islamo-liberal constituency.

34. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “Da‘wa ila Taqnin Wazifat Rijal al-Hisba” [“Call for a Regulation of the

Prerogatives of the Religious Police”], Al-Majalla, April 30, 2000, and “Al-Amr bi-l-Ma‘ruf wa-l-Nahi‘an al-Munkar” [“The Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice”], Al-Watan, February 25, 2002.

35. Mansur al-Nuqaydan, “Al-Fikr al-Jihadi al-Takfiri… Wafid am Asil Darib bi-Judhurihi?”

(“The Jihadi Takfiri Thought… Coming from the Outside or Deeply Rooted in the Country?”], Al-

Riyadh, May 11, 2003.

36. “Bayan fi Riddat Mansur al-Nuqaydan” [“Statement on the Apostasy of Mansur al-Nuqaydan”],

www.alkhoder.com, January 24, 2003.

37. Mansur al-Nuqaydan , “Ray’i fi Sukuk al-Takfir” [“What I think of the Decrees of Takfir”],

www.elaph.com, February 14, 2003.

38. The accusation of Irja’ has in the last decades been at the center of the debates within the Saudi

religious circles, especially between the Islamists and some of the Wahhabi ‘ulama’, each group accusing

the other of being Murji’a, or adepts of Irja’. It is within this context that al-Nuqaydan’s call for a revival

of Irja’ must be understood as a new challenge to both the Islamists and the Wahhabi establishment.


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M UHAMMAD S A‘ ID T AYYIB , THE L IBERAL

Muhammad Sa‘id Tayyib was born in Mecca in 1939. In the 1950s, he became

an ardent admirer and proponent of Egypt’s President Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (Nasser),

which, under the reign of King Faysal, caused him much trouble. His writings led

him several times to jail. Although in the 1980s he moved slightly away from politics,

he could not stand back when, in the wake of the second Gulf War in 1990-1991, the

country witnessed a rare wave of political upheaval. Indeed, he subsequently became

one of the prominent figures of what came to be known as the “liberal trend.” In

1992, he published a book entitled “Intellectuals and a Prince… Shura (Consultation)

and the Policy of the Open Door,”40 which represents an authentic manifesto of liberal

reformism, calling for democracy and freedom of speech. As a result of this newimpertinence, he once again ended up in jail for a few months. Since the beginning of

the media infitah (opening) in 1999, he has been expressing himself regularly in the

press and has revived his famous Tuesday diwaniyya (salon), “al-thulathiyya,” a main-

stay of Saudi intellectual life, capable of gathering upwards of 80 figures from the

local political, economic, media and literary elite.41

Muhammad Sa‘id Tayyib’s political program is that of all liberals: reform, de-

mocracy, freedom of speech, human rights, etc… nothing really original here, par-

ticularly since he is an activist, not a theoretician. What is interesting to note, how-

ever, is that, since the middle of the 1990s, he has begun to reformulate those same

political ideas in a new language, insisting on the centrality of Islam. This is not to say

that Tayyib, or any of the Saudi liberals, had ever openly put into question the su-

premacy of the shari‘a. But neither had they taken any active stance towards it, nor

had they used it as the intellectual framework of reference for their reform projects.

However, Tayyib’s present statements are unequivocal: “Religion is a red line I do not

want to cross — and which I do not even want to get close to; this is true particularly

for all the questions to which there is a clear answer in the Qur’an and the Sunna.”

Elsewhere, he explains that, concerning the role of women, “we do not want to devi-

ate from the book of God and the Sunna of his Prophet, we want for women the rights

given to them by the Qur’an and the Sunna.”42

It is on this basis that he and other liberals, aware of their utter lack of popular

support within Saudi society, have been calling over the last few years for a rap-

prochement with Islamists. In 2001, Tayyib declared, acknowledging in a certain

fashion that Arab nationalism now belongs to the past and that Islamism has taken

over: “Personally, I don’t see any contradiction between my convictions and that of a

real Islamist movement, in the sound meaning of the word. On the contrary, we are all

brothers and our objectives are the same… a better and more beautiful life. And I will

40. Muhammad Sa‘id Tayyib, Muthaqqafun wa Amir… al-Shura wa Siyasat al-Bab al-Maftuh

[ Intellectuals and a Prince… Shura and the Policy of the Open Door ], (n.d., n.p.).

41. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Qasim, Mukashafat [ Revelations], (Jidda, 2002), p. 221.

42. “Ahdath Amrika wa Athruha ‘ala al-Mustaqbal al-Siyasi li-l-Sa‘udiyya” [“The US Events and

their Impact on the Political Future of Saudi Arabia”], Bila Hudud (No Limits), Al-Jazeera TV, December26, 2001.

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not hide from you that the changes that have occurred have made certain Arab nation-alist principles unsuitable for this age. Arab nationalists thus have to adapt to the

evolutions, to the requirements and to the circumstances of the era.”43 Since Septem-

ber 11th, “the necessity of joining forces in the face of adversity” has made Tayyib’s

calls even more pressing. Interviewed on Tuwa in May 2003, he made this goal the

central theme of his speech: “Making peace, getting together, coming to an agreement

— call it as you like — is nowadays an urgent and pressing necessity, that can’t be

postponed… in this sense, it is exactly like the question of reform itself — and has no

less importance.”44 On May 17, 2003, he put his calls into a concrete form by taking

part in a meeting with Safar al-Hawali.45 Asked about the impression he had of the

shaykh, Tayyib answered: “Believe me, I found nothing in him but nobleness and

magnanimity… and a fabulous ability to understand… and an incredible exaltationfor the superior interests of the nation.” And for those who would still doubt his

sincerity, he adds: “My relations with the religious trend, its figures and leaders are

not mere tactical relations, as some imagine. They are, on the contrary, the fruit of

true convictions, in the name of the common good of this country.” And Tayyib

concludes: “I am entirely convinced that there exist between us and them common

principles and denominators, on which we all agree and that we want — with serious-

ness and loyalty — to develop and to promote… particularly in those difficult and

crucial times.”46 This last sentence seems to sum up perfectly the Islamo-liberal project.

T HE S HI ‘ ITE V OICES :

M UHAMMAD M AHFUZ , J A‘FAR AL-S HAYIB AND S HAYKH Z AKI AL-M ILAD

Muhammad Mahfuz, Ja‘far al-Shayib and Shaykh Zaki al-Milad are Shi‘ite

activists from the city of Qatif, in the Eastern Province. They left Saudi Arabia in the

1980s, before coming back to the country in the 1990s, after an agreement was reached

in 1994 between the Saudi government and the Shi‘ite opposition.

Mamoun Fandy has noted and analyzed the change of discourse of Shi‘ite activ-

ists, from Khomeinism to democratic pluralism, at the end of the 1980s. However, at

that time, the Shi‘ites had no one to talk to in the Sunni Islamic opposition, whose

43. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Qasim, Mukashafat , p. 245.

44. Dialogue between Muhammad Sa‘id Tayyib and Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com, June 6, 2003 (http://

bb.tuwaa.com/showthread.php?s=c07110b4f71da52c9d23d11bb403b536&threadid=15856 ).

45. This happened on the occasion of the launching of Safar al-Hawali’s “Global Campaign Against

Aggression,” aimed at uniting “the efforts of members of the Umma in alerting the community concern-

ing its right to self-defense and resistance to the aggression of its enemies in all possible legitimate and

effective means ,” and in which Tayyib accepted to take part. (See “Al-Hamla al-‘Alamiyya li-Muqawamat

al-‘Udwan Satadbut al-Masha‘ir Tujah al-Akhar” [“The Global Campaign Against Aggression Will

Correct the Feelings Towards the Other”] , Al-Watan, May 17, 2003; for more on the Global Campaign

Against Aggression, see its website at www.maac.ws .

46. Muhammad Sa‘id Tayyib, “Kalimat akhira ila usrat Tuwa al-Ghaliyya” [“Last Words to the

Beloved Family of Tuwa”], www.tuwaa.com, June 22, 2003 (http://bb.tuwaa.com/

showthread.php?s=01d3c9004e798c55e6792c00d3888974&threadid=18038 ).

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intransigence represented an ever greater danger for them than the power of the royalfamily. As Fandy argues, their isolation on the local scene made them subscribe to

this new discourse in order to be connected with the global world, and particularly its

western core.47 The rise of a Saudi Islamo-liberal reformist constituency from 1998

onwards therefore gave Shi‘ite intellectuals an opportunity to reintegrate themselves

into the local context, and their discourse subsequently experienced a few changes.

Democracy, human rights and civil society still constitute the core of their rhetoric,

but two new elements have appeared. First, one can notice a greater emphasis on

Islam in comparison with the beginning of the 1990s. As Shaykh Zaki al-Milad puts

it: “we, as Shi‘ites, no longer want to be systematically counted amongst the liberals.

We wish to propose a project that is at the same time democratic and Islamic.”48 This

same idea is at the center of Muhammad Mahfuz’s latest book, Islam and the Chal-lenges of Democracy, in which he writes: “We will not progress and evolve signifi-

cantly at every level of our existences unless we follow the teachings of Islam. […]

The only way for us, as Arabs and Muslims, to evolve and to progress is to combine

Islam and democracy.”49 Mahfuz’s discourse thus perfectly echoes that of the Sunni

Islamo-liberals. Indeed, to make this combination possible, “we call for a civilizing

and humanist reading of Islam,” as he writes, before embarking on a lengthy praise of

ijtihad . Second, the Shi‘ite leaders today champion Saudi nationalism, which they

have learned to instrumentalize in their political discourse. “We are Saudi and we love

our country. All that we ask for is the unity of the Saudi nation to truly become a

reality. It is in this framework, and in no other, that we want the Shi‘ite question to be

settled,”50 Muhammad Mahfuz explains. “We no longer want to be assimilated to therest of the Shi‘ites who live in the Gulf and to be suspected of being a fifth column of

the neighbouring states. We want to be a fully-recognized constituent of the Saudi

nation,”51 Shaykh Zaki al-Milad adds.

The discourse used by Shi‘ite intellectuals is therefore very close to that of the

other Islamo-liberals we’ve mentioned. Indeed, one can consider them an integral

constituent of the Islamo-liberal reformist project. In addition, several channels of

communication and interaction have been created between Sunni and Shi‘ite Islamo-

liberals. For example, the “Tuesday salon,” founded in 2000 in Qatif and supervised

by Ja‘far al-Shayib, has received as speakers several prominent figures of Sunni Islamo-

liberal reformism, such as ‘Abdallah al-Hamid and Tawfiq al-Qusayyir. 52 In an un-

precedented move in Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Hasan al-Saffar, the historical leader of

the Saudi Shi‘ite movement, was invited to give a lecture on “social peace” at the

47. Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent , (Baginstoke: Macmillan, 1999),

pp.211-212.

48. Author’s interview with Shaykh Zaki al-Milad, Qatif, June 2003.

49. Muhammad Mahfuz, al-Islam wa Rihanat al-Dimuqratiyya [ Islam and the Challenges of De-

mocracy] , (Beirut : Al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al-‘Arabi, 2002), pp.204-205.

50. Author’s interview with Muhammad Mahfuz, Qatif, June 2003.

51. Author’s interview with Shaykh Zaki al-Milad, Qatif, June 2003.

52. Author’s interview with Ja‘far al-Shayib, Qatif, June 2003.

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out their project of creating a political platform that would unify the whole of theSaudi intellectual field and, beyond the elite, the entire Saudi society itself. This

construction of a unitary political discourse has taken place in several stages, princi-

pally by the way of manifestos and petitions, reminding observers of the frenzy that

Saudi Arabia had witnessed in the wake of the Gulf War.

“HOW WE CAN COEXIST”: A FAILED MANIFESTO OF SAUDI NATIONALISM

The first step in that direction was a manifesto published in April 2002 entitled

“How we can Coexist.”57 It came as a response to an open letter signed by 60 Ameri-

can intellectuals — among them Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama — which

sought to provide moral justifications to the Bush Administration’s “war on terror.” Intheir text, the 150 Saudi signatories called for peaceful coexistence with the West and

expressed their readiness to pursue dialogue with their American counterparts, while

strongly reasserting their attachment to their Saudi and Islamic specificity, in a tone

that is unequivocally Saudi nationalistic. Moreover, the composition of the list of

signatories aims at reinforcing the nationalistic nature of the message. Shaykh ‘Abd

al-‘Aziz al-Qasim, who played a central role in the project, and some of his fellow

“Islamo-liberals” have indeed managed to gather support from almost all socio-politi-

cal groups, including liberals and women, but also more radical Islamists such as

Salman al-‘Awda or Safar al-Hawali, who thought they had found there a good op-

portunity to improve their image. The only significant absence is that of the Shi‘ites,

who probably resented the presence of ‘ulama’ such as Shaykh ‘Abdallah Bin Jibrin,notorious for having taken radical anti-Shi‘ite stances in the past.58

Al-Qasim and his companions’ main objective here was to make the exterior

part of the Islamo-liberals’ political program — and, beyond this, the whole Islamo-

liberal reformist project itself — appear as if it were the fruit of a consensus within

Saudi society. On May 5, 2002, Islamo-liberal columnist Yusuf al-Dayni, believing

that the game has already been won, rejoiced in al-Watan: “This manifesto inaugu-

rates a new era of intellectual harmony that really represents our national unity.[…] It

has mostly succeeded in shaping a new, unitary intellectual vision capable of destroy-

ing the imaginary barriers of ice that have been raised through a long history of

struggle between the supposed dualities of modernisation and authenticity, tradition

and reason, nationalism and Islam, democracy and shura.”59 The authors’ second ob-

jective was to gain durably the support of the senior sahwist shaykhs and to have their

legitimacy put at the service of the Islamo-liberal project.

57. “‘Ala Ayy Asas Nata‘ayish” [“How We Can Coexist?”], posted at http://www.islamtoday.net/

bayan/bayanm.cfm on April 29, 2002 — the English translation is available at http://

www.americanvalues.org/html/saudi_statement.html.

58. In 1991, Ibn Jibrin issued a fatwa declaring the Shi‘ite infidels and authorizing their murder. (See

Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent , (Baginstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 206.

59. Yusuf al-Dayni, “Bayan al-Muthaqqafin al-Sa‘udiyyin Najah Dakhili wa Ikhfaq Khariji” (The

Saudi Intellectuals’ Manifesto — A Success at Home and a Failure Abroad), al-Watan, May 5, 2002.

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However, al-Qasim’s risky bet has failed. The shaykhs from the growing Salafi-Jihadi trend, acting here as guardians of the Wahhabi Orthodoxy and of the sacrosanct

principle of “al-wala’ wa-l-bara’” (loyalty to fellow Muslims and rejection of the

infidels), violently criticized the content of the manifesto and attacked al-‘Awda and

al-Hawali for supporting it.60 The pressure on the two shaykhs became so strong that

they were forced into signing an “explanatory manifesto” in which they purely and

simply contradicted every single argument and principle they had stood for in the

first text.61 Similarly, many of the signatories published separate statements in which

they announced their withdrawal from the list.62 Those moves triggered a shower of

criticism in the Saudi press and on the Internet, mainly directed against the Islamist

signatories for their opportunism. After two months of a genuine “media-frenzy”

surrounding the issue, nothing was left of the manifesto.This first attempt to bring together the Saudi intellectual field on an Islamo-

liberal and nationalist platform thus seems to have come to nothing. However, the

long debate that followed the publication of the text gave the Islamo-liberal reform-

ists, and their ideas, an unprecedented visibility on the Saudi scene. And they were

definitely going to take advantage of it to carry on with their socio-political project.

“VISION FOR THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE OF THE HOMELAND”:

A REFORMIST CHARTER 63

In August 2002, a group of Islamo-liberal intellectuals, Sunnis and Shi‘ites,

embarked on the drafting of a new manifesto dealing in a direct and uncompromisingway with the internal problems faced by the country and requesting the implementa-

tion of political, economic, and social reforms.64 However, it was only at the end of

January 2003, after five months of debate, drafting, and gathering signatures that a

charter entitled “Vision for the Present and the Future of the Homeland” was finally

sent to Crown Prince ‘Abdallah and a dozen other prominent members of the royal

family.

The charter begins and ends with an unequivocal pledge of allegiance to the

Saudi royal family. First, it contains a number of political demands: the separation of

powers; the implementation of the rule of law; equal rights for all citizens regardless

of their regional, tribal, and confessional background; the creation of elected national

60. See for example “Ihya’ Millat Ibrahim wa-l-Radd ‘ala al-Mukhadhdhilin al-Munhazimin”

[«Reviving the Community of Abraham and Responding to the Defeatist Traitors»], signed by ‘Ali al-

Khudayr and others, on www.alsalafyoon.com/ArabicPosts/IslamTodayNetRad.htm or Nasir al-Fahd’s

book Al-Tankil bima fi Bayan al-Muthaqqafin min Abatil [Castigating the Errors Contained in the

Intellectuals’ Manifesto] at http://www.al-fhd.com/kutob.htm.

61. Al-Bayan al-Tawdihi [The Explanatory Manifesto], posted on May 19, 2002, on

www.islamtoday.net and removed a few days later.

62. The letters in which the signatories announce their withdrawal can be found at

www.alsalafyoon.com/ArabicPosts/IslamTodayNetRad.htm.

63. “Ru’ya li-Hadir al-Watan wa Mustaqbalihi” [“Vision for the Present and the Future of the

Homeland”], Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, January 30, 2003.64. Author’s interview with ‘Abdallah al-Hamid, Riyadh, June 2003.

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and regional parliaments (majlis al-shura); and complete freedom of speech, assem-bly, and organization to allow the emergence of a true civil society. As for economic

demands, the signatories call for a fair distribution of wealth, serious measures against

corruption and waste, and the diversification of the country’s revenues. A third con-

cern, addressed under the rubric of “The Dangers that Threaten National Unity,” deals

with social issues: the respect of human rights; the ending of discrimination; the

improvement of public services; the struggle against unemployment; and the role of

women, who are described as “half of the society” and who should be given the rights

bestowed upon them by the shari‘a. Moreover, the signatories ask the rulers to take

immediate measures as a proof of their determination to effect reform: the liberation

— or fair trials — of all political prisoners, the reinstatement of all the intellectuals

dismissed from their jobs, and the right for all to express themselves freely withoutrisk of having their passport seized or losing their jobs. Finally, they demand the

organization of a national dialogue conference in which all regions and social groups

would be represented. Yet it appears that, in order to assemble a wide consensus

within the intellectual field, the Islamo-liberals avoided addressing some of the most

controversial issues. First, the issue of a reform of the Saudi curricula, which had for

months been at the center of violent disputes between certain liberals and Islamists in

the press and on the Internet, has simply been dropped. Second, the question of the

role of women in Saudi society, which had been an important focus for the disputes as

well, is merely alluded to, and many consider that it has not received the attention it

deserves.

Although the language of the text may not sound as religious as, say, that of the“Memorandum of Advice” ( Mudhakkarat al-Nasiha), which was presented to King

Fahd by 107 ‘ulama’ and Islamist activists in 1992, let us not be mistaken: the signa-

tories are careful enough to state several times in the document that the shari‘a is the

appropriate framework for all the reforms they demand. Moreover, although it is

evident that the signatories endorse such concepts between lines, the words “democ-

racy” and “parliament” are absent and all that can be found within the text is a refer-

ence to the Islamic institution of shura. As al-Hamid, one of the authors of the text

and whose influence is evident on this choice of terminology, argues, the aim is “to

root the reformist discourse in Islam.”65 This ambiguity of an Islamic discourse with

a liberal smell, or a liberal discourse with an Islamic smell, explains why most West-

ern — and even Arab — media misunderstood the initiative. Indeed, after many

articles described the document as “a liberal petition,” some newspapers, such as the

Washington Post ,66 preferred to warn their readers against a text written by dangerous

fundamentalists opposed to the United States.

If one takes a close look at the list of signatories, one will indeed find the whole

Islamo-liberal reformist conglomeration in full force: the Islamist wing — which,


66. “Reform with an Islamic Slant,” Washington Post , March 9, 2003.

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although not as numerous as the liberal one, played a key role in the project67

— isnotably represented by ‘Abdallah al-Hamid, Hamad al-Sulayfih, and Sulayman al-

Rashudi, three of the six founding members of the Committee for the Defense of

Legitimate Rights; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Qasim, whom we introduced earlier; Tawfiq al-

Qusayyir, a former professor of physics and a signatory of the “Memorandum of

Advice;” Muhammad al-Harfi, an Islamic researcher; Fayz Jamal, a writer; ‘Abd al-

Muhsin Hulliyat Muslim, a poet and a journalist; Muhammad Salah al-Din, a senior

journalist at al-Madina newspaper and a publisher; ‘Abdallah Farraj al-Sharif, a jour-

nalist at al-Madina; ‘Abdallah bin Bejad al-‘Utaybi, a journalist at al-Watan, intellec-

tually close to al-Nuqaydan; ‘Abd al-Humaid al-Mubarak, a Sunni shaykh from the

Eastern Province; and Shaykh Ahmad Salah Jamjum, a former Minister of Trade. The

liberal wing is represented by intellectuals such as Muhammad Sa‘id Tayyib; Matruk al-Falih, a political science professor at King Saud University; Khalid al-Dakhil, a

sociology professor at King Saud university; Qinan al-Ghamidi, a former editor-in-

chief of al-Watan; ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Dukhayyil, a former minister of finance; ‘Abid

Khazindar, a literary critic and a former Arab nationalist militant imprisoned in the

70s; and, last but not least, the well-known novelist Turki al-Hamad. 68 As for the

Shi‘ite wing, it includes Muhammad Mahfuz, Ja‘far al-Shayib, Shaykh Zaki al-Milad

and al-Watan journalist Najib al-Khunaizi — twenty people in total. The fact that two

of the intellectuals we introduced earlier — Mansur al-Nuqaydan and Hasan al-Maliki

— are missing from this list does not mean that they disagree with the demands. On

the contrary, both of them have expressed their entire support for the document. 69

However, they simply preferred not to get directly involved in politics, consideringthat their role — which they see as definitely no less important — is elsewhere.

If “How we can Coexist” somehow represented the external part of the Islamo-

liberal reformists’ political program, then “Vision for the Present and the Future of

the Homeland” can certainly be considered as the internal one. Thus, these intellectu-

als have not only managed to orchestrate a historic rapprochement between two forces

long considered mutually opposed, the liberals and the Islamists, but they have, mani-

festo after manifesto, succeeded in constructing a moderate Islamo-liberal reformist

and nationalist discourse, around which they created a wide consensus.

67. This dimension was largely overlooked by Richard Dekmejian in his article on “The Liberal

Impulse in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, No. 3, (Summer 2003), pp. 400-413. The

reason for this is that he relied on the statistical method which, in this case, allowed him to show that the

majority of the group of signatories are individuals usually categorized as liberals, but didn’t permit him

to determine where the group’s intellectual center of gravity is situated.

68. However, Turki al-Hamad has — ideologically speaking — little to do with the Islamo-liberal

trend as we described it here. He himself confesses that he didn’t sign the petition — which he considers

as “much too Islamist” — out of conviction, but only to prove to its authors, who accused him of not

being willing to sign because he feared the consequences, that he did not. (Author’s interview with Turki

al-Hamad, Riyadh, June 2003).

69. For Hasan al-Maliki, see his dialogue with Tuwa, www.tuwaa.com; for Mansur al-Nuqaydan,

author’s interview, Riyadh, June 2003.

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GOVERNMENTAL REACTIONS: CROWN PRINCE ‘ABDALLAH AND THE ISLAMO-LIBERALS

The first reactions to the petition have overall been quite positive, starting with

that of Crown Prince ‘Abdallah who received forty of the signatories in his palace and

assured them of his support, before adding that he is not the only person in command

and that the process of reform will take time.70 A few days after this historic meeting,

an authentic “Riyadh spring” was launched in the Saudi government-controlled press,

which witnessed a proliferation of reform-oriented articles implicitly supporting the

charter in its general outlines.

The first concrete step taken by Crown Prince ‘Abdallah towards the Islamo-

liberal reformists was the organization in June 2003 of the national dialogue confer-ence which they had asked for in their petition. For the first time in the country’s

history, thirty ‘ulama’ belonging to all the confessional groups present on the Saudi

territory — Salafi and non-Salafi Sunnis, Sufis, Twelver and Isma‘ili Shi‘ites —

were invited to sit together under the Crown Prince’s auspices. The debates led to the

adoption of a charter71 which can be considered a first response to the Islamo-liberals’

political and religious demands. On the political level, the text recognizes the neces-

sity of implementing reforms and ensuring freedom of speech and a better distribu-

tion of wealth. The subsequent announcement in October 2003 of partial municipal

elections to be held in 200472 may be seen as a first concrete move in that direction.

On the religious level, the document is a severe blow to the official Wahhabi doctrine.

First, it acknowledges the intellectual and confessional diversity of the Saudi nation,which is contrary to traditional Wahhabi exclusivism. Second, it criticizes one of

Wahhabism’s juridical pillars, the principle of “sadd al-dhara’i‘ ” (the blocking of

the means), which “should from now on be used only with measure and moderation.”

It is notably in pursuing this principle — which requires that actions that could lead to

committing sins must be prohibited — that women do not have the right to drive in

Saudi Arabia. Moreover, among the ‘ulama’ invited to attend the conference, none of

the figures of the official Wahhabi establishment were present, which obviously de-

notes a willingness to marginalize it.

However, the Crown Prince’s stance on Islamo-liberal reformism doesn’t seem

to be shared by all his brothers, either because they are opposed to the new intellectu-

als’ reformist and anti-Wahhabi views, or because they fear that the Islamo-liberals

might reinforce ‘Abdallah’s position and legitimacy within the royal family. Thus,

70. Author’s interview with Matruk al-Falih, who attended the meeting, Riyadh, June 2003.

71. “Al-Sa‘udiyya: Munaqashat Sariha Hawla al-Ta‘addudiyya al-Madhhabiyya wa Hurriyat al-

Ta‘bir wa Huquq al-Mar’a wa Muwajahat al-Ghuluw” [“Saudi Arabia: Sincere Discussions About

Confessional Pluralism, Freedom of Speech, Women’s Rights and the Fight Against Extremism”], Al-

Sharq al-Awsat , June 22, 2003.

72. “Saudis Announce First Elections,” www.bbc.co.uk, October 13, 2003; for the text of the govern-

mental decree, “Nass Qirar al-Hukuma al-Sa‘udiyya bi-l-Intikhabat fi-l-Majalis al-Baladiyya” [“Text

of the Saudi Government’s Decision to Hold Elections for Municipal Councils”], www.elaph.com,

October 13, 2003.

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the “Islamo-liberal issue” seems to have become a bone of contention among theruling élite.

CONCLUSION

The emergence in Saudi Arabia of an “Islamo-liberal” trend, constituting a uni-

tary reformist movement seeking a compromise between democracy and Islam, repre-

sents a significant evolution towards Post-Islamism,73 a phenomenon not unique to

Saudi Arabia. Indeed, this movement may remind us of similar evolutions in other

Islamic countries, such as, for instance, the efforts made in Egypt to found a Wasat

party, aimed at unifying Islamists and Christians on an Islamo-democratic platform.74

However, there is, as we’ve seen, much more novelty in Saudi Islamo-liberalreformism. Indeed, while earlier Saudi reformist trends had focused primarily on

political change, the new reform movement’s main characteristic is that it presents

political reform as inseperable from religious reform. In other words, for Islamo-

liberal reformists, no democratic change may come about without a comprehensive

revision of Wahhabi religious doctrine. This Islamo-liberal trend is therefore not only

Post-Islamist, it might also be dubbed Post-Wahhabi.

The first question that arises is the durability of such a heterogeneous move-

ment. Indeed, one could assume that there is nothing more to the Islamo-liberal trend

than the temporary agreement of various forces seeking political change on a minimalist

platform. And it is true that some of the most delicate issues — the reform of the

curricula and the place of women in Saudi society — have not been fully addressedand could become a bone of contention. What we have argued here, however, is that

Islamo-liberal reformism, more than an opportunistic alliance, is the expression of a

significant evolution within the Saudi intellectual field. This guarantees that it will

show — unless subjected to very strong pressure — a good degree of resilience.

The second question is the future of relations between the Crown Prince and the

Islamo-liberals. ‘Abdallah has up to now shown support for their reformist and criti-

cal project. But will he be able to impose his views on his brothers, some of whom

have very different opinions regarding this issue, at the risk of breaking the sacrosanct

family consensus? And, in the end, is he really ready — as the Islamo-liberals demand

— to found a new Saudi Arabia, based on the inclusive value of nation and not the

exclusive one of Wahhabism? This would indeed mean transforming the traditional

tribal-Wahhabi legitimacy of the Al Sa‘ud family into a modern nationalist one and

73. Gilles Kepel points at this phenomenon when he describes “the new orientation taken by those

militants who now, in the name of democracy and human rights, are looking for common ground with the

secular middle class. They have put aside the radical ideology of Qutb, Mawdudi, and Khomeini; they

consider the jihadist-salafist doctrines developed in the camps of Afghanistan a source of horror, and

they celebrate the “democratic essence” of Islam. Islamists defending the rights of the individual stand

shoulder to shoulder with secular democrats in confronting repressive and authoritarian regimes.” Gilles

Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam, 2nd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), p. 368.

74. See Joshua A. Stacher, “Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The Emergence of the Wasat Party,”

Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, (Summer 2002), pp. 414-432.

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would imply a radical change of socio-political alliances. Such a move, in the currentcontext of growing domestic instability, could be politically risky.

between islamists and liberals saudi arabia

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