458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 1

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF theHENDRICK HUDSON CENTRAL

SCHOOL DISTRICT, WESTCHESTERCOUNTY, et al., Petitioners

v.Amy ROWLEY, by her parents and

natural guardians, Clifford and NancyRowley

etc.

No. 80-1002.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued March 23, 1982.

Decided June 28, 1982.

**3035 *176SYLLABUS [FN*]

FN* The syllabus constitutes no partof the opinion of the Court but hasbeen prepared by the Reporter ofDecisions for the convenience of thereader. See United States v. DetroitLumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act)provides federal money to assist state andlocal agencies in educating handicappedchildren. To qualify for federal assistance, aState must demonstrate, through a detailedplan submitted for federal approval, that it hasin effect a policy that assures all handicappedchildren the right to a "free appropriate publiceducation," which policy must be tailored tothe unique needs of the handicapped child bymeans of an "individualized educationalprogram" (IEP). The IEP must be prepared(and reviewed at least annually) by school

officials with participation by the child'sparents or guardian. The Act also requiresthat a participating State provide specifiedadministrative procedures by which the child'sparents or guardian may challenge any changein the evaluation and education of the child.Any party aggrieved by the stateadministrative decisions is authorized to bringa civil action in either a state court or a federaldistrict court. Respondents--a child with onlyminimal residual hearing who had beenfurnished by school authorities with a specialhearing aid for use in the classroom and whowas to receive additional instruction fromtutors, and the child's parents--filed suit inFederal District Court to review New Yorkadministrative proceedings that had upheld theschool administrators' denial of the parents'request that the child also be provided aqualified sign-language interpreter in all of heracademic classes. Entering judgment forrespondents, the District Court found thatalthough the child performed better than theaverage child in her class and was advancingeasily from grade to grade, she was notperforming as well academically as she wouldwithout her handicap. Because of thisdisparity between the child's achievement andher potential, the court held that she was notreceiving a "free appropriate publiceducation," which the court defined as "anopportunity to achieve [her] full potentialcommensurate with the opportunity providedto other children." The Court of Appealsaffirmed.

*177 Held:

1. The Act's requirement of a "freeappropriate public education" is satisfied**3036 when the State provides personalizedinstruction with sufficient support services to

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permit the handicapped child to benefiteducationally from that instruction. Suchinstruction and services must be provided atpublic expense, must meet the State'seducational standards, must approximategrade levels used in the State's regulareducation, and must comport with the child'sIEP, as formulated in accordance with theAct's requirements. If the child is beingeducated in regular classrooms, as here, theIEP should be reasonably calculated to enablethe child to achieve passing marks andadvance from grade to grade. Pp. 3041-3049.

(a) This interpretation is supported by thedefinitions contained in the Act, as well as byother provisions imposing proceduralrequirements and setting forth statutoryfindings and priorities for States to follow inextending educational services to handicappedchildren. The Act's language contains noexpress substantive standard prescribing thelevel of education to be accorded handicappedchildren. Pp. 3041-3042.

(b) The Act's legislative history shows thatCongress sought to make public educationavailable to handicapped children, but did notintend to impose upon the States any greatersubstantive educational standard than isnecessary to make such access to publiceducation meaningful. The Act's intent wasmore to open the door of public education tohandicapped children by means of specializededucational services than to guarantee anyparticular substantive level of education onceinside. Pp. 3042-3046.

(c) While Congress sought to provideassistance to the States in carrying out theirconstitutional responsibilities to provide equalprotection of the laws, it did not intend toachieve strict equality of opportunity or

services for handicapped and nonhandicappedchildren, but rather sought primarily toidentify and evaluate handicapped children,and to provide them with access to a freepublic education. The Act does not require aState to maximize the potential of eachhandicapped child commensurate with theopportunity provided nonhandicappedchildren. Pp. 3046-3048.

2. In suits brought under the Act'sjudicial-review provisions, a court must firstdetermine whether the State has compliedwith the statutory procedures, and must thendetermine whether the individualized programdeveloped through such procedures isreasonably calculated to enable the child toreceive educational benefits. If theserequirements are met, the State has compliedwith the obligations imposed by Congress andthe courts can require no more. Pp.3050-3052.

*178 (a) Although the judicial-reviewprovisions do not limit courts to ensuring thatStates have complied with the Act'sprocedural requirements, the Act's emphasison procedural safeguards demonstrates thelegislative conviction that adequatecompliance with prescribed procedures will inmost cases assure much, if not all, of whatCongress wished in the way of substantivecontent in an IEP. Pp. 3050-3051.

(b) The courts must be careful to avoidimposing their view of preferable educationalmethods upon the States. Once a courtdetermines that the Act's requirements havebeen met, questions of methodology are forresolution by the States. Pp. 3051-3052.

3. Entrusting a child's education to state andlocal agencies does not leave the child without

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protection. As demonstrated by this case,parents and guardians will not lack ardor inseeking to ensure that handicapped childrenreceive all of the benefits to which they areentitled by the Act. P. 3052.

4. The Act does not require the provision of asign-language interpreter here. Neither of thecourts below found that there had been afailure to comply with the Act's procedures,and the findings of neither court will supporta conclusion that the child's educationalprogram failed to comply with the substantiverequirements of the Act. Pp. 3052-3053.

632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), reversed andremanded.

**3037 Raymond G. Kuntz argued the causefor petitioners. With him on the briefs wereRobert D. Stone, Jean M. Coon, Paul E.Sherman, Jr., and Donald O. Meserve.

Michael A. Chatoff argued the cause and fileda brief for respondents.

Elliott Schulder argued the cause for theUnited States as amicus curiae urgingaffirmance. On the brief were SolicitorGeneral Lee, Assistant Attorney GeneralReynolds, Walter W. Barnett, and Louise A.Lerner.*

* Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmancewere filed by Charles S. Sims for theAmerican Civil Liberties Union; by JaneBloom Yohalem, Norman S. Rosenberg,Daniel Yohalem, and Marian Wright Edelmanfor the Association for Retarded Citizens ofthe United States et al.; by Ralph J. Moore,Jr., and Franklin D. Kramer for the MarylandAdvocacy Unit for the DevelopmentallyDisabled, Inc., et al.; by Marc Charmatz,

Janet Stotland, and Joseph Blum for theNational Association of the Deaf et al; byMinna J. Kotkin and Barry Felder for the NewYork State Commission on the Quality ofCare for the Mentally Disabled, Protection andAdvocacy System; and by Michael A. Rebellfor the United Cerebral Palsy Associations,Inc., et al.

Norman H. Gross, Gwendolyn H. Gregory,Thomas A. Shannon, and August W.Steinhilber filed a brief for the NationalSchool Boards Association et al. as amicicuriae.

*179 Justice REHNQUIST deliveredthe opinion of the Court.

This case presents a question of statutoryinterpretation. Petitioners contend that theCourt of Appeals and the District Courtmisconstrued the requirements imposed byCongress upon States which receive federalfunds under the Education of the HandicappedAct. We agree and reverse the judgment ofthe Court of Appeals.

I

The Education of the Handicapped Act (Act),84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 etseq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV), provides federalmoney to assist state and local agencies ineducating handicapped children, andconditions such funding upon a State'scompliance with extensive goals andprocedures. The Act represents an ambitiousfederal effort to promote the education ofhandicapped children, and was passed inresponse to Congress' perception that amajority of handicapped children in theUnited States "were either totally excludedfrom schools or [were] sitting idly in regular

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classrooms awaiting the time when they wereold enough to 'drop out.' " H.R.Rep.No. 94-332, p. 2 (1975) (H.R.Rep.). The Act'sevolution and major provisions shed light onthe question of statutory interpretation whichis at the heart of this case.

Congress first addressed the problem ofeducating the handicapped in 1966 when itamended the Elementary and *180 Secondary Education Act of 1965 to establisha grant program "for the purpose of assistingthe States in the initiation, expansion, andimprovement of programs and projects ... forthe education of handicapped children."Pub.L. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204. Thatprogram was repealed in 1970 by theEducation of the Handicapped Act, Pub.L.91-230, 84 Stat. 175, Part B of whichestablished a grant program similar in purposeto the repealed legislation. Neither the 1966nor the 1970 legislation contained specificguidelines for state use of the grant money;both were aimed primarily at stimulating theStates to develop educational resources and totrain personnel for educating the handicapped.[FN1]

FN1. See S.Rep.No. 94-168, p. 5(1975) (S.Rep.); H.R.Rep., at 2-3,U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News1975, p. 1425.

Dissatisfied with the progress being madeunder these earlier enactments, and spurred bytwo District Court decisions holding thathandicapped children should be given accessto a public education, [FN2] Congress in 1974greatly increased federal funding for educationof the handicapped and for the first timerequired recipient States to adopt "a goal ofproviding full educational opportunities to allhandicapped children." Pub.L. 93-380, 88

Stat. 579, 583 (1974 statute). The 1974statute was recognized as an interim measureonly, adopted "in order to give the Congressan additional year in which to study what ifany additional Federal assistance [was]required to enable the States to meet the needsof handicapped children." H.R.Rep., at 4.The ensuing year of study produced theEducation for All Handicapped Children Actof 1975.

FN2. Two cases, Mills v. Board ofEducation of District of Columbia,348 F.Supp. 866 (D.C.1972), andPennsylvania Assn. for RetardedChildren v. Commonwealth, 334F.Supp. 1257 (ED Pa.1971) and 343F.Supp. 279 (1972), were lateridentified as the most prominent of thecases contributing to Congress'enactment of the Act and the statuteswhich preceded it. H.R.Rep., at 3-4.Both decisions are discussed in Part IIIof this opinion.

In order to qualify for federal financialassistance under the Act, a State mustdemonstrate that it "has in effect a policy *181 that assures all handicapped children theright to a free appropriate public education."**3038 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1). That policymust be reflected in a state plan submitted toand approved by the Secretary of Education,[FN3] § 1413, which describes in detail thegoals, programs, and timetables under whichthe State intends to educate handicappedchildren within its borders. §§ 1412, 1413.States receiving money under the Act mustprovide education to the handicapped bypriority, first "to handicapped children whoare not receiving an education" and second "tohandicapped children ... with the most severehandicaps who are receiving an inadequate

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education," § 1412(3), and "to the maximumextent appropriate" must educate handicappedchildren "with children who are nothandicapped." § 1412(5). [FN4] The Actbroadly defines "handicapped children" toinclude "mentally retarded, hard of hearing,deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped,se r ious ly emot iona l ly d i s tu rbed ,orthopedically impaired, [and] other healthimpaired children, [and] children with specificlearning disabilities." § 1401(1). [FN5]

FN3. All functions of theCommissioner of Education, formerlyan officer in the Department of Health,Education, and Welfare, weretransferred to the Secretary ofEducation in 1979 when Congresspassed the Department of EducationOrganization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3401 etseq. (1976 ed., Supp.IV). See 20U.S.C. § 3441(a)(1) (1976 ed.,Supp.IV).

FN4. Despite this preference for"mainstreaming" handicappedchildren-- educating them withnonhandicapped children--Congressrecognized that regular classroomssimply would not be a suitable settingfor the education of many handicappedchildren. The Act expresslyacknowledges that "the nature orseverity of the handicap [may be] suchthat education in regular classes withthe use of supplementary aids andservices cannot be achievedsatisfactorily." § 1412(5). The Actthus provides for the education ofsome handicapped children in separateclasses or institutional settings. Seeibid.; § 1413(a)(4).

FN5. In addition to covering a widevariety of handicapping conditions, theAct requires special educationalservices for children "regardless of theseverity of their handicap." §§1412(2)(C), 1414(a)(1)(A).

The "free appropriate public education"required by the Act is tailored to the uniqueneeds of the handicapped child by means of an"individualized educational program" (IEP).*182 § 1401(18). The IEP, which isprepared at a meeting between a qualifiedrepresentative of the local educational agency,the child's teacher, the child's parents orguardian, and, where appropriate, the child,consists of a written document containing

"(A) a statement of the present levels ofeducational performance of such child, (B)a statement of annual goals, includingshort-term instructional objectives, (C) astatement of the specific educationalservices to be provided to such child, andthe extent to which such child will be able toparticipate in regular educational programs,(D) the projected date for initiation andanticipated duration of such services, and(E) appropriate objective criteria andevaluation procedures and schedules fordetermining, on at least an annual basis,whether instructional objectives are beingachieved." § 1401(19).

Local or regional educational agencies mustreview, and where appropriate revise, eachchild's IEP at least annually. § 1414(a)(5).See also § 1413(a)(11).

In addition to the state plan and the IEPalready described, the Act imposes extensiveprocedural requirements upon States receivingfederal funds under its provisions. Parents orguardians of handicapped children must benotified of any proposed change in "the

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identification, evaluation, or educationalplacement of the child or the provision of afree appropriate public education to suchchild," and must be permitted to bring acomplaint about "any matter relating to" suchevaluation and education. §§ 1415(b)(1)(D)and (E). [FN6] *183 **3039 Complaintsbrought by parents or guardians must beresolved at "an impartial due process hearing,"and appeal to the state educational agencymust be provided if the initial hearing is heldat the local or regional level. §§ 1415(b)(2)and (c). [FN7] Thereafter, "[a]ny partyaggrieved by the findings and decision" of thestate administrative hearing has "the right tobring a civil action with respect to thecomplaint ... in any State court of competentjurisdiction or in a district court of the UnitedStates without regard to the amount incontroversy." § 1415(e)(2).

FN6. The requirements that parents bepermitted to file complaints regardingtheir child's education, and be presentwhen the child's IEP is formulated,represent only two examples ofCongress' effort to maximize parentalinvolvement in the education of eachhandicapped child. In addition, theAct requires that parents be permitted"to examine all relevant records withrespect to the identification,evaluation, and educational placementof the child, and ... to obtain anindependent educational evaluation ofthe child." § 1415(b)(1)(A). See also§§ 1412(4), 1414(a)(4). Stateeducational policies and the state plansubmitted to the Secretary ofEducation must be formulated in"consultation with individualsinvolved in or concerned with theeducation of handicapped children,

including handicapped individuals andparents or guardians of handicappedchildren." § 1412(7). See also §1412(2)(E). Local agencies, whichreceive funds under the Act byapplying to the state agency, mustsubmit applications which assure thatthey have developed procedures for"the participation and consultation ofthe parents or guardian[s] of[handicapped] children" in locale d u c a t i o n a l p r o g r a m s , §1414(a)(1)(C)(iii), and the applicationitself, along with "all pertinentdocuments related to suchapplication," must be made "availableto parents, guardians, and othermembers of the general public." §1414(a)(4).

FN7. "Any party" to a state or localadministrative hearing must"be accorded (1) the right to beaccompanied and advised by counseland by individuals with specialknowledge or training with respect tothe problems of handicapped children,(2) the right to present evidence andconfront, cross examine, and compelthe attendance of witnesses, (3) theright to a written or electronicverbatim record of such hearing, and(4) the right to written findings of factand decisions." § 1415(d).

Thus, although the Act leaves to the Statesthe primary responsibility for developing andexecuting educational programs forhandicapped children, it imposes significantrequirements to be followed in the dischargeof that responsibility. Compliance is assuredby provisions permitting the withholding offederal funds upon determination that a

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participating state or local agency has failed tosatisfy the requirements of the Act, §§1414(b)(2)(A), 1416, and by the provision forjudicial review. At present, all States exceptNew *184 Mexico receive federal funds underthe portions of the Act at issue today. Brieffor United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2.

II

This case arose in connection with theeducation of Amy Rowley, a deaf student atthe Furnace Woods School in the HendrickHudson Central School District, Peekskill,N.Y. Amy has minimal residual hearing andis an excellent lipreader. During the yearbefore she began attending Furnace Woods, ameeting between her parents and schooladministrators resulted in a decision to placeher in a regular kindergarten class in order todetermine what supplemental services wouldbe necessary to her education. Severalmembers of the school administrationprepared for Amy's arrival by attending acourse in sign- language interpretation, and ateletype machine was installed in theprincipal's office to facilitate communicationwith her parents who are also deaf. At the endof the trial period it was determined that Amyshould remain in the kindergarten class, butthat she should be provided with an FMhearing aid which would amplify wordsspoken into a wireless receiver by the teacheror fellow students during certain classroomactivities. Amy successfully completed herkindergarten year.

As required by the Act, an IEP was preparedfor Amy during the fall of her first-grade year.The IEP provided that Amy should beeducated in a regular classroom at FurnaceWoods, should continue to use the FM hearingaid, and should receive instruction from a

tutor for the deaf for one hour each day andfrom a speech therapist for three hours eachweek. The Rowleys agreed with parts of theIEP, but insisted that Amy also be provided aqualified sign- language interpreter in all heracademic classes in lieu of the assistance**3040 proposed in other parts of the IEP.Such an interpreter had been placed in Amy'skindergarten class for a 2-week experimentalperiod, but the interpreter had reported thatAmy did not need his services at that time.The school administrators *185 likewiseconcluded that Amy did not need such aninterpreter in her first-grade classroom. Theyreached this conclusion after consulting theschool district's Committee on theHandicapped, which had received expertevidence from Amy's parents on theimportance of a sign- language interpreter,received testimony from Amy's teacher andother persons familiar with her academic andsocial progress, and visited a class for thedeaf.

When their request for an interpreter wasdenied, the Rowleys demanded and receiveda hearing before an independent examiner.After receiving evidence from both sides, theexaminer agreed with the administrators'determination that an interpreter was notnecessary because "Amy was achievingeducationally, academically, and socially"without such assistance. App. to Pet. for Cert.F- 22. The examiner's decision was affirmedon appeal by the New York Commissioner ofEducation on the basis of substantial evidencein the record. Id., at E-4. Pursuant to the Act'sprovision for judicial review, the Rowleysthen brought an action in the United StatesDistrict Court for the Southern District ofNew York, claiming that the administrators'denial of the sign-language interpreterconstituted a denial of the "free appropriate

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public education" guaranteed by the Act.

The District Court found that Amy "is aremarkably well-adjusted child" who interactsand communicates well with her classmatesand has "developed an extraordinary rapport"with her teachers. 483 F.Supp. 528, 531(1980). It also found that "she performs betterthan the average child in her class and isadvancing easily from grade to grade," id., at534, but "that she understands considerablyless of what goes on in class than she could ifshe were not deaf" and thus "is not learning asmuch, or performing as well academically, asshe would without her handicap," id., at 532.This disparity between Amy's achievementand her potential led the court to decide thatshe was not receiving a "free appropriatepublic *186 education," which the courtdefined as "an opportunity to achieve [her]full potential commensurate with theopportunity provided to other children." Id.,at 534. According to the District Court, sucha standard "requires that the potential of thehandicapped child be measured and comparedto his or her performance, and that theresulting differential or 'shortfall' be comparedto the shortfall experienced bynonhandicapped children." Ibid. The DistrictCourt's definition arose from its assumptionthat the responsibility for "giv [ing] content tothe requirement of an 'appropriate education'" had "been left entirely to the [federal] courtsand the hearing officers." Id., at 533. [FN8]

FN8. For reasons that are not revealedin the record, the District Courtconcluded that "[t]he Act itself doesnot define 'appropriate education.' "483 F.Supp., at 533. In fact, the Actexpressly defines the phrase "freeappropriate public education," see §1401(18), to which the District Court

was referring. See 483 F.Supp., at533. After overlooking the statutorydefinition, the District Court soughtguidance not from regulationsinterpreting the Act, but fromregulations promulgated under § 504of the Rehabilitation Act. See 483F.Supp., at 533, citing 45 CFR §84.33(b).

A divided panel of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. TheCourt of Appeals "agree[d] with the [D]istrict[C]ourt's conclusions of law," and held that its"findings of fact [were] not clearly erroneous."632 F.2d 945, 947 (1980).

We granted certiorari to review the lowercourts' interpretation of the Act. 454 U.S.961, 102 S.Ct. 500, 70 L.Ed.2d 376 (1981).Such review requires us to consider twoquestions: What is meant by the Act'srequirement of a "free appropriate publiceducation"? And what is the role of state andfederal courts in exercising the **3041 reviewgranted by 20 U.S.C. § 1415? We considerthese questions separately. [FN9]

FN9. The IEP which respondentschallenged in the District Court wascreated for the 1978-1979 school year.Petitioners contend that the DistrictCourt erred in reviewing that IEP afterthe school year had ended and beforethe school administrators were able todevelop another IEP for subsequentyears. We disagree. Judicial reviewinvariably takes more than ninemonths to complete, not to mentionthe time consumed during thepreceding state administrativehearings. The District Court thuscorrectly ruled that it retained

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jurisdiction to grant relief because thealleged deficiencies in the IEP werecapable of repetition as to the partiesbefore it yet evading review. 483F.Supp. 536, 538 (1980). See Murphyv. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct.1181, 1183, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982);Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147,149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 348, 46 L.Ed.2d350 (1975).

*187 III A

[1][2] This is the first case in which thisCourt has been called upon to interpret anyprovision of the Act. As noted previously, theDistrict Court and the Court of Appealsconcluded that "[t]he Act itself does not define'appropriate education,' " 483 F.Supp., at 533,but leaves "to the courts and the hearingofficers" the responsibility of "giv[ing]content to the requirement of an 'appropriateeducation.' " Ibid. See also 632 F.2d, at 947.Petitioners contend that the definition of thephrase "free appropriate public education"used by the courts below overlooks thedefinition of that phrase actually found in theAct. Respondents agree that the Act defines"free appropriate public education," butcontend that the statutory definition is not"functional" and thus "offers judges noguidance in their consideration ofcontroversies involving 'the identification,evaluation, or educational placement of thechild or the provision of a free appropriatepublic education.' " Brief for Respondents 28.The United States, appearing as amicus curiaeon behalf of respondents, states that"[a]lthough the Act includes definitions of a'free appropriate public education' and otherrelated terms, the statutory definitions do notadequately explain what is meant by

'appropriate.' " Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae 13.

We are loath to conclude that Congress failedto offer any assistance in defining the meaningof the principal substantive phrase used in theAct. It is beyond dispute that, contrary to theconclusions of the courts below, the Act doesexpressly define "free appropriate publiceducation":

*188 "The term 'free appropriate publiceducation' means special education andrelated services which (A) have beenprovided at public expense, under publicsupervision and direction, and withoutcharge, (B) meet the standards of the Stateeducational agency, (C) include anappropriate preschool, elementary, orsecondary school education in the Stateinvolved, and (D) are provided inconformity with the individualizededucation program required under section1414(a)(5) of this title." § 1401(18)(emphasis added).

"Special education," as referred to in thisdefinition, means "specially designedinstruction, at no cost to parents or guardians,to meet the unique needs of a handicappedchild, including classroom instruction,instruction in physical education, homeinstruction, and instruction in hospitals andinstitutions." § 1401(16). "Related services"are defined as "transportation, and suchdevelopmental, corrective, and othersupportive services ... as may be required toassist a handicapped child to benefit fromspecial education." § 1401(17). [FN10]

FN10. Examples of "related services"identified in the Act are "speechp a t h o l o g y a n d a u d i o l o g y ,psychological services, physical andoccupational therapy, recreation, and

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medical and counseling services,except that such medical services shallbe for diagnostic and evaluationpurposes only." § 1401(17).

Like many statutory definitions, this onetends toward the cryptic rather than thecomprehensive, but that is scarcely a reasonfor abandoning the quest for legislative intent.Whether or not the definition **3042 is a"functional" one, as respondents contend it isnot, it is the principal tool which Congress hasgiven us for parsing the critical phrase of theAct. We think more must be made of it thaneither respondents or the United States seemswilling to admit.

According to the definitions contained in theAct, a "free appropriate public education"consists of educational instruction speciallydesigned to meet the unique needs of thehandicapped *189 child, supported by suchservices as are necessary to permit the child"to benefit" from the instruction. Almost as achecklist for adequacy under the Act, thedefinition also requires that such instructionand services be provided at public expenseand under public supervision, meet the State'seducational standards, approximate the gradelevels used in the State's regular education,and comport with the child's IEP. Thus, ifpersonalized instruction is being providedwith sufficient supportive services to permitthe child to benefit from the instruction, andthe other items on the definitional checklistare satisfied, the child is receiving a "freeappropriate public education" as defined bythe Act.

Other portions of the statute also shed lightupon congressional intent. Congress foundthat of the roughly eight million handicappedchildren in the United States at the time of

enactment, one million were "excludedentirely from the public school system" andmore than half were receiving aninappropriate education. 89 Stat. 774, notefollowing § 1401. In addition, as mentionedin Part I, the Act requires States to extendeducational services first to those childrenwho are receiving no education and second tothose children who are receiving an"inadequate education." § 1412(3). Whenthese express statutory findings and prioritiesare read together with the Act's extensiveprocedural requirements and its definition of"free appropriate public education," the faceof the statute evinces a congressional intent tobring previously excluded handicappedchildren into the public education systems ofthe States and to require the States to adoptprocedures which would result inindividualized consideration of and instructionfor each child.

Noticeably absent from the language of thestatute is any substantive standard prescribingthe level of education to be accordedhandicapped children. Certainly the languageof the statute contains no requirement like theone imposed by the lower courts--that Statesmaximize the potential of handicappedchildren "commensurate with the opportunity*190 provided to other children." 483F.Supp., at 534. That standard wasexpounded by the District Court withoutreference to the statutory definitions or even tothe legislative history of the Act. Althoughwe find the statutory definition of "freeappropriate public education" to be helpful inour interpretation of the Act, there remains thequestion of whether the legislative historyindicates a congressional intent that sucheducation meet some additional substantivestandard. For an answer, we turn to thathistory. [FN11]

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FN11. The dissent, finding that "thestandard of the courts below seems ...to reflect the congressional purpose"of the Act, post, at 3057, concludesthat our answer to this question "is nota satisfactory one." Post, at 3056.Presumably, the dissent also agreeswith the District Court's conclusionthat "it has been left entirely to thecourts and the hearing officers to givecontent to the requirement of an'appropriate education.' " 483 F.Supp.,at 533. It thus seems that the dissentwould give the courts carte blanche toimpose upon the States whateverburden their various judgmentsindicate should be imposed. Indeed,the dissent clearly characterizes therequirement of an "appropriateeducation" as open-ended, noting that"if there are limits not evident fromthe face of the statute on what may beconsidered an 'appropriate education,'they must be found in the purpose ofthe statute or its legislative history."Post, at 3054. Not only are we unableto find any suggestion from the face ofthe statute that the requirement of an"appropriate education" was to belimitless, but we also view thedissent's approach as contrary to thefundamental proposition thatCongress, when exercising itsspending power, can impose noburden upon the States unless it doesso unambiguously. See infra, at 3049,n. 26.No one can doubt that this would havebeen an easier case if Congress hadseen fit to provide a morecomprehensive statutory definition ofthe phrase "free appropriate publiceducation." But Congress did not do

so, and "our problem is to construewhat Congress has written. After all,Congress expresses its purpose bywords. It is for us to ascertain--neither to add nor to subtract, neitherto delete nor to distort." 62 Cases ofJam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593,596, 71 S.Ct. 515, 518, 95 L.Ed. 566(1951). We would be less thanfaithful to our obligation to construewhat Congress has written if in thiscase we were to disregard the statutorylanguage and legislative history of theAct by concluding that Congress hadimposed upon the States a burden ofunspecified proportions and weight, tobe revealed only through case-by-caseadjudication in the courts.

*191 **3043 B (i)

As suggested in Part I, federal support foreducation of the handicapped is a fairly recentdevelopment. Before passage of the Act someStates had passed laws to improve theeducational services afforded handicappedchildren, [FN12] but many of these childrenwere excluded completely from any form ofpublic education or were left to fend forthemselves in classrooms designed foreducation of their nonhandicapped peers. Aspreviously noted, the House Report begins byemphasizing this exclusion and misplacement,noting that millions of handicapped children"were either totally excluded from schools or[were] sitting idly in regular classroomsawaiting the time when they were old enoughto 'drop out.' " H.R.Rep., at 2. See alsoS.Rep., at 8. One of the Act's two principalsponsors in the Senate urged its passage insimilar terms:

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FN12. See H.R.Rep., at 10; Note, TheEducation of All HandicappedChildren Act of 1975, 10U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 110, 119 (1976).

"While much progress has been made in thelast few years, we can take no solace in thatprogress until all handicapped children are,in fact, receiving an education. The mostrecent statistics provided by the Bureau ofEducation for the Handicapped estimate that... 1.75 million handicapped children do notreceive any educational services, and 2.5million handicapped children are notreceiving an appropriate education." 121Cong.Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks of Sen.Williams).

This concern, stressed repeatedly throughoutthe legislative history, [FN13] confirms theimpression conveyed by the language *192 ofthe statute: By passing the Act, Congresssought primarily to make public educationavailable to handicapped children. But inseeking to provide such access to publiceducation, Congress did not impose upon theStates any greater substantive educationalstandard than would be necessary to makesuch access meaningful. Indeed, Congressexpressly "recognize[d] that in many instancesthe process of providing special education andrelated services to handicapped children is notguaranteed to produce any particularoutcome." S.Rep., at 11, U.S.Code Cong. &Admin.News 1975, p. 1435. Thus, the intentof the Act was more to open the door of publiceducation to handicapped children onappropriate terms than to guarantee anyparticular level of education once inside.

FN13. See, e.g., 121 Cong.Rec. 19494(1975) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("alltoo often, our handicapped citizens

have been denied the opportunity toreceive an adequate education"); id.,at 19502 (remarks of Sen. Cranston)(millions of handicapped "children ...are largely excluded from theeducational opportunities that we giveto our other children"); id., at 23708(remarks of Rep. Mink) ("handicappedchildren ... are denied access to publicschools because of a lack of trainedpersonnel").

Both the House and the Senate Reportsattribute the impetus for the Act and itspredecessors to two federal-court judgmentsrendered in 1971 and 1972. As the SenateReport states, passage of the Act "followed aseries of landmark court cases establishing inlaw the right to education for all handicappedchildren." S.Rep., at 6, U.S.Code Cong. &Admin.News 1975, p. 1430. [FN14] The firstcase, Pennsylvania **3044 Assn. for RetardedChildren v. Commonwealth, 334 F.Supp.1257 (Ed Pa.1971) and 343 F.Supp. 279(1972) (PARC ), was a suit on behalf ofretarded children challenging theconstitutionality of a Pennsylvania statutewhich acted to exclude them from publiceducation and training. The case ended in aconsent decree which enjoined the State from"deny[ing] to any mentally retarded childaccess to a free public program of educationand training." 334 F.Supp., at 1258 (emphasisadded).

FN14. Similarly, the Senate Reportstates that it was an "[i]ncreasedawareness of the educational needs ofhandicapped children and landmarkcourt decisions establishing the rightto education for handicapped children[that] pointed to the necessity of anexpanded federal fiscal role." S.Rep.,

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 13

at 5, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News1975, p. 1429. See also H.R.Rep., at2-3.

PARC was followed by Mills v. Board ofEducation of District of Columbia, 348F.Supp. 866 (D.C.1972), a case in which theplaintiff handicapped children had beenexcluded *193 from the District of Columbiapublic schools. The court's judgment, quotedin S.Rep., at 6, provided that

"no [handicapped] child eligible for apublicly supported education in the Districtof Columbia public schools shall beexcluded from a regular school assignmentby a Rule, policy, or practice of the Board ofEducation of the District of Columbia or itsagents unless such child is provided (a)adequate alternative educational servicessuited to the child's needs, which mayinclude special education or tuition grants,and (b) a constitutionally adequate priorhearing and periodic review of the child'sstatus, progress, and the adequacy of anyeducational alternative." 348 F.Supp., at878 (emphasis added).

Mills and PARC both held that handicappedchildren must be given access to an adequate,publicly supported education. Neither casepurports to require any particular substantivelevel of education. [FN15] Rather, like thelanguage of the Act, *194 the cases set forthextensive procedures to be followed informulating personalized educationalprograms for handicapped children. See 348F.Supp., at 878-883; 334 F.Supp., at1258-1267. [FN16] The fact that both PARCand Mills are discussed at length in thelegislative Reports [FN17] suggests that theprinciples which they established are theprinciples which, to a significant extent,guided the drafters of the Act. Indeed,

immediately after discussing these cases theSenate Report describes the 1974 statute ashaving "incorporated the major principles**3045 of the right to education cases."S.Rep., at 8, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News1975, p. 1432. Those principles in turnbecame the basis of the Act, which itself wasdesigned to effectuate the purposes of the1974 statute. H.R.Rep., at 5. [FN18]

FN15. The only substantive standardwhich can be implied from these casescomports with the standard implicit inthe Act. PARC states that each childmust receive "access to a free publicprogram of education and trainingappropriate to his learning capacities,"334 F.Supp., at 1258 (emphasisadded), and that further state action isrequired when it appears that "theneeds of the mentally retarded childare not being adequately served," id.,at 1266. (Emphasis added.) Millsalso speaks in terms of "adequate"educational services, 348 F.Supp., at878, and sets a realistic standard ofproviding some educational services toeach child when every need cannot bemet."If sufficient funds are not available tofinance all of the services andprograms that are needed and desirablein the system then the available fundsmust be expended equitably in such amanner that no child is entirelyexcluded from a publicly supportededucation consistent with his needsand ability to benefit therefrom. Theinadequacies of the District ofColumbia Public School Systemwhether occasioned by insufficientfunding or administrative inefficiency,certainly cannot be permitted to bear

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more heavily on the 'exceptional' orhandicapped child than on the normalchild." Id., at 876.

FN16. Like the Act, PARC requiredthe State to "identify, locate, [and]evaluate" handicapped children, 334F.Supp., at 1267, to create for eachchild an individual educationalprogram, id., at 1265, and to hold ahearing "on any change in educationalassignment," id., at 1266. Mills alsorequired the preparation of anindividual educational program foreach child. In addition, Millspermitted the child's parents to inspectrecords relevant to the child'seducation, to obtain an independenteducational evaluation of the child, toobject to the IEP and receive a hearingbefore an independent hearing officer,to be represented by counsel at thehearing, and to have the right toconfront and cross-examine adversewitnesses, all of which are alsopermitted by the Act. 348 F.Supp., at879-881. Like the Act, Mills alsorequired that the education ofhandicapped children be conductedpursuant to an overall plan preparedby the District of Columbia, andestablished a policy of educatinghandi capped ch i l d r en wi thnonhandicapped children wheneverpossible. Ibid.

FN17. See S.Rep., at 6-7; H.R.Rep.,at 3-4.

FN18. The 1974 statute "incorporatedthe major principles of the right toeducation cases," by "add[ing]important new provisions to the

Education of the Handicapped Actwhich require the States to: establisha goal of providing full educationalopportunities to all handicappedchildren; provide procedures forinsuring that handicapped children andtheir parents or guardians areguaranteed procedural safeguards indecisions regarding identification,evaluation, and educational placementof handicapped children; establishprocedures to insure that, to themaximum extent appropriate,handicapped children ... are educatedwith children who are nothandicapped; ... and, establishprocedures to insure that testing andevaluation materials and proceduresutilized for the purposes ofclassification and placement ofhandicapped children will be selectedand administered so as not to beracially or culturally discriminatory."S.Rep., at 8, U.S.Code Cong. &Admin.News 1975, p. 1432.The House Report explains that theAct simply incorporated thesepurposes of the 1974 statute: the Actwas intended "primarily to amend ...the Education of the Handicapped Actin order to provide permanentauthorization and a comprehensivemechanism which will insure thatthose provisions enacted during the93rd Congress [the 1974 statute] willresult in maximum benefits forhandicapped children and theirfamilies." H.R.Rep., at 5. Thus, the1974 statute's purpose of providinghandicapped children access to apublic education became the purposeof the Act.

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 15

*195 That the Act imposes no clearobligation upon recipient States beyond therequirement that handicapped children receivesome form of specialized education is perhapsbest demonstrated by the fact that Congress, inexplaining the need for the Act, equated an"appropriate education" to the receipt of somespecialized educational services. The SenateReport states: "[T]he most recent statisticsprovided by the Bureau of Education for theHandicapped estimate that of the more than 8million children ... with handicappingconditions requiring special education andrelated services, only 3.9 million such childrenare receiving an appropriate education."S.Rep., at 8, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News1975, p. 1432. [FN19] This statement, whichreveals Congress' view that 3.9 millionhandicapped children were "receiving anappropriate education" in 1975, is followedimmediately in the Senate Report by a tableshowing that 3.9 million handicapped childrenwere "served" in 1975 and a slightly largernumber were "unserved." A similar statementand table appear in the House Report.H.R.Rep., at 11-12.

FN19. These statistics appearrepeatedly throughout the legislativehistory of the Act, demonstrating avirtual consensus among legislatorsthat 3.9 million handicapped childrenwere receiving an appropriateeducation in 1975. See, e.g., 121Cong.Rec. 19486 (1975) (remarks ofSen. Williams); id., at 19504 (remarksof Sen. Schweicker); id., at 23702(remarks of Rep. Madden); ibid.(remarks of Rep. Brademas); id., at23709) (remarks of Rep. Minish); id.,at 37024 (remarks of Rep. Brademas);id., at 37027 (remarks of Rep. Gude);id., at 37417 (remarks of Sen. Javits);

id., at 37420 (remarks of Sen.Hathaway).

*196 It is evident from the legislativehistory that the characterization ofhandicapped children as "served" referred tochildren who were receiving some form ofspecialized educational services from theStates, and that the characterization ofchildren as "unserved" referred to those whowere receiving no specialized educationalservices. For example, a letter sent to theUnited States Commissioner of Education bythe House Committee on Education andLabor, signed by two key sponsors of the Actin the House, asked the Commissioner toidentify the number of handicapped "childrenserved" in each State. The letter asked forstatistics on the number of children "beingserved" in various types of "special educationprogram[s]" and the number of children whowere not "receiving educational services."Hearings on S. 6 before the Subcommittee onthe Handicapped of the Senate Committee onLabor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1stSess., 205-207 (1975). Similarly, SenatorRandolph, one of the Act's principal sponsorsin the Senate, **3046 noted that roughlyone-half of the handicapped children in theUnited States "are receiving specialeducational services." Id., at 1. [FN20] By*197 characterizing the 3.9 millionhandicapped children who were "served" aschildren who were "receiving an appropriateeducation," the Senate and House Reportsunmistakably disclose Congress' perception ofthe type of education required by the Act: an"appropriate education" is provided whenpersonalized educational services areprovided. [FN21]

FN20. Senator Randolph stated:"[O]nly 55 percent of the school-aged

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handicapped children and 22 percentof the pre-school-aged handicappedchildren are receiving specialeducational services." Hearings on S.6 before the Subcommittee on theHandicapped of the Senate Committeeon Labor and Public Welfare, 94thCong., 1st Sess., 1 (1975). Althoughthe figures differ slightly in variousparts of the legislative history, thegeneral thrust of congressionalcalculations was that roughly one-halfof the handicapped children in theUnited States were not receivingspecialized educational services, andthus were not "served." See, e.g., 121Cong.Rec. 19494 (1975) (remarks ofSen. Javits) ("only 50 percent of theNation's handicapped childrenreceived proper education services");id., at 19504 (remarks of Sen.Humphrey) ("[a]lmost 3 millionhandicapped children, while in school,receive none of the special servicesthat they require in order to makeeducation a meaningful experience");id., at 23706 (remarks of Rep. Quie)("only 55 percent [of handicappedchildren] were receiving a publiceducation"); id., at 23709 (remarks ofRep. Biaggi) ("[o]ver 3 million[handicapped] children in this countryare receiving either below pareducation or none at all").Statements similar to those appearingin the text, which equate "served" as itappears in the Senate Report to"receiving special educationalservices," appear throughout thelegislative history. See, e.g., id., at19492 (remarks of Sen. Williams);id., at 19494 (remarks of Sen. Javits);id., at 19496 (remarks of Sen. Stone);

id., at 19504- 19505 (remarks of Sen.Humphrey); id., at 23703 (remarks ofRep. Brademas); Hearings on H.R.7217 before the Subcommittee onSelect Education of the HouseCommittee on Education and Labor,94th Cong., 1st Sess., 91, 150, 153(1975); Hearings on H.R. 4199 beforethe Select Subcommittee on Educationof the House Committee on Educationand Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 130,139 (1973). See also 34 CFR §300.343 (1981).

FN21. In seeking to read more into theAct than its language or legislativehistory will permit, the United Statesfocuses upon the word "appropriate,"arguing that "the statutory definitionsdo not adequately explain what [itmeans]." Brief for United States asAmicus Curiae 13. WhateverCongress meant by an "appropriate"education, it is clear that it did notmean a potential-maximizingeducation.The term as used in reference toeducating the handicapped appears tohave originated in the PARC decision,where the District Court required thathandicapped children be provided with"education and training appropriate to[their] learning capacities." 334F.Supp., at 1258. The word appearsagain in the Mills decision, the DistrictCourt at one point referring to theneed for "an appropriate educationalprogram," 348 F.Supp., at 879, and atanother point speaking of a "suitablepublicly- supported education," id., at878. Both cases also refer to the needfor an "adequate" education. See 334F.Supp., at 1266; 348 F.Supp., at 878.

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 17

The use of "appropriate" in thelanguage of the Act, although by nomeans definitive, suggests thatCongress used the word as much todescribe the settings in whichhandicapped children should beeducated as to prescribe thesubstantive content or supportiveservices of their education. Forexample, § 1412(5) requires thathandicapped children be educated inclassrooms with nonhandicappedchildren "to the maximum extentappropriate." Similarly, § 1401(19)provides that, "whenever appropriate,"handicapped children should attendand participate in the meeting at whichtheir IEP is drafted. In addition, thedefinition of "free appropriate publiceducation" itself states that instructiongiven handicapped children should beat an "appropriate preschool,elementary, or secondary school"level. § 1401(18)(C). The Act's useof the word "appropriate" thus seemsto reflect Congress' recognition thatsome settings simply are not suitableenvironments for the participation ofsome handicapped children. At thevery least, these statutory uses of theword refute the contention thatCongress used "appropriate" as a termof art which concisely expresses thestandard found by the lower courts.

*198 (ii)

Respondents contend that "the goal of the Actis to provide each handicapped child with anequal educational opportunity." Brief forRespondents 35. We think, however, that therequirement that a State provide specializededucational services to handicapped children

generates no additional requirement that theservices so provided be sufficient to maximizeeach child's potential "commensurate with theopportunity provided other children."Respondents **3047 and the United Statescorrectly note that Congress sought "toprovide assistance to the States in carrying outtheir responsibilities under ... the Constitutionof the United States to provide equalprotection of the laws." S.Rep., at 13,U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p.1437. [FN22] But we do not think that suchstatements imply a congressional intent toachieve strict equality of opportunity orservices.

FN22. See also 121 Cong.Rec. 19492(1975) (remarks of Sen. Williams);id., at 19504 (remarks of Sen.Humphrey).

The educational opportunities provided byour public school systems undoubtedly differfrom student to student, depending upon amyriad of factors that might affect a particularstudent's ability to assimilate informationpresented in the classroom. The requirementthat States provide "equal" educationalopportunities would thus seem to present anentirely unworkable standard requiringimpossible measurements and comparisons.Similarly, furnishing handicapped childrenwith only such services as are available tononhandicapped *199 children would in allprobability fall short of the statutoryrequirement of "free appropriate publiceducation"; to require, on the other hand, thefurnishing of every special service necessaryto maximize each handicapped child'spotential is, we think, further than Congressintended to go. Thus to speak in terms of"equal" services in one instance gives lessthan what is required by the Act and in

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 18

another instance more. The theme of the Actis "free appropriate public education," aphrase which is too complex to be captured bythe word "equal" whether one is speaking ofopportunities or services.

The legislative conception of therequirements of equal protection wasundoubtedly informed by the two DistrictCourt decisions referred to above. But casessuch as Mills and PARC held simply thathandicapped children may not be excludedentirely from public education. In Mills, theDistrict Court said:

"If sufficient funds are not available tofinance all of the services and programs thatare needed and desirable in the system thenthe available funds must be expendedequitably in such a manner that no child isentirely excluded from a publicly supportededucation consistent with his needs andability to benefit therefrom." 348 F.Supp.,at 876.

The PARC court used similar language,saying "[i]t is the commonwealth's obligationto place each mentally retarded child in a free,public program of education and trainingappropriate to the child's capacity...." 334F.Supp., at 1260. The right of access to freepublic education enunciated by these cases issignificantly different from any notion ofabsolute equality of opportunity regardless ofcapacity. To the extent that Congress mighthave looked further than these cases which arementioned in the legislative history, at thetime of enactment of the Act this Court hadheld at least twice that the Equal ProtectionClause of the Fourteenth *200 Amendmentdoes not require States to expend equalfinancial resources on the education of eachchild. San Antonio Independent School Dist.v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293

F.Supp. 327 (ND Ill.1968), aff'd sub nom.McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S.Ct.1197, 22 L.Ed.2d 308 (1969).

In explaining the need for federal legislation,the House Report noted that "nocongressional legislation has required aprecise guarantee for handicapped children,i.e. a basic floor of opportunity that wouldbring into compliance all school districts withthe constitutional right of equal protectionwith respect to handicapped children."H.R.Rep., at 14. Assuming that the Act wasdesigned to fill the need identified in theHouse Report--that is, to provide a "basicfloor of opportunity" consistent with equalprotection--neither the Act nor its historypersuasively demonstrates that Congressthought that equal protection requiredanything more than equal **3048 access.Therefore, Congress' desire to providespecialized educational services, even infurtherance of "equality," cannot be read asimposing any particular substantiveeducational standard upon the States.

The District Court and the Court of Appealsthus erred when they held that the Act requiresNew York to maximize the potential of eachhandicapped child commensurate with theopportunity provided nonhandicappedchildren. Desirable though that goal might be,it is not the standard that Congress imposedupon States which receive funding under theAct. Rather, Congress sought primarily toidentify and evaluate handicapped children,and to provide them with access to a freepublic education.

(iii)

Implicit in the congressional purpose ofproviding access to a "free appropriate public

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education" is the requirement that theeducation to which access is provided besufficient to confer some educational benefitupon the handicapped child. It would do littlegood for Congress to spend millions of dollarsin providing access to a public education onlyto have the *201 handicapped child receive nobenefit from that education. The statutorydefinition of "free appropriate publiceducation," in addition to requiring that Statesprovide each child with "specially designedinstruction," expressly requires the provisionof "such ... supportive services ... as may berequired to assist a handicapped child tobenefit from special education." § 1401(17)(emphasis added). We therefore conclude thatthe "basic floor of opportunity" provided bythe Act consists of access to specializedinstruction and related services which areindividually designed to provide educationalbenefit to the handicapped child. [FN23]

FN23. This view is supported by thecongressional intention, frequentlyexpressed in the legislative history,that handicapped children be enabledto achieve a reasonable degree ofself-sufficiency. After referring tostatistics showing that manyhandicapped children were excludedfrom public education, the SenateReport states:"The long range implications of thesestatistics are that public agencies andtaxpayers will spend billions of dollarsover the lifetimes of these individualsto maintain such persons asdependents and in a minimallyacceptable lifestyle. With propereducation services, many would beable to become productive citizens,contributing to society instead of beingforced to remain burdens. Others,

through such services, would increasetheir independence, thus reducing theirdependence on society." S.Rep., at 9,U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News1975, p. 1433.See also H.R.Rep., at 11. Similarly,one of the principal Senate sponsors ofthe Act stated that "providingappropriate educational services nowmeans that many of these individualswill be able to become a contributingpart of our society, and they will nothave to depend on subsistencepayments from public funds." 121Cong.Rec. 19492 (1975) (remarks ofSen. Williams). See also id., at 25541(remarks of Rep. Harkin); id., at37024-37025 (remarks of Rep.Brademas); id., at 37027 (remarks ofRep. Gude); id., at 37410 (remarks ofSen. Randolph); id., at 37416 (remarksof Sen. Williams).The desire to provide handicappedchildren with an attainable degree ofpersonal independence obviouslyanticipated that state educationalprograms would confer educationalbenefits upon such children. But atthe same time, the goal of achievingsome degree of self-sufficiency inmost cases is a good deal more modestthan the potential-maximizing goaladopted by the lower courts.Despite its frequent mention, wecannot conclude, as did the dissent inthe Court of Appeals, thatself-sufficiency was itself thesubstantive standard which Congressimposed upon the States. Becausemany mildly handicapped childrenwill achieve self-sufficiency withoutstate assistance while personalindependence for the severely

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handicapped may be an unreachablegoal, "self-sufficiency" as asubstantive standard is at once aninadequate protection and an overlydemanding requirement. We thusview these references in the legislativehistory as evidence of Congress'intention that the services providedhandicapped children be educationallybeneficial, whatever the nature orseverity of their handicap.

*202 The determination of whenhandicapped children are receiving sufficienteducational benefits to satisfy therequirements of the Act presents a moredifficult problem. The Act requiresparticipating States to educate a widespectrum of handicapped children, from themarginally hearing-impaired to the profoundlyretarded and palsied. **3049 It is clear thatthe benefits obtainable by children at one endof the spectrum will differ dramatically fromthose obtainable by children at the other end,with infinite variations in between. One childmay have little difficulty competingsuccessfully in an academic setting withnonhandicapped children while another childmay encounter great difficulty in acquiringeven the most basic of self-maintenance skills.We do not attempt today to establish any onetest for determining the adequacy ofeducational benefits conferred upon allchildren covered by the Act. Because in thiscase we are presented with a handicappedchild who is receiving substantial specializedinstruction and related services, and who isperforming above average in the regularclassrooms of a public school system, weconfine our analysis to that situation.

The Act requires participating States toeducate handicapped children with

nonhandicapped children whenever possible.[FN24] When that "mainstreaming"preference of the Act *203 has been metand a child is being educated in the regularclassrooms of a public school system, thesystem itself monitors the educationalprogress of the child. Regular examinationsare administered, grades are awarded, andyearly advancement to higher grade levels ispermitted for those children who attain anadequate knowledge of the course material.The grading and advancement system thusconstitutes an important factor in determiningeducational benefit. Children who graduatefrom our public school systems are consideredby our society to have been "educated" at leastto the grade level they have completed, andaccess to an "education" for handicappedchildren is precisely what Congress sought toprovide in the Act. [FN25]

FN24. Title 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)requires that participating Statesestablish "procedures to assure that, tothe maximum extent appropriate,handicapped children, includingchildren in public or privateinstitutions or other care facilities, areeducated with children who are nothandicapped, and that special classes,separate schooling, or other removalof handicapped children from theregular educational environmentoccurs only when the nature orseverity of the handicap is such thateducation in regular classes with theuse of supplementary aids and servicescannot be achieved satisfactorily."

FN25. We do not hold today thatevery handicapped child who isadvancing from grade to grade in aregular public school system is

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automatically receiving a "freeappropriate public education." In thiscase, however, we find Amy'sacademic progress, when consideredwith the special services andprofessional consideration accorded bythe Furnace Woods schooladministrators, to be dispositive.

C

When the language of the Act and itslegislative history are considered together, therequirements imposed by Congress becometolerably clear. Insofar as a State is requiredto provide a handicapped child with a "freeappropriate public education," we hold that itsatisfies this requirement by providingpersonalized instruction with sufficientsupport services to permit the child to benefiteducationally from that instruction. Suchinstruction and services must be provided atpublic expense, must meet the State'seducational standards, must approximate thegrade levels used in the State's regulareducation, and must comport with the child'sIEP. In addition, the IEP, and therefore thepersonalized instruction, should be formulatedin accordance with the requirements of *204 the Act and, if the child is being educated inthe regular classrooms of the public educationsystem, should be reasonably calculated toenable the child to achieve passing marks andadvance from grade to grade. [FN26]

FN26. In defending the decisions ofthe District Court and the Court ofAppeals, respondents and the UnitedStates rely upon isolated statements inthe legislative history concerning theachievement of maximum potential,see H.R.Rep., at 13, as support fortheir contention that Congress

intended to impose greater substantiverequirements than we have found.These statements, however, are toothin a reed on which to base aninterpretation of the Act whichdisregards both its language and thebalance of its legislative history."Passing references and isolatedphrases are not controlling whenanalyzing a legislative history."Department of State v. WashingtonPost Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600, 102 S.Ct.1957, 1960, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982).Moreover, even were we to agree thatthese s ta tement s ev ince acongressional intent to maximize eachchild's potential, we could not holdthat Congress had successfullyimposed that burden upon the States."[L]egislation enacted pursuant to thespending power is much in the natureof a contract: in return for federalfunds, the States agree to comply withfederally imposed conditions. Thelegitimacy of Congress' power tolegislate under the spending powerthus rests on whether the Statevoluntarily and knowingly accepts theterms of the 'contract.' ... Accordingly,if Congress intends to impose acondition on the grant of federalm o n e y s , i t m u s t d o s ounambiguously." Pennhurst StateSchool v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17,101 S.Ct. 1531, 1539-40, 67 L.Ed.2d694 (1981) (footnote omitted).As already demonstrated, the Act andits history impose no requirements onthe States like those imposed by theDistrict Court and the Court ofAppeals. A fortiori Congress has notdone so unambiguously, as required inthe valid exercise of its spending

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power.

**3050 IV A

[3] As mentioned in Part I, the Act permits"[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings anddecision" of the state administrative hearings"to bring a civil action" in "any State court ofcompetent jurisdiction or in a district court ofthe United States without regard to the amountin controversy." § 1415(e)(2). The complaint,and therefore the civil action, may concern"any matter relating to the identification,evaluation, or educational placement of thechild, or the provision *205 of a freeappropriate public education to such child." §1415(b)(1)(E). In reviewing the complaint,the Act provides that a court "shall receive therecord of the [state] administrativeproceedings, shall hear additional evidence atthe request of a party, and, basing its decisionon the preponderance of the evidence, shallgrant such relief as the court determines isappropriate." § 1415(e)(2).

The parties disagree sharply over the meaningof these provisions, petitioners contending thatcourts are given only limited authority toreview for state compliance with the Act'sprocedural requirements and no power toreview the substance of the state program, andrespondents contending that the Act requirescourts to exercise de novo review over stateeducational decisions and policies. We findpetitioners' contention unpersuasive, forCongress expressly rejected provisions thatwould have so severely restricted the role ofreviewing courts. In substituting the currentlanguage of the statute for language thatwould have made state administrative findingsconclusive if supported by substantialevidence, the Conference Committee

explained that courts were to make"independent decision[s] based on apreponderance of the evidence."S.Conf.Rep.No.94-455, p. 50 (1975),U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p.1503. See also 121 Cong.Rec. 37416 (1975)(remarks of Sen. Williams).

But although we find that this grant ofauthority is broader than claimed bypetitioners, we think the fact that it is found in§ 1415, which is entitled "Proceduralsafeguards," is not without significance.When the elaborate and highly specificprocedural safeguards embodied in § 1415 arecontrasted with the general and somewhatimprecise substantive admonitions containedin the Act, we think that the importanceCongress attached to these proceduralsafeguards cannot be gainsaid. It seems to usno exaggeration to say that Congress placedevery bit as much emphasis upon compliancewith procedures giving parents and guardiansa large measure of participation at every stageof the administrative process, see, e.g., §§1415(a)-(d), as it did upon the measurement ofthe resulting *206 IEP against a substantivestandard. We think that the congressionalemphasis upon full participation of concernedparties throughout the development of the IEP,as well as the requirements that state and localplans be submitted to the Secretary forapproval, demonstrates the legislativeconviction that adequate compliance with theprocedures prescribed would in most casesassure much if not all of what Congresswished in the way of substantive content in anIEP.

**3051 Thus the provision that a reviewingcourt base its decision on the "preponderanceof the evidence" is by no means an invitationto the courts to substitute their own notions of

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 23

sound educational policy for those of theschool authorities which they review. Thevery importance which Congress has attachedto compliance with certain procedures in thepreparation of an IEP would be frustrated if acourt were permitted simply to set statedecisions at nought. The fact that § 1415(e)requires that the reviewing court "receive therecords of the [state] administrativeproceedings" carries with it the impliedrequirement that due weight shall be given tothese proceedings. And we find nothing in theAct to suggest that merely because Congresswas rather sketchy in establishing substantiverequirements, as opposed to proceduralrequirements for the preparation of an IEP, itintended that reviewing courts should have afree hand to impose substantive standards ofreview which cannot be derived from the Actitself. In short, the statutory authorization togrant "such relief as the court determines isappropriate" cannot be read without referenceto the obligations, largely procedural in nature,which are imposed upon recipient States byCongress.

Therefore, a court's inquiry in suits broughtunder § 1415(e)(2) is twofold. First, has theState complied with the procedures set forth inthe Act? [FN27] And second, is the *207 individualized educational program developedthrough the Act's procedures reasonablycalculated to enable the child to receiveeducational benefits? [FN28] If theserequirements are met, the State has compliedwith the obligations imposed by Congress andthe courts can require no more.

FN27. This inquiry will require a courtnot only to satisfy itself that the Statehas adopted the state plan, policies,and assurances required by the Act,but also to determine that the State has

created an IEP for the child inquestion which conforms with therequirements of § 1401(19).

FN28. When the handicapped child isbeing educated in the regularclassrooms of a public school system,the achievement of passing marks andadvancement from grade to grade willbe one important factor in determiningeducational benefit. See Part III,supra.

B

[4] In assuring that the requirements of theAct have been met, courts must be careful toavoid imposing their view of preferableeducational methods upon the States. [FN29]The primary responsibility for formulating theeducation to be accorded a handicapped child,and for choosing the educational method mostsuitable to the child's needs, was left by theAct to state and local educational agencies incooperation with the parents or guardian of thechild. The Act expressly charges States withthe responsibility of "acquiring anddisseminating to teachers and administratorsof programs for handicapped childrensignificant information derived fromeducational research, demonstration, andsimilar projects, and [of] adopting, whereappropriate, promising educational practicesand materials." § 1413(a)(3). In the face ofsuch a clear statutory directive, it seems highlyunlikely that Congress intended *208 courts tooverturn a State's choice of appropriateeducational theories in a proceedingconducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2). [FN30]

FN29. In this case, for example, boththe state hearing officer and theDistrict Court were presented with

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evidence as to the best method foreducating the deaf, a question longdebated among scholars. See Large,Special Problems of the Deaf Underthe Education for All HandicappedChildren Act of 1975, 58 Wash.U.L.Q.213, 229 (1980). The District Courtaccepted the testimony of respondents'experts that there was "a trendsupported by studies showing thegreater degree of success of studentsbrought up in deaf households using[the method of communication usedby the Rowleys]." 483 F.Supp., at535.

FN30. It is clear that Congress wasaware of the States' traditional role inthe formulation and execution ofeducational policy. "Historically, theStates have had the primaryresponsibility for the education ofchildren at the elementary andsecondary level." 121 Cong.Rec.19498 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Dole).See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393U.S. 97, 104, 89 S.Ct. 266, 270, 21L.Ed.2d 228 (1968) ("By and large,public education in our Nation iscommitted to the control of state andlocal authorities").

**3052 We previously have cautioned thatcourts lack the "specialized knowledge andexperience" necessary to resolve "persistentand difficult questions of educational policy."San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 42, 93 S.Ct., at 1301.We think that Congress shared that view whenit passed the Act. As already demonstrated,Congress' intention was not that the Actdisplace the primacy of States in the field ofeducation, but that States receive funds to

assist them in extending their educationalsystems to the handicapped. Therefore, oncea court determines that the requirements of theAct have been met, questions of methodologyare for resolution by the States.

V

Entrusting a child's education to state andlocal agencies does not leave the child withoutprotection. Congress sought to protectindividual children by providing for parentalinvolvement in the development of state plansand policies, supra, at 3038, and n. 6, and inthe formulation of the child's individualeducational program. As the Senate Reportstates:

"The Committee recognizes that in manyinstances the process of providing specialeducation and related services tohandicapped children is not guaranteed toproduce any particular outcome. Bychanging the language [of the provisionrelating to individualized educationalprograms] to emphasize the process ofparent and child *209 involvement and toprovide a written record of reasonableexpectations, the Committee intends toclarify that such individualized planningconferences are a way to provide parentinvolvement and protection to assure thatappropriate services are provided to ahandicapped child." S.Rep., at 11-12,U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p.1435.

See also S.Conf.Rep.No.94-445, p. 30(1975); 34 CFR § 300.345 (1981). As thisvery case demonstrates, parents and guardianswill not lack ardor in seeking to ensure thathandicapped children receive all of thebenefits to which they are entitled by the Act.[FN31]

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FN31. In addition to providing forextensive parental involvement in theformulation of state and local policies,as well as the preparation of individualeducational programs, the Act ensuresthat States will receive the advice ofexperts in the field of educatinghandicapped children. As a conditionfor receiving federal funds under theAct, States must create "an advisorypanel, appointed by the Governor orany other official authorized underState law to make such appointments,composed of individuals involved inor concerned with the education ofhandicapped children, includinghandicapped individuals, teachers,parents or guardians of handicappedchildren, State and local educationofficials, and administrators ofprograms for handicapped children,which (A) advises the Stateeducational agency of unmet needswithin the State in the education ofhandicapped children, [and] (B)comments publicly on any rules orregulations proposed for issuance bythe State regarding the education ofhandicapped children." § 1413(a)(12).

VI

[5] Applying these principles to the facts ofthis case, we conclude that the Court ofAppeals erred in affirming the decision of theDistrict Court. Neither the District Court northe Court of Appeals found that petitionershad failed to comply with the procedures ofthe Act, and the findings of neither courtwould support a conclusion that Amy'seducational program failed to comply with thesubstantive requirements of the Act. On thecontrary, the District Court found that the

"evidence firmly establishes that Amy isreceiving an *210 'adequate' education, sinceshe performs better than the average child inher class and is advancing easily from grade tograde." 483 F.Supp., at 534. In light of thisfinding, and of the fact that Amy wasreceiving personalized instruction and relatedservices calculated by the Furnace Woodsschool administrators to meet her educationalneeds, the lower courts should not haveconcluded that the Act requires the provisionof a sign- language interpreter. Accordingly,the decision of the Court of Appeals isreversed, and the case is **3053 remanded forfurther proceedings consistent with thisopinion. [FN32]

FN32. Because the District Courtdeclined to reach respondents'contention that petitioners had failedto comply with the Act's proceduralrequirements in developing Amy'sIEP, 483 F.Supp., at 533, n. 8, the casemust be remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with thisopinion.

So ordered.

Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in thejudgment.

Although I reach the same result as the Courtdoes today, I read the legislative history andgoals of the Education of the Handicapped Actdifferently. Congress unambiguously statedthat it intended to "take a more active roleunder its responsibility for equal protection ofthe laws to guarantee that handicappedchildren are provided equal educationalopportunity." S.Rep.No.94-168, p. 9 (1975),U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p.1433 (emphasis added). See also 20 U.S.C. §

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1412(2)(A)(i) (requiring States to establishplans with the "goal of providing fulleducational opportunity to all handicappedchildren").

As I have observed before, "[i]t seems plainto me that Congress, in enacting [this statute],intended to do more than merely set outpolitically self- serving but essentiallymeaningless language about what the[handicapped] deserve at the hands of state ...authorities." Pennhurst State School v.Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 32, 101 S.Ct. 1531,1547, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (opinionconcurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). The clarity of the legislative *211 intent convinces me that the relevantquestion here is not, as the Court says,whether Amy Rowley's individualizededucation program was "reasonably calculatedto enable [her] to receive educationalbenefits," ante, at 3051, measured in part bywhether or not she "achieve[s] passing marksand advance[s] from grade to grade," ante, at3049. Rather, the question is whether Amy'sprogram, viewed as a whole, offered her anopportunity to understand and participate inthe classroom that was substantially equal tothat given her nonhandicapped classmates.This is a standard predicated on equaleducational opportunity and equal access tothe educational process, rather than uponAmy's achievement of any particulareducational outcome.

In answering this question, I believe that theDistrict Court and the Court of Appealsshould have given greater deference than theydid to the findings of the School District'simpartial hearing officer and the State'sCommissioner of Education, both of whomsustained petitioners' refusal to add asign-language interpreter to Amy's

individualized education program. Cf. 20U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (requiring reviewingcourt to "receive the records of theadministrative proceedings" before grantingrelief). I would suggest further that thosecourts focused too narrowly on the presence orabsence of a particular service--asign-language interpreter--rather than on thetotal package of services furnished to Amy bythe School Board.

As the Court demonstrates, ante, at3039-3040, petitioner Board has providedAmy Rowley considerably more than "ateacher with a loud voice." See post, at 3055(dissenting opinion). By concentrating onwhether Amy was "learning as much, orperforming as well academically, as she wouldwithout her handicap," 483 F.Supp. 528, 532(S.D.N.Y.1980), the District Court and theCourt of Appeals paid too little attention towhether, on the entire record, respondent'sindividualized education program offered heran educational opportunity *212 substantiallyequal to that provided her nonhandicappedclassmates. Because I believe that standardhas been satisfied here, I agree that thejudgment of the Court of Appeals should bereversed.

Justice WHITE, with whom JusticeBRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join,dissenting.

In order to reach its result in this case, themajority opinion contradicts itself, the **3054language of the statute, and the legislativehistory. Both the majority's standard for a"free appropriate education" and its standardfor judicial review disregard congressionalintent.

I

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 27

The majority first turns its attention to themeaning of a "free appropriate publiceducation." The Act provides:

"The term 'free appropriate public education'means special education and related serviceswhich (A) have been provided at publicexpense, under public supervision anddirection, and without charge, (B) meet thestandards of the State educational agency,(C) include an appropriate preschool,elementary, or secondary school educationin the State involved, and (D) are providedin conformity with the individualizededucation program required under section1414(a)(5) of this title." 20 U.S.C. §1401(18).

The majority reads this statutory language asestablishing a congressional intent limited tobringing "previously excluded handicappedchildren into the public education systems ofthe States and [requiring] the States to adoptprocedures which would result inindividualized consideration of and instructionfor each child." Ante, at 3042. In its attemptto constrict the definition of "appropriate" andthe thrust of the Act, the majority opinionstates: "Noticeably absent from the languageof the statute is any substantive standardprescribing the level of education to beaccorded handicapped children. Certainly*213 the language of the statute contains norequirement like the one imposed by the lowercourts--that States maximize the potential ofhandicapped children 'commensurate with theopportunity provided to other children.' "Ante, at 3042, quoting 483 F.Supp. 528, 534(SDNY 1980).

I agree that the language of the Act does notcontain a substantive standard beyondrequiring that the education offered must be"appropriate." However, if there are limits not

evident from the face of the statute on whatmay be considered an "appropriate education,"they must be found in the purpose of thestatute or its legislative history. The Act itselfannounces it will provide a "full educationalopportunity to all handicapped children." 20U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (emphasis added). Thisgoal is repeated throughout the legislativehistory, in statements too frequent to be "'passing references and isolated phrases.' "[FN1] Ante, at 3049, n. 26, quotingDepartment of State v. Washington Post Co.,456 U.S. 596, 600, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 1960, 72L.Ed.2d 358 (1982). These statementselucidate the meaning of "appropriate."According to the Senate Report, for example,the Act does "guarantee that handicappedchildren are provided equal educationalopportunity." S.Rep.No.94-168, p. 9 (1975),U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1975, p.1433 (emphasis added). This promise appearsthroughout the legislative history. See 121Cong.Rec. 19482-19483 (1975) (remarks ofSen. Randolph); id., at 19504 (Sen.Humphrey); id., at 19505 (Sen Beall); id., at23704 (Rep. Brademas); id., at 25538 (Rep.Cornell); id., at 25540 (Rep. Grassley); id., at37025 (Rep. Perkins); id., at *214 37030(Rep. Mink); id., at 37412 (Sen. Taft); id., at37413 (Sen. Williams); id., at 37418-37419(Sen. Cranston); id., at 37419-37420 (Sen.Beall). Indeed, at times the purpose of the Actwas described as tailoring each handicappedchild's educational plan to enable the child "toachieve his or her maximum potential."H.R.Rep.No.94-332, pp. 13, 19 (1975); see121 Cong.Rec. 23709 (1975). **3055 SenatorStafford, one of the sponsors of the Act,declared: "We can all agree that education[given a handicapped child] should beequivalent, at least, to the one those childrenwho are not handicapped receive." Id., at19483. The legislative history thus directly

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 28

supports the conclusion that the Act intends togive handicapped children an educationalopportunity commensurate with that givenother children.

FN1. The Court's opinion reliesheavily on the statement, which occurs throughout the legislative history,that, at the time of enactment, onemillion of the roughly eight millionhandicapped children in the UnitedStates were excluded entirely from thepublic school system and more thanhalf were receiving an inappropriateeducation. See, e.g., ante, at 3042,3045, 3046, n. 20. But this statementwas often linked to statements urgingequal educational opportunity. See,e.g., 121 Cong.Rec. 19502 (1975)(remarks of Sen. Cranston); id., at23702 (remarks of Rep. Brademas).That is, Congress wanted not only tobring handicapped children into theschoolhouse, but also to benefit themonce they had entered.

The majority opinion announces a differentsubstantive standard, that "Congress did notimpose upon the States any greater substantiveeducational standard than would be necessaryto make such access meaningful." Ante, at3043. While "meaningful" is no moreenlightening than "appropriate," the Courtpurports to clarify itself. Because Amy wasprovided with some specialized instructionfrom which she obtained some benefit andbecause she passed from grade to grade, shewas receiving a meaningful and thereforeappropriate education. [FN2]

FN2. As further support for itsconclusion, the majority opinion turnsto Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded

Children v. Commonwealth, 334F.Supp. 1257 (ED Pa.1971), 343F.Supp. 279 (1972) (PARC ), andMills v. Board of Education of Districtof Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866(D.C.1972). That these decisionsserved as an impetus for the Act doesnot, however, establish them as thelimits of the Act. In any case, the verylanguage that the majority quotes fromMills, ante, at 3044, 3047, sets astandard not of some education, but ofeducational opportunity equal to thatof non-handicapped children.Indeed, Mills, relying on decisionssince called into question by thisCourt's opinion in San AntonioIndependent School Dist. v.Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278,36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), states:"In Hobson v. Hansen, [269 F.Supp.401 (D.C.1967) ] Judge Wright foundthat denying poor public schoolchildren educational opportunity equalto that available to more affluentpublic school children was violative ofthe Due Process Clause of the FifthAmendment. A fortiori, thedefendants' conduct here, denyingplaintiffs and their class not just anequal publicly supported education butall publicly supported education whileproviding such education to otherchildren, is violative of the DueProcess Clause." 348 F.Supp., at 875.Whatever the effect of Rodriguez onthe validity of this reasoning, thestatement exposes the majority'smischaracterization of the opinion andthus of the assumptions of thelegislature that passed the Act.

*215 This falls far short of what the Act

458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034 Page 29

intended. The Act details as specifically aspossible the kind of specialized educationeach handicapped child must receive. Itwould apparently satisfy the Court's standardof "access to specialized instruction andrelated services which are individuallydesigned to provide educational benefit to thehandicapped child," ante, at 3048, for a deafchild such as Amy to be given a teacher witha loud voice, for she would benefit from thatservice. The Act requires more. It defines"special education" to mean "specificallydesigned instruction, at no cost to parents orguardians, to meet the unique needs of ahandicapped child...." § 1401(16) (emphasisadded). [FN3] Providing a teacher with a loudvoice would not meet Amy's needs and wouldnot satisfy the Act. The basic floor ofopportunity is instead, as the courts belowrecognized, intended to eliminate the effectsof the handicap, at least to the extent that thechild will be given an equal opportunity tolearn if that is reasonably possible. AmyRowley, without a sign-language interpreter,comprehends less than half of what is said inthe classroom--less than half of what normalchildren comprehend. This is hardly an equalopportunity to learn, even if Amy makespassing grades.

FN3. "Related services" are" t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a n d s u c hdevelopmental, corrective, and othersupportive services ... as may berequired to assist a handicapped childto benefit from special education." §1401(17).

Despite its reliance on the use of"appropriate" in the definition of the Act, themajority opinion speculates that "Congressused the word as much to describe the settingsin which *216 handicapped children should

be educated as to prescribe the substantivecontent or supportive services of theireducation." Ante, at 3046, n. 21. Of course,the word "appropriate" can be applied in manyways; at times in the Act, Congress used it torecommend mainstreaming **3056handicapped children; at other points, it usedthe word to refer to the content of theindividualized education. The issue before usis what standard the word "appropriate"incorporates when it is used to modify"education." The answer given by the Court isnot a satisfactory one.

II

The Court's discussion of the standard forjudicial review is as flawed as its discussion ofa "free appropriate public education."According to the Court, a court can ask onlywhether the State has "complied with theprocedures set forth in the Act" and whetherthe individualized education program is"reasonably calculated to enable the child toreceive educational benefits." Ante, at 3051.Both the language of the Act and thelegislative history, however, demonstrate thatCongress intended the courts to conduct a farmore searching inquiry.

The majority assigns major significance to thereview provision's being found in a sectionentitled "Procedural safeguards." But whereelse would a provision for judicial reviewbelong? The majority does acknowledge thatthe current language, specifying that a court"shall receive the records of the administrativeproceedings, shall hear additional evidence atthe request of a party, and, basing its decisionon the preponderance of the evidence, shallgrant such relief as the court determines isappropriate," § 1415(e)(2), was substituted atConference for language that would have

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restricted the role of the reviewing court muchmore sharply. It is clear enough to me thatCongress decided to reduce substantiallyjudicial deference to state administrativedecisions.

The legislative history shows that judicialreview is not limited to procedural matters andthat the state educational agencies are givenfirst, but not final, responsibility for the *217 content of a handicapped child's education.The Conference Committee directs courts tomake an "independent decision."S.Conf.Rep.No.94-455, p. 50 (1975). Thedeliberate change in the review provision is anunusually clear indication that Congressintended courts to undertake substantivereview instead of relying on the conclusions ofthe state agency.

On the floor of the Senate, Senator Williams,the chief sponsor of the bill, CommitteeChairman, and floor manager responsible forthe legislation in the Senate, emphasized thebreadth of the review provisions at both theadministrative and judicial levels:

"Any parent or guardian may present acomplaint concerning any matter regardingthe identification, evaluation, or educationalplacement of the child or the provision of afree appropriate public education to suchchild. In this regard, Mr. President, I wouldlike to stress that the language referring to'free appropriate education' has been adoptedto make clear that a complaint may involvematters such as questions respecting achild's individualized education program,questions of whether special education andrelated services are being provided withoutcharge to the parents or guardians, questionsrelating to whether the services provided achild meet the standards of the Stateeducation agency, or any other question

within the scope of the definition of 'freeappropriate public education.' In addition, itshould be clear that a parent or guardianmay present a complaint alleging that a Stateor local education agency has refused toprovide services to which a child may beentitled or alleging that the State or localeducational agency has erroneouslyclassified a child as a handicapped childwhen, in fact, that child is not a handicappedchild." 121 Cong.Rec. 37415 (1975)(emphasis added).

There is no doubt that the state agency itselfmust make substantive decisions. Thelegislative history reveals that the *218 courts are to consider, de novo, the same**3057 issues. Senator Williams explicitlystated that the civil action permitted under theAct encompasses all matters related to theoriginal complaint. Id., at 37416.

Thus, the Court's limitations on judicialreview have no support in either the languageof the Act or the legislative history. Congressdid not envision that inquiry would end if ashowing is made that the child is receivingpassing marks and is advancing from grade tograde. Instead, it intended to permit a full andsearching inquiry into any aspect of ahandicapped child's education. The Court'sstandard, for example, would not permit achallenge to part of the IEP; the legislativehistory demonstrates beyond doubt thatCongress intended such challenges to bepossible, even if the plan as developed isreasonably calculated to give the child somebenefits.

Parents can challenge the IEP for failing tosupply the special education and relatedservices needed by the individual handicappedchild. That is what the Rowleys did. As theGovernment observes, "courts called upon to

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review the content of an IEP, in accordancewith 20 U.S.C. [§] 1415(e) inevitably arerequired to make a judgment, on the basis ofthe evidence presented, concerning whetherthe educational methods proposed by the localschool district are 'appropriate' for thehandicapped child involved." Brief for UnitedStates as Amicus Curiae 13. The courtsbelow, as they were required by the Act, didprecisely that.

Under the judicial review provisions of theAct, neither the District Court nor the Court ofAppeals was bound by the State's constructionof what an "appropriate" education means ingeneral or by what the state authoritiesconsidered to be an appropriate education forAmy Rowley. Because the standard of thecourts below seems to me to reflect thecongressional purpose and because theirfactual findings are not clearly erroneous, Irespectfully dissent.