book 3 - succession_v1.docx

School of Law

Compilation of Questions and Suggested Answers

Book 3(Succession)

Submitted by:

CIVIL LAW (Weekday & Weekend) CLASS(A.Y. 2015-2016)

Submitted to:

ATTY. JENNOH TEQUILLOCivil Law Review Professor

December 17, 2015

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Table of Content

SUCCESSION....................................................................................................................1Succession................................................................................................................1

Gepulle-Garbo vs. Spouse Garabato..........................................................1Ang vs. Pacunio...........................................................................................3Aranas vs. Mercado.....................................................................................4Vales vs. Galinato........................................................................................6Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. vs. Gonzales.............................................8Bartolome vs. Social Security System..........................................................9Republic vs. Marcos-Manotoc...................................................................11Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-Suntay.................................................................12Vda. de Cabalu vs. Spouses Tabu..............................................................14Romero vs. Court of Appeals.....................................................................15In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate for the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez Richard Lopez vs. Lopez..........................16Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy........................17Beumer vs. Amores....................................................................................18Spouses Fernande vs. Fernan...................................................................20Heirs of Policronio Ureta vs. Heirs of Liberato Ureta.............................21Pasco vs. Heirs of Filomena De Guzman..................................................23Balus vs. Balus..........................................................................................25Del Rosario vs. Ferrer...............................................................................26Arellano vs. Pascual..................................................................................28Echavez vs. Dozen Construction and Development Corporation.............29Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino Briones......................................................31Aznar Brothers Realty Co. vs. Aying.........................................................34Testate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. Abaja...............................................35Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals.......................................................37Viado vs. Court of Appeals........................................................................39Dela Merced vs. Dela Merced...................................................................41

Action that Survives..............................................................................................42Cruz vs. Cruz.............................................................................................42

Attestation Clause..................................................................................................43Azuela vs. Court of Appeals......................................................................43

Capacity.................................................................................................................44Baltazar vs.Laxa........................................................................................44Valmonte vs. Valmonte..............................................................................46

Compulsory Heirs..................................................................................................48Spouses Tumbokon vs. Legaspi.................................................................48

Determination of Heirship.....................................................................................50Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte....................................................50

Devise....................................................................................................................52Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco................................................................52

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Disinheritance........................................................................................................54Ching and Po Wing vs. Rodriguez.............................................................54

Disqualifications of Surviving Spouse..................................................................55Spouses Capitle vs. Elbambuena...............................................................55

Donation Mortis Causa..........................................................................................56Maglasang vs. The Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan....................................56

Future inheritance..................................................................................................57Ferrer vs. Spouses Diaz.............................................................................57

Hereditary Succession of Foreigners.....................................................................59Matthews vs. Taylor..................................................................................59

Holographic Wills; Preterition...............................................................................61Seangio vs. Reyes......................................................................................61

Intestate Proceedings.............................................................................................64Heirs of the Late Spouses Flaviano Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corporation...............................................................................................64

Intestate Succession...............................................................................................66Spouses Peralta vs. Heirs of BernardinaAbalon.......................................66

Partition..................................................................................................................67Spouses Marcos vs. Heirs of Isidro Bangi................................................67Casilang, Sr. vs. Casilang-Dizon..............................................................68Zaragoza vs. Court of Appeals..................................................................70

Probate of a Will Executed by a Foreigner Abroad...............................................71In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta Palagnas....71

Probate of Will.......................................................................................................73Alejandra Arado Heirs vs. Alcoran...........................................................73Baltazar vs. Laxa.......................................................................................75Santiago vs. Santiago................................................................................76

Proof of Heirship...................................................................................................78Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs.Basbas..........................................................78

Repudiation of Inheritance....................................................................................80Guy vs. Court of Appeals...........................................................................80

Reserva Troncal.....................................................................................................81Mendoza vs. Delos Santos.........................................................................81

Sale by Heirs..........................................................................................................83Extraordinary Development Corporation vs. Samson-Bico......................83

Sale of Intestate Estate by an Administrator..........................................................84Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr........................................................................84

Successional Right.................................................................................................86Bunyi vs. Factor........................................................................................86Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals....................................................................87

Transmission of Successional rights......................................................................88Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-Garcia....................................................88Ining vs. Vega............................................................................................90

Trusteeship on the Estate.......................................................................................91Hilarion, Jr. vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita Rodriguez91

Venue for Settlement of Estate..............................................................................92

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Jao vs. Court of Appeals............................................................................92Venue of Action.....................................................................................................94

San Luis vs. San Luis.................................................................................94Umengan vs. Heirs of RosendoLasam.......................................................96

Wills Admitted for Probate but Archived..............................................................97Hacbang vs. Alo........................................................................................97

Wills Admitted for Probate but Intrinsically Void................................................99Dorotheo vs. Court of Appeals..................................................................99

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SUCCESSIONSuccession

I.

Civil Law Topic : Succession

Source : Gepulle-Garbo vs. Spouse GarabatoG.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015

Contributor : Jurolan, Marymar

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PROBLEM:

Nathan was married to Chloe in 1967. They were blessed with a son named George who in turn had an illegitimate daughter named Leila. On June 17, 1991, a Deed of Sale was executed between Chloe and George whereby the former sold to the latter a parcel of land. The deed of sale was signed by Nathan. Chloe died in 1992. Nathan then married his long time friend, Patricia in 1993. In 2000, George registered the property in his name and was issued TCT No. 4171863. Nathan died in 2002. Patricia then filed a petition for cancellation of TCT No. 4171863 against Leila, the legal heir of George. She impugns the validity of the June 17, 1991 Deed of Sale on the ground that the signatures of Nathan and Chloe were forged by George. Patricia claimed that Nathan had previously sought the examination of his alleged signature on the June 17, 1991 Deed of Sale by the NBI. The NBI examiner allegedly found that the questioned signature and the standard signatures of Nathan were not written by one and the same person. During the trial, Patricia asserted that Nathan left real properties including the property covered by TCT No. 4171863. She claimed that by virtue of a holographic will executed by Nathan, the subject property was bequeathed to her. In the same will, he disinherited his son, George. Patricia admitted that the said holographic will was never probated. The Court ruled in favor of Leila on the ground that signatures of Nathan and Chloe appearing on the instruments are not forged. Is the ruling correct? Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the ruling of the court is correct.

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The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.

In the problem given, the NBI’s opinion as to the truth or falsity of the signature of Nathan is not binding and conclusive upon the court since the request for examination of the deed of sale was not upon the order of the court but at the instance of the Patricia. Such examination brings suspicion as to the bias or prejudice of the examining party. Moreover, while it was concluded that there was variance in the compared signatures, such mere variance cannot be considered conclusive proof that the signature was forged.

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II.


Source : Ang vs. PacunioG.R. No. 208928, July 8, 2015

Contributor : Udtohan, Liljoy

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PROBLEM:

L, M, N and O sought to declare the sale of land between A and U null and void. They contend that U who owned the land was their grandmother and left it to them as their inheritance. They further asserted that the one who sold the land is an impostor since their grandmother was already dead for more than 20 years when the sale occurred.

a. When does the right of representation occur?b. Do L, M, N and O have the right to declare the sale null and void?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a. The right of representation is available when the original heir had:(a) predeceased; (b) is incapacitated to inherit; or (c) was disinherited, if decedent

died testate.

b. NO. L, M, N and O have no right to declare the sale null and void.

Under the law, however, L, M, N and O will only be deemed to have a material interest over the subject land- and the rest of U's estate for that matter if the right of representation provided under Article 970, in relation to Article 982, of the Civil Code is available to them. In this situation, representatives will be called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented; and the representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. In the instant case, they claim to be the successors-in-interest of the subject land just because they are U’s grandchildren.

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III.


Source : Aranas vs. MercadoG.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014

Contributor : Manuales, Eisone Brix

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PROBLEM:

Emigdio S. Mercado died intestate, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard , and Maria Teresita ; and his two children by his first marriage, Franklin and Thelma. During the lifetime of Emigdio, he inherited and acquired real properties from her deceased mother. He owned corporate shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which were in the name Teresita which were paid through conjugal funds. He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty .The assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. Thelma then petitioned for the appointment of Teresita as administrator of Emigdio’s estate. Subsequently it was granted. Thereafter, following an order from the court, Teresita filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased but excluded therefrom the properties mentioned to have been already assigned to Mervir Realty. Thelma moved that the list of inventory be amended to include all the properties of the deceased even if already assigned. The trial court then issued an order mandating Teresita to re-do the inventory made. Is the exclusion of the above-mentioned properties valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Article 1061 of the Civil Code requires every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, to “bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he or she may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.”

Furthermore, the usage of the word all in Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent in the

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inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

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IV.


Source : Vales vs. GalinatoG.R. No. 180134, March 5, 2014

Contributor : Villamor, Cletus

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PROBLEM:

Spouses Perfecto and Marietta Vales (Sps. Vales) executed a Deed of Sale6 conveying five (5) parcels of registered agricultural land, with an aggregate area of 20.3168 hectares (has.), to their three (3) children, herein petitioners (subject sale) but failed to register and at the time of the sale, the subject lands were tenanted.

On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was passed decreeing the emancipation of tenants.

Petitioner filed a petition before the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Region VI, praying that they be certified as owners of the subject lands which they have declared in their names for tax purposes as early as November 29, 1972. The petition, however, remained unresolved for nearly two (2) decades. On August 16, 1999, the DAR Regional Director declared that ownership over the subject lands remained with Sps. Vales due to petitioners’ failure to effect the registration or even the annotation of the subject sale before October 21, 1972. Hence, the sale did not bind the tenants concerned, and no retention rights were transferred to petitioners. Are petitioners entitled to avail of any retention right under existing agrarian laws? Decide with reasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

PD 27, which implemented the OLT Program of the government, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT Program are the following: (a) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (b) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for exemption since the land would not be considered as covered under the OLT Program. Accordingly, a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.

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If the land is covered by the OLT Program, which, hence, renders the right of retention operable, the landowner who cultivates or intends to cultivate an area of his tenanted rice or corn land has the right to retain an area of not more than seven (7) has. thereof, on the condition that his aggregate landholdings do not exceed 24 has. as of October 21, 1972. Otherwise, his entire landholdings are covered by the OLT Program without him being entitled to any retention right. Similarly, by virtue of LOI 474, if the landowner, as of October 21 1976, owned less than 24 has. of tenanted rice or corn lands, but additionally owned (a) other agricultural lands of more than 7 has., whether tenanted or not, whether cultivated or not, and regardless of the income derived therefrom, or (b) lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes, from which he derives adequate income to support himself and his family, his entire landholdings shall be similarly placed under OLT Program coverage, without any right of retention.

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V.


Source : Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. vs. GonzalesG.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014

Contributor : Siega, Mar Teresa

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PROBLEM:

Dr. Fave , an 80- year widower, married Juana in the year 1990. Twelve years into the marriage, they begot a child named Mario. Beginning 1995 until his death in 2002, DrFavewas beset with various illnesses including Parkinson’s disease. He died of cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to multi-organ/ system failure. On October 16, 2001 he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying properties in favor of his grandchildren with Juana.

Claiming that their legitimewas prejudiced by such donation, Dr. Fave’s children with his first wife filed an action for annulment of the Deed of Donation because DrFave could not have willfully made the Deed due to his advanced age. Respondents contend that the donation was valid because DrFave was still in full control of his mind during the execution of the Deed of Donation. Is the contention of the respondents tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. The Deed of Donation was invalid.

To determine the intrinsic validity of the deed of donation subject of the action for annulment, the mental state / condition of the donor Dr. Fave at the time of its execution must be taken into account. Factors such as his age, health and environment among others should be considered. Although the age of senility varies from one person to another, to reach the age of 92 with all the medications and treatments one have received for those illnesses, yet claim that his mind remains unimpaired, would be unusual.

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VI.


Source : Bartolome vs. Social Security SystemG.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

Contributor : Corbo, Rhobie

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PROBLEM:

After obtaining degree in Nautical Science, Zaldy was lucky enough to join P&O Nedlloyd Company as Third Engineer for a contract of two years. While onboard a vessel in Brazil on June 2, 2008, he met a fatal accident at work which resulted to his death. Zaldy died as a young bachelor leaving no family of his own but only his late adoptive parent Zacharias and his biological mother Zane. His biological mother, Zane filed a claim for death benefits under the ECP and with the Social Security System as the beneficiary. The latter, however, denied her claim for death benefits, averring that she is no longer considered as the parent of Zaldy as he was legally adopted by Zacharias. Zane filed an appeal with the Employees Compensation Commission, which also denied the appeal. In denying the appeal, the SSS and the ECC reasoned out that Zane’ s denial was by reason of her not being the primary beneficiary. Thus, the late Zacharias being the adopted parent should only be the beneficiary.

By virtue of adoption proceeding, is the tie between the biological parent and the adoptee totally severed thus Zane, his biological mother should denied to claim as Zaldy’s beneficiary?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

NO. In the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one. Even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code that when the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters.

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From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-a-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.

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VII.


Source : Republic vs. Marcos-ManotocG.R. No. 171701, February 8, 2012

Contributor : Nalia, Ellen

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PROBLEM:

Vernie and Clifford are the children of Ernesto Sy. Ernesto died without a will leaving all his properties to his children. However, the said properties were allegedly part of Sy’s accumulated ill-gotten wealth. The Office of the Solicitor General filed a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against Ernesto Sy who was later substituted by his estate upon his death. Vernie and Clifford were sued to render an accounting and to return the alleged ill-gotten wealth. They argued that they did not conspire or participate in accumulating ill-gotten wealth and should not be maintained as respondents. Is maintaining them as respondents proper in the case? Decide the case using the rules of succession.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes they should be maintained as respondents since they are compulsory heirs of Ernesto. They may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos couple.

Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the decedent’s properties upon his death. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate.

In the given circumstance, while it was not proven that Vernie and Clifford conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of Ernesto. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as rightfully belonging to the State.

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VIII.


Source : Suntay III vs. Cojuanco-SuntayG.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2002

Contributor : Avenido, Anna Mae

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PROBLEM:

Juanito is the illegitimate grandchild of Julio and Julia. He was raised by his grandparents like their own child. Andres, Juanito’s father, was married to Adora and had children with her. But their relationship got sour and decided to have it annulled. After several years, Andres died of cancer. Two years after the death of Andres, Julia died intestate. Julio then adopted Juanito to be his legal son and heir.

Upon the death of Julia, Adora filed for a petition for the issuance of letters administration in her favour. But this was opposed by Julio and instead appointed Juanito to be the administrator of Julia’s estate on his behalf. On the course of the proceedings, Julio died.

Adora contends that Juanito should not become the administrator of the estate citing Article 992 which states: An Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Was the contention of Adora tenable?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The contention of Adora is not tenable.

Article 992 states: An Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child

The successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary. Juanito, an

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illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son and eventually legally adopted by decedents husband.

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will.

The peculiar circumstances of this case, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

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IX.


Source : Vda. de Cabalu vs. Spouses TabuG.R. No. 188417, September 24, 2012

Contributor : Sayson, Gerlyn Mae

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PROBLEM:

DA sold a 9000 square meter of property to M. The subject property was owned by the aunt of his father, BA, which the latter inherited from the former through a holographic will. The holographic will was not subjected to probate at the time of BA’s death and even at the time of the sale of the property. Will the property be a proper subject of sale? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the property cannot be a proper subject of sale. When DA sold the disputed property to M, he is not yet the owner. The property was inherited by his father BA from his aunt. When BA died and DA sold the property to M, the latter has no authority to dispose the property since the holographic will which DA’s father BA based his right on the property was not yet probated. He could not have disposed the entire 9000 square meters of land to M.

Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that no contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. A contract entered into upon future inheritance is void. The law applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance and; (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

In the present case, at the time Domingo sold the property, the holographic will executed by the aunt of BA was not yet probated. The property subject to the contract of sale still formed part of the estate of BA’s aunt. DA had only a mere inchoate hereditary right therein.

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X.


Source : Romero vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

Contributor : Gula, Maria Monica

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PROBLEM:

Can the probate court decide a question of title or ownership?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As a general rule, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership. But if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

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XI.


Source : In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate for the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez Richard Lopez vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012

Contributor : Parawan, Eula

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PROBLEM:

X died leaving a will. Y, as his executor and administrator, filed a petition for probate of X’s will. W opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The court found that while the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. Should the court disallow the probate of the will?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, the statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence.

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XII.


Source : Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim UyG.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

Contributor : Tejano, Misaellee

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PROBLEM:

Annie has 5 daughters: Agatha and Athena from her first marriage to Anthony; Amanda, Arabella, and Ana from her second marriage to Arnold. Annie and Arnold owns the following properties: Lots 1, 2, 3 located in Quezon City; Lots 4, 5 6 in Bulacan and a house in Makati City.

Annie died intestate leaving her husband Arnold and 5 daughters one of which, Ana, is still a minor. Arnold together with Agatha, Amanda and Arabella executed and Extra-Judicial Settlement adjudicating among themselves various properties. The settlement are as follows: Agatha was given Lot 1. Lot 2 went to Athena, Lot 3 to Amanda, Lot 4 to Arabella. Lot 5 to Ana and the Makati property was given to Arnold. Lot 6 was sold to Spouses Aaron and Amor.

Is the extra judicial settlement valid? Is the sale to Spouses Aaron and Amor valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. When Annie died, her children and Arnold acquired their respective inheritances entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate. In the execution of the Extra Judicial Settlement, all the heirs should have participated. In this case, Athena was excluded. Further, minor Ana was not property represented. Thus, the settlement was null and void.

As to the sale of Lot 6 to Spouses Aaron and Amor, it is valid but only with respect to the shares of Arnold, Agatha, Amanda and Arabella. With respect to Ana, since she is a minor, Arnold represented her in the sale but she was only clothed with powers to administration and not power to dispose of the property.

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XIII.


Source : Beumer vs. AmoresG.R. No. 195670, December 3, 2012

Contributor : Quiron, Maria Cristina

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PROBLEM:

William Conroy, an American National, married Maria Santos, a Filipina. During their marriage they bought several houses and lot and were registered in Maria’s name. They acquired the properties out of William’s money which he received from the United States government as his disability benefits since Maria did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. Unfortunately the marriage turned sour and Maria filed an annulment on the basis of Williams’s psychological incapacity.

William then filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution of properties which he bought during their marriage.

Will the properties purchased using the personal funds of William Conroy be considered part of the conjugal property.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the parcels of land purchased using the personal funds of William Conroy will be considered as paraphernal properties of Maria due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, William Conroy, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.

Regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition, William cannot acquire any right whatsoever over the properties because of the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:

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Section 7: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

However, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, therefore William is only entitled to the share on the houses standing on the parcels of land.

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XIV.


Source : Spouses Fernande vs. FernanG.R. No. 191889, January 31, 2011

Contributor : Ygana, Angeline

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PROBLEM:

A,B, and C are co owners of a lot. B, single died April 28, 1988 leaving no will. A and C presented a Deed of Partition with Sale dated and notarized October 27, 1994 with the Registry of Deeds thereby terminating the co-ownership. Transfer of Certificate of Titles were issued. X the full blood brother of A, B and C filed a complaint alleging that B’s signature on the Deed of Partition with Sale was a forgery since B died April 28, 1988 before the deed was executed 1994. At the witness stand Y the wife of A declared that she was present during the execution of the deed in 1986 on the agreement that it will be held on safekeeping until it was notarized 1994. Will the action of X prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, under In Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban provides that if it is established that petitioners’ consent was not given to the Deed of Partition with Sale which became the basis for the issuance of the new title, the absence of such consent makes the Deed null and void ab initio and subject to attack anytime. It is recognized in our jurisprudence that a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no title. Article 1410 of the Civil Code clearly provides that an action to declare the inexistent of a void contract does not prescribe.

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XV.


Source : Heirs of Policronio Ureta vs. Heirs of Liberato UretaG.R. Nos. 165748 & 165930, September 14, 2011

Contributor : Rivera, Clieford

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PROBLEM:

A executed 4 Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of B,C,D,E, and A’s common-law wife F. The sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, A continued to own, possess and enjoy the said properties. A's heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the said deeds of sale X, B's eldest son, representing the Heirs of B, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.

After their father's death, the Heirs of B found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. They obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by A in favor of B.Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of B sought to amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of A. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of B filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of Abefore the RTC. The Heirs of B argued, among others, that the heirs of A cannot question validity of the sale without first proving that their successional rights were unduly prejudiced, considering that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. Is this argument correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Article 842 of the Civil Code provides: One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.

This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of

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Alfonso need not first prove that the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their legitimes.

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XVI.


Source : Pasco vs. Heirs of Filomena De GuzmanG.R. No. 165554, July 26, 2010

Contributor : Perias, Christine Joymarie

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PROBLEM:

Bong2x obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000 from Noy2x (now deceased), to secure the loan Bong2x excuted a chattel mortgage on his Mitsubishi Strada pick up in favor of Noy2x. Upon his death his heirs sought to collect from Bong2x but despite numerous demand it was no avail. The heirs authorized Kris, as their attorney-in-fact through a Special Power of Attorney, the SPA authorized Kris to do the following in behalf of the co-heirs:

1) To represent us on all matters concerning the intestate estate of our deceased brother, Noy2x Alonzo;

2) To file cases for collection of all accounts due said Noy2x Alonzo or his estate, including the power to file petition for foreclosure of mortgaged properties;

Bong2x claim that Kris cannot collect the payment because she is not a party to the mortgage thus he only is liable to Noy2x. His defense in non-payment is he will only pay the loan directly to Noy2x’s estate, not to Kris.

Is Bong2x’s contention correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, he is not correct. It is undisputed that Kris’s co-heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney, designating Kris as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to file cases for collection of all the accounts due to Noy2x or his estate. Consequently, Kris filing of cases in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Bong2x from Noy2x was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her.

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It is true that Noy2x’s estate has a different juridical personality than that of the heirs. Nonetheless, her heirs certainly have an interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties, for at the moment of Noy2x’s death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent's liabilities. In this connection, Article 777 of the Civil Code states that [t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

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XVII.


Source : Balus vs. BalusG.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010

Contributor : Bacalso, Vernie Rose

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

F, owner of Lot 1-A, had 3 children A,B,C. F mortgaged said property to the bank as a security for a loan. Due to F’s failure to pay the loan, subject property was foreclosed and subsequently, a new title was issued in favor of the bank. After F’s death, his children continued possession of said property. They executed an extra-judicial partition of the property apportioning 1/3 thereof for each of them, and agreed to redeem the property from the bank. However, the period for redemption had elapsed. Hence B and C bought the property from the bank. Acting as new owners, B and C wanted to divide the property between the two of them only. A opposed on the basis of his right as heir of F and on the basis of the previous extra-judicial agreement. Does A have a right over the said property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death (Art. 777). In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession (Art. 781). In the present case, since F lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, A,B,C never inherited the subject lot from their father. Instead, B and C acquired ownership over the property pursuant to the sale. Therefore, A does not have any right over the property.

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XVIII.


Source : Del Rosario vs. FerrerG.R. No. 187056, September 20, 2010

Contributor : Arañas, Niña Grace

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PROBLEM:

Spouses Gonzales executed a document captioned “DONATION MORTIS CAUSA”, covering a 126 sq. Meter lot and house in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini, who was the daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo. The deed of donation showed express irrevocability of the said donation which shall be respected by the surviving spouse and that the latter reserves the right, ownership, possession and administration of the donated property. The deed shows that the donation shall take effect upon the death of the donors. The donee’s acceptance was clearly shown on the document. Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in and thereafter, Leopoldo, the donor husband, assigned his rights and interests in of the subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo later died. Subsequently, Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the said deed of donation mortis causa, but Asuncion challenged the petition, invoking the deed of assignment made in her favour previously by her father and further claims that the donation was in fact a donation inter vivos and not a donation mortis causa.

Was the donation a donation inter vivos or mortis causa? Explain your answer. Distinguish donation inter vivos from donation mortis causa. Give the essential characteristics of a donation mortis causa.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. Although it was captioned as “Donation Mortis Causa”, the caption is not controlling. In Austria-Magat v. CA, the Court ruled that, “irrevocability is a characteristic absolutely incompatible with the concept of conveyances mortis causa, where revocability is precisely the essence of the act.

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUE DONATION INTER VIVOS:1. The necessary form

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2. Consent or acceptance by donee during donor’s lifetime3. Irrevocability4. Intent to benefit the donee5. Resultant decrease in the assets or patrimony of donor

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUE DONATION MORTIS CAUSA:1. that it conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the

transferor; or there is retention of the owner of his/her full or naked ownership while alive;

2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and

3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee

The revocability of the donation is the ultimate test that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos. In the case at bar, the irrevocable character of the donation was clear in the statement of the document that the will shall be irrevocable and that the surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a donation inter vivos. The donor’s act of reserving their ownership rights to the property donated in the context of an irrevocable donation means that the donors parted with their naked title, keeping only beneficial ownership while they lived. Moreover, the express acceptance of the donees in the document is a requirement only for donation inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, does not require the acceptance of the donee during the donors lifetime. In case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed. Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final by the donees’ acceptance of the donation. Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion was void because he had no more rights to assign.

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XIX.


Source : Arellano vs. PascualG.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010

Contributor : Solon, Roger Benjamin

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

A died intestate leaving only her siblings B and F as her heirs. F filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration" alleging that a property was transferred by the decedent to B by Deed of Donation. The validity of the donation was assailed by F, contending that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" of B. The probate court found the deed of donation valid and that said property was subject to collation. The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s ruling that the property is subject to collation.

When is collation proper? Is the donation valid in this case?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.

In this case, the donation is valid. There is no indication that A left any compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. Thus, the donation is valid.

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XX.


Source : Echavez vs. Dozen Construction and Development CorporationG.R. No. 192916, December 11, 2010

Contributor : Guma, Israel

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Alma Morena donated several lots to Karen Divala through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa. Karen accepted the donation. The Deed of Donation did not contain an Attestation Clause but it has an acknowledgment portion, which reads:

BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared Alma S. Morena with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed.

Is the donation mortis causa valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The donation is not valid. The donation in favor of Karen Divala was a donation mortis causa, hence, the compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed. The purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment potion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule in Singson v. Florentino and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case.

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Moreover, the Court also points out that even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.

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XXI.


Source : Pilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino BrionesG.R. No. 150175, March 10, 2006

Contributor : Labella, Margaret

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PROBLEM:

Maximino, whose marriage to Donata did not produce any children, died without a will on 1 May 1952. Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, settled her husband’s estate with the Court of First Instance (CFI), to whichshe submitted an Inventory of Maximino’sproperties, that included, among others, five (5) parcels of land, which were prime properties.

The RTC subsequently issued an Order, awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata, who was adjudicated as Maximino’s sole heir. When Donata died on 1 November 1977, Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata, which was given due course.

On 21 January 1985, LinoBriones, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC, allowing Lino to collect rentals from Maximino’s properties. ErlindaPilapilfiled with and was later granted by the RTC the Motion to Set Aside the said Order, since said properties were already under her administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata.Letters of Administration issued to Linowere subsequently set aside by the RTC.

In 1989, Lino and the other heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. The heirs of Maximino presented the documents relating to the Special Proceedings naming Donata as sole heir and Administrator of the properties of Maximino, including the Inventory submitted by Donata to the CFI. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals rendered Decision, in favor of the heirs of Maximinoratiocinating thus: “This supposed declaration of heirs declaring the late

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Donata Briones as the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the late Maximino S. Briones entered in the Register of Deeds has been made thru misrepresentation to the Court by Donataas Administratrix of the estate of her husband Maximino S. Briones by failing to honestly disclose to the Court that the decedent was survived not only by his widow but also by his brothers and sisters and/or their children by right of representation which fact was known to her at the time of her husband’s death.”

If you were the judge, who, between Erlinda (Donata’s heirs) and Lino (Maximino’s heirs) had the better right to inherit the properties subject of the case? Explain.

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Lino and Maximino’s heirs had the better right to inherit the properties of the deceased spouses. Theright of Maximino’s heirs to inherit, together with Donata, from the estate of Maximino, is anchored clearly on Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, which read ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

The supposed Order declaring the late Donata Briones as the sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the late Maximino S. Briones appear to have indeed been made thru misrepresentation to the Court by failing to honestly disclose to the Court that the decedent was survived not only by his widow but also by his brothers and sisters and/or their children by right of representation which fact was known to her at the time of her husband’s death. Thus, the RTC and CA were correct in declaring that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to of the real properties from Maximino’s Estate.

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Erlinda (Donata’s heirs) had the better right to inherit the properties of the deceased spouses. Where the spouse (Donata Ortiz-Briones) was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declaring her (Donata) as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximinoin Special Proceedings, there is no longer basis, as heavily relied on by respondents, to apply Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code.

It is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death on 1 May 1952, by virtue of Articles 995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code. Nonetheless, the

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RTChad declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino in its Order, dated 2 October 1952. This Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can only presume that Special Proceedings No. 928-R was fair and regular, which would consequently mean that the CFI complied with the procedural requirements for intestate proceedings such as publication and notice to interested parties.

There is no showing that the said Order had been appealed and had, therefore, long attained finality, which even this Court would be bound to respect. Without doubt, if the action for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession instituted by the heirs of Maximino succeeds, then, it would be a circumvention of the finality of the said RTC (then CFI) Order, dated 2 October 1952.

It is also worthy to note that the heirs of Maximino presented the documents relating to the Special Proceedings naming Donata as sole heir and Administrator of the properties of Maximino, including (2) the Inventory submitted by Donata to the CFI. It goes to show that the heirs of Maximino did have access to the records of the Special Proceedings and if the contents of such Order were truly adverse to them, then it would have been more compelling for the heirs of Maximino to present it before the RTC where Lino filed the Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino.

The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they had waited more than 30 years from Maximinos death before one of them, Lino, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in a Special Proceedings, they waited another four years, before institutingthe Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate of Maximino. The heirs of Maximino put off acting on their rights to the estate of Maximino for so long that when they finally did, attributing fraud to Maximinos wife, Donata, the latter had already passed away, in 1977, and was no longer around to explain and defend herself. The delay of the heirs of Maximino is not without consequence. , In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Orderpresumed to be fairly and regularly issued, hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. (G.R. No. 150175, ErlindaPilapil vs. Heirs of Maximino Briones, March 10, 2006).

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XXII.


Source : Aznar Brothers Realty Co. vs. AyingG.R. No. 144773, May 16, 2005

Contributor : Yray, Rhea

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PROBLEM:

CrisantaMaloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over a parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the issuance of a decree in the name of CrisantaMaloloy-on’s eight children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe, Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war.

The siblings extra-judicially sold the lot however, three siblings, namely, Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon Aying did not participate in the extra-judicial partition. After the partition the lot was sold. 29 years after, the Roberta, Emiliano and Simeon filed a case for the ejectment of the present occupants.

Did the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute bind the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate therein?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and binding only as to the heirs who participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate therein, cannot be bound by said document.

Article 1104 of the Civil Code, which states that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, suffice it to say that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only as to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. What was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the shares of the heirs who executed the subject document.

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XXIII.


Source : Testate of the Late Alipio Abada vs. AbajaG.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005

Contributor : Macatangay, Maria Theresa

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PROBLEM:

Enrique died on June 21, 1999, leaving behind his wife, Wendy, and four legitimate children, Richard, Diane Jeanne, Marybeth and Victoria. Before his death, he executed a Last Will and Testament naming Richard as the executor and administrator. Thus, on September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his last will and testament before the RTC of Manila. Marybeth filed an opposition, joined by Victoria, alleging that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure on Enrique by Richard. After compliance with the jurisdictional requisites, Richard presented the attesting witnesses, Reynaldo, Romulo, and Ana Marie as well as the notary public who notarised the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco. They attested to the fact that Enrique signed the will on each and every page and they read the same in the latter’s presence and of one another. Perfecto testified that Enrique had been his client for 20 years, and consulted him in the preparation of the will. He prepared it in accordance with the latter’s wishes. It was Ana Maria who prepared the drafts and revisions of the will before the final copy was made.In a Decision rendered on August 26, 2005, the RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code, requiring a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages upon which the will is written.It noted that while the attestation clause stated that the will “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written”, hence eight (8) pages, the actual number of pages was only seven (7).The will thus failed to comply with the formalities of law.Richard, relying inArticle 809 of the Civil Code,which requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Art 805,appealed the RTC decision to the CA.

Which argument, between the RTC and Richard, was correct? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The RTC was correct.

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1While Article 809 of the Civil Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Art. 805, the rule applies only if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the document without resorting to evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required.The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT that it “consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

2While Article 809 of the Civil Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Art. 805, the rule applies only if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the document without resorting to evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. In the words of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, regarding the application of Article 809, he said:

x xx The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

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XXIV.


Source : Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001

Contributor : Dacudao, Ron Juko

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PROBLEM:

Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven (11) children. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties. Subsequently, eight (8) of the surviving children filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof. In their effort to preserve the properties, the wife and three of the surviving children moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with. The oppositors claim that the petition is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same family, hence, must comply with Art.222 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035

Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The argument is misplaced. The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

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It must be emphasized that the oppositors are not being sued for any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special jurisdiction of the probate court.

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XXV.


Source : Viado vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000

Contributor : Imperial, Christine

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PROBLEM:

Deceased spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several properties, among them a house and a lot located at Isarog St., La Loma, Quezon City; they had four children: Leah Viado-Jacobs, NiloViado, Rebecca Viado-Non and Delia Viado. Leah Viado Jacobs and NiloViado both died in 1987, with Nilo leaving behind his wife, Alicia and two children, herein respondents. The other two siblings, Rebecca Viado-Non and Delia Viado are the petitioners in this case. Alicia claimed absolute ownership as evidenced by a deed of donation in which the late Julian Viado donated his conjugal share of the property to Alicia’s deceased husband. There was also a deed of extrajudicial settlement where Rebecca Viado-Non and the late Leah Viado (without Delia Viado’s participation) waived their rights and interests over their share of the property inherited from their mother Virginia. Thus, the property was titled in the name of the heirs of NiloViado.

a) Was the exclusion of Delia Viado in the extrajudicial settlement partakes of a preterition?

b) What is the concept ofpreterition?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) YES. The exclusion of Delia Viado has the effect of preterition.This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on the new life.Art 1104 provides the remedy: where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.

b) The concept of preterition is under Article 854 of the NCC is characterized by the following:

1. There must be an omission of one, some or all of the heir/s in the will

40

2. The omission must be that of a COMPULSORY HEIR 3. Compulsory heir omitted must be of the DIRECT LINE4. The omitted compulsory heir must be LIVING at the time of testator’s death or must at least have been CONCEIVED before the testator’s death

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XXVI.


Source : Dela Merced vs. Dela MercedG.R. No. 126707, February 25, 1999

Contributor : Repaso, Jurdelyn

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PROBLEM:

Gina died intestate without issue, leaving Eight Million Pesos. She was survived by her sister, Karen, and her nephew, Alex, the only son of her only other sibling and brother who predeceased Gina. A year later, Karen died, survived by his husband, Alden, and one (1) illegitimate child, Alberto. Alden and Alex executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Gina. Alberto contested the validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate on the ground of his exclusion. He claimed a right to a portion of the estate of Gina on the ground of his illegitimate filiation to Karen. Alden moved to dismiss the complaint of Alberto asserting as basis, Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which bars illegitimate children from claiming ab intestato inheritance rights to the estate of the legitimate relatives of their parents. Is Alden correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Alden is incorrect. Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case. The case at bar is one where an illegitimate child inherits from his father the latter’s share in or portion of what the latter already inherited from her deceased sister Gina. Article 777 of the New Civil Code governs. It provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. An illegitimate child, as an heir of his late mother, has a right to the undivided share of his mother from the estate of his mother’s sister who had predeceased her. Since Gina died ahead of Karen, the latter inherited a portion of the former’s estate as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Karen died, her heirs namely: her husband; legitimate children; and Alberto, an illegitimate son, inherited Karen’s share in Gina’s estate. Alberto does not claim to be Gina’s heir by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of Karen, in the latter’s share in Gina’s estate. Hence, Alden is incorrect.

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Action that Survives

XXVII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Action that Survives

Source : Cruz vs. CruzG.R. No. 173292, September 1, 2010

Contributor : Logroño, Joseph Alfie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Memoracion owned a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. Later, she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred to Oswaldo through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation. She filed for the reconveyance of the property but during the pendency of the case she died. Oswaldo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death. Will the Motion to Dismiss prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion.

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Attestation Clause

XXVIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Attestation Clause

Source : Azuela vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006

Contributor : Armenion, Ramy

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Grace executed a notarial will and named Rudy as testamentary heir. Rudy filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for probate of the notarial will of Grace. The will consisted of two (2) pages. The first page contained the entire text of the testamentary dispositions and the second page contained the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. The attestation clause or any part of the will failed to state the number of pages used in the will. The petition was opposed by Miriam, who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of Grace. Should the petition for probate of the notarial will be allowed?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The petition for probate of the notarial should be denied. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that the attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. There is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

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Capacity

XXIX.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Capacity

Source : Baltazar vs.LaxaG.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012

Contributor : Ygnacio, Marie Angelee

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Alden Richards is the nephew of Dona Rita Richards. Dona Rita was an old spinster when she made her last will and testament. The will bequeaths all her properties to respondent Richards and his wife Yaya Dub and their children. A week after executing the same, she went to the States and there she lived with her nephew Alden and his family until her death. Four years after her death, Alden filed for the Probate of the Will and for the Issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor. Petitioner Frankie Arenolli opposed by arguing that the properties subject of Dona Rita’s Will belong to Francisco Arenolli, his predecessor-in-interest. Frankie presented his niece Francesca who for some time lived with Dona Rita. Francesca testified that Dona Rita was forgetful. Alden, on the other hand, presented DoktoraIza Dora Santibanez, one of the instrumental witnesses of the Will and also the daughter of the Judge ZoroSantibanez who stood as the notary public. The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Francesca and concluded that at the time Dona Rita signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. Is the trial court correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the trial court is not correct. Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

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It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Francesca pertaining to Dona Rita’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Dona Rita was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, Dra. Santibanez’ testimony is more credible as to the soundness of mind of Dona Rita when the latter went to Judge Santibanez’ house and voluntarily executed the Will.

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XXX.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Capacity

Source : Valmonte vs. ValmonteG.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005

Contributor : Apatan, Rosane

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Mr. Old, Fil-American pensionado is 80 years old. He married Ms. Young who was only 23 years old. A little after two years of wedded bliss, Mr. Old died. Before he died, he executed a notarial last will and testament where he bequeathed all his properties to his wife and named her executrix. All the other formal requirements of a valid will had been complied with. Ms. Sista, the deceased sister assails the validity will by imputing fraud in its execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time made the will. According to her there was fraud as it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life to almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who was thrice her age who happened to be a pensioner. Moreover the time of the execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old therefore he was no longer of sound mind.

Is the fact that the testator is already 83 years make him of unsound hence not capable of making a valid will? What are the requisites in order for a testator to be considered of sound mind?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The fact that the testator is already 83 years does not necessarily make him of unsound mind. According to Article 799 of the Civil Code, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act.

Applying this test to the present case,it must be noted that despite Mr Old’s advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. He knew the character of his act being gratuitous in nature, that his properties will be transferred to his wife at the moment of death. Moreover, the omission

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of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

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Compulsory Heirs

XXXI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Compulsory Heirs

Source : Spouses Tumbokon vs. LegaspiG.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010

Contributor : Sumampong-Espejo, Marietes

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Nicanor sued Apolonia for recovery of possession and ownership over a parcel of land which the former acquired by purchased from Crecenscia. Nicanor presented a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Victor in favour of Crecenscia (wife of Victor’s son) transferring ownership over the land. Victor is the son-in-law of Sespee, who inherited the land when his wife pre-deceased Sespee.

However, Apolonia in her defense states that the sale was void as Crecenscia holds no valid title over the said property. Being the daughter of decedent Sespee in her second marriage, contends that Victor cannot validly transfer the said land as he is not an heir to her mother and she was in actual possession of the said lot as true owner. Nevertheless, Nicanor further contends that he relied on the fact that Victor is the only heir that survived the decedent and no other brother or sister, therefor Victor, automatically is an heir of Sespee and his title over the property is legal, that he can validly dispose the property without infirmity.

If you are the Judge how will you rule the issue?

sWho are the compulsory heirs of a decedent?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

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(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;(3) The widow or widower;(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.

Under art. 887, Victor is not among those who can inherit from the estate of Sespee as he is only a son-in-law of the latter. Suffice it to say, he has no authority to dispose the said property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of Crecenscia. Hence, the contention of Nicanor is bereft of merit. He was not able to establish the right or title of Victor over the land except that he only relied on the fact that upon the death of his wife, daughter of Sespee, Victor became and automatically an heir of the deceased.

If I were the judge to rule on the issue the case should be dismissedwith Victor lacking any just and legal right in the land, the transfer of the land from him to Crecenscia was ineffectual. As a consequence, Crecencia did not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to Nicanor.

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Determination of Heirship

XXXII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Determination of Heirship

Source : Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. RicaforteG.R. No. 198680, July 9, 2013

Contributor : Trias, Parker

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso). In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno's collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent's compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno's son — and hence, his compulsory heir — through the documentary evidence he submitted.

Is the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action proper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

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The rule that the determination of a decedent's lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent's lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of the civil case.

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Devise

XXXIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Devise

Source : Villanueva vs. Spouses BranocoG.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011

Contributor : Jordan, Rebecca

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

On 1965 Rodriguez received a land from Rodrigo through a deed of donation inter vivos. However on 1971 Villanueva bought a parcel of land from Reve who in turn bought it from Rodrigo. Villanueva claims ownership of the land on the ground that the deed made by Rodrigo for Rodriguez was a devise and not a donation thus the subsequent sale of the subject property to him is an implied revocation of the devise. In contrary Rodriguez contends that it was a valid donation inter vivos and not a devise.

The two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and say:

xxxxx………….because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the improvements

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existing thereon, which parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as follows:

xxxx…..It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise.

That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;

That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.

Whether the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate, waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.

The existence of consideration other than the donor’s death, such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter vivos] transfers."

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Disinheritance

XXXIV.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Disinheritance

Source : Ching and Po Wing vs. RodriguezG.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011

Contributor : Bautista, Mel-Lisanina

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

The youngest sibling was accused of murdering his father. The older siblings filed a petition against him to be disinherited. The older siblings did not present any Last Will and Testament executed by their father. Can the youngest sibling be declared disinherited?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the youngest sibling cannot be declared disinherited. Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. While the older siblings sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned.

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Disqualifications of Surviving Spouse

XXXV.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Disqualifications of Surviving Spouse

Source : Spouses Capitle vs. ElbambuenaG.R. No. 169193, November 30, 2006

Contributor : Canasa, John Paul

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

AA died leaving BB (surviving spouse) and CC (daughter in law). AA and DD were friends since childhood. The latter was allowed to occupy in a parcel of land which is now inherited by BB and CC. BB wanted to use the land but DD refuse to vacate the same since AA executed a waiver of right in favor of DD. He argued that BB is disqualified to inherit as heir because the decedent and the latter were separated during the lifetime of her husband. Is the separation during the lifetime of AA by BB a ground to disqualify her as heir.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The separation between AA and BB during the formers lifetime is not a ground to disqualify the latter as heir. It has been held that mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the decedent. The separation during the lifetime of the deceased and BB does not tantamount to disqualification as contemplated in the Civil Code.

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Donation Mortis Causa

XXXVI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Donation Mortis Causa

Source : Maglasang vs. The Heirs of Corazon CabatinganG.R. No. 131953, June 5, 2002

Contributor : Maylon, Ron Stephane

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

AA died leaving BB (surviving spouse) and CC (daughter in law). AA and DD were friends since childhood. The latter was allowed to occupy in a parcel of land which is now inherited by BB and CC. BB wanted to use the land but DD refuse to vacate the same since AA executed a waiver of right in favor of DD. He argued that BB is disqualified to inherit as heir because the decedent and the latter were separated during the lifetime of her husband. Is the separation during the lifetime of AA by BB a ground to disqualify her as heir.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The separation between AA and BB during the formers lifetime is not a ground to disqualify the latter as heir. It has been held that mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the decedent. The separation during the lifetime of the deceased and BB does not tantamount to disqualification as contemplated in the Civil Code.

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Future inheritance

XXXVII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Future inheritance

Source : Ferrer vs. Spouses DiazG.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010

Contributor : Mamao, Arief

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

KatnissvEverdeen sought financial accommodations from Atty. Peeta Mellark which totaled P500,000.00. As she could not practically comply with her obligation, Atty. Peeta Mellark presented to Ms. Everdeen a document denominated as Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) pertaining to a waiver of her hereditary share over her parents' property.

Katniss' parents asserted that Atty. Mellark has no cause of action against them. They claimed that they do not even know him and that they did not execute any SPA in favor of Katniss authorizing her to mortgage for the subject property. Is the waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code.

A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur:

(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

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Hence, adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property.

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Hereditary Succession of Foreigners

XXXVIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Hereditary Succession of Foreigners

Source : Matthews vs. TaylorG.R. No. 164584, June 22, 2009

Contributor : Esmeña, Kimberly Marie

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

Benjamin A. Taylor, a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor, a Filipina. While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot situated at Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter’s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. In 1992, Joselyn as lessor and Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn.Can the court validly annul the Agreement of Lease on the ground that it was entered into by Joselynwithout the consent of her husband?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The court cannot annul the Agreement of Lease. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. Thus, Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated “vendee” in the Deed of Sale of said property, she

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acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

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Holographic Wills; Preterition

XXXIX.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Holographic Wills; Preterition

Source : Seangio vs. ReyesG.R. No. 140371-72, November 27, 2006

Contributor : Andales, Ziazel

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

The marriage of Bruce and Selina bore three children – Alfred, Bane and Blake. When Bruce died, he left a document, to which his heirs, except Alfred purport to be a holographic will. It is quoted, as follows:

Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Bruce Payne, Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfred Payne dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Bane Payne labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfred sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfred ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Talia de Ghul sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.

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At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfred at ng kanyang asawa na mga customer ng Green Earth Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Blake.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfred ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfred at si Alfred Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi.

(signed)Bruce Payne Nilagdaan sa harap namin (signed)Selina K. Payne (signed) Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi (signed) ikatlong saksi

The heirs of Bruce, with the exception of Alfred filed before the RTC a petition for the probate of the purported holographic will of Segundo.

Alfred moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and, thus, does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. Moreover, according to Alfred, granting that the document is a valid holographic will, the succession to Bruce’s properties would still result to intestacy because the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfred, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition.

Is the document executed by Segundo a holographic will? If so, is there preterition?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it is a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

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Bruce’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Bruce himself.

An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfred, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Bruce in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfred.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.

With regard to the issue on preterition, such is not obtaining in the case presented. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, Bruce’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfred.

Also, Bruce did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of the other sons of the petitioners did not operate to institute them as the universal heir.

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Intestate Proceedings

XL.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Intestate Proceedings

Source : Heirs of the Late Spouses Flaviano Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corporation

G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013

Contributor : Tirol, Mark Jason

-xxxx-

PROBLEM:

On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang obtained a credit line from Manila Banking Corporation in the amount of P350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed over seven of their properties located in Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of P209,790.50 and P139,805.83 on October 24, 1975and March 15, 1976, respectively, both of which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. Further, the parties agreed that the said loans would earn interest at 12% per annum (p.a.) and an additional 4% penalty would be charged upon default.

The creditor proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction for the amount of P350,000.00. There, however, remained a deficiency amounting to P 100,000. Can the creditor recover the deficiency?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

Jurisprudence breaks down the rule and explains that the secured creditor has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or

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other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others.

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Intestate Succession

XLI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Intestate Succession

Source : Spouses Peralta vs. Heirs of BernardinaAbalonG.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014

Contributor : Calvo, Mario Dennis

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PROBLEM:

BernardinaAbalon owned a parcel of land in Legazpi City, registered under her name. Mr. FaustoRellama, fraudulently transferred the title to his name and subsequently subdivided and sold separately to Sps. M and to A, B and C. BernardinaAbalon, died without issue and left her siblings Manuelito and Amelia Abalon as forced heirs. During her lifetime, BernardinaAbalon had promised her siblings that she would give them the subject property. A duplicate copy of OCT was delivered to them upon her death. In representative capacity, Heirs of Bernardina filed a case claiming back and annulling the deed of absolute sale of the parcel of land from Rellama and from subsequent buyers before the RTC of Legazpi City. Heirs of Bernardina alleged that they have the possession of such property through their tenant Mr. X and being forced heirs of Bernardina, they have the right over the parcel of land and further alleged that the deed of absolute sale purportedly executed between Bernardina and Rellama was forged and has passes no title. Defendants averred that the plaintiffs are not forced heirs of BernardinaAbalon; hence, they do not have the legal personality to file the action to annul the subject Deed of Sale. Are the defendants correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the respondents are incorrect; her siblings are considered her forced heirs. Under Article 975 of the Civil Code, siblings Mansueto and Amelia Abalon are the legal heirs of Bernardina, the latter having had no issue during her marriage. As such, they succeeded to her estate when she passed away.

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The subject parcel of land is a titled property; thus, acquisitive prescription is not applicable. Upon the death of Bernardina, being her legal heirs, they acquired the subject property by virtue of succession, and not by ordinary acquisitive prescription.

Partition

XLII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Partition

Source : Spouses Marcos vs. Heirs of Isidro BangiG.R. No. 185745, October 15, 2014

Contributor : Solatorio, Carol

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PROBLEM:

When is oral partition effective?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Oral partition is effective when the parties have consummated it by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership of the respective portions set off to each.

An oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

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XLIII.


Source : Casilang, Sr. vs. Casilang-DizonG.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013

Contributor : Regudo, Marion Thursday

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PROBLEM:

The late spouses L and F had five (5) children, namely: S, SS,SSS, X, and B. L died intestate on October 11, 1997 at the age of 83, followed not long after by his wife F on December 25, 1997.

Their son X died on June 11, 2007, survived by his four (4) children, namely: Mario, Angelo, Rosario, and Rodolfo, herein respondents.

The estate of L, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land located in Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 111; (2) Lot No. 222; and (3) Lot No. 333.

On June 2, 2013, the petitioners, counting 4 of the 5 children of Land F, filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages" against the respondents. Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 2007 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by X’s children over Lot No. 333, as well as Tax Declaration (TD) No. 3, and by necessary implication its derivatives, TD No. 313 (for the lot) and TD No. 31313 (for the house), both of which were issued in 2013 in the name of Rosario.

The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all five (5) children of Liborio entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which B was allotted Lot No. 333 as his share; that X never claimed ownership of Lot No. 333, nor took possession of it, because his share was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 111, of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetime;that Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his family’s semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his parents’ old bamboo hut; that he took in and cared for his aged parents in his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of his children has also built a house on the lot.

As RTC judge, decide who the rightful owner of Lot No. 333 is.

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

As RTC judge, I will rule in favor of B. The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction.

B’s ownership and possession of Lot No. 333 is affirmed by virtue of the oral partition of the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. The claim of Rosario that Lot No. 333 was an inheritanceof her father Bis baseless considering that a tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership. The parties’ verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking possession of their respective shares.

A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right. It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of ownership. We have seen that there is no proof that L, or the children of L conveyed Lot No. 333 to X. There is also no proof that X himself declared Lot No. 333 for tax purposes, and even if he or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject property.

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XLIV.


Source : Zaragoza vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 106401, September 29, 2000

Contributor : Patatag, Arnel

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PROBLEM:

Before his death, T, decedent made an inter-vivos partition his properties to his three heirs A,B, and C through a sale without consideration. D, the other heir questioned the partition contending that there was no legal basis since there is no will nor any document that will support the transfer. He likewise demanded against A for the delivery of his share in the inheritance as he was not given any share in the inter-vivos partition because allegedly he was an American citizen at the time, upon whom no valid sale can be made because of the Constitutional ban on sale of land to an alien. Was the partition done during the lifetime of the testator valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061:

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. In the case given, only A was impleaded. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are

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present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.

Probate of a Will Executed by a Foreigner Abroad

XLV.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Probate of a Will Executed by a Foreigner Abroad

Source : In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Ruperta PalagnasG.R. No. 169144, January 26, 2011

Contributor : Parilla, Dave Edaward Velasquez

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PROBLEM:

Grace O. Po, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California in 2010, she designated her sister, Karen O. Po, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

Gabriel O. Po, another brother of Grace, filed a petition for the probate of Grace’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. However, Gina Po, niece of Grace opposed the petition on the ground that Grace’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. She further alleged that a will executed by a foreigner abroad cannot be probated in the Philippines as it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

Is the contention of Gina meritorious?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The contention of Gina is without merit. Philippine laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities

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prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

What is required, is merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.

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Probate of Will

XLVI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Probate of Will

Source : Alejandra Arado Heirs vs. AlcoranG.R. No. 163362, July 8, 2015

Contributor : Jaen, Bea Marie

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PROBLEM:

Anacleto is the illegitimate son of Nicolas. Nicolas died leaving properties to his mother and Anacleto. Because Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina. Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor. Joaquina died leaving properties inherited from Nicolas and her exclusive properties. Anacleto then took over the possession of the said properties. Now, Joaquina’s siblings are claiming ownership over the properties left by Joaquina. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Anacleto is barred by law from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with, Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina. Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child.

When Joaquina died, her hereditary estate included the exclusive properties, as well as her share in the estate of Nicolas. In as much as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, Article 1003 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her entire estate.

The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not

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inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and testamen. Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. The probate of the will is mandatory." Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided.

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XLVII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Probate of Will

Source : Baltazar vs. LaxaG.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012

Contributor : Ocat, Mylene

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PROBLEM:

A, a 78 year old spinster made her last will and testament bequeathing all her properties to her nephew Lorenzo whom she considered as her own son. After A died, Lorenzo filed a petition for probate of the Will of A. However, Antonio opposed alleging that at the time A signed the Will, A no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity. To prove his allegation, Rosie the housemaid was presented in court who testified that A was forgetful because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later. Will the argument of Antonio prosper?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. The burden to prove that the testator was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the one questioning it.

Article 799 of the New Civil Code states that:

“Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.”

Hence, it shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. In the facts given, aside from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to A’s forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that A was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will.

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XLVIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Prohibition against alienation of property

Source : Santiago vs. SantiagoG.R. No. 179859, August 9, 2010

Contributor : Digaum, Lucks Mae

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PROBLEM:

Liam and Margaux married in Manila. During their marriage, they begot six children namely, Ishmael, Kara, Sara, Laura, Lucille, and Antonio. The couple through out the years acquired vast properties one of which is the house they lived in Manila. After living a fruitful life, Liam suddenly got sick and was diagnosed with cancer and died testate in the year 1973. Thereafter, his will was probated. One of the provisions of his will reads as follows:

“Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nagsasaysay sa itaas ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pagalan nila Kara at Lucille hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Manila o kalapit na mga lunsod.”

In 1994, Sara, one of Liam’s daughter filed a case with the RTC for partition of the properties of their father and to sold the house and lot in Manila and divide the proceeds between them on the ground that twenty (20) years have already lapsed. The prohibition should already be lifted and let the partition of the said properties be commenced and be granted. Is the contention of Sara correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it is correct.

Article 870 of the Civil Code provides that the dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void.

In this case, it is clear from Liam’s will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only, and that the property

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be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code.

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Proof of Heirship

XLIX.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Proof of Heirship

Source : Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs.BasbasG.R. No. 188773, September 10, 2014

Contributor : Geli, Cheska Marie

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PROBLEM:

Peter Florick was married to Alicia Florick. They had a child named Zach. During Peter’s lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna otherwise known as Lot No. 39. Sometime in 1995, Zach’s daughter Lisa discovered that John Florick and JesseFlorick were able to secure for themselves Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 over Lot No. 39.Jesse and John claim to be legal heirs of Peter Florick. They claimed that they derived their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of Jason Florick, grandson of the late Peter Florick and that he gave Lot No. 39 to Glenn Florick, their grandfather.

If you were the counsel for Lisa, how would you argue against Jesse and John’s claim over the subject property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

I would argue that they don’t have a right over the subject property because they are not the legal heirs of Peter. They claimed that they derived their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of Jason, an alleged grandson of Peter and that Peter gave Lot No. 39 to Glennhas no basis at all.

Assuming that Glenn, predecessor of Jesse and John, was the son of Peter, then Glenn must have been his illegitimate child , in which case his filiation should be first established before he can claim to be an heir. But this cannot be done anymore, simply because an action for recognition should have been made or brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents. It could not even be applied under the exception of said law as

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no evidence was ever adduced to that effect. The only conclusion, therefore, is that Glenn was neither a legitimate nor an illegitimate son of SeveroBasbas, so that Jesse and John are not the legal heirs of Peter.

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Repudiation of Inheritance

L.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Repudiation of Inheritance

Source : Guy vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006

Contributor : Tohay, Ada Bonita

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PROBLEM:

Mara and Clara, who were represented by their mother Susan, filed a petition for letters of administration. They alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Gorio. Jose (son of Gorio) filed an opposition claiming that their claim had been paid., waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Suan’s Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received., Susan and her minor children (Mara and Calara) discharge the estate of Gorio from any and all liabilities. Is there release and waiver claim made by Susan in behalf of her minor children (Mara and Clara) valid waiver of inheritance?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No.

Under Article 1044 of the Civil Code, any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. Accordingly, repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass thje court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward.

In the given case, release and waiver of claim made by Susan in behalf of her minor children (Mara and Clara) not having been judicially authorized is void and will not bar them from asserting their rights as heirs of Gorio.

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Reserva Troncal

LI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Reserva Troncal

Source : Mendoza vs. Delos SantosG.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013

Contributor : Ramirez, Gemma

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PROBLEM:

Gregoria died intestate and without issue leaving three parcels of land she inherited from her father Exequiel. Her maternal aunt Julia adjudicated to herself all the properties as the sole surviving heir.

Her father’s nieces and nephews filed a Petition against Julia for recovery of possession by reservatroncal alleging that the said properties were part of their grandparent’s properties subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. Julia denies the obligation to reserve the properties as it did not originate from the familial line but were bought by Exequiel.

The trial court granted the Petition. However, the appellate court reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision holding that petitioners failed to establish their grandparent’s ownership over the properties in dispute.Were the petitioners entitled to a reservation of the properties?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. the petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the properties.

The principle of reservatroncal as provided in Art. 891 of the Civil Code of the Phil. as amended provides that the ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or brother or sister is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law

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for the benefit of relatives who are within the 3rd degree and belong to the line from which the said properties came.

Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the property came. Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are not reserves or reservatarios.

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Sale by Heirs

LII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Sale by Heirs

Source : Extraordinary Development Corporation vs. Samson-BicoG.R. No. 191090, October 13, 2014

Contributor : Melicor, Joreyna Mae

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PROBLEM:

A and M begot two children, namely, J and R. During his lifetime, A owned a parcel of land. When A and M died, the property was inherited by J and R. When the latter died, the heirs of J and R became co-heirs of the property.

The heirs of J, without the consent of the heirs of R, executed in favor of ED Corporation a Deed of Absolute Sale and later cause the registration in ED Corporation's name. Was the sale of one heir of the entire property to ED Corporation valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes but valid only to the extent of the heir's undivided one-half share.

The execution by the heirs of J of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with the heirs of R, was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no title or interest to transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the other heirs without the latter’s consent because when there are two or more heirs, the whole estate before it's partition is owned in common by such heirs.

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Sale of Intestate Estate by an Administrator

LIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Sale of Intestate Estate by an Administrator

Source : Silverio, Sr. vs. Silverio, Jr.G.R. Nos. 208828-29, August 13, 2014

Contributor : Baquero, Hope Cesely

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PROBLEM:

The late Beatriz S. Silverio died without leaving a will, survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S. Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter). Subsequently, an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate was filed by Silverio, Sr. The administrator first appointed by the Court was EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the intestate court and in his stead, Silverio, Sr. was appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new administrator ensued between Silverio, Sr. and Silverio, Jr. The intestate court flip-flopped in appointing as administrator of the estate petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr.

Silverio, Sr. filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion to declare the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void. The intestate court rendered the now assailed Orders granting the preliminary injunction against Silverio, Jr., and declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia properties as null and void. The Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and Intsia Property valid. CA explicitly stated in its fallo that it pertained only to the portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by respondent Silverio, Jr., but did not expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Was the sale of the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio valid?

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SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the sale of the Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio was valid. An administrator can validly sell the intestate estate under his administration ONLY by leave of court. While it is true that Silverio Sr. was eventually reinstated as Administrator pursuant to the 2008 decision, the permanent injunction issued by the CA, as explicitly stated in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the 2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of administration to and taking of an oath of administration by Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. The Respondents Ocampo, Citrine and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order in 2006 which remained valid and subsisting insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.

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Successional Right

LIV.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Successional Right

Source : Bunyi vs. FactorG.R. No. 172547, June 30, 2009

Contributor : Bernaldez, Josephus

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PROBLEM:

The 18 hectare land was co-owned by siblings Billy and Mancelita after their father’s death. After the death of BillyFactoran, it was his eldest child, GeneFactoran-Nilabao who took over the administration of the subject property.Gene was married to Robbin. When Gene died, Robbin remarried and this time, the tenant of the property named Jenny. Robbin died while Jenny holds the real property. Mancelita wanted to eject Jenny from the real property. Jenny argued that Mancelita was never in possession of the subject property since the latter never occupied the same. Does Mancelita have the right to eject Jenny?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, according to the Civil Code, the right to the property was vested with Mancelita and her siblings from the moment of the death of their father. After the death of Gene, Mancelita, as one of the surviving co-owners, may be subrogated to the rights of the deceased co-owner, which includes the right to the administration and management of the property.

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LV.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Successional Right

Source : Rioferio vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004

Contributor : Tabada, Ian Rene

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PROBLEM:

Spanky died intestate on May 31, 1995 leaving several personal and real properties in Bohol, Siquijor and Romblon. He is survived by his wife Darla and their three children, namely: Alfalfa, Buckwheat and Porkie. Apart from his family, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour, Amy and their children Butch and Woym. On November 8, 1995, Porkie discovered that Amy and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Deceased Person and Quitclaim involving the property of Spanky in Bohol. In fact, a new Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Amy and her children. This prompted Darla and her children to file a complaint for the Annulment of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Person and the Cancellation of the Certificate of Title against Amy and her children. On their answer, they interposed a defense that Darla and her children are not the real-party-in-interest but instead it is the estate if Spanky in view of the pendency of the administration proceeding.

Are the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the heirs have the legal standing to prosecute the belonging to the deceased. The law provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Furthermore, in several lines of cases the Supreme Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. In this case, there is no dispute that Darla and her three children are the legal heirs and that their rights to the estate of Spanky has been transmitted at the time of his death. Evidently, the necessity of the heirs to seek judicial relief to seek recovery of the property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator. Therefore, the defense of Amy and her children is not tenable.

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Transmission of Successional rights

LVI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Transmission of Successional rights

Source : Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-GarciaG.R. No. 184148, June 9, 2014

Contributor : Lumantas, Jessa Faith

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PROBLEM:

R Santos married K Todre and had 2 children named A and B. When K died, R Santos entered into a second marriage with one L Misa with whom they had 3 children. During the subsistence of this second marriage, Romeo Santos filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land in which he has been occupying since his first marriage with K Todre. Later on, after acquiring title over it, he sold such parcel of land to one of his children on his second marriage. A and B Santos, asserted their ownership over such parcel of land and assailed the validity of the sale on the ground that there was a failure to obtain their consent, being co-owners of the same. Does A and B Santos co-own the said parcel of land with their father being heirs of the spouses in the first marriage?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, R Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.

In the said problem, R Santos was issued a free patent over such land after he applied and proved that he possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required by law for free patent. Although, he may have been issued with the free patent only after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject property ipso jure became his private property and formed part of his exclusive property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Thus, in this case, it is only

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upon the death of R Santos that his heirs will acquire their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate.

As of the moment, being the sole and exclusive owner, R Santos had the right to convey his property.

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LVII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Transmission of Successional Rights

Source : Ining vs. VegaG.R. No. 174727, August 12, 2013

Contributor : Maico, Ma. Noelle A.

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PROBLEM:

Adam Amping, married to Ava, is the owner of a 5,000-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Antique. The couple died without issue. Adam was survived by his brothers, Adonis and Apollo, who are now both deceased. Adonis was survived by his daughter, Aphrodite. Apollo, in turn, was survived by his children, Athena and Atlas.

Acting on the claim that one-half of the subject property belonged toher as Adonis’ surviving heir, Aphrodite filed for partition, recovery of ownershipand possession, with damages, against Apollo’s heirs. Is the claim of Aphrodite correct?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, Aphrodite’s claim is correct.

Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the successionare transmitted from the moment of death.Since Adam died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Adonis and Apollo, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Adonis’ and Apollo’s heirs became entitled to the property upon the brothers’ passing. Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Adonis and Apollo, Aphrodite, Athena and Atlas became co-owners thereof.

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Trusteeship on the Estate

LVIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Trusteeship on the Estate

Source : Hilarion, Jr. vs. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña Margarita RodriguezG.R. No. 168660, June 30, 2009

Contributor : Isidro, Dalisay

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PROBLEM:

Considering that under Article 870 of the Law on Succession, wherein the perpetual prohibition to alienate or mortgage the properties of the decedent is declared void, is the creation of a perpetual trust for the administration of the testatrix’s properties and the income accruing there from allowed.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Under Article 1013, the allowance for a permanent trust, approved by a court of law, covers property inherited by the State by virtue of intestate succession. The article does not cure a void testamentary provision which did not institute an heir. Accordingly, the article cannot be applied to dispose of herein decedent’s properties.

Article 870 of the New Civil Code, which regards as void any disposition of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than 20 years, was designed "to give more impetus to the socialization of the ownership of property and to prevent the perpetuation of large holdings which give rise to agrarian troubles."

The herein testatrix’s large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife.

Therefore, the trust on the testatrix’s properties must be dissolved after the twenty-year period and this case is remanded to the lower court to determine intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining

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properties, constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet.

Venue for Settlement of Estate

LIX.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Venue for Settlement of Estate

Source : Jao vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 128314, May 29, 2002

Contributor : Gutierrez II, Cedric

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PROBLEM:

Hoyben was born and raised in Surigao del Sur. When he was diagnosed with Diabetes, he moved to his daughter’s (Evelyn) house in Cebu City where he had easy access to medication and hospital. Evelyn was a pharmacist by profession and was knowledgeable in all of Hoyben’s medication.

Hoyben eventually passed away due to complications to Diabetes. Evelyn subsequently instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City over the estate of Hoyben.

Edmund, Evelyn’s brother, moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. Edmund argued that the deceased did not reside in Cebu City during his lifetime but in Surigao del Sur. He argued that Hoyben was a businessman in Surigao del Sur and when Hoyben was diagnosed with Diabetes, he left for Cebu to seek medication until his demise.

Where is the proper venue for the settlement proceeding?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

It should be in Cebu City.

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Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death.

Jurisprudence further provides that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, and the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

In this case, physical presence of the testator is in Cebu City at the time of death and not in Surigao del Sur.

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Venue of Action

LX.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Venue of Action

Source : San Luis vs. San LuisG.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007

Contributor : Cataquis, Jamine Rawen

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PROBLEM:

The former governor of Laguna married thrice before he died. A, had 1st spouse, B, with whom he has 6 children and who predeceased him. Then he married again, to C, an American citizen who divorced him before the Hawaiian courts, with whom he had a son, Tobias, and then he remarried again. He died married to his 3rd wife, D to whom he resided with in Alabang. When A died, D filed for Dissolution Of Conjugal Partnership Assets and Settlement Of A's Estate, filing for a letter of administration before RTC Makati. However, his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law and that Venue improperly laid. It should have been filed in Laguna, where the decedent is domiciled and where he is duly elected, and not in Makati. The RTC ruled dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, A was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with A was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. However, it was reversed by the CA. Is the venue improperly laid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

YES. The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases. There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of

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Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

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LXI.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Wills

Source : Umengan vs. Heirs of RosendoLasamCA-G.R. SP No. 80032, February 16, 2005

Contributor : Legaspo, Marje

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PROBLEM:

Isabel, the deceased, had two sons by her first husband, namely Dom and Rufo. She had another child – Triny by another man. Before Isabel’s death, she executed a last will and testament giving her properties to Dom and Rufo. Dom and Rufo then submitted the will for probate. Triny now questions the authenticity and genuineness of the alleged last will and testament of Isabel as the testator, the witnesses and the notary public did not sign the will. Can there be a valid partition by will of the said properties?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No. Article 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs.

In the case given, the requisites provided in the law are absent. The testator and the witnesses did not sign the will. Moreover, the alleged will was not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and by the witnesses. In other words, the will is void and would have been disallowed if submitted to probate. Consequently, the succession to Isabel’s estate should have been by legal or intestate succession.

Thus, there can be no valid partition by the disputed will.

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Wills Admitted for Probate but Archived

LXII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Wills Admitted for Probate but Archived

Source : Hacbang vs. AloG.R. No. 191031, October 5, 2015

Contributor : Amores, Ernesto Miguel

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PROBLEM:

On 3 April 1980, Stephen Thompson died leaving several properties behind.

Stephen Thompson was survived by his parents, Dell and Sonya Thompson, and his siblings: Kobe Thompson, Lebron Thompson, Harrison Thompson, and Riley Thompson. Petitioner Klay Curry is the grandchild of Kobe while petitioner Seth Thompson is a son of Lebron.

Stephen Thompson left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his properties to his parents and devised the other half to his sister Riley. The decedent specifically identified the specific properties forming part of their inheritance.

On 21 May 1980, the RTC admitted Stephen Thompson's will to probate.

The RTC ordered the proceedings to be archived on 2 November 2000. Consequently, there was no adjudication and distribution of the properties.

The petitioners filed a case arguing that: (1) Stephen Thompson's will did not validly transfer the subject property to Riley Thompson; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity of its intrinsic provisions; (3) that the distribution of the estate should be governed by intestate succession because: (a) the properties were not adjudicated; and (b) the settlement proceedings were archived and dismissed. Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of Stephen Thompson's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest thereto as representatives of their ascendants, the other children of Stephen Thompson's parents.

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Was Stephen Thompson’s will as well as his dispositions therein valid despite the lack of court adjudication and distribution?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, the will is valid.

Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death — not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties.

In the case of HacbangvsBasilio, the Court declared that if the court archived the settlement proceedings and did not declare any of the dispositions in the will invalid, the same remains valid as it is. The admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.

Moreover, in a plethora of cases, our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. Thus, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.

In the case at bar, even though the RTC archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared any of the dispositions in the will invalid. Stephen Thompson was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his compulsory heirs. Stephen Thompson's only compulsory heirs were his parents. Their legitime was one-half of Stephen Thompson's estate. Considering that Stephen Thompson gave his parents half of his estate, then he was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister, Riley Thompson. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.

The RTC's failure to adjudicate the specific properties is irrelevant because Stephen Thompson did not just name his heirs; he also identified the specific properties forming part of their inheritance. The dispositions in the will rendered court adjudication and distribution unnecessary.

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Wills Admitted for Probate but Intrinsically Void

LXIII.

Civil Law Topic : Succession; Wills Admitted for Probate but Intrinsically Void

Source : Dorotheo vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 108581, December 8, 1999

Contributor : De los Santos, Naiza Mae

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PROBLEM:

Ellen died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Her husband Louie died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Louie’s death, a certain Marinette who claims to have taken care of Louie before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter’s last will and testament. In 1981, the court admitted Alejandro’s will to probate. No appeal was made by the children of Louie. Later in 1983, Louie’s children filed a “Motion to Declare The Will Intrinsically Void”. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order which states that Marinette is not the wife of the late Louie, the provisions of the last will and testament of Louie as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Victoria, Josefina and Nilo as the only heirs of the late spouses Louie and Ellen, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government.

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executor still be given effect?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes, it can still be given effect.

It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a

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different motion. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/ dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.

In the case at bar, the court had ruled that the will of Louie was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply.